Description as Choice Author(s): Amartya Sen Reviewed work(s): Source: Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol.

32, No. 3 (Nov., 1980), pp. 353-369 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2662796 . Accessed: 18/02/2012 03:23
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oxford Economic Papers.

http://www.jstor.org

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE*

By AMARTYA SEN 1
DESCRIPTION is sometimescontrasted withprescription, at othertimes and withprediction. While the former differentiates statements from descriptive it value judgmentsand imperatives, latterdifferentiates frompredictive the statements. Philosophicaldiscussionsin the social sciences have tended to on and predictiveexercises,and as a consequence concentrate prescriptive the methodologicalissues involved in descriptionhave remained largely unexplored.The object of thispaper is to take up some of these issues. Boundaries are not alwaysclear-cutbetweenprescription description, and nor between prediction and description. The ambiguities have given while bemusing and amusingarguments, philosophersscope for interesting and befuddling no-nonsensepracticalman eager to get on withthe job. the Some of the discussionin thispaper will touchon these boundaryquestions, but I shall not be directly concernedwiththese classificatory problems. I believe that boundary questions are sometimes taken to be more than they are. Intellectualinterestin these issues may distract important attentionfromthe fact that imprecisionof boundaries can still leave vast It regionswithoutambiguity. is indeed possible to say a good deal about China and India withoutasserting thatthereare no ambiguities to where as the boundarybetween the two countrieslies.

2 It is fairto say that description an intellectual as activity typically is not regardedas verychallenging. characterize workin the social sciencesas To a "purely descriptive"would not normallybe regarded as high praise. The reason for this-at least in part-must rest in the idea that descriptionis largely a matter of mere observation and reporting,or reading other people's reports and summarising-at best systematizing. Whether a descriptivestatementis acceptable could be thoughtto be dependent on its and that could be resolved simplyby observing. correctness, I would like to begin withwhat I thinkis a moderateclaim,reserving the right to be controversiallater on. Description isn't just observing and it reporting; involves the exercise-possibly difficult-of selection. For example, in judging F. M. Eden's 1797 study The State of the Poor, or
*This is a revised version of the text of a public lecture given on 30th May, 1979, at the Canadian Learned Societies' Conferenceheld at the University Saskatchewan,Saskatoon. of For critical comments an earlierdraft, am mostgrateful JohnHicks and Tim Scanlon. I on I to have also benefitted fromdiscussionswithJohnFischer,Dieter Helm, Eric Hobsbawm, Isaac Levi, and Henry Wan, Jr.

354

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

in FrederichEngel's The Condition the Working-Class England in 1844, of or Johnand Barbara Hammonds' The Village Labourer1760-1832, a good deal more is involved than just checkingthe truthof the individualfacts can be characterized choosingfromthe set recorded.In fact,description as of possiblytrue statementsa subset on groundsof theirrelevance. Truth is-at best-a necessarybut not sufficient conditionforgood description. It is perhaps not an exaggeration say that any conscious act of description to contains some theory-usually implicit-about the relative importanceof the various statements I dealing withthe subject matter.1 shall call thisthe "choice basis of description".I mightadd in passing that recentdevelopused for studyingthe ments in formal choice theory can be fruitfully but I shall not pursue this suggestionin this regularitiesof description,
lecture2

3 A description can be accurate withoutbeing a good description. could It be unhelpful, even useless. We question the experton the level of factory wages in India. He answers: "Oh, it varies from place to place." True enough,of course. We ask for more description, demandingprecision.The expert now goes into details. "The integerapproximation the national of average wage in rupees," he says,"is a primenumber".I won't belabour the for pointfurther. Clearly,truth isn'ta sufficient condition a description be to good. Is it a necessarycondition?It mightappear thatthe answermustbe yes. How can a false description good? The issue is, however,more complex be than that,and there are at least two distinct sources of difficulty. fromliteraltruth First,departures may not be immediately dismissableas untrue.Indeed, approximations, metaphors,simplifications, etc., have importantroles in conveyingthe truth.Your child asks you: "How large is China?", and you reply:"Very large-it has 900 millionpeople". You may have enlightened made a statement him,but you have also almostcertainly thatis untruein termsof the exact number.900 millionmay conveythe size more efficiently-shorn unimportant of detail-than 876,493,179, even if that happens to be the exact numberat the momentyou spoke. Even that old summary statement:"Every fifth person born on earth is Chinese" has communicated about the size of China in the past, despitepitfalls something in the literalinterpretation thatstatement of and feeblejokes about the fifth
1See Koopmans (1947) and Hicks (1979), p. ix. on 2The literature generalchoice theoryis quite vast. Discussion of some of the main issues can be foumdin Herzberger(1973) and Sen (1977b, section 4). Herzberger'srecentconcern approachesto semanticsrelatescloselyto the choice basis of description, withchoice-theoretic as definedhere.

A. SEN

355

childin an Englishfamily being called Chang. Insofaras truth a necessary is conditionof good description, concept of truth the mustbe a broad one. The second problem is, I think,a good deal more complex. Description may have objectivesthe pursuitof whichcan be helped by departures from truth-even in the broad sense. Milton Friedman(1953), in particular, has in argued powerfully favourof departing fromtruth describing in realityin the contextof economic models,judgingthe meritsof the assumptions not in termsof accuracybut in the lightof theirpredictiveusefulness.I shall to have something say presently Friedman'smethodological on observations, and on Paul Samuelson's critiqueof Friedman and the "F-twist",3but at thisstage I would simplynote thatFriedmanhas drawnour attention the to importantpossibilitythat an unrealisticassumptiongiving an inaccurate description may nevertheless a usefulone forthe purpose forwhichthe be is description intended.Friedmanrestricts attention predictive his to usefulness only, but the point can be generalized, and objectives other than predictivesuccess mightalso lead to a case for departingfromthe truth. Examples can be constructed such that truthof descriptions conflicts with for usefulness prescriptive exercises,or even for communication. 4 A distinction of must,however,be made betweena description something being good in the sense of being a good one to give and it being a good descriptionof that thing. The aspiring murdererdemands from you a of description where his would-be victimhas gone, and as you point at the wrong road he proceeds in that directionwith a roar. That descriptionof where the would-be victimhas gone is, I would agree, a good one to give, but it can hardlybe accepted as a good description where the would-be of victimhas gone. The goodness of a description can be judged in termsof of but in calling a description good description a many alternative criteria, truth-in the broad sense-would seem to be a necessarycondisomething, tion.4 There isn't anything has verypuzzlinghere, even thoughthe distinction of reflects been frequently overlooked.A good description something reality it. about thatthingis some straightforward sense, ratherthandistorting This is in is so even when distortion a commendableactivity termsof some other also commendable taking everything into acobjective, and furthermore count.A cook who helps the arrestof a mass murderer mixing sleeping a by drug with his food mightwell be doing good, but that does not make his cook. cooking good, nor does it make him an outstanding
3Samuelson (1963), pp. 231-6; reprinted Stiglitz(1966), pp. 1772-8. in can be seen to be an 4In termsof M. A. Slote's (1966) "theoryof important criteria",truth of of important criterion a description being a good description something.

356

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

5 I turnnow to the methodological disputebetweenFriedmanand Samuelson.5 Friedman argued that the appropriateness an assumptionmust be of judged not by its realism but by its predictiveusefulness.Furthermore, Friedmansaw an inverserelationship between realismof assumptionsand its predictivecontribution.
Insofaras a theorycan be said to have 'assumptions'at all, and insofaras their 'realism' can be judged independently the validityof predictions, relation of the betweenthe significance a theory of is and the 'realism' of its assumptions almost the opposite of that suggestedby the view under criticism. and Truly important will be foundto have 'assumptions'thatare widelyinaccusignificant hypotheses rate descriptive of representations reality, the and, in general,the more significant the more unrealistic the assumptions(in thissense).6 theory,

Characterizing approach as "F-twist",Samuelson has attackedFriedthe man's positionsharply. the abstract "If models containempirical falsities, we mustjettisonthe models,not gloss over theirinadequacies." "The empirical harmdone by the F-twistis this.In practiceit leads to Humpty-Dumptiness. Lewis Carrollhad Humpty-Dumpty words any way he wantedto. I had use in mind somethingdifferent: Humpty-Dumpty uses the F-twist to say, 'What I choose to call the admissable amount of unrealismand empirical is invalidity the tolerable amount of unrealism"'.' I am not presently concernedwithwhether Friedmanis correct thinking in thatan inverserelationship tendsto existbetweenaccurateassumptions and predictivesuccess. The important point to note is that if such an inverse were to obtain, Friedman would be quite willingto sacrifice relationship accuracy. Stanley Wong (1973) has pointed out that Samuelson's critique takes insufficient of the "instrumental" note natureof Friedman'smethodological concernwithprediction.8 position,and the latter'soverriding This, I believe, differ an issue that on is indeed the case, but the two views of description focus. No matterwhat the goes well beyond the question of the predictive aim happens to be, as long as it is not-or does not include-making only can conceivablyarise accurate statements about observed facts,a conflict The issue is a between descriptive accuracyand the aim of the description. good deal more general than the so-called "F-twist", and concerns the of thatcan be conflict between aims of description and the truth statements used to further these aims.
5See also Nagel (1963). 6Friedman(1953), p. 14. 7Samuelson (1963), p. 236. 8See also Boland (1979).

A. SEN

357

6 Anotherdifferent is motivation involvedin Nicholas Kaldor's9 advocacy of departurefromtruthful in description, favourof what he calls "stylized facts". These aren't factsin the sense of being true,but theycommunicate rapidly certain thingsthat are close enough to being true, but avoid a plethoraof details. An example: thatin the Westerneconomies the capitalover manydecades and so did the share of outputratio remainedstationary wages in nationalincome.Not exactlytrueforall the alluded economies.In fact,not exactlytrueforany of the alluded economies.Still,ifthe variations are relatively small in comparisonwithother,relatedvariables,the simplification will have certainobvious advantages. I have to reportthat in this case the advantages were probably rather who used unequallyshared,withthe biggestshare goingto Kaldor himself, these stylized facts to illustratehis well-known models of growth and distribution. thatwasn't all therewas to it,and some of the stylized But facts succeeded in enhancingcomprehension, undoubtedly drawingattentionto even thoughtheywere not quite accurate. important observed regularities, issue here isn'twhetherthese particular However, the important simplificationswere all informative withoutbeing misleadingbut that the methodof using "stylizedfacts" can indeed have thisproperty. There is nothingexceptional to economics in making stylized facts a efficient possible and potentially methodof understanding reality. Fictionis a generalmethodof comingto gripwithfacts.There is nothing illegitimate in being helped by War and Peace to an understanding the Napoleonic of wars in Russia, or by Grapes of Wrathto digesting aspects of the Depression. There is no reason why descriptive in statements economics have to withcomprehension aspire aftermechanicalaccuracyeven when it conflicts and absorption.There is, of course, an obvious objection to presenting non-facts dressedup as facts,but thereis no need to do thisonce non-facts are accepted as ligitimate descriptiveinstruments themselves.Such a dewill be good in the sense of being useful,but-as scriptionof something already explained-must not be confused with its being a good-or of realistic-description that thing. 7 that "we mustjettisonthe models" that "contain Samuelson's argument empiricalfalsities"seems to be based on a verynarrowview of objectivesof description. However,Samuelsonwasn'tonlyobjectingto the use of empirical falsitiesin models, but also disputingFriedman's use of words. The deals withthis.This relatescloselyto our to reference Humpty-Dumptiness
9See Kaldor (1960a, 1960b).

358

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

between a descriptionthat is good and a good descriptionof distinction Friedmannot only defendsthe use of inaccurateassumptionin something. but also employsa new conceptof realism.It is "the test predictive theory, assumptions "as more or less realisalternative by prediction"in classifying tic" that Friedman embraces and which he sees others being "necessarily driven" to accept (p. 33). the maywell justify of usefulness an inaccuratedescription The predictive descripbut choice of thatdescription, whydoes it make it a more realistic natureof Friedman'spositionmay be adequate in tion? The "instrumental" but to call it "realistic" is a defendingthe choice of such an assumption, must criterion that a description assertion, violatingthe important separate be true, in the broad sense, to be realistic.Samuelson's objection to this character violationcannot be dismissedby a pointerto the "instrumental" of Friedman'seconomic methodology. of The defencethatFriedmanprovidesof thischaracterisation "realism" the of conception. of mainlytakes theform denying viability any alternative
"realistic" in the A theoryor its "assumptions"cannot possiblybe thoroughly "realisimmediatedescriptive sense so oftenassignedto thisterm.A completely tic" theoryof the wheat marketwould have to include not only the conditions the directly underlying supplyand demand forwheat but also the kindof coins or of creditinstruments used to make exchanges;the personalcharacteristics wheattraderssuch as the colour of each trader's hair and eyes, his antecedentsand anteceeducation, the numberof membersof his family,their characteristics, dents, and education, etc.; the kind of soil on which the wheat was grown,its the physicaland chemical characteristics, weatherprevailingduringthe growing of growingthe wheat and of the season; the personal characteristics the farmers to Any consumers who willultimately it; and so on indefinitely. attempt move use veryfar in achievingthis kind of "realism" is certainto rendera theoryutterly useless.'0

In assessing this objection it is necessary to consider the distinction but betweenrealismin the sense of "nothing the truth"and thatin the sense in can of "the whole truth". assumption be realistic thatit is truewithout An the claim being made that it is exhaustivein capturingall aspects of the reality.Advocates of realismin the sense of "nothingbut the truth"need withFriedman'sposition not demand "the whole truth".The dissatisfaction on the part of criticssuch as Samuelson does not arise fromFriedman's rejectionof "the whole truth",but fromhis rejectionof "nothingbut the truth". from is for The distinction important Friedman'sdiscussionof departures of realismand the criteriaof acceptability such departures.
What is the criterionby which to judge whethera particulardeparturefrom business realismis or is not acceptable? Why is it more "unrealistic"in analysing of coststhanthe colour of their behaviourto neglectthe magnitude businessmen's
l'Friedman (1953), p. 32.

A. SEN

359

eyes? The obvious answeris because the first makes more difference business to behaviourthan the second; but thereis no way of knowingthatthisis so simply thatbusinessmen have costs of different do by observing magnitudes and eyes of different colour. Clearly it can only be known by comparingthe effecton the between actual and predictedbehaviourof takingone factoror the discrepancy other into account. Even the most extremeproponentsof realisticassumptions are thusnecessarily drivento reject theirown criterion and to accept the testb prediction when theyclassify alternative assumptionsas more or less realistic.

I shall have something say presently the predictive to on focus. What is, in however,more important the presentcontextis to note that"to neglect"' the colour of businessmen's eyes need not involve any departure from "nothingbut the truth".The factthat a model does not bringin the colour of businessmen's eyes does not implythatit is being assumed thatbusinessmen have eyes of the same colour. This neglect would not, thus, be a The "departure fromrealism" in the sense of makinguntruestatements. need to neglectsome aspects of the truthand therebydepartingfromthe whole truth does not establishthe necessityof departingfromnothing but and Friedman'sdismissalof the viability the traditional of view of the truth, realism seems over-hasty. 8 While the precedingargument disputesFriedman'streatment realism, of it does not disestablish Friedman'srejectionof truthas a necessarycondition of acceptability a description. of An untruedescriptionof something of may not be a good description thatthing-nor a realisticdescription. But it can serve some otherobjective efficiently, if so, could well be chosen and on that ground. However, Friedman's concentrationon predictivesuccess as the only objective he considers, also makes his treatmentof the choice basis of descriptiona very limited one. Description may well be geared to some objective other than prediction, e.g., normativeanalysis,or efficient comor munication, even satisfying idle curiosity. Even the preference confor on costsratherthanon the colour of theireyes-to centrating businessmen's return Friedman'sexample-may arise from to some non-predictive motivation.For example,within normative the the perspective, businessmen's costs be might relevantto some notionof desert,e.g., a person deservesto get a rewardforthe costs he has undertaken, and thismay give no place at all to the colour of the person's eyes. The nature of economic questions reflects varietyof interests a that the subject has to cater to. Has the distribution income turnedmore unequal of in country Are the residents country betterfed todaythanbefore?Is x? of y
"1Friedman (1953), pp. 32-3.

360

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

moderntechnology getting easilyabsorbed in country Has tradeunionism z? influenced distribution income under capitalism?Are therebusiness the of cycles still in the Western economies? How large is the Soviet Union's international trade? How should we plan the use of exhaustibleresources? Does progressivetaxation affectincentives?Will the expansion of money supply-this one in honourof MiltonFriedman-expand pricesproportionately?This bag of assortedquestionsreflects plurality motivation a of thatis not reducible to some kind of single "ultimateobjective". They represent predictiveinvestigation, normative concernas well as curiosity related to a fromsympathy satisfying to varietyof interests one's spiritof inquiry.A monolithic characterization the objective of description of will leave us with a methodology ill-suitedto the subject. 9 The multiplicity motivation of has been discussedso far in the particular contextof departures fromaccuracy,but it is of course a muchmore central issue than this particularcontextmightsuggest.Even when no departures from truthare involved, there is-as already discussed-the problem of a selection,choosingfromthe set of truestatements subsetof relevantones. Criteriaof relevanceare crucialto thischoice basis of description goingwell beyond the issue of truth. Methodologicaldiscussionsin economics have tended to concentrateon predictiveand prescriptive concerns,and seem to have had the effectof This bias has had a ignoringother motivationsthat stimulateinquiry.12 in ratherinpoverishing role on the descriptive traditions economics. The choice basis of description thatprecipitates may relateto the curiosity need not reflect interand this curiosity inquiry, predictiveor prescriptive ests. Indeed, even the use of language can relate to selectionbased on other In typesof curiosity. responseto the question: "Is China a large country?", we accepted the answer: "Yes, it has 900 millionpeople", basing the notion of the size of country the size of its population.However, China has less on surfacearea than Canada, fewertigersthan India, fewerpolar bears than accounts-no the Soviet Union, and-according to some early enthusiastic China as largerthanCanada, India or the fliesat all. The case fordescribing Soviet Union clearlyrests in our greaterinterestin human beings than in of square miles,tigers, polar bears and flies.But it is not a reflection some greaterpredictive merit,norof some obvious prescriptive interest. The view of human beings having no interests whateverother than predictiveand concernsdoes some injusticeto the species. prescriptive
12Inthisthereis unity betweenmembersof widelydifferent schools of economicphilosophy, e.g., Milton Friedman(1953), Gunnar Myrdal (1954), Joan Robinson (1964).

A. SEN

361

The non-predictive, non-prescriptive motivations are particularly important to bear in mind in understanding role of "theories of value" in the economics,particularly labour theory value. The labour theory the of can, in fact,be given various intrepretations related to the motivationsinvolved. One is that of a predictive theory-in particularthat of relativeprices and distribution, and it encompasses the so-called "law of value". Another is normative, providing theoryof entitlements. third, a A whichis frequently between different featuresof production missed,is a way of discriminating and exchangeby focussing elementsof human involvement.13 Value, in on Marx's (1887) words,is "a relationbetweenpersonsexpressedas a relation between things"(p. 45). The last interpretation frequently is taken to be "metaphysical", Joan as Robinson (1964) puts it, describing also as "a mere rigmaroleof words" it (p. 39). Whyso? Because it picksup fromthe description production of and exchange only some featuresas being speciallysignificant, leaving the rest untouched? The discrimination makes the descriptionarbitrary, many as criticshave seen it. But, as I have already tried to argue, any description involvesdiscrimination selection,and the real question is the relevance and of the selectionprocess to the objectives of description. I have claimed elsewhere14 that the methodologicalissue can be more easily understoodby looking at other descriptive statements which the in discrimination involvedcannotbe reducedentirely predictive prescripto or tive interests. Consider the statement"Michaelangelo produced the statue of David". There is an obvious sense in whichthiswould be accepted as a realistic description,despite its being informationally selective and the selectionprocess not being primarily motivatedby predictionor prescription. The productionprocess in making the statue actually involved not merely Michaelangelo, but his helpers, a huge block of stone, chisels, scaffoldings, but the description etc., quoted focusseson Michaelangeloonly as the mostrelevantbit of information. Note thatthe discrimination cannot be based on any marginal productivity considerationin the usual neoclassical sense. Without Michaelangelo, no statue, but withoutstone, no statue either!But this does not give the same statusto the two statements "Michaelangeloproducedthe statueof David" and "thisstone producedthe statueof David" (or "this stone quarryproducedthe statueof David"). The other motivations, particular, selectionprocess reflects in that of capturing the source of the imagination displayedin the statue. The labour theory of value, in its descrptiveinterpretation, shows a similar-but not the same-type of discrimination, focussing-in thiscaseon the human effortdirectlyand indirectly involved in the process of
14Sen (1978a) pp. 176-8.

"This has been best discussed by Maurice Dobb (1937).

362

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

productionand exchangeof commodities. assessingthe labour theoryof In value as a description productionand exchange,it is the cogencyof this of focus that has to be assessed, includingits ability,if any, to capture our interest comparedwithothermethodsof discrimination. Examiningonlythe theory's predictive success,or its normative relevance,will not even beginto providea completeassessmentof the labour theoryof value. And to call it metaphysicalbecause it is informationally discriminating involves a total failureto perceive the natureof description an activity. as 10 I turnnow to the otherof the two greattheoriesof value, viz., the utility have predictiveand normativeinterest, theory.Again, utility descriptions The joys and but once again theydo not exhaustthe descriptive motivations. of sufferings human beings and their deprivationsand fulfilments have interestof theirown. Even classical political economistswere much conin cerned withrelated-though not identical-featuresin theirinterset use value.15It is thispart of the descriptive motivation thathas been least well of most notablyby the theory served by recentdevelopments utility theory, of revealed preference. Focussingonlyon predicting behaviour,the richness of human psychology has been substantially to ignored,refusing see anyor thingin utility happinessotherthan choice. As the "father"of revealed Paul Samuelson,puts it: behaviouris to be "explained in preference theory, termsof preference, whichare in turndefinedonly by behaviour."'16 This has led to an approach that is-despite some predictivemeritsin remarkably mute about humanjoys and sufferings whicheconomicsused from to take a lot of interest.The result is a descriptiveimpoverishment many perspectives,including-among others -normativerelevance, since many of the common normsdo relate preciselyto the ignoreddescriptive features.17 Attemptsat overcomingthis lacuna by defining utilitynot in termsof choice but independently, as a person'sown conceptof his own say, well-being,but assumingthat people do in fact choose accordingto their thisyieldsa view of raise otherdifficulties. particular, In respectiveutilities, his to other than maximizing own wellman totallyuncommitted anything of being irrespective politicalvalues, class interests, community spiritsand social conventions, except insofaras these thingsaffecthis perceptionof
15This is especiallytrueof Karl Marx, and as he himself puts it: "use-value plays a farmore important part in my economics than in economicshitherto"(Marx (1879-80, p. 39)). In the subject indexof volume I of Capital (Marx (1887)), edited by Engels, the first reference "use to value" is to pages 1-114. This aspect of Marx's concernseems to be frequently overlooked in characterisations Marx's "treatment value". of of 16Samuelson (1947), pp. 90-1. 17See Hicks (1958, 1974). Also Sen (1979).

A. SEN

363

model ofman-the "rationalfool"'8 hisownwell-being. This extraordinary has been widelyused in economicswithverylittleempiricaltesting. to Insularity permitted has thistheory remainin vogue, despite conspicuous failureto accountformanytypesof humanbehaviour,e.g., whypeople for vote in large elections,whypeople are ready to fight and even die fora cause, or why so many seem convincedthat theydo many thingsout of a sense of commitment ratherthan pure pursuitof self interest.Predicting futurechoice on the basis of past choice is not in itselfa bad predictive problems).But if thatis used as the only strategy (despite some well-known focusof the theory utility, of thenthereis either silence on manyimportant issues (when "utility" is treated as just another name for a numerical of reflector choice), or thereis a good deal of senseless noise. While there have been some attemptsrecently break away fromthis to highly limited model, e.g., in the works of Hirsch (1976), Hirschman (1977), Leibenstein(1976), Scitovsky(1976), and a few other authors,the dominant traditionof behavioural studies in economics remains largely shackled to that model. We have, thus,the strangespectacle of two great theories of "value"-each rich in descriptivefeatures in their original penuryor to factual irrelevance.The formulation-reducedto descriptive labour theory of value is dismissed as "metaphysical", or at best an The intermediate imperfect productin a theoryof price and distribution. to one of silentchoice-no questionsasked as delimitation utility of theory to what lies behind choice-stifles descriptive inquiryinto human joys and in The sufferings. dominantmethodology economicswithits extraordinarily narrow interpretation objectives of descriptionhas produced molehills of out of mountains. 11 for Descriptiveeconomics has suffered a long time fromthe imperialism of predictive economics.Recentlyit has suffered certainamountalso from a economics. Prescriptive the new and expanding empire of prescriptive economicshad itselfa ratherhard timeearlierin the positivist heyday.The economics that can be seen in such works as Lionel debunkingof warfare Robbin's The Natureand Significance Economic Science'9 kept prescripof tive studiessomewhatimmersedin a pool of apology fromthe mid-thirties until relatively Welfare economics was for a long time the "unrecently. of touchable" in the community economics and when economistsspoke use thatlovelyexpressionbroughtinto circulation "qua economist"-to by
of 18Fora critiqueof the propensity economic theoryto relyon the "rationalfool", see Sen (1977a). For a "balanced" account of the issues involved, see Hahn and Hollis (1979), "Introduction". 19Robbins(1932).

364

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

positivism-theytried to speak in a value-free"scientific"language, with "expletives" deleted. Welfare economicswas seen as the subject, if not of whichthe cool positivist at scientists expletives, least of emotiveutterances, found "meaningless"in termsof theirnarrowtheoryof meaning. The balloon did ultimately burst,and prescriptive economicshas certainly forms of emergedin recentyearsas a vigorousfield-both in the traditional welfareeconomicsand politicaleconomyas well as in the shape of the new mattersare no disciplineof social choice theory.Debates on prescriptive longer treated as just a case of "thy blood or mine", to quote Lionel Robbin's influentialcharacterization.But while freeing itself from the economics has, I would now like to argue, positivistprison, prescriptive quite oftenimposed its own shackleson the disciplineof description. There has been the propositionthat every factual statementinvolves and use, this claim, which I implicitvalues. In its original formulation believe is false, may have played a challenging part in the dialecticswith positivism."So you want facts only, no values, because they are illegitimate," the argument ran, "but you can't have facts without values. Touche'!" But why must every factual statementinvolve values? The basis of the claim seems to rest uneasily on the belief, which is correct, that any involvessome selection.What is not correctis the further belief description that the selection must be based on some explicitor implicitprescriptive The criteriaused for selection,as I have been arguing,may be criterion. aimed at objectives other than prescription, e.g., catering to curiosity. take thisforgranted.There is, of course,a sense Cosmologistsor historians in whichthistoo involvesa judgment, wit,it is right cater to people's to to in But curiosity the choice basis of description.20 thisdoes not implythatthe is selectionhas to be done in termsof normative interests. Prescription one of several possible objectives of descriptiveselection, and to assert its is of economicsby that omnipresence to replace the imperialism predictive of prescriptive economics. 12 The enormous success of Gunnar Myrdal's Political Elements in the Development Economic Theoryowes not a littleto this spiritof hunting of for values in factual statements. While Myrdal entered the exercise as a positivist, looking for contrabandvalues, he ended up asserting something close to the impossibility prescription-free of descriptivestatements(see Myrdal (1958)). There was, however, some haste and a good deal of
20Even the choice of words reflects judgments, when "a clusterterm"is used, as to "what is or is not important"(Slote (1966), p. 223).

A. SEN

365

unestablishedassertion in detectingunderneatheach bed a surreptitious head. prescriptive the need for The chief source of confusionhere rests in confounding selection in the choice basis of descriptionwith the need to cater to identifiOne consequence of thisillegitimate ends in particular. prescriptive questions to of cation is the growth the recenttendency convertdescriptive ones. To take an example, considerthe question of into as if prescriptive measurementof inequalities of income. While there is little doubt that interestprovides one reason for inquiringinto economic inprescriptive equality,the question "How much inequalityof incomes is there?" cannot But interpretation. in a paper published be fullycapturedby a prescriptive the reinterpreted questionin ethicalterms in 1920, Hugh Dalton,21 in effect, to mean: "How much loss of social welfareis therefrominequality?" remainedsubdued under the positivist re-interpretation This prescriptive afterDalton's paper was published,but with hegemonyestablishedshortly backlash, this has now re-emergedin the frontline. Tony the prescriptive Atkinson's(1970) ethicalindex of economic inequalitymeasuresinequality in termsof the same approach as thatof Dalton, but does it more elegantly the measuring social welfareloss in termsof through and moreeconomically of features equivalentincome.This has the consequence thatthe descriptive income inequalityare all drowned in a normativeflood, producingsome of consequences. An income distribution (99,1) has to ratherextraordinary is taken to be the sum of equal if social welfare be declared as perfectly of individualutilitiesgiven by a linear function individualincomes, since there is no social welfare loss from inequality in this case. Other odd consequences-some more serious than others-have been pointed out.22 would perhaps remain unaffected these by A hard-headedprescriptivist consequences if he really does believe that income inequality has no meaningat all, and would probablysay something independentdescriptive like: "Why not describe(99,1) as equal ifthereis no social welfareloss from this inequality,I mean, discrepancy?"But inequalitydoes seem to have and meaningtoo whichpeople acknowledge,23 to jettisonall that descriptive the subject. One of the ironies of the situationis that Tony impoverishes in featuresof inequality Britain(works Atkinson'sown workson descriptive which in depth and relevance remain, in my opinion, quite unexcelled
and forcefulrejection of this approach, see 21Dalton (1920). For an uncompromising Wiles (1974). 22See Hansson (1977) and Sen (1978b). in thatthereare no ambiguities the descriptive 23Thisis, however,not the same as asserting meaning,nor that it mustyield a completeordering.These issues have been discussed in Sen (1978b), which shows, among other things,that the partial orderingof unambiguousethical is ranking(given the commonlyused value frameworks) not more extensivethan the partial ranking(in termsof the commonlyaccepted descriptive orderingof unambiguousdescriptive criteria).

366

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

anywhere),cannot be captured at all within the arena of the DaltonAtkinsonmeasures. Nor can ethical measurement provide the appropiate background for checking such relations as that between inequality and crime. We are back again at the question of realism. Friedman dismissed its claim on the ground that the only way of telling realism is predictive relevance; the Dalton-Atkinsonapproach to the measurement inequality of amountsto dismissing on the groundthatthe only criterion prescriptive it is relevance. Neitherseems correct, but both have a good deal of following. There are two distinct objectionsto the ethicalindexesof inequality. First, ethicalconcernis not the only motivation behindmeasuring inequality, and mightnot even be the most important motivationin many cases. Second, even if ethicalconcernwere the dominantmotivation, distinction has a still to be made between a description inequalitythat is useful and a good of of description inequality discussedin section4). Even ifwe are interested (as in inequalityprimarily because of the loss of social welfare from it, the questions "How much inequalityis there?" and "How much loss of social welfareis therefrominequality?"are not identicalqueries. There may be no loss of social welfarefroma distribution (99,1), but it is absurd to call it an equal distribution. 13 A related,thoughnot exactlyparallel,problemhas arisen in the conceptualizationof proverty. The distinguished American sociologistMollie Orshansky (1969) has not been alone in arguing that "poverty is a value judgment",and the approach is well-reflected her often-quotedaphorby ism: "Poverty,like beauty,lies in the eye of the beholder" (p. 37). Does it really? Orshansky'sview is an amalgam of taking a prescriptive view of description(of poverty, thiscase), and-additionally-a subjectivist view in of prescription. Both assertions have superficialplausibility, but neither claim is, I believe, easy to sustain. is Here we are reallyconcernedwiththe former claim,viz., thatpoverty a value judgment. This assertion suffers difficulties rather similarto those from of that apply to ethical measurement inequality.Povertydescription-like any description-involvesselection,but value interests may not providethe even ifprescription selection.Furthermore were onlymotivation underlying in the only reason forwhichpeople take an interest poverty-thisI believe is not the case but assumingthatthiswere the case-poverty description will then reflect sociallyheld value judgmentsratherthan be value judgements themselves. As Marx (1887) had argued, discussingthe concept of "subsistence", while the notion of "the so-called necessarywants" have "a historicaland

A. SEN

367

moral element", "neverthelessin a given country, a given period, the at average quantity the means of subsistenceis practically of known" (p. 150). For the social scientist studying poverty, exerciseis not one of unleashthe ing one's moralson the statistics deprivation. of Rather it is the exerciseof assessingthese statistics line withsociallyheld views as to what countsas in poverty.These views may or may not themselvesbe moral ones, but even when theyare moral,forthe person studying these views,theyare matters of fact,viz., that such views are held.24To describewhat prescriptions are made is a description, a prescription. not

14
The view that povertyis a value judgmenthas often had the peculiar consequence of leading to attempts avoid the use of the word "poverty" to in social communication. Indian official In documents-includingplanning papers-the words "poor" and "unemployed" have been replaced fairly uniformly the expression:"the weaker sectionof the Indian population". by This may have been morallywell-motivated, it has not been descripbut As tivelyvery illuminating. it happens, people drawn fromthis "weaker sectionof the Indian population" do the heavywork in India, varying from loads on theirheads. breakingstones and bendingiron to carrying heavy However, it has been possible to avoid being constantly remindedof the facts of overwhelming Of povertyin India by the peculiar terminology. course, this practice has to be distinguished from the spirit of Mollie Orshansky'sclaim, but the view that povertyis nothingbut a value judgment does open up many possibilities.It also eases the way to achieving what the late Daniel Thorner (1956) had characterised-in a paper on Indian censuses-as "AgrarianRevolutionby Census Redefinition". Indeed, we have verylittlehard factsabout, say, the plightof the "untouchables"in India because not contentwith calling themby the morallysuperiorname "Harijan"-"children of God"-as Mahatma Gandhi had renamed them, the census authoritiesproceeded to discontinue data collection on the morallyoffensive subject of the practiceof untouchability. To returnto my general theme, the prescriptive traditionin the social sciences-freed at last fromthe shackles of positivist dismissal-has started an of exercising imperialism its own.

15
Finally,a few concludingremarks. First,description inevitably involvesselection.It can be usefully seen as a choice of a subset froma set of possible statements.
in the 24Whiletypically exercisemay be concernedwithviews held in the community which povertyis being measured, this need not always be the case. For example, "international of standards"are sometimesused for the measurement "national" poverty.

368

DESCRIPTION

AS CHOICE

Second, truthis clearlynot a sufficient conditionfor a description be to good. Third, nor is it a necessarycondition.Friedman's defence of departures fromtruthin choosing factual assumptionsis a special case of a general argumentin favour of judging descriptionby its usefulness. Friedman considersonly predictiveusefulness,but there are other objectives which lead to the same conclusion.Samuelson's assertionof the need to "jettison" models that contain "empiricalfalsities"seems to take a verynarrowview of description an activity. as notionsof realismis based on a Fourth,Friedman'sattackon traditional His own suggestion about judgingrealismby "the testby misunderstanding. withitsrealism.A prediction"seems to confound usefulness a description of of can be a good one to give withoutbeing a good description something of description that thing. or can be motivatedby predictiveinterest by prescripFifth,description and attention but tiveinterest, it may also have othermotivations, to confine interestimpoverishesthe traditionsof only to predictiveor prescriptive economics. descriptive can Finally,such impoverishment be seen in recentdevelopments many in different fields of economics, varyingfrom interpretations theories of of "value" to the measurementof inequality and poverty.The richness of for motivations seems to have been sacrificed consistency descriptive within an arbitrarily narrow conception of these motivations,or-to be more exact-for consistency within two arbitrarily narrow conceprespectively tions of motivations. This, I have argued, has been an unequal exchange: confoundingthe nature of descriptionas an activityand unnecessarily of weakening the theoretical underpinning many legitimate and useful in the social sciences. activities All Souls College Oxford.
REFERENCES
ATKINSON,

A. B. (1970), "On the Measurementof Inequality",Journalof Economic Theory, Vol. 2. (1976), The Economics of Inequality, Oxford: Claredon Press. BOLAND, L. A. (1979), "A Critiqueof Friedman'sCritics",Journal EconomicLiterature, of vol. 17. Burrs, R., and HINTIKKA, J., eds. (1977), Logic, Methodologyand Philosophyof Science, Dordrecht:Reidel. DOBB, M. H. (1937), PoliticalEconomy and Capitalism,London: Routledge. Press. FRIEDMAN, M. (1953), Essays in PositiveEconomics,Chicago: Chicago University and Economic Theory,Oxford: Oxford HAHN, F., and HOLLIS, M., eds. (1979), Philosophy Press. University

A. SEN

369

HANSSON, (1977), "The Measurement Social Inequality",in Buttsand Hintikka(1977). B. of HARRIS,H., ed. (1979), Scientific Models and Man, Oxford: Clarendon Press. HERZBERGER, G. (1973), "Ordinal Preference H. and Rational Choice", Econometrica, 41. vol. HICKS,J. R. (1958), "The Measurementof Real Income", OxfordEconomic Papers,vol. 10. (1974), "Preferenceand Welfare", in A. Mitra, ed., Economic Theoryand Planning: Essays in Honour of A. K. Das Gupta, London: OxfordUniversity Press. (1979), Causality in Economics,Oxford: Blackwell. HIRSCH, F. (1976), Social Limitsto Growth, Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press. HIRSCHMAN, A. 0. (1977), The Passions and theInterests, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. KALDOR, N. (1960a), Essays on Value and Distribution, London: Duckworth. London: Duckworth. (1960b), Essays on Economic Stability and Growth, KOOPMANS, T. (1947), "MeasurementwithoutTheory", Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 29. KRELLE, A., and SHORROCKS, A., eds. (1978), Personal Income Distribution, Amsterdam: North-Holland. LEIBENSTEIN, H. (1976), Beyond Economic Man: A New Foundation for Micro-economics, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press. MARX, K. (1887), Capital, vol. I, 1867; English translation, London: Sonnenschein,1887. vol. 19, (1879-80), "Marginal Notes on A. Wagner"; publishedin Marx-Engels Werke, Issue 5, Spring1972. Dietz Verlag. Englishtranslation A. Hussain, Theoretical by Practice, MYRDAL, G. (1953), Political Elements in the Developmentof Economic Theory,ed. by P. Streeten,London: International Libraryof Sociology. with an Introduction P. Streeten,London: Allen & (1958), Value in Social Theory, by Unwin. in NAGEL, E. (1963), "Assumptions Economic Theory",AmericanEconomicReview,vol. 53. ORSHANSKY, M. (1969), "How Povertyis Measured", Monthly Labor Review. ROBBINS, L. (1932), An Essay on theNature and Significance Economic Science, London: of Macmillan,2nd ed., 1935. Harmondsworth: ROBINSON, J. (1964), Economic Philosophy, PenguinBooks. SAMUELSON, P. A. (1947), The Foundationsof EconomicAnalysis,Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard Press. University (1963), "Problems of Methodology:Discussion", American Economic Review, vol. 53; reprinted Stiglitz(1966). in intoHuman Satisfaction and Consumer SCITOVSKY, T. (1976), The Joyless Economy:An Inquiry London: OxfordUniversity Press. Dissatisfaction, SEN, A. K. (1977a), "Rational Fools: A Critiqueof the Behavioural Foundationsof Economic in and Public Affairs, vol. 6; reprinted Harris (1979) and Hahn and Theory", Philosophy Hollis (1979). vol. 45. (1977b), "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination",Econometrica, (1978a), "On the Labour Theory of Value: Some Methodological Issues", Cambridge Journalof Economics,vol. 2. in (1978b), "Ethical Measurementof Inequality:Some Difficulties", Krelle and Shorrocks (1978). vol. 76. and Welfarism", Journalof Philosophy, (1979), "Utilitarianism vol. 63. SLOTE, M. A. (1966), "The Theory of Important Criteria",Journalof Philosophy, STIGLITZ, J. E., ed. (1966), The CollectedScientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson,Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Indian EconomicReview, THORNER, D. (1956), "AgrarianRevolutionby Census Redefinition", in vol. 3; reprinted D. Thornerand A. Thorner,Land and Labour in India, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. WILES, P. (1974), Distribution Income: East and West,Amsterdam:North-Holland. of WONG, S. (1973), "The 'F-twist' and the Methodology of Paul Samuelson", American Economic Review,vol. 63.