Local Political Leadership in Japan: A Harbinger of Systemic Change in Japanese Politics?

1
Purnendra Jain
Abstract
Observers of Japanese politics have generally assumed that because Japan is a unitary state, local government and its political chief executives have very little political and policy autonomy. Yet the assumption that a high degree of centralization in the political structure prevents leadership at the local level is misguided. Three case studies demonstrate that local chief executives from the peripheries are now more than ever demonstrating leadership at the local level. Local chief executives are increasingly challenging central government plans and policy priorities for local areas by setting policy agendas to follow their own vision and local needs, rather than accepting the centers fiat. Using the typology of transactional and transformational styles of leadership, this article argues that trends observed in some localities may be the harbinger of transformational leadership from the local level, as local government takes a more salient place in Japans political system.

Observers of Japanese politics have generally assumed that because Japan is a unitary state, local government and its political chief executives have very little political and policy autonomy. Thus, examination of Japans political leadership has looked for leadership at the national level in Japan and in the nations actions in regional and international contexts (MacDougall 1982; Rix 1993; and Shinoda 2000). Yet the assumption that a high degree of centralization in the political structure prevents leadership at the local level is misguided. In the 1970s some heads of government at the local level exercised unambiguous leadership, in a few cases even inspiring the central government to follow their local initiatives into national policy despite tight restrictions within the unitary structure (Aqua 1982; and Jain 2000a, 4-7). In this article I revisit the issue of political leadership at the local level in Japan, turning to more recent times. While the central government had generally subsumed the local challenge in the 1970s by the end of the decade, we find some local leaders taking political ground again from the early 1990s. I argue here through three case studies that local chief executives from the peripheries are now more

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than ever demonstrating leadership at the local level. They are increasingly challenging central government plans and policy priorities for local areas by setting policy agendas to follow their own vision and local needs, rather than accepting the centres fiat. As in the 1970s, some local chief executives have set new policy directions, some of them ahead of the national government (information disclosure, for example) which has later incorporated those local ideas and policies within the national policy framework. This article also considers some of the key reasons for the revival of political leadership at the local level and how these changes now under way may prefigure a deeper structural change in Japans unitary political system. I argue that whereas in the 1970s the local challenge to the national government was basically a response to domestic pressures, this time local leaders are also responding to international pressures, particularly deriving from the consequences of globalization inside Japan. This time the scale of the challenge is broader than before; we already observe elements of strong leadership in more local administrations across various levels of local government. It is also deeper, since this emerging leadership style involves more than innovative practical responses to local problems. This local push is trying to instigate a profound philosophical shift in the way the politics of the nation are conducted. It conflates demands from the people for democratic process and transparency with demands from local administrations for greater independence in policy decisions and responsibility, through liberalizing and decentralizing the unitary state. I argue that this may be the harbinger of transformational leadership from the local level, as local government takes a more salient place in Japans political system. 1. Leadership in Japan Some of the earlier studies of the Japanese political system have claimed there is a complete absence of leadership within it. For example, Karel Van Wolferen (1989, 5) argued that Japans political system lacked a peak governing body and described it as a truncated pyramid without a supreme institution that has ultimate policymaking jurisdiction. He concluded that in government decision making, the buck simply kept circulating.

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Rix (1993) considered leadership in the context of Japans foreign aid policy, questioning Japans capacity as an international leader in official foreign aid. Rix identified a few indicators of emerging leadership in this policy area, which he termed entrepreneurship (161), and noted the tendency for leadership from behind, which he found to be characteristic of the domestic political scene. Rix concluded that Japan was unable to set for itself an identifiable global aid leadership, partly due to domestic political and administrative obstacles (189). Shinoda (2000) refuted the Van Wolferen thesis, arguing that there has been a political centre, in the position of the prime minister. Shinoda recognizes that institutional and political constraints make it difficult for any prime minister to emerge as a strong leader, although in his view Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Miki, Nakasone, Takeshita and Hosokawa all played leadership roles, even though they were different kinds of leaders. Shinoda classifies them under four broad categories: political insiders, grandstanders, kamikaze fighters and peace lovers. These categories may have some utility for explaining leadership at the national level. But they are not helpful for understanding leadership at the local level, where the hierarchy of power relationships through the centralized national structure sets in train different political dynamics through which local administrators can assert their leadership capacity. Although local chief executives in Japan are constrained by a highly centralized political system, they are not completely prevented from exercising leadership at the local level. Local chief executives are elected directly by constituents, unlike national leaders. Direct election of local leaders removes the layer of party politics at work in choosing the national leader and gives local leaders some scope for overcoming local political and bureaucratic resistance to push their own policy preferences. Local leaders derive their power directly from the people in their area, giving them opportunity to take a stronger leadership role than their counterpart at the national level. 2. Types of Leadership The vast comparative literature on political leadership is rich with definitions of leadership and typologies of political leaders (Sweeting 2002, 4). Here I take up the concept that Burns (1978) advanced,

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which distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. For Burns (1978, 18), leadership is exercised when people with certain motives and purposes, who are in competition or conflict with others, mobilize institutional, political, psychological, and other resources to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. True leaders induce followers to act in accordance with the values and the motivations of both the leader and the followers themselves. Burns distinguishes between transactional and transforming leadership, the former involving an exchange of valued things, and the latter an engagement in which leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality (Hanson 1999). Transforming leadership has a clear moral dimension. Gergen (1999) claims that the line of transactional leaders is, If you vote for me, Ill build a bridge in your neighbourhood, simply a transaction between leader and follower. However the transformational leader awakens within the followers a desire to live in a better society one more open, decent and caring. Gergen advocates transformational leadership on this basis, since politics and public life have become almost entirely transactional, creating cynicism, distrust and disengaged citizens. Robinson (2000) advocates a similar position, recognizing that in the 21 st century, the days of incremental improvement are over, and require a new form of leadership that inspires innovation, pioneering and creativity. For Robinson, these needs compel transformational leadership since its context includes a kind of visionary acumen that can articulate winning and success in a way that captures the imagination of others. Transactional leaders address the material needs of followers while transformational leaders address the self-concept and self-worth of followers (Moyer 1996). Distinguishing between transactional and transformational leadership is a useful approach to understanding leadership at the local level in contemporary Japan and the new challenge it presents to the national level. We see some local leaders trying to move local political life from a series of practical transactions meeting material needs in exchange for votes and power to a fuller engagement with the citizenry that includes guiding public conscience through their actions. These local leaders are responding to mounting public cynicism and distrust of politicians. Their moves are a bid to raise the standards of public

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life using visionary acumen to capture the popular imagination at grassroots level. It is an ambitious move by some local leaders to transform the desire of people within their communities for a more open, decent and caring society into a socio-political reality at all levels of government. The moves by local leaders come at a time when it appears there is no choice but to change, whether or not this change becomes transformative. Other internal and external forces largely inspired by the impacts of globalization are forcing economic and philosophical dislocation across society, and rendering the highly centralized, opaque system of government untenable to many. This forces local leaders to inspire innovation, pioneering and creativity. Hence, the moves by local leaders and the visionary acumen driving them are a challenge not simply to the national government but to the Japanese unitary state in its present form. These moves have potential to be transformational. And they are now growing apace as the actions of a small group of local leaders builds momentum. 3. Japans Local Government Japans local government consists of two layers: prefectural (to, do, fu and ken) and municipal (shi, cho and son). There are 47 prefectures from Hokkaido in the north to Okinawa in the south and some 3200 municipal governments. The latter include 13 large cities (legally called designated cities) such as Yokohama and Kobe, which are huge in both population and financial capacity, and many small towns and villages with tiny populations that depend heavily on prefectural and national governments financially and administratively. Each local government is led by a political chief executive (prefectural governors, city mayors, and town and village heads) who is directly elected by the residents of the locality. Each local government has an assembly of local councillors, again directly elected. Separation of powers operates at the local level with checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches. The 1947 constitution includes a separate chapter on Japans local self-government (Chapter VIII, articles 92-95) that sets out the broad legal parameters of local governance. Other details are codified in a number of laws, principally the Local Autonomy Law. There is surely great variation between local governments in terms

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of their population, financial capacity and functions. This article focuses on medium-sized prefectures in regional Japan, recognizing that conclusions drawn from these sample prefectures are broadly applicable to many other local governments including municipal administrations large and small. Some city and town mayors have been very active in initiating and implementing new ideas and policies in transformational ways, and although these mayors are not under the spotlight here we can speculate that the mayoral initiatives may resemble those of their gubernatorial counterparts in motivation and style. I acknowledge that my empirical work, discussion and conclusions are by no means definitive. Yet it is not my purpose here to advance grand conclusions applicable to all types of local governments in Japan. I believe that instead my analysis opens the window on some new directions in local political leadership, with profound consequences if and as present trends gain transformative capacity within Japans political system. 4. Past Examples of Local Leadership Most studies concerning Japans local government have not addressed the issue of leadership at the local level. Aqua (1982) is one of a few exceptions. The absence is conspicuous even in most recent studies (Muramatsu, Iqbal and Kume 2001), although Chiba (2003) discussed the issue in a cursory manner. Yet the virtual absence of scholarly attention does not imply the absence of local political leadership. It is more likely to reflect misguided assumptions that Japans unitary political structure impedes upon or disables political leadership from local political heads. As discussed below, however, especially in the 1960s and 1970s there were some conspicuous examples of strong leadership by local leaders and their administrations. Historical antecedents and a political culture that promoted topdown bureaucratic governance from prewar Japan prevailed in the early part of the postwar period, despite a new status for local government set down in the 1947 constitution.2 But rapid industrialization and urbanization produced some dire social consequences that conservative local leaders with transactional approaches to politics ignored. Citizens movements began to spread across Japan in protest at the national governments failure to take remedial action, but conservative local leaders kept their attention fixed narrowly on the mantra of economic

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growth. Progressive political parties (mainly the Socialist and Communist parties) were unsuccessful in mounting a comprehensive challenge at the national level and began to challenge conservative political leaders at the local level. These parties and their candidates promised to protect the interests of their local communities rather than functioning simply as a conduit of the national government, as did most conservative chief executives. In response, many progressive (kakushin) leaders were elected in large urban industrial centres such as Yokohama, and soon the huge metropolises of Tokyo and Osaka saw the ascendance of progressive governors. After the 1975 unified local elections, it was estimated that one third of Japans population lived under progressive rule at the local level (Jain 2000a, 4). Many of the progressive local chief executives took bold policy initiatives in social welfare, such as providing better medical services and more child-care centres. They also established strict controls to combat industrial and other types of pollution. These policy reforms made major improvements to the lives of urban residents and other industrial workers and their families. Progressive local leaders not only pursued innovative policies, they also mounted a serious challenge to the national government and its unyielding authority over local administrations. The relationship between local and central governments and the issue of local autonomy were brought under the spotlight as newspaper headlines drew attention to vigorous citizens movements and the striking new policy initiatives of progressive local leaders. Case studies of local policymaking in this period suggest that the Japanese state was less centralised than many observers had assumed. These studies demonstrated that local governments and their chief executives had significant leeway in some policy matters as demonstrated by their ability to introduce new policies and other reform measures within their local administrations. These progressive local administrations in the 1970s set domestically unprecedented examples of what public administration could achieve, and by doing so helped to force the national government to revise some of its strategies to at least match the popular policy directions set by local leaders (Steiner et al. 1980; Muramatsu 1988; and Jain 1989). The political space that the unaddressed public dissatisfaction of the late 1960s and early 1970s presented to the local progressives was

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clearly dissipating by the end of the 1970s as the reform movement lost momentum. Most star progressive governors and mayors had retired from office or chose not to seek re-election. The central governments measured response and a national economic boom enabled the centre to rein in the pressure for reform and importantly, to retain its tight hold on the local administrations. The brief fling of some electorates with progressive administrations at the local level provided a release for voter frustration and the opportunity for some local leaders to demonstrate their leadership capacity, especially vis--vis the centre. During the bubble economy of the 1980s, the coffers of many localities bubbled with cash. This was a new period of construction in Japan gymnasiums, halls, sporting arenas, roads, bridges and golf courses as the political pork barrel was in full swing at the national level. The public had less reason for political grievance and the central government had less challenge to retaining the political status quo. Citizens movements against dams, nuclear power plants and other public policies that many found unacceptable continued, but in an attenuated form. Local referendums against public works projects and other hazardous industries were proposed and carried out throughout the 1990s (Jain 2000b). Voices calling for local reform continued too in the 1980s and early 1990s. But now these came from quarters different from those in the 1970s. 5. Demand for Reform and Strong Leadership From the early 1990s another shift in the condition of the national economy, this time a downturn into prolonged recession, set the stage for the new wave of local reform and political leadership at the local level. Public alarm at exposure of political corruption in both levels of government added credence to the views of local reformers. Meanwhile, national economic downturn and the consequences of national adjustment to globalization drove the push for cleaner, leaner government at all levels. Thus a mix of economic and political imperatives from both external and internal sources has revitalized the reform movement in local government. It has created circumstances where again local leaders are motivated to challenge the central government, but this time their motivations and the scale of their united efforts appear to be closer to a transformational style of leadership.

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This time the activist local leaders are seeking reform and have a firmer political philosophy to drive it. The electorates ouster of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from national rule in 1993, although brief, provided the political space for a few strong advocates of local government to secure influential positions in the new central government.3 The end of the LDPs central monopoly also prompted some local leaders to push more vigorously for reform. The lesson that some local leaders took from the LDP ouster was that the nations people clearly wanted their elected representatives to be more responsible, and more responsive to the needs of the people. A national system of government in which the local level was forced to submit to venal central control was no longer tenable. Revelations of corruption at the local level during the 1990s intensified both public dissatisfaction with politicians and the will of reformers to overhaul the political system to remove its inherent compulsions toward corruption. Some local governments drew the wrath of the electorate for expenses from the public purse that citizens found unacceptable. Under economic recession, the central government had reduced its budget allocations to local administrations as an act of financial stringency, which exacerbated the financial difficulties that many of the local governments were already battling. The recession had already hit local finances by reducing income from local corporate taxes that are a vital source of independent revenue for the administrations of most prefectures and metropolitan cities. To compensate for lost revenue, many local governments undertook supplementary borrowing that raised their debt ratios to very high levels (Abe and Shindo 1997, 72).4 In these times of relative economic hardship with a much discussed need for real financial stringency, citizens were outraged to hear reports of their local politicians paper tours (kara shutcho) and local officials involvement in political deals using taxpayers money (kan kan settai entertaining central bureaucrats to court subsidies and other favours from the centre). Construction of bridges, dams and roads was no longer popular among local residents, who began to watch the expenditures of their local governments with much more critical eyes. Public demand for local government transparency strengthened considerably. Corrupt local leaders were forced to resign from their

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position and were replaced by new local leaders who promised to govern in the interest of the community.5 Political corruption was not confined to the local level. In the 1990s media also exposed corruption in the central bureaucracy, which was widely assumed until then to be a bastion of propriety at the centre of the political system. The expose forced members of the public to question not only the bona fides of the central bureaucrats, but also the ethical capacity of central bureaucrats to work on managing local matters. It was now becoming clear how far this responsibility for local affairs could present a conflict of interest for bureaucrats whose primary loyalties are with the central government locus of power to which they are primarily responsible. At various times from the 1970s, media exposure of bribery and other scandals brought to public attention the high level of corruption among the nations politicians and helped to bring down governments. In the 1990s it fed directly into public cynicism, distrust and disengagement the public response that has motivated some local leaders to pursue as never before a reform agenda with a new philosophy of political decentralisation to transform the nations political life. Corruption is not the only problem begging transformative change to the political system. The forces of globalisation and major advances in information technology, both with mostly external origins, have also exposed the shortcomings of the present political system by highlighting how tight centralization slows or disables local governments in responding effectively to rapid change. These forces have exposed local governments to global competition in trade and commerce but the local governments do not have the independence or flexibility to respond as effectively as they wish. Some commercial arrangements made at the national level such as financial and market deregulation have consequences at the local level that require swift policy responses consistent with specific local needs or preferences. Yet, hamstrung by the centres tight grip upon them, local governments have very little control over what they can and cannot do without central direction (Nagata 1999).6 Inflexibility has bred inefficiency in local government operations through lost opportunities and other economic costs. Being slow to respond because they lack independence, local governments lose competitive advantage in fast changing, highly competitive situations,

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which are the ever more common results of globalization and information technology. The centralized political structure thus creates the political irony that we see at work from the 1990s. On the one hand it restricts the space in which local leaders can act independently from the centre and demonstrate political leadership. But on the other hand it fuels the desire among reformist local leaders to push harder to reform this system. Reformist local leaders are developing stronger political will to push the centre towards granting them greater independence and making the nations political life more responsive and open to the public. They are also directing their stronger political will to demonstrate to the centre what they are capable of and how seriously they are motivated to change an outmoded system from the bottom up. The discussion above points to the genesis of a new wave of local reform. Unlike the earlier reform movements, this one is not driven exclusively by internal forces. A mix of factors is at work here, including globalisation and technological development, stronger public support for decentralisation and demand for transparency, and rekindling of the earlier forces pushing for administrative reform. It creates circumstances conducive to local leaders asserting their leadership capacity to demonstrate to all in the nation the capacity of local governments as responsible, capable, independent political actors in a less centralized political system. 6. New-Wave Governors New political and economic challenges arising from globalisation, technological advancement and fiscal difficulties have helped to produce a new breed of governors in Japan. As noted before, this is not a brand new phenomenon in Japans local politics. In the 1960s and 1970s new types of governors emerged, supported by the opposition socialist and communist parties. Scholars, people of letters (bunkajin) and prominent party leaders such as Asukata Ichio of the Socialist Party were elected to head local governments as progressive chief executives. Most of these progressive governors and mayors were brought to office in major urban centres and metropolises such as Tokyo and Osaka. However the new breed of reform-minded governors in the 1990s has some characteristics very different from those of its predecessors in the 1960s and 1970s.

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First, many have been elected as ainori (literally, sharing a ride) candidates, supported by most of the major political parties except the Japan Communist Party. More than 80 percent of governors in place after the April 1999 unified local elections had run as ainori candidates (Jain 2002, 14). There is now also a growing trend for independent candidates with no party support to run successfully for gubernatorial positions. Ishihara Shintaro in Tokyo, Tanaka Yasuo in Nagano, Domoto Akiko in Chiba and Hashimoto Daijiro of Kochi are telling examples. Second, because of the growing phenomenon of ainori and noparty support, the earlier ideological cleavage between progressive and conservative chief executives is no longer salient in Japanese local politics. Nor are the new local leaders hostage to the ideologies and platforms of the parties supporting them. They promote themselves as local leaders, working in the interest of the locality that they represent and not as an agent of the national government or of a political party. Third, the new breed of governors is often labelled reformers (kaikakuha) as opposed to progressives (kakushin). Their aim is to reform the political system by securing greater autonomy for local administrations, making decision-making channels transparent and open, and providing better services to the people. Their political philosophy is driven by ideas of efficiency, managerialism and cost effectiveness, and they are increasingly becoming internationalist. They make major decisions based on their own assessment of local interests and their own policy preferences and vision, rather than following party affiliations and national guidelines. Fourth, unlike in the 1970s when progressive governors came to power mostly in urban centres and metropolises, many of the current reformist governors have emerged in regional and rural Japan, including areas such as Nagano and Chiba prefectures that have been conservative strongholds for long periods in postwar Japan. Finally, the number of governors who are ex-bureaucrats is not declining, and not all of these ex-bureaucrats tow the national political line or emphasise their national connection (chuo chokketsu). Indeed some of them are very critical of national policies and central control.7 New governors now come from all sorts of different backgrounds, stretching from the bureaucracy (Katayama of Tottori and Asano of Miyagi), media (Hashimoto of Kochi and Domoto of Chiba) to literature and public life (Tanaka of Nagano).

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7. Networking for Policy Coordination Formal national associations of governors and mayors in Japan (Zenkoku Chijikai and Zenkoku Shichokai) meet regularly to discuss issues of mutual interest. However, some local chief executives form informal smaller groups to realize some common purpose beyond the terms of reference of the national association. Progressive governors in the 1960s formed their own association called the Association for Progressive Chief Executives of Japan (Kakushin Shichokai). Some of the new wave governors have also organised themselves in informal groups to exchange ideas and act as a pressure group to seek greater autonomy for local government. Here we see local leadership in action. One such group is Chiiki kara kawaru Nihon (Japan changing from the regions), formed in 1998 by Kochi Governor Hashimoto Daijiro, Mie Governor Kitagawa Masayasu, Gifu Governor Kajiwara Taku, Miyagi Governor Asano Shiro, Iwate Governor Masuda Hiroya and Akita Governor Terata Sukeshiro. Their aim is to articulate innovative ideas from the regions and introduce them as policy initiatives. They see political space for their actions at a time when the central government has demonstrated its inability to manage local problems effectively, despite its overall responsibility. These governors recognise that they are well placed to take this action rather than leave matters to central bureaucrats who have demonstrated repeatedly that they will perpetuate the systems tight centralisation. This group of local chief executives seems to have followed their progressive predecessors of the 1960s and 1970s who recognised mutual benefit from sharing views on their common interests in managing local administrations, and established an association to serve as a think tank for policy directions. With like-minded reformist governors from Iwate, Miyagi and other prefectures, Mie Governor Kitagawa founded a study group in July 2002 to promote further decentralization and this group has already made recommendations to the central government to review its public works projects. Group membership has since expanded significantly and now includes governors of Tottori, Gifu, Kochi, Wakayama, and Fukuoka. One of the key drivers behind this group is the former Ministry of Finance official, also known as Mr Yen, Sakakibara Eisuke, who is now a professor at Keio University, a highly prestigious private university in Tokyo. In November 2002, the group announced the items

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on its agenda, which include information disclosure and assessment, transparency, competition, and partnership with the private sector (Chiba 2003). To amplify their voices nationally, the governors of Miyagi, Mie and Kochi authored a popular book (Asano, Kitagawa and Hashimoto 2002) calling for the regions to show national government the path to reform and change. These initiatives by local leaders seeking to carry with them both the moral dimensions the conscience and the practical dimensions the actual support of their electorates suggest the qualities of transformational leadership discussed earlier in this article. 8. Policy and Ideas Most of these reformist governors have revolted against the prevailing top-down rule, a disposition similar to that of their progressive colleagues in the 1960s and 1970s. They have also opposed wastage of taxpayers money on building unnecessary dams and other public works projects. Tanaka of Nagano opposed a dam that the Construction Ministry wanted built against the wishes of local residents; Fukuda Akio in Tochigi won election on a similar platform. Domoto in Chiba opposed a land-reclamation project that Tokyos bureaucrats have been pushing for nearly 30 years. These reformist governors concern for the environment, their respect for peoples voices and their conviction that change in Japan must begin from the regions distinguish them from fellow transactional types of governors.8 So impressive are the ideas and policies of the reformist governors and so powerful is their stance in Japans political life that The Economist in London paralleled the governors transformative potential with that of the samurai from the remote domains of Satsuma and Choshu who restored the Meiji emperor and brought to a sudden end two-and-ahalf centuries of rule by the Tokugawa Shogunate.(The Economist, 14 June 2001, www.epiphanycorp.com/jetaa_usa9/library/ governors.html, accessed 7 January 2003). The current leaders are from the regional Japan, as were their samurai antecedents. Whether or not these reformist local leaders will be able to transform the nations political system as the Satsuma and Choshu samurai did in the past is questionable. They have presented their vision and policies for their local areas, and are increasingly forcing the national government to

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devolve power to the peripheries and modernize its outdated structure sustaining central control. They have also become a role model for the national government for some initiatives concerning political style, including greater transparency and accountability in the political system. The reformist local leaders are not simply pushing political rhetoric. The cases presented below reveal how these leaders have taken concrete action and achieved some of their policy goals, and have plans in place for implementing others. Reformist governors have also focused on improving their economies. Governor Kimura of Wakayama, for example, has generated jobs through a program of local revitalization combined with the protection of nature (Hagami 2002, 208-210). Governor Katayama of Tottori has generated jobs in the face of the ongoing economic slump by slashing the salaries of all prefectural workers by 5 per cent over a three-year period, using the savings to hire additional employees under a work-sharing program. The salary levels of Tottori civil servants subsequently fell to the lowest among Japans 47 prefectures, but this self-declared New Deal policy enabled the prefecture to add 170 new workers to its payroll. Governor Tanaka of Nagano has taken a more drastic approach by slashing prefectural employees salary by 10 per cent annually from 2002 for three years in order to reduce the burden of prefectural debt accumulated over the years. These are policies with practical outcomes but they also carry the moral weight required of transformative leadership to carry the will of the people with the will of the leader. 9. Case Studies The new reformist movement that began to appear in Japan in the 1990s was largely in response to the bursting of Japans bubble economy, the IT revolution, and the gathering forces of globalization. These forces began to harm localities economically as never before and highlighted the dysfunctionality of the present unitary system. The electorate was aggrieved and responded with their votes to empower a new breed of local leaders advocating bottom-up reform of the political system.9 To illustrate the types of leadership roles that the new breed of governors in Japan is playing, I present three case studies of governors in Gifu, Mie and Miyagi prefectures. My findings here are informed

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largely by extensive interviews that I conducted in these prefectures with senior officials and with Governor Kitagawa of Mie and Governor Asano of Miyagi. These cases are drawn from regional Japan rather than from metropolitan and large prefectures such as Tokyo and Osaka, prefectures that are economically powerful and politically influential.10 The rural and regional prefectures in Japan have accumulated vast debts through borrowings to finance blind spending on public works projects. Conservative governors had built a financial pipeline to the national government and became highly dependent on central subsidies and other central assistance including borrowings. These are also the areas where local leaders mounted large-scale construction projects heavily subsidized by the national government. These local leaders were captive to special interest groups, such as the construction industry, that delivered both the money and votes that are essential for electoral success. The case studies presented here are to illustrate the types of transformative leadership that some prefectural governors are exercising. These cases cannot depict comprehensively what 47 prefectural governors from a range of backgrounds are doing. The two major types of reformist governors are: 1) bureaucrats who take early retirement and run for gubernatorial positions; and 2) politicians who run for gubernatorial positions after serving in various capacities including in local assemblies and/or in the national parliament.11 I include both types in my case studies below. Gifu Prefecture: Governor Kajiwara Kajiwara Taku has been Gifus governor since 1989. His profile is typical of many past and current prefectural governors in Japan (Kataoka 1997, 218).12 A graduate of Kyoto Universitys law faculty and a former Ministry of Construction bureaucrat, he is a native of Gifu where he attended school and studied at Kyoto University (second in prestige after Tokyo University). In his capacity as a central government bureaucrat he was transferred to Gifu prefectural government for some time and was then appointed Vice Governor of Gifu in 1985 under Governor Uematsu Yosuke, before being elected as governor in 1989. He is currently serving his fourth term in office. He is a typical conservative governor, supported ainori-style by the LDP, Komeito and the Democratic Party of Japan.

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Since he was elected as governor at the time when Japans bubble economy and construction industry were booming, he felt it was natural that he would seek a number of construction projects including roads and bridges to his local area, especially given his strong political and bureaucratic links with the centre. However, Kajiwara wanted to distinguish himself from fellow bureaucrats-turned-governors by introducing his own vision for the prefecture. Gifu is home to small and medium-sized industries such as textiles (apparel) and ceramics that were losing their competitiveness to foreign producers and relocating their manufacturing units in China in order to cut costs and remain competitive. Kajiwaras plan therefore included making Gifu a centre of the new economy led by IT and software. He wanted to achieve this not just through the conventional methods of appealing to the central government for subsidies and inviting local businesses to his prefecture. He also tried to forge links with companies and governments overseas. One of his innovative potentially transformative leadership initiatives is establishing links directly with partners abroad without taking the central government route. Policy Initiatives in Gifu Governor Kajiwaras primary objective from the beginning of his term was to prepare Gifu for the 21st century, harnessing judiciously the twin forces of globalization and information technology. He understood well that Gifus traditional industries would not withstand the forces of globalization and could not compete against goods produced in cheap-labour countries like China. His focus was therefore on making Gifu a centre of IT industry. Sweet Valley, around the three Kiso rivers was his answer to the looming forces of the 21st century. The valley is located around the Nobi plain in southern Gifu and now boasts a high density of R&D sites in information, communications and robotics, including Softopia Japan and Technoplaza. Kajiwaras dream for Gifu is to make it a regional hub of what he terms jojo (comprising two Japanese characters to mean information industry) as opposed to nojo (agriculture) and kojo (industry) of the previous centuries. The idea is to attract IT companies from throughout Japan and from overseas to transform Gifu into a major IT centre in Japan. The advancements in information technology and presence of knowledge-based companies are also expected to enhance the lifestyle of Gifu residents (e.g. when

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applied to providing welfare services) and local administration (such as advancement in e-local government). In 2003, the Softopia Japan building accommodates some 160 companies, including 35 foreign companies some of which are Silicon Valley-based Indian companies. Softopia Japan has become a model hub of IT for several other Asian nations such as the Philippines, China and Hong Kong, whose officials have visited the facility in the hope of establishing similar hubs in their own countries. Governor Kajiwara also aims to achieve excellence at the international level by making some Gifu products world class. His administration and the residents of Gifu already take pride in Gifus international achievements: producing a top class marathon runner (gold medallist at the Sydney Olympics), a world karate champion, a Nobel prize winner and a world-class pianist, three of whom are women. Kajiwaras administration is committed to helping people, industry and businesses, especially those who have the potential to excel at the global level. One such initiative is to produce first class designer products in Gifu, and international trade links have been established for these. Under the Oribe project,13 Gifu invites artists from around the world to work with local industries and design new products that are sold in both the national and international markets. Gifu has also formed an alliance with the Domus Academy in Italy to help activate its local industries. Gifu prefecture has established a direct overseas partnership program to promote exchanges conducted in a mutually beneficial spirit. The Gifu prefectural administration regards the prefecture as one sovereign nation since its economy is at par with those of Singapore and Malaysia.14 Its GNP of US$78 billion ranked 37th in the world and its per capita GNP of $37,030 ranked fourth in the world, at the same level as Denmark and Switzerland in 1999. Governor Kajiwaras emphasis on international linkages is manifest in the direct partnerships that Gifu has with 22 countries in one or more fields (US, Brazil, Argentina, UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Israel, the Republic of Korea, China, India, Malaysia and Australia). Between 1989 and early 2002, the governor led 25 missions overseas in 27 countries, searching for trade linkages, investment opportunities and other kinds of exchanges in Asia, Europe, the Americas and

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Oceania. Gifu has established 12 offices overseas destinations in such countries as China, Hong Kong, US, France, Germany, Italy and Holland. Sceptics have raised questions about these huge projects (Softopia alone is a 54 billion yen facility), trade missions and overseas offices and their direct role in improving the Gifu economy. There is some clear evidence of economic benefits flowing from these projects, 15 but officials admit readily that these are still early days for some of these programs. One official claimed that the governor is betting his political life on Softopia (Kruger and Fuyuno 2002, 32). Governor Kajiwara is certainly aware of the risks, but he sees that laying the blame for the national economic recession on Tokyo is not the way out and the prefecture must work its own way out. This governor is a regional advocate in his reformist position, claiming For Japan to change drastically, the regions must first change drastically. We need the pioneer spirit (Kruger and Fuyuno 2002, 32).16 He is also an internationalist. His strategy to change Gifu is via building closer alliances that extend beyond the limits of nationality, language, race, culture and religion, as the projects discussed above indicate. Governor Kajiwaras ideals may be lofty, but as the data presented here indicate, he is certainly taking a broad range of practical initiatives that appear designed to carry the people of Gifu forward with his own political vision. We could describe this as the type of visionary acumen that can articulate winning and success in a way that captures the imagination of others, as Robinson (2000) casts the context of transformative leadership. Mie Prefecture: Governor Kitagawa Kitagawa Masayasu is a native of Mie Prefecture and was elected its governor in 1995. A graduate of Waseda Universitys commerce department, he entered prefectural politics and was elected to the local assembly in 1972, where he served close to three terms until 1983. That year he was elected as an LDP member to the Lower House of parliament where he served four terms until 1995. During his parliamentary career, he also served as LDP deputy secretary-general. A year before his retirement from the Lower House he left the LDP and joined Shinshinto (New Frontier Party) in 1994. Kitagawa first ran for the governorship of Mie Prefecture in 1995 with support from Shinshinto, the predecessor of the Liberal Party.17 He defeated Ozaki

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Takeo, a former vice governor supported by the LDP. Kitagawa won his second term in 1999 as an ainori candidate, supported by all political parties except the Japan Communist Party. While most people inside and outside the prefecture expected him to run for his third term in April 2003, especially given his high popularity among voters, to the surprise of many, in November 2002 Kitagawa announced his intention not to seek a third term and accordingly retired from this position in April 2003.18 Kitagawas conservative political background suggested he would become a typical LDP policy-oriented governor favouring close ties with the construction industry and relying on central subsidies and handouts. Far from this typecast, however, Kitagawa returned to his native prefecture with new political agendas driven by a clear policy orientation at odds in many ways with the LDP party philosophy. Like Kajiwara above, Kitagawa recognized the need to tackle at the prefectural level the serious challenges facing Japan. He saw the erosion of peoples trust in public administration and politics as the result of bad policies, corruption and putting the taxpayers interests last. What he saw in Japans body politic is precisely what Gergen (1999) claimed are the results of transactional leadership: cynicism, distrust and disengaged citizens. Kitagawa therefore set as his first task restoring peoples confidence in their prefectural administration, a task he felt was possible only by taking into account the views of taxpayers. This meant reorienting policy focus away from the supply side and toward the demand side through changes in administrative procedures and rules (interview with Governor Kitagawa, 31 January 2003).19 For Kitagawa, the practices of Japans centralized administration and nationwide standardization were out of step with global trends that demand flexibility, efficiency and competitiveness. He saw the solution in locally based policies that develop a sense of ownership among stakeholders within the locality the essential conditions for making Mie a prefecture in which its residents took pride. We see here direct parallels with Governor Kajiwaras philosophy on Gifu residents identifying themselves as stakeholders in the prefecture. Kitagawa pursued a number of dramatic policy initiatives to introduce a new paradigm in prefectural management. One was to make the prefectural administration as transparent as possible by

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opening up the administrations culture long characterized by secrecy and internal negotiations, through an information-disclosure policy in all areas of public administration. Mie is not the first local government in Japan with an information-disclosure ordinance,20 but Mie has the most comprehensive plan, with more disclosure rules than most local administrations allow. Another was introducing some basic principles of private-sector management: least cost with best results. Resistance to his new philosophy and practice was expected, especially from the prefectural civil service. Nevertheless, after more than 10,000 hours of dialogue to induce what he calls change in attitude (ishi kaikaku) of prefectural employees, Kitagawa secured prefectural employees commitment to his principles. A third initiative was introducing a costperformance assessment system for budget compilation to comply with the principle of administrative accountability. Other moves in administrative reform had an eye to environmental protection. Kitagawa was also the first governor to legislate an ordinance to tax industrial waste, aiming to reduce production of industrial wastes and encourage recycling. His prefectural office launched an ecoffice campaign; prefectural offices now do not have a rubbish bin and staff are encouraged to dress casually during summer to save energy by lowering the demand for air conditioning. Mie has received several prizes for its energy efficient and green-oriented office, proudly holding an International Organization for Standardization certificate of Environmental Management systems. Indeed, Mie prefectural office serves as a national role model. Governor Kitagawa also took a number of bold steps that made it clear he was taking into account the views of local people as residents and taxpayers. In February 2000 he cancelled a nuclear power plant project that created a feud among local residents for about 40 years. The plan to construct two reactors in Ashihama, a scenic coastal area in Mie prefecture, had remained the subject of a prolonged and bitter confrontation since 1963 when a local utility company, Chubu Electric Power, made a proposal to build this power plant. Governor Kitagawa broke the stalemate by cancelling the project, citing in front of local politicians a lack of consensus among local residents, especially in the light of recent nuclear accidents in other parts of Japan (Watts 2000). Yet Kitagawa was also very mindful of the critical economic situation in the nation and in his own prefecture. Unlike many other

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regional prefectures, Mie is home to large industrial complexes; best known is Yokkaichi Petroleum. With the old industrial structure becoming obsolete, the governor began to focus on new industries such as IT and communications to regenerate Mies economy. He therefore cited with a great sense of achievement being successful in attracting Sharp Corporation to Mie to produce state-of-the-art products, after offering the corporation a substantial prefectural subsidy of 9 billion yen to relocate in Mie. We see here that Mies economic regeneration programs are focused primarily on domestic industries, unlike Gifus that are focused on domestic and international linkages.21 Currently, Mie has four major plans for economic and technological advancement: medical, silicon, crystal and pearl valley programs, each focusing on new and emerging technologies of the 21st century. Toshiba is a part of the Crystal Valley program and has generated more than 1200 jobs in the prefecture. A better employment environment is expected after most economic regeneration plans are implemented (Interview, 31 January 2003). Through a broad range of moves such as these, many with a moral as well as an instrumental tow, Kitagawa has implanted a new paradigm in prefectural management and political philosophy at the local level. He has also carved out a reputation as an eminent reformist governor. Most stakeholders in the prefecture have approved of Kitagawas paradigm shift to a managerial style of administration and he has received national and international media acclaim. Here too we see a governor with apparently visionary acumen, taking a proactive policy position to proceed with potentially transformative leadership initiatives. Many other local leaders are apparently inspired by the kinds of initiatives that Kitagawa took in Mie.22 Miyagi: Governor Asano As with the two governors discussed above, Asano Shiro also serves as governor of his native prefecture and has been in this position since 1993. He was born in Sendai where the prefectural headquarters are located.23 A graduate of Tokyo Universitys Faculty of Law, he entered the Ministry of Welfare in 1970. While he was serving as Director of the Panning Division in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, a major scandal broke in his native city Sendai and then in Miyagi prefecture itself. In early 1993 the mayor of Sendai was arrested on bribery charges.

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Three months later, then Governor Honma Shuntaro was also forced to resign. He was later arrested on charges of accepting bribes from general contractors (zenekon). This type of corruption through kan kan settai (official to official entertainment practices) is typical of the political culture in regional Japan. Local politicians forge strong connections with the national government and its bureaucracy to secure funds for public works programs in the localities. At the local level politicians establish close links with construction and other publicworks related companies that thrive on government construction programs and in turn offer huge amounts of money to local politicians coffers, mostly illegally. Yet for both the mayor of a city where the prefectural headquarters is located and the governor to be arrested on bribery charges within a space of three months was exceptional. Asano saw this as a sign that something was seriously wrong with Sendais political culture and administration (Interview, 4 February 2003). Just three days before the deadline for registration of candidates in the local electoral office, Asano resigned his secure bureaucratic position and decided to run for the gubernatorial position as an independent candidate without the backing of any political parties. In subsequent elections in 1997 and 2001, Asano refused any support from political parties and launched a grassroots campaign with volunteers collecting 100-yen donations from citizens (Asahi Shinbun [Miyagi edition] 2 and 19 November 2001).24 Given the circumstances under which Asano was elected in 1993, one of his major aims was to clean up Miyagis administration and restore peoples trust in politicians and administrators. 25 Thus one of Asanos policy successes is his contribution to dealing with endemic structural corruption. Asano recognized transparency as the key to removing corruption and other unethical political practices, to restore peoples trust in public administration. In a letter to all senior members of the Miyagi civil service typical of Asanos hard line on corruption Asano wrote:
We must choose one of two avenues. Either we will sincerely devote ourselves to explication of the real truth, or we will direct all of our efforts to protection of prefectural officials, even if it means concealing the truth. In all ways, we will seek to show the truth. This statement is not merely for discussion; this is an order. For those who cannot follow this guideline, resignation is the only course (published in Asahi Newspaper, reproduced in Repeta 2001, 4).

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The road to stamping out what has been standard practice for most of the postwar period in a regional prefecture is, of course, no easy task. Asano faced intense bureaucratic and political resistance to fully implement the freedom of information ordinance. For example, the prefectural police department resisted the Governors pressure and found a powerful ally in the local assembly, which sided with it to oppose the governors proposal to make police records available for public scrutiny. Asanos aim to make his administration transparent and make past cases of corrupt practices available for public scrutiny was extenuated by an already a strong public movement in Sendai demanding the administration submit all entertainment expenditures before a civil ombudsman, formed by a group of local lawyers. But Miyagi officials continued to refuse disclosure of public expenditures. In 1995, the local lawyers filed suit in the Sendai District Court under the Miyagi information disclosure ordinance. This put Asano under the spotlight as he was elected on the promise of striving for clean politics and transparent administration. As governor, he was named a defendant in a suit asking the government to open its files. Asano surprised many in the prefecture by not taking the traditional transactional path of governors who would have resisted public pressure. In fact, not only did he not appeal a district court ruling and complied with citizens demands to reveal information about the prefectural government entertainment expenses on central bureaucrats, he gave them more than they asked for. Miyagi prefecture delivered data on expenses for food and drinks for the entire government rather than just the three departments targeted by the Ombudsman (Repeta 2001, 5). According to newspaper reports, this disclosure of information case in Miyagi eventually led the central government to ban its bureaucrats from the practice of entertaining each other.26 We see here how Asanos bid to clean up political life from the local level up is driven by a strong vision to reform not just the mechanics of political life but also the values that set these arrangements in place and give life to the political system. As with the other two leaders discussed above, we see this leader exercising the kind of visionary acumen that captures the imagination of others. Instead of, indeed to end, the succession of transactional leaders who by narrowly addressing the material needs of followers have helped to

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embed channels of corruption within the political system, Asano is showing the signs of transformational leadership to restore faith in government by bringing higher standards to public life. 10. Conclusions Several conclusions can be drawn based on the preceding discussion. First, more and more prefectural political chief executives in Japan are demonstrating their willingness to take strong leadership in a range of policy areas. Many of their policies have been adopted and implemented in the face of tough resistance coming from different quarters, both locally and nationally. Cancellation of dam projects and nuclear power plants, and the introduction of industrial waste taxes have attracted both supporters and critics. This is of course not the first time that the phenomenon of innovative and bold policy measures at local level has appeared in Japan. Indeed, this can be regarded as the second wave of postwar local leadership in Japan first, it emerged in the 1960s when many urban centres of Japan were governed by progressive chief executives. In recent years, local leaders of varying political persuasions have revived the tradition of transformational type of local leadership, first established by progressive local chief executives. Reform, decentralization, transparency, information disclosure, responsibility, efficiency, and public participation have become part of the new political lexicon in Japans local administrations, most clearly articulated and implemented by the new breed of governors. Second, the new wave governors may not be radical, but neither are they purely traditional or incremental. Some of their actions have been path breaking, as we see in all three of the case studies. They have certainly made significant advances in administration by challenging some of the old ways of conducting public administration and fundamentally altering them. They have championed the cause of administrative transparency and public participation, as is amply evident in the cases of Mie and Miyagi. They have also gone beyond the typical incremental change process and are building a new political culture within, but in some ways to replace existing frameworks. They have distinguished themselves from their conservative predecessors and some of the currently serving governors by adopting policies that have earned them accolades in their own area, nationally and internationally.27

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Third, while it is indisputable that there is significant and qualitative improvement in local political leadership, one needs to keep in mind that they are local leaders. Some of the qualities expected from transformational leadership may be more relevant for national leaders. It is not easy for local political leaders to make radical changes, as they have to operate within legal frameworks on which they have little control. That is why theirs is a bid to induce far-reaching systemic change from the bottom up. Undoubtedly they are sending the right kinds of signals about the need for transformative change to all in this political system residents of the locality, local bureaucrats, local industry, and to the national government. They have also organized themselves in various national networks of like-minded chief executives and are in the process of presenting their ideas to the national government to change its traditions and modernize public administration, appropriate for a powerful industrial nation in the 21st century. Together they are likely to present a formidable force which is worth closer attention. Finally, it is important to observe that local political leaders in Japan need to maintain a balance between transactional and transformational types of leadership styles. There is no denying that the era of a typically transactional type of leadership that broadly characterized postwar local administrations is slowly coming to an end in Japan. But this does not necessarily lead to the rise of ideal transformational types of leaders as local politicians in Japan, as in most countries, have to constantly juggle and balance their new ideas with old practices. Leach and Wilson have observed that if the leader turns too much towards the forces of tradition, then he/she is in danger of losing credibility in the eyes of the modernizers. On the other hand, if leaders push too strongly in the direction of reform and heterodoxy, their own position might become vulnerable (Leach and Wilson 2002, 685). However, given that ordinary people in Japan demand government to be responsive, it is more likely now than before that many local leaders in Japan will move further along the reformation path. Their voices and actions, however, will be more effective if they form a strong network of reformist chief executives. They will then be better able to build nationwide consensus on crucial system concerns: decentralization of functions and authority, policy change, participation, transparency, and partnerships between government, private and non-

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government organizations. The new era, characterized by technological innovations and globalization, certainly requires a more transformational style of leadership as we are beginning to see in some local administrations, but considerable change of attitude on the part of a range of policy actors will be required to bring real transformative change in Japans political life and its system. Notes
1. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Leadership in Japan: Transactional and Transformative International Workshop held in Brisbane, February 20-21, 2003. The paper is part of my larger research project on Japans local government for which financial support has been received from the Australian Research Council under its Large Grants Scheme. Many colleagues and officials at various levels in Japan have helped me with this research project over the past several years. The author is especially grateful to Dr Greg Story, Senior Austrade Commissioner in Tokyo and his colleagues in regional Japan for organizing interviews with governors and officials of a number of prefectures during my field research for this paper in late January and early February 2003. The author would also like to thank Governor Kitagawa of Mie (retired in April from this position) and Governor Asano of Miyagi and high-ranking officials of Gifu Prefecture (especially as Governor Kajiwara had to cancel an interview appointment with this author due to some other pressing matters) for their time and interviews. 2. The prewar Meiji Constitution made no mention of local government. 3. Hosokawa Morihiro who headed a coalition government following LDPs defeat in 1993 is the only former governor who has served as prime minister of Japan. 4. For example, the component of local taxes fell from 42.6 per cent of the total in 1989 to 37.8 per cent in 1992 and 33.9 per cent in 1994. Similarly the local allocation tax (a general equalization grant) fell from 18 per cent in 1989 to 17.1 per cent in 1992 and 16.2 per cent in 1994. To cover these shortfalls, local governments increased their revenue through local bonds. The share of revenue from this source increased from 7.5 per cent in 1989 to 11.2 per cent in 1992 and 14.9 per cent in 1994. 5. The most recent example is Tokushima Prefecture where Governor Endo Toshio (a former Transport Ministry official) who favoured construction of a local dam was involved in a bribery scandal. He resigned from his position in March 2002. He was charged, fined and sentenced to three years in prison, but suspended for four years (this means he will not have to serve prison unless he repeats the offence). Endo was replaced by Ota Tadashi who is supported by broad sections of the local people, who favour both clean politics and a no-dam policy. 6. Nagata cites a number of examples of Japans central government committing local governments to international obligations without prior consultation. 7. A former Ministry of Home Affairs official, Governor Katayama Yoshihiro of Tottori is one such example. See his article (2002). 8. For example, the disgraced and pro-dam governor of Tokushima Prefecture, Endo Toshio.

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9. Hashimoto Daijiro, elected as governor of Kochi Prefecture in 1991, is one of the first such reformist (kaikaku-ha) governors. 10. One could probably argue that Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro is also a reformist governor (kaikaku-ha chiji), but because of his nationalistic fervour and because Tokyo is a relatively rich prefecture, I have not taken up Tokyo in my discussion here. 11. According to Kataokas data, 43 of 47 prefectural governors in 1995 came either from the bureaucracy or through political career. Kataoka (1997), p. 218. 12. In 1995, 34 of the 45 prefectural governors came from the central and local bureaucracies. 13. A native of Gifu, Oribe Furuta was a tea master during the 16th century. He demonstrated his genius in his creations ranging from the inventive designs of tea ceremony rooms to his bold artistic expressions in ceramics. Gifu prefecture has produced a manga book on Oribe Furuta, written by Machiko Satonaka and Moribi Murano. In 2001 Gifu Prefecture published the English edition, Oribe Furuta: Warrior and Tea Man. 14. Local officials throughout Japan are fond of comparing their locality with a sovereign nation. A former Saitama official (on loan from the Ministry of Home Affairs) told me that he produced various statistics to Governor Tsuchiya to convince the governor that Saitama Prefecture should regard itself as a medium-sized industrialised European nation and project itself accordingly. 15. The governors office has produced many statistics that show economic benefits flowing to the prefecture. Some of these statistics were made available to this author during the interview process. 16. Gifu Shinbun carried a series of articles (some 52 of them) over a period of six months from June to December 2002 under the broad title of chiho ga Nihon o kaeru (The localities that will change Japan). 17. In August 2003, the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party of Japan, which was then led by Kan Naoto. 18. There is an ongoing debate among reformist governors about the maximum number of terms that governors should seek. Some have proposed two, others argue for three, while still others think there should be no limit. 19. Governor Katayama of Tottori takes a similar view. In an article published in Chihozei in May 1998, Katayama, then a section chief in MOHA emphasized the importance of local residents as taxpayers whose views should matter very much, rather than local administrations treating local residents simply as objects under their administration as has been the case throughout postwar (quoted in Chiiki Seisaku, July 2002, 33). 20. The first to establish such an ordinance was the small town of Kanayama in rural Yamagata Prefecture in 1982, some 17 years before the national government passed legislation on information disclosure. It is interesting to note that some small localities in regional Japan have been at the forefront of new initiatives like this. In Niseko in Hokkaido Prefecture, a town with a population of about 4500, mayor Osaka Seiji made all kinds of information available when he was elected in 1994, including access to all meetings held at the section chief level. In 1999, around 20 per cent of local governments in Japan had arrangements in place to allow public access to information, although many do not allow the public to access the deliberations of local assemblies and other government services such as police (Jain 2000a, 12-13). 21. However, a Mie official indicated that the prefecture rents some commercial space in

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Singapore, which is made available to Mies venture companies for a nominal amount (interview, 31 January 2003). 22. In my many interviews with local officials throughout Japan in connection with my larger project, references to Kitagawas administration were made several times. 23. After I completed my interview with the governor, he very proudly pointed his finger in the direction of a building which was his high school in Sendai, visible through the glass window of the site where the interview was conducted. 24. According to the 2001 Zenkoku shucho meibo (directory of Japans local chief executives, 2001) produced by Jichi Kenkyusho, Asano received indirect support from the Socialist Party. 25. One of the most important policy initiatives of Governor Asano is in the field of social welfare programs, with his vision to make Miyagi Prefecture Number One in welfare. See Miyagi no fukushi yume puran: Nihon ichi no fukushi senshinkenzukuri (Vision plan of welfare in Miyagi: towards constructing a number one developed welfare prefecture in Japan). Heisei 9-nen 9-gatsu sakutei, heisei 14-nen 3-gatsu chukan minaoshi (March 2002 mid-term review of September 1997 Welfare Plan), Miyagi Prefecture, July 2002. 26. Asahi Shinbun, 18 May 1999. 27. Many of the internationally renowned media outlets such as the Economist and Guardian from England, Time Asia, Business Week and the International Herald Tribune have covered stories on these new wave Japanese local chief executives.

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