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CONGO: NO STABILITY IN KIVU DESPITE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RWANDA

Africa Report N165 16 November 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. AN EXIT STRATEGY FROM THE DRC-RWANDA CRISIS ................................... 1
A. GOMA CRISIS ...............................................................................................................................1 B. UNEXPECTED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN DRC AND RWANDA ..................................................2 1. Secret agreement to strengthen the respective position of the two presidents .............................2 2. Exit from the stalemate by a reshuffle of alliances .....................................................................3 3. Unanimous support from the international community ...............................................................4

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PLAN ..................................... 5


A. MILITARY CAMPAIGNS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE RESULTS .............................................6 1. The inefficiency of FARDC-led military operations ...................................................................6 2. Cost of military failure for the population ...................................................................................8 3. Powerless MONUC ...................................................................................................................10 4. Failure of integration and an increase in activities by Congolese armed groups .......................11 5. An aborted resettlement plan .....................................................................................................12 B. UNFINISHED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ........................................................................................13 1. A fools game between the CNDP and the Congolese government .........................................13 2. Regional relocation of protests ..................................................................................................15 3. Worsening of intercommunity antagonisms ..............................................................................17 C. LABORIOUS BEGINNINGS TO THE ECONOMIC PEACE AGENDA ....................................................18 1. The limited impact of the stabilisation programmes ..................................................................19 2. Provincial power struggle ..........................................................................................................20 3. From regional confrontation to regional cooperation ...............................................................20

III.CHANGING THE APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT . 22 IV.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO .............................................................................26 B. MAP OF NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU ...................................................................................................27 C. REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................................................................................28 D. GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................................31 E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................33 F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007 .....................................................34 G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................36

Africa Report N165

16 November 2010

CONGO: NO STABILITY IN KIVU DESPITE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RWANDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The plan to resolve the conflict in the Kivu by emphasising a military solution is failing. Two years after the rapprochement between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame, government soldiers are still battling militias for control of land and mines. Neither side has the strength to win, but both have the resources to prolong the fighting indefinitely. Meanwhile, civilians suffer extreme violence, and the humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Ethnic tensions have worsened in anticipation of the repatriation of tens of thousands of Congolese refugees who fled to Rwanda during the 1990s. The UN Security Council has witnessed the deterioration of security in eastern Congo without opposing the decisions of Kagame and Kabila. A strategy based on secret presidential commitments, however, will not bring peace to the Kivu: the present approach must be reevaluated and broadened in order to engage all local communities and prepare the future of the region in a transparent dialogue that also involves neighbouring countries. During summer 2008, the National Congress of the People (CNDP), a Congolese rebel group then led by the Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda and backed clandestinely by Rwanda, withdrew from negotiations with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A major crisis erupted in the province of North Kivu, catching the Congolese authorities and the UN peacekeeping mission (then called MONUC) off guard. The international community, concerned about the consequences of a CNDP conquest of the capital of North Kivu, Goma, launched multiple initiatives to prevent an escalation that could lead to confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC. In November 2008, President Kabila reached out to President Kagame, his long-time adversary, to end the crisis. Without recourse to formal mediation mechanisms favoured by the international community, the two leaders negotiated an agreement whose content remains secret. The Congolese initiative surprised most of the international partners of the Great Lakes region. They were relieved, however, that discussions about international intervention to stabilise the Kivu could abruptly end. Kabila and Kagame are now working to implement the bilateral commitments in their joint plan to resolve the conflict in the Kivu. This involves two major concessions by Kabila. First, he undertook to meet the political demands of the rebel group, the CNDP, that has in the past caused him most problems with his electoral base. Secondly, he agreed to launch military operations that serve more to meet the interests of those conducting them than to protect the population. The success of this plan, including its political and economic components, depends on the response of the Kivu population to the redistribution of local power as well as to the ability of the national army (FARDC) to achieve Kinshasas military objectives. The Congolese-Rwandan rapprochement has altered the balance of power in North and South Kivu. General Nkunda was arrested in January 2009 and replaced by Bosco Ntaganda, a suspected war criminal for whom the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant in 2006. The CNDP, which was originally established to defend the interests of the Tutsi community, was integrated into and has become a major part of the national army. Its political agenda was put front and centre in the implementation of an agreement between the government and the Congolese armed groups in the Kivu. The new influence gained by the CNDP is resented by leaders of other communities who fear that it will disadvantage them in the general elections scheduled for 2011-2012. But the limits of the politico-military approach designed in Kinshasa and Kigali have already been reached. Despite three successive operations conducted by the Congolese army, the humanitarian situation in the Kivu has deteriorated, and instances of extreme violence have multiplied. Women and girls, particularly, have suffered the consequences of impunity and of a highly militarised environment in which rape is endemic. The population is being victimised by both retribution campaigns of the rebels and unpunished human rights violations by Congolese soldiers.

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The Rwandan Hutu rebel group, Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), is resisting forcible disarmament by forming alliances with Congolese militias that refuse integration into the national army. It has been chased out of many mining sites it previously controlled, but the natural resources have not yet been brought under legitimate control. Dissidents from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi seek support in the Kivu to create cross-border armed coalitions. In response, there are increasing signs of neighbours interference in the Kivu. The rapid integration of former rebels, involving suspected war criminals, into the national army and their subsequent involvement in poorly planned military operations have done little to resolve the conflict in the East. The UN effort to correct course by implementing a new conditionality policy for its peacekeepers support has not affected the behaviour of Congolese forces. The credibility of MONUC renamed MONUSCO in July 2010 has been seriously undermined by its failure to protect civilians better. Meanwhile, struggle for local power has made rule of law in the Kivu even more problematic. Land conflicts and inter-communal tensions have multiplied, exacerbated by repeated cycles of displacement. Unresolved inconsistencies between customary and statutory law put traditional chiefs in opposition to administrative authorities seeking to implement the CNDP agenda. The branches of provincial government are trading accusations of corruption, thus creating a crisis of local governance. Despite the growth of trade in cities along the border and the revival of regional economic institutions, long-term economic development remains elusive. Combined, these factors increase the risk of inter-ethnic clashes, disintegration of the national army and destabilisation of the region as a result of neighbours meddling. Unless the current approach is broadened to bring in all communities in a transparent way and new international momentum is created, the population will continue to bear the brunt of the failed attempts to establish state sovereignty in the Kivu.

Congolese armed groups is being fully implemented; and apply targeted military pressure on the FDLR in North and South Kivu, while international partners monitor and support these battalions in the field; b) focus MONUSCO forces on immediately increasing protection of the population from gross human rights violations, including by maintaining an airborne rapid support and deployment capacity, defensive deployments and joint protection teams; help the national army hold territories left by the FDLR; and regain Congolese trust by ensuring that the rules of engagement are actively implemented and pursuing the arrest of Bosco; and c) start a revised program combined with a new disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program under international responsibility to process all soldiers who have joined the national army since January 2008, including ex-CNDP and Congolese rebels now associated with the FDLR; and begin to reduce the 60,000 troops in the Kivu to the target number of 21,000 in the governments January 2010 army reform plan.

To the Government of Congo and the CNDP:


2. Implement fully the 23 March agreement, including by: a) renewing the mandate of the National Steering Committee (CNS) that expired in May 2010, so that international partners can support and monitor the CNS by reporting regularly on implementation of each sides commitments; and reopening discussions on the ranks of the officers of other Congolese armed groups who have been integrated into the national army; b) appointing CNDP figures to the North Kivu provincial institutions in exchange for verifiable dismantlement of CNDP parallel administrative and tax structures, subject to MONUSCO monitoring and reporting to the CNS; and arresting Bosco; c) handing over responsibility for security of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories to national army battalions trained by foreign partners and MONUSCO; d) committing troops who have participated in the Amani Leo operation to join the new DDR program, so that all ex-CNDP fighters are either completely integrated into the national army or police or reinserted into civilian life; and e) committing not to engage in any political or military activities with foreign dissidents, including those of the Rwandan general, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Congo, its international partners and MONUSCO:
1. Suspend offensive military operations in the Kivu pending deployment of internationally-trained battalions, including units trained by the U.S., China, Belgium, South Africa and Angola, and then: a) deploy the trained Congolese battalions first in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu to provide security for the population while the 23 March 2009 agreement between Kinshasa and the

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To the Governments of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):
3. Oversee and ensure a secure environment for refugee return in the Kivu, including by: a) conducting a census of the undocumented refugees who returned to the Kivu since summer 2009 in partnership with UNHCR; starting a nationality verification process and issuing voter cards to eligible persons before elections; and reviving the joint Congo-Rwanda-Uganda verification mechanism to deter illegal immigration into the Kivu; and b) starting repatriation of refugees from Rwanda and Uganda under UNHCR conditions, including voluntary return and security of the zones of return; the permanent local conciliation committees (CLPC) should decide if security conditions allow return based on clear benchmarks; and areas determined by MONUSCO to be under parallel administration should not be considered open for return.

To the Presidents of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi:


5. Organise a special summit of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) to: a) open political discussions at head-of-state level and chaired by the African Development Bank (ADB) to agree on economic, land and population movement issues, with the aim of forming a mutually beneficial vision for the future of the Great Lakes region; b) analyse jointly the regions traumatic history, so as to foster reconciliation between Congolese and Rwandans; and c) commit not to interfere in legitimate efforts at consolidation of the state in eastern Congo.

Nairobi/Brussels, 16 November 2010

To the Government of Congo:


4. Build the institutions and the capacities to foster intercommunal reconciliation and dispute management, including by: a) developing expertise to manage land conflicts, including a land commission to review titles; reinforcing STAREC, the Congolese government organisation in charge of stabilisation programs, as a permanent conflict resolution mechanism; implementing the 2008 Goma conference resolutions on peace and security; and dedicating adequate resources and additional staff taken on through a transparent recruitment process; b) empowering provincial institutions with resources and authority to respond to local needs; and creating the legal and administrative framework to address issues of ethnic minorities political representation and inconsistencies between customary and modern law; and c) holding a roundtable with local communities, provincial authorities and national representatives to set clear guidelines for allocating posts in the provincial administration; map out a consensual process for distancing local communities from armed groups; and adopt a code of conduct for political activities in the Kivu.

Africa Report N165

16 November 2010

CONGO: NO STABILITY IN KIVU DESPITE A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH RWANDA


I. AN EXIT STRATEGY FROM THE DRC-RWANDA CRISIS
Amongst the numerous ethnic communities which coexist in the Kivu region1, the Tutsi and the Hutu both have their historic roots in Rwanda.2 Between the beginning of the first war in Congo in 1996 and the end of the second in 2003, Rwanda kept its troops in the Kivu. Many Congolese resented this military presence, viewing it as foreign occupation of a rich region of their country. Supported by Kigali, the Rassemblement congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) enabled both Hutu and Tutsi figures to control political, economic and security institutions in Kivu until the 2006 elections. Then presidential candidate Joseph Kabila, secretly agreed with the Rwandan authorities to integrate the RCD into his government should he win.3 The RCD suffered a crushing defeat at the elections, and the post of North Kivu governor was once again in the hands of a member of the Nande community that is dominating the Grand Nord territories.4 The new power structure in this province and President Kabilas reconsideration of his earlier commitment caused leaders of the
Until an official division of boundaries in 1986, Kivu comprised the current provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema. Kivu by convention in this report refers to the geographic ensemble of North and South Kivu. 2 These Rwandan-speaking communities are also collectively known as Banyarwanda. 3 See Crisis Group Africa Report N133, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007, pp. 2-5. 4 At the beginning of 2007, the outgoing governor, Joseph Serufuli, a Hutu from Rutshuru, gave way to Julien Paluku, a Nande from Lubero and former mayor of Beni and Butembo towns. North Kivu could be divided into two entities. The most important territories from the Grand Nord are the Beni and Lubero territories. The three biggest of the Petit Nord, in the south of the province, are Rutshuru, Masisi and Walikale. Amongst the provinces nine communities, the Nande is the largest demographically. This community is mainly concentrated in the Grand Nord where its members account for more than 90 per cent of inhabitants. In the Petit Nord, Hutu and Tutsi communities represent 40 per cent of the inhabitants of Goma and the Masisi and Rutshuru territories. Demographic data provided by the MONUCs political section in July 2008.
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Tutsi community to worry about their vulnerability in the face of reprisals. With consent from Kigali, the Tutsi community representatives in North Kivu decided to support the Congolese Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda, founder of the politico-military organisation Congrs National pour la Dfense du Peuple (CNDP) just a few days before the first round of the presidential election in July 2006.5 The first two years of the CNDPs existence were punctuated by periods of confrontation and negotiation. The failure of the Congolese Government and the Congolese armed groups from Kivu to honour commitments made during a January 2008 peace conference in Goma, hastened a renewal of hostilities around the provincial capital of North Kivu. The Goma crisis in autumn 2008 eventually concluded with a dramatic rapprochement between Kigali and Kinshasa.

A. GOMA CRISIS
On 28 August 2008, the Congolese national army (FARDC) launched its sixth offensive since 2004 against the Nkundaled rebel group. In less than two months, FARDC were routed and the CNDP militia were within sight of Goma deserted by the government troops in October 2008. The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (MONUC) declared itself incapable of protecting the civilian population against war crimes committed by both sides,6 and the United Nations Secretary-General called for a third European military mission in DRC.7 In view of the gravity of the situation, some key countries from the international

Crisis Group Report, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, op. cit, pp.6-8. 6 See Crisis Group Africa Report N150, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, 11 May 2009, pp. 2-5. 7 Two temporary deployments of troops had already been conducted under the supervision of the European Union as a complement to MONUC. In 2003, Operation Artemis led to the liberation of Bunia from the grip of the militia from Ituri district. In 2006, the EUFOR operation were brought in to confront the threat of the destabilisation in the country during the elections, played a role in securing the capital Kinshasa at a crucial moment in the Congolese democratic transition.

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community reproached Kigali and Kinshasa for their antagonistic policies in eastern Congo.8 In 2006, the return to peace in DRC was a campaign promise which mobilized more than 90 per cent of the voters in Kivu in support of the candidate Kabila.9 General Nkunda had therefore just inflicted a military and political humiliation on the Congolese president. Triumphantly, the CNDP leader received the diplomatic delegations and the international press on his farm in the hills of Masisi. There Nkunda revealed to them his national ambitions, which raised fears of the emergence of a new rebel group similar to the Alliance des forces dmocratiques pour la liberation du Congo (AFDL).10 Urgently, in the margins of a session of the United Nations General Assembly at the end of September 2008, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, submitted to the Rwandan and Congolese delegations a plan to resolve the crisis.11 The confidential document listed the conditions for a rapprochement between the two countries, including recourse to a joint military operation against the Forces dmocratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR),12 a rebel Rwandan Hutu group operating in the North and South Kivu provinces.13 The personal relationships between presidents Kagame and Kabila were at an all time low.14

B. UNEXPECTED RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN DRC AND RWANDA


In the last days of October 2008, a strategic U-turn took place. A series of bilateral meetings between Congolese and Rwandan officials began on 28 October in Kigali with a meeting between the Foreign Ministers Alexis Thambwe Mwamba and Rosemary Museminali.15 At an exceptional regional summit in Nairobi on 7 November, which brought together Kabila and Kagame, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Great Lakes Region, Olusegun Obasanjo, noted that the head of the Congolese state had got closer to his Rwandan and Ugandan counterparts.16 On the basis of the American proposition, Kabila and Kagame concluded a secret agreement in November.17 The agreements existence was publicly confirmed on 5 December when the Congolese and Rwandan Foreign Ministers announced in Goma that the armies of both countries would launch anti-FLDR operations and that direct negotiations would be opened between CNDP and Kinshasa.18

1. Secret agreement to strengthen the respective position of the two presidents


It was the constraints and respective interests of Kabila and Kagame which brought them closer. It was essential for the Congolese president that he ended the conflict, putting him against the CNDP, and neutralised Nkunda. The military solution had failed again and none of the DRCs international partners wanted to contribute to an operation against the CNDP.19 After the Goma crisis, the

See Crisis Group Africa Report N151, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, 9 July 2009, pp. 3-4. 9 See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N73, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, 8 April 2010, pp. 2-3 and 8. 10 This alliance is the rebel movement which allowed Laurent Dsir Kabila, the father of the current Congolese Head of State, to overthrow the regime of President Mobutu and seize power in 1997. The AFDL benefited massively from the support of Rwanda. War in the East: CNDP becomes a movement for the liberation of Congolese people, Radio Okapi, 3 October 2008. Also see Crisis Group Report, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, op. cit., p. 3. 11 Crisis Group interviews, members of the U.S. Permanent Representation to the United Nations, New York, September 2008. 12 Crisis Group interview, advisor to President Kabila and member of the Congolese Delegation sent to the High-Level Plenary Session of the 63rd Session of the UN Assembly General, DRC, 29 May 2010. 13 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit. 14 In an interview with a journalist on 6 September, President Kagame gave details of content of the conversation held between the two leaders. See Colette Braeckman, Le president Kagame coeur ouvert, Le carnet de Colette Braeckman, 6 September 2008, http://blogs.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2008/ 09/06/le-president-kagame-a-coeur-ouvert. On 9 October, President Kabila publicly accused the CNDP of being in the service of foreign forces a few hours after the denunciation by a member of his government of Rwandan participation in the fighting

in North Kivu. Joseph Kabila appelle les Congolais un sursaut de patriotism pour conjurer la destabilisation de la Nation!, Digital Congo, 10 October 2008, www.digitalcongo.net/ article/54116#. See also Combats/RDC: Kinshasa accuse Kigali denvoyer des troupes sur son territoire, Agence FrancePresse, 9 October 2008. 15 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit, pp. 3-5. 16 Crisis Group interview, Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian president, Nairobi, 11 January 2009. 17 Crisis Group interview, advisor to President Kabila and member of the Congolese Delegation sent to the High-Level Plenary Session of the 63rd Session of the UN General-Assembly, DRC, 29 May 2010. 18 From 9 to 10 December the U.S. hosted a meeting in Kigali of Defence Ministers from DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in the framework of a Tripartite plus one mechanism. There they discussed elimination of the security threat posed by illegal armed groups in the eastern DRC. On 14 December, a surprise offensive was launched against the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) on Congolese soil by Ugandan military units. On 20 January 2009, the Rwandan army entered Kivu to attack the FDLR. 19 During the Goma Crisis, the idea of a short-term European military intervention was considered but later abandoned, the

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political cost of supporting the Nkunda rebellion became too much for the Rwandan president. Indeed, President Kagame statements denying Rwandas implication were, for the first time, openly contested by his western allies.20 Kagame still had to continue to protect Rwandan political and economic interests in the Kivu. He needed to guarantee the protection and provincial political influence of the Congolese Tutsis, even though the FDLR still constituted a threat and prevented the return to North Kivu of thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda. The two heads of states came to an agreement which eventually altered the balance of power in the Kivu. In Kinshasa, the details of the conflict resolution plan were elaborated by Katumba Mwanke, the special advisor to the presidency.21 The implementation of its politico-military component was entrusted to John Numbi, the chief of the national police.22 Both of Kabilas right-hand men were from Katanga.23 The North and South Kivu governors

were not involved in the development of this plan24 and the two most influential national figures from Kivu, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Vital Kamerhe, were also pushed to one side.25 On the other hand, the former RCD governor from North Kivu, Eugne Serufuli, was solicited by Kinshasa and Kigali.26 Serufuli, promoter of the concept of Rwandaphonie an alliance to unite the Hutu and Tutsi Congolese communities, tried during his mandate in North Kivu to create a Hutu/Tutsi political front to compensate the demographic advantage of the Nande community.27 The political balance between communities needed to be taken into account to implement the plan. With the agreement reached between presidents Kabila and Kagame the alliances were reversed on the ground at the expense of a change in the balance of power between the Kivu communities.

2. Exit from the stalemate by a reshuffle of alliances


The first change in alliance involved Nkunda and Rwanda. A United Nations experts report in December 2008 publicly confirmed the existence of Rwandan support for the CNDP.28 During an interview with Crisis Group on 30 January 2009, President Kagame explained that his intelligence services had sent a message to General Nkunda requesting him to end the crisis. The position of the rebel general was abruptly weakened while Numbi secretly negotiated his eviction with his rival within the CNDP, Bosco Ntaganda. The founder of the CNDP was finally

French President Sarkozy at the time holder of the European Council Presidency indicated at a European Council meeting on 12 December that MONUC had sufficient troops to carry out the mission. Crisis Group report, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, op. cit., pp. 6-7. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and later Angola were also solicited to send soldiers to North Kivu. The Angolan President Dos Santos refused saying that his country would only intervene to stop a genocide or to defend the integrity of the DRC. Crisis Group interview, Olusegun Obasanjo, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Great Lakes region, 11 January 2009. 20 Les EU mettent en garde les rebelles de RD Congo de rester hors de Goma, Agence France-Presse, 30 October 2008. 21 Crisis Group interviews, Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, January and February 2009. 22 John Numbi and the Rwandan Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) James Kabarebe, met in Rwanda in the border town of Gisenyi, on 24 and 25 November, then in Kinshasa on 8 January 2009 to prepare the neutralisation of Nkunda and the launch of the operation Umoja Wetu against the FDLR. 23 Born in 1963 in Pweto, Katanga, Katumba Mwanke is from the Bemba ethnic group. He is considered the most influential presidential advisor. Arriving into power with Laurent-Dsir Kabila, he stayed with his son where he has continued to assume strategic functions. His name figured on the list of individuals for whom individual sanctions are recommended by a group of experts mandated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. See Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations Security Council, S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002, p. 8 and Annex II. Born in 1962 in North Katanga, John Numbi is from the Luba tribe like Laurent-Dsir Kabila. He befriended the Kabila family in the 1990s, while he was an active member of the party of the Union des Fdealistes et Rpublicains Independants (UFERI) which committed ethnic cleansing in Katanga. Becoming militarised under the orders of James Kabarebe after the overthrow of Mobutu, he collaborated again with the latter

in the negotiation of a failed integration attempt with the CNDP at the beginning of 2007. Numbi belonged to the Presidents inner circle until his arrest in June 2010 for his presumed role in the assassination of the human rights activist, Floribert Chebeya. 24 Un nouvel ordre politique lest de la RDC, Pole Institute, 26 January 2009, p. 4. 25 Mbusa Nyamwisi, a Nande from North Kivu, was replaced in the post of Foreign Minister by Thambwe Mwamba (from Maniema) during a 27 October 2008 cabinet reshuffle. Vital Kamerhe, born in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, was forced to resign as Speaker of the National Assembly for having publicly shown his opposition to the joint anti-FDLR operation, on 21 January 2009. Crisis Group briefing, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 26 Crisis Group interviews, CNDP officers, Goma, March 2009. Since November 2008 and during the first months of 2009, Serufuli presided over a series of meetings with Hutu community representatives from North Kivu. See also Jason Stearns, Politics in North Kivu since CNDPs integration, Congo Siasa, 12 October 2009, http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/10/guestblogger-politics-in-north-kivu.html. 27 Crisis Group report, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 28 See Final Report of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Security Council, S/2008/ 773, 12 December 2008.

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arrested in Gisenyi, Rwanda, during the night of 22 January 2009.29 On hearing the news of his arrest spontaneous demonstrations broke out in the Congolese Tutsi refugee camps in Rwanda.30 The Rwandan Chief of Defence Staff, James Kabarebe, convinced Colonel Sultani Makenga and other CNDP officers close to Nkunda that the Kigali-Kinshasa rapprochement necessitated their integration into the FARDC. The CNDP alignment to the Rwandan recruits was not well received by Nkunda supporters. On 28 January, Makenga left the Rumangabo base a few minutes before the inaugural integration ceremony began. Only 60 CNDP soldiers remained to take part in the event attended by Bosco and the Congolese Minister of Defence.31 Granting a general amnesty for rebellion and liberating CNDP prisoners, continuing direct negotiations and launching offensives against the FDLR were not enough to consolidate the CNDP integration within the Congolese army. Kinshasa unofficially offered additional guarantees:32 CNDPs military chain of command and its parallel civil administration in the Masisi and Rutshuru territory in North Kivu would not be immediately dismantled; the North and South Kivu mines, until then controlled by the FDLR and the Mayi Mayi Congolese militia, would be distributed to the benefit of the CNDP after their conquest; CNDP commanders implicated in war crimes would not be harassed; and a mechanism would be put in place for the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. It seemed that commitments had also been made regarding access to grazing land in North Kivu for thousands of cows belonging to Congolese Tutsis and Rwandan military.33 The second change of alliance involved the FDLR and the Congolese authorities. Since their arrival in Kivu after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the FDLR openly collaborated with successive regimes in Kinshasa until 2002.

From 2002 to the end of 2008, the Congolese leaders closed their eyes to the cooperation, which despite being officially forbidden still existed between FARDC officers and the rebel Rwandan group. Taking a different approach to this strategy, President Kabila resorted to force to disarm the FDLR.34 By authorising the Rwandan army to intervene in North Kivu, Kabila presented a credible military challenge to the FDLR but he also took a major political risk considering the hostility that the majority of Congolese have towards their former enemy. At the end of 2008, Kinshasa demanded that their military cut all communication with the Rwandan rebels. The influential members of the Congolese Hutu community were also pressured into cutting ties with them.35 The launch of the joint DRC-Rwandan operation Umoja Wetu (Our Unity) on 20 January 2009 was viewed as treason by the FDLR leadership.36 The third change of alliance consisted of organising a political and economic rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda. The new Kinshasa-Kigali axis is counterbalancing the privileged relationship that Congo maintained with its traditional Angolan ally since the 1998 war.37 In December 2008, the Congolese and Rwandan governments announced the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the effective re-launching of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL).38 This new rapprochement was ratified in Goma on 6 August 2009 during the first bilateral summit between the two Heads of State since the 1996 war.

3. Unanimous support from the international community


While it is likely that a restricted group of foreign representatives had access to the contents of the secret agreement, the diplomats from numerous international partner

Crisis Group reports, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, op. cit., p. 7; and Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., p. 4. 30 Furthermore demonstrations in the Gihembe and Kiziba camps, protests in the ranks of the Rwandan army and within the Tutsi community in Rwanda were also reported. 31 Crisis Group interview, Rumangabo ceremony witness, Goma, 20 February. See also Intgration des troupes et invalidation des deputes proches du CNDP, Pole Institute, 3 February 2009. 32 Crisis Group report, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, op. cit., pp. 9-13. 33 Crisis Group telephone interview, Brussels, 12 August 2010. Before each new crisis between CNDP and FARDC, Masisi cows were shielded from the fighting in Rwanda. With a price per head rising to US$600, tens of millions of dollars need to be protected. See Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), 11 March 2008, p. 26.

29

Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., pp. 19-23. 35 Crisis Group interviews, Political Section and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) officers, MONUC, Goma, 16 February 2009 and 19 April 2010. 36 During the first three months of 2008, the political leaders from FDLR/FOCA operating in Germany and France edited almost twenty press releases and two open letters to call on the international community to put weight behind their arguments and put an end to military operations. 37 Relations with Luanda had been tense since the opening of negotiations in 2007 on the associated rights of offshore oil and gas zones in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. Benjamin Aug, Border Conflict Tied to Hydrocarbons in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in Jacques Lesource, Governance of Oil in Africa: Unfinished Business (IFRI, Paris, 2009), p. 188. 38 See regional cooperation annex.

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organisations in the Congo were not aware of it.39 Even though the whole international community publicly supported the rapprochement, the exact conditions had not been revealed to them. On 22 December 2008, the United Nations Security Council voted Resolution 1856, which urged the two governments to reinforce their cooperation to make a start on disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR. The United Nations officials also acknowledged the rapprochement they had encouraged. They feared however that by negotiating in secret and from a position of weakness, the Congolese president might have been forced to accept a change in economic and political power in Kivu, which would benefit a legalised CNDP. They anticipated a deterioration of inter-community tensions based on the perception of the domination of the Tutsi community in North Kivu.40 Congos western allies had requested Kinshasa to neutralise the FDLR, but at the same time refused to deploy their own contingents to Kivu. At the time of the announcement of operation Umoja Wetu, the incapacity of FARDC to conduct operations on the ground without putting the population in danger was known to western diplomats. The integration process of 18,000 fighters from the CNDP and other armed groups41 was carried out over just a few weeks and did not include the removal of those commanders strongly suspected of already having committed war crimes. Irrespective of their views on the chances of successfully disarming the FDLR by force, some embassies hoped that the participation of the Rwandan army in this first joint operation would weaken the FDLR enough to please Kigali.42 No country or international organisation expressed any opposition to the agreement between Kabila and Kagame.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PLAN


The Kivu conflict resolution plan evolved through the numerous failed peace agreements with the different armed groups. The 9 November 2007 Nairobi Communiqu and the 23 July 2008 agreement concluding the Goma conference defined a peace doctrine with simple principles: political and military integration of former Congolese rebels, reestablishment of state authority, forced disarmament, repatriation and resettlement of FDLR members, refugee return to their country of origin and regional development in order to diffuse the conflict. Since 2002, MONUC renamed MONUSCO on 1 July 2010 with the S standing for stabilisation led a voluntary demobilisation and repatriation programme with Rwandan Hutu rebels from the FDLR.43 The sensitisation and communication campaign came up against a hard core of extremist elements or members who remained sceptical about returning safely to Rwanda. Negotiations with the FDLR leadership had been attempted in 2005 with the assistance of the Sant Egidio community. At the time, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted the lack of will on behalf of the FDLR to disarm their combatants as the primary cause for the failed negotiations. The Congolese governments international partners implicated in the stabilisation programmes in the DRC reached the conclusion that the best strategy to dismantle the FDLR had to combine an intense sensitisation campaign and credible military pressure. The application of such a strategy was contained in the Nairobi Communiqu with the possibility for Rwandan rebels who had not participated in the 1994 Genocide to be disarmed and resettled temporarily in a Congolese site far from the Rwandan border.44 Overall a consensus formed around the idea that the resolution of the Kivu conflict had to bring an economic and regional dimension. The agreement between Presidents Kabila and Kagame took up the commitments in the Nairobi Communiqu against the FDLR and included political negotiations with the new CNDP led by civilians close to Bosco. Its implementation was however marked by the priority given to the use of constraint and the dialogue between the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi was mainly devoted to se-

Crisis Group interview, senior United Nations officials, New York, 21 January 2009. Representatives of the Political Affairs Division regretted that the Special Representative Olusegun Obasanjo had not been informed of the agreement even though he had participated in the negotiations between the Congolese government and the CNDP since December 2008. 40 Crisis Group interview, senior United Nations officials, New York, 21 January 2009. The Peacekeeping Department anticipated a reaction from the Nande community who controls the Grand Nord in North Kivu. 41 Figure established through a biometric survey conducted by EUSEC, the European Support Mission to the military section of security sector reform in DRC. Crisis Group interview, EU Delegation, Kinshasa, 29 June 2010. 42 Crisis Group interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) diplomats, London, 16 July 2009.

39

Among the commanders and leaders of the FLDR are officers from the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) as well as members of the Hutu Interahamwe militia and former civilian leaders of President Habyarimanas regime who organised the 1994 genocide. 44 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., pp. 19-22.

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curity cooperation. This agreement was completed by a stabilisation programme and reconstruction for conflict affected areas (Starec). Two years after the rapprochement, the authority of the Congolese state and the security of the population have still not been re-established in North and South Kivu provinces; the FDLR resistance has not been seriously shaken; reconstruction and regional cooperation has hardly progressed; and elements of a global strategy including the intercommunity reconciliation, reinforcement of local institutions and the fight against impunity and corruption have not been put in place by Kinshasa.

A. MILITARY CAMPAIGNS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE RESULTS


Since January 2009, Kinshasa has authorised three antiFDLR operations and one operation against a Ugandan militia in the Kivu. However, the FDLR is still active and carrying out reprisals against the local population; the military integration of certain armed groups has fallen short; around 1.3 million Congolese from Kivu are still displaced by violence also committed by government soldiers; and forced disarmament has failed. The continuation of military action was nevertheless justified on the grounds that stopping could worsen the situation. Endless and inefficient operations continue to be inflicted in the Kivus.

During 2008, MONUC repatriated on average 50 FDLR combatants per month. This rate increased to 130 in 2009 after the start of anti-FDLR operations then decreased to 82 in the first nine months of 2010.47 The rebel group did suffer combat losses, although less than what was communicated to the Congolese authorities.48 At the same time, the FDLR carried out new recruitment campaigns of Rwandan Hutu refugees and of many young Congolese.49 In 2010, the monthly figure of deserters gradually diminished, despite strikes in May on the Kibua and Shalio headquarters in North Kivu. Between the start of 2009 and October 2010, MONUC estimated that the strength of FDLR decreased from 6,000-6,500 to 3,000-4,000.50 The core of radical fighters linked to the Rwandan genocide and FDLRs chain of command in the field was not broken up. The military approach favoured by Kinshasa did not inflict a strategic setback for the FDLR nor did it directly neutralise their main commanders. The successes concerning the fight against the FDLR operations involved Congos international partners. The chain of command in Europe was disorganised thanks to the arrest of the rebel groups major political figures. On 17 November 2009, the groups president and the vicepresident, Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni, were arrested by German authorities.51Acting on an arrest warrant delivered on 28 September by the International Criminal Court (ICC), French police arrested the new Vice-President of the FDLR, Callixte Mbarushimana,

1. The inefficiency of FARDC-led military operations


Three successive anti-FDLR operations have been carried out: Umoja Wetu, Kimia II and Amani Leo. Beginning 20 January 2009, the first operation lasted for 35 days and only affected the southern part of North Kivu. The Rwandan army progressed rapidly along the roads in the areas occupied by the FDLR but the quick integration and the deployment of FARDC battalions in the liberated towns proved more difficult.45 Kimia II began in March 2009 and was carried out exclusively by FARDC units supported by MONUC: its field of action extended to South Kivu. Kimia II was marked by a dramatic increase in human rights violations committed both by the FDLR and the national army. Amani Leo began on 1 January 2010 with a more strict conditionality policy on the support provided by MONUC. In summer 2010, 60,000 FARDC and ten peacekeeping battalions from MONUC were deployed in North and South Kivu.46

Ibid. This report examines in detail the actions and the results of Umoja Wetu. 46 MONUC has six infantry battalions in North Kivu (plus 5,000 soldiers), four infantry battalions in South Kivu (plus 4,000

45

soldiers), to which can be added the support units, special forces and helicopter personnel. 47 Throughout 2009, MONUC DDRRR section reported having repatriated 1,564 Rwandan combatants from the FDLR. From January to October 2010, it had repatriated 743 more Rwandan combatants, bringing the total number of Rwandan combatants demobilised from the FDLR to 2,307 since the start of military operations in January 2009. Data established by the DDRRR section in MONUC in October 2010. 48 At the end of the Umoja Wetu Operation, General Numbi publicly announced that 153 combatants from the FDLR had been killed, 13 injured, 37 captured and that 103 had deserted. The estimation of losses suffered by the Rwandan rebel group by the FARDC was questioned by MONUC officers during interviews with Crisis Group in February 2009. MONUC however did not deny the reports presented by the Congolese military authorities to illustrate the pretended success of their military operations. See Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., pp. 19. 49 Even though the FDLR ranks had very few Congolese combatants until the beginning of military operations, MONUC demobilised 433 in 2009 and 462 in the first nine months of 2010. Data established by the DDRRR section in October 2010. 50 Crisis Group electronic correspondence, MONUC official in Goma, 3 November 2010. 51 See the Final Report by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Security Council, S/2009/603, 23 November 2009.

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thirteen days later in Paris.52 Simultaneously, by investing a lot of specialist resources in it, the United Nations Mission supported the demobilisation of six senior FDLR officers in 2010. On 27 September, it repatriated to Rwanda Eli Mutarambirwa, alias Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Safari, for example.53 The Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) section of MONUC initiated and organised the defection of this Commander of the Someka battalion from North Kivu.54 These blows struck against the political network of the FDLR abroad and the defections of several field commanders still did not provoke internecine struggles within the military leadership of the group in the Kivu or massive desertions even if a sharp increase in the number of combatants entering into the DDRRR programme was observed in the first week of November 2010, perhaps because of a drop in moral linked to the neutralisation of Callixte or a challenge to the orders for redeployment to North Kivu for rebels hitherto operating in South Kivu.55 These incidents did prove, however, the international communitys heightened involvement in the struggle against the FDLR since the agreement between Kabila and Kagame. The FDLR were isolated politically by the DRC-Rwanda rapprochement, but they adapted to the new strategic outlook. After the withdrawal to South Kivu in 2009, then to the Maniema and Katanga provinces, they increased alliances of convenience with armed Congolese groups hostile to the Rwandan regime or those who refused integration.56 Deprived of an alternative solution to repatriation,
52

and in the absence of a credible resettlement programme or welcome offer from a foreign country, those who remained within the FDLR radicalised as political conditions in Rwanda tightened before the Cial elections of August 2010. The restriction of political freedom was immediately exploited by FDLR propaganda to justify and discredit voluntary repatriation.57 At the end of June 2010, in consultation with Kampala but without prior planning with MONUC, Kinshasa intervened against the Forces allies dmocratiques (ADF) which had settled since the mid-90s on the Ugandan-DRC border, in the Rwenzori area.58 Shortly after the launch of the Rwenzori offensive, the ADF dispersed their combatants to areas difficult to access from Oicha and in the mountains of Rwenzori. An ambush on a lorry on a road leading to the town of Beni caused fifteen civilian casualties on 27 July 2010, four days before a field visit by the Congolese Minister of Defence, Mwando Nsimba, and the Chief of the Defence Staff of FARDC, General Didier Etumba. On 7 September 7, the Congolese army launched the second phase of the operation and after 72 hours of fighting announced that they had killed 29 rebels.59 In reality, FARDC suffered heavy losses. A United Nations specialist observed that the discovery of a well-stocked arms and provisions cache, as well as the tactical superiority of the ADF over the Congolese National Army, suggested that the rebel group had grown stronger since the last military campaign against them at the end of 2005.60 FARDC were free to conduct operations planned with MONUC or to carry them out unilaterally when the supervision of the peacekeepers proved to be too burdensome. The carte blanche given by Kinshasa to the FARDC did not hand them a decisive victory. The Congolese troops still did not have sufficient logistics to accompany their campaign. The majority of the former rebels who had rejoined the army did not have adequate training and their

Callixte Mbarushimana arrested in France for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in the Kivus (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Press Release from the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 11 October 2010. 53 Rwanda: FDLR Commander defects, The New Times, 29 September 2010. 54 Mutarambirwa learned that his direct superior, Colonel Pacifique Ntawunguka, alias Omega had planned to assassinate him. Crisis Group electronic correspondence with a MONUSCO official, 31 October 2010. 55 Crisis Group interview, DDRRR officials from MONUC, Kampala, 12 November 2010. At the time of this reports publication, there is insufficient time to interpret this recent positive development. 56 The FDLR made deals with the Front patriotique pour la libration du Congo (FLPC) of Gad Ngabo, the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) of Colonel Janvier Buingo, the Mayi Mayi Cheka and the group of Colonel Lafontaine in North Kivu and with the Forces rpublicaines fdralistes (FRF) of Michel Rukunda and the Mayi Mayi Yakutumba in South Kivu. The head of the military of the FDLR, General Sylvestre Mudachumura, established his headquarters in Lukweti, three kilometres from the headquarters of Colonel

Janvier. Since autumn 2010, more and more CNDP soldiers, sometimes Tutsi, have deserted FARDC to rejoin groups associated with the FDLR. 57 Crisis Group interview, DDRRR official from MONUC, Entebbe, July 2010. 58 Sometimes reference has been made to ADF/Nalu, the second part of which refers to the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. This is a rebel movement of Ugandan Bakonjo tribe formed at the beginning of the 1990s against Musevenis regime. Even though the leaders of Nalu in 2004 were associated with ADF, almost all of their combatants now have since left the group targeted Operation Rwenzori. ADF presentation by MONUC Force Commander. 59 Beni: poursuite des affrontements entre FARDC et ADF/ Nalu, 29 rebelles tus, Radio Okapi, 9 September 2010. 60 Crisis Group interview, DDRRR official, MONUC, Kampala, 12 November 2010.

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military wages when they were not misappropriated were not enough to provide for their families who accompanied them in their deployments. The FARDC were not able to defeat the rebels who were operating in an environment familiar to them. This assessment was known even when the military strategy was implemented, although the vital reform of the Congolese army, announced at the start of the transition period had still not begun.61 The anti-FDLR campaign had allowed a number of officers to increase their own personal wealth. In April 2009, the officers recently integrated into the FARDC began to receive command bonuses. Until reform of the payment system, carried out at the end of 2009 by the European Union, some new officers siphoned off the salaries of their soldiers. In 2010, it was established that financial aid granted to the dependents of deployed soldiers did not reach its beneficiaries.62 In February 2009, MONUC and FARDC within the framework of Kimia II planned to expel the FDLR from the Kivu mines to deprive them of their resources. It was the FARDC battalions who from then on took advantage of their presence in these mining areas.63 The house-building and petrol stations in the large towns in the Kivu and on the Sake-Masisi axis bear witness to the profit made by the Congolese commanders.64

South Kivu.66 The total number of IDPs has therefore risen across the Kivu despite the promises of the DRCRwandan rapprochement and because of the military approach taken against the rebel groups. Since January 2009, many families have fled the fighting. The Rwenzori offensive launched on 25 June 2010 for example caused 90,000 extra IDPs in less than 30 days.67 Some families have been able to return to their place of origin thanks to a change in the militias operating areas. Between January 2009 and September 2010, 538,000 IDPs from North Kivu and 192,000 IDPs from South Kivu returned to their homes.68 Almost half of those who returned to North Kivu went to Masisi and Rutshuru territories in the areas controlled by the CNDPs parallel administration.69 In a 9 July 2010 report, the UN Secretary-General recognised the role that military operations and human rights violations had played in the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Kivu.70 The coercive approach lead to a deterioration of civilian security stemming from a resurgence in brutality by the FDLR and from criminal behaviour attributed to the FARDC. Since the departure of Rwandan troops at the end of Umoja Wetu, the leaders of FDLR opted for a policy of reprisals against populations accusing them of treason.71 Through the distribution of threatening letters and village attacks like the one in Luofu in April 2009 where 250 houses were set alight the FDLR targeted two

2. Cost of military failure for the population


Several hundred thousand Congolese were caught in a cycle of displacement and return, depriving them of regular access to their livelihoods or to humanitarian assistance. Since 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) at 800,000 in North Kivu and 266,000 in South Kivu.65 On 30 September 2010, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) counted 590,000 displaced in North Kivu and 676,000 in

See Crisis Group briefing, Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, op. cit., pp. 14-16. 62 In December and in January 2009, a few tens of millions of dollars were given to Numbi to convince the CNDP officers to rejoin Bosco. Some civilians also benefited from the money. Several transfers were made by Kinshasa to finance their sensitization campaigns run by their traditional leaders. Crisis Group interviews, FARDC and CNDP officers, Goma, February-April 2009, and Kinshasa, July 2010. 63 See Ruben de Koning, Controlling Conflict Resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, SIPRI Policy Brief, July 2010. 64 After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese Military Campaigns?, Crisis Group blog, On the African Peacebuilding Agenda, 19 July 2010, www.crisisgroup. org. See also Fidel Bafilemba, Field Dispatch: Conflict Minerals Windfall for Armed Forces in Eastern Congo, Enough Project, 4 August 2010, www.enoughproject.org. 65 See DRC Fact Sheet, UNHCR, 5 February 2008.

61

See Mouvements de population au 30 septembre 2010, OCHA, 11 October 2010. 67 See Briefing humanitaire en RDC do 07 au 13 aot 2010, OCHA, 13 August 2010. 68 See the South Kivu monthly humanitarian report established by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Support (OCHA) for the month of September 2010 and Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo: mouvements de population de janvier 2009 septembre 2010, Province du Nord Kivu, OCHA, 13 October 2010, available on http://rdc-humanitaire.net. 69 The six historical camps sheltering 60,000 displaced around Goma were closed in September 2009. Almost all of their occupants were members of the Hutu community and they went to Masisi and Rutshuru, sometimes to rejoin one of the forty provisional transit camps. The decision to close the camps gave the false impression to numerous VIP delegations spending only a few days in North Kivu, that it was the result of an overall improvement of the situation of the population. The closure of the camps in Goma was a political act by President Kabila, who announced it himself with a megaphone to the displaced during his stay in the town at the beginning of August 2009. Crisis Group interview, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) official, Goma, 19 April 2010. 70 See the United Nations Secretary-Generals Report on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Security Council, S/2010/669, 9 July 2010, p. 3, point 10. 71 See the Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 23 November 2009, op. cit., p. 24, point 93.

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objectives: to impose their conditions on the Congolese civilians and to obtain from the international community a stay on their offensives for humanitarian reasons.72 During the same period, the FARDC committed violent acts against the Congolese civilians and the Hutu-Rwandan refugees.73 In 2009, the United Nations Population Fund counted more than 8,000 cases of sexual violence in the East of Congo that it primarily attributed to the FDLR and the FARDC.74 The conditions for humanitarian organisations working with vulnerable populations had also deteriorated. During the first six months of 2010, they were the targets of 120 acts of aggression, a two-fold increase in security incidents compared to the same period in 2009.75 In summer 2010, the FDLR continued its policy of reprisals and domination through fear. In South Kivu, between 2 and 8 August, the FDLR attacked several localities in Shabunda territory, destroying 1,230 houses, raping at least 130 civilians (amongst them around 20 girls below fifteen years old) and causing the displacement of 38,000 people.76 In North Kivu, between 30 July and 2 August, FDLR elements associated with the Mayi Mayi Cheka took control of fifteen villages in the Luvungi area, in Walikale territory. Without firing a shot, and without interruption from MONUSCO patrols, they carried out a planned and methodical campaign of sexual violence against at least 250 villagers. On 13 August, the FDLR burned 350 houses near to Ntoto, 70km from Walikale town, and captured some civilians as porters.77 On 8 September 2010 the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Atul Khare, explained to the Security Council that, although the primary responsibility of protecting civilians and stopping mass rapes rests first and foremost on the Congolese State, these attacks represent a failure for MONUSCO.78 In other words, eighteen

months of military campaigns against the rebel groups has not provided security to the population in Kivu. The FARDC contributed significantly to the increase in insecurity. In June 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, revealed that the integration process and the launch of Kimia II had coincided with a strong rise in the number of human rights violations by FARDC.79 In 2010, a wave of criminality affected Beni and Butembo towns in the Grand Nord of North Kivu. Since March 2010, civil society has accused officers of the national army and asked for demilitarising the cities.80 The consequences of over-militarisation of towns in terms of criminality are similar in Rutshuru, Walikale, and Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu where the International Bank of Africa in Congo was robbed by soldiers on 26 June 2010.81 Robbery, looting, acts of violence and killings are more frequent since the launch of operation Rwenzori against the ADF. The deployment of new government troops in an area largely populated by the Nande community feeds intercommunity tension already fuelled by political manipulation. Local economic operators have even themselves provided fuel and supplies to the Congolese army in a bid to reduce the levels of violence committed by the soldiers and to give them the means to protect the population against ADF reprisals. Despite strong criticism aimed at the international community, Kinshasa remained very tolerant towards the criminal behaviour of the military personnel. The integration of former rebels was negotiated under the promise of an official amnesty approved by Parliament. The 7 May 2009 law grants amnesty for acts of war committed by Kivu militia between 2003 and the beginning of 2009. For

From April 2009, the leaders of Luofu, Kalete, Kanyabayonga and Kibua received leaflets signed by FDLR officers encouraging them to surrender under the threat of retaliation. 73 You Will Be Punished. Attacks On Civilians in Eastern Congo, Human Rights Watch, 13 December 2009. 74 More than 8,000 women raped last year by fighters in Eastern DRC, UN News Centre, 9 February 2010, www.unfpa.org/ public/cache/offonce/news/pid/4852. 75 32nd Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO, 8 October 2010, op. cit., p. 7, point 30. 76 Bulletin dinformation humanitaire, province du Sud Kivu, OCHA, 31 August 2010. 77 UN e-mail shows early warning of Congo rapes, The New York Times, 31 August 2010. See also Walikale: les FDLR frappent Budere, Radio Okapi, 19 August 2010. 78 Preliminary Report of the Fact-finding Mission of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into Mass Rapes and Other Human Rights Violations by a Coalition of Armed Groups along

72

the Kibua-Mpofi Road in Walikale, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August 2010. One of the leaders of the Mayi Mayi Cheka, Lt Col Mayele, was finally arrested in October 2010. 79 See the 28th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, Security Council, S/2009/335, 30 June 2009, p. 13, point 55. 80 Some civil society organisations and influential members of the Nande community immediately denounced the responsibility of the CNDP commanders for the violence. See Inscurit toujours grandissante dans les villes de Butembo et de Beni au Nord Kivu, Groupe dassociations de dfense des droits de lhomme et de la paix (GADHOP), document N03/2010, MayJuly 2010. Les FARDC au premier rang des violations des droits de lhomme en territoire de Lubero et de Beni, Press Release from the Centre of Research on the Environment, Democracy and Human Rights (CREDHO), 19 April 2010. See also Situation scuritaire de la ville de Butembo et suite du meurtre de ltudiant Mwanazaire, civil society committee in Butembo, 11 July 2010. 81 Bulletin dinformation humanitaire, province du Nord Kivu, OCHA, 31 August 2010. See also Bukavu: cambriolage en plein jour la Biac, un mort et trois blesss, Radio Okapi, 26 June 2010.

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purely legal reasons, war crimes committed by certain CNDP leaders are excluded.82 The commanders of the eighteen brigades of the national army, responsible for the sacking of Goma and Kanyabayonga during the crisis at the end of 2008, were also spared by the military judges.83 For the Congolese authorities, the official or informal amnesty is the price to pay for CNDP integration.84 Similarly, the Congolese authorities remained tolerant of the recruitment of child soldiers. 1,235 new cases were registered in 2009, mainly in North Kivu and in Kalehe territory to the north of South Kivu. FARDC accounted for 40 per cent of the recruitments.85 On several occasions in the summer of 2009, MONUC teams trying to extricate minors serving as soldiers were threatened by FARDC. Forced or voluntarily re-enrolment of former child soldiers was still observed by MONUSCO and NGOs, in spite of constituting a war crime86, and while the government is implementing a World Bank-funded national programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration mainly aimed at child soldiers.

rank of General.89 The new army units were constituted with former rebels who had not been trained by MONUC, some of whom were suspected of war crimes.90 The conditions of engagement stipulated in Resolution 1856 were therefore not fulfilled. Although a strict reading of its mandate prevented MONUC from participating in the plan conceived by Numbi and Kabarebe, a political decision was taken to associate the peacekeepers with it. The head of Mission, Alan Doss, explained that MONUCs participation reduced the negative impact on the population.91 The presence of peacekeepers at the operations centre theoretically gave the UN access to the planning stages to anticipate negative impacts on civilians. In exchange for UN logistics support, Doss expected a special effort from the Congolese to improve the behaviour of their troops on the ground. From 20 January 2009, MONUC supported FARDC with logistical support: transporting soldiers, evacuating the injured and providing fuel, water and rations. Support fire from its attack helicopters was also provided under strict conditions. In this context in 2009, MONUC put in place a range of measures designed to protect the population and improve the behaviour of the Congolese soldiers. MONUC planning officers were quickly dispatched to the operations centre. Egyptian Special Forces, troops and additional helicopters arrived in the Kivus at the end of 2009. In eighteen months, the number of simultaneous deployments of peacekeepers to the hotspot areas of the two provinces in Kivu went from twenty to more than 70. Through the support of the United Kingdom, the DDRRR section in charge of FDLR demobilisation was significantly reinforced with human resources and material.92 To improve the quality of information received on the ground and to react quickly, MONUC created mixed Joint Protection Teams (JPT), with civilian liaison and interpreters (CL/I), rapid intervention cells

3. Powerless MONUC
Resolution 1856 of December 2008 mandated MONUC to support the integrated FARDC brigades trained by them for jointly planned operations that respected international law.87 During the preparations for Umoja Wetu, the UN mission had deliberately been kept away.88 On 16 January 2009, Bosco who was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), left the CNDP and rejoined the FARDC in Goma with the

Bosco and Sultani Makenga have in common that they have both personally supervised civilian massacres. Congolese judges ascertained Makengas responsibility in the Burumba massacre of March 2007. The United Nations inquiry into the massacre of 67 villagers from the village of Kiwanja in November 2008 revealed the responsibilities of Bosco and Zimurinda. See Consolidated Report on Investigations conducted by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) into grave human rights abuses committed in Kiwanja, North Kivu, in November 2008, 7 September 2009. 83 Ibid. In November 2008, a stampede of government soldiers looted, raped and summarily executed in the town of Goma and in Kanyabayonga area. 84 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights and the High Commission activities in DRC, Human Rights Council, A/HCR/13/64, 28 January 2010, point 46. 85 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, op. cit., p. 4, point 17. 86 Article 8 on the definition of War Crimes from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 87 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1856, S/RES/1856 (2008), 22 December 2009, point 3.G. 88 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., p. 4.

82

This arrest warrant was issued under seal on 22 August 2006 and made public on 28 April 2008 for crimes committed in Ituri Province. He is accused by the ICC of recruitment of child soldiers and civilian massacres. In April 2005, the DRC authorities had emitted an arrest warrant against him. Bosco is also suspected of the murder of humanitarian workers and MONUC personnel. He rejoined CNDP under Nkunda in North Kivu in 2006 to become Chief of Defence Staff of the organisation. 90 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 91 Alan Doss intervention at a round table organised by international NGOs, New York, 9 April 2009. 92 Department for International Development (DFID), the British development agency put at the disposition of the DDRRR programme civilian-military specialists and fifteen mobile radios to diffuse the sensitisation messages in remote areas in Eastern DRC. At the end of 2010, there were 157 staff working in the DDRRR section.

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and a protection working group in Kinshasa.93 However, the UN peacekeepers who spoke neither French nor Swahili still encountered difficulties in interacting with the local population.94 Planning and coordination with Congolese local authorities also remained dysfunctional. From April 2009, local and international NGOs warned the United Nations about the scale of human rights violation committed by the FARDC taking part in Kimia II. In particular they brought to light the Shalio massacre of 27 April 2009 carried out by troops under the orders of Colonel Innocent Zimurinda.95 It took until 1 November 2009 and the visit to the DRC of Assistant SecretaryGeneral for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Alain le Roy, for MONUC to announce the withdrawal of logistical support for the battalion implicated in this event. The logistics involvement of MONUC was also contentious. Some United Nations officials returning from the Kivus strongly pleaded for logistics support to be suspended while the Congolese government, the head of MONUC and some Security Council member countries insisted on its continuation. The latter group believed that the integration of the CNDP depended on it and pointed out the increase in the rate of repatriation of the FDLR ex-combatants.96 Before the annual renewal of MONUCs mandate on 23 December 2009, it was decided that the peacekeepers would continue to participate in the military campaign. During 2009, and after being alerted to the risks of legal co-responsibility for the crimes committed by MONUC assisted units, the United Nations developed a conditionality policy for their support. Their initial intention was to reduce the number of abuses committed by FARDC without stopping the anti-FDLR offensive. MONUC proposed to the Congolese authoritys additional trainings to better prepare soldiers serving in Kivu.97 On 17 December 2009, the new operational guidelines signed by MONUC and FARDC did not resume its measures in the long run. On the contrary it planned for putting aside leaders of bat-

talions suspected of violent acts and a reduction from 16,000 to 1,600 in the number of Congolese soldiers receiving support. It insisted on joint planning. From then on, the conditionality policy which entered into force during the launch of operation Amani Leo, did not contribute to making FARDC more efficient but rather served to legally protect MONUC. The conditions accepted by the Congolese government for 2010 were immediately bypassed. In South Kivu, during the first four months of the year, 25 joint military actions were undertaken while 74 others were carried out unilaterally by FARDC without the knowledge of the peacekeepers.98 In May, United Nations experts indicated that ongoing military operations could make the situation more dangerous for the FDLR fighters who wanted to hand over their weapons and be repatriated.99 Until July, in the organigrams established by FARDC and accessible by MONUC, war criminals still figured in command posts for Operation Amani Leo.100 MONUC had no influence on a campaigning national army renowned for its grave level of disorganisation, corruption and impunity. The credibility of the peacekeeping mission was greatly undermined.

4. Failure of integration and an increase in activities by Congolese armed groups


At the time of the Goma Peace Conference in January 2008, 21 Congolese armed groups from Kivu were recognised by the government. Initially, a large majority accepted to participate in the integration process launched in 2009. The benefits granted to former CNDP commanding officers, the lack of attention given to the integrated Mayi Mayi and the difficulties of imposing authority from army re-

Crisis Group interviews, Civil Affairs and Human Rights officers, Bukavu, 25 May 2010, Kinshasa, 29 June 2010. 94 UN e-mail shows early warning of Congo rapes, The New York Times, op. cit. 95 The Congolese government admitted on 16 October 2009 to having been informed but explained that they had taken the decision not to sanction this former CNDP officer. See You Will Be Punished. Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, Human Rights Watch, op. cit., pp. 130-137. 96 Crisis Group interviews, MONUC officials, Kinshasa, November 2009, Goma, April 2010. See Thirtieth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, S/2009/623, 4 December, p. 3, point 9. 97 Crisis Group interview, MONUC official, Kinshasa, 29 June 2010.

93

Presentation given by a MONUC officer at the headquarters of Amani Leo to humanitarian actors, Goma, 21 April 2010. 99 See Interim Report by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Security Council S/2010/252, 25 May 2010, p. 10, point 40. 100 On the Amani Leo organigram for South Kivu dated 2 July 2010, Makenga who has been found guilty in absentia by Congolese magistrates for the Buramba massacre in March 2007 appears as second in command for operations and in charge of information. On the Amani Leo organigram for North Kivu dated 5 April 2010, Zimurinda appears as 23rd Sector Commander. Several other senior officers strongly suspected of war crimes are in charge of Amani Leo operations, but are below the Battalion Commander grade and are therefore excluded from the shelving required by MONUC. In October 2010, Bosco declared to the international press that he was playing a coordinating role in the military operations which were underway, Congo war indicted says direct UN-back ops, Reuters, 6 October 2010.

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gional headquarters on mixed groups ultimately led to the failure of attempts to integrate all the Congolese ex-rebels. In order to defend the interests of the particular communities against the CNDP, the Forces rpublicaines fdralistes (FRF) and a faction of the Coalition des patriotes rsistants congolais (PARECO) refuse to join FARDC. The Banyamulenge militia of the FRF operate on the upper plateaus of Fizi territory in South Kivu and its head, Michel Rukunda, conditioned their demobilisation to the demands of the inhabitants of this region. Although they are Banyarwandan, the Banyamulenge are hostile to the Rwandan regime and refuse to be associated with the Congolese Tutsi community. The FRF protected the FDLR fleeing offensives and shared the taxes they had collected with them.101 In North Kivu, the former head of the Hunde branch of PARECO, Janvier Karairi, saw in the DRCRwandan rapprochement an extermination plan of people native to the Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories.102 The Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), which he currently commands and which collaborates closely with the FDLR in the west of Masisi, is supported by the rural Hunde population fearful for their land. Other armed group were reconstituted after having integrated into the Congolese army. The Yakutumba Mayi Mayi rejoined the rebellion in November 2009 after a conflict with another brigade of FARDC in the Baraka zone in South Kivu. The Yakutumba group coordinates its actions with the FDLR battalions posted near gold mines in the south of Fizi territory. It counts on support from the Bembe community. In North Kivu, around 300 Mayi Mayi Kifuafua fighters integrated into the FARDC in February 2010, but the Congolese authorities neglected these new troops without any real local influence. Left without supervision and without income, many returned home or allied with the FDLR. The first mass desertion of former CNDP soldiers was recorded at the end of 2009. Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, a Tutsi officer, left his position in Masisi taking with him the FARDC battalion he was commanding. He explained to his CNDP interlocutors that he would continue fighting against Kinshasa alongside the FDLR and the non-integrated Mayi Mayi. Financial motives are at the heart of many rebel groups strategies. In South Kivu, Kyatende Ditman proclaimed himself General in April 2010. In Shabunda territory he organised, a militia along with an ex-combatant Mayi Mayi integrated in the national army and attacked the

FARDC to take control of Moba gold mine. Kyat was finally arrested in July 2010 for participation in an insurrectionary movement.103 In North Kivu, the Mayi Mayi Cheka has no known community claims. Many are deserters from the 85th FARDC brigade, which exploited the tin ore (cassiterite) Bisie mine until it was replaced in January 2009 by the 1st integrated brigade led by ex-CNDP officers.104 They cooperated with FDLR to intercept a share of the income drawn from the Walikale miners transiting by the road which they controlled. On several occasions, they pillaged the mining city of Mubi. Twice during summer 2010, the Cheka group hijacked the private aircraft supplying miners in the area and took their crew hostage.105

5. An aborted resettlement plan


The resettlement of the Hutu rebels that did not take part in the 1994 genocide was part of the solutions outlined in the Nairobi Communiqu in November 2007. By offering an alternative to forced repatriation it ensured that the FDLR combatants would not be forced into a situation that may alienate them from future reconciliation efforts.106 MONUC collaborated during the first half of 2010 with President Kabilas security advisors to re-launch the resettlement option, and create security conditions for the host Congolese population and for those FDLR who accepted the offer. International funding was also discussed.107 On 15 May 2010, the Congolese head of state confirmed that military operations would continue, but announced that from then on his government proposed to those FDLR combatants who handed over their arms, resettlement in a Congolese province far from Rwanda.108 However, the UN organisations involved in the preparation of the resettlement were pushed to one side. At the beginning of June 2010, the Congolese NGO, Ecumenical Program for Peace, Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation (PAREC) led by Pastor Ngoy Mulunda, received funding from the presidency to transport 350

Uvira: les FRF coalisent avec les FDLR dans les Hauts plateaux, Radio Okapi, 5 August 2009. 102 See the press releases of the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), Buboa, 6 to 12 January 2009.

101

Bukavu, dbut du procs des prsums insurgs de Shabunda, Digital Congo, 18 September 2010, www.digitalcongo. net/article/70181. 104 See Final Report by the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, 23 November 2009, op. cit., p. 50, point 201. 105 Indian pilot freed after Congo hostage ordeal, Reuters, 3 August 2010. 106 Crisis Group report, Congo: A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, op. cit., pp. 20-23. 107 Crisis Group interview, MONUC official and FARDC officer, Goma, May 2010, Kinshasa, July 2010. 108 Report of the Security council mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 13 to 16 May 2010, document S/2010/ 288, 30 June 2010, p. 3.

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FDLR combatants and their dependants to Katanga.109 The Katangan population had not been informed by the Minister of Defence who was subsequently questioned in Parliament. MONUC did not have access to these combatants, but the information received in Kivu indicated that the majority of the 190 combatants identified by PAREC were not from the FDLR. Some belonged to a group of bandits set up in 2005 by Soki, a young FDLR dissident. Others, according to comments in the press by the leader of the PAREC programme, were civilian Rwandan refugees.110 Many seemed to just be Congolese hoping to gain financially from this process.111 Some Rwandans settled by PAREC in the KisengeManganse former refugee camp complained about living conditions and fled by the end of the June 2010. The governor of Katanga had to intercede with the United Nations to request that they assume responsibility for 37 fugitives who had been intercepted. On 17 August 2010, PAREC returned 58 people to Rwanda outside of the MONUC, World Bank and UNHCR repatriation programme.112 The Rwandan authorities eventually noticed that almost half of these people were in actual fact Congolese.113 During the first week of November, MONUC took responsibility for 83 additional fugitives while between 100 and 150 people are still being held against their will in Katanga.114 The resettlement option, which is the key complementary component of forced disarmament, was temporarily discredited by the reported failure of PAREC.

tions started a month earlier. As the essential aspect was the respect of the secret agreement made between Kabila and Kagame, the Congolese government and the CNDP negotiated in a climate of mutual suspicion and did not address the issue of the roots of intercommunity tensions in their discussions.115 However, their rapprochement worried communities threatened by the new military alliance and by the political and territorial consequences of the repatriation of refugees. Kinshasa still did not control large sections of Kivu on the borders with its three neighbours and certain areas in the provinces of North and South Kivu were still conducive to foreign rebel activity.

1. A fools game between the CNDP and the Congolese government


In accordance with his agreement with Kagame, Kabila accepted the integration of CNDP officers into the FARDC in influential posts in the anti-FDLR operations chain of command. At the beginning of 2009, 5,800 CNDP fighters, out of the 7,000 registered, rejoined the ranks of the national army.116 More than 450 of them later disclosed their Rwandan nationality to MONUC in order to be repatriated to their country.117 On 4 February, the new president of the CNDP, Dsir Kamanzi,118 announced the de facto transformation of the politico-military movement into a political party.119 This was included in the 23 March peace agreement signed by the government and the CNDP and brokered by the international community.120

B. UNFINISHED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT


After the ousting of Nkunda at the end of January 2009, a new political leadership close to Kigali and Bosco was installed at the head of the CNDP to continue the negotiaThese roots are explored in the Crisis Group report, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, op. cit. 116 See Twenty-Seventh Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2009/160, 27 March 2009, p. 2. 117 During the first eight months of 2009, these Rwandan soldiers from the CNDP were repatriated by the DDRRR Section of MONUC. During the previous conflict in December 2007, MONUC assessed CNDP strength at around 2,500 combatants. CNDPs doubling in size in one year can be explained by recruitment in eastern Congo, but also by the admission of Rwandan citizens into its ranks during the crisis at the end of 2008. 118 Bosco could not fill the position that Nkunda had occupied because his arrest warrant from the ICC stopped him from moving outside Kivu or negotiating with international representatives. Kamanzi was therefore designated. See later section with details about his links with Rwanda. 119 He made a series of requests copied from the list of requirements that Nkunda presented in October 2006. Dclaration politique du CNDP, Goma, 4 February 2009. 120 See Accords de paix entre le gouvernement et le CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009. International facilitation was composed of former heads of state Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa. In the same capacity as the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General Obasanjo, the former Tanzanian president Mkapa has been mandated since November 2008 by the African Union and the International Confer115

PAREC is led by Pastor Ngoy Mulunda. Originally from Katanga, Pastor Mulunda is a founding member of the presidents party Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la dmocratie (PPRD) and a family friend of the Kabilas. 110 Nouvelle vague de 263 FDLR au Katanga, inquitudes au Lualaba, Radio Okapi, 8 June 2010. 111 Crisis Group interviews, Kinshasa, June 2010. 112 This programme has functioned since 2002 and included identification measures and long-term monitoring. One of its objectives is to ensure transparency of the treatment of ex-FDLR combatants once they are in Rwanda. Minimal security guarantees are given to potential demobilisation candidates influenced by the propaganda of the FDLR command. 113 The 26 people recognised as Congolese by the Rwandan Reintegration Commission all escaped after a week in Rwanda and vanished. See Rwanda: 26 Congolese among FDLR returnees, The New Times, 25 August 2010; and Les 26 exFDLR prsents comme des Congolais se sont evad du camp de Mutobi, Radio Okapi, 1 September 2010. 114 Crisis Group interview, MONUC official, Kampala, 11 November 2010.

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In the agreement drawn up on the model of the Act of Engagement from the July 2008 Goma Conference, Kinshasa committed mainly to free prisoners and to take responsibility for CNDP war victims, to promulgate an amnesty law and to prepare for the return of Congolese refugees from neighbouring countries. Kabila accepted the principle of CNDPs participation in the countrys political affairs and agreed to the creation of a national reconciliation mechanism. In exchange, CNDP pledged to integrate its military into the Congolese security forces. The group agreed to re-establish state authority in the areas of North Kivu it governed. The CNDP also proposed a new territorial organisation and a revision of the electoral law. A 90-day implementation calendar was annexed to the agreement. The normalisation of the CNDP without Nkunda marked the official end of the Congolese rebellion in Kivu and an apparent political victory for Kabila. During the negotiations, the CNDP leaders kept in mind two tacit commitments: 1) former CNDP fighters would not be redeployed outside of Kivu before the neutralisation of the FDLR; 2) their officers would obtain ministerial posts in the national and North Kivu provincial governments. Other Congolese militia from Kivu, like those from PARECO, eventually acquiesced to the agreement. In exchange for the recognition of the ranks that they attributed to themselves during the rebellion, they also agreed to transform their organisations into political parties. At the time of the implementation of the 23 March 2009 agreement, Eugne Serufuli considered that he had the support of the head of state to institutionalise Rwandophonie. Serufuli had worked since December 2008 to reassure sceptical members of the Hutu community of Boscos intentions. A letter which reached the embassies in Kinshasa around this time is attributed to him. This letter promoted the division of North Kivu province into two separate political entities entrusted respectively to the Nande group and a Hutu-Tutsi alliance.121 With CNDPs normalisation, a legitimate and powerful Tutsi partner was identified to promote common Hutu-Tutsi interests. Eighteen months later, neither the DRC government, nor the CNDP had completely respected their commitments.122 This time, Kinshasa had freed 400 prisoners, passed an amnesty law and officially transferred US$160,000 to the
ence on the Great Lakes Region to facilitate negotiations between Kinshasa and the CNDP. 121 Regional division of the North Kivu province: a leading solution to the problems in eastern DRC, attributed to Eugne Serufuli, Kinshasa, dated 2 December 2008. 122 The same posture could be seen with the 2007 Mixage process an initial agreement on CNDP integration into the FARDC and then with the peace agreement of the 2008 Goma Peace Conference, prior to their respective failures. Crisis Group report, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, op. cit., pp. 7-10.

CNDP for them to take charge of those wounded during the war. On the other hand CNDP had limited access to the political arenas. At a provincial level, they had only one post (the provincial minister responsible for justice, human rights and community reinsertion). At the national level, they received nothing, despite assurances given by Kabila during a meeting in Kinshasa on 17 April 2009. The parliamentary group of the presidential majority had refused to accept that a provincial party without elected officials could obtain national ministers; instead it proposed posts in public enterprises and the territorial administration of North Kivu. Considering that all the demands had been met, the Congolese government did not renew the mandate given to the National Committee for the Follow-up of 23 March Agreements, which expired in May 2010. At the same time, the CNDP did not show any motivation to give up its parallel system of administration or its system of taxation on the Masisi, Rutshuru and Nyiragongo populations. At the time of integration in January 2009, the CNDP had already officially lifted all taxes.123Yet in May 2009, lorry drivers blocked the roads and protested against their continuation.124 The CNDP then announced the dismantling of its illegal administration on 14 June 2010, when five of its members were nominated by the government to administration posts in Masisi.125 However, on 30 July, Masisi civil society addressed an open letter to the president, complaining the CNDP had reinitiated its parallel administration and expressing frustration at the decision to entrust the administration of the territory to former rebels that had committed crimes.126 On 25 August, the president of the Masisi civil society, Sylvestre Bwira, was kidnapped and severely beaten during a week by unknown people in military uniform.127 On 31 August, OCHA observed that illegal taxes are still levied daily on a road controlled by the CNDP.128

Vainqueur Mayala et Bsoco Ntaganda Mushake, fief du CNDP, Radio Okapi, 16 January 2009. 124 Masisi: le CNDP peroit toujours des taxes, Radio Okapi, 1 May 2009. 125 Masisi: le CNDP met fin ladministration parallle, le gouvernement sen rjouit, Radio Okapi, 26 June 2010. In a press release on 31 March 2010 the CNDP had already announced the raising of its blockades and illegal tax collecting in North Kivu. In their 25 May 2010 report, the UN experts contradicted this news. Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, op. cit., p. 9, point 36. 126 Demande urgente de la dlocalisation de tous les lments issus des groups arms dans le territoire de Masisi, Civil Society/ Forces vives coordination territoriale de Masisi, open letter to President Kabila, 30 July 2010. 127 Violences au Congo: militaires nouveau accuss, La Libre Belgique, 1 September 2010. 128 Bulletin dinformation humanitaire, province du Nord Kivu, OCHA, 31 August 2010.

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Another violation was revealed in August 2009 during the second meeting of the 23 March Goma Peace Agreement Follow-up Committee. Ex-CNDP combatants who are now senior FARDC officers continued to take part in meetings of the new political party in contradiction with the principle of military neutrality.129 Kabila, who was in Goma in August to meet with Kagame, brought up this issue with the CNDP leadership. It was also raised during the follow-up committee in December 2009 to no avail. In May 2010, the CNDP flag was still flying near to military positions in Mushake and Kitchanga. In their internal reports, MONUC estimated that the CNDP exerted a wide control of the largest part of Petit Nord in North Kivu.130 The parallel administration and civilian-military chain of command of the CNDP were maintained despite its formal integration into the Congolese institutions. On 6 September 2010, Kabila went to Kigali to attend the investiture of Kagame at the start of his second presidential term. The two leaders met several times to discuss their partnership. On his way back to Kinshasa, president Kabila announced his decision to freeze the exploitation of minerals in Kivu and indicated that in Goma the military integrated into FARDC since January 2008 had to prepare for redeployment to other Congolese provinces. This decision seemed to correspond to a request from the Rwandan president to move CNDP leaders suspected of talking to Rwandan dissidents away from the border. On 23 September 2010, some officers linked to the CNDP addressed a memorandum to the president criticising the government for failing to honour certain key commitments from the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement. They requested the president to halt movements of troops outside the Kivu before the agreement was completely implemented, including the recognition of ranks.131 On 18 October 2010, the Hutu branch of PARECO integrated into the FARDC put on a common front with the CNDP by publicly associating with its position at the end of a bilateral meeting.132 PARECO was actually the big loser in the agreement. It did not obtain any position in the administration or in the provincial political structures. The self-proclaimed general Mugabo Baguma, who encouraged the integration of the
129

Hutus into the FARDC in January 2008, only ever received military pay according to his rank in the national army. The rapprochement between PARECO and the CNDP was a consequence of a lack of enthusiasm shown by the Congolese government to honour its commitments.

2. Regional relocation of protests


Far from being a new phenomenon, relocation of armed political resistance remains a characteristic of the Kivu region. Unable to develop in their country, the resistance relocates into the Kivu, where they take advantage of the lack of state control to form an armed rebellion. Even if interventions by national troops are rare, the threat for the regimes they challenge persists. Regional cooperation, manipulation of a Congolese group or intimidation are all methods still used in the Kivus. The arrest and detention of Laurent Nkunda in Rwanda created a deep rift within the CNDP. Bosco, who rejoined Nkundas military chief of staff in 2006, did not have historical legitimacy in the eyes of the Congolese founders of the movement. The two subsequent presidents Dsir Kamanzi and Philippe Gafishi had built their professional careers in Rwanda and were practically unknown in Kivu.133 Nkundas former collaborators denounced Kigalis takeover of their movement. They criticised president Kagame, accusing him of prioritising his own international image after the 2008 crisis for the grounds pursued by CNDP.134 Bertrand Bisimwa, the former spokesperson of the CNDP, explained to the media that Rwandans have deceived [them] since 25 January 2009.135 From the end of 2009 until summer 2010, the division progressively widened between the figures deemed close to Kigali and those who refused to follow Rwandan instructions. The faction which remained faithful to Nkunda was perceived as a threat to the Rwandan authorities. As the presidential elections of August 2010 approached, the politicosecurity situation in Rwanda deteriorated. One of Kagames rivals, General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, fled Rwanda on 27 February 2010 to take refuge in South Africa. A former chief of defence staff and director of intelligence, General Kayumba Nyamwasa had collaborated

Second session of the follow-up committee of the 23 March agreement, message sent by Alan Doss to Alain Le Roy, 13 August 2009. 130 Confidential: Provincial Report of the MONUC NK Task Force on Cross Border Movement of Populations from Rwanda to the DRC, MONUC, Goma, 27 November 2009, p. 3. 131 Mmorandum lintention du prsident Kabila, objet: revendication de certains officiers FARDC, Goma, 23 September 2010. 132 Communiqu de presse du CNDP et de la PARECO, Goma, 18 October 2010.

Crisis Group interview, Goma, 24 February 2009. See also Jason Stearns, A CNDP Christmas and CNDP and the logic of disorder, Congo Siasa, 15 November and 17 December 2009. Gafishi, a close of Bosco, was named to the head of the CNDP in December 2009 after the surprise suspension of Kamanzi on 8 October in a context of heightened tensions between proBosco and pro-Nkunda supporters. 134 Crisis Group interviews, CNDP leaders, October 2010 and May 2010. 135 RDC: militaires rwandais et congolais progressent pour chasser les rebelles, Agence France-Presse, 26 January 2009.

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with the Congolese Tutsis close to Nkunda and continued to benefit from the network of support within the Rwandan army. MONUC was informed that General Kayumba had contacted leading CNDP figures, the FDLR, and a new militia led by the Tutsi Gad Ngabo the Front patriotique pour la liberation du Congo (FPLC, see below).136 On 2 June 2010, in coordination with the FDLR, the FPLC attacked an important arms depot in Burungu in a part of Masisi controlled by the CNDP. Between March and June 2010, an anti-Kagame armed front with potential links to the Rwandan security forces was established. Rwandan pressure on the CNDP increased. In May 2010, Patrice Habarurema, then Gafishis Chief of Staff, announced the project for a reformed CNDP temporarily led by a Secretary General. Habarurema wanted the post of president to be left vacant awaiting the return of Nkunda. This initiative anticipated the departure of the CNDP from the integration process. Habarurema was arrested on 7 May in the Rwandan town of Gisenyi and transferred to Kigali.137 On 20 June, Denis Ntare Semadwinga, president of the Banyarwanda community in North Kivu and Nkundas former colleague, was assassinated in Gisenyi. On 30 August 2010, Emerita Munyashwe, another ally of Nkunda, was killed by unknown assailants on a street in Goma.138 The deterioration of the link between the Rwandan regime and the CNDP had unexpected consequences. Since the end of November, numerous reports indicated to MONUSCO that CNDP officers were deserting the FARDC ranks and getting close to the FDLR.139 Along the border with Uganda, two armed groups posed other risks of regional destabilisation. Since summer 2009, Gad Ngabos FPLC had gradually extended their influence in a part of Rushuru territory bordering Uganda and had recruited demobilised Mayi Mayi and CNDP deserters. Ngabo appeared free to travel to Kampala regularly where he raised funds through his support network. Twice, the peacekeepers recorded incursions into North Kivu of Rwandan army reconnaissance units attempting to evaluate the strength of the FPLC.140 In the Grand Nord of North Kivu, the 500 to 600 fighters of the Ugandan group ADF did not pose a major security risk to the Congolese Nande population. In November 2009, Kampala informed Kinshasa that the rebel group had intensified its training and recruitment. The Ugandan
Crisis Group interviews, MONUC officials, Kinshasa, June and July 2010. 137 Crisis Group interview, CNDP leader, May 2010. 138 Jason Stearns, Assassination of Nkunda ally in Goma, Congo Siasa, 30 August 2010. 139 Crisis Group interview, MONUSCO official, 12 November 2010. 140 Crisis Group interview, MONUC officials, Kinshasa and Goma, May, June and July 2010.
136

Chief of the Defence Staff explained that he suspected links between the ADF and the Somali rebel group AlShabaab. In December 2009, a battalion of Ugandan soldiers spent several days in Beni, North Kivu. This was officially recognised as an accident. In February 2010, Kampala, Kinshasa and MONUC agreed to exchange intelligence on the ADF. The FARDC started to prepare for a military operation.141 Despite increased tension between Uganda and Rwanda during the first half of 2010 the Rwandan army was reinforced along the shared border142 in June 2010, Presidents Kabila, Kagame and Museveni decided on a coordinated approach to address the ADF and the FPLC. On 25 June, without consulting MONUC and with no warning given to the local population, the FARDC suddenly launched operation Rwenzori against the ADF. On 28 June, Gad Ngabo was summoned by the Ugandan intelligence services and arrested in Kampala.143 On 14 July, the Rwandan police participated in the forced repatriation of 1,700 Rwandans from refugee camps in Uganda, leading to the death of two people while trying to escape.144 The friendly relationships between the three heads of state were on show in Kinshasa during the Congos celebrations to commemorate fifty years of independence.145 In August 2010, Agathon Rwasa, the president of the Forces nationales de libration (FNL) a former Burundian Hutu armed group converted to a political opposition party took refuge in the DRC.146 After the failure of his movement in the summer 2010 elections, he went underground and crossed the border of South Kivu with the complicity of the Congolese military.147 MONUSCO received accounts at the end of 2010 indicating that he was recruiting new fighters with the support of Yakutumba Mayi Mayi.148 The risk of reactivating a Burundian rebellion due to the historical support in South Kivu, in addition

Crisis Group interviews, Kampala, July 2010. UDPF call for calm as Rwanda deploys on border, The Monitor, 28 June 2010. 143 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, Kinshasa and Kampala, June and July 2010. 144 UNHCR condemns forced return of 1,700 Rwandans from Uganda, UNHCR, 16 July 2010. See also Uganda/Rwanda: Halt Forced Returns of Refugees, Human Rights Watch, 17 July 2010. 145 The Ugandan intelligence service accused the ADF of having taken part in the 11 July 2010 attacks in Kampala attributed to the Somali organisation Al-Shabaab. 146 See Crisis Group Africa report N155, Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, 12 February 2010; and Crisis Group Africa briefing N63, Burundi: To Integrate the FNL Successfully, 30 July 2009. 147 Crisis Group interview, Bujumbura, August 2010. 148 Crisis Group interview, MONUSCO official, Kampala, 12 November 2010.
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to ADF, FDLR and other anti-Kagame armed movements further illustrated the potential for regional destabilisation in eastern Congo.

3. Worsening of intercommunity antagonisms


The role of the CNDP is still to protect the North Kivu Tutsis against hostile communities. Despite their division into pro-Bosco and pro-Nkunda factions, all CNDP members agreed on the need to strengthen their collective influence and in the long term to eventually establish safe territory for Congolese Tutsis. The CNDP had a window of opportunity to achieve this thanks to its integration in the Congolese army in Kivu.149 Since reintegration, the CNDP has pursued its stated aims of the repatriation of Tutsi Congolese, sheltering in Rwanda and their resettlement in protected areas before the planned February 2012 provincial elections.150 UNHCR in Rwanda manages three camps sheltering 54,000 Congolese the majority Tutsi and provides assistance to 4,000 more Congolese in the towns.151 In Uganda, UNHCR registered 75,000 other Congolese refugees coming from Kivu and the Eastern Province the largest proportion of them being Hutu.152 At the end of 2009, Gafishi, the new CNDP president, put forward a figure of 150,000 more Tutsi refugees, who were living in Rwanda without recourse to any support from UNHCR, though this estimation was immediately denounced by the traditional leaders in North Kivu.153 A spontaneous return movement from Rwanda was observed in 2009.154 On 5 August 2009, the National ComThe 8th military district officially coordinates FARDC action from its Goma headquarters. In reality, many operations are directed from the CNDP command centre in Kitchanga, in Masisi territory. The military leaders sent by Kinshasa for the anti-FDLR campaigns and the head of the 8th military district, General Mayala, do not have any real influence on the CNDP commanders. Crisis Group interviews, Goma and Bukavu, April and May 2010. 150 Crisis Group interviews, CNDP leaders, Goma, March 2009 and April 2010. 151 Crisis Group interview, UNHCR official, Goma, 18 April 2010. 152 Crisis Group interview, UNHCR official, Kampala, 26 July 2010. 153 They challenged the status of refugee for Congolese Tutsis who returned to Rwanda after Kagame seized power. They also denied Congolese citizenship to those who had dual Rwandan nationality. The leaders of Walikale, Lubero and Beni denied that a Tutsi community had ever existed in their territories. See the daily report from MONUC in North Kivu, Goma, 8 September 2009. 154 This return movement was not the first. When Serufuli was governor of North Kivu, he organised the return of 45,000 refugees who joined transit camps around Kirolirwe in Masisi.
149

mission for Refugees (CNR) became aware of refugees crossing the border at Kibumba to North Kivu. According to its investigation finalised in September 2009, this movement began in May 2009 and involved 12,000 individuals not-registered by UNHCR.155 They entered Congo under the supervision of CNDP, without crossing customs posts, before taking chartered public transport to Masisi, Ngungu and Kitchanga areas, causing anger amongst the traditional Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga leaders.156 MONUC considered it very likely that Rwandan illegal immigrants would have helped to orchestrate the movement157 including Rwandan Hutus having gone into exile following the implementation of agrarian reforms and the imposition of English language in Rwandan schools in Rwanda.158 In order to set up an official and organised return, the DRC, Rwanda and UNHCR signed a Tripartite Agreement on 17 February 2010 to launch repatriation. The United Nations agency would only take responsibility for those refugees who were registered and who voluntarily wanted to return to their place of origin. It warned that the cases of internally displaced people living in the refugee return areas should be resolved urgently to avoid accusations of preferential treatment. Provisions in the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement foresaw the need to set up 30 Local Permanent Conciliation Committees (CLPC) to accompany the reinsertion process. In August 2010, UNHCR officials warned that political manipulation would provoke ethnic violence in the Kivus159 as, in April 2010, the Congolese authorities ignored a proposition from UNHCR to conduct an accurate census on spontaneous returns, which seemed to be continuing.160 Without fixing an exact date for the start of the repatriations, the Tripartite Commission (DRC-Rwanda-UNHCR) adopted the practical modalities, which were immediately contested by traditional chiefs in the areas of return.161 A

Briefing Note: Population Movements from Rwanda UNHCR Sub Office Goma, UNHCR, Goma, 10 November 2009. See also the UNHCR report from the follow-up meeting to the Humanitarian Security Committee Meeting, Goma, 21 October 2009. 156 Refugees in Eastern DRC: a discussion document, International Alert, January 2010, p.3. 157 Confidential: Provincial Report of the MONUC NK Task Force on Cross Border Movement of Populations from Rwanda to the DRC, 27 November 2009, op. cit., p. 2. 158 Crisis Group interview, 28 October 2010. 159 The president of civil society in North Kivu was quoted as saying I can tell you for sure that if these returns happen now there will be catastrophe. People say they will protect their land until the last drop of blood is spilled. Fertile land the prize that could reignite ethnic conflict in DR Congo, The Guardian, 20 August 2010. 160 Crisis Group interview, UNHCR official, Goma, 18 April 2010. 161 During the public meetings, the traditional leaders announced their refusal to accept the return of the refugees. Some eventu-

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Tripartite Agreement (DRC-Uganda-UNHCR) was also signed on 29 October 2010. In a poll carried out at the beginning of 2010, 32,000 Congolese refugees had expressed their wish to be repatriated by the Ugandan government and UNHCR.162 The issue of refugee return where a parallel CNDP administration survives highlights the ongoing problem of competition for land. The influx of returning refugees has created suspicion about attempts to modify political balances in the Kivu areas rich in grazing land, natural resources and farmable land. Traditional leaders feel that their authority is undermined by the CNDP administration. Customary law gives traditional leaders the power to allocate land and they want to be involved in the identification of refugees who do not have documents proving their origin. On the other hand, the CNDP proposed a new territorial and electoral division to the Congolese government, which reduces the influence of traditional authorities to the benefit of future locally-elected representatives. While numerous farmers follow customary laws and are unaware of referral to the land registry, the CNDP wanted the Congolese state to enforce the property rights in accordance with the national land law of 1973.163 The contradictions between customary law and the written law have considerable consequences in terms of legitimacy for local powers. National authorities have avoided debate for fear of accusations of meddling in laws for political benefit. After the closure of the camps for displaced people in Goma in September 2009 and the simultaneous arrival of cows crossing the border town of Bunagana, land conflicts have multiplied in the area controlled by the CNDP.164 Operating with limited means, between September 2009 and July 2010 UN HABITAT registered approximately 450 conflicts in one section of the Masisi and Rutshuru

territories.165 In some cases several hundred families face a few landowners supported by the FARDC officers.166 MONUC also was informed that, in several localities of the Masisi territory, ex-CNDP military have despoiled some villages of their fields in order to make them pasture land or to exploit minerals there.167 In the context of the CNDP civilian-military chain of command and of the forthcoming repatriation of refugees to Kivu,168 the politicisation and militarisation of the largest land conflicts exceeds the work of the land mediation carried out on the ground by the CLPC, UN HABITAT and other NGOs. In fact, this risks reducing it to nothing.

C. LABORIOUS BEGINNINGS TO THE ECONOMIC PEACE AGENDA


The political and security dimensions of the resolution of the conflict in the Kivus are completed by an institutional (re-establishment of state authority) and economic (regional development) approach, which seeks to address the roots of conflict. This approach is largely supported by

ally refused to recognise to have been invited and to have participated in the tripartite meeting in Kigali. See La Tripartite RDC-Rwanda-HCR adopte les modalits du retour des rfugis, Radio Okapi, 31 July 2010. In September, the return of 500 Congolese refugees from Rwanda to the areas of Kisimba and Ikobo in the Walikale territory provoked displeasure in the local population, Controverse autour de linstallation dans la cit de Walikale de 500 rfugis congolais en provenance du Rwanda, www.digitalcongo.net/article/70385 (27 September 2010). www.digitalcongo.net/article/70385 (27 September 2010). 162 Joint Communiqu of the First Meeting of the Uganda-DRCUNHCR Tripartite Commission on Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Living in the Republic of Uganda, Kampala, 29 October 2010. 163 Crisis Group interview, CNDP leader, Goma, April 2010. 164 Crisis Group interviews, Goma, April 2010.

UN HABITAT has six land mediators operating from Kitchanga to meet a need estimated at more than fifty mediators. Crisis Group interviews with UN HABITAT officials, Goma and Entebbe, 17 May and 22 July 2010. Three social groups are embroiled in these conflicts: a minority class of large land owners, powerful breeders, and farmers forming the majority of the population. RD Congo/ Nord Kivu: Caritas combat les conflits foncier par la vulgarisation de la loi, Caritas, 30 April 2010. 166 The agricultural cooperative COOPRAKA regrouping 510 families is in conflict with a group of eleven landowners over 500 hectares of land near Tongo. Amongst the landowners is the spokesperson of the Amani Leo operation in North Kivu, Major Kazarama. The latter had five members of the cooperative arrested under the pretext of defamation. Another example can be given of the villagers from Ndeko in Masisi who signalled to MONUC that Colonel Ngaruye Baudoin, deputy leader of Zone 2 of the same operation, was interfering in a land dispute on behalf of a landowner. See Daily Situation Report, MONUC Brigade from North Kivu, Goma, 2 May 2010. 167 Crisis Group interview, MONUC official, Goma, April 2010. This phenomenon is not limited to North Kivu as army interventions in land disputes have been witnessed also in the Kalehe territory, in the extreme north of South Kivu province. On 9 June 2010, in the Minova area, some FARDC soldiers from Goma have intimidated civilians involved in an ongoing land conflict on the Kilenge plantation. 168 The Nande community is very hostile to the return of a few hundred Tutsi families in the South of the Lubero territory in the Grand Nord of North Kivu. On 26 April 2010, a memorandum from the national deputies of South Kivu addressed to the Congolese Prime Minister denounced a return movement of Rwandan Tutsis notably to Kalonge and Numbi. It condemned control by CNDP military of strategic positions in the province and the attempt to nominate an administrator from Rwanda in the Idjwi island on Lake Kivu.

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international donors and the United Nations and, for the time being, is facing persistent insecurity, a deficient national and provincial government, capacity gaps and lack of political will between the governments in the region.

1. The limited impact of the stabilisation programmes


For Kinshasa, the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement with the Congolese armed group concluded the peace negotiations. To illustrate this success, in November 2009 Kabila asked MONUC to began preparations for a withdrawal of its peacekeepers. The UN Mission became MONUSCO in July 2010 to mark the passage from a peacekeeping mission to a stabilisation phase in eastern Congo. On 29 June 2009, president Kabila established the Congolese Programme for Stabilization and Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas (STAREC).169 The contribution of foreign actors is set out in the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Congo (ISSSS). Initially, the contents of STAREC and ISSSS were harmonised. The stabilisation activities consisted of rehabilitating, as a matter of priority, strategic roads in order to open up high-risk areas and to construct buildings to deploy police and administrative services on land taken back by armed groups. In summer 2010, the stabilisation strategy encountered several major obstacles. Firstly, raising the funds quickly became problematic. The requested amount and the final budget granted were incomparable: Kinshasa estimated the cost of stabilisation at US$1.2 billion over a period of six months.170 The final budget established by the international donors was a more realistic figure of US$850 million over three years for the priority needs. In May 2010, only US$266 million had been mobilised for security and for carrying out the political commitments made in the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement. The STAREC component dealing with revival of economic activities had been temporarily frozen. In July 2010, the component addressing sexual violence had only been allocated US$5 million for projects in Ituri and South Kivu. As the integration of ex-combatants came under STAREC, the absence of financial engagement from Kinshasa sent a strong negative signal to the remaining armed rebel groups.171

The inability of the Congolese government to assume a dynamic role in stabilisation was obvious. In July 2010, the implementation of ISSSS rested on 38 administrative centres, prisons, courts and police stations out of a planned 50. They were nevertheless ready to house 300 civil servants, 300 territorial police and 800 members of the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR). The rehabilitation of three roads in Kivu, totalling almost 300km, was also finished.172 However, the Congolese government did not manage to set up or deploy the administrative personnel needed to re-establish state authority. Only 100 PIR police were deployed to South Kivu, the other 700 were retained in Kinshasa. No logistics support or medical care was made available to the 300 territorial police from North Kivu. Many of the buildings which had been constructed remained empty and unused and had to be guarded to ensure that the equipment was not looted. Finally and above all, the current political-military situation in Kivu does not correspond to a stabilisation phase. This difference between the stabilisation programme and the realities on the ground was clearly exposed by international NGOs to European Ambassadors during their stay in Bukavu in September 2010.173 Work on several sections of the strategic road has been interrupted by opposing armed groups. In South Kivu, the road between Hombo and Bunyakiri remains under the control of the FDLR. The reconciliation commission under STAREC supports UN HABITAT in resolving land disputes and preparing for the repatriation of refugees from Rwanda. Its local employees are disappointed that Kinshasa still views South Kivus problems as local and does not engage with the CNDP for their resolution.174 The delays in nominating 60 civil administrators set out in STAREC in the CNDP area further illustrate the challenge of restoring state authority in the region. The construction of barracks was also a priority of the international stabilisation plan. At the beginning of 2010, the FARDC reform project presented by the Congolese government anticipated the maintenance of twenty battalions in Kivu. Some financial resources were mobilised in the ISSSS framework for half of these battalions, and installations were made ready to host three in South Kivu. However, the UK Department for International Development and International Organisations for Migration (IOM) initiative for seven additional battalions was blocked by

The Congolese government, MONUC, fifteen implementing partners and ten international donors agreed to a joint approach on stabilisation. 170 Programme de stabilisation et de reconstruction des zones sortant des conflits arms, Gouvernement de la RDC, June 2009. 171 Crisis Group, member of the stabilisation team in MONUC, Goma, 17 April 2010.

169

The ISSSS planned to reopen three road axis in South Kivu, of which the Bukavu-Hombo and Baraka-Fizi roads were practically finished by August 2010, and two axis in North Kivu, of which Rutshuru-Ishasa has also been finished. 173 Briefing to European Union Ambassadors during their visit to South Kivu, 22 September 2010. 174 Crisis Group interview, STAREC official, Goma, 18 April 2010.

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the Congolese military authorities who prioritised military operations already underway. The number of FARDC soldiers currently engaged in military operations in Kivu is six times greater than the capacity of the barracks planned in the stabilisation strategy.

2. Provincial power struggle


The provincial political institutions from North and South Kivu were unable to efficiently assist the stabilisation strategy because of governance problems in Goma and Bukavu. In North Kivu, a corruption scandal destabilised the governor Julien Paluku. A report submitted in September 2009 by an evaluation commission on implementation of the North Kivu budget revealed serious signs of corruption. Out of 42 provincial deputies, 18 signed a no-confidence request against the governor. The deputies in favour of the governor no longer attended the parliamentary sittings meaning that there would not be an adequate quorum to make a vote of no confidence. This behaviour blocked all the activities of the provincial parliament. The North Kivu political corruption file was handed over to the courts and two concurrent legal proceedings have begun.175 As a result, the executive and legislative institutions of North Kivu have been brought to a standstill. In December 2009, the Goma opposing factions solicited the assistance of the president, who had given an extra thrust to the application of the national strategy of zero tolerance against corruption since July 2009.176 However, Kabila did not step in and waited for the results of the legal process.177 Paluku was an important figure in dialogue between the presidency and CNDP politicians through STAREC. His enforced departure would have opened up a power struggle in North Kivu at the moment where intercommunity tensions were at their peak. In the second half of 2010, a temporary compromise enabled the provincial parliament to function again thanks to mediation by a Council of Elders. However, political manoeuvring continued until summer 2010 and handicapped the functioning of the provincial institutions. In South Kivu, the governors imposed by Kinshasa succeeded one another unable to last in the face of a rebellious provincial assembly. Governor Louis Lonce Muderwa
See the Goma Court of Appeal ruling of 6 February 2010. On 31 July 2009, 80 legal professionals were dismissed and 1,212 retired from office. On 2 January 2010, seventeen Executive Orders for contract termination and nomination were signed to replace almost 1,500 service sector employees under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. See Human Rights Situation Report for July 2010, United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJDRO), p. 2. See also Orders N10/001N10/017 from 2 January 2010. 177 Crisis Group interview, Goma, 15 May 2010.
176 175

was accused by a parliamentary commission of financial mismanagement and bad management. Although a member of the Shi ethnic community, which is very influential in South Kivu, his popularity in Bukavu has declined significantly since taking up his position in December 2008. Civil society reproached him for not listening, and the Federation of Congolese Businesses noted the lack of economic improvement. While Muderwa stayed in Kinshasa to gain the support of Kabila between February and April 2010, the South Kivu parliament began dismissal proceedings. It was approved by 22 provincial deputies. Muderwa resigned on 19 April. His replacement was decided in a politically sensitive context. Kabila went to Bukavu one week before the election of the third governor of South Kivu since 2006, where he met in private with the members of parliament. On 12 June, his former diplomatic advisor from Kinshasa and member of the Shi community from Walungu, Marcellin Chishambo, won 24 of the 36 votes cast. Only the vice governor retained his seat but no other member of the provincial government was returned. Without a local political intermediary, Chishambo has to gain the confidence of the population through his achievements before the next governor elections at the start of 2012 and loosen the political hold of Vital Kamerhe, a disgraced former president of the national assembly and potential candidate in the next presidential election. The failure of this second governor imposed by the president reflected both the refusal to accept Kinshasas control of South Kivus affairs and the need to respect the subtle balancing act between communities, even within communities, of this province.

3. From regional confrontation to regional cooperation


To address the economic roots of the violence in the Great Lakes region a revival of the regional cooperation begun in the 1970s is required. Regional economic cooperation is both a tool and a signal. It is a tool which creates a coalition of economic interests, which benefits countries and their citizens by moving from regional competition to regional cooperation; it is also a signal of a certain level of confidence among the Great Lakes countries. However, restarting cooperation has been slowed down by capacity gaps and a lack of willingness. In the long term, like everywhere in Africa, the harmonisation of cooperation structures is a way to avoid duplication of efforts. There are two main structures of regional cooperation in the Great Lakes with different forms although there are cross-cutting areas: the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) created in 1976 and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL), a more recent creation and initially a political forum which

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champions regional development.178 The scope of activities of the two organisations should be harmonised in the long term, but the sub-regional co-operational framework functions nevertheless. The current re-launch of CEPGL, which stalled due to successive conflicts, came back to life when the Kinshasa named its representative to the organisation in May 2009. With financial support from the European Union, the CEPGL committed to designing regional economic integration projects, but it is really on the energy projects that it has framed its re-launch. Indeed, the energy deficit has formed a bottleneck for the economy in the region. CEGPL is credited for establishing hydroelectric dams on the Ruzizi River, which separates South Kivu from Rwanda, and supplying both Bukavu and Goma with five megawatts of power.179 CEPGL planned to increase the electricity service of its member countries by creating a Ruzizi III180 and by developing the exploitation of methane gas under Lake Kivu. The management of the energy projects revealed willingness and capacity gaps for regional cooperation. In July 2009, Rwanda and DRC signed an agreement to jointly construct a gas turbine of 200 megawatts on Lake Kivu (the needs in North and South Kivu are estimated at 50 megawatts). Since then, no concrete initiative has been taken by the Congolese side because the Minister of Hydrocarbons and the Minister of the Environment are fighting a political battle for control of the gas extraction projects.181 However, Rwanda has not waited for Congo to sort out its difficulties. Since March 2009, Kigali has begun developing an off-shore platform with a partner anticipating an investment of 325 million dollars. The objective is to produce 25 megawatts by the end of 2010 and 100 megawatts by 2012.182 In the long term, DRC will have to buy electricity produced on Lake Kivu by Rwandan plants. The Congolese government is clearly at a disadvantage in the face of Rwandan specialists used to transforming international aid into concrete achievements. It appears that DRC has reluctantly reengaged in regional cooperation, going as far as to sabotage the French led initiative to organise a Great Lakes meeting during the FranceAfrica summit in Nice. French diplomacy has committed
178

itself to promoting cooperation and integration. Since July 2009, France had made preparations for a donor conference which would mobilise international funding for large infrastructure projects in the Great Lakes region. The Ruzizi III project would be the main beneficiary, but the three countries of the CEPGL initially had to bring with them US$43 million and find private investors to finance the majority of the investment. The selection of regional projects of common interest was done during preparatory meetings throughout 2010 and Presidents Kabila, Kagame and Sarkozy had to announce this conference in Nice, on 1 June 2010. After having let uncertainty persist and after asking for a change in the shape of the meeting at the last minute, Kabila finally cancelled his attendance and the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs refused even the idea of a meeting on regional cooperation with his counterparts who were also present in Nice.183 While the 24/7 opening of the border between Goma and Gisenyi since April 2010 favoured small cross-border business,184 CIRGLs contribution to the improvement in exchanges in the region is still to be seen. One of CIRGLs priorities was to develop a regional strategy to fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources, which represents a significant part of the cross-border or foreign exchanges. Another initiative consisted of facilitating the compilation of export data registered at border posts. By improving the transparency of these exchanges, CIRGL hoped to respond to suspicions of pillaging of Congos wealth by its neighbours and thereby reinforcing mutual trust. CEPGL and CIRGL collaborate on projects for the harmonisation of administrative procedures and the improvement of the big markets in border towns. In the state, the absence of harmonisation of customs regulations and administrative annoyances/harassment limit the expansion of the formal economy. The acceleration of commercial flux largely benefits the operators in the big towns in Kivu, but the rural economy has not improved. Despite the existence of two regional organisations, regional cooperation still remains in a project state. The development of regional commercial exchanges is the result of dynamic entrepreneurs in the region and not because of official declarations. In the absence of concrete plans and taking into account the various contentious issues between

For the history of CEPGL and CIRGL, see Annex C Regional Cooperation. 179 Les experts de la CEPGL analysent limpact environnemental de Ruzizi III, Radio Okapi, 18 February 2010. 180 Ruzizi 3 at Last Under Discussion, Africa Energy Intelligence, 14 July 2010. 181 Lac Kivu: lexploitation du gaz methane trane les pieds, Radio Okapi, 13 July 2010. 182 ContourGlobal signs agreement with Republic of Rwanda to develop Lake Kivu Methane Gas Project, press release, ContourGlobal, 2 March 2009.

Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Paris, 13 September 2010. According to International Alert, 22,000 traders and their dependants from the two countries directly profited from this measure. The Crossing. Small-Scale Trade and Improving Cross-Border Relations between Goma (DR Congo) and Gisenyi (Rwanda), Celestin Kimanuka and Maria Lange, International Alert, June 2010.
184

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member states,185 it would seem that regional development policy remains a slogan and feeds the prevailing scepticism regarding the economic potential of the Great Lakes region.186

III. CHANGING THE APPROACH TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT


The success of the 2006 presidential elections won by Joseph Kabila fuelled hopes for peace within the Congolese population worn out by ten years of violence, civil wars and foreign occupation. One year before the end of President Kabilas first mandate, the women and men of Kivu are still victims of war crimes and massive violations of their basic rights by the military. The DRC government has the main responsibility to offer this population a credible perspective of an end to the conflict in the east. The anti-FDLR campaigns of the FARDC have not led to reestablishment of security and state authority. MONUSCOs conditionality policy was skirted by the national military authorities who led unilateral operations. In these circumstances, it was necessary to suspend military offensive operations in the provinces of North and South Kivu. They could only restart if they were led in an efficient way mainly by soldiers from outside of Kivu. For several years, international partners of DRC have participated in Congolese troop training. The United States has trained battalions in Kisangani, China in Kamina, Belgium in Kananga, South Africa in Mura and Angola in Kitona. None of these have been deployed to Kivu since the rapprochement between Presidents Kabila and Kagame. The Congolese government has until now chosen to keep its best troops in reserve to deal with other eventualities.187 Kinshasa should provide the military component of a global strategy for disarming the FDLR to these forces. Previously, they were deployed to the Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu, to guarantee the safety of the population until the final application of the 23 March 2009 peace agreement. The countries which trained the Congolese military units could supervise, advise and support them in their operational activities in Kivu. The United Nations Security Council Members should give MONUSCO peacekeepers the resources to allow them to concentrate their activities on the protection of civilians. This mainly entails retaining movement capabilities, support to mobile bases and the deployment of joint protection teams. In summer 2010, India repatriated helicopters which were then not replaced. The fleet of UN helicopters dwindled from 36 units at the beginning of 2010 to 24 today and could even be reduced further to fourteen at the beginning of 2011. If air assets are not provided quickly enough, a number of important peacekeeping bases in Kivu populations will be closed, due to a lack of support and resupply capabilities.

Several contentious subjects put the states of CEPGL in opposition, notably the recapitalisation of the Development Bank of the Great Lake Countries (BDEGL) of which the debt has still not been paid off. Banque des grands Lacs: les bailleurs posent des conditions sa relance, RTBF, 29 November 2009. 186 Some countries believe, in effect, it is more realistic and more profitable to focus on the regional development in East Africa than in the Great Lakes. Crisis Group interview, Rwandan Minister, September 2010.

185

Crisis Group interview, FARDC officer seconded to the Ministry of Defence, Kinshasa, July 2010.

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MONUSCO should continue to collaborate with FARDC to control the zones where FDLR have been pushed from and to restrict the access to the mining areas. However, it needs to regain credibility it lost with the Congolese population. The trust given by the Kivu villagers to those mandated to protect them is a decisive element of the debate opened at the end of 2009 on the date of withdrawal of the UN Mission. Considering the conditions which have recently favoured rapes in the summer of 2010 in the Luvungi area, the MONUSCO leadership must show the determination of its contingents to make full use of their scope of actions permitted by their rules of engagement.188 To make the multiple denouncements of impunity in the Congo consistent with the reality of the engagement of the peacekeepers in DRC, the United Nations should condition MONUSCOs support to the Congolese authorities on the arrest of Bosco. An opportunity to re-establish the weakened links between the peacekeepers and the Congolese presents itself with the arrival on 1 July 2010 of a new head of the peacekeeping mission, Roger Meece. The rapid integration of the rebel fighters into FARDC organised by the Congolese government has not stopped the formation or the reconstitution of numerous militia. The alliance between the Mayi Mayi Kifuafua and the FDLR is the result of the absence of a credible demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration into civilian life programme (DDR). During the first ten months of 2010, the United Nations mission picked up approximately 410 child-soldiers from the ranks of the FDLR for whom no specific reintegration programme is financed by the Congolese authorities. Congos international partners should take responsibility of a revised integration process linked to a new DDR programme. Both should be financed by the peacebuilding fund and donors. All the FARDC soldiers from Kivu, like the fighters from groups associated with the FDLR, would have access to the programme. The international donors should make child soldiers the centre of their priorities. The number of military in North and South Kivu provinces would be reduced to reach the goal of six brigades

of 3,500 soldiers fixed in the FARDC reform plan presented by the Defence Minister in January 2010.189 Kinshasa and the CNDP have no credible reason not to fully implement the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement. The Congolese government, which recently abandoned dialogue with the signatories, should renew by ministerial order the mandate of the National Follow-up Committee (CND) which expired in May 2010. It should also implement the recommendations which have not been followed up from the Military Commission on the recognition of grades from January 2010. Considering the failure of each side to abide by its commitments, representatives of the main partner countries of Congo should be associated with the work of the CND in order to make a regular assessment of the implementation of the agreement. CNDP figures should be appointed to political and administrative positions in North Kivu to compensate for the complete dismantling of parallel CNDP administrative and taxation structures. This dismantling should be confirmed by MONUSCO. The CNDP leaders should also be encouraged to avoid involvement in Rwandas internal politics by severing contact with Rwandan dissidents such as General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. The implementation of the 23 March 2009 Peace Agreement will not be complete until the Congolese authorities have arrested Bosco. The crimes committed by Bosco are not covered by the amnesty law voted by the Congolese parliament and no political normalisation of the CNDP will be possible as long as he remains a member of the organisations leadership. Obtaining national and international political legitimacy means that the CNDP accepts the end of impunity for Bosco and his transfer to the ICC. The governments of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda and UNHCR have a shared responsibility to supervise and guarantee a safe environment for the return of Congolese refugees to the Kivu. Some nationality verification procedures are integrated into the registration and issuance of voting cards process, which should be carried out before the general elections in 2011-12. In partnership with UNHCR, the authorities in Kinshasa should before then carry out an accurate census of non-documented refugees who have left Rwanda for Kivu since summer 2009. The joint verification mechanism (JVM) of the border between Rwanda and DRC will be reactivated and spread to Uganda to dissuade clandestine immigration in Kivu. The border posts should be strictly demilitarised and run by the duly authorised administrative services. The repatriation of Congolese refugees from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi should be carried out under the strict

The conclusion of a UN evaluation mission headed by General Maurice Baril in April 2008 led to the understanding that some MONUC contingents lacked a willingness to apply the whole range of measures of the rules of engagement assigned to the mission. The same assessment was made in different terms in the United Nations analysis of the Kiwanja massacre of November 2008 close to the MONUC base. See 26th Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, S/2008/433, 3 July 2008, point 36, and Consolidated report on investigations conducted by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) into grave human rights abuses committed in Kiwanja, North Kivu, in November 2008, op. cit.

188

Plan de la rforme de larme, Ministry of Defence and Veterans, March 2009 edition, p. 16.

189

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conditions established by UNHCR. These include the assurance of voluntary return and security in the return areas. The Kivu territories in which MONUSCO records the existence of a parallel administration in contradiction to the 23 March 2009 peace agreement will not be open to a return. A range of objective and verifiable indicators will be established by the Permanent Local Conciliation Committees (CLPC) to determine if the reception conditions allow for the return of refugees. This return to an environment where a lot of internally displaced persons remain would only exacerbate tensions further. Among the indicators taken into account by the CLPC should be the implementation of simultaneous measures to improve the living conditions of the displaced and thereby avoid the perception of privileged treatment of one category of civilian victims. The Congolese government should reinforce the institutions and resources available to support intercommunity reconciliation and the peaceful management of conflicts. A land commission to arbitrate disputes should be established based on the model which was successful in Ituri, in Eastern Province. STAREC should be reformed to constitute a permanent mechanism to resolve local conflicts. It should be mandated to implement resolutions from the 2008 Goma Conference on Peace and Security, which were for the large part ignored by the provincial and national Congolese authorities. Adequate resources and a transparent recruitment process for additional personnel should be dedicated to STAREC. Even though the Congolese constitution confers a key role to the provinces, these provinces have serious capacity and operating shortcomings. In the framework of the decentralisation process, the national government should support their institutions while watching over the reinforcement of the local and provincial capacities, notably in financial management. A legislative effort in Kinshasa and in provincial parliaments should be engaged to establish the legal and administrative framework necessary for handling issues linked to political representation of ethnic minorities and to discrepancies between traditional justice and the rule of law. The Congolese government should hold a round table with the local communities, provincial authorities and national representatives. They should establish clear lines of authority for appointments in the provincial administration, and should define a consensual procedure so that local communities remove their support for armed groups. They should also adopt a code of conduct for political activities in Kivu. Under the aegis of the African Development Bank (AfDB), an extraordinary summit of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes countries (CEPGL) should bring together the heads of state from Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Bu-

rundi. Since the revival of the CEPGL, it has never hosted a meeting at this level. The presidents would publicly discuss a common project for the future of the region which should be concrete and mutually beneficial. The economic development, land issues and population movements must be placed at the centre of their discussions. The report by the United Nations Experts from December 2008 underlined the existing link between Rwanda and the CNDP of Laurent Nkunda. On 1 October 2010, the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights published a report listing the crimes against civilians in the Congo from 1993 to 2003. These two documents help to explain the context of hatred and blame that the Congolese population still maintains towards the Rwandan population or those of Rwandan origin. The Congolese and Rwandan presidents should seize this opportunity offered by a CEPGL summit to jointly and publicly analyse the traumatic history of the region and promote the necessary reconciliation between Congolese and Rwandans. DRC partner countries in the CEPGL should commit themselves at this time to non-interference with the process of re-establishing state authority in Kivu or the political normalisation of the CNDP.

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IV. CONCLUSION
As the current frequency of their bilateral meetings shows, the relationship between Presidents Kabila and Kagame has undeniably improved since the end of 2008. This improvement, encouraged by the international community and resting on a secret agreement, is not enough in itself to stabilise Kivu. The Congolese government and the former leaders of the rebel groups have publicly agreed to reciprocal commitments. No sooner had their word been given then, as with previous attempts to resolve the conflict, the relationship between Kinshasa and local interlocutors has unavoidably worsened. Despite official declarations about the success of the adopted strategy since the rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda, the conflict in Kivu continues without credible hope for an improvement. Secretly negotiating a balance between the particular interests of the parties present around the table has not worked. As soon as an agreement is concluded by ignoring the deeper causes of the conflict, each side tries to maximise their gains during the period of its implementation. The historic, demographic, land, ethnic and economic190 causes of the conflict in Kivu are not always seen as the strategic stakes in the peace negotiations. Admitting the current degradation of security and political conditions in Kivu, and recognising the difficulties in improving the economic situation of the population, the Congolese authorities and their international partners should reconsider their plan for the resolution of the conflict which has been applied since the end of 2008. A different conflict resolution approach centred on the Congolese population is needed.

Nairobi/Brussels, 16 November 2010

See Grard Prunier, Africas World War. Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe (Oxford/New York, 2009). See also Crisis Group report, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, op. cit.

190

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APPENDIX A MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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APPENDIX B MAP OF NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU

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APPENDIX C REGIONAL COOPERATION

CEPGL Created on 26 September 1976, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes countries (CEPGL) is a subregional body with the goal of developing cross-border economic cooperation. The founding member countries of CEPGL are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Its stated objectives are to ensure security in the region, to increase trading, to allow for the emergence of collective projects of interest, and also reinforcing political cooperation between the member states. The leading authorities of CEPGL are the Conferences of the heads of state and the Council of Ministers of the Member States. The daily functioning of CEPGL is carried out by the Permanent Executive Secretariat, located in the Rwandan town of Gisenyi, and by several bodies located in member countries: the Development Bank of the Great Lake countries (BDEGL) based in Goma, the Energy Organisation of the Great Lakes (EGL) in Bujumbura, the Agricultural and Zoological Research Institute (IRAZ) in Gitega in Burundi, and even the International Society of Electricity of the Great Lakes (SINELAC) which has its headquarters in Bukavu.191 The successive crises which hit Burundi and Rwanda at the beginning of the 1990s have considerably affected the functioning of CEPGL and it was put on ice after the collapse of Mobutus regime. The day after the 2003 presidential election in Rwanda, the European Union as well as Belgium included the re-launch of CEPGL on the stabilisation agenda for the Great Lakes region. In July 2004 in Brussels, Louis Michel, the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, organised a meeting bringing together the Congolese, Rwandan, and Burundian Foreign Affairs Ministers with the aim of discussing the revival of the CEPGL. Several donors (European Union, Belgium, African Bank for Development, European Investment Bank) decided to financially support this revival. Burundi and Rwanda nominated their representatives to the CEPGL in July 2007 almost two years before the appointment, under pressure from the

European Union, of a Congolese representative Ntumba Luaba in May 2009.192 Since then, several high-level meetings have taken place, including the conference of the presidents of the parliaments of member states in Bujumbura in September 2009 and then in Kinshasa in April 2010193 or more meetings with the Foreign Affairs Ministers in April 2007 and in July 2010 in Gisenyi. During the latter, the issue of the overhaul or at the very least the updating of the statutes figured at the centre of the talks. The diplomatic heads of the CEPGL countries welcomed in addition the prospect of re-launching the BDEGL.194 During November 2009, a meeting was held in Goma with the Finance Ministers from the member countries, representatives from the CEPGL as well as donors, in this case the African Development Bank and Belgium to discuss the future of BDEGL. AfDB and Belgium were committed to finance the restarting of the Banks activities on the condition that the CEPGL members recovered their debts from SINELAC and the Congolese state-controlled water distribution company (REDGIDESO).195 One of the major challenges of CEPGLs revival related to the free movement of citizens from the member countries within the countries of the Economic Community. In June 2009, the Congolese, Burundian and Rwandan Directors of the Immigration Agencies as well as the Commissioner Generals of the CEPGL met to deliver a special travel authorisation with a one-year validity for member state citizens. The difficulties to put in place such a system were linked first of all to the membership of Burundi and Rwanda in the East African Community, another regional organisation and also to the fact that these authorisations should be accompanied by an identity card which many Congolese do not possess. This initiative was not new, since 1980, the states came to an agreement on the free movement of civil servants as well as the sale of a special CEPGL card

Dune CEPGL une autre: quelles alternatives dans les stratgies actuelles dintgration et de cooperation pour le dveloppement?, Centre dEtudes Politiques, Universit de Kinshasa, p. 2.

191

Grands Lacs: Ntumba Luaba, reprsentant congolais la CEPGL, Radio Okapi, 7 May 2009. 193 CEPGL, vers la rvision de la convention fondatrice!, La Prosprit, 2 April 2010. 194 This institution created in 1977 was only really functional between 1984 and 1994 before being declared bankrupt and to ceasing its activities completely. 195 BDEGL, les bailleurs se disent favorables sa relance mais posent des conditions, Radio Okapi, 28 November 2009.

192

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allowing notably businesspeople to travel without a visa from the member countries. Five years later, the convention on the free movement of people and capital and the right to residence in the CEPGL member countries was signed. It anticipated the issuance of an immigration document called a CEPGL Laissez-passer allowing citizens of the member countries to circulate freely in the CEPGL countries. Although it was signed by the presidents of the CEPGL countries at the time, this convention was never ratified by the Congolese or Burundian parliaments.196 One of CEPGLs main achievements has been without doubt, the running of the hydroelectric power station by SINELAC Ruzizi II based in Mumosho in DRC. This produced electricity, purchased exclusively by the national energy companies of the member states (REGIDESO for Burundi, SNEL for DRC and ELECTROGAZ for Rwanda). According to Ntumba Lwaba the Congolese representative, feasibility studies had been done on the rehabilitation of power stations to increase production and modernize them (Ruzizi III and Ruzizi IV); these projects could benefit from European Union subsidies. But SINELAC must confront many difficulties, first and foremost the insolvency of its only customers. Amongst the other significant advances of CEPGL, the signing of a protocol of agreement on university cooperation in January 2010 in Bujumbura should benefit the mobility of professors, researchers and students in the three countries from the zone. The creation of both a Great Lakes Inter-University network headquartered in Bujumbura, and, in partnership with the American university Carnegie Mellon, an information technology and communication centre of excellence based in Kigali, are also outlined in this protocol. 197 During the latest conference in April 2010 with the presidents of the parliaments of the member states, many recommendations were made to allow them to be debated during the summit of the heads of state of CEPGL, planned for the end of 2010. These recommendations include the issue of the parliamentary dimension within the sub-regional organisation, the reinforcement of dialogue mechanisms in terms of security and combating transborder crime and facilitating trans-border commerce. Even though the revival of CEPGL is a reality, a lot of work remains. Delays in the transfer of contributions by member states, late recovery of debts owed by the coun-

tries to the CEPGL institutions, weak budgets of these same institutions act as breaks on an effective CEPGL revival. In 2009, Dr Grard Rusuku, Director of IRAZ, stated that he was unable to recruit experts for financial reasons. The fact that no Heads of State Summit has been organised since the CEPGL revival could also be criticised. Such a summit would send a strong political signal and allow for a high-level discussion on the activities of this regional organisation. CIRGL It was under the impetus of the United Nations and the African Union during the second half of the 1990s that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (CIRGL) was created in order to develop a regional approach to conflict resolution. This initiative was supported by a number of external partners including the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland and also the African Bank for Development, the European Union and the United Nations. The first summit took place in November 2004 in Tanzania and opened with the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration. The countries present were Angola, Burundi, Congo, Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. During this conference four focus areas were defined: peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration and social and humanitarian issues. Two years later, on 15 December 2006, the Treaty of Nairobi198 was signed. This treaty entered into force in June 2010 and includes an implementation document on the above-mentioned Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration, several protocols and action plans, establishment of a special fund for reconstruction and development of the region supported by statutory contributions from member states and by donations from external partners, as well as a regional follow-up mechanism. This mechanism anticipates a biannual summit of the heads of state, the creation of coordination mechanisms by each member state, as well as a regional inter-ministerial committee and a CIRGL executive secretariat, the technical body of the meeting coordination, based in Bujumbura. Joint management of border security, judicial cooperation between member countries, notably in terms of extradition and judicial proceedings, guarantees not to provide shelter to rebel groups on their territory and not to support armed groups on the territory of another member states and also implementation of regional mechanisms to fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources are part of the Nairobi Pact.

Bob Kabamba, Lintgration rgionale dans lAfrique des grands Lacs, mythes et ralits, (Editions Luc Pire, Brussels, 2008), p. 23. 197 CEPGL, Ministres et recteurs pour une coopration interuniveristaire, Kongo Times, 8 February 2010.

196

198

CIRGL internet site, www.cirgl.org/home.html.

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In order to avoid duplications between CEPGL and CIRGL, the latter included the relaunching of CEPGL as one of the main elements in its Regional action programme for economic development and regional integration.199 According to the Executive Secretary of CEPGL, Gabriel Toyi, the two organisations decided to sign a protocol of agreement which aims to harmonise their activities to avoid overlap in activities and responsibilities. A joint commission should determine the matrix of common activities of the two organisations. The next head of state summit is supposed to take place in November in Kinshasa. Amongst the themes which will be addressed, the evaluation of the functioning of the pact on security, stability and development and above all the exploitation of natural resources and the establishment of a certification mechanism for the Great Lakes region, will be the object of special attention.

199

Ibid.

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APPENDIX D GLOSSARY

ADF/NALU AFDL

Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, Ugandan rebel group present in North Kivu province. Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo-Zare (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zare), a rebel movement which overthrew President Mobutu Sese Seko and brought Laurent Kabila to power following the first war in the Congo (1996-97). Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo), a dissident faction of PARECO created in 2008 and led by Janvier Buingo Karairi. Communaut conomique des pays des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Countries Economic Community), regional organisation created in 1976 for the economic integration of the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. Confrence internationale sur la rgion des Grands Lacs (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region), a forum for political dialogue launched in 2000 and including Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia Comits locaux permanents de conciliation (Permanent local conciliation committees), bodies charged with determining if security conditions are present to allow the return of refugees to their areas of responsibility, then to promote their peaceful reintegration. Congrs national pour la dfense du people (National Congress for the Defence of the People), political movement set up by Laurent Nkunda in July 2006. Commission nationale pour les rfugis, a body under the Congolese Interior Ministry in charge of refugees issues. The unit of MONUC in charge of setting up the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement program for ex-combatants from foreign armed groups operating on DRC territory. Former Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces armes rwandaises) and a radical Rwandan Hutu militia whose members fled to Congo after the 1994 genocide and who then regrouped to form the Rwandan Liberation Army (Arme de Libration du Rwanda ALiR) before forming the FDLR. Forces armes de la Rpublique dmocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo), name used to refer to the Congolese national army after the start of the transition (2003). Forces dmocratiques pour la libration du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a Hutu rebel group operating in Kivu. The leadership is mainly composed of Rwandans but over the course of the last two years has recruited more and more young Congolese and has entered into coalitions with Congolese militia. Fdration des entreprises congolaises (Federation of Congolese Enterprises). Forces combattantes Abacunguzi, the FDLRs military wing.

APCLS

CEPGL

CIRGL

CLPC

CNDP CNR DDRRR

Ex-FAR/ Interahamwe

FARDC

FDLR

FEC FOCA

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FNL FPLC FRF ISSSS Mayi Mayi Mixage MONUC MONUSCO

Forces nationales de libration (National Liberation Forces), the former armed wing of the Burundian Hutus now transformed into a political opposition party. Front patriotique pour la libration du Congo (Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Congo). Forces rpublicaines fdralistes (Federalist Republican Forces), a rebel Banyamulenge group established in eastern Congo. The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy for Congo. Local militias recruited on a tribal basis, mainly in eastern Congo. Process begun in January 2007 merging Nkundas battalions with FARDC battalions to create six new brigades. Mission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo. United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo), MONUSCO replaced MONUC on 1 July 2010, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Ecumenical Program for Peace, Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation, Congolese NGO led by Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda. Patriotes rsistants congolais (Congolese Patriotic Resistance), originally an anti-CNDP militia composed of Hutu, Hunde and Nande branches, formed in March 2007, mainly in reaction to the mixage process. Police dintervention rapide congolaise (Congolese Rapid Response Police Unit). Rassemblement congolais pour la dmocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy), a former rebel movement set up in 1998, backed by Rwanda and Uganda and led by former Vice President Azarias Ruberwa. Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan in Conflict-Affected Areas. United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

OCHA PAREC PARECO

PIR RCD

STAREC UNHCR

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APPENDIX E ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Groups approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. Crisis Groups reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. The Crisis Group Board which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Crisis Groups international headquarters are in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently operates nine regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogot, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cte dIvoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela. Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. The following governmental departments and agencies have provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development and Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Commission, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Agency for International Development. The following institutional and private foundations have provided funding in recent years: Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Charitable Foundation, Clifford Chance Foundation, Connect U.S. Fund, The Elders Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish World Watch, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and VIVA Trust.

November 2010

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APPENDIX F CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007


Central Africa
Congo: Staying Engaged after the Election, Africa Briefing N44, 9 January 2007 (also available in French). Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, Africa Report N124, 26 April 2007. Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report N128, 5 July 2007 (also available in French). Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, Africa Report N131, 28 August 2007 (also available in French). Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum, Africa Briefing N46, 14 September 2007. Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report N133, 31 October 2007 (also available in French). Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, Africa Report N136, 13 December 2007 (also available in French). Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa Report N140, 13 May 2008 (also available in French). Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N53, 19 August 2008 (also available in French). Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, Africa Report N144, 24 September 2008 (also available in French). Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N55, 9 December 2008 (also available in French). Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, with or without Kony, Africa Report N146, 10 December 2008. Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report N149, 15 April 2009 (also available in French). Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, Africa Report N150, 11 May 2009 (also available in French). Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N151, 9 July 2009 (also available in French). Burundi: russir l'intgration des FNL, Africa Briefing N63, 30 July 2009. Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap, Africa Briefing N65, 26 August 2009 (also available in French). CAR: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, Africa Briefing N69, 12 January 2010 (also available in French). Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N155, 12 February 2010 (also available in French). Libye/Tchad: au-del dune politique dinfluence, Africa Briefing N71, 23 March 2010 (also available in Arabic). Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Africa Briefing N73, 8 April 2010 (also available in French). Chad: Beyond Superficial Stability, Africa Report N162, 17 August 2010 (only available in French). Congo : Pas de stabilit au Kivu malgr le rapprochement avec le Rwanda, Africa Report N165, 16 November 2010 (only available in French). Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing N64, 12 August 2009. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents, Africa Report N153, 4 September 2009. Somaliland: A Way out of the Electoral Crisis, Africa Briefing N67, 7 December 2009. Sudan: Preventing Implosion, Africa Briefing N68, 17 December 2009. Jonglei's Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report N154, 23 December 2009. Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan, Africa Briefing N72, 30 March 2010. LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report N157, 28 April 2010 (also available in French). Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence, Africa Report N159, 6 May 2010. Somalias Divided Islamists, Africa Briefing N74, 18 May 2010 (also available in Somali). Sudan: Defining the North-South Border, Africa Briefing N75, 2 September 2010. Eritrea: The Siege State, Africa Report N163, 21 September 2010. Negotiating Sudans North-South Future, Africa Briefing N76, 23 November 2010.

Horn Of Africa
Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, Africa Briefing N45, 26 January 2007. Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report N125, 30 April 2007 (also available in Arabic). A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan, Africa Report N130, 26 July 2007 (also available in Arabic). Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock, Africa Briefing N47, 12 October 2007 (also available in Arabic). Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War, Africa Briefing N48, 5 November 2007. Darfurs New Security Reality, Africa Report N134, 26 November 2007 (also available in Arabic). Kenya in Crisis, Africa Report N137, 21 February 2008. Sudans Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis, Africa Briefing N50, 13 March 2008 (also available in Arabic). Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, Africa Report N141, 17 June 2008. Sudans Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Africa Report N145, 21 October 2008 (also available in Arabic). Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report N147, 23 December 2008. Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa Report N152, 17 July 2009.

Southern Africa
Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?, Africa Report N122, 5 March 2007. Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?, Africa Report N132, 18 September 2007. Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, Africa Report N138, 20 March 2008. Negotiating Zimbabwes Transition, Africa Briefing N51, 21 May 2008. Ending Zimbabwes Nightmare: A Possible Way Forward, Africa Briefing N56, 16 December 2008. Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, Africa Briefing N59, 20 April 2009. Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, Africa Briefing N70, 3 March 2010.

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Madagascar: sortir du cycle de crises, Africa Report N156, 18 March 2010. Madagascar: la crise un tournant critique ?, Africa Report N166, 18 November 2010 (only available in French).

West Africa
Guinea: Change or Chaos, Africa Report N121, 14 February 2007 (also available in French). Nigerias Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis, Africa Report N123, 28 March 2007. Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?, Africa Report N126, 30 May 2007. Cte dIvoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?, Africa Report N127, 27 June 2007 (also available in French). Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity, Africa Report N129, 12 July 2007. Guinea: Change on Hold, Africa Briefing N49, 8 November 2007 (also available in French). Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta, Africa Report N135, 5 December 2007. Cte dIvoire: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N139, 22 April 2008 (only available in French). Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms, Africa Briefing N52, 24 June 2008 (also available in French). Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State, Africa Report N142, 2 July 2008 (also available in French). Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report N143, 31 July 2008. Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell, Africa Briefing N54, 18 September 2008. Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa Report N148, 13 January 2009. Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability Pact, Africa Briefing N57, 29 January 2009 (also available in French). Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, Africa Briefing N58, 5 March 2009 (also available in French). Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Briefing N60, 30 April 2009. Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun, Africa Briefing N61, 25 June 2009 (also available in Portuguese). Cte dIvoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis, Africa Briefing N62, 2 July 2009 (also available in French). Guinea: Military Rule Must End, Africa Briefing N66, 16 October 2009 (also available in French).

Cte dIvoire: scuriser le processus lectoral, Africa Report N158, 5 May 2010. Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa Report N160, 25 May 2010 (also available in French). Cameroon: The Dangers of a Fracturing Regime, Africa Report N161, 24 June 2010 (also available in French). Guinea: Reforming the Army, Africa Report N164, 23 September 2010 (also available in French). Cte dIvoire : Sortir enfin de lornire ?, Africa Briefing N77, 25 November 2010 (only available in French).

Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda Crisis Group Africa Report N165, 16 November 2010

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APPENDIX G INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CO-CHAIRS
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford University

OTHER BOARD MEMBERS


Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN

Lena Hjelm-Walln
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Sweden

Swanee Hunt
Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair, Institute for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Alternatives Fund

Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company

Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International

Kofi Annan
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001)

PRESIDENT & CEO


Louise Arbour
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

Igor Ivanov
Former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Russian Federation

Nahum Barnea
Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel

Samuel Berger
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S. National Security Advisor

Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey

Emma Bonino
Vice President of the Senate; Former Minister of International Trade and European Affairs of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid

Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands

Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile

Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC

Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of International PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S.

Maria Livanos Cattaui


Member of the Board, Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland

Sheila Coronel
Toni Stabile, Professor of Practice in Investigative Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S.

Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown


Former Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Deputy Secretary-General

Yoichi Funabashi
Editor in Chief, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan

Jan Egeland
Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK

Frank Giustra
President & CEO, Fiore Capital

Jessica Tuchman Mathews


President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S.

Ghassan Salam
Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po

Mohamed ElBaradei
Director-General Emeritus, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Nobel Peace Prize (2005)

Benjamin Mkapa
Former President of Tanzania

Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Moiss Nam
Senior Associate, International Economics Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy

George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute

Gareth Evans
President Emeritus of Crisis Group; Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Australia

Pr Stenbck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland

Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Ayo Obe
Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria

Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany

Gler Sabanc
Chairperson, Sabanc Holding, Turkey

Jean-Marie Guhenno
Arnold Saltzman Professor of Professional Practice in International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Former UN UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

Javier Solana
Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO SecretaryGeneral and Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain

Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative

Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda Crisis Group Africa Report N165, 16 November 2010

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PRESIDENTS COUNCIL Crisis Groups Presidents Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission.
Canaccord Adams Limited Neil & Sandy DeFeo Fares I. Fares Mala Gaonkar Alan Griffiths Frank Holmes Steve Killelea George Landegger Ford Nicholson Statoil ASA Harry Pokrant Ian Telfer Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Groups International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser
Co-Chair

Elliott Kulick
Co-Chair

Iara Lee & George Gund III Foundation Chevron John Ehara Equinox Partners Neemat Frem Seth Ginns Paul Hoag Joseph Hotung International Council of Swedish Industry

H.J. Keilman George Kellner Amed Khan Zelmira Koch Liquidnet Jean Manas McKinsey & Company Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Yves OltramareAnna Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey Hoguet

Michael Riordan Shell Belinda Stronach Talisman Energy Tilleke & Gibbins Kevin Torudag VIVATrust Yap Merkezi Construction and Industry Inc.

Anglo American PLC APCO Worldwide Inc. Ed Bachrach Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman Harry Bookey & Pamela Bass-Bookey

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Groups Senior Advisers are former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari
Chairman Emeritus

George Mitchell
Chairman Emeritus

Mong Joon Chung Pat Cox Gianfranco DellAlba Jacques Delors Alain Destexhe Mou-Shih Ding Gernot Erler Marika Fahln Stanley Fischer Malcolm Fraser I.K. Gujral Max Jakobson James V. Kimsey Aleksander Kwaniewski Todung Mulya Lubis Allan J. MacEachen Graa Machel Barbara McDougall Matthew McHugh Nobuo Matsunaga Mikls Nmeth Christine Ockrent

Timothy Ong Olara Otunnu Shimon Peres Victor Pinchuk Surin Pitsuwan Cyril Ramaphosa Fidel V. Ramos George Robertson Michel Rocard Volker Rhe Mohamed Sahnoun Salim A. Salim Douglas Schoen Christian Schwarz-Schilling Michael Sohlman Thorvald Stoltenberg William O. Taylor Leo Tindemans Ed van Thijn Simone Veil Shirley Williams Grigory Yavlinski

Uta Zapf Ernesto Zedillo

HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Shlomo Ben-Ami Hushang Ansary Richard Armitage Ersin Arolu scar Arias Diego Arria Zainab Bangura Christoph Bertram Alan Blinken Lakhdar Brahimi Zbigniew Brzezinski Kim Campbell Jorge Castaeda Naresh Chandra Eugene Chien Joaquim Alberto Chissano Victor Chu