-:

.l

F?frIB:

391- 6.5S?

{i::j ,i 3)-F.I-,. ,\.

db-J(f

(b) (1)

tsy Dick Chun 034

Until the outbreak of hostillties in Korea/ on 2i Junc l95Or [oree rar an aLnost unknorm corrntry to the average Ancricen, The corrrse of the conflict since that ti.ne and the gffect that ii hac had on the world for the past 2O
r, Jrears have br"o.-ght greater

l-''

farniliarity, espccialJy to those wlro ncne intinatcly

with thc present stalemted, but

involned.

To those who rnay be concerned

nonetheless potentially e:cplosivc situation

in Koree, here is a thrrnbncil sketch of the Korean COMINT effort (Less the KORCOM Air problen) when it:began.

llior

Lo 2J June 1950, wheR the North Korean armed forees cr.oased thq
I
I

38th pqrallel, there was vdrtuelly no COI'{INT effort on the North Korean cortuu-

nj,cations. A U; S . intercept

Arrny

Security Agency unfU

bgati iaterl

cepting North Korean tra Korea4 trafflo e1$ thi-s effort weg eugnented by South Koreen

the end of Septenber L95Q, fasA4urrtqpg*Aqi!|d,. -:. -gfiitqrg; Sfeinf hat established an tdv-qnccd etcuent g1 Tadgu, Korcr and in
ruid-october the 50th signal serrrice
Ianded

(nOfW Group n14rr)r Ey

t-*l-lfnon

Fort Lcris, wuhlngton

in hrsan. Ttre total. l.lntercg;t ras laereased to 2O posltionr rhcn became operational ln'the nLdst of a golf sourse located in the outgkirts of
Scoul Ci-ty.

With the availability of intercopted North Korcen comunioationr cenc

the nced for

Konean

traffie anrlysta,
civilian

cryptanalysts and

llnguists.

There wer,e no

linguists assigned to the lrncd Forces Security

One

Ageocy

(lFA,

forerrrnner
e

of NSA).

who had studled

the langrnlc whllc hospltallzed and

rith ecvcral Japanese linguists, estrrblished the firrt Korean language urrit. I! war possible to convert Japanese iinguists dqe to fhe sinilarity of the gmtmrr
fenale civil-ian of Korean deseent both enployed by AFSA, together

rmit, reselrre officcr personnel with previous Korean }arngua..ge background werc rocalled to active duty and the
To augrnent bhie }anguege
'vf0

of both languages.

) began to

F[:rr]verJ fc'r
.t-

nel*fise hy hl5A ,l 1*-;iltt7 FillA. il nr* # 4:34

nfrfrID:

391 65.
accclerate

its proqran of trainlng U. S. Anay personncl ln the Koreen language. In the interin, one of the two U. S. Anny offlcers of Korean ancestry
to
ASAPAC. He was

stationed as instnrctors at bhe Anny Ianguagc School xas irmediately sent to

Japan and assigned

later joined by the rcErinitg instructor and sevcral other AIEA linguistr in both Japan aod in Kol&. Concurlsntly rdth the shortagc of Korcan linguists, there was a$ alnost total lack of suitable Korean diciionaires and knowledge of North Korean nilitary and technlcal genninologr. fn tne beginning, terrnlnoJ-ogr appearing in North Korean mlJ-ltary coranunications was compiled and definitiona weFe
detennined by conte:<t

or by referring to
r.rere

Japanese and Chlnese

dictionaries.

Other sources

of tennilolog5r

derived

fro

Norbh Konean prisoners-of-war

interrogation and captured docunrenrts. Drring this period, the conduct of

prisoner-of-war interrogation Hae virtually
ASA

left

up

to the imagination of, the

Thc intcroogator
r,raa

linguists assigned to interrogate the subject.

norrnal\y given only the

nilitary

occupation speciality

of the prisonsr he was

apprecLa-

to intcrr.ogatc.
At this point,
we cannot continue

'dth this tople without suo

CS{INT

tton of the cryptanelytic

crXlntosystencs

aspects

of the Norbb [orean

effort. In thc
and

leglnning phase of the confllct, North Korean encrypted messages used sirnple

in large volrrmes and the eryptana\rbic effort in the field

was

at

NSA

e4joyed high successe The'North Korreans changcd

their systqffi frretained, cryptanaly-

quent\r, but sLnce the besic sirnplicity of the systens

tic exploitation ras not a naJor pr^oblem. Therefore, the end-product translations eroduced during the lattor paft of 1950 and through the spring of 1951 were large in nunber and of e:cLrerne value to the custqners. High echelon North
Korean messeges reveaLed nuch infomati.on about

the capabilltiee and intentions

and

of the }Iorth Koreanr.forccs and were considered by the U. N. tiigh Connand t field
conmanders

to

be a

vitally

imporbant source
I

of intelligence.
.; -.i:-.'"'-ll

1/

B#frIBr
{utri

391 65F?
E:<pJ-oiting Nozth Korean cryptosystens and producing
was

translation reports

not

hampered so much by

a corplec proble[! as by the large vo].rne of

be publi-shed

(tii.i3)-50

usc 40s

(bx3)-18 USC 7e8 (bi(3).P L 86-36

t,

ir

highlf ei,gnifiglnt measages which had to qualified linguistic persorlhelr

nith criti-fal\y rrni!64

This situation contifiued until the truce agreement was signed in July L953. Affitlllthe tnrce greement was signed, another narked eI'fort
North Koreans
wa6 nade

by

Lhe

Sincc opn hostilltics

had ceascd and the use

sitmtion

uas becmlng

static, the t{orth

Koreans bcgan less

of radio

conmunLcation and Dore usc

of l"andlinc and courier or neil servlccg,

cmmunications, uhich

In

L952t North fioreanqpmunications targets other than milltarTr uGrc

Lntercepted. North Korean lnternal

resenbLed,

civil

in nany respect

the Westera Union, produced plai.nterd nesaagos pesscd betscen raajor

Norbh Korean

cities

and

industnial cmplerres.

Theac Resregcs contalned a

large variety of subjects ranging frqn personal nessages to coal, lead, zilc
and other mining

statistics.

Order

of Battle information
rnenbere

was alco available

when these messages were passed

to or frm

of the nilitary forccs.

D#frI'S

3g1 fiSS?

lle have seen a C0UINT oroblem i'inding

flcd.ged problenr during the

its

begiruring with the North Korean.

forces crossing the 38bh parallel on 2J June 195O and developing into a

full

hostllities; then with the end of the conflict graual\y changing into a peace fime COMINT effort except for couple of intense periods followLng the capLure of the PTEBIO and shootdown of a U. S. reconneisaaaco airrcraft. However, there is one difference - the Nor{h Koreana are not the North Koreans of I95O. ?hey are now & nodern, better cquj.pped, bettcr trajned and e:cpenienced nilitary nachine. In adrtitionr thcnc ars thousands of well
trained and well
walting to
ccrne armed Chinese CornrnunLst

forces acroas the YaIu Rive:r just

should,

to the aid of their North Korean fnienda. So, there

be no lesc requirnents
(k,)(1j (b)(-r)-50 IJSC 403 (b ) ( ) -1 I r_l,si_l 7 9B (l*,) (.j) -F. t,. s6-:j6
_3

for cmtinued rvatchfulness

War"

todey than

that

which

exlsted during the Korean