Egyptian Revolution: A Political Analysis and Eyewitness Account by

EGYPTIAN
REVOLUTION
ThE
A politicAl AnAlysis And eyewitness
Account by Sameh Naguib
2 The Egyptian Revolution
events of world historical signifcance are taking place in the Arab world.
A series of revolutions that began in tunisia and spread to egypt, yemen,
libya, bahrain and syria are without doubt one of the most serious chal-
lenges facing us imperialism and world capitalism in the last four decades.
if we place these events in the context of the world capitalist crisis that
broke out in 2008 and continues to reverberate around the world and the
growing mass resistance to austerity measures throughout europe, then we
are clearly entering a period of extraordinary opportunities and challenges
for revolutionary socialists internationally.
the egyptian revolution that began on 25 January 2011 and was able to
overthrow Mubarak in 18 days, is by far the most signifcant of the Arab
revolutions. egypt is not only the most populous of the Arab countries, it
also has the largest, most militant and experienced working class in the
region. the fate of the ongoing egyptian revolution will play a major role in
determining the future, not only of the wider Arab revolution but also the
ability or inability of us imperialism and world capitalism to contain this
unprecedented challenge.
At the time of writing (early June 2011), the battles of the egyptian revolu-
tion are far from over. we are experiencing a protracted revolutionary proc-
ess with advances and retreats, with periods of reactionary attacks followed
by periods of mass strikes and demonstrations. Reactionary forces both in-
ternationally (the us, eu, saudi Arabia and israel) and locally (the egyptian
ruling class, the army generals, the remnants of the security apparatus) are
all uniting to reverse or at least contain the revolution.
it is the duty of revolutionaries worldwide to build the largest and most
militant solidarity movement with the egyptian and Arab revolutions, and
just as importantly to build revolutionary movements and organisations in
their own countries to fght their own ruling classes.
what follows is a rough guide to the causes, developments and prospects
of the egyptian revolution in its frst few months.
Sameh Naguib, cairo, June 2011
the author is a leading member of the Revolutionary socialists in egypt
Introduction
The Egyptian Revolution J
Mubaraks turbulent last decade
the egyptian revolution did not come out of thin air. Although no one could
predict the event itself, during the last decade of Hosni Mubaraks rule so-
cial, economic and political tensions were reaching levels hard to sustain.
Mubaraks rule relied on three interrelated policies. the frst was a neoliberal
economics which further integrated the egyptian economy in an uneven way
into the world capitalist economy and internally impoverished the vast major-
ity of the population. the aim was to pump in more proft into the coffers of
the multinationals and a small group of egyptian capitalists.
the second policy was to entrench the regime and its army as a strategic
ally, or rather satellite state, in the service of us imperialism and israel. the
third policy was to maintain a ruthless police state that would crush any chal-
lenge to the regimes power and the capitalists wealth.
A central plank of us imperialist policy in the region, as elsewhere in the
world, was to open up economies for investment and exploitation by multi-
national corporations. Military and strategic control of this vital oil produc-
ing region would go hand in hand with the liberalisation of its economies.
this did not need to be forced on the regimes of the region, since it coin-
cided with the interests of the local ruling classes. these ruling classes used
a combination of neoliberalism, an alliance with the us, and the regional
backing for israel to gain access to world markets and to become partners
with major multinationals. they also secured the support of the us for their
brutal and anti-democratic regimes, such as Mubaraks.
Antonio Gramsci, the great italian revolutionary, argued that to remain in
power any ruling class requires a combination of coercion and consent. the
regime of Gamal Abdel nasser, which came to power after the overthrow of the
monarchy by junior army offcers in 1952, did use coercion. but it also made
concessions to sections of the working class and peasantry. nasser also played
a role as a champion of anti-imperialism. His support for the palestinian cause
allowed him to maintain his monopoly of political power and minimised oppo-
sition both from the left and from political islamism until the 1967 war.
the policies of nassers successor, Anwar sadat, and those of Mubarak
who came to power following sadats assassination in 1981, gradually erod-
ed the relative consent created by the nasserist social contract. particularly
during Mubaraks 30 year rule, the regime more and more relied on brutal
repression alone to maintain its grip on power.
Neoliberalism and revolution
Although sadat began to implement policies to liberalize and deregulate the
egyptian economy, known as inftah, in the mid 1970s, the measures them-
selves were limited to trade liberalisation and facilitating a greater role for
foreign and local private capital. but the economy continued to be domi-
nated by the state and public sector well into the 1980s.
it is in the 1990s that the frontal attack on the working class and urban
poor and on the poorer sectors of the peasantry began. in the following two
decades a new class of multi-billionaires organically linked to the state came
to dominate the egyptian economy and polity.
in cooperation with the international Monetary Fund (iMF) the regime be-
gan implementation of a structural adjustment programme in 1991.
the programme involved rolling back all the nasserist laws that gave the
poorer sections of the peasantry some protection from the ravages of the
free market. the pricing of agricultural products was liberalised, and subsi-
dies on seeds, fertilisers and agricultural machinery removed. in 1992, a law
let agricultural rents soar, and allowed the eviction of tenants after a fve year
transitional period. thus in the period after 1997 tens of thousands of tenant
farmers and their families were evicted from lands they had tilled for genera-
tions. the lands returned to the original, mostly absentee landlords.
A massive programme of privatisation began in 1996. by 2005 over 200 out
of the 314 major public sector industrial and service companies had been ei-
ther totally or partially privatised. the number of workers in the public sector
was reduced by nearly 50 percent from the mid 1990s to 2005. some 20 per-
cent of the banking sector was transferred from public control to the private
sector. the net result of these policies was an unprecedented worsening of
working conditions, a rapid rise in unemployment, and the further impoverish-
ment of wide sectors of the egyptian population. this was coupled as usual
with the accumulation of massive wealth among top generals, bureaucrats
and businessmen who bought, sold and speculated throughout the process.
in fact since the Mubarak regime started implementing its neoliberal poli-
cies the percentage of egyptians living at or under the poverty line ($2 a day)
has risen from 20 percent to 44 percent. And in Mubaraks last decade when
Gdp growth rate was at its highest, those in absolute poverty (less than $1 a
day) increased from about 16 percent to nearly 20 percent.
neoliberal doctrine calls in theory for the shrinking of the public sector. in
fact, real-existing neoliberalism was about reallocating public resources
The Egyptian Revolution 5
for the beneft of a tiny minority. those well connected (and billionaires are
as a rule well-connected) could buy state owned assets for a tiny fraction of
their market value. companies supplying basic construction materials like
steel and cement through government contracts made huge profts.
According to Ahmed el-naggar, director of the economic studies unit at
Al-Ahram centre for political and strategic studies, government offcials
sold state-owned land to politically connected families for low prices. they
also allowed foreign conglomerates to buy state-owned companies for small
amounts, receiving kickbacks in exchange.
in 2004 Mubarak appointed a new government made up of top business-
men and so-called phd technocrats who were actually highly ideological
neoliberals, mainly british educated thatcherites and American educated
Reaganites. the new government opted for an acceleration of the neoliberal
programme. everything would be put up for sale, including factories, desert
land, agricultural land, airports and public transport. the new government
reduced the top rate of tax from 42 percent to 20 percent, leaving billion-
aires and multinational companies paying exactly the same proportion of
their income in tax as small shop owners.
during the period 2005-8 the egyptian government was highly praised by
international fnancial institutions, particularly the iMF and the world bank, for
achieving Gdp growth rates averaging 7 percent. but one of the main features
of neoliberal growth rates is that they hide the unequal distribution of that
growth. it is generally assumed that these high growth rates produce trickle
down effects which eventually improve the lives of the poor. but this does not
materialise. in egypt high growth rates produced unprecedented wealth for a
tiny minority but rapidly growing poverty and unemployment for the majority.
After Mubaraks fall, investigators discovered the astronomical size of the
fortunes made by the Mubarak family, ministers and other top state and
party offcials. sections of the egyptian and western bourgeois press con-
cluded that this was a result, not of neoliberal policies or free market capi-
talism, but rather of crony capitalism. Accordingly, they argued, it is the
corruption of those running the state and their integration of political and
economic power that prevent the liberalisation policies from improving the
lives of the poor. there are two problems with this argument. the frst is that
the intimate relationship between political power and economic power is
as old as capitalism itself. the second is that the policies of neoliberalism
were never about dismantling or even reducing the role of the state in the
economy but rather about increasing the role of the state as a facilitator of
capitalist proft-making at the expense of the working class. this created an
even more intimate relation between state and capital. it is precisely in this
G The Egyptian Revolution
intimate relationship that corruption and cronyism fourish. to paraphrase
a clich, one could say that capitalism corrupts and neoliberal capitalism
corrupts absolutely.
US imperialism and Mubaraks regime
ever since egypts peace treaty with israel in 1979, the us-egyptian alliance
has been one of the main pillars of us strategic hegemony in the region.
in every American and israeli war and aggression in the region, the egyp-
tian regime played the role of loyal servant to its strategic allies. From the
israeli war on lebanon in 1982, and its murderous siege of beirut and mas-
sacres in the sabra and shatila palestinian refugee camps, to the barbaric
war on Gaza in 2008-9, the Mubarak regime continued its role as a major
facilitator and broker in the region.
As noam chomsky puts it, alliance with the us meant that crucially,
egyptian military forces were excluded from the Arab-israeli confict, so that
israel could concentrate its attention (and its military forces) on the occu-
pied territories and the northern border. in the frst Gulf war in 1991 egyp-
tian forces took part under us command in the massive military attack on
iraq euphemistically called the liberation of Kuwait. the general in com-
mand of egyptian forces during that war was none other than General Mo-
hamed Hussein tantawi, Mubaraks defence Minister ever since, and current
de facto ruler of egypt after his masters fall from power.
After 11 september 2001, the Mubarak regime played a central role in aid-
ing and facilitating the us programme of outsourcing torture, the so-called
extraordinary renditions. in 2005, the bbc reported that both the us and
britain sent terrorist suspects to egypt for detention. in that report, egypts
prime minister acknowledged that since 2001, the us had transferred more
than 60 detainees to egypt as part of the war on terror. during the inva-
sion of iraq in 2003, egypt kept the suez canal open to the us warships that
were to devastate iraq. Mubarak also played a major role in helping to try
to legitimise the successive puppet regimes enforced on the iraqi people by
the us occupation.
in israels 2006 war on lebanon, the egyptian regime was a staunch sup-
porter of israels plan to destroy Hezbollah and orchestrated an intensive
media campaign demonising shiites and fuelling sunni-shiite sectarian ten-
The Egyptian Revolution /
sion. the israeli war against Gaza in 2008-9 was fully endorsed by Mubarak,
who met top israeli offcials hours before the bombing started. egypt played
a major role in the suffocating siege of Gaza helping deprive 1.5 million pal-
estinians of their basic livelihood by blockading the Rafah crossing.
of course, Mubaraks services were well paid for by consecutive us ad-
ministrations. the us provided Mubaraks regime with almost $2 billion an-
nually, the second largest foreign aid recipient after israel. According to the
congressional Research Report submitted to congress in september 2009,
the us had subsidised the egyptian regime with over $64 billion since it
signed the peace treaty with israel in 1979, including $40 billion in military
hardware and security gear.
it also rewarded the regime with $7 billion debt relief in April 1991 for its
support of the Gulf war earlier that year. Furthermore, it intervened with the
paris club to forgive half of egypts $20 billion debt to western governments.
the us continued to support the Mubarak regime until the very end. when
president barack obama was asked by the bbc during his celebrated visit
to egypt in June 2009, whether he regarded president Mubarak as an au-
thoritarian ruler, obama answered with an emphatic no.
even during the revolution itself when the regime was beating, arresting
and killing the egyptian people by the thousands, secretary of state Hillary
clinton said, our assessment is that the egyptian government is stable
and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of
the egyptian people. when white House press secretary Robert Gibbs was
asked whether the us believed the egyptian government was stable, he re-
plied without hesitation: yes.
The fght back: the Second Palestinian
Intifada and the Iraq invasion
the outbreak of the second palestinian intifada in september 2000 had
two major effects in egypt. the frst was the collapse of the us-led peace
process in which the egyptian regime had played such a central role. that
process, which had begun with the oslo Accords between israeli and pales-
tinian negotiators in 1993, reached a dead end with the pro-us leadership
of the palestinian liberation organisation giving in to nearly all the israeli
demands. Meanwhile the israelis continued their encroachment and occu-
pation of more palestinian land while refusing to give any concessions on
the central questions of the return of the palestinian refugees forced from
their homes in 1948 and after, the fnal status of Jerusalem and the sover-
eignty of any future palestinian state. throughout this process the egyptian
regime maintained extreme pressure on the palestinian side to make more
and more concessions, with great praise from us and israeli leaders for Mu-
baraks wise leadership.
the outbreak of the second intifada not only exposed the peace process
as a faade for further israeli aggression and occupation but also revealed
the complete complicity of the egyptian regime as an ally of israel and an
enemy of the palestinian people and their aspirations.
the intifada had an electrifying effect in egypt. the shameful role of the
regime on the one hand and the bravery and resilience of the palestinian
people and their armed resistance movements had a radicalising effect on
hundreds of thousands of young egyptians. Mass demonstrations took place
throughout the country. both university and school students organised dem-
onstrations that were to be their very frst participation in politics. nasserists,
islamists and socialists collaborated in organising protests and collecting do-
nations, food and medicine for convoys to the besieged palestinians.
this political awakening became wider and deeper with the us war on
iraq. on 20 March 2003 activists organized an anti-war demonstration in
tahrir square which drew 40,000 people. protesters burned posters of Mu-
barak and occupied the square for 24 hours in what turned out to be a re-
hearsal for the 2011 revolutionary occupation.
The democracy movement
the violence and repression used by the regime to crush these waves of
protest forced the question of democracy to the fore. the suffocating au-
thoritarianism and dictatorship of the regime, police brutality, torture, mass
arrests and military trials of civilians, came together with the growing signs
that Mubarak was preparing his son Gamal to succeed him as president.
these factors formed the background to the rise of a democratic movement
calling for an end to emergency rule, democratic elections and an end to the
Mubarak presidency (father or son).
on 12 december 2004 a coalition of political opposition forces including
nasserists, socialists, islamists and liberal democrats organised the frst of
a series of demonstrations under the title Kifaya (enough). the demonstra-
tions were small, attracting a few thousand at their peak. but their political
effects were much larger than their numbers would suggest. taboos were
broken with the call for the end of Mubaraks rule, the explicit demand for
putting police generals on trial for torture and illegal arrests. the exposure of
the corruption of the ruling family and top state offcials resonated strongly
with a much wider audience.
However, the movement was unable to mobilise wider sections of the
masses or connect their political demands with the economic and social
demands that were boiling beneath the surface and were about to explode.
when in 2005 the regime not only was able to renew Mubaraks presidency
for a ffth term but also renew the repressive emergency laws for another
two year period, there was a lull in the movement.
Trade unionists shout at leaders of
corrupt state unions
IO The Egyptian Revolution
The workers movement
by far the largest and most dangerous challenge to the regime came in the
form of the unprecedented workers strike wave that began in 2006 and con-
tinues to widen and deepen even after the fall of Mubarak.
there had been a slow rise in strikes and protests starting in 2004 and
accelerating after the installation of the government of Ahmed nazif in July
that year. in 2005 there were 202 collective actions by workers, 222 in 2006,
and an unprecedented 614 in 2007.
in december 2006 workers of the Misr spinning and weaving company in
Mahalla al-Kubra, where more than a quarter of egypts public sector textile
workers are employed, began a strike that would become a major turning
point in the workers movement. the government had promised to increase
signifcantly the annual bonus for public sector workers. when the Mahalla
workers discovered in december that the promise had been broken, anger
rapidly developed into the preparation for a strike. leading workers started
distributing leafets and making speeches calling for a strike.
on 7 december thousands of workers gathered at one of the main en-
trances to the factory. A demonstration of 3,000 female garment workers
marching through the spinning and weaving sections called on workers to
join the strike. production was totally halted in all sectors of the giant textile
mill. some 24,000 workers struck and occupied the mill with a sit-in that
continued for three days. strikers called for the full bonuses promised in
March and a set of other demands on transport, medical care, nurseries,
working conditions and mismanagement. by the fourth day the government
conceded to most of the demands, and the strike was halted with threats of
resumption if the rest of the demands were not met.
the strike movement that began at Mahalla in december 2006 spread
in an unprecedented manner. it went from the public sector to the private,
to the civil service, from the old industrial areas to the new towns, in all
provinces. it went from the textile sector to engineering, to chemicals, to
building and construction, to transport and to services. the strikes reached
sectors that do not have a culture of protest, such as teachers, doctors and
civil servants, and even to slum dwellers. the strike wave succeeded in gen-
eralizing a culture of protest.
even in sectors where strikes were banned by special laws, workers were
able to organise mass strikes challenging those laws and challenging the
authorities to take action against them. this happened in the railways, the
The Egyptian Revolution II
cairo Metro, hospitals, ambulances, the postal system, public transport and
very signifcantly, in industries owned by the armed forces.
in september 2007, the Mahalla textile workers organised their second
mass strike and again occupied the factory. the government had not ful-
flled its promises. this time the strike was even more militant than the frst.
After a six day strike and occupation the workers won a bonus and the much
hated chief executive was forced to resign. the workers regarded this not
only as an economic victory but a political one. despite the laws, despite
the repression, despite the threats and intimidations, the workers had won
through collective action against a ruthless regime. this was a victory for
democracy, specifcally for workers democracy. the workers had shown the
democracy movement of the previous years that only they had the real col-
lective power to challenge the dictatorship.
At the end of 2007 some 55,000 property tax collectors went on strike, with
mass sit-ins at the gates of the Finance Ministry. their demand was for wage
parity with their counterparts employed directly by the Ministry of Finance.
the strike lasted for three months, during which property tax collection
dropped by 90 percent in egypt. Victory was achieved with an 11 day sit-in
in downtown cairo, in front of the Finance Ministry. the tax collectors won a
325 percent increase in pay and more signifcantly transformed their demo-
cratically elected strike committee into the executive of the frst independ-
ent trade union in egypt since 1957.
Mass strikes and social protests continued to spread throughout the coun-
try, slowing down in some months only to resume more powerfully in oth-
ers. the working class had entered the battle against the regime. the revolt
against neoliberalism and dictatorship had begun in earnest.
The world economic crisis
the great recession that shook the globe in 2008 accelerated the crisis in
egypt and continues to create conditions of instability. there are three main
factors involved. Firstly, egypt is highly dependent upon exports to europe
and these fell rapidly due to the drop in demand that followed economic
contraction. world bank fgures show that egypts year-on-year growth rates
of merchandise exports to the eu dropped from 33 percent in 2008 to mi-
nus 15 percent by July 2009.
I2 The Egyptian Revolution
secondly, the situation was worsened by the advent of the draconian aus-
terity policies in europe. Remittances from emigrants fell by 17 percent com-
pared to 2008, tourism revenues also went from a rise of 24 percent in 2008
to a fall of 1.1 percent in 2009 and the suez canal revenues fell by 7.2 per-
cent compared to 2008.
A third factor has been the sharp rises in the costs of basic foods. egypts
dependence on imported food, particularly wheat, makes it diffcult for the
government to shield the economy from the effect of global food price rises.
in egypt annual food price infation accelerated to 18.9 per cent in January
2011 from 17.2 per cent in december 2010.
neoliberalism had made the country much more vulnerable to the crisis it-
self massively widening the levels of inequality and, simultaneously, under-
mining potential mechanisms of social support. thus the effects of the crisis
were sharply concentrated on the most vulnerable layers of egyptian society.
the world crisis could not have come at a worse time for the regime. the
rising workers movement and the slow revival of the democracy movement as
the 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections approached meant that the
regime had to have a clear strategy to deal with the deepening challenges.
Towards revolution
splits and cracks began to appear amongst the ruling circles. should they
continue with their accelerated neoliberal programme and crush workers
resistance or should they slow down and try to contain the movement?
should they go ahead with the planned succession plan for Gamal Mubarak
or should they choose a more acceptable fgure, perhaps from the military,
as egypts next president and thus appease the growing opposition to the
ruling family?
Massive coercion or attempted containment? containment would be seen
as a concession to the growing movements from below and might embolden
them even more against the regime. coercion could risk an uncontrollable
explosion. neither side of the ruling circles had any real confdence that
their strategy would save the regime.
the confusion at the top became apparent during the 2005 parliamentary
elections, which were carried out in three stages. in the frst stage it seemed
that the containment faction had the upper hand. ballot rigging was mini-
The Egyptian Revolution IJ
mal and the Muslim brotherhood, the largest opposition force was able to
get 88 seats (20 percent). this frightened the coercion faction and the next
two stages were violently rigged, maintaining a large majority for the ruling
national democratic party (ndp).
by 2010, the coercion faction had gained the upper hand completely. in
the face of the massive strike and protest movement and the growing conf-
dence of the Muslim brotherhood, particularly after Hamas won the pales-
tinian elections in 2007, the decision was taken to proceed with the succes-
sion plan and purge the parliament of all opposition in the 2010 elections,
with clear signs of approval from the us administration. yet the move was
carried out with shaking hands and with serious disagreements amongst
the ruling army generals, ndp leaders and top businessmen.
thus locally we had all the classical prerequisites of a revolution. the rul-
ing classes were unable to rule in the old ways and the working classes were
unable to live under the old conditions.
Globally, an unprecedented crisis of capitalism was calling the whole sys-
tem into question, again producing splits and confusion among and between
the different states, banks and multinationals. At the same time, and related
to the crisis, there was the long term decline of us imperialist hegemony
exposed by the quagmires of iraq and Afghanistan.
these global and local conditions set the stage for the egyptian revolution.
Eighteen days
there are decades when nothing happens; and there are weeks when dec-
ades happen. Vladimir lenin
For years, bloggers, political activists, and more recently Facebook activ-
ists, would plan a day of protest, send thousands of text messages, get tens
of thousands of virtual supporters and on the planned day a few hundred of
the usual suspects would show up, sometimes reaching the magical number
of one thousand. we would be surrounded by three to four thousand riot
police and after chanting and speeches and a few confrontations with the
police the planned day would end.
Activists were more optimistic about 25 January, not only because of the
numbers that signed up for it but because of the tunisian spark that had
electrifed the streets of cairo and Alexandria and other major urban and
working class towns. the small groups of democratic youth coalitions, liber-
als, socialists and nasserists were optimistic. this time we might get several
thousand people, at least in two or three of the main centres. perhaps we
could even reach ten thousand! but none of the activists, in their wildest
dreams could have imagined what actually took place that day.
the Muslim brotherhood leadership had announced that they would not
participate in the event, but still the idea of having a number of demonstra-
tions starting from different working class districts and attempting to con-
verge on the main city centrestahrir square in the case of cairoseemed
to be worth the attempt. this was especially because the chosen date was
national police day (which commemorates the massacre of police by the
british that sparked off riots that burned down portions of cairo in January
1952). the growing hatred and anger at decades of police brutality, torture
and humiliation coupled with the tunisian miracle would at least resonate
with people, even if only a few of them would actually join the protests.
the planned protests were to have several main demands: social justice
and a minimum wage, an end to the state of emergency, upholding judicial
independence, the resignation of the interior minister General Habib Al-Adly
who was notorious for his record of torture and human rights violations.
we were also calling for political reforms such as dissolving parliament and
the holding of new elections after the scandalous november 2010 elections
which were marked by massive fraud and removed almost all opposition
Mps from parliament.
on the morning of 25 January, activists began gathering at the main start-
ing points in the working class districts. the day was a holiday in celebration
of the police. but the police were defnitely not on holiday! tens of thousands
of riot police were waiting for us everywhere. there was a sense of tension
among the police and the hundreds of plain-clothes offcers with their guns
and their usual sunglasses. it seems they were better at understanding and
predicting the mood of the masses than the activists. the whole of the po-
lice force was fully mobilized across the countrys cities and towns.
the demonstrations started with the usual slogans against Al-Adly, Mu-
barak and the ndp, against price increases and unemployment, against cor-
ruption and the hated Gamal Mubarak and the steel tycoon and ndp strong-
man Ahmed ezz. but as soon as the by now famous tunisian chant was
shoutedthe people want the downfall of the regimesomething seemed
to have changed, both in the mood of the activists and in the rapidly increas-
ing numbers of people joining the protest marches.
More and more people came down from their houses and started shout-
ing the slogan with overwhelming passion. Men and women, young and old,
The Egyptian Revolution I5
Women in Tahir Square
IG The Egyptian Revolution
christians and Muslims took part the vast majority poor egyptians. the
louder they shouted that magical slogan, the more it echoed in the poor al-
ley ways, the more people joined. what started with a few hundred activists
turned into mass demonstrations of tens of thousands.
the fear and confusion of the police was palpable. in some cases they
charged towards the demonstrators only to retreat as the masses charged
back with a power, confdence and unity that clearly baffed the sunglass-
wearing offcers and the rank-and-fle policemen, all poor peasant young-
sters conscripted for three years to do the dirty work of protecting the egyp-
tian ruling class.
the police were ordered to retreat to the major junctions in an attempt to
prevent the demonstrators from reaching the city centres. it is there that the
major battles on that historical day took place. water cannons, rubber bul-
lets and endless rounds of teargas canisters were used to beat back the pro-
testers. by far, the most diffcult obstacle was the choking teargas. but the
more seasoned demonstrators started organising the distribution of clini-
cal masks, cola cans and onionsprovided freely by housewives, pharmacy
workers and coffee-shopsto help survive the white clouds of teargas.
tens of thousands of demonstrators were able to break through many of
the police barriers and reach the city centres including, of course, tahrir
square. but the battles continued. there were tens of martyrs and thou-
sands of injured at the end of that day of liberation, the day that ignited the
egyptian revolution.
demonstrations and battles continued during the following two days, but
the main focus was on organising the Friday of Rage, 28 January. the or-
ganisers were no longer just the usual suspects of political activists, Face-
bookers and bloggers, but thousands of new leaders, mostly working class
youth who were better educated by days of actual revolution than years of
political education.
this time the Muslim brotherhood decided to participate in the Friday of
Rage. A curfew was announced from 6pm to 6am in the main battlefelds of
cairo, Alexandria, suez and Mahalla, and hundreds of brotherhood leaders
and activists were arrested.
the regime was facing something it could not understand. the masses had
gone mad. they demanded justice and freedom and were prepared to die for
it in their hundreds of thousands. the fear of torture, prison and even death
had evaporated together with the fumes of teargas that had flled the streets
of egypts cities. in fact the masses had not gone mad, they were fghting the
most rational battle possible for freedom, social justice and dignity. it was the
regime that was going mad, panicking and seemingly less and less attached
The Egyptian Revolution I/
to reality. the government decided to shut down the internet and mobile net-
works completely on the assumption that this desperate move would prevent
the supposed organisers from using these crucial tools of communication
and thus weaken their ability to mobilise for the Friday demonstrations.
it was a terrible miscalculation. the regime seemed to believe its own
propaganda about this being a middle class Facebook Revolution. the ac-
tion had no visible effect, as the vast majority of leaders and organizers at
this stage had nothing to do with Facebook and could easily use more tra-
ditional forms of communication. in fact it emboldened the demonstrators
even more by proving the regime was desperate and weak.
After Friday prayers hundreds of thousands started their marches from all
the major mosques and squares towards the city centres. the police again
concentrated their forces in major junctions in a last attempt to break the
unstoppable wave and prevent millions reaching the main city squares.
in cairo, major battles took place at all major roads and bridges leading
to tahrir. similar battles were taking place on the main streets in suez, Ma-
halla, Alexandria and tens of other cities and towns.
the bravery and resolve of the mass demonstrators has been recorded for
posterity in thousands of youtube videos and personal accounts that will be
a treasure for future historians of the egyptian revolution and more impor-
tantly for future revolutionaries across the world.
the police used the usual teargas, rubber bullets and water cannons and
in desperation added live ammunition, snipers and even armoured vehicles
to crush demonstrators. Hundreds were killed and thousands injured. but
the police were defeated decisively across the country and retreated rap-
idly. thousands of police cars, armoured vehicles, police stations were burnt
down, with police offcers, once the main source of fear on egyptian streets
feeing for lives. ndp buildings were torched and every sign, portrait or pic-
ture of the hated dictator was burnt down.
Hundreds of thousands reached tahrir square and began their famous
occupation of the square that only ended with Mubaraks fall on 11 February.
people marched in from all walks of life, mostly poor working class, but also
many young middle class people, women in the niqab alongside women in
jeans, bearded islamists alongside christians: all with a ferce determina-
tion to overthrow the regime.
by nightfall the police had all but vanished with the exception of those
still protecting the notorious interior Ministry, for decades the central head-
quarters for the torture of civilians. naturally, many of the demonstrators
attempted to storm the building. well-positioned snipers shot to kill. over a
dozen protesters died and hundreds were injured.
As they withdrew from the streets, the police offcers had opened up the
prisons and let out thousands of seasoned criminals in order to create a
sense of fear and chaos among the population. yet their plan to create cha-
os and mayhem failed. popular committees sprung up all over the country
to defend their neighbourhoods, to organise traffc and even to clean the
streets. the president ordered the army into the cities to crush the uprising
and to return to order after the police had been vanquished.
on the night of that Friday of Rage, Mubarak made his frst speech blam-
ing the government as inept and promising to appoint a new cabinet. there
were no apologies for the dead and injured, no mention of the peoples de-
mands. there was a cold detachment in his tone, as if he were talking about
another country and another people. As with many dictators before him, he
obviously could not believe or understand what was happening. He despised
the people and was already part of the past already.
the masses reacted with anger to the speech, but also seemed to see
through his posturing. He both looked and sounded like an ancient relic. by
the following day he had appointed the chief of intelligence General omar
suleiman as his frst ever Vice-president and General Ahmad shafq as
prime Minister.
these two men were both hated fgures from Mubaraks immediate en-
tourage. suleiman was known as dr torture for his leading role in the us-
led extraordinary renditions programme of exporting prisoners to egypt and
other Arab countries for torture. He was also known as a particularly close
ally of israel in its war on Gaza.
by Monday the new cabinet was sworn in, retaining most of the hated min-
isters of the previous government including those running the strategic posts
of defence, communications, justice, oil and foreign affairs. the hated Habib
Al-Adly was removed, together with several of the group of business minis-
ters that were part of his son Gamals group of extreme neoliberal crooks.
the superfcial concessions were seen as insulting and only added fuel to
the anger and determination of the masses.
the entry of the army tanks onto the main streets and entrances of tahrir
square and other city centres, were met at frst with anger, but very quickly
and with remarkable spontaneity large numbers of people rushed towards
the soldiers embracing them, climbing on the tanks, waving the egyptian
fag and chanting loudly the army and the people are one hand. soon
youngsters had painted anti-Mubarak slogans all over the tanks. this was not
as many people remarked, simply confusion among the masses about the
real role of the army, although such confusion existed. it was rather a bril-
liant and rapid neutralisation of the armed forces in the squares and streets,
The Egyptian Revolution I9
making it near impossible for the soldiers and young offcers to shoot at the
people even if they were ordered to. previous revolutions had seen similar
mass tactics aimed at fraternising with the soldiers and young offcers.
the protesters called for million-strong marches on tuesday 1 February
in all major cities. the reaction of the army generals was one of the major
turning points in the revolution. Military spokesman General ismail othman,
declared on national television that the army recognised the legitimate de-
mands of the people and would not shoot at them.
the army generals understood that ordering a crackdown by the troops
would split the forces and turn thousands of soldiers and young offcers against
them. the army leaders were prepared to sacrifce Mubarak to save the regime
that ultimately rested on their ability to keep their power over their troops.
on Monday 31 January, the new vice-president suleiman addressed the
nation saying that he was asked by Mubarak to open a dialogue with all op-
position groups and to ask the judiciary to overturn the disputed elections
results of last november. it was a tactical retreat by the regime in order to
gain time and exhaust the protesters.
Tuesday 1 February
the regimes tactics were not working. Millions participated in the protests
of that day including two million in tahrir square in cairo, one million in
Martyrs square in Alexandria, 750,000 in Mansoura, and a quarter of a mil-
lion in suez. it was an unprecedented show of strength. this time, protesters
demanded not only the immediate removal of Mubarak but also the ouster
of the whole regime.
tahrir square was turning into a massive commune of resistance and a
festival of the oppressed. people felt they were winning this historical bat-
tle. An explosion of individual and group creativity was taking place. thou-
sands of banners and placards with the peoples demands expressed with
poetry, jokes and personal stories flled the square. Graffti, murals and slo-
gans covered every building wall.
the space in tahrir was not simply occupied physically but spiritually.
Harassment against women disappeared, tensions between copts and Mus-
lims evaporated. people shared food, water, cigarettes. songs, music, poetry
and chants flled the air. A new egypt was being created.
2O The Egyptian Revolution
However, the enemy would not give up that easily. the ruling class was
carefully conspiring and strategising to bury this new egypt. by tuesday
evening, Mubarak gave his second speech in response to the massive dem-
onstrations of the day. He pledged to complete his term and that he would
not leave under pressure. this time he seemed to have been better advised
as he recalled his service to his country for over six decades while pledging
to oversee major reforms. in the speech, he promised not to seek re-elec-
tion, to leave in september and die in egypt.
the speech had a confusing effect on sections of the less politicised mass-
es, some people started arguing for an end of the demonstrations. the man
was old, he was leaving power in a few months. However the regime was us-
ing a parallel tactic of an intense media campaign about conspiracies to cre-
ate chaos, that there were food shortages, that the economy was collapsing,
that banks were running out of money, that the demonstrators were being
paid by foreign agencies, that tahrir square was turning into an orgy of sex,
drugs and alcohol and so on. All the flth that has been thrown at revolution-
aries throughout history by the ruling classes flled the television networks,
the government papers and was spread by thousands of agents. the splits
and confusion amongst the masses were temporary however. the regime
was planning a diabolical and violent counter-revolution for the next day.
Battle of the Camel: Wed 2 February
A number of prominent billionaires, ndp leaders and secret police offcers, led
by Gamal Mubarak devised a plan for a full blown attack on the demonstrators.
each businessman pledged to recruit as many people from their businesses
and industries as well as hoodlums, lumpen proletarians that were prepared
to do anything for money (known as the baltagiyya in Arabic). Meanwhile, the
interior Minister reconstituted some of the most notorious offcers of his secret
police to join the counter-revolutionary demonstrations planned for wednes-
day, with a specifc plan of attack on the pro-democracy protesters.
About a dozen security offcers, who were to supervise the plan in the feld,
also recruited former dangerous ex-prisoners who had escaped the previous
saturday, promising them money and presidential pardons for their convic-
tions. this plan was to be executed in cairo, Alexandria, suez, port said,
damanhour, Asyout, among other cities.
The Egyptian Revolution 2I
this kind of mobilisation of the lumpen proletariat for counter-revolution
is not new. Karl Marx famously described how the same tactic was used by
louis bonaparte after the 1848 revolution in France:
on the pretext of founding a benevolent society, the lumpen proletariat of
paris had been organised into secret sections, each section led by bonapar-
tist agents, with a bonapartist general at the head of the whole. Alongside de-
cayed rous with dubious means of subsistence and of dubious origin, along-
side ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds,
discharged soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers,
mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, maquereaux
[pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife
grinders, tinkers, beggars in short, the whole indefnite, disintegrated mass,
thrown hither and thither, which the French call la bohme; from this kindred
element bonaparte formed the core of the society of december 10.
the use of such elements was also not new in egypt either. the same tac-
tic was used to rig elections, to intimidate voters, to attack demonstrators
and strikers, particularly during Mubaraks last decade in power.
Around 2pm on wednesday 2 February, the plan of attack was executed.
over 3,000 baltagiyya attacked from two entrances to tahrir square. they
threw thousands of rocks and stones at the tens of thousands of peace-
ful demonstrators gathered in the square, while most attackers had shields
to defend themselves against the returning rocks. while a few were armed
with guns, all baltagiyya were armed with clubs, machetes, razors, knives or
other sharp objects.
After about an hour of throwing stones, the attackers moved on the sec-
ond stage of the plan, as dozens of horses and camels came charging at the
demonstrators in a scene reminiscent of the battles of the Middle Ages. con-
fused and bewildered at frst, the demonstrators fought back with their bare
hands, throwing their bodies at the horse and camel-riding thugs.
battles took place at all the entrances to the square. the demonstrators
quickly organized themselves into thick defence lines and stones and bricks
were gathered from all over the square for the fghtback. blood fowed eve-
rywhere. those injured at the frontlines would immediately be replaced and
the injured carried to the make-shift feld hospitals organised by volunteer
doctors and nurses.
the thugs were pushed back, but everyone knew that this was only the
beginning. At incredible speed barricades were set up at all the entrances
to the square in preparation for the coming battles. the more organised
groups, particularly the Muslim brotherhood youth, played a central role in
preparing, organising and fghting the thugs.
the expected next attack came in the evening when thousands of thugs,
plainclothes policemen and snipers started gathering, particularly at the en-
trance closest to the egyptian Museum and at the tops of several buildings.
A nearby bridge gave the thugs an elevated position and therefore a tactical
advantage at that entrance. the barricades were reinforced with burnt-out
police cars and trucks and thousands of fghters prepared for battle.
An elaborate division of labour was devised. the young and strong, par-
ticularly the working class youth would take the front lines as stone throwers.
others would break pavements to provide a steady fow of stones to the front-
lines. yet other groups would carry the stones to the frontlines. young women
brought water to the fghters throughout that terrible but heroic night.
the thugs began an intensive campaign of throwing stones, empty soda
bottles and Molotov cocktails. part of the plan seemed to be to start fres in
the egyptian Museum, in an apparent attempt to burn it down and blame
it on the demonstratorsanother fne example of how barbaric the ruling
bourgeoisie can become when under threat. burn the old pharaohs to save
the modern pharaohs! Groups were organised for the protection of the mu-
seum, putting out fres as they arose.
Hundreds of frontline fghters charged towards Mubaraks thugs, crossing
the barricades and becoming completely exposed but using all their strength
to bombard them with stones. dozens would be wounded, rapidly carried
away and another stone-throwing attack at the thugs would ensue. the idea
of these raids beyond the barricades, despite the exposure and despite the
tactical elevation of the thugs, turned to be a strike of collective genius. it
was part of a psychological offensive to disarm the thugs. the idea was to
make clear that the revolutionaries were prepared to die for their cause. no
mercenary force can face such a challenge in the long term.
snipers started aiming their laser pointers at the demonstrators. tens of
young demonstrators would climb the barricades and let the pointers aim at
their chests. these were fearless fghters, with a clear aim and a clear mes-
sage: either death or victory!
over a dozen young fghters were martyred during that night, their bod-
ies carried with pride and determination by their comrades to the makeshift
hospitals. thousands were injured, doctors and nurses worked all night to
stitch up there wounds and comfort them. Hundreds of the injured would
return immediately to the frontlines to continue the battle.
there was another battle taking place at the top of buildings, some oc-
cupied by the thugs and others by the revolutionaries, fres were burning
all over the place. A small but effcient Molotov cocktail factory was estab-
lished on our side of the barricades to fght fre with fre. some would bring
The Egyptian Revolution 2J
Confronting the regimes
camel-riding thugs
the gasoline, others would bring the crates of empty bottles and yet others
would prepare them flling crate after crate of bombs and others would carry
them both to the frontlines and to the liberated building tops.
by dawn the battle had been won. the thugs and police were feeing. they
were running for their lives as the revolutionaries had reached the bridge
and intersections outside the square and ran after the thugs, arresting hun-
dreds. the murderers were pulled into the square, beaten up, but protected
from the many demonstrators that wanted them executed on the spot. A
makeshift prison was used to hold them. the majority turned out to hold
either police or ndp identity cards.
the battles and the victory gave a huge boost to the revolution. those that
were confused the night before became infuriated. the presidents speech was
exposed as a ploy in preparation for the murderous attacks of the next day.
the role of the army was also exposed to many as hypocritical. the talk of
protecting the revolution seemed particularly hollow now.
one hour before the planned assault the army announced to the demon-
strators on national tV that the government got the message and then im-
plored the protesters to end the demonstrations and go home. but when
the protesters begged the army units to interfere during the brutal attacks
that persisted for 16 hours, the army declared that it was neutral and partial-
ly withdrew from some entrances despite its promise to protect the peaceful
and unarmed demonstrators.
by daybreak, hundreds of thousands of egyptians joined their fellow dem-
onstrators in order to show support and solidarity. the leaders of the pro-
tests had already called for massive demonstrations on Friday across egypt
after congregational prayers, calling the event departure day, in a refer-
ence to their hopes to force Mubarak to resign or leave the country.
omar suleiman had earlier called for a national dialogue with the op-
position. Amazingly a dialogue actually took place on sunday 6 February. it
included not only the tame and loyal opposition of discredited fgures from
the supposedly left-wing tagammu party and the liberal wafd party but also
several key leaders of the Muslim brotherhood, naguib sawiris, head of the
richest family in egypt and some members of youth coalitions. Most of the
latter no one had seen or heard from before, but there were a few that were
lured into suleimans trap.
the meetings took place in a major government hall with a huge portrait
of Mubarak hanging on the wall. the offcial media of course made a huge
deal of the dialogue. but the streets and squares of egypt had far surpassed
any new tricks by the regime. there was furious anger at those opposition
fgures that took part in the talks. the Muslim brotherhood youth openly at-
tacked their leadership on a decision they saw, rightly, as a betrayal of the
revolution and its martyrs.
At the end of the meeting the regime issued a communiqu that thanked
Mubarak, and reiterated the regimes perspective and interpretation of events.
it claimed, inaccurately, that all participants agreed on the road map towards
fnding a solution to the crisis. this was supposedly based on limited re-
forms to the constitution and elections, while maintaining all state institu-
tions and characters including the fraudulent parliament. it did not promise
the immediate lifting of the emergency law. ironically, a day after the dialogue
suleiman declared on national tV that egypt is not ready for democracy.
under pressure from their youth the brotherhood leadership announced
that the talks had failed, and that suleiman had not offered anything sub-
stantial. but their image was already tainted and an increasing sense of mis-
trust towards their leadership animated the brotherhood youth.
pressure was building amongst the demonstrators to use new tactics.
on tuesday 8 February, hundreds of thousands held huge demonstrations
around the prime ministers building, preventing him from reaching his of-
fce. they also blocked the parliament, preventing any member from going in
or out. they vowed that soon the presidential palace would be surrounded.
similar mass sieges were held around government buildings in Alexandria.
Workers in the uprising
throughout these momentous events, ordinary working class people domi-
nated the battlefelds, increasingly so with every passing week. they partici-
pated, not in an organised way as unions or workplace representatives but
as individuals. of course the media version of events would give an opposite
view. the star revolutionary interviewees were all middle class university-
educated youth of one coalition or the other, all beaming with pride at being
considered heroes of the revolution.
in the last week of the uprising a wave of mass strikes and demonstrations
by workers in key sectors of the economy spread like wildfre, with both eco-
nomic demands and the main revolutionary demand of removing Mubarak.
suez, scene of some of the fercest battles against the police on the Friday of
Rage, led the way. on 8 February 6,000 suez canal workers went on strike,
joining textile workers and steel workers. petroleum workers held protests
2G The Egyptian Revolution
the following day demanding better pay and job security. but strikes were
spreading rapidly now in all the big cities and many smaller towns, drawing
in transport workers, textile workers, civil servants and health workers. on
thursday 10 February, the wave had spread from Alexandria in the north to
Aswan in the south. even the generals own factories, where workers live
under harsh military discipline, were alight with strikes.
in most of these workplaces, strikers had been emboldened by the upris-
ing and again raised economic demands. but in some key sectors, they went
further, by directly confronting the dictatorship and demanding the fall of the
regime. cairo public transport workers brought out a statement on 9 February
in full solidarity with the aims of the uprising which they distributed in tahrir
square. the following day, strikers shut down bus garages across the city.
even the new york times had to admit to the important role this interven-
tion by the working class played in changing the shape of egypt after Mu-
barak, writing a few days after the dictators fall:
the labour unrest this week at textile mills, pharmaceutical plants, chem-
ical industries, the cairo airport, the transportation sector and banks has
emerged as one of the most powerful dynamics in a country navigating the
military-led transition that followed an 18-day popular uprising and the end
of Mr. Mubaraks three decades of rule.
The end of Mubarak
it was obvious to the army generals, the us administration and egypts ruling
capitalists that they had to speed up the process and get rid of Mubarak. the
media announced that Mubarak would be giving a third speech that night.
people waited for hours as the speech was delayed. Announcements from
army offcers, leaders of the Muslim brotherhood and the us administration
all seemed to indicate that the game was over and that Mubarak would an-
nounce his resignation. but the masses were on full alert. three decades of
treachery and lies made them sceptical. And they were right. Mubarak made
a short speech that night declaring that he would stay till the election time,
delegating his powers to suleiman. the fury that was unleashed by that ar-
rogant speech was unprecedented. Hundreds of thousands hurried to raise
their shoes in the air to signal that the struggle would continue.
the demonstrations on Friday 11 February were the largest ever. over 15
The Egyptian Revolution 2/
million people were estimated to have taken part in demonstrations all over
the country. workers came out this time in organised demonstrations from
their workplaces, signalling that they would paralyse the country if Mubarak
did not back down.
the same evening, that demand was fnally met in a 20-second address
by suleiman. Appearing on state television, he declared that Mubarak had re-
signed from his 30-year position, transferring his authority to a military coun-
cil called the supreme council of the Armed Forces (scAF). the frst stage of
the egyptian revolution had triumphed. nearly a thousand were martyred, tens
of thousands injured, but Mubarak was history. the mass celebrations that
continued through the night and the whole of the next day were the largest and
most festive in egypts modern history.
Generals in power and the transition
An army is always a copy of the society it serveswith this difference, that
it gives social relations a concentrated character, carrying both their positive
and negative features to an extreme. leon trotsky, History of the Russian
Revolution. the generals and feld marshals of any army are obviously an
essential part of the ruling class and egypt is no exception. the army lead-
ers are connected by thousands of golden threads to the billionaires and
other state offcials who have ruled the country for decades.
the military rulers of post-Mubarak egypt, the scAF, are all hand-picked
by the former dictator. Field Marshal tantawi, who heads the council, had
been Mubaraks defence minister since 1991. His loyalty to Mubarak was un-
surpassed and he was a central fgure among Mubaraks circle of advisers.
the egyptian army is also an economic empire that accounts for nearly
20 percent of the egyptian economy. the military establishment owns vast
amounts of agricultural and real estate, an industrial complex producing
everything from ammunition to washing machines, tourist companies, trad-
ing companies and much more.
this economic empire is not immune to the corruption that has been the
main feature of all major state institutions during the Mubarak era. indeed
the secrecy that protects the army budget and fnances makes it probably
one of the most corrupt of these institutions.
the army is also intimately linked to the us military. it receives a yearly
aid package of $1.3 billion and has regular joint military exercises with the
us army and navy. All special training of offcers takes place in the us, and
all high-tech weaponry purchased by the egyptian army is us-made.
the majority of soldiers and young offcers are conscripts, mainly from work-
ing class, peasant and lower middle class backgrounds. the generals control
this army through severe and archaic discipline involving harsh punishments,
humiliation and complete segregation between the professional offcer caste
and the conscript soldiers in terms of food, accommodation and even toilets.
As was mentioned earlier, the decision of the army leadership not to order
an attack on the demonstrators during the revolution was not a sign that the
army actually supported the revolution in any way but rather that they knew
such orders would split the army. they sacrifced Mubarak to save the system.
when they were forced to remove Mubarak from the scene and take over
power directly the scAF knew that they had to tread very carefully between
concessions to the people and protecting the interests of the ruling class that
were still intact at the core of the regime. this would not be an easy task.
Concessions, coercion and pressure
on 13 February scAF dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution,
but it kept the hated Mubarak-appointed government in place. it promised
to investigate the police crimes against the people and the conspiracies and
corruption of the old regime. on 17 February Habib Al-Adly, minister of the
interior, and his aides were arrested. Also arrested that day were the three
billionaire ministers Ahmed Maghraby, Zoheir Garana and Ahmed ezz, the
steel tycoon and organisational head of the ndp.
but the scAF continued to stall in regards to Mubarak and his family and the
real presidents men; the circle of ministers and top offcials that he relied
on for most of his years in power. Massive demonstrations were again to take
place on Friday 18 February both as a celebration of the great achievement of
ousting Mubarak and to call for the change of government and trials for the
president and his men. the scAF appointed a panel of judges to prepare a set
of constitutional amendments to prepare organize parliamentary elections,
a constitutional assembly and presidential elections, these would be put to
a referendum on 19 March. the panel was headed by a Muslim brotherhood
(Mb) sympathiser and had another Mb conservative member on its board.
The revolution split the military
JO The Egyptian Revolution
The new government
the policies of a revolutionary government ought never to offend anybody
unnecessarily. that was, at bottom, the guiding principle of the whole provi-
sional Government, which feared most of all to offend anybody from the circles
of the possessing classes. leon trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution
As far as the most threatening problems of the peoples existence were
concerned, the revolution had apparently been achieved only in order to
make the announcement: everything remains as before.
A major demand of the continuing weekly Friday demonstrations was the
dismissal of the Mubarak-appointed government of Ahmed shafq. on 3
March the scAF conceded and appointed essam sharaf to form a new tran-
sitional government. but sharaf not only held on to some of Mubaraks ap-
pointees, but added others that were either big businessmen or connected
in one way or another to the old regime.
yet major revolutionary initiatives continued. on 4 and 5 March angry
young protesters stormed the hated state security offces, for decades cen-
tres for torture, illegal detention and murder. the movement started in Al-
exandria and within hours dozens of these ugly, blood-stained buildings
had been stormed all over the country. what the protesters found in these
hastily-abandoned buildings was astonishing: tons of documents, videos
and recordings of interrogations, and reports on the every move of tens
of thousands of political activists. Although the offcers had tried to destroy
the evidence by shredding and burning, they did not have the time to com-
plete the job.
Many of the protesters had previously entered these buildings as blindfold-
ed prisoners, suffering torture, humiliation, electric shocks and rape while
listening to the terrifying sounds of the screams of others. now they were
entering as liberators. their torturers had fed and had left behind them a
trail of their crimes against the egyptian people and against humanity. on 15
March scAF was forced to concede to the mass demand of disbanding the
criminal state security agency.
one of the frst announcements by the new transitional government was
that there would be no change in the free market economic policies of the
government. scAF had already emphasised in a previous announcement
that the government remained committed to its international treaties and
would remain an ally and friend of the us.
on 23 March the government put forward a law criminalising strikes and
The Egyptian Revolution JI
protests that disrupt the normal function of institutions or services, whether
private or public. the sentences for breaking this new law were one year in
jail and a fne of 500,000 egyptian pounds (50,000).
but strikes continued to spread, obviously and intentionally disrupting
the normal function of institutions yet the government and scAF did not
at frst make any attempts to actually enforce the law.
However the scAF, the government, bourgeois and state press and media,
liberal and islamist writers and commentators joined in what seemed to be
a coordinated propaganda campaign against workers strikes. they labelled
strikes as selfsh sectional actions which did not take into account the inter-
ests of the nation as a whole. they were damaging to the economy and there-
fore to the project of building the new egypt. this was a revolution of all honest
egyptians, capitalists and workers, poor and rich and even if the poor have
rightful demands they should be patient. they should wait until the transition.
An anti-working class consensus was emerging between this new bour-
geois alliance. the striking workers were causing chaos and threatening the
orderly transition of power. in fact many went so far as to call workers strikes
counter-revolutionary actions that must be stopped immediately. in one of
essam sharafs announcements he compared them to attacks by thugs.
the propaganda campaign continues, with barrages of articles, tV shows,
army announcements and interviews with ministers all talking about the new
stage of the revolution relying on restarting the wheel of production that
the workers seemed crazy enough to want to interfere with. thank you very
much, you helped us get rid of Mubarak, but now go back to work and shut
up, that seemed to be the message to the egyptian working class from the
bourgeoisie and its intellectuals.
yet the workers and the poor in general did not seem to get the message.
strikes, sit-ins, the blocking of railway lines and demonstrations in front of
ministries continued unabated.
of course, this message was not only meant as a threat to the workers
but also as a rallying cry for the middle classes. constant talk of chaos and
economic collapse at a time of real economic crisis truly frightened large
numbers of small businessmen, the traditional petty bourgeoisie, artisans
and peasants owning medium-sized farms who could not sell their products.
by shifting the blame from the capitalist crisis and neoliberal policies that
were the real cause of their misery, to the workers, they were trying not only
to defect anger that could have been directed by these sectors towards the
government and its policies but also to prepare the necessary alliances for a
future confrontation with the working class.
April was a month of mounting pressure from below, signifcant conces-
J2 The Egyptian Revolution
sions from the ruling scAF, but also growing repression by the military po-
lice. the stalling by the scAF on the arrest and trial of the president and his
entourage was becoming both threatening and unacceptable to the revolu-
tionary masses. the role of the scAF and its relation to the revolution was
being questioned after a short honeymoon during which large sections of
the masses had trusted the army leaders as protectors of the revolution.
on Friday 1 April, new mass demonstrations took place in tahrir square,
Alexandria, suez and other major cities in what was called the Friday to save
the Revolution. the protesters called for the banning of the ndp, speeding
up the process of investigating corruption and putting Mubarak, his sons and
other top offcials on trial.
on 8 April hundreds of thousands gathered in tahrir square for a Friday
of cleansing and trial. this was to turn into the frst major confrontation be-
tween demonstrators and the military police. several army offcers took part
in the demonstrations in their uniforms. they chanted slogans against feld
marshal tantawi and against corruption in the army. several thousand dem-
onstrators, including the offcers, staged a sit-in at the centre of the square,
deciding to continue the demonstration through the night. this fraternisation
between protesters and uniformed offcers and the new tone of anger against
the scAF became intolerable for the army leadership. Military police were
ordered to break up the sit-in. they shot into the crowds killing at least one
person and injuring dozens. All the protesting offcers were arrested.
the army was using more and more coercion in attempting to contain the
protest movements. At cairo university military police broke up a student
occupation. Hundreds of activists throughout the country were arrested and
tortured. the number of civilians in military jails reached 10,000 prisoners.
but perhaps most bizarrely, female activists arrested were forced to have
their virginity tested. this was a gruesome reminder that the military police
offcers had the same brutal mindset of the state security police offcers.
yet the scAF had to make serious concessions in order to keep control of
the situation. thus on 7 April, Zakariya Azmi, Mubaraks chief of staff and
most trusted aide, was arrested. this was followed by the arrests of Ahmed
nazif, Mubaraks last prime minister (10 April), safwat el-sherif; the president
of the shura council and ndp general secretary (11 April); and Fathi soroor,
the parliamentary speaker (13 April). the arrest of Mubarak and his two sons,
Gamal and Alaa was ordered on 13 April. the two sons were transferred to
tora prison in cairo while Mubarak was transferred to a hospital in sharm el
sheikh as he allegedly suffered a heart attack.
The Egyptian Revolution JJ
Counter-revolutionary dangers
As in any revolution, those who lose power are prepared to do anything to
regain it. the remnants of the ndp, the security police and billionaire busi-
nessmen connected to the old regime continued to make attempts at roll-
ing back the revolution. the use of thugs to intimidate people and create a
sense of fear and insecurity continued unabated. the police continued with
what amounted to an informal strike, partly out of fear but also to add to the
absence of security on egypts streets. perhaps most dangerously was the
rapid rise of the salaf groups (ultra-religious conservative Muslims) who
began targeting the christian minority. As Mustafa omar describes in one of
his excellent articles about the revolution:
First, in early March, in the village of Atfh, south of cairo, a mob of
salafsts, along with disenfranchised urban poor, burned a coptic church to
the ground because of an alleged relationship between a christian man and
a Muslim woman. in April, in the southern governate of Qenawhich has
a large number of christian residentssalafsts organised civil disobedi-
ence to oppose a new governor for the province on the basis of his christian
identity. in fact, many christians and Muslims opposed the appointment
of emad Mikhael because he was a notoriously brutal general in the secret
police under Mubarak. but the salafsts directed their wrath on the appoint-
ed governors religious faith. More recently, in early May, in the impover-
ished neighbourhood of imbaba in cairo, another Muslim mob attacked and
burned a coptic church. salafsts had been agitating against christians for
some time, and claimed that priests were holding a christian woman mar-
ried to a Muslim man in the church against her will. As army and police of-
fcers stood by, gunfghts between Muslims and christians broke out. they
lasted for hours and left at least 11 people dead. Fortunately, a public outcry
by a sizeable majority of ordinary Muslims and christians against church
burning temporarily slowed down the salafsts.
Attempts at counter-revolution thus far have not been able to demobilise
or demoralise the revolution. However, revolutionary vigilance is necessary.
those that want revenge on the revolution will keep trying. what they failed
to do with camels and horses on 3 February, they will try again with bombs,
machine guns and sectarian violence.
Islamists, liberals and a struggle for power
the Muslim brotherhood was not able to participate in the revolution with-
out vacillations and splits. what moved the Mb leadership was pressure
from various trends within the organisation rather than participation in the
revolution on the basis of principle. in particular it was the result of the in-
tense pressure from the brotherhoods youth base which had merged with
the masses in the streets during the revolution.
this vacillation and contradiction are not new to the brotherhood. the
organisations entire history is witness to this tendency from the time of
the brotherhoods founder, imam Hassan al-banna, until today. At the end
of the 1940s the monarchy was able to destroy the heart of the organisa-
tion, despite its power and half a million members, by exploiting the sharp
disagreements within the organisation and the indecision of its leadership in
confronting the regime. the group saw a similar crisis during the frst years
after the revolution of July 1952, when internal divisions and wavering lead-
ership allowed the nasserist regime to destroy it.
this permanent fuctuation between opposition and compromise, be-
tween escalation and calm, is a result of the nature of the brotherhood as a
popular religious group which comprises sections of the urban bourgeoisie
side by side with sections of the traditional and modern petty bourgeoisie
(drawn from students and university graduates), the unemployed and large
sections of the poor. this structure remains stable at times of political and
social calm, but turns into a time bomb at moments of great transformation,
when it becomes almost impossible to reconcile the various contradictory
social interests under a broad and vague message.
day and night the brotherhood has parroted the same lines about the
armys patriotism and its leadership, about how there is a red line around
the army, about its work protecting the revolution and that any movement
against the army is a betrayal of the revolution. in a statement on the broth-
erhoods website we fnd the following section: the army is trying to pre-
serve a degree of discipline among its ranks, and it is right to do so, for if it
cannot maintain its own discipline it cannot protect the people.
At present the army is the only organised force in egypt, and it is not in
our interests to weaken it, nor will we let anyone else weaken it. we know
who is working in this way, and what their goals and intentions are. the
Muslim brotherhood wants to see the success of the revolution, and we are
fully aware that the position of our great army in relation to the revolution
The Egyptian Revolution J5
Revolutionary graffti is
everywhere in Cairo
JG The Egyptian Revolution
is one of the principal factors in its success. For the army has said to the
people since the frst moment you can express your views freely and dem-
onstrate during the day, but not during the night-time curfews, which have
been reduced more than once to only 3 hours.
in relation to the social deepening of the revolution with the great wave
of strikes which were triggered by the uprising, the brotherhood took the
same position as the government and the Military council, demanding, A
return to work to save the egyptian economy. the Muslim brotherhood calls
on all sections of the egyptian people to keep the wheels of production and
development turning. demonstrations for sectional demands, albeit a fun-
damental right, are detrimental to production and damage the economy,
particularly as the revolution is linked to keeping the motor of the economy
turning. citizens must feel that their sacrifces in the search for a dignifed
life were not just empty talk, so that the egyptian people can prove that they
are capable of a further achievement beyond the revolution, in other words,
to lift egypt out of its economic crisis.
these positions are, of course, not restricted to the brotherhood. liberal
forces are also participating with great enthusiasm in the same double cam-
paignabsolute support for the military council and a hysterical campaign
against workers strikes under the banner of Keep the wheel of production
turning. Amr Hamzawy, one of the stars of liberalism, even called for the
formation of groups of young people and public personalities in order to
spread propaganda against strikes among the workers. A wide range of in-
tellectuals and revolutionaries of yesterday are inciting for smashing strikes
with the cooperation of the army, as part of these campaigns against the
second phase of the revolution.
both islamists and liberals formed a number of political parties in ex-
pectation that elections would be held in september. Although superfcially
debates between secular liberals and islamists over the details of the consti-
tution and over the place of islamic sharia law in a future democratic egypt
suggest that their differences are irreconcilable, when it comes to the class
struggle and to the limits of the revolution they turn out to be close allies.
both forces fully support the scAF and strongly condemn any criticism of
the army. both sides support free market capitalism, both are strongly op-
posed to the continuing strike movement and both will probably end up in
an alliance to help save capitalism and crush the workers.
The Egyptian Revolution J/
The workers revolt
the strike wave that had begun on the third week of the revolution and which
delivered the fnal blow to Mubaraks rule did not end with the fall of the dic-
tator. in fact the political victory of ousting the dictator gave a huge drive
to thousands of both economic and political strikes throughout the coun-
try. during the two months after Mubaraks fall more strikes took place and
more workers participated than throughout the whole 2006-9 strike wave,
the largest in modern egyptian history.
in fact the new post-Mubarak strike wave was both a continuation and
deepening of the previous one. thus dozens of new independent unions were
formed in the heat of the struggle, democratically electing leaders from the
strike committees. the strike wave spread between industries, among white
collar workers and throughout the private sector. demands involve both im-
mediate economic issues, national demands such as a minimum wage and
anti-corruption demands. the levels of generalisation and radicalisation are
unprecedented.
those who wished for an orderly, purely political democratic revolution,
an engineered transition from dictatorship to democracy led by liberal bour-
geois democrats and moderate islamists, a transition that would be passive-
ly supported by the working class and the poor, had clearly not understood
what they were getting themselves into.
during the early days of the revolution, when the common aim was mainly
the ousting of Mubarak and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy,
there seemed to be a sense of cross-class unity, perhaps most symbolised
by the egyptian fag. the poorest unemployed, the richest corporate execu-
tive and everyone in between waved the fag proudly. those who fought at
the barricades and those who showed up later when conditions became safe
enough, all felt this to be their united revolution: a revolution of the whole
egyptian people, with all its social classes against a hated dictatorship. but
this sense of unity was both superfcial and temporary.
the seemingly vague democratic slogans of freedom, social justice and
dignity meant completely different things to the different classes participat-
ing. Freedom for the worker did not only mean freedom to vote or freedom of
expression, it also meant freedom from hunger, insecurity and the constant
threat of unemployment. social justice meant equality and redistribution of
wealth, better wages, healthcare, housing, education and public services. dig-
nity was a meaningless notion unless it meant an end to poverty and need.
the bourgeois democrat had, of course a different understanding of these
slogans. Freedom for him meant a western-style parliamentary system. so-
cial justice meant a slight improvement in the conditions of the poor as long
as this did not frighten off investors and as long as the demands were realistic
and did not threaten the survival of capitalism. dignity meant an end to po-
lice brutality but had very little to do in his mind with any social questions.
other sections of the population would translate these slogans into more
and more varied notions. the ousting of Mubarak began to force these differ-
ences to the surface.
this brings us to the question of the relationship between politics and eco-
nomics and more specifcally between a democratic revolution and a social
revolution. A democratic revolution in which the working class plays a major
role is in itself already implicitly and potentially a social revolution. From the
very frst moments of the revolution, the future class struggles of the later
phases of the revolution are already immanent. in the case of egypt, where
the revolution was carried out against not only a brutal dictatorship, but also
a neoliberal capitalist one, and where the revolution was preceded by years
of workers struggles against neoliberal policies, it could not be otherwise.
there could not be an outcome similar to the colour revolutions this time.
the interaction between political and economic protests during a revolu-
tion was brilliantly described by Rosa luxemburg in her analysis of the Rus-
sian revolution of 1905:
but the movement on the whole does not proceed from the economic to
the political struggle, nor even the reverse. every great political mass ac-
tion, after it has attained its political highest point, breaks up into a mass of
economic strikes... every new onset and every fresh victory of the political
struggle is transformed into a powerful impetus for the economic struggle,
extending at the same time its external possibilities and intensifying the in-
ner urge of the workers to better their position and their desire to struggle.
After every foaming wave of political action a fructifying deposit remains
behind from which a thousand stalks of economic struggle shoot forth. And
conversely. the workers condition of ceaseless economic struggle with the
capitalists keeps their fghting energy alive in every political interval.
this interaction between political and economic demands is a central fea-
ture of the egyptian revolution.
one of the factors that intensifes this interaction in the egyptian case is
the extent to which the institutions of the state, the ndp and big business
were, and continue to be, deeply connected to each other at all levels of
society.
one of the main slogans of the revolution, particularly after the removal
The Egyptian Revolution J9
of Mubarak was that of cleansing the system. what this meant was that
the revolution would not succeed unless there was a thorough purge of all
ndp and corrupt offcials from all institutions. thus, in nearly all the major
strikes taking place since the revolution, a major demand was to remove
corrupt and ndp -inked managers and to put them on trial. this clearly
political demand was integrated with the economic demands of minimum
wage, permanent contracts for temporary workers, better working condi-
tions and so on.
A similar situation arose during the portuguese revolution of 1974. As tony
cliff explained in an important analysis of the revolution:
saneamento (purging) meant much more than simply locking up the se-
cret policemen. effectively and thoroughly carried out, it means to virtually
destroy the structure of the bourgeois state. because the corporate state
meant control over every level of social life, banks, churches, schools, uni-
versities, offces and factory managements, a complete saneamento would
mean the destruction of the entire social hierarchy from board of directors
right down to foremen.
thus what started in egypt on 25 January as a seemingly purely demo-
cratic political revolution can develop into a revolution challenging the very
basis of capitalist society.
Rising expectations and economic crisis
Another important factor pushing the egyptian revolution beyond the limits
of bourgeois democratic transition is the deepening contradiction between
rising expectations among workers and the poor, and the economic crisis of
capitalism. people expect higher wages, a reduction of unemployment, bet-
ter housing, education and healthcare. but within the confnes of the capital-
ist system, all these things are expected to get worse.
the egyptian economy was already in crisis before the revolution. but
things have become much worse since. perhaps the most visible problem
is infation. Food prices for example were up by 20 percent in April 2011
compared to the same month the previous year. unemployment has risen
sharply, compounded by the return of hundreds of thousands of workers
from libya. there were 1.5 million egyptian workers in libya. the revolu-
tion and civil war there caused a sharp decline in workers remittances, an
4O The Egyptian Revolution
important source of foreign currency. tourism revenues, which account for
11 percent of Gdp, also fell sharply adding hundreds of thousands to the mil-
lions of unemployed youth.
to try to stabilise the economy, the government has deployed foreign
reserves, propping up the egyptian pound. the reserves have fallen from
$34bn to $28bn in the last three months. but the egyptian pound still fell.
the longer term threat is a rapid further decline in reserves followed by
speculation on the pound and a complete collapse in its value. the budget
defcit in 2011 is estimated at over 9 percent and Gdp growth has shrunk by
4.2 percent in the frst quarter.
what all this means is either that egyptian capitalism is about to collapse,
or the working class and poor of egypt will be made to pay the price of the
crisis. but the working class and poor in egypt revolted and are continuing
to revolt precisely because they have been paying the price for neoliberal-
ism and its failures for decades. what they expect is an end to poverty, un-
employment and the humiliation and indignity they have suffered.
the generals and capitalists and their transitional government cannot make
any substantial concessions to the workers without breaking, not only with
neoliberalism but with the very structure of the capitalist economy. For them
that would not only be irrational but suicidal. they will fght tooth and nail to
save the system and make the poor pay the price. but the poor will also fght
tooth and nail to save their revolution. A new and ferce clash is brewing.
Enter world capitalism
egyptian capitalism is an integral part of the world capitalist system. its sur-
vival depends on the vital links that connect it to the us, eu and Gulf states
economies. it is therefore to these that the transitional government has run
for help. And indeed, as would be expected, the fact that the scAF and the
transitional government have pledged to continue the same economic and
foreign policies of the previous regime has made the us, the eu and their
fnancial institutions, the iMF and world bank, all eager to help.
the G8 summit held on 26 and 27 May (attended by essam sharaf) an-
nounced that up to $20 billion would be offered to egypt and tunisia. when
support from the Gulf Arab states is added to these fgures egypt alone ap-
pears to be on the verge of receiving around $15 billion in loans, investment
The Egyptian Revolution 4I
Standing up to the police
and aid from governments and the key international fnancial institutions
(iFi). However, this money comes with conditions. the packages are prem-
ised upon the continuation of neoliberal policies of privatisation, deregula-
tion and encouragement of foreign investment.
on 24 May this conditionality was set out following an announcement by
the world bank and iMF that they would provide $4.5 billion to egypt over
two years. noting that reforms were as important as money, the iMF made
clear during the G8 summit what was to be required if the money would
start fowing to egypt:
overcoming high unemployment will require a substantial increase in the
pace of economic growth Achieving such growth rates will entail both
additional investment and improved productivity. while some increases in
public investment may be required, for instance to improve the quality of
infrastructure and services in less developed rural areas, the key role will
have to be played by the private sector, including by attracting foreign direct
investment. thus, government policies should support an enabling environ-
ment in which the private sector fourishes.
therefore the main thrust of the international fnancial intervention in
post-Mubarak egypt is an acceleration of the neoliberal policies followed by
the Mubarak regime. those same policies that led to the impoverishment of
the majority of the population, the massive concentration of wealth amongst
a tiny minority and a facilitating state in bed with the billionaires.
that is exactly the egypt we revolted against and it is exactly the egypt
being offered us again with only the slightest of change in the packaging.
Preparing for the second revolution
As we saw above, the revolution involves a complex interaction between po-
litical and economic demands, between its democratic and its social phases.
there are no clearly demarcated and separate stages in the revolution. the
achievement of the main political democratic demands of the revolution,
which has only just begun, can only be completed and maintained by the
mass participation of the egyptian working class. this necessarily trans-
forms the revolution from its narrow bourgeois democratic demands and
puts to the fore social demands that cannot be achieved within the confnes
of capitalism and its endless crises.
The Egyptian Revolution 4J
the threat to capitalism unites all kinds of disparate forces against the
working class and the poor. plans of containment on the one hand and con-
spiracies for counterrevolution on the other hand fll the air. For many liber-
als and islamists, the threats posed by the political awakening of the working
class and the poor become much more menacing than the slow and limited
pace of political and democratic reform on offer from the generals.
thus the true completion of the democratic revolution requires that the
working class take the lead pulling behind them the poor peasants, the ur-
ban poor, the oppressed sections of society, the poor copts, nubians and
sinai bedouins. this is needed to save the revolution from containment,
reaction and counter-revolution and then to prepare for a new uprising that
would complete the overthrow of the regime, to complete the cleansing
process by destroying the old regime state structures. then to begin the
task of building the social republic, through the conquest of political pow-
er by the working class with the support of the poor peasantry, the urban
poor and all sections of society oppressed by the old regimeand by the
so-called transitional regime and its generals.
these tasks cannot be achieved solely by the organisation of independent
trade unions and popular committees, however vital those tasks will be in
the future insurrection. there is a vital need for the building of a revolution-
ary workers party. A party whose task will be not only to unite the most ad-
vanced elements of the working class, but to pull towards it the less organ-
ised and isolated sectors of the class. this party must become a tribune of
the oppressed, winning the argument among all the victims of exploitation
and oppression that only under the leadership of the working class can their
suffering truly end.
clarity and honesty is of utmost importance regarding the coming insur-
rection. the enemy will fght us viciously. the army will play the major role
in trying to smash, not only the insurrection itself but also every vestige of
independent workers organisations. it is therefore of vital importance in the
coming battles to win over soldiers and young conscript offcers to the side
of the revolution in order to expose, isolate and eventually defeat the army
leadership.
our enemies are organised. they have the full backing of bourgeois me-
dia. only an organised revolutionary party that is strong enough in numbers
and that is capable of propagating its ideas and agitating for revolutionary
action among the masses can hope to win this battle.
the gap between the current size and forces of the revolutionary left in
egypt and the tasks mentioned above is huge. yet we know that our argu-
ments can make a real difference and shape the struggles to come. those
of us in tahrir square during the uprising who believed that workers could
fnish off Mubarak didnt simply wait for strikes to happen. we went and
argued with leading activists in the workplaces that workers could use their
organised collective power against the regime.
the revolutionary crisis in egypt and in the wider Arab world is of a scale
and depth magnifed by the context of world economic crisis that means
our enemies will fnd it diffcult to resolve in the near future. the crisis will
probably be one of years rather than months. this gives revolutionary so-
cialists a window of opportunity that is truly historical. if we get it right on
the essential questions of revolutionary strategy and tactics, if we learn the
right lessons from both the failures and successes of our international revo-
lutionary tradition, then a historic victory for the working class in egypt and
internationally could be within our grasp.
Another crucial factor that can make the difference between victory and
defeat is the question of revolutionary internationalism. the world capitalist
class is uniting and organising to contain and suffocate the egyptian revolu-
tion. yet world capitalism is in a long and protracted crisis. All over the world
ruling classes are attempting to make the working classes pay the price for
that crisis. Resistance to these attempts are growing and deepening all over
the world. the mass strikes and demonstrations in Greece and spain are
both inspired by and inspiring to the egyptian revolution. the revolutions
in yemen and syria, although facing unimaginable repression are still con-
tinuing. every victory for the working classes and masses in one region or
country will give a tremendous boost to all the rest. yet we cannot just rely
on the relatively spontaneous interactions between these revolutions and
movements. we need to organise international solidarity and use this his-
torical moment to build our organisations all over the globe.
For the frst time in decades, we literally have a world to win.
4G The Egyptian Revolution
The Egyptian Revolution 4/

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