Corona

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitione r, - versus SENATE of the PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE KAKA BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARIAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents. x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 200242
There are all sorts of imaginable things that a trial ordinarily entails. Are we going to be reviewing all of those?
Unnamed United States Supreme Court Justice (Transcripts of Oral Arguments for Nixon v. U.S. where the power of the US Senate to determine the manner of trial in impeachment cases was upheld.)
Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242
COMMENT AD CAUTELAM EX SUPERABUNDANTI1

(WITH OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER) Respondents SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Senate), sitting as a Senate Impeachment Court (Impeachment Court) and THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Prosecution Panel), through the Office of the Solicitor General, by way of special appearance and in compliance with the Honorable Supreme Courts Resolution dated February 9, 2012, respectfully submit this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti (with Opposition to the Application for a Temporary Restraining Order).
This petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only by the Senate and the House. Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti is being filed by herein respondents without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional and
exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment.2
1
For more abundant caution. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009.) Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality and validity of the Resolutions dated January 27, 2012 and February 6, 2012 of respondent Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, in Senate Impeachment Case No. 002-2011, entitled In the Matter of the Impeachment Trial of Renato C. Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Petitioner, the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (CJ Corona), prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Senate
Impeachment Court; (ii) the implementation of Impeachment Court Resolution dated February 6, 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) from submitting documents and testifying on the bank accounts of CJ Corona or his family; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint.
CJ Corona likewise prays that the Honorable Supreme Court, after giving due course to the petition, render judgment: (i) declaring the Impeachment Complaint filed against him null and void; (ii) prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint; (iii) annulling the Impeachment Courts Resolutions dated January 27, 2012 and February 6, 2012, as well as any subpoena issued pursuant thereto; and (iv) making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction he seeks permanent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 13, 2012, respondents Senate and Prosecution Panel received a copy of the Resolution dated February 9, 2012 issued by the Honorable Court requiring them to submit their Comment to the Petition within ten (10) days from notice or until February 23, 2012. In view of the significance and the complexity of the issues involved, respondents Senate the Prosecution Panel moved for a five (5) day extension of the period, or until February 28, 2012, to file the required pleading. This Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti is being filed within the extended period prayed for.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 12, 2011, one hundred eighty-eight (188) of the two hundred eighty-four (284) Members of the House of Representatives of the Philippines filed the Verified Impeachment Complaint against CJ Corona on the following grounds: (a) betrayal of public trust; (b) culpable violation of the Constitution; and (c) graft and corruption.
The Verified Complaint having been filed by at least onethird of all House of Representatives Members (or by at least 95 congressmen and congresswomen), it automatically became the Articles of Impeachment and, on December 13, 2011, was immediately transmitted to the Senate in accordance with Section 13, Rule IV of the House Impeachment Rules.
On December 14, 2011, the Senate convened as an Impeachment Court. Summons was then issued directing CJ Corona to file his Answer to the Articles of Impeachment within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.3 CJ Corona filed his Answer on December 26, 2011.
On December 29, 2011, CJ Corona filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing praying that:
1. A preliminary hearing be held on the affirmative defense that the verification of the
3
A copy of the Summons issued by the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court is attached hereto as Annex 1.
Verified Complaint for Impeachment is fatally defective; and
2. Thereafter, the Verified Complaint for Impeachment be dismissed.
On January 16, 2012, the Senate Impeachment Court, through Senate President and Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), denied CJ Coronas Motion for Preliminary Hearing for lack of merit. The impeachment trial thereafter proceeded.
During the impeachment proceedings, counsel for CJ Corona raised the issue of whether or not the Prosecution Panel may be allowed to prove the allegations in Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 under Article II of the Impeachment Complaint. In its Resolution dated January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court allowed the
Prosecution Panel to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment. It, however, disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 on the ground that the same does not sufficiently inform CJ Corona of the nature of the accusation against him.4
A copy of the Resolution dated January 27, 2012 issued by the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court is attached hereto as Annex 2.
On January 31, 2012, the Prosecution Panel filed two requests for issuance of subpoena seeking to require the President/Manager and/or other authorized officers of PS Bank and BPI to produce and testify on the original and certified true copies of specified bank documents before the Impeachment Court.
Both requests were opposed by CJ Corona, through counsel, on February 1, 2012. The Prosecution Panel filed a Reply dated February 2, 2012 to CJ Coronas oppositions to the requests for issuance of subpoenae. On February 3, 2012, the Prosecution Panel filed its Supplemental Request for Subpoenae/Reply, identifying certain bank accounts in PS Bank which CJ Corona allegedly owns. CJ Corona thereafter filed a Consolidated
Opposition and Rejoinder.
On February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court resolved to grant the requests for issuance of the subpoenae, viz:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecutions Request for Subpoena to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows: The Branch Manager of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th floor,
a)
SGV Building, 6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for Bank Account No. 14458030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing the balances of the said account as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010. The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate, at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona and the documents showing the balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010: xxx5
b)
Thereafter, the corresponding Subpoenae Duces Tecum Et Ad Testificandum6 (Subpoenae) were issued by the Impeachment Court to responsible officers of PS Bank and BPI directing them to appear before it to:
(a) testify on [their] knowledge in the case which is before the Senate in which the House of Representatives has impeached [CJ Corona]; and (b) bring with you the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for the abovedescribed accounts.
On February 7, 2012, CJ Corona filed this Petition. On February 8, 2012, PS Bank filed a Petition assailing the Subpoena issued to it by the Impeachment Court. In its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 200238, PS Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (a)
5
A copy of the Resolution dated February 6, 2012 issued by the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court is attached hereto as Annex 3. 6 Copies of the Subpoenae issued by the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court are attached hereto as Annex 4 and 5.
annul and set aside the subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court directing PS Bank representatives to testify and/or bring documents relating to certain foreign currency accounts; and (b) order the Impeachment Court to cease and desist from requiring PS Bank representatives to testify and/or bring documents relating to said accounts.
In its Resolution dated February 9, 2012 in G.R. No. 200238, the Honorable Supreme Court, voting 8 to 5, issued a TRO enjoining the Impeachment Court and the Prosecution Panel from implementing the Subpoena against PS Bank.
In another Resolution dated February 9, 2012, this Honorable Court required the respondents in this case to comment on CJ Coronas petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti.
ARGUMENTS
I. CONGRESS HAS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE POWER TO INITIATE, TRY AND DECIDE IMPEACHMENT CASES. II.
10
IN ANY EVENT, THE IMPEACHMENT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; IT HAS, IN FACT, BEEN CONDUCTING THE PROCEEDINGS JUDICIOUSLY. III. SUBJECTING THE ONGOING IMPEACHMENT TRIAL TO JUDICIAL REVIEW DEFEATS THE VERY ESSENCE OF IMPEACHMENT. IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY to CJ CORONA AND HIS OBLIGATION TO FULLY DISCLOSE HIS ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH PREVAIL OVER HIS CLAIM OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF DEPOSITS; HENCE, THE SUBPOENAE SUBJECT OF THIS CASE WERE CORRECTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY ISSUED.
DISCUSSION
I. CONGRESS HAS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE POWER TO INITIATE, TRY AND DECIDE IMPEACHMENT CASES. The Constitution clearly confers upon Congress the sole
and exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment, to wit:
(a) The House shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.7
7
Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1).
11
(b) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The words sole and exclusive are of considerable significance. Sole is defined as having no companion, solitary, being the only one, and functioning independently and without assistance or interference.9 The word exclusive, on the other hand, is defined as shutting out all others from a part or share.10
The use of the words sole and exclusive gives the House the exclusive authority to initiate and the Senate the sole authority to try and decide all cases of impeachment. It means that they alone shall have the authority to determine the form, manner and conduct by which an impeached public officer shall be tried, and whether said public officer should be convicted or acquitted.11
There are three modes of initiating an impeachment case under the Constitution. The first mode involves the filing of a verified impeachment complaint by a Member of the House of Representatives.12 The second mode involves the filing of a
8 9
Ibid. at (6). Websters Third New International Dictionary 2168 (1971), cited in Nixon vs. US, 5066 U.S. 224 (1993). 10 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/exclusive. 11 Nixon vs. US, supra. 12 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(2).
12
verified impeachment complaint by a citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member of the House.13 In both these modes, the verified impeachment complaint shall be referred to the House Committee on Justice. After hearing and by a majority vote of all its members, the House Committee on Justice shall submit its report to the House, together with the corresponding resolution.14 Thereafter, a vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the House Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.15 The third mode of initiating an impeachment complaint involves the filing, by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, of a verified impeachment complaint or resolution of impeachment. Under this mode, the verified impeachment complaint shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.16 The impeachment case against CJ Corona was initiated by the House under the third mode.
The Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, on the other hand, is limited only by three very specific requirements. These are: (a) the Senators
13 14 15 16
Ibid.
Ibid. Ibid. at (3). Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).
13
shall be under oath or affirmation; (b) when the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside (but not vote) over the impeachment trial; and (c) the impeached public officer may only be convicted upon the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.17 These limitations are precise, and their nature suggests that no additional limitations on the form, manner and conduct of the impeachment trial have been intended.18 a. Outside of any alleged transgression of the express constitutional limitations, the impeachment process was never intended by the Framers to be subject to judicial review. Indeed, the Constitution gives the Honorable Supreme
Court expanded judicial power, which includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.19
The extent of the Supreme Courts power of expanded judicial review

17 18 19
in
the
context
of
impeachment
proceedings,
Ibid. Nixon v. US, supra. Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
14
however, was clarified by the Honorable Court in the twin cases of Francisco vs. The House of Representatives20 and Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives.21 In these cases, the Honorable Supreme Court maintained that, despite its expanded certiorari jurisdiction, it cannot take cognizance of purely political questions. Thus:
These petitions raise five substantial issues: I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution. xxx The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
20 21
22
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. Francisco, supra. See also Gutierrez, supra.
15
The Honorable Supreme Court in Francisco thereafter defined what constitutes a political question which is beyond the scope of its power of expanded judicial review:
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionality imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, to determine whether the case falls within the domain of judicial review, the following issues must first be answered in the affirmative: (a) Whether a power or function has
been conferred upon a political body, branch or instrumentality of government; (b) Whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on the said power or function; and (c) body, If there are limits, whether the or instrumentality properly
branch
acted within such limits.
This Gutierrez.
23
three-fold In
test
was the
applied
in
Francisco Supreme
and Court
Francisco,
Honorable
Francisco, supra.
16
recognized
the
exclusive
power
of
the
House
to
initiate
impeachment cases and the express constitutional limitations attached to said power. Applying the constitutional limitations on the Houses exercise of its exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, the Honorable Supreme Court barred the second impeachment complaint against then Chief Justice Davide on the ground that the same violated paragraph 5, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution which expressly provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The Honorable Supreme Court in said case, however, refrained from ruling on the issue of what constitutes an
impeachable offense for lack of any express constitutional limitations in relation thereto.24
In Gutierrez, the Honorable Supreme Court again had occasion to rule upon the validity of an impeachment complaint in relation to the limitation on the power to initiate impeachment cases found under paragraph 5, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. In said case, the Honorable Supreme Court upheld the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints to the House Committee on Justice for appropriate action. It however dismissed petitioner Gutierrezs claimed denial of her right to due process on account of the delay in the
24
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
17
publication of the Impeachment Rules, ruling that inasmuch as the Constitution did not prescribe any limitation on the manner of promulgation, the Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.25
It is clear from both Francisco and Gutierrez that there are instances when the Honorable Supreme Courts power of
expanded judicial review may indeed be exercised within the context of an impeachment proceeding, i.e. where there is a clear transgression of an express constitutional limitation on the sole and exclusive power of the Congress to initiate, try and decide impeachment cases.
That is not the case here.
Here, CJ Corona questions the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against him on the following grounds:
(1) The Impeachment Complaint is null and void because it was transmitted without due notice and hearing to CJ Corona; (2)The Impeachment Court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in retaining Par. 2.3 of Article II; (3)Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Complaint are based on pure speculation and conclusions, which cannot be considered as ultimate facts sufficient to support a complaint;
25
643 SCRA 198, 244 (2011).
18
(4)The presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth violates petitioners right to due process; and (5)The Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subpoena for all the bank accounts, as requested by the prosecution.26
Unlike Francisco and Gutierrez, the foregoing do not concern, or allege any violation of, the express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases. The grounds raised by CJ Corona pertain to actions, orders and prerogatives of the Congress in the course of impeachment proceedings that are not covered by any definite constitutional limitation. Following the principle in Francisco and Gutierrez, it is most respectfully submitted that the Honorable Supreme Court cannot exercise its power of expanded judicial review in this case.
This is not to say that the Senate is left without any significant check for its exercise of the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. This check must, however, be provided by the text of the Constitution itself. To quote United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Nixon vs. United States:
The Framers have anticipated this objection and created two constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check. The first safeguard is that the
26
Petition, p. 16.
19
whole of the impeachment power is divided between the two legislative bodies, with the House given the right to accuse and the Senate given the right to judge. This split of authority avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. The second safeguard is the twothirds supermajority vote requirement.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
The same principle applies in our jurisdiction. Here, the Constitution entrusted the sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases to the Senate, subject only to three express and exclusive constitutional limitations. To recall, these limitations are: (a) the Senators shall be under oath or affirmation; (b) when the President is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside (but not vote) over the impeachment trial; and (c) the impeached public officer may only be convicted upon the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate.28
Again, it is most respectfully submitted that the grounds raised by CJ Corona do not concern any clear violation of the foregoing constitutional limitations. There is no basis for the exercise of the Honorable Supreme Courts power of expanded judicial review in this case. b. Grave abuse of discretion is a tool or standard for judicial
27 28
Supra. Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).
20
review; it cannot be applied to evaluate the actions of the Impeachment Court unrelated to the express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the exercise of its impeachment powers.
If the framers intended to confine impeachment proceedings to clear and simple judicial exercise, it could have easily done so. They, however, saw it fit to exclude the Judiciary from the adjudication of impeachments. This fact all the more underscores the nature of impeachment as a political, rather than judicial, process. At best, all that is being asked of the Senate, as the body solely mandated by the Constitution to try and decide
impeachment cases, is that it be judicious. Judicious is defined as well-considered, discreet, widely circumspect.29
Judicious- not judicial. The framers of the Constitution carefully excluded the judiciary (all but the Chief Justice, who presides at the Senate trial of an impeached President) from the adjudication of impeachments.30
There are no other constitutionally provided standards by which the Senate should try and decide impeachment cases. Neither is there a constitutional requirement that the Senate should conduct an impeachment trial like a criminal case, a civil case or any other judicial proceeding. Such details, among others,
29 30
Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 2009. Posner, Richard A., An Affair of State, The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton, Harvard University Press, Second Printing Edition, 1999, p. 2.
21
were left to the Senate to provide as public interests, changing conditions and circumstances may require.31
For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the concept of grave abuse of discretion cannot apply here. Grave abuse of discretion is essentially a tool or standard for judicial review. This standard is not applicable when the controversy or issue pertains to the exercise of powers solely vested by the Constitution in a political body. This is precisely because by vesting such powers solely with the Senate, the intention of the Framers was not to subject the decision-making to any outside review. Rather, the intention was to exclusively confine the same with the Senate.
To illustrate, the Constitution vested the Honorable Supreme Court with judicial power, that is, the duty to settle actual controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable rights, as well as determine whether a branch or instrumentality of Government has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Pursuant to this power, the Honorable Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land, can resolve, with finality, actual controversies falling within its jurisdiction. In so doing, it can never be accused of having gravely abused its discretion.
31
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
22
The Senate, on the other hand, was vested by the Constitution with the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. In the same way that it would be impossible under our Constitution to accuse the highest court of the land to have gravely abused its discretion in deciding matters falling within its jurisdiction, the Senate, absent any transgression of the three express and constitutionally imposed restrictions of its power, cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in its conduct of an impeachment trial. To construe otherwise would be an unjustified infringement of the Senates sole constitutional power and duty to try and decide
impeachment cases. II. IN ANY EVENT, THE IMPEACHMENT COURT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; IT HAS, IN FACT, BEEN CONDUCTING THE PROCEEDINGS JUDICIOUSLY. The Impeachment Courts conduct of its proceedings itself belies any allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of
23
power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.32
Records of the proceedings before the Impeachment Court show that the same have been conducted in accordance with the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials, particularly Rule VI of the said Rules which provides:
VI. The President of the Senate or the Chief Justice when presiding on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of materiality, relevancy, competency or admissibility of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless a Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision after one contrary view is expressed; or the Presiding Officer may at his/her option, in the first instance, submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. xxx
The Impeachment Court, in fact, holds regular caucuses to discuss and resolve, by majority vote, any objection of a Member of the Senate to a ruling made by the Honorable Presiding Officer Sen. Enrile. Clearly, the decisions of the Impeachment Court are arrived at thoroughly, reasonably, judiciously and after due consideration of all pertinent issues. They can hardly be considered capricious, whimsical or arbitrary.
32
Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 143351 and 144129, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 396 as cited in Henry Jun Dueas v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010.
24
Regardless,
petitioners
allegations
of grave abuse of
discretion must fail for utter lack of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioner has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Impeachment Court. He has filed his Answer, appeared on the first day of the trial proper and has been actively participating in the trial through counsel. He even sought and obtained the following reliefs from the Impeachment Court: (1) CJ Coronas opposition to the request to subpoena granted his by wife and family was Court
the
Impeachment
when it refused to issue the requested subpoena; (2) CJ Coronas motion to exclude
presentation of evidence on Section 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment was granted; (3) CJ Coronas presentation motion of to disallow the
Philippine
Airlines
executive Enrique Javier was likewise granted.
25
In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that petitioner is already estopped from questioning the Impeachment Courts jurisdiction on the ground of an alleged defect in the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment.
Second. Petitioner claims that the Articles of Impeachment are null and void for having been transmitted by the House of Representatives to the Senate without affording him notice and hearing in violation of his right to due process of law. He avers that the Senates act of accepting the same and proceeding with the impeachment trial on the basis thereof constituted grave abuse of discretion on its part.
With due respect, the petitioner errs.
Due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness.33
It is
defined as the process contemplating notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting ones person or property.34 What is due process of law, however, depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject-matter and the necessities of the situation.35 Thus, depending on the subject
matter and circumstances involved, the procedural requirements
33
Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed, p. 113. 34 Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 534 (1918). 35 W. Cameron Forbes, et al. vs. Chuoco Tiaco, G.R. No. L-6157, July 30, 1910.
26
of notice and hearing vary in judicial proceedings, administrative proceedings and school disciplinary proceedings. There are even instances where the twin requirements of prior notice and hearing are dispensable in view of the nature of the case and the urgency of the governmental action as long as a subsequent opportunity to be heard is available.36
In resolving petitioners allegation of due process violation, it is imperative to establish at the outset the process that is due to him in impeachment proceedings.
The verified impeachment complaint against petitioner CJ Corona was filed by one hundred eighty eight (188) Congressmen and Congresswomen, comprising more than one-third (1/3) of all Members of the House of Representatives, pursuant to the third mode of initiating an impeachment complaint under paragraph 4, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. In Gutierrez,37 the Honorable Supreme Court described this third mode as the abbreviated mode of initiation, where the filing of the Impeachment Complaint and the automatic transmittal of the same are merged into one single act.
36
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000; Central Bank of the Phil. vs. CA, G.R. No. 76118. March 30, 1993. 37 Supra.
27
Contrary to petitioners submission, the third mode of initiating an impeachment does not require notice and hearing before an impeachable official could be impeached by the House. In fact, the Constitution imposes only three limitations for the validity of an impeachment complaint filed under the third mode. These limitations are (1) that the complaint be verified, (2) that the same be filed by one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives and (3) that no prior impeachment proceeding has been commenced against the same official within the year. Evidently, these constitutional requirements were complied with in this case.38
Considering that observance of prior notice and hearing by the House before its transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment is not textually required by the Constitution under the third mode of initiating impeachment, CJ Corona can neither ask for the nullification of the impeachment complaint nor fault the Senate for taking cognizance of the same.
Petitioners allegation of violation of his due process right to be heard is likewise devoid of merit. He is, in fact, being heard. As previously stated, petitioner has filed his Answer and his impeachment trial is ongoing. He is represented before the Impeachment Court by counsel who have filed pleadings and
38
This is, in fact, admitted by CJ Corona himself. See Petition, p. 17.
28
motions in his defense.
There is thus absolutely nothing to
support his claim that his due process right to be heard has been violated.
Third. CJ Corona claims that the Impeachment Court gravely abused its discretion when it proceeded with the impeachment trial despite the alleged patent absence of probable cause against him.
Again, with due respect, the argument is without merit.
There
is
no
requirement
under
the
third
mode
of
impeachment in paragraph 4, Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution that the House of Representatives should first establish probable cause before a public official can be
impeached.
Neither does the provision require the Senate to
determine the existence of probable cause before proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In fact, paragraph 4 mandates the immediate transmittal of the impeachment complaint to the Senate when it treats the verified complaint as automatically constituting the articles of impeachment. The Senate, on the other hand, has the
constitutional duty to immediately proceed with the impeachment
29
trial once the articles of impeachment are filed with it, regardless of the amount of evidence that supports it. This duty of the
Senate is clear from the unqualified language of the Constitution that trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
Finally, in questioning the Impeachment Courts decision to retain Article 2.3 of the Impeachment Complaint and accept evidence on the basis thereof, petitioner seeks a review and determination by this Honorable Court of the sufficiency of the substance of the Impeachment Complaint, and the actions taken by the Impeachment Court on the same.
With utmost due respect, it is submitted that the Honorable Supreme Court is not empowered under the Constitution to do so.
Outside of paragraph (6), Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, there are no other judicially discoverable and manageable standards by which the actions of the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, may be examined by the Honorable Supreme that Court. there This is a is a mute but eloquent
manifestation
textually
demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue on impeachment trial to the Senate, a coordinate political department of the Honorable Supreme Court.
30
Necessarily, all issues related to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Articles of Impeachment, the admissibility and quantum of evidence required for conviction and the propriety of the issuance of subpoenae for the production of evidence, should be left to the sound discretion of the Impeachment Court, considering that the same are political questions outside the ambit of the Honorable Courts certiorari jurisdiction. To reiterate, this rule is mandated by the Honorable Supreme Courts ruling in Francisco and Gutierrez.
Inasmuch
as
the
Honorable
Supreme
Court
has
no
jurisdiction to pass upon the sufficiency of the impeachment complaint, it is most respectfully submitted that it cannot review the evidence and the manner of their submission to the Impeachment Court in support of the allegations in the
Impeachment Complaint against CJ Corona. The Honorable Supreme Court has likewise no jurisdiction to pass upon the propriety of the Resolutions dated January 27, 2012 and February 6, 2012 issued by the Impeachment Court. In said Resolutions, the Impeachment Court allowed the presentation of evidence on paragraph 2.3 of the Impeachment Complaint and the issuance of subpoenae for the bank accounts of CJ Corona.
31
Moreover, to allow a public official being impeached to raise to the Honorable Supreme Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the Impeachment Complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process, one that may even go beyond the terms of the Senators-Judges hearing the
impeachment case. This is clearly not what the Constitution intended. As aptly observed in Nixon vs. US:
In addition to the textual commitment argument, we are persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability. Xxx We agree with the Court of Appeals that opening the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachment would expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years of chaos. Xxx This lack of finality would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated. Equally uncertain is the question of what relief a court may give other than simply setting aside the judgment of conviction. Could it order the reinstatement of a convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim?39 (Emphasis supplied.)
Impeachment is inarguably a political act exercised by the Legislature, a political body elected by and directly accountable to the people. This power is lodged in those who represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the
39
Supra.
32
objects of it may be such as cannot easily be reached by an ordinary tribunal.40
Full discretion is vested in Congress, both the House and the Senate, to determine whether or not an officer should be impeached, subject only to constitutionally provided limits
provided under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
Thus, all issues, matters or questions affecting, relating or referring to, in connection with, or arising from, the determination offense of what political constitutes questions, an the
impeachable
involve
resolution of which are left to the wisdom of Congress. These issues of include, the but are not in limited the to, the of
sufficiency
allegations
Articles
Impeachment, the materiality, relevance, competency, admissibility and quantum of evidence required for
conviction, the propriety of the issuance of subpoenae for the production of evidence and other incidental questions.
Although ostensibly crafted to allege procedural issues on violations of the right to due process, this petition in truth and in fact raises issues of substance. With all due respect, the
40
Labovitz, John R., Presidential Impeachment, 20 (1978) as cited in Concurring Opinion (Sereno, J.) in Gutierrez, supra.
33
Honorable Supreme Court cannot give due course to this petition without contravening the Constitution. The function to initiate, try and decide impeachment cases is solely vested in Congress. The political character of the process is underscored by a degree of thus imprecision allowing in the offenses sufficient subject leeway of to
impeachment,
Congress
describe the acts as impeachable or not.41
To give due course to this petition and grant petitioner injunctive relief would be tantamount to effectively deciding the outcome of the impeachment case in gross arrogation of an exclusive constitutional duty accorded to a separate and
independent branch of Government. This, the Honorable Supreme Court simply cannot do.
III. SUBJECTING THE ONGOING IMPEACHMENT TRIAL TO JUDICIAL REVIEW DEFEATS THE VERY ESSENCE OF IMPEACHMENT.
Impeachment by the Legislature as representatives of the People is the only constitutional check on members of the Honorable Supreme Court under our constitutional system.42
41 42
Concurring Opinion (Sereno, J.) in Gutierrez, supra. Nixon v. US, supra.
34
With utmost due respect, permitting judicial review over impeachment matters unrelated to any of the express
constitutional limitations thereon is tantamount to installing the Honorable Supreme Court as the final reviewing authority over a process meant to check its own actions. Questions will necessarily arise as to the integrity and independence of the Honorable Supreme Court in deciding such matters, especially when the same involves the head of the entire Judiciary, as in this case. A decision by the Honorable Supreme Court under these
circumstances may be perceived to have been rendered with partiality, and may not gain the trust of the People. Furthermore, the Constitution provided impeachment as the only means to review a class of impeachable officers. Subjecting the
impeachment process to judicial review by the Supreme Court will give its Members an unfair advantage over the other groups of impeachable officers. This absurd and expectedly self-defeating situation surely could not have been intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Concomitantly, and with all due respect, the Senate, pursuant to its duty under the Constitution, cannot permit such situation to occur.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND CJ CORONAS OBLIGATION TO DECLARE AND PUBLICLY DISCLOSE HIS ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH
35
PREVAIL OVER HIS CLAIM OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF DEPOSITS; HENCE, THE SUBPOENAE SUBJECT OF THIS CASE WERE CORRECTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY ISSUED. The constitutional command of public accountability has been enshrined as early as the 1973 Constitution. Section 1, Article XIII thus states:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people.
At the time, the means of enforcing such command was only statutory in character. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 301943 states that public officers and employees shall file a true, detailed and sworn declaration of their assets, liabilities and income with their respective department heads, or in the case of a department head or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President.
The 1987 Constitution similarly provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.44 It, however, strengthened the command of public accountability and constitutionalized the obligation of public officers and
43 44
Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
36
employees to declare their assets, liabilities, net worth and income.
Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets liabilities and net worth.45 In the case of Members of the Honorable Supreme Court, their declaration of assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.46 These are constitutional provisions which must be followed.47
Clearly, a public official (much less one who has been impeached) has no constitutional right to privacy over his bank deposits. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records, as such information is voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.48
45 46
Id., Art. XI, Sec. 17. Ibid., emphasis supplied. 47 xxx in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. (Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System 48 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-443 (1976).
37
Accordingly, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended,49 obligates public officials and employees to accomplish and submit sworn declarations of their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests, including those of their spouses and of their unmarried minor children living in their households. This requirement, where full disclosure of wealth is mandated, is the means to achieve the policy of public accountability of all public officers and employees.50 This holds especially true in impeachment cases.
In his petition, CJ Corona essentially claims that the impeachment proceedings should be enjoined on the following grounds: (a) his rights to procedural due process and the rules on pleading have been violated by the immediate transmittal of the verified Impeachment Complaint to the Senate; and (b) the subpoenae issued by the Impeachment Court violate the rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency bank deposits as provided by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (FCDA).
These procedural and statutory rules must, however, yield to CJ Coronas clear constitutional obligation to declare and publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth. In case of a conflict
49 50
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. The Ombudsman, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau et al v. Valeroso, G.R. No. 167828, April 2, 2007.
38
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because it is the basic law to which all other laws must conform.51
In
determining
whether
CJ
Corona
should
be
held
accountable for his alleged misdeeds, the Impeachment Court must be allowed to conduct its proceedings judiciously and without intervention.
With all due respect, the Honorable Supreme Court cannot possibly prevent the Impeachment Court from performing its duty under the Constitution upon a mere invocation of statutory and procedural rules.
Re: The Issuance of Subpoena Covering CJ Coronas Foreign Currency Accounts
As stated above, the constitutional command of public accountability and CJ Coronas obligation to fully declare and publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth should prevail over the statutory rule on absolute confidentiality of deposits under the FCDA.
51
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.
39
This is evident under the general law on bank secrecy, Republic Act No. 1405, which covers all deposits whether in domestic or foreign currency.52 Under said law, the confidentiality of deposits does not apply in cases of impeachment or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.53 Clearly, the policy of public
accountability should not be subverted by statutory rules such as confidentiality of deposits. Thus:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.54 (Emphasis supplied.)
CJ Corona has publicly admitted ownership of several foreign currency deposit accounts and vowed to disclose them in due time.55 CJ Corona is not permitted to dictate when he will publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth. In issuing the Subpoenae, the Impeachment Court only sought to enforce CJ Coronas constitutional obligation to fully declare and publicly disclose his assets.
52
Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189206, June 8, 2011. 53 Republic Act No. 1405, Sec. 2. 54 Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006. 55 Disclosure In Due Time, Says CJ, The Philippine Star, February 11, 2012, p. 1.
40
Moreover,
CJ
Coronas
foreign
currency
deposits
(the
ownership of which he has admitted publicly) ceased to be absolutely confidential from the very moment he became a public officer. Petitioner cannot invoke the rule on absolute
confidentiality in assailing the inquiry into his foreign currency deposits.
To emphasize, the FCDA was enacted: (a) to promote and encourage foreign currency deposits and investments in the Philippines; and (b) to give protection to foreign lenders and investors from which said deposits and investments will flow.56 It was never intended to protect local depositors, much less public officers who might have foreign currency deposits in Philippine banks. More significantly, the law was never meant to be used by public officers to renege on their constitutional obligation to disclose their assets, liabilities and net worth, or even by ordinary citizens to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus:
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate
56
Last two Whereas Clauses, Republic Act No. 6426; Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997); cf. Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, supra.
41
the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. 57
Whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.58 Although the FCDA contains a rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits, this rule should be interpreted together with the underlying legislative policy under Republic Act No. 1405 on the supremacy of public accountability over the confidentiality of bank deposits. In other words, the rule on absolute
confidentiality under the FCDA must give way to more paramount public interests such as the accountability of public officers and employees.
If at all, it is Republic Act No. 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law), and not Republic Act No. 6246 (FDCA), which applies in the case of CJ Corona and all public officers and employees. Republic Act No. 1405 provides exceptions to the confidentiality of deposits of whatever nature founded on the principle of accountability of public officers and employees over the general rule of
confidentiality, among which are cases of impeachment. The Impeachment Court may therefore legally inquire into the bank
57 58
Salvacion, supra. City of Naga v. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049, May 31, 1976.
42
accounts, whether these be in local or foreign currency, of CJ Corona.
In any event, assuming again for the sake of argument that the FCDA applies, the inquiry into CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits is an exception to the rule on absolute confidentiality.
First. Section 7 of the FCDA states that the Monetary Board of the Central Bank (now the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or BSP) shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the said Act which shall take effect after publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks.
Section 76, Part V (Foreign Exchange Transactions) of the 2009 and 2010 BSP Manual of Regulations for Banks provides that foreign currency deposits may be inquired into pursuant to a lawful order issued by a competent court. The Resolution and Subpoenae issued by the Impeachment Court directing PS Bank and BPI representatives to produce bank documents covering CJ Coronas foreign currency deposits are inarguably lawful orders issued by a competent court under which a bank
43
inquiry and the issuance of subpoenae in relation thereto may be justified.
Second. Jurisprudence shows that the strict provisions on confidentiality and exemption from processes of foreign currency deposits may be relaxed when the purpose of the law is not being served, and in the interest of substantial justice.
In
Salvacion,59
this
Honorable
Court
sustained
the
garnishment of the foreign currency deposits of a foreign transient who was held civilly liable for having raped the petitioner in said case. The Honorable Supreme Court explained that the FCDA failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality, and that the
application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. It was further held that the FCDA is primarily intended to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and cannot possibly be applied to foreign currency deposits of mere transients.
In China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,60 the Honorable Court held that the owner of funds in a foreign currency account unlawfully taken and undisputably deposited in the account of his daughter may inquire into said deposits even
59 60
Supra. G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006.
44
without his daughters written consent. The Honorable Court reasoned that it was not the intent of the legislature when it enacted the law on secrecy on foreign currency deposits to perpetuate injustice.
The questioned Resolution dated February 6, 2012 and the subpoenae issued pursuant thereto seek to inquire into foreign currency deposits in the name of CJ Corona, the highest magistrate of the land. He is accused of grave and serious offenses which may constitute betrayal of public trust. Public accountability, paramount public interest and the interests of substantial justice demand that such an inquiry be allowed, so that the Impeachment Court may properly determine whether the publics trust in CJ Corona has indeed been betrayed. The rule on absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits cannot be used to obstruct proceedings and processes seeking to enforce public accountability. To do so would be a great and rank injustice to the Filipino people.
Finally, in an attempt to exclude the information sought by the Subpoenae, CJ Corona contends that the detailed information submitted in support of the requests for subpoenae was illegally obtained since it was mysteriously sourced and gathered by means of the fishing expedition permitted by the Impeachment
45
Court. He then contends that being the result of illegal acts, the records subpoenaed are fruits of the poisonous tree which cannot be admitted into evidence.
This contention is without merit.
In Joseph Victor G. Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and People of the Philippines,61 the Honorable Supreme Court dismissed a similar claim by petitioner therein that the subpoena covering his bank accounts must be quashed because it was obtained using extremely detailed and illegally disclosed information. This Honorable Court ruled that Republic Act No. 1405 does not provide that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Such unlawful examination would only render the person responsible therefor criminally liable. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision into the act.62
In sum, CJ Corona has no constitutional or statutory right to privacy and confidentiality of his bank deposits. On the contrary, he is constitutionally obligated to publicly disclose them as the highest Magistrate in the land. The Subpoenae issued by the
61 62
G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006. U.S. v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249 (1991), as cited in Ejercito, supra.
46
Impeachment Court simply seeks to enforce the constitutional command of public accountability and disclosure. Thus, these must be upheld.
OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

At the risk of being repetitive, it is respectfully submitted the Honorable Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of this petition (and/or grant any relief to CJ Corona) without unduly infringing upon the Senates sole and exclusive constitutional duty to try and decide impeachment cases.
Assuming again for the sake of argument that the Honorable Court may properly take cognizance of this case, CJ Coronas prayer for the issuance of a TRO must still be denied for utter lack of merit.
To be entitled to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, a petitioner must show, with clear and convincing evidence, that the following requisites are present: (a) a clear and unmistakable right; (b) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (c) there is
47
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.63
These requisites are not present in this case.
First. Far from being clear and unmistakable, CJ Coronas rights to public office and the confidentiality of his foreign currency bank accounts are, at best, disputed. To reiterate, the Senate is the final arbiter in all matters relating to the substance and conduct of an impeachment case. CJ Corona is not entitled to the issuance of any injunctive writ against the Senates
proceedings. Furthermore, the constitutional principle of public accountability and CJ Coronas obligation to fully and publicly disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over the statutory rule on absolute confidentiality of deposits under the FCDA.
Second. As a public official, and no less than the Chief Justice of the highest court of the land, CJ Corona is under an obligation to properly and truthfully disclose all his assets, liabilities and net worth and that of his spouse and unmarried minor children. An inquiry into CJ Coronas foreign currency bank accounts should therefore not result in any material or substantial damage
63
Boncodin v. National Power Corp. Employees Consolidated Union, 503 SCRA 611 (2006).
48
considering that these accounts should have been disclosed by him in the first place.
Third. There is no urgent and paramount necessity to prevent, through the issuance of an injunctive writ, any serious damage to CJ Corona.
As
recognized
by
the
Honorable
Supreme
Court
in
Gutierrez, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender. If there are any rights that should be protected by the Honorable Supreme Court, it should be those of the People. To do this, the Honorable Court must deny petitioner injunctive relief.
In fine, the unhampered continuation of the impeachment proceedings against CJ Corona would strengthen the Constitution, the institutions of the Government, the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. It must be stressed that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.64 The subject impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is
64
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 1.
49
being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected. Verily, the injury being claimed by the Honorable CJ Corona allegedly resulting from the subject impeachment proceedings has no factual and legal basis. Perforce, the petition must be dismissed.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition be DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
Other reliefs just or equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for ad cautelam ex superabundanti.
Makati City for Manila, February 24, 2012.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Solicitor General Roll No. 25719 IBP (Lifetime) No. 00037, 1-18-93 MCLE Exemption No. III-0008523
KARL B. MIRANDA
50
Assistant Solicitor General Roll No. 33306 IBP (Lifetime) No. 04423, 1-9-2003 MCLE Exemption No. III-000370
MARSHA C. RECON Senior State Solicitor Roll No. 41169 IBP No. 883342, January 10, 2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003882
NOEL CEZAR T. SEGOVIA Senior State Solicitor Roll No. 40524 IBP No. 880248, 01-09-2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003843
HILARION B. BUBAN State Solicitor Roll No. 50397 IBP No. 841400 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003390, May 18, 2009
LESTER O. FIEL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 51983 IBP No. 858305, 03-15-2011 MCLE Compliance No. III-0003785
JASON T. LORENZO Associate Solicitor Roll No. 55864 IBP No. 883037, January 9, 2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-000763
51
JUDY A. LARDIZABAL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57090 IBP O.R. No. 852574, 01-26-11 MCLE Compliance No. III-0017487
DENISE S. DY Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57316 IBP (Lifetime) No. 010412, January 11, 2012 MCLE Compliance No. III-0011975
MICHAEL T. MACAPAGAL Associate Solicitor Roll No. 57135 IBP O.R. No. 879933, 01-06-12 MCLE Compliance No. III-0008492
RONALD JOHN B. DECANO Associate Solicitor Roll No. 58393 IBP No. 884741, 01-20-2012 MCLE Compliance No. (Exempted-New Lawyer)
MARLON P. BOSANTOG Attorney II Roll No. 59094 IBP No. 887196, January 20, 2012 MCLE Compliance No. (Exempted-New Lawyer) OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City Tel. Nos. 818-6301 to 09 local 239, 238 and 237 COPY FURNISHED: (by registered mail) Justice Serafin R. Cuevas (Ret.), Attys. Jose M. Roy III, Jacinto D. Jimenez,
52
Dennis T. Manalo and Noel B. Lazaro Counsel for Petitioner Suite 1902 Security Bank Center 6676 Ayala Avenue Makati City 1226 Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile Senate President Office of the Senate President Rm. 606, 6th Floor GSIS Bldg. Pasay City Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte Speaker Hon. Neil Tupas, Jr. House of Representatives Batasan Hills, Quezon City The Senate Secretary Senate of the Philippines Rm. 606, 6th GSIS Building Pasay City The Secretary General House of Representatives Batasan Hills, Quezon City Atty. Maria Valentina S. Santana-Cruz Senate Legal Counsel Senate of the Philippines Pasay City Public Information Office Supreme Court EXPLANATION For lack of time and messengerial manpower, copies of the foregoing Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti were served by registered mail, rather than by the preferred mode of personal service.
DENISE S. DY Associate Solicitor

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA

G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

COMMENT AD CAUTELAM EX SUPERABUNDANTI1

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Verified Complaint for Impeachment is fatally defective; and

2. Thereafter, the Verified Complaint for Impeachment be dismissed.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Opposition and Rejoinder.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Hence, this Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Ibid. Ibid. at (3). Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

The extent of the Supreme Courts power of expanded judicial review

Ibid. Nixon v. US, supra. Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

acted within such limits.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

460 Phil. 830 (2003).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

That is not the case here.

643 SCRA 198, 244 (2011).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Supra. Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(6).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

discretion must fail for utter lack of merit.

executive Enrique Javier was likewise granted.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

With due respect, the petitioner errs.

Due process is a guarantee of procedural fairness.33

matter and circumstances involved, the procedural requirements

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

This is, in fact, admitted by CJ Corona himself. See Petition, p. 17.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

motions in his defense.

There is thus absolutely nothing to

Again, with due respect, the argument is without merit.

Neither does the provision require the Senate to

constitutional duty to immediately proceed with the impeachment

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

objects of it may be such as cannot easily be reached by an ordinary tribunal.40

provided under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti Corona v. Senate, et al. G.R. No. 200242

describe the acts as impeachable or not.41