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Text: The United States Federal Government will [insert plan text here] through the relevant United Nations organizations. The UN is the optimal inter-regional forum for space activities. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2009Towards a UN Space Policy
The principles and practices of a UN Space policy cannot be realized if there is no appropriate and adequate means. At the moment, the UNCOPUOUS as well as other international organizations do not possess sufficient budgets and institutions to implement a UN Space Policy.It

is therefore important to establish credible means for achieving the goals of a UN Space Policy.These means could be achieved if the UN were to: a) Encourage member states to cooperate in the establishment of regional space agencies for developing regional space programmes.Regional space agencies and the regional space programmes are of particular importance because geographically proximate States can develop and share assets to address the same concerns and issues. For instance, they can share a single satellite in geostationary orbit for satellite communications ,
broadcasting and meteorology. It would be highly useful to establish a common regional Space Policy for using the same satellites for common purposes, which would promote regional cooperation and maximize the use of limited resources such as orbital slots.

Furthermore, regional space agencies can provide satellite images which may be shared by the Member States for cooperative security and confidence building measures. The United Nations could also play a role as an inter-regional forum for exchanging views and interests from these regional space agencies.

AND the Net Benefit is UN Credibility
The plan must be implemented internationally to follow up Obama’s NSP. Smith 11-- Space and Technology Policy Group
(February, 2011, Marcia A., Space Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 1, p. 22-23, Science Direct) months national security officials began speaking about how the USA cannot do everything on its own. For example, General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2010: Reality is that we don’t fight alone, we don’t deter alone, we don’t assure alone. Everything is done in partnerships. Everything is in coalitions. We [think we] have to have the only capability; we have to fill every rung on the ladder
Over succeeding with the best capability in the world. We can‘t afford it, nor can we do it. There are other very capable nations out there very willing to

We’ve got to make sure that our strategy is inclusive. You cannot afford to do everything yourself. We are not an island [4]. Thus, a major thrust of the new US policy is working together with like-minded countries in using space and treating space as a global commons for which all are responsible. 2. Implementing the new policy A policy, of course, is just words on paper the real point is how it is implemented. But perception is keyand the Obama policy clearly wants to convey that the USA is willing not only to talk, but to listen, and to find mechanisms for ensuring space sustainability. In a real sense implementation will have to happen on an international basis. If other countries do not agree that space sustainability is a critical need, the USA cannot do it alone. ―Sustainability‖ has become the keyword and while it is not defined in the policy, thatmeans all the stakeholders will have the opportunity to discuss what it is and what is needed to
partner up.

the number of space users was The space security environment has changed dramatically since the 1967 Outer Space tier companies. is that it gives space-faring partners a stake in pursuing responsible behavior and increases their willingness to cooperate in space (or at least lessens the chances of hostile or irresponsible actions in space). rather than undermines.‖ http://www. Geneva. It is now up to the Department of Defense (DoD).cissm. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.afspc. " The National Space Policy: Sustainability and Cooperation in a Congested. This methodology was lost neither by our allies nor our rivals. 22 March 2005. Europe already deserves a lot of credit for its draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.‖8 This represents a subtle but significant shift in policy. the president. Some argue. all nations and peoples—space-faring and space-benefiting— will find their horizons broadened. Moreover. She co-directs the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program] The current rules regulating space activities were originally developed when the technology was new. February. disarmament credibility. Switzerland dated March 2006http://www. that the increased complexity in the space security environment strengthens. and future uncertainty was high. Nancy Gallagher "Approaches to Regulating Weapons in Space" in Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space—Conference Report. further the peaceful use of space. however. the policy specifies that the US endeavors to leverage national security space to ―expand international cooperation‖ in order to ―extend the benefits of space. and decline in the American space industrial base. and enhance collection and partnership in sharing of space-derived information. Competitive.‖ In addition.pdf [Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. that scheme of maneuver has not worked. their knowledge enhanced. led by and in close coordination with the State Department via a whole of government approach. these policies were underwritten by an informal strategy of ―space dominance‖ which called for discouraging and restraining others to our benefit. the case for small. including many international partners I have spoken to. Plan’s unilateral action is perceived as latent space dominance. that our previous policies paid a certain degree of ―lip service‖ to cooperation and were best described as bellicose. in both substance and tone.umd.achieve it. like our last plan. raising questions about which uses of space should now have priority and how they should be protected. A revised version was released at a meeting at the UN in October 2010 [5]. especially second and third and their lives greatly improved. Perception of has started us on the right path with the new NSP by re-energizing international cooperation. and thus converting competitors to collaborators.pdf) Cooperation for contested and competitive domain. Clearly. higher incidents of denied access in space.chief of staff of the Air Force fellow and the director of space policy for the under secretary of defense for policy (Daniel. evidenced by the increasing competition in the domain. 11 . Non-US policy makers may have as much influence on the implementation of these aspects of the policy as their American colleagues.N. and Contested Domain.The NSP also recommits us to cooperate in space: ―The US hereby renews its pledge of cooperation in the belief that with strengthened international collaboration and reinvigorated US leadership. A perceptible result of cooperating in space. . insistence to maintain space dominance erodes U. High Frontier.9 Once again. I will argue. The Bush Administration’s approach amounts to deregulation of military space activities in the expectation that US military power will be able to protect and promote US interests in a more competitive arena. to translate our advantages in space to active leadership of the coalition of responsible space-faring nations.

vulnerable and offered the United States few—if any—advantages over land-. if any. It explicitly prohibits only a few military uses of space—i. data management and miniaturization . 4. however. while preventing the Soviet Union from using space in ways that the United States neither wanted to pursue nor would concede to its rival. the United States worked hard to gain international agreement to a set of formal and informal rules that increased predictability and helped protect those uses of space that it deemed most valuable. including the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty‘s injunction against nuclear explosions in space. nonappropriation. Most military uses of space. helped to stabilize deterrence and should be protected. sea. however. weapons of mass destruction in orbit and military activities on celestial bodies. let alone to reach agreement. 2 The Outer Space Treaty‘s rules were reinforced by a number of other agreements. In practice. about how the existing rules should be applied to the new situation. whereas if the United States exercised restraint the Soviets would reciprocate or take an incremental step that the United States could quickly counter. civilian and commercial users. so the advantage for the United States would be short lived. such as arms control verification and early warning. several developments began complicating efforts to provide predictability and protect peaceful space activities though a mix of general principles. then to a postCold War era without clarity about whether the new strategic principle should be cooperative threat reduction or hegemonic restraint and protective regulation based on equitable rules. Although the superpowers never explicitly outlawed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. This resistance reflects a deep skepticism about arms control’s ability to provide either predictability or protection. 3. The US preference for a mix of formal regulations and informal restraint on space weapons reflected four hard-headed calculations about US security: 1. Finally. and what. 2.e. and the protections for ―national technical means‖ of verification in numerous arms control accords. that all uses of space must be ―in accordance with international law. it has been difficult to have sustained discussions.or air-based systems for most military missions. deregulation and privatization produced a sizeable commercial space industry.1 In the early years of the space age. Space weapons were technologically challenging. the Soviets would follow suit. The use of space went from being monopolized by a small number of governments to being widely accessible through private companies to countries and organizations None of these developments automatically reduces the relevance of the Outer Space Treaty. The United States was more dependent on space than the Soviet Union was. The treaty tacitly legitimates the use of space for surveillance (which the Soviets had denounced as72 espionage until the early 1960s) and is silent about other space-based military support activities. The number of independent capabilities would create destabilizing incentives for preemptive attack. including high resolution remote sensing. Major advances in space-related technologies. The Outer Space Treaty codified the key principles upon which the original space security system was built. It was deliberately written as a foundation document whose basic principles would remain valid and valuable when space was being widely used for a variety of purposes by both state and non-state actors. a few explicit prohibitions and a large amount73 of voluntary restraint. the United States has been especially resistant to negotiations on the topic both in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). If the United States deployed space weapons. They also blurred the distinction between ―benign‖ and ―threatening‖ uses of space. the prohibition on space-based missile defence found in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. precision navigation. but the spending and capabilities gap between the United States and all other countries widened even more. including the Charter of the United Nations‖. that lacked independent space capabilities of their own. agreed operating practices and increased transparency. and a philosophical conviction that deregulation in the military sphere of space activities will free the . The strategic context shifted from stable mutual deterrence to concerns about possible nuclear warfighting. space powers increased significantly. It clearly states. including free access. expensive. equitable benefits and peaceful use. the United States pursued a policy of reciprocal restraint with the Soviet Union and neither superpower made a serious effort to deploy a significant ASAT system or space-based weapons that could strike targets on Earth. increased the importance of space for military. so it had more to lose if attacks on space assets were legitimized. whereas the deployment of space-based weapons and other antisatellite Starting in the late 1970s. Although annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) document near universal diplomatic support for steps to reinforce the Outer Space Treaty and further regulate military uses of space. new rules are needed to balance interests and protect high-priority space activities. The overarching objective of US space policy during the early decades of the Cold War was to develop and legitimate reconnaissance satellites and other military support systems that helped stabilize deterrence.

The United States is the only country currently developing ASATs and other space weapons. and to control other countries‘ access to and use of space. is the ―undisputed home of international arms control efforts. however. but US military planning documents now assert that peace is best protected by unilateral space dominance—i. In effect. orbital slot allocation and space traffic management. Other ―evidence‖ involves no real threat to US satellites (Iraq jammed US military global positioning system receivers. and the jammers were destroyed without space weapons) or unsubstantiated assumptions about dual-use capabilities (i. or risk sliding back. and would also be controversial in the United States if the American public realized that such a radical reorientation of US space security policy was underway.‖ he continued. allegations that a Chinese microsatellite is being developed for solutions.asp?NewsID=37390&Cr=disarmament&Cr1= Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today called on the world’s sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum to overcome its decade-long deadlock and begin substantive work. ―parasitic‖ or ―killer‖ purposes). It also assumes that self-help is the most reliable form of protection. interpreting others very narrowly (the Outer Space Treaty). Unlike most other space-faring countries. Documents such as the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission report argue that the United States must move quickly to develop offensive and defensive space weapons if it wishes to avoid a ―Space Pearl Harbor‖. Ban said in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. it could eventually stimulate threats that do not currently Administration has kept the issue out of the spotlight by quietly reinterpreting ambiguous language in the Clinton-era presidential space directive rather than spelling out its own presidential-level space policy. such as space debris. The most immediate result of the new approach has been to shift US space priorities in ways that favour military uses of space over scientific and commercial ones and that impede international cooperation on a range of space-related issues. The US quest for military space dominance is based on a distorted conception of the security challenges created by the global spread of space capabilities. to attack anything that is deemed dangerous. ―The world’s multilateral disarmament machinery should deliver more and more quickly. 4 This is one reason why the Bush space assets. Credibility of disarmament on the brink now – that’s key to overall UN credibility. . The Bush Administration74 has sought to maximize its freedom of action by withdrawing from some agreements (the ABM Treaty). warning that the very credibility of the United Nations body is at stake.e. to defend all US This approach to space security is fundamentally at odds with the principles and commitments in the Outer Space Treaty. yet would have neither effective legal and diplomatic tools for managing those dangers nor reliable unilateral military protection. ―However.e. The United States still professes its commitment to the peaceful uses of space.‖ and has had a unique role since its inception. January 26th2011 UN News Centre http://www. although other countries are capable of doing likewise should they decide to emulate or offset some of the advantages that the United States military attributes to its space capabilities.‖ Mr. including by producing landmark treaties to promote international security while demonstrating that multilateral collaboration can serve the global and national interest alike. having the ability to see anything in and from space. neither reflect hostile intent nor are75 amenable to military Upon closer examination. Ban noted. ―I call on you to become a first harbinger of hope for 2011 in the field of disarmament… ―The next few years will be critical. and opposing negotiation of any new restriction on military space activities. some anecdotes used to document present dangers turn out to be coordination problems that respond to diplomatic solutions (for example. 3 It is of grave concern to the rest of the world. the Bush Administration is trying to change the facts on the ground in ways that favour expanded US military uses of space while avoiding any serious national or international assessment of the interests at stake. Mr. stressing the need to build on the hard-won momentum of recent years. If the United States continues to expand its militaryspace capabilities and doctrine while resisting international efforts to discuss the limits of legitimately ―peaceful‖ use. one incident of alleged jamming was actually due to an orbital slot allocation dispute that was resolved peacefully). not satellite signals. 5 Most near-term problems. ―We can push forward on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.‖ The Conference on Disarmament.United States to maximize its competitive advantage. the current US administration believes that the global spread of space capabilities translates directly into growing threats against US space assets.

In the area of space-based disaster management. The UN is the best agency through which one should pursue space policy. [NEO Solvency] Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 2009Towards a UN Space Policy http://www. space traffic management. for many years. Esther Brimmer September 7th2011Remarks at the U. Hence we must also pragmatically understand the UN’s role and capacities.pdf Issues of global importance. the focus is on developing capacity to ensure access to and use of space-based solutions during all phases of the disaster.might collapse. the safety of nuclear power sources in outer space. In the area of space debris. and planetary defence from impacts of Near Earth Objects (NEOs) all require a coordinated global response. Although non-binding. neither time nor any consensus would now produce a better new weapons and crises . constraints or help. selfselected few. terrorism. Priorities at the United Nations http://www. but the organization is mentioned frequently simply because it is our most effective and credible tool in dealing with global issues.unvienna. war and climate instability. leadership with U. Within the UN-SPIDER the most useful and representative forum we’ve got. the UN System . these guidelines are widely supported by all leading actors in the space arena. Sustaining America’s Global Leadership: U. such as space-based disaster management. Christopher Spencer 11 [Former Senior Advisor International Organizations. Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. including the risk reduction phase which will contribute to a significant reduction in loss of lives and property.S.N.S. international interest particularly on the Global Satellite Navigations Systems. Our very interdependent world civilization . In any attempt to find and apply globally agreed and acceptable solutions to world problems. Likewise. space debris mitigation. 1-15-11.the Conference’s record of achievement has been overshadowed by inertia t hat has now lasted for more than a decade. utilised space assets to support disaster relief operations. work in the UNCOPUOS has already led to the adoption of a set of UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. plus dangerous instability with no agreed web of rules. prevents disease spread.S. steady progress is being made on the other issues of broad The solutions to such issues can only be found through international cooperation. Moreover. the closest to a GLOBAL 911. the UN has.oosa.state. The very credibility of this body is at risk. GNSS. U.htm . Ban and the UN is the appropriate intergovernmental forum to pursue such solutions. Failure to preserve the UN results in anarchy and the collapse of civilization.‖ Mr. Continued inaction will only endanger its future as a multilateral negotiating forum.with all its faults . GLOBAL ISSUES AND UN RELEVANCE] It is not about the United Nations. Institute of Peace. Its loss would result in unrepresentative dominance by a powerful.

sent to President John Kennedy by my predecessor. Yet there are still some here in Washington intent on forcing a U. leads to rampant disease spread. S. We cannot turn back the clock to a time when the world was simpler and less interconnected. our economy and security is intertwined with that of the rest of the globe.[PHD in IR from Oxford. 2001AIDS AT 20 / An Evolving Epidemic / Scientists fear AIDS' future http://www. one that ignores the role multilateral bodies play in so many of our most pressing challenges. even when they fall within a single country halfway around the world. the impact of climate change will further accelerate across the globe. U. on some very important matters.S. according to some forecasts.S. engagement with the UN has never been more critical or more beneficial to our nation. ―nearly every major issue of American foreign policy will be before the [ ] General Assembly of the United Nations.‖ This was written not last year or the year before. U. and the centrality of multilateral diplomacy to U. interests. our foreign policy – even how we engage multilaterally – has adapted as Terrorism and transnational crime do not respect national borders. most Democratic and Republican Administrations have understood. seemingly unaware of the profoundly altered global landscape. And its principles are as true today as they were then.html Today. Disease: HIV kills immune systems. and important issues will be decided at the United Nations whether or not the United States chooses to be actively engaged. And we know all too well that conflict and instability. global influence by engaging multilaterally. So many of the threats we face are shared by the global community. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. This Administration has strengthened our national security and restored U. In short. But as the world has changed. as well as the threats and challenges that cross-border networks pose for our national security. and their solutions will require global cooperation.Nuclear proliferation endangers the security of us all. Harlan Cleveland. no. by hindering our participation in the UN system. And we cannot dispatch U. Now more than ever. diplomats to the United Nations to pursue our 21st century foreign policy objectives hobbled by a 19th century worldview. but also the Administration‘s approach to the UN. the State Department‘s International Organizations bureau – which I head – drafts a memorandum for the President.S. framing the strategic context and highlighting the most session‘s important debates. about 37 million people are suffering from various stages of HIV-induced immune system problems. it true because we have deliberately decided. In advance of each year‘s General Assembly.Pandemic disease requires no passport to move quickly from one country to another. Twenty years into the future. can unleash these and other dangers. regardless of party. engagement at the United Nations works. To state them plainly: multilateral diplomacy is central to American foreign policy. and multilateral engagement was less essential to core U. The importance to the United States of our engagement at the UN is hardly a new phenomenon. It is against this backdrop that I want to discuss not only the U. I want to share with you today a brief excerpt from a past such memo. foreign policy in the 21st century. retreat from global leadership. We have seen the benefits that globalization can bring for our economy. Newsday May 31. If not checked.S.S. This would be largely true even if we did not want it that way. indeed. Attacks on freedom and universal human rights anywhere stain our collective conscience.aegis. We also know that to respond to these and other threats.S. regardless of nationality. with the AIDS epidemic 20 years old. even though the world and the multilateral system have changed dramatically over the past half-century. the importance and benefits to our nation of multilateral engagement. goals for the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly. It begins by stating that in September. we face our own challenges. It is all the more the United Nations must be the central forum in which to pursue our objectives. Bureau of International Organization Affairs] Here in the United States. the pool of human beings living with AIDS-weakened immune systems .S. that dates to summer 1961.

―The survival of humanity is not preordained…The single biggest threat to man’s continued dominance on the planet is the virus‖ (A Dancing Matrix. are airborne and can simply be breathed in. Mycobactriumavium (a bird form of tuberculosis). for the most part." Bacteria could become increasingly drug resistant. provided they learn the tricks of human-to-human transmission.) Terrorism: Terrorism leads to extinction . Some. Floating pieces of "harmless" genetic material. And that has some biologists worried about the insidious next pathogen that may surface. "Where 10 percent or more of the population is immunocompromised due to HIV just imagine how previously rare opportunistic infections could rapidly evolve to become novel human-to-human pathogens. Several diseases have taken advantage of the immune-compromised AIDS populations.. multidrug. even if HIV comes under control by immunization. 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and foremost authority on emerging viruses. Weiss predicts. They came. "new diseases may roam former HIV land.Killer Germs. Robin Weiss of the WohlVirion Centre at University College in London. It is not going to be a unique event.S. warned in a December 1990 article in Discover magazine: ―It is still not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural. from the steamy jungles of the world. first to the immunodeficient host and eventually to immunocompetent humans. And. the explosion of HIV is occurring at the With age. journal Nature in which he suggested: "Microbes that are poorly adapted for human infection could become well adjusted.could well exceed 200 million.. Joshua Lederberg. Today some five thousand vials of exotic viruses sit.resistant tuberculosis. The result – emerging diseases. deforestation. 132] Then came AIDS…and Ebola and Lassa fever and Marburg and dengue fever. And such events already have occurred with HIV. citing NobelPrize Winner and Leading authority on emerging diseases Joshua Lederberg. of even greater concern. by RobinMarantzHening. Herpes simplex virus. Many are carried by insects and are termed arboviruses(arthropod borne). And changing lifestyles as well as changing environmental conditions are flushing them out. disease passed in contaminated water). global warming are forcing never-before-encountered viruses to suddenly cross the path of humanity. p. taking advantage of such an enormous pool of people with compromised immune systems. could take on lethal forms. Pandemics will be more surprises. both have M. They await the outbreak of diseases that can be ascribed to them. at Yale University – imports from the rain forests. That’s extinction." says Dr. These include cryptosporidiosis (an intestinal same time as societies of the wealthy world are aging. most people's immune systems deteriorate."I can envisage other horror scenarios. vaccine-associated viruses and bacteria. freeze-dried. no doubt. because our fertile imagination does not begin stomach all the tricks that nature can play…‖ According to Lederberg. Degrees from Long Island University. Lush tropical rain forests are ablaze with deadly viruses. Air travel. causing not only unusual ailments in HIVpositive individuals but also communitywide outbreaks. bird viruses and farm animal parasites. Zimmerman and Zimmerman."Such speculation may seem apocryphal. ’96 [Barry and David. as well as microbes and parasites from other animal sources. HHV-8 (a cancer-causing virus). Others. rendering them fatally vulnerable to infections such as the flu."Weiss recently authored a forecast for the British science infection. except for two points: First. which are common now. This could include free-living microbes from the environment . could threaten humanity’s very existence. almost predictable phenomenon. toxoplasmosis.

and energy. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. and North Korea. picture Japan. China. oil. minerals. for access to its grain. Iran. this war will be without winners and losers. South Korea. ―An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security‖. struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food. Envision Pakistan. Pentagon. eyeing Russia. we will all be losers. and arable land. Great Britain. as will Israel. and Germany will all have nuclear weapons capability. With over 200 river basins touching multiple nations. we can expect conflict over access to water for drinking. Commissioned by the U. whose population is already in decline. Or. and natural gas may join Europe. from which no one will emerge victorious. many countries’ needs will exceed their carrying capacity. Weekly political analyst August 26 2004. disease. Japan. The Danube touches twelve nations. With a scarcity of energy supply – and a growing need for access -. with its abundant minerals. existing hydrocarbon supplies are stretched thin. countries including the United States would be likely to better secure their borders.kelber.S. Imagine easternEuropeancountries. and weather-related disasters strike due to the abrupt climate change. Egypt. Europe may act as a unified block – curbing immigration problems between European nations – and allowing for protection against aggressors. energy will become a critical source of power. In this world of warring states. And. Spanish and Portuguese fishermen might fight over fishing rights – leading to conflicts at sea. . 2004 (Peter. This could lead to a third world war. India.htm)IM a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. India. The United States and Canada may become one. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. As cooling drives up demand. CIA consultant and former head of planning at Royal Dutch/Shell Group.pdf) As famine. we can expect alliances of and 4 (Al-Ahram Mohamed. access to shared rivers. tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. Russia. suffering from flooding along its coastal cities and contamination of its fresh water supply. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. In this scenario. which is likely to lead to offensive aggression in order to reclaim balance. water. eying Russia‘s Sakhalin Island oil and gas reserves as an energy source to power desalination plants and energy-intensive agricultural processes. http://www. and energy supply. and this will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security. What would be the consequences of Climate Crises: Climate crises cause global nuclear war – multiple scenarios in every region of the world Schwartz and Randall. and the Amazon runs through seven. and Doug of the California-based Global Business Network. Canada might keep its hydropower—causing energy problems in the US. nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable. North and South Korea may align to create one technically savvy and nuclear-armed entity.ahram. This will create a sense of desperation. http://weekly. irrigation. the Nile runs though nine. andChina – all armed with nuclearweapons – skirmishing at their borders over refugees. simplifying border controls. France. Societies would close in on themselves. Pakistan.

but restricts the sharing of this information on the basis of national security concerns.‖ [italics added] In the context of the section on ―Preventing and Deterring Aggression. this nominal commitment is significant in its own right.S. to cooperation with other states and non-state actors in the space stability. • The most assertive passages of the statement are moderated with community-building intent.5 Also. policy has subsumed commercial and civil interests to national security concerns. U. the U.S.2 U. space policy that is integrated with. ―leadership‖ toward fostering international cooperation. if not already factual. expressed through the tightening of export control restrictions inhibiting a broad range of technology sharing. best practices.S. orbital congestion and coordination among a growing number of space actors — not state-based security threats per se. ―The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and. pursuit of national security space objectives.igc.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=429:the-2011-us-national-space-security-policy-engagement-as-a-work-inprogress&catid=154:disarmament-times-spring-2011&Itemid=2) As is well understood. by other national priorities.S.S.senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. Once again. policy-makers (as noted above) not to expect the strategy states the U.S.‖ and to ―expand provision of safety of flight services to U. space security concerns with new independent capabilities. is best interpreted against this background of the Obama administration‘s turn toward both greater international space cooperation and greater attention that the emphasis on fostering global cooperation on space-related activities is more grounded in deliberate foresight than sailing the prevailing political winds. • The strategy commits to reforming export controls. in this case dominated by military security concerns. Also. commercial and civil engagement was overshadowed by these security concerns. International Organizations. Finally. global aims. indicating an increased prioritization of attention to space policy at higher levels of policy-making. But the improved clarity of vision in the 2010 Space Policy suggests The 2011 National Security Space Strategy.S. UNIQUNESS 1.3 Less broadly noticed was this policy‘s clarity and coherence in articulating a vision for U.1NC: Shell (Full) A.‖ the quid pro quo responses to cooperative gestures. wide range of global policy challenges. transparency and confidence-building measures.S. http://disarm. commercial firms.6 The initial section portraying the strategic environment to which U.S.‖ Greater SSA information sharing has been a key suggestion for fostering international cooperation.S. and its references. For example. ―The 2011 U. ―In particular. To some degree. export controls not only impinges on U. This first-of-its-kind strategic statement culminates a congressionally mandated space posture review.S.S. The U. This background is essential for appreciating how including as explicit near-term goals the expansion of international cooperation on all activities and pursuing international as well as national measures to enhance Particularly notable are the document‘s emphasis on orienting U. • The Department of Defense is directed to ―foster cooperative SSA relationships.S. released February 4. National Space Security Policy: Engagement as a Work in Progress‖. ―freedom of action. and Commercial Firms. include:8 • The strategy presents a full section on ―Partnering with Responsible Nations. work with international institutions to do so. from Iranian nuclear ambitions to global climate change.S. a revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts. i. displaying a symbiosis of alliance-building and collective cooperation not always carefully distinguished. space activities on its own terms. . the Obama administration has pursued a more cooperative disposition across a information sharing on space situational awareness (SSA). certainly inevitable. China‘s 2007 anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision increased awareness of the challenge of space debris and the need for better global a turn toward multilateral cooperation in U. Government agencies. The document is organized around core principles. ―will support development of data standards.S. commercial space actors but also epitomizes the high degree to which U. This policy orientation dismissed multilateral cooperation as impinging on U. rather than derivative of.S.‖7 Specific provisions intended to implement this strategy. and encourage potential adversary restraint.whether or not such concord leads to more formal arms control arrangements in the longer-term. National Space Policy issued in June 2010 has been widely recognized for its cooperative and multilateral tone.S. discussed below).S. subsidiary goals and implementing guidelines that exceed its predecessors in delineating a longer-term direction for U. The 2006 National Space Policy unabashedly proclaimed the U. possesses globally superior SSA capabilities. as new opportunities arise for international collaboration. where appropriate.‖ • The strategy intends to ―encourage responsible behavior in space and lead by the power of example. to space policy in general.‖ throwing weight instead behind a wide range of technology development initiatives founded on the assumption that deployment of weapons in space was. the strategy‘s section on ―Preventing and Deterring Aggression‖ concludes that the U. Obama is pursuing space cooperation – US multilateral leadership is creating a framework against weaponization Huntley. California (Wade. The strategy appears to acknowledge this connection and commit to remedy it.S. intention to maintain a dominant position in space indefinitely.e.‖ This category is not wholly multilateral in the traditional sense. strategy similarly intends to ―support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space‖ as well as ―pursue international partnerships that This emphasis on norm-building and the role of example suggests a near-term endorsement of the development of ―codes of conduct‖ for space activities (such as the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct. security policy must be responsive highlights the growing problems of space debris.‖ a significant observation given the tendency of U.S. and norms of behavior for responsible space operations. the space policies of the Bush administration were decidedly oriented toward military security concerns and independent action. other nations. space policy was subsumed the space policies of the Obama administration are beginning to genuinely break new trails . space policy was to be expected new budget realitiesand unpromising technological developments have scaled back ambitions in some quarters for solving U. The Security Space Strategy features the objective of a ―stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility.. the oppressive impact of current U. Spring.9 Hence. ―will retain the . in its concluding section.‖ along with other measures.S. 11 .4 The policy also was generated and issued far earlier in the tenure of the administration than either of its predecessors. broader U. Disarmament relevant to the preceding observations.‖ As noted above.

Perhaps as strikingas the prevalence of such passages. a principal spacefaring nation. the administration‘s warming toward normative commitments in general — and the EU Code of Conduct in particular — are in part intended to forestall pressure for more formal and binding measures that would definitively cut off the ―hedge‖ of unilateral U. ―will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law. policy toward greater global engagement but also. include ASATs. The Space Review. ―The US can‘t solve this problem alone. stated at the Conference on Disarmament that the administration was nearing a decision on whether the U. a group of 37 Republican senators led by Arizona Senator Jon Kyl issued a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressing concern over a potential multilateral commitment that might limit development and/or deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors and ASAT-defeating systems.‖11 but Mr. indicating that more specific guidelines for military implementation of the strategy remain to be developed. treaties to which the United States is a party.‖ Regardless of the approach used for space security—code of conduct. he said. and have accordingly generated resistance from Space Treaty have intensified. to some extent this turn in tone is overdetermined by extenuating global circumstances. 10 – editor of the Space Review (Jeff. Schulte. of these channels will be activated in the near term.‖ If the US makes a decision to support the EU Code. LINK 1. Suggesting such limitations. I think will be decisive in determining which. anticipated only a few short years after Donald Rumsfeld‘s notorious warning of a ―space Pearl Harbor.‖10 This section of the strategy does not. which tend to be voluntary as opposed to legally binding. and ongoing debates over the role of U. highlighted the initiative ―as a potential way‖ to promote ―transparency and confidence-building measures. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control. ― There are very few nations in the world that can get everybody—all the key players—together. however. treaty. pledges.12 The strategy did not explicitly endorse this EU initiative.‖ • The concluding and most conflictoriented section of the strategy opens by noting that ―some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide military advantage. http://www.S. space activities. and more importantly. at the February 4 presentation of the strategy. but so is the proliferation of these technologies: ―If Ethiopia can jam a commercial satellite. and what modifications might be required in order to do so. the strategy is still but one step on a long road. IF NONE EXISTS. highlighting those elements expressing consistency with the 2010 National Space Policy‘s bend toward fostering greater international collaboration.S.S.‖ and endorsed maintaining the goal of U. a step toward greater long-term coherence in thinking concerning the core goals of U. unarticulated in the document. 2.S. is the absence of expressed intention — even couched in hedging language — to sustain or expand the kind of independent space-based military capabilities that were the centerpiece of the prior administration‘s aims (if not its accomplishments). US leadership will bring others on board Foust.14 Critics also decried the strategy‘s emphasis on ―the old fallacious assumption that the power of example will prevent adversaries from doing the United States harm.‖ A week earlier. if any.S. Again. 12/20.S. the strategy asserts that the U.13 As U. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory Schulte explained at the strategy‘s rollout that China is a principal concern in this regard. or something else—experts say the US role will be critical. debates over its provisions and its relationship to the Outer These policy movements toward multilateral engagement and commitment to behavioral standards (even if non-binding) mark a sharp departure from the stiff resistance to curtailing U. call for maintaining options to develop complementary space conflict capabilities.‖ but immediately adds that the U. said that US leadership could be demonstrated by helping bring other ―like-minded‖ countries to the table to agree upon a code of conduct or similar concepts. ―I think that is something that you would see the United States doing: getting everybody to sit down at the table together. ―Securing space security‖. Verification and Compliance. In sum. interest in the Code of Conduct has increased. ground-based directed energy weapons and satellite transmission jamming. in his earlier Stimson Center comments. Prior to the release of the National Security Space Strategy.17 But if this reading is sound. ―That‘s going to be the challenge in the coming year: how do you make this happen?‖ he said. USE DANT> . weapons development options. Even supporters of the general directions of the strategy noted its more-than-expected breadth of thought. would sign on to the code. Rose Gottemoeller.‖15 In fact. debate may have shifted toward greater international cooperation. should deterrence fail. But one must still be struck by the degree to which developments such as the Chinese ASAT test have not ignited the kind of response one might have The most immediate significance of the NationalSecuritySpaceStrategy is likely the signals its sends concerning U. space policy vis-à-vis broader national security interests will insure that road is bumpy. however.16 The balance of U.‖ Meyer said.right and capabilities to respond in self-defense.‖ Counterspace capabilities.S.‖ Grego said. <INSERT CASE SPECIFIC LINK.18 Many devils may lurk in these details. ―The position of the US. and the inherent right of self defense. ―freedom of action‖ in the previous administration.S.S. She said the new national space policy ―shows an encouraging awareness‖ of the issues of space security. but it can and should take the lead. ―It needs either to initiate these efforts or to respond constructively to others‘ initiatives so that progress can be made. retention of a ―dominant position in military and intelligence space capabilities. the National Security Space Strategy appears to mark not only a swing in U.‖ and identifies ―resilience‖ and ―space protection‖ as the key criteria.‖ Rose. congressional opponents on just those terms. but it needs to follow through with specific measures.S. Schulte acknowledged that the classified version of the strategy is only four pages longer than the released version. you have to worry what others can do. policy toward the recently revised European Union Code of Conduct. but the terms of the debate remain the same. The preceding survey of elements of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy is deliberately selective. ―must be prepared to ‗fight through‘ a degraded environment. Rather.

mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110224-052. if both parties choose to cease cooperating simultaneously. A perceptible result of cooperating in space. Moreover. ―The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration‖.9 Once again. February. In general. canceling a program becomes inconsistent with political sustainability as long as the utility cost associated with the loss of diplomatic benefits and the negative effects on reputation of terminating an international agreement is larger in magnitude than the utility cost that must be paid to maintain the system. and Contested Domain. international cooperation does provide a rationale for sustaining the pro-gram. D. even when the immediate cost may seem to call for terminating it.‖ http://www.A. " The National Space Policy: Sustainability and Cooperation in a Congested. the integration of Russia into the ISS program may well have saved the program from cancellation (consider that the year before Russia was introduced as a partner.pdf) International cooperation is valuable to a given nation in that it tends to increase political sustainability. because there would be no unilateral actor to whom one could assign blame. and their lives greatly improved. further the peaceful use of space. http://csis. Furthermore. in both substance and tone. As such. it is to be expected. The corollary to this is that there is a high cost to be paid by any nation that chooses to unilaterally withdraw from an existing cooperative any unilateral action sends a signal that the actor is an unpredictable and therefore an unreliable and possibly disrespectful partner. This cost comes in the form of damage to the departing nation‘s reputation or credibility. in a diplomatic sense. Unilateral action alienates allies and shatters other areas of cooperation Sabathieret. High Frontier. Broniatowski. Nevertheless. many of the negative reputation effects. al 6— senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program and former senior fellow and director of CSIS space initiative (September 18. the possibility of future beneficial cooperation would be more likely.chief of staff of the Air Force fellow and the director of space policy for the under secretary of defense for policy (Daniel. because each party might outline a set of grievances and conditions for the termination of cooperation. Some argue. and decline in the American space industrial base. the diplomatic utility cost of terminating this cooperation is large. The diplomatic utility of maintaining this cooperation is often not recognized. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indeed. the advent of cooperation is a significant event. On the other hand. that our previous policies paid a certain degree of ―lip service‖ to cooperation and were best described as a program is made safer from cancellation to the extent that Congress and the administration are not willing to break international agreements. that scheme of maneuver has not worked. 2oo6 . to translate our advantages in space to active leadership of the coalition of responsible space-faring nations.pdf) Cooperation for contested and competitive domain. Clearly. has started us on the right path with the new NSP by re-energizing international cooperation. If cooperation has never occurred (as is the case be-tween China and the United States). there is a long-term benefit to maintaining cooperation. Sabathier. including many international partners I have spoken to. because canceling the program would result in a net loss in utility. if cooperation is the norm (as is the case between Canada and the United States). This tends to sabotage the possibility of future cooperation .‖ Such a mutual decision would be significantly more tenable. is that it gives space-faring partners a stake in pursuing responsible behavior and increases their willingness to cooperate in space (or at least lessens the chances of hostile or irresponsible actions in space). If it were necessary to cease cooperation. State Department via a whole of government approach. It is now up to the Department of Defense (DoD). G. there would be a ―mutual divorce. the ISS was saved by one vote in Congress).Vincent G. especially second and third tier Indeed. and enhance collection and partnership in sharing of space-derived information. because it would alienate a key ally. Within the United States.‖8 This represents a subtle but significant shift in policy. Ryan Faith. since the agreement would be termi-nated in a spirit of mutual understanding. IMPACTS . evidenced by the increasing competition in the domain. a mutual choice to do so would likely mitigate endeavor.The perception of pursuing space dominance will destroy the commitment to the new Obama National Space Policy Dant. this would mitigate the negative-reputation effect—rather.The NSP also recommits us to cooperate in space: ―The US hereby renews its pledge of cooperation in the belief that with strengthened international collaboration and reinvigorated US leadership. their knowledge enhanced. Once cooperation has commenced. these policies were underwritten by an informal strategy of ―space dominance‖ which called for discouraging and restraining others to our benefit.afspc. led by and in close coordination with the addition. all nations and peoples—space-faring and space-benefiting— will find their horizons broadened. the president. 11 . C. and thus converting competitors to collaborators. In the case of the ISS.‖ In the policy specifies that the US endeavors to leverage national security space to ―expand international cooperation‖ in order to ―extend the benefits of space. 2. higher incidents of denied access in space. Competitive. likely delivering a lot of diplomatic utility. This methodology was lost neither by our allies nor our rivals.

and no consensus seems to have emerged in official Washington circles about the Chinese intent.‖ or illuminate. before things got even worse. The Starfire system incorporates adaptive optics that narrow the outgoing laser beam and thus increase the density of its power.000 miles. such microsatellites could also ram target satellites or carry explosives or directed-energy payloads such as radiofrequency jamming systems or high-powered microwave emitters. Pentagon budget documents from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 listed antisatellite operations among the goals of the Starfire research. the U. That capability is not required for imagery or tracking. by attenuation as they passed through smoke or clouds. The first two microsatellites in the program. proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U. Because the weather satellite was still operating when it was destroyed. it is the precision maneuverability and guidance technology needed to steer the vehicle into its target. trade journal Defense News. U. In such headlong competition—whether in space or elsewhere—equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Finally.The U. that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so.‖ but it was last demonstrated in 1982 and is probably no longer working. It follows that among the satellites vulnerable to such an attack are the orbital spies. Engineers in both countries have focused on the many problems of building high-power laser systems that could reliably destroy low-flying satellites from the ground. above Earth). spy satellites with a ground-based laser [see lower box on page 83]. The American efforts to build a missile defense system. A 1997 test of the army‘s MIRACL system (for midinfrared advanced chemical laser) showed that satellites designed to collect optical images can be temporarily disrupted—dazzled—by low-power beams. the test was provocative. military and intelligence capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Was Beijing actually trying to ―blind‖ or otherwise damage the satellites? No one knows. for instance.250 miles. The U.000 kilometers. which is developing microsatellites intended to conduct ―autonomous proximity operations‖ around larger satellites. Today such an interceptor would likely be a microsatellite that could be parked in an orbit that would cross the orbits of several of its potential targets. they argue. Again.cfm?id=space-wars-coming-to-the-sky-near-you) Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations. Putin charged. and the former Soviet Union began experimenting with laser-based antisatellite weapons in the 1970s. As for Russia.S. including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system. tested and even declared operational a co-orbital antisatellite system—a maneuverable interceptor with an explosive payload that was launched by missile into an orbit near a target satellite in low Earth orbit. the Chinese operators would have known its exact location at all times.S.000 kilometers. including a test in which a beam was bounced off a mirror mounted on a satellite. instead. ―Space Wars . the device was a smart ―space mine. http://www. Scientific American. high) with a medium-range missile. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a bill backed by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for ―military and national security‖ purposes. as a major spacefaring power that has incorporated Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities.S.Yet despite decades of work. to get there first with firepower.1. Given the current state of research. Just how well China has mastered those techniques is unclear. Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program. may feel compelled to seek -offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. At the same time.sciam. for instance. Yet Russia itself. eight of those countries can reach geostationary orbit (about 36. Perhaps China was simply testing how well its network of low-power laser-ranging stations could track American orbital observation platforms.Ground-Based LasersThe test of China‘s direct-ascent antisatellite device came on the heels of press reports in September 2006 that the Chinese had also managed to ―paint. will be necessary not only to defend U. and even then the range and effectiveness of the beams would be severely limited by dispersion. but that language was removed from budget documents in fiscal year 2008 after Congress made inquiries. and by the difficulty of keeping the beams on-target long enough to do damage. Such systems could be guided by ―adaptive optics‖: deformable mirrors that can continuously compensate for atmospheric distortions. hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons. Not all satellites have to be electronically ―fried‖ to be put out of commission.S. quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kineticenergy (nonexplosive. Hit-to-Kill InterceptorsAccording to assessments by U.S.S. in the wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscow‘s stance against the weaponization of space.In 2005 the air force described a program that would provide ―localized‖ space ―situational awareness‖ and ―anomaly . the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. or 22. Even if the major powers did achieve stability. the XSS-10 and XSS-11.S. he refused to criticize Beijing‘s actions and blamed the U. Like India. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other. or 60 to 1.Coming to the Sky Near You?‖. It could then be activated on command during a close encounter. in the distant void. might join such a space race. further suggesting that Starfire could be used as a weapon. If India goes down that path. there would be strong temptation to strike first. Though ostensibly intended to inspect larger satellites.During the cold war the Soviet Union developed. which is dedicated to research on military laser and microwave systems. One example that demonstrates the potential is the air force‘s experimental satellite series (XSS) project. An air force planning document. Antisatellite and satellites into its national security structure. About a dozen nations and consortia can reach low Earth orbit (between roughly 100 and 2. battle-ready versions of directed-energy weapons still seem far away. In effect. were launched in 2003 and 2005. Even Japan. would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space. officials as well as by independent experts.S. Air force budget documents show that the XSS effort is tied to a program called Advanced Weapons Technology. and the increasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were prompting China‘s moves. conducted several laser experiments from Hawaii. space-based the Chinese probably destroyed their weather satellite with a kinetic-energy vehicle boosted by a two-stage medium-range ballistic missile. a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. first strike incentives and global war Hitchens.During the development of the SDI. But tremendous amounts of energy would be needed to feed high-power lasers. even those dates seem optimistic. Ironically. the third major Asian power. India. After all. launching such direct-ascent antisatellite weapons is one of the simplest ways to take out a satellite.the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike. Laser experiments continue at the Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. Technologically. February. 8 – president of the Center for Defense Information (Theresa. its archrival Pakistan will probably follow suit. though. Multilateral cooperation against weaponization is vital to preventing miscalculation.Co-orbital SatellitesRecent advances in miniaturized sensors.Even so. before the adversary could catch up. powerful onboard computers and efficient rocket thrusters have made a third kind of antisatellite technology increasingly feasible: the offensive microsatellite.But the real technical hurdle to making a hit-to-kill vehicle is not launch capacity. reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic. including one of China‘s regional rivals. predicted in 2003 that a ground-based weapon able to ―propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to [stun or kill low Earth orbit] satellites‖ could be available between 2015 and 2030.

A ―parasitic satellite‖ would shadow or even attach itself to a target in geostationary orbit.‖ including a ―warning sensor for detection of a direct ascent or co-orbital vehicle. Hence. and the budget line believed to represent it focuses on acquiring ―high value space asset defensive capabilities. Any shooting war in space would raise the specter of a polluted space environment no longer navigable by Earth-orbiting satellites.Some of the congressional sensitivity to the design of the CAV may have arisen from another. Opponents of multilateral space weapons agreements contend that others (particularly China) will sign up but build secret arsenals at the same time. has prohibited any work to place weapons on the CAV.S. meanwhile. come to grips with their strong self-interest in preventing the testing and use of orbital weapons. it would travel through space to strike Earth-bound targets. The options range from treaties that would ban antisatellite and space-based weapons to voluntary measures that would help build transparency and mutual confidence. I remarked earlier on the general instabilities of an arms race.S. the Pentagon‘s Common Aero Vehicle/Hypersonic Technology Vehicle (often called CAV) enters into this discussion because. Thus. Orbital weapons would be mostly autonomous mechanisms. and any suspicious object in orbit would promptly be labeled as such. which would make hiding large weapons problematic. Most other space-capable countries are instead seeking multilateral diplomatic and legal measures. An unpowered but highly maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle. because such treaty violations cannot be detected. thereby greatly increasing launch costs. as well as the technical and financial hurdles that must be The U. Although engineers are making steady progress on the key technologies for the CAV program. while it stretches the economic capacities of the competitors to the breaking point. orbiting the globe in a cloud that lies between about 200 kilometers (125 miles) and 4. A good example is the Biological Weapons Convention. cannot sit idly as potential adversaries gain failure to negotiate such agreements entails real opportunity costs. The nations of Earth must soon decide whether it is possible to sustain the predominantly peaceful human space exploration that has already lasted half a century. They would be just as vulnerable as satellites are to all kinds of outside agents: space debris. has refused to accept anything less. then. nearly vertical flight path would be extremely difficult.000 kilometers (2.S.000 a pound to reach low Earth orbit and between $15. baseball-size and larger. to avoid stoking a potential arms race in space. satellites had to alter course.S.‖Air force planning documents from 2003 envisioned that such a technology would emerge after 2015. Furthermore.Alternatives to Space WarfareGiven the risks of space warfare to national and international security. either. however. An arms race in space may end up compromising the security of all nations. Each rod would be hurled downward from an orbiting spacecraft and guided to its target at tremendous speed. To avoid being damaged by the Chinese space debris.‖ It is clear that such guardian nanosatellites could also serve as offensive weapons if they were maneuvered close to enemy satellites. which would make operational errors and failures likely. two U. But if antisatellite weapons disabled those eyes-in-the-sky.500 miles) above Earth‘s surface. getting into space and operating there is extremely expensive: between $2. including that of the U. The U. projectiles. is holding the U. They argue further that the U. progress on establishing a new multilateral space regime has lagged. The program is dubbed ANGELS (for autonomous nanosatellite guardian for evaluating local space).Finally. Certainly a prohibition on the testing and use (as opposed to the deployment) of the most dangerous class of near-term space weapons—destructive (as opposed to jamming) any party to a treaty would know that all its space launches would be tracked from the ground. Congress recently began funding the project but. electromagnetic signals. Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a treaty to ban space weapons.Both high costs and the laws of physics. each as long as six meters (20 feet) and 30 centimeters (12 inches) across. the Chinese antisatellite test left more than 2. The international outcry that would ensue from such overt treaty violations could deter would-be violators. High orbital velocities make even tiny pieces of space junk dangerous to spacecraft of all kinds. to which I alluded earlier.S. despite continued interest in them. both the vehicle and its space plane mothership are still likely decades off. Each space-based weapon would require replacement every seven to 15 years. According to investigators at the air force. NASA and Celestrak (an independent space-monitoring Web site). the air force proposed some time ago a space-based radio-frequency weapon system.000 and $20.S. The paths of objects in orbit are relatively easy to predict. it would seem only prudent for spacefaring nations to find ways to prevent an arms race in space. the expense of lofting the heavy projectiles into orbit would be exorbitant. And ground stations cannot reliably monitor or track objects smaller than about five centimeters (two inches) across in low Earth orbit (around a meter in geostationary orbit). even natural micrometeoroids.‖ the bundles would be made up of large tungsten rods. Early-warning and spy satellites have traditionally played a crucial role in reducing fears of a surprise nuclear attack.And the list goes on. focus has been to reduce the vulnerability of its satellite fleet and explore alternatives to its dependence on satellite services.000 objects that are a centimeter (half an inch) across and larger were released. For decades air force planners have been thinking about placing weapons in orbit that could strike terrestrial targets. Countries must stalled. The likely alternative would be unacceptable to all. in fact. ―hardened‖ bunkers and caches of weapons of mass destruction.Obstacles to Space WeaponsWhat. space traffic control or a code of responsible conduct for spacefaring nations have remained Space warfare is not inevitable.Proponents of international treaties counter that many advocates of a space weapons ban concede that it will be difficult to construct a fully verifiable treaty—because space technology can be used for both military and civilian ends—effective treaties already exist that do not require strict verification. .000 and $10. And whereas spaceborne resources that could enhance their terrestrial combat capabilities.The Bush administration has adamantly opposed overcome. Shielding space weapons against such threats would also be impractical. but there is a further issue of stability among the nuclear powers. Furthermore.. much more controversial space weapons concept with parallel goals: hypervelocity rod bundles that would be dropped to Earth from orbital platforms. particularly buried. technological challenges and high costs. Farsat. ―would be placed in a ‗storage‘ orbit (perhaps with many microsatellites housed inside) relatively far from its target but ready to be maneuvered in for a kill.The American body politic is deeply divided over the wisdom of making space warfare a part of the national military strategy. the resulting uncertainty and distrust could rapidly lead to catastrophe. the CAV would be deployed from a future hypersonic space plane. Ensuring that the projectiles do not burn up or deform from reentry friction while sustaining a precise. however. And because satellites in low Earth orbit are overhead for only a few minutes at a time. which ―would be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems. challenge their feasibility.000 a pound for geostationary orbit. Calculations indicate that the nonexplosive rods would probably be no more effective than more conventional munitions. keeping one of them constantly in range would require many weapons. has blocked effortsat the United antisatellite systems—would be easily verifiable. like an ICBM. intermediate measures such as voluntary confidence-building. (and other nations) back from a full-bore pursuit of space weapons? The countervailing pressures are threefold: political opposition.‖Finally. But outside experts think that orbital radio-frequency and microwave weapons are technically feasible today and could be deployed in the relatively near future. mostly because shielding is bulky and adds mass. and China‘s provocative actions have highlighted the fact that the world is approaching a crossroads.S. Commonly called ―rods from God. But the recent policy shift in the U. rods from God seem to fall into the realm of science fiction. because earthbound observers can readily detect orbital debris. Perhaps another 150.One of the most serious technological challenges posed by space weapons is the proliferation of space debris.000 pieces of junk. any form of negotiations regarding space weapons. The risks are manifold. a capability that might enable satellites to maneuver out of the way.Space BombersThough not by definition a space weapon. and in-orbit repairs would not be cheap. which was mentioned in an appendix to the [Donald] Rumsfeld Space Commission report in 2001.characterization‖ for friendly host satellites in geostationary orbit. China. swoop down into the atmosphere from orbit and drop conventional bombs on ground targets.Since the mid-1990s.Basing weapons in orbit also presents difficult technical obstacles.

recognized. The increased post– Cold War U. The United States has unparalleled agenda-setting powers. and targeting. but not universally. but the limits of protection will surely pale beside available means of disruption and destruction. the readiness to initiate war and to prevent another nation from shooting as they are decades old. and because most national leaders have long recognized that this would open a Pandora's box that would be difficult to close. the dilemma of the profound vulnerability of essential satellites has been reinforced by another dilemma of the space age: satellites have been linked with the nuclear forces of major powers. usually serve multiple purposes in both military and nonmilitary domains. as well as the ability to dictate the choice of strategy and tactics in space. Defensive if the most indiscriminate means of space warfare are employed. . particularly if other nations make unwise choices and if these choices are then emulated by others. To interfere with the satellites of major powers has meant—and continues to mean—the possible use of nuclear weapons. the U nited States has the most to lose if space were to become a shooting gallery. Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Michael Katz-Hyman. but they are essentially instruments of warfighting.S.ndu. properly inserted into LEO. also Theresa Hitchens." the high seas. The best offense can serve as an effective defense in combat at sea. it is likely to be even more challenging in space. To be sure. First. it surely would have occurred when the United States and the Soviet Union went to extraordinary lengths to compete in so many other realms. Our analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the introduction and repeated flight-testing of dedicated ASAT weapons would greatly subtract from U. Space control is impossible. gravity-bound warfare has proven to be challenging. could destroy a $1 billion satellite. forecasting. and publicly compelling intelligence. Much has changed since the end of the Cold War. 11 – President of the Henry L. but this nostrum does not apply in space. Stimson Center on the Space Security and South Asia Projects (Michael. tests of dedicated ASAT weapons have periodically occurred. countermeasures override deterrence and risk nuclear escalation Krepon et al. The ability of the United States to upon which spacepower depends are extremely vulnerable. A ship damaged in combat can seek safety and repairs at a friendly port. we believe this analogy to be deeply flawed. commercial. And other spacefaring nations. As the preeminent space power. civil. The weaponization of space has not occurred to date and is not inevitable in the future because of strong public resistence to the idea of weapons in space. Research Associate at the Henry L. no nation can expect there to be safe havens in space. Together with the widespread public antipathy to elevating humankind's worst practices into space. We argue that realizing the benefits of spacepower requires acknowledgment of four related and unavoidable dilemmas. they help explain why the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated space weapons have not become commonplace. It takes great hubris to believe that even the world's sole superpower would be able to fulfill the requirements of space control when a $1 bag of marbles. the satellites advanced spacefaring nations can take various steps to reduce satellite vulnerability. Toward a Theory of Space Power: Selected Essays. but not eliminated.2. Instead. on the other hand. where there is less margin for error. have not changed. The first attack against a satellite in crisis or warfare is therefore unlikely to be a stand-alone event. but this principle holds little promise in space since a strong offense in this domain could still be negated by asymmetric means. and at sea. we propose that the United States seek to avoid further flight testing of ASATs while hedging against hostile acts by measures are easier to undertake at sea than in space.The third dilemma of spacepower is that space disruption is far more achievable than space control. but Washington does not have the power to dictate or control the choices of other nations. and targeting information to national command authorities. Indeed. Satellites. February. since warfighting plans in satellites makes the introduction of dedicated space weapons even more hazardous for national and economic security. communications. Vulnerabilities can be mitigated. http://www. A strong offense might constitute the best defense on the ground. especially in low Earth orbit (LEO). If the weaponization of space were inevitable. dictate military strategy and tactics in asymmetric. Even nuclear powers that do not rely on satellites for ballistic missile warning may still rely on them for communications.Second. Stimson Center. and such systems were deployed for short periods during the Cold War. including the linkage of satellites to nuclear deterrence among major powers. since major powers could view attacks on satellites as precursors to attacks on their nuclear forces. If space weapons are deployed and used. and nations may choose different rules of engagement for space warfare and different means of attack once this threshold has been crossed. Nuclear deterrence has long depended on satellites that provide early warning. but the fundamental dilemmas of space control. debris will become a long-lasting hazard to military and nonmilitary satellite operations.pdf) While some have compared space to another "global commons. and lifesaving benefits that satellites provide. spacepower. The fourth overarching dilemma relating to spacepower therefore rests on the realization that hard military power does not ensure space control. since essential satellites remain extremely vulnerable to rudimentary forms of attack. These dilemmas are widely. Space control requires exquisitely correct. placing at greater risk the military. The debris from combat at sea sinks and rarely constitutes a lingering hazard. timely.S. All countries would be victimized if a new precedent is set and satellites are attacked in a crisis or in warfare. Warships provide backup for sea-based commerce. The introduction of dedicated and deployed weapons in space by one nation would be followed by others that feel threatened by such actions. in the air. These capabilities are certainly not difficult to acquire. dependence on Advocates of muscular space control must therefore take refuge in the fallacy of the last move.

multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable.38 Given this unique potential for destruction. since proposed remedies are far more likely to accentuate than reduce satellite vulnerability. 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. Paradoxically. defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force. The United States now enjoys unparalleled benefits from the use of space to advance national and economic security. 37 In inevitable'. risks extinction Mitchell. '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that.S. According to retired Lt.demon. http://www. by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war. et al 1 -Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh (Dr. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations. ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence. this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. According to Perrow. it is not hard to imagine that . Robert M. given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in make sense only in the absence of successful countermoves. explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space. this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. These benefits would be placed at risk if essential zones in space become unusable as a result of warfare. As Perrow explains.S. No. Col. ―Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads‖. Offensive counterforce operations in space do not come to grips with the dilemmas of spacepower. 3. with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. Bowman. conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'. but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result inthe increased likelihood of their use'. 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'. military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. spacepower will be undercut by the use of force in space. However.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. including use of nuclear. 6 July. As Marc tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons.isisuk. capabilities in The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament. you could use the same capability to target something on land'. and/or chemical weapons. given the system characteristics. In theory. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars'. such has analyzed 'complexly interactive. the preservation and growth of U. This analysis leads inexorably to a deeply unsatisfactory and yet inescapable conclusion: Realizing the enormous benefits of spacepower depends on recognizing the limits of power. Spacepower depends on the preservation and growth of U. War is space occurs through miscalculation. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.html) A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence. capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere.36 the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace. Gordon. biological.