Controversy surrounding prisoners voting rights exposes a deeper lack of understanding of, and commitment to, human rights

law in England and Wales. Discuss. Introduction Briefly, what is the controversy surrounding prisoners voting rights? No more than two or three sentences. What are the arguments for the motion - that the controversy has exposed a deeper lack of understanding of, and commitment to, human rights law in England and Wales? Your position with respect to the question and your reasons for reaching that position.

Main body

The controversy surrounding prisoners voting rights explained in more detail. Arguments for and against the motion that the controversy has exposed a deeper lack of understanding of, and commitment to, human rights law in England and Wales? And your evaluation of those arguments

Conclusion Re-state your thesis and summarise what you have said in the main body.

The government of United Kingdom is set to allow prisoners to vote but it wants the right limited to those sentenced to a year or less. In 1983 the Representation of the People Act placed a blanket ban on prisoner voting. This act continues a ban that dates back to the Forfeiture Act of 1870. This essay will look at why prisoners should be allowed to vote and apply the argument to Article 3 of the first protocol. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of Hirst v UK not allowing prisoners to vote infringes their human rights. The applicant, John Hirst, served a sentence of life imprisonment for manslaughter until 25 May 2004, when he was released from prison on licence. He remained in detention, as the Parole Board considered that he continued to present a risk of serious harm to the public. As a convicted prisoner, the applicant was barred by section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 from voting in parliamentary or local elections. The applicant alleged that, as a convicted prisoner in detention, he was subject to a blanket ban on voting in elections. He relied on Article 3 of the first Protocol which states; "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature." The Court stressed that the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the first Protocol were crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law and also that the right to vote was a right and not a privilege. However, when the government asked the court for guidance as to where exactly the line could be drawn in determining which prisoners should be given the vote and which shouldn't, the court declined to provide it."It is

primarily for the state concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order," the court said. In other words, the court said that while a blanket ban is a violation of the right of the state's obligation to take a proactive role in facilitating free elections, how UK law should change to remedy the situation is for the democratically elected legislature parliament to decide. Turning now to the main argument given to deny prisoners the vote, it is argued that as they have committed a crime, it stands to reason that they should not take part in the law making process. Some, including the PM, have spoken about the revulsion they feel at the prospect of some of the worst criminals participating in the democratic processes that some have denied to others. And this has instinctive appeal, why should murderers be allowed to vote when their victims cant? Is it appropriate that rapists and paedophiles should participate in elections to the legislature? The answer for many, if not most, is no. However, there is a different side to tell. It is known that the majority of prisoners come from backgrounds with multiple levels of deprivation, that civic engagement is poor and repeated studies report feelings of disenfranchisement. I feel there is a danger that denying prisoners the vote reinforces the perception that the issues they confront, and got them into prison in the first place, are not issues that politicians really want to deal with. Perhaps giving prisoners the vote will encourage participation and as a result politicians will sit up and take notice. The European Convention on Human Rights essentially sees voting for a legislature as an inalienable human right, so to deny the vote to prisoners it must be done on one of two grounds; (i) Prisoners are not human (ii) Voting is not an inalienable right. Although some may argue that some prisoners are not human, as evidenced by their crimes, it is generally accepted that prisoners are human and are in fact accorded all other human rights whilst in prison. Not allowing prisoners to vote states society's belief that once convicted you are a non-person, one who should have no say in how our society is to develop, whose opinion is to count for nothing. This thought can cause a prisoner to continue committing crime and not willing to change, so he/she can be civilised member of society. The decision of ECtHR reflects the progressive approach to Human Rights issues, including the rights of prisoners. When judgments of the domestic courts are compared with the rulings of the ECtHR, it is evident that the domestic courts are reluctant to confer the universal and fundamental rights to prisoners. ECtHR; therefore, underlined the significance of a blanket ban and leaves options for the domestic court to decide on the merit of individual cases. The decision in Hirst v UK is very important in this respect, as it effects the entire prison population because of its universal applicability. It must be highlighted here that the decision was made by the Grand chamber and, it was unanimous, which shows consistency of opinion by the judiciary at the ECtHR level. Therefore, it opens the debate as to which prisoner or which category of prisoners should have the right to vote. Should it be decided on the severity of crime and punishment given or should there be a blanket ban policy as the rights that the prisoners are invoking are universal rights, which means these rights should be extended to everyone. The case of Hirst v UK showed that s.3 of the Representation of the People Act [1983] was incompatible with the Convention right, but this argument was not accepted by the UK domestic court, which interpreted the Commissions decision on H v Netherlands that each Member State was given a wide margin of appreciation to decide on restriction on prisoners right to vote. Also, the ECtHR held in Mathien-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium stated that the right of an individual to vote is subject to restrictions placed by the national authorities legitimately and reasonably.

In conclusion, the ECtHR found the blanket ban on all convicted prisoners disproportionate and beyond the states margin of appreciation, evidence so far suggests that the UK courts will not be prepared to take a dynamic approach to many of the issues, particularly where the European Court and Commission have offered a wide margin of appreciation to each Member State. So, too, one would expect the courts to continue to take a hands-off approach with regard to the granting of positive facilities to prisoners, where much depends on subjective decision on the allocation of resources. However, the availability of the doctrine of proportionality, and the resultant obligation to show that restrictions meet a pressing social need, should intensify the level of judicial review of relevant policies and practices.