Casupanan, Capitulo vs Larroya Vehicles figured in an accident. One driven by Larroya, the other, owned by Capitulo, by Casupan.

Criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property was filed by Larroya against Casupanan. During its preliminary investigation, a civil case based on quasi delict was filed by petitioners herein against respondent. They contend that it is in the form of a counter claim which cannot be submitted in the criminal case. Furthermore Art. 31 of the NCC provides that any other cause of action from other sources of obligation may be filed independently from the criminal action. WON civil case filed by petitioners will prosper. MTC dismissed; RTC dismissed for lack of merit.SC held Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit: "SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) . . . . "No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." Marcelo Jervoso, Norma Jervoso vs People (lumang rules of court, all civil actions are instituted) Husband and wife convicted of homicide and physical injuries respectively for stabbing to death one Rogelio Jervoso. Their defense was self defense which was found to be lacking in the evidence they adduced. They now aver that they should not have been sentenced to pay 30k as damages since a separate civil action had been filed against them, and that they must not have been convicted. SC ruled : the first contention is meritorious since a prior civil case has been instituted no award of damages should have been awarded since a prior civil action was instituted (in this acse civil action under Art. 33 defamation, physical injury) Ang rule dito pag nainstitute ang Criminal, instituted na lahat. PAg reserve ng isa Waived lahat. Pag waive nd isa waived lahat. Chu, Hee vs CA Navoa DeLeos 1990 Chu and Hee allegedly succeeded in inducing private respondents to mortgage a parcel of land belonging to and registered in the name of Jaime Navoa, and that they (petitioners) misappropriated the proceeds therefrom, causing damages to private respondents in the amount of P670,000.00. Estafa filed against them but was dismissed; Joint venture on Virginia tobacco did not go well because of President proscribed importation, no fraud just usual business misfortune. A civil case for damages arising form guaranty and fraud filed. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil
action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action.

Whether or not the action will prosper under Art. 33 on fraud, defamation, physical injuries SC held: Yes The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. To
subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the criminal prosecution would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law provides that such civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter."

Marcia et. al. vs CA Victory Liner 1983 Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente Marcias resulted in the latter s death and physical injuries to other petitioners. A criminal action was filed, and subsequently a civil action for damages arising reckless imprudence and negligence was filed against private respondents. Initially respondent was convicted but was overturned on appeal, and while the civil action was pending. The Court of Appeals declared that the no negligence criminal nor civil accompanied his acts, and that it was pure accident. CFI dismissed the civil action and was affirmed by the CA. Whether or not the civil case will prosper. SC held: NO, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. Art. 33 also does not apply, the article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Mendoza vs Arrieta, Timbol (Montoya), Salazar 1979 Old din to kelangan ireserve yung 31 32 33 34, to proceed independently from criminal case. Pero since rules of court lang vs substantive law 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111
with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.' . . ."

Mercedes, truck and Jeepney figured in an accident. Two Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Case one agains Montoya for hitting the jeep on the rear right portion, causing it to hit the Mercedes which is subject in case two against Salazar. RTC convicted Montoya, and absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner was not awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. Pet filed civil caseagainst Timbol (owner of truck) and Salazar. CFI dismissed both cases, for the former because of bar by prior judgement, and for the latter because "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 . . ." SC held: as to Timbol the dismissal was improper, no res judicata because there is no indentity of parties, further the liability in the CA is exdelicto while that in the civil action is clearly quasi delict. As to Salazar, dismissal was proper, since he was prosecutd under culpa-criminal cause of action which as already been decided does not exist. Heirs of Tayag Sr. vs Hon Alcantara, Philippine Rabbit, Villa Deceased was hit by the bus driven by Villa, while the former was riding a bicycle. A complaint for damages against the private respondents. The private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial, on the ground that the criminal caseagainst the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule III of the Revised

Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. The criminal case was dismissed on the ground of reasonable doubt. A motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them, the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal action. The judge dismissed the case. Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil. SC held: Yes, the civil action for quasi delict provides a source of obligation different from the criminal case which is based on delict. The allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was based upon a quasi delict. Furthermore the quasi delict civil action could have even proceeded independently. And assuming that the civil action was for liability ex delicto, it will still prosper as provided for in Art 29 of the NCC, because the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt only. Cinco vs Hon. CAnonoy, Hilot, Pepito, Pepito A civil action for damages filed against private respondents on account of a vehicular accident between their jeepney and petitioner s automobile. A criminal action was subsequently filed, which prompted PR to file a motion to suspend the CC. The City court, affirmed by the CFI, granted the suspension , invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides: "(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;" Whether or no t suspension was proper. SC: No the civil action which is suspended upon the institution of the criminal case is that arising ex-delicto. From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual, predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. , in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict.

Madeja vs Hon Caro, Japzon 1983 Petitioner filed a case against Dr. Japzon for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." Thereafter a civil action for damages was filed, but was dismissed upon motion of private respondent. The quort a quo invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil action arising from offenses. In all case not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." . . .

Whether or not dismissal was proper SC held: NO, the cause of action herein is based on Art. 33 on fraud, defamation and physical injuries. It reasoned that since the acts mentioned are generic in nature. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. In other words, the term physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury.