David LoVerme

Cold War in the Mediterranean

6 December 2008
Final Paper

Anti-Imperialism, Self-determination and Peace:

The Italian Communist Party’s reaction to the Suez Crisis

 LoVerme 2

Introduction

When General Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in Egypt in 1952 via a military

coup, the government that he established was a dictatorship. Although he did make some

reforms over the next several years, Egypt would remain essentially a dictatorship at the

time of the Suez Crisis in late 1956, which is the period that this paper examines. In

contrast, the Italian Communist Party—Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI—although

founded in 1921, derived its legitimacy, in the public eyes, primarily through its leading

role in the partisan resistance to Mussolini’s fascist government, and later the Nazi

occupation during the Second World War. It is not surprising therefore, that the PCI

initially adopted a negative and critical view of Nasser and the new Egyptian

government. By 1956 and the Suez Crisis however, the party had shifted gears and

assumed a more positive stance.

For the PCI, the Suez Crisis, from the initial nationalization of the Canal through

the Italian Parliamentary and United Nations debates on the subject and ultimately the

tripartite invasion of Egypt, provided an excellent opportunity to articulate this recent

policy shift through its statements, debates, and media coverage of the events, framing

the Crisis as an aggressive imperial act of violence against the national sovereignty of an

independent nation that threatened to obliterate peace in the world. While one should not

doubt the firm convictions of the party and the sympathy of its members for the Egyptian

people, the PCI’s response to Suez was not wholly motivated by reasons of empathy, but

also reflected an attempt by the party to boost its own self-image domestically, and that of

socialism internationally. Through close examination of the statements of the PCI, taken

mostly, though not entirely, from the party’s daily newspaper, L’Unità, this paper will
 LoVerme 3

seek to demonstrate the clear shift in the PCI’s attitude toward Suez, examine the main

tenants of its arguments, and tease out its underlying purposes.

In order to fully understand and appreciate the relationship between the PCI and

Egypt during the Suez Crisis, a basic knowledge of the history of each is necessary. The

Italian Communist party, as mentioned above was founded in 1921, however it spent the

majority of the interwar years underground, as communism was illegal and its adherents

persecuted under Italy’s fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini. After the war, thanks in great

part to the leading role it played in the partisan resistance, the PCI took part in the Italy’s

governing coalition between 1945 and 1947, which drafted a new constitution and

created a parliament based on proportional representation. In April of 1947 however, the

communists were expelled from the government, along with their socialist allies, most

likely as a gesture of goodwill to the Americans to better secure Marshall Plan aid. In the

1948 elections, the PCI lost to the Christian Democrats—Democrazia Cristiana or DC—

the center-right party that enjoyed heavy backing from the Catholic Church and the

American government. The PCI, tied closely to the Soviet Union, thus assumed a strong

oppositional role, which defended the Soviet Union and criticized the West and Italy’s

inclusion therein, especially during the debates about whether or not Italy should join the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a move which the PCI argued vehemently, though

unsuccessfully, against. Thus, it was this strong but isolated opposition party, determined

but very specific in its doctrine and support of Soviet policy, that represented the PCI in

the early to mid 1950s, the period of this project.1

The Suez Crisis, in turn, was the result of tensions between Egypt and the former

imperial powers of Great Britain and France, as well as with Israel. Egypt, a former
1
pp. 1-7
 LoVerme 4

British colony, gained its independence in 1922; although the British maintained military

bases in the country, control of the Suez Canal—an important trade route linking the Red

Sea to the Mediterranean—and a great deal of influence, even if it was often underwritten

by a great deal of tension. The country was a monarchy, governed first by King Faud and

then by his son King Farouk, until the latter was overthrown in a military coup by the

Free Officers Movement. Among these officers was a Colonel Nasser who would soon

become a General and then President, exercising dictatorial rule over Egypt by the end of

1954. At this point, while relations with the West were tense, they still held a somewhat

cooperative character and the current status quo was considered to be “acceptable” by the

West. All of this changed however, with Egyptian-Czech arms deal that provided Soviet

Bloc weapons to Egypt, thus disrupting the status quo and—as scholar Amin Hewdy

argues—sparking the Suez Crisis that would erupt in violence only a year later.2 Owing

to Egypt’s eastward shift, Western powers withdrew aid offers that would have financed

the construction of the Aswan dam, a project intended to disrupt the flow of the Nile in

such a way as to greatly improve irrigation for agriculture. In retaliation to this act,

Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, placing the critical trade route under

Egyptian control and sparking an intense international debate. The Crisis was further

complicated by the execution of a thinly veiled plot of collusion in which Israel attacked

Egypt, and Great Britain and France intervened militarily to “restore the peace,” thereby

regaining control of the Canal zone and thus the operation of the Canal. As the plan

unfolded however, the collusion of the three powers was obvious and the invaders found

2
pp. 162
 LoVerme 5

themselves without the support of either superpower. By the end of November, invading

troops, under pressure from the United Nations, were forced to withdraw.3

The PCI’s early portrayals of Nasser and the mid-1950s shift

In the immediate aftermath of the 1952 coup in Egypt, the PCI condemned the

incident as an attempt to merely replace the current, British-imposed “semi-feudal”

system with the American capitalist model. Thus, as Italian scholar Luca Riccardi argues

in his book Il “problema Israele”, Egypt had simply gone from a British colony to an

American colony in the eyes of the PCI. Riccardi demonstrates this point by citing an

article published in Rinascita, the party’s weekly magazine, which asserts that the

Americans were attempting to create a strata of kulaks, the derogatory Soviet term for

farmers considered to be too enterprising who suffered incredible persecution in the

Soviet Union, especially during the early years of collectivization.4 The PCI thus

considered Egypt to be an ideological enemy and was especially critical of the new

government because of its treatment of Egyptian communists, who were oppressed and

forced underground as communism was outlawed. The PCI simultaneously expressed its

aversion for the Nasser regime and its solidarity with the Egyptian communists by

publishing in early 1955, a critical, unsigned letter in Rinascita, drafted by Egyptian

communists. The authors condemn the government as a “tyrannical regime,” and Nasser

himself as, “a dictator of fascist character in the service of imperialists”.5 Indeed as late

as September of 1956, only about a month before the tripartite invasion, L’Unità

published an article entitled Il Dittatore Nasser, in which it asserts, “Egypt is under the
3
4
pp. 122
5
Translated by the author: il regime tirannico and una dittatura di carattere fascista al servizio
dell’imperialismo.
 LoVerme 6

control of a dictator. The Communist Party is illegal, like in the German Democratic

Republic, like in the Catholic regimes of Spain and Portugal, like in some Latin American

nations over which the ‘democratic’ hegemony of North America is spreading.”6 By this

time however, while the issue of the repression of communists was still unresolved, the

PCI had undergone a considerable shift in its position towards Nasser and Egypt.7

Egypt’s participation in the Bandung Conference—which formally established the

beginnings of the non-aligned and third world solidarity movements—and the Egyptian-

Czech arms deal in 1955, represented a distinct break with the neocolonial image that the

PCI had asserted up to that point. After Bandung, the language of the party became less

openly critical and the arms deal, as Italian scholar Giammarco Santese argues, became

the true turning point in the PCI’s portrayal of Nasser. Instead of being a “brutal dictator”

as before, a March article in L’Unità hailed Nasser as “The Man of the Egyptian national

revolution,” and “A flag…a symbol of a Third World that begins to awaken us to the door

of our house.”8 The PCI began to see Egypt as a major player in the Third World

movement that was threatening to wrest the former colonies from Western control and

thereby present a challenge to the party’s main opponent, the capitalist West.

Likewise, the increased openness to progressive alliances and alternative methods

over overt class warfare, introduced by Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” to the XXth

Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, allowed for alternative

interpretations of the Egyptian government. Even as it decried the oppression of

Egyptian communists, Il Dittatore Nasser, the same article cited above, continues,
6
Original: L’Egitto è sottoposto a una dittatura. Il Partito comunista vi è illegale, come nella
democristiana Repubblica tedesca, come nei cattolicissimi regimi di Spagna e di Portogallo, come in
parecchi stati dell’America latina sui tali si stende la “democratica” egemonia nord-americana.
7
pp. 123
8
Original: L’uomo della rivoluzione nazionale egiziana and una bandiera…simbolo di un Terzo Mondo che
cominciava a destarsi, alle porte di casa nostra. pp. 92
 LoVerme 7

The fight for national independence, despite this, is progressive, is revolutionary,

is necessary because, in its own course, it rises and it develops democratic and
socialist struggles… the general direction is the path of progress, of civilization,
of the elevation of humanity. For this reason, we throw our full support behind
the fight of the Egyptian people and we wish them victory.9

Given the newly acceptable possibility of the existence of multiple roads to socialism, the

PCI chose to present Nasser’s actions as one of them. It praised him for the moves that

fell in line with PCI ideology and dismissed his repressive measures as being the

inevitable results of an oppressive, colonial past. Indeed the PCI’s shift is especially clear

in its reaction to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, which it viewed as a type of

vanguard for the anti-imperialist movement.10 Indeed, often times in its new found

appreciation for Nasser, the PCI was prone to exaggeration, such as in a June 19, article

in L’Unità, in which it quoted Nasser as having declared,

It is my wish that my country assume the form of a cooperative socialist society.

Additionally, I hope that we are able to liberate ourselves from any egotistical
individualism, that instead each person dedicates themselves to the service of the
community.11

While the article did not include the context of the quotation, it is almost certain that

Nasser did not intend for it to mean that Egypt would ever turn to a Soviet-style system,

the interpretation that L’Unità attempts to imply.

The PCI’s shift in its attitude toward Nasser reflects not only a change in its view

of Egypt and other former colonial states, but also a change in its view of itself: its

motives and methods. By emphasizing the revolutionary nature of Egypt’s actions, even

9
Original: La lotta per l’indipendenza nazionale, ciononostante, è progressiva, è rivoluzionaria, è
necessaria perché nel suo corso stesso surgano e si sviluppino le lotte democratiche e socialiste…la linea
generale è la linea di progresso, di civiltà, di elevazione per l’umanità. Perciò diamo tutto il nostro
appoggio alla lotta del popolo egiziano e gli auguriamo vittoria.
10
11
Original: Mi auguro che il mio paese assuma la forma di una società socialista cooperativa. Mi auguro
inoltre che noi stessi possiamo liberarci da qualsiasi individualismo egoista, che ciascuno si dedichi al
servizio della comunità.
 LoVerme 8

as it partook in actions in distinct contrast to traditional communist form, the PCI was

implying the legitimacy of actions that it might undertake domestically to gain power.

The shift allowed for Palmiro Togliatti, the general secretary of the party, to emphasize

his theory of “polycentrism”,12 and to assert that Italy could follow its own path to

socialism, even if such a path did not follow the traditional guidelines of the Soviet

philosophy. This reflected a conscious effort on the part of the PCI to advance a world

system in which it could develop more freely and perhaps even play a leading role, a

motivation that would also underwrite some of the party’s public portrayal of the Crisis

itself.

12
Polycentrism was a theory espoused by Palmiro Togliatti that advocated for multiple centers of
communism, instead of just Moscow. He believed that there could be as many centers as there were
communist parties and that each should be more or less free to follow its own path. He argued that only by
separating themselves from Moscow could many communist parties achieve political success.
 LoVerme 9

Anti-Imperialism and the Right of National Self-Determination

From the international debates through the actual tripartite invasion of Egypt, the

PCI made a point to emphasize the idea of imperial aggression. Since, Israel was not a

historically imperial nation, the PCI downplayed its role in the attacks in favor of a heavy

condemnation of Great Britain and France. Israel was portrayed as either the tool of

western imperialists, or simply left out of communist press coverage.13 Indeed, the party

made this view explicitly clear in an article entitled Aggressione, in the first of an

unprecedented three editions published on October 31, 1956, just over a day after the

Israeli army invasion. The article asserts, “Today’s aggression was conducted by Israel

but it is the work of Great Britain and France, with the Americans conniving or uncertain,

against a young and free nation.”14 Likewise, in an October 30 article entitled “Questions

in London,” L’Unità further demonstrated the obviousness of Britain’s directing role,

citing the lack of surprise in the British response and its seemingly calculated eagerness

to intervene in the strategically important Suez Zone.15 The PCI insisted that this attitude

of aggressive imperialism was retrograde and unacceptable. Indeed, in his report to the

8th Congress of the PCI in December of 1956, Togliatti spoke of “the general crisis of

capitalism” in which old imperial powers see their empires fall despite their best efforts

to keep them oppressed and intact. He asserted further that the United States takes this

decrease in old prestige and transforms it into power, reinforcing their world position.

Ultimately, it is on the antiquated imperialist system that Togliatti places the blame for

the Suez Crisis.16

13
14
Original: L’aggressione di oggi è condotta da Israele ma è opera della Gran Bretagna e della Francia,
conniventi o incerti gli americani, contro una giovane e libera nazione.
15
16
 LoVerme 10

In its coverage of the Suez Crisis, the Italian communist press almost always tied

its condemnations of imperialism to the defense of the right of national self-determination

and the principles of non-intervention. In doing so, it also expressed great admiration and

solidarity for the non-aligned movement. . In an article published on September 21,

entitled Initiative of the Youth for Suez and the development of democratic unity, L’Unità

proclaimed, “The communist youth expresses our active solidarity to all Mediterranean

nations in their fight against imperialist oppression, in the name of the principles of

liberty and national independence that guided the Italian Risorgimento.”17 Togliatti also

emphasized this idea, saying that the Mediterranean could not continue to be “a lake for

the exercises of the English and American fleets,” but rather must return to its old form as

an area of free flowing goods and ideas.18 He thus called for a revitalization of the

Mediterranean and again clarified that, despite differences, the PCI’s solidarity with

Egypt was based on a common imperialist enemy. The PCI’s support for the Third World

movement was also visible in the coverage of UN debates, publishing articles such as “In

London Arab solidarity has won,”19 and “The Shout “Hurrah for our Canal!” accompanies

ships across the strait,” in which the article quotes a dock worker as saying, “The time of

colonialism is finished, finished, finished. The past will not return.”20

During the course of the post-nationalization debates leading up to tripartite

invasion, the legality of the nationalization was the main topic of discussion and one on

which the PCI, not surprisingly, strongly supported the Egyptian side. Indeed, Hewedy

17
The term Risorgimento refers to the unification of Italy, undertaken by the King of Savoy and Giusseppe
Garibaldi in the late 19th Century. Original: I giovani comunisti esprimono la loro attiva solidarità a tutte
le Nazioni del Mediterraneo in lotta contro l’oppressione imperialistica in nome di quei principi di libertà
e di indipendenza nazionale che hanno guidato il Risorgimento.
18
Original: non puo essere un lago per le esercitazione delle flotte inglesi e americane pp. 174
19
20
Original: Il tempo di colonialismo è finito, finito, finito. Il pasato non ritornerò.
 LoVerme 11

asserts that the nationalization was within Egypt’s rights as a sovereign state, that it

complied with UN regulations and the Treaty of Constantinople, and, most notably, that it

found precedent in similar nationalizations undertaken by other nations, including

France.21 The Suez Canal Users Association, the group formed by great powers such as

France and Britain among others, was the main opponent of the legality of the

nationalization, claiming that Egypt could not be trusted with the administration of such

an important route. The PCI however, was understandably skeptical and expressed a

critical stance on the issue in Italian parliament, calling on the DC to clarify their

ambiguous stances. In reference to the Suez Canal Users Association, the PCI insisted

that it must clarify its intention, “If it consists of safeguarding the legitimate commercial

interests of associate powers, no one can take exception; if instead it wants to attempt to

substitute itself for Egypt in the management of the canal, then it is evident that it

proposes to rape Egypt’s Sovereignty.”22 Thus, the PCI was adamant in its rejection of

any actions that would involve an invasion of national sovereignty by any outside force.

Togliatti emphasized this point yet again in parliamentary debate, saying,

Naturally, given how much we regard the interests and the care of those “under-
developed” countries and populations, of whom the minister spoke of in his
conclusions, our opinion is that the first thing to do is not to look to put our hands
—neither with force nor other expedients—on the riches of those countries and
populations handling them.23

21
pp. 165-66
22
Original: Si costituisce per la salvaguardia di leggitimi interessi commerciali delle potenze associate,
nessuno può avere nulla da eccepire; se invece essa vuol tentare di sostituirsi all’Egitto nella gestione del
Canale, allora è evidente che si propone di violare la sovranità egiziana.
23
Original: Naturalmente, per quanto riguarda l’interesse e la cura per i paesi e i popoli “sottosviluppati”,
di cui il ministro ha parlato nelle sue conlusioni, la nostra opinione è che la prima cosa da farsi è di non
cercare di mettere le mani—nè con la forza nè con altri espedienti—sulle ricchezze di cui questi paesi e
popoli dispongo.
 LoVerme 12

Now, more than ever, the PCI was adamant in its insistence on a lack of outside

intervention, (even if this position was complicated by Togliatti’s expressed support for

the Soviet actions in Hungary).24

The shift in the PCI’s attitude and the sudden embrace of Third World

countries, specifically Egypt, with distinctly non-communist and even anti-communist,

forms of government does correspond, not surprisingly, with a similar shift in Soviet

attitudes, enunciated most specifically in Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the XXth Party

Congress. Nonetheless, one should not simply dismiss the PCI’s attitudes as following

step for step the Soviet Union. As a party that gained 22.6% of the vote in the 1953

national elections, the PCI was by far the second largest party in Italy.25 It had and would

continue to grow steadily for the next twenty years, but it was also the target of a great

deal of CIA action because of Italy’s inclusion in the Western sphere of influence. Any

prospect of the communists gaining control of Italy, at least through political means,

would require the country’s ability to practice national self-determination, without any

outside intervention. Thus, the PCI’s emphasis on anti-imperialism, national self-

determination and non-intervention represented a nuanced attempt to redefine the world

system in a way that was favorable for its development. Indeed, in a report to the 8th

Party Conference of the PCI in December of 1956, Togliatti asserted that the world was

shifting and that the new system was more in line with his idea of policentrism, and the

actions of the PCI dating back to Gramsci’s philosophy.26 Likewise, the PCI’s support of

24
Refers to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 that occurred almost contemporaneously with the Suez
Crisis, in which the new Hungarian government, with the support of mass uprisings, attempted to reform
the government and even leave the Warsaw Pact, but the movement was quelled by the violent introduction
of Soviet tanks into Budapest, and the eventual capture and execution of Imre Nagy, the leader of the
government at the time of the uprisings.
25
pp. 2-3
26
pp. 170
 LoVerme 13

the Third World, especially in the Mediterranean region, reflected an attempt to place

Italy in a potentially acceptable, though non-Western, orientation.

Imperial Aggression as a World Threat and the PCI as the Party of Peace

In addition to rejecting Imperialist aggression and intervention as a retrograde

invasion of national sovereignty, the PCI’s press also emphasized the threat that

imperialist aggression posed to peace in the world, and the Communist Party’s resultant

role as protector of that peace. In the first edition of L’Unità published on October 31,

1956, the PCI states,

The peace of the world will be endangered in the next twenty-four hours. Great
Britain and France have decided to invade Egypt and militarily occupy the Suez
Canal zone, using the current conflict between the Egyptians and Israelis as a
pretext.”27

Hours later, in their Appeal, published in the Extraordinary Second Edition, the PCI

proclaims, “The imperialists’ armed intervention to crush the independence of the

Egyptian people contains within itself a grave and immediate threat to the security and

peace of all humanity.”28 Memories of the Second World War still haunted the better part

of the world, and the specter of the atomic bomb hung forebodingly, but in Italy, only a

decade removed from the utter devastation of WWII another world war was especially

terrifying.

27
Original: La pace del mondo potrà essere mesa in pericolo nelle prossime ventiquattr’ore. La Gran
Bretagna e la Francia hanno deciso di invadere l’Egitto e di occupare militarmente la zona del Canale di
Suez, prendendo a pretesto il conflitto in corso fra truppe egiziane e israeliane.
28
Original: L’intervento armato degli imperialisti per schiacciare l’indipendenza del popolo egiziano
contiene una grave immediata minaccia alla sicurezza e alla pace di tutta l’umanità.
 LoVerme 14

29

In parliamentary debates, communist members were particular vocal in their

insistence on resolving the conflict through peaceful means. They viciously attacked

members of the DC for their imperialist sympathies, even though the two parties shared

remarkably similar hopes for the resolution of the crisis. Both sides wanted the issue

resolved by peaceful means and their differences were more ideological than practical.30

While the Christian Democrats supported a peaceful resolution to the conflict, they

insisted on tying themselves to the Atlantic and NATO. The PCI in turn, as discussed

above, looked for peace in the rejection of Atlantic solidarity and in the recognition of

national sovereignty, non-intervention, and Mediterranean solidarity.

As a result of their fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance, many DC members were

hesitant to level criticism against Britain and France for fear of offending their allies,

even if they did disagree with their actions. This gave the PCI the opportunity to paint

the DC, and the Italian nation they controlled, as weak and subservient to the greater

powers of Europe. In an article published October 4, Comrade Pajetta, a communist

29
This map, illustrating the Israeli attack and the areas of the threat of British and French invasion was
published in L'Unità, 31 October 1956.
30
 LoVerme 15

member of parliament, challenged his western sympathizing opponents, claiming, “We

must demand a commitment that will never sacrifice our country for someone else’s

interests.”31 Likewise, in his report to the PCI, Togliatti warned of the dangers of

subscribing to the idea of Atlantic solidarity, reminding his audience that such a concept

would have wanted Italy to join in the armed oppression of Egypt. He decried the

Western philosophy of maintaining peace by specific interventions or calculated actions

such as the rearming of West Germany, claiming that such actions could only serve to

provoke war, as must have resonated quite well with the Italian people.32

The PCI in turn, painted itself as the party of peace, making strong condemnations

of imperialist aggression calling for a peaceful resolution that would allow for continued

harmonious living, on the principles of equality in the world system. The appeal that it

published on October 31 was addressed to “All the party organizations, to communists, to

socialists, to sincere democrats, to union members, and to all friends of peace.” Thus

labeling communism and socialism, (read: the PCI), as “friends of peace.”33 One of the

five actions that the appeal called for was a meeting that would include the major world

powers, as well as the Mediterranean nations, with the goal of “putting an end to the

conflict through joint-action of all the powers that wish to save the peace of the world.”34

Obviously, as a communist initiated program, the PCI would play a major role in such a

meeting and thus solidify its role as the party of peace. The PCI reaffirmed this notion

even more firmly the day after the British and French invasion, responding to the attack

31
Original: Dobbiamo pretendere un impegno che mai verrà sacrificato il nostro paese gli interessi altrui.
32
pp. 179.
33
Original: Ai comunisti, ai socialisti, ai democratici sinceri, agli iscritti ai sindacati, a tutti gli amici della
pace.
34
Original: Porre fine al conflitto con un’azione comune di tutte le potenze che vogliono salvare la pace
del mondo.
 LoVerme 16

by stating, “Today, still more than yesterday, we Italian communists are and must be the

leading and consequent defenders of peace.”35

The PCI’s insistence on peace was often associated with the idea of

Mediterranean solidarity, an idea that must have evoked images of Italy’s past role as

master of the Mediterranean. Building on the idea of Italian advantage in turning away

from the Atlantic in favor of the Mediterranean, Pajetta reminded Italians in an October

4th article that,

Until only a few years ago England was the godfather of Egypt and
practically of the Canal, where with their fleet and their troops they impeded
transit of their enemies, and of the enemies of France during two wars. Today
Egypt is in the hands of the Egyptians, as is the Canal. Why worry now and not
before? Now, indeed, it would be much more difficult, given Egyptian interests,
for Egypt to attempt to block the canal.36

This positioning of the path to peace in a new framework that emphasized Italy as

a Mediterranean power presented a distinct challenge to the bipolar framework of the

Cold War. This was however, exactly the hope of the PCI, which had come to see that

Soviet alignment and class struggle were not viable ways to gain power in Italy. It thus

began to switch gears and paint itself as the party of Mediterranean alignment and peace,

in hopes that this would provide a more viable route to power and influence. Thus, in

presenting itself as the party of peace and attempting to reorient Italy from the war-

mongering Atlantic to the peaceful sea to its south, the PCI sought to boost its own

support within the country, and once again hinted at a revised world system that would

benefit the party and free it from the constraints of Western power.

35
Original: Oggi più ancora che ieri noi comunisti italiani siamo e dobiamo essere i più avanzati e
conseguenti difensori della pace.
36
Original: Fino a pochi anni fa l’Inghilterra era padrone dell’Egitto e practicamente del Canale, dove era
con la flotta e con le truppe: durante due guerre il transito fu impedito ai nemici dell’Inghilterra e della
Francia. Oggi l’Egitto è in mano agli egiziano, e così il Canale. Perché preoccuparsi ore a non prima?
Ora, poi, sarà più difficile, proprio per gli interessi egiziani, che l’Egitto tenti di bloccare il Canale.
 LoVerme 17

Conclusion

Thus, while it is unlikely that Italian communists expected to immediately

overturn the world system and take control of Italy, their response to the Suez Crisis

reflects a concerted, if nuanced, effort to evolve the world system in such a way as to

make possible a PCI rise to power. The party’s shift in attitude towards Egypt reflects an

increased openness to multiple paths to power. It emphasizes the belief that many actions

can be revolutionary, not only class struggle. This then lent legitimacy to the political

route as an acceptable means of carrying on the struggle, a fact crucial to the PCI, which

would continue to make electoral gains over the next twenty years.

Likewise, the party’s emphasis on anti-imperialism and rights of national self-

determination, including non-intervention from outside, reflects yet another attempt by

the PCI to nudge the world system in its favor. While the PCI was condemning British

and French imperialist intervention, a critique of the Americans was also ever-present.

However, in a world system where the right to national self-determination and non-

intervention by outside forces was paramount, the PCI would be able to operate without

having to face American opposition, of both a direct and indirect nature, (even if this

would also preclude the use of significant Soviet aid for the party).

In regards to anti-imperialism and Third World solidarity, the PCI was attempting

to slowly wrest Italy from the Western camp to place it within the Mediterranean instead.

The PCI believed that doing so would help further break down the dominant two-power

system, and thereby move away from the Cold War, which Togliatti asserted—incorrectly

—was coming to an end. His criticism of imperialist aggression asserted that the acts of
 LoVerme 18

country’s like Britain and France, once again taking Israel as a pawn of the West,

represented retrograde attempts to escape the inevitable world tendencies that were

moving away from the destructive Cold War system.37 Such a move could only be

favorable to the PCI, whic, up to this point, had found itself on the wrong side of a

bipolar conflict.

Finally, the PCI’s self-description as the party of peace and emphasis on

Mediterranean solidarity as the compliment of this, in contrast to the war-like Atlantic

Alliance, attempted to appeal to the Italian public by identifying with two very salient

issues. With memories of WWII still fresh, no one in Italy wanted another conflict and

the country also responded well to the idea of a revitalization of Italy’s power and

prominence, both through a leading role in the Mediterranean and also in non-

subservience to the stronger powers of Western Europe.

Thus, while Italy played a relatively small role in the Suez Crisis, the event was

nonetheless, supremely important for the PCI, because it provided the party an

opportunity to express its new positions in a subtle way. The statements and coverage of

the events of the Crisis by PCI members and press contained the underpinnings of a new

world system that would be of great profit to the party itself. While it was a slow

process, the enunciation of ideas and change of party tactics that accompanied the Suez

Crisis, laid the groundwork for the path that the PCI would follow over the next several

years, ultimately resulting in the Italian Eurocommunism movement, which, though in

the end a failure, represents the closest a western communist party has come to governing

a Western sphere country.

37
pp. 174
 LoVerme 19

Bibliography