I

AIL BURMA STUDENTS'

DEMOCRATTC FRONT

ALL

RURMA STIDSI\ITS' DM(OCRATIC FRC]']T (ENSIN)

HE]iD.;UARTERS

EXPLANATORY STATTTdLITT ON
FL,i1

gIIE TilrRI

C0NFEIEIC.E

ALL IIMBERS OF ?HE ABS}F'

999999999999s999q9696q9ss1q99999996696966q996901e9909999999s9969s99ee9es

1. The third conference of the AtsS-lF conmenced on 14 August 1991. Durlng the conference, the process of discussions was much delayed due to heated debates and disagreements among the representatives concerning the political and militarSr pollcies of the ARSIF. The climax of d.isagreements happened in the efection process. Regardi-ng the agenda and. sessions of the conference, ure Ceem i-t necessary to present an explanatory statement for all members of 1i:he AESIF 2. Accord.ing to the financial report submitted to the conference, the tot.a1 amount of the funds during the previous two-year term of the
conference
was

(") more than 5roooroco tsahtt (t) 32.fr, of the total financial income (rvhich amounted to more than 2TOOOTOOO Eaht) was spent on the expenses of lndividua.l members of the central cornnittee and that of the offices; (") only 8.5$ $bJ"ch amounted to only 5C0roo0 Baht) was spent on the armed revolution. ( tfre report itself reveals that the main aim of the ABSDF to overthrovr the military d.i-ctatorship tbrough the armed revolution was not prioritized. but almost neglected by the central committee.) J. The accounting reports of the Financial Department submitted to the
conference are (a) not accountable for scrutiny; (t) ttre accountsare not prepared according to thc basics of simple
accountancy I

(c) tne reports are technically impossible to be approved.

I

(z)

Tin }rlaung Tun, the offlcial auditor of the oentral commi-ttee, stated beforetherepresea{+t'-I?".of,theconferencethattheaccountswere hurried,ly ad.justed. .iq:t"before the commencement of the conference; that he himself had. done tbe adjuitment; and that the accounts were technically unaccountable e*nd, therefore, impossible for inspection' 4,oni.nspectingthecluarterlyfinancialtransactionbyMaung}i,the assistant secretary of the Financial }epartment, the Audit committee found that (r) of the total amount (z+oooo tsaht) of money transaction, only IOOOO Baht was paid to the cam^os rrnd the rest were spentontheexpensesofthecentralcommi.ttee,offices,

(.)

;*L-";:';l:-,.;T,;": X',;::"ll"l"u,ca1
the
rvounded

expenses of
a

stu,lents v.,ho needed money for emergency mdtltcal treatment; antl that on the same date he paid

large amount of

money

to

some

central connnittee

members

with him' actions 5. Tberefore, we had urged the conference to take imnediate against those who were responsible for breach of mles and' mishand'ling of funds. Ilowever, thi-s was unscrupulously lgnored by the so-ca11ed majority 1ed bY Dr. Naing Aung' 6. During the general tliscussion session, Thet Thet Lwin confessed herself to be divergent from the main policy and decisions of the AISDF by attempting tb establish a non-violent group in the revolutionary &I&o This also was not well discussed and- turned" asid'e unscrupulously' rDawn Bulletint, one whole page 7. Similar1yl in an issue of the 1991 strike i-n was flourishly printed with a pictrEe of a refugee on hr:nger front of the Burmese embassy and the caption that he had chosen the non-vi-oIen mean since the armecl revoluti-on could ensue bad consequences. Regarding this we had. d.el-iberately pointed out that the secretary of the lnformation Department had abused the rules and' that it was a d'ownright who had insult to all armed revolutionary organizations and' the comrad-es given up their lives for the democratic cause' to bave' 8. ',If necessary we should compromise with the enemy as a tactic as good image at the international level.tt This was the statement' the Euet Thet Lwin had. confessed Sefore the representatives of conferencer made by herself and Drr Thaung Tun' to the question as 9. The central committee d-id not respontE offlcially to u,hether the BcG had requested to change the armed revolutionary gay of the ABSIF.
who were most acquainted-

(i)
10. During the appeal sessionl Dr. Kxraw Thet oo of Ye-Gyaw campt submitteh a case on so-called appeal for Ko Ko Lay, the one who abscond-ed with d hund.'r.ed-r thousandsworth of Baht for the purchase of arns for the Battallbn (fOZ). Ko Ko Iray was thus trletl and eentenoed to 5-month imprisoriiaent in absentia on the ground's of desertion and misappropriation.Intheprocessofrevi-ewlngtbecase,the 'Khln Maung representatives also discovere'.l the unlawful acts of Ilinrthesecretaryoflnformationlepartmentrlr.iiyawThetoorand' Ko Ko Lay some central committee rnembers. Khin }{aung win helped keep off the 1ega1 procet)r,rings b}, offering financia.l and job assistance' KoKotayrvasholetlupinYeGyawcampwiihthehelpofDr.Kyaw Thet Oo. similarly, some central commitiee memtrers ;;l:usec'1 tlierr: i)ositions and powers by d.isrrrpting the arrest of the sa'id absconrler' Thustbedisnrpti.veandconspirationaleffortsofsomecentral comtittee members were uncovered- tluring the proceedings ' tl4s 11. In ad.tlition to this,, another case of extrajud-icial Eilling brought to 1ight. Despite th.e AtsSIlF ejBstitution that forbids two cag.i-tal punishment at the camp levelr four people includ'ing civiliansweresentencedtodeathbya''gl'rupinclu'iingTtranNaing against of Battal:.on (fOf). Being a crlminal caset we pressed charges ThanNaingand.tbegroup.Ilowevell}r.IrlaingAunSandhisSroup adjuclge'1 by tire broke off the d-isoussion and decid':il the cp'se to be nest cetrt::;1 c.:nrnlttee' ll:2. In thls way the central committee members have repeatedl-y done and- are dov"nr'ight riotions that a.re not compiia.nt with tbe coastitution of the ABSIF' transgresstron of the 1-'o1itlca1 t'nd milltary policies 'be ritxe these at,ies an6. criminal actions nothing coul'J i3. Iespite shameless to take aCtions aga.inst t,]rose who are responsible' In their cfforttomaintainpoweranc.position,theremorselesscentral j-nfluenc'e on the representatives committee members tried- to Frrt rrndue whispering through intimid-ation, money anc. posi-tlon incentives, and" begr:'n' than campaigns agai-nst others. lio sooner had the conference a shadow set up of oentral committee, with Dr. iiainS Aung as the 1'ur0our chairman, carne out to start the rumour. Then the infectious soon rea-c?ied the Eangkok circles ' 14. In such conditions, mere a.d-option of political an'1 military policier; and alone is not adequate. To choose or not to choose a Tue1l organised efficient central cornmittee is of utmost importance and necesiity' !5. Tberefore, on the election day, we proposed that the representation with franchise sh-ould be based. on leadership: norms an,:l that it' should

(a)
be mandatory. However, i)r. Naing Aung, having planned to put undue influence on the maSority.of the representati.ves, refused our proposal. 16. Iue to thls disagf,.dement on the process of election the conference d.ecid.ed. to have a quprum of 1] ( one from each of 1l camps) to seek a compromise soluti-on.

1?. During the discussion process, despite our effort to compromise with open mintledness and toleranee, Dr. Nai.ng Aung stubbonly demanded obedience to the so-ca11ed majority. 18. Dr. Naing Aung and h.is group d-isrupted- the d.iscussion again and forced. the chairoan of the commission for conference to continue the eonferenee through intimidation. Being a responsible person, the chairman of the conmission mad-e clear that thie should be avoided since it was uncor15tLtutional. On this Dr. Nai-ng Aung a.nd the group ordered the chairman of the- conference to get out of the conferoceo 19. At the same time they d-issolved the 1ega1ly forzred commission and reformed an i11ega1 one witb Soe Lin, Myo l[in, and Tun Myat Thu. After putting up the so-ca11ed functional supervisory group, they seized the arms and took holcl of the headquarters. Such conditions sould only oreate d.i'sintagratlon,of the ABSIF in 20. tbe interest of the eneqy. Therefore, the DAB lead.ersrin responee to the appeal of some representatives, offered to nediate in the di.spute.
21-. After thoroughly discussing the process of electing 23 central
committee members before the DAB leaders, the 1l representatives of the camps agreed- to nominate JO cantlid.ates. 22. Tbe lnterest.of the revolutiion and the unlty of the AffiIF ,ria without preference to any form of personal being the main "im attachmentrwe proposed. the nominatj-on of JO canclirlates as well as the following lead.ership norns well accepted by the revolutionary

organizations-

ll

(a) a[egiance to the political military policies and prograllunes of the (b) ered.ibil1ty, (o) self-sacrifice, (d) gooa norality, and ("), itL in managing. "t In tbe. nomination of 3O candid.ates, we sincerely inclucled many candidates who be long to Dr. traing Aungts group. 23. Eoweverl regard.ing our propesal for nomination of the candidatest Dr. Naing Arrngts main aIm (a) to oust Moe Thee Zun, (t) to put up Dr. I{aing Aung as the chai.::man of the ABS}F,
ABSDF,

t
I
I

(l)
(c) to select all 23 candid.ates of Dr. Naing Aungle choice for the the cent'ral:cld*dtit.tqe was clearly revealed as a proven hard fact. 24. I[hereas the insip6erity of Dr. Naing Aung and his group had. become a hindrance to the..'election process, we promised to accept the good-hearted assistance and suggestion of the DAB lead"ers. They also refused. this. 25. Consid.ering the situations both at the national and. internatj"onal levels, Gen. Saw Bo Mya finally suggested the compromise sharing of central committee posts. 213 of all central committee posts to be shared by Dr. Naing Aung and his group on condition that Moe Thee Zun be reelected. as the chai-rman. We aceeptetl this. Bowever, d.ue to the whispering campaigns of Dr. Naing Aung and his group, the situat'ion had.
become worse. urgsd 26.. $lhatever difficulties we had to overcome, weflr. Naing Aung and his group repeated-ly to be more tolerant for find.ing a compromise solution and. avoid.ing d.isintegrat j-on and discred.ition of the ABSIF.

27.

his group, announced. that they had d.ispelletl our (ZZ) representatives from their so-called. conference which was not quorate. Since there was a total of (8f) representatives to the conference, the minimum nr:mber of representatives who had" to be present to make if, valid was (50). Therefore, the act of Ir. Naing Aung and his group was ve,ry unconstitutional . It was sinply mobocracy. '28, Simi-1arly, they also held. an lnva1id electlon and formed a so-ca1led- central committee with Dr. Naing Arrng as its chairman. ry. (a) According to the ABSDF constitution the election of the central comnittee by voting ils not compulsory. (t) fne central committee elected, by voting from the secon& conference had. repeated-ly d.one actions whlcb are not compllanf with the ABSDF constitution and are d.ownright traasgresslons of the main
Then Aung and.

Dr. Naing

political and military policies and programmes of the ABSDF. nn the llght of these hard. facts we have mad.e efforts to establish a well organized. and efficient central committee d"espite lame excuses and. refusals of Dr. Naing Aung and his group. Their attitud.e towards the present situation Lr the ABSDF, in the oplnions of many sinoere people, seem to cause suspicion since they are very i.rratj-onal .

(6)

3O. Presentlyr,se'.afei--ha{1n! a very crltical tine tlue to the yery unlque Bolltisal anil, nllitraly situati.ons and the lnfiltratioa of a brrnob sf en6By apies at tbeoABSDI'ieadquarters in the Kachin state. :''. Tberefore, we cleem tt necessary to establieh a well organized and. efficient cantral cornmlttee to annlbilate the milltary dictatorship without compromlsing through the arued revolution.
'

Central Committee

All hrrma Studentsr Dsnocratic Front

25 october 19991