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Evidence and Explanation in History and Sociology: Critical Reflections on Goldthorpe's Critique of Historical Sociology Author(s): Joseph M.

Bryant Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 3-19 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591521 . Accessed: 14/01/2012 09:53
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Joseph M. Bryant

Evidenceand explanationin historyand sociology:criticalreflectionson Goldthorpe's critiqueof historicalsociology*

In 'The uses of historyin sociology',John Goldthorpe(1991) raises severalseriousobjectionsto the currentrevivalof historical modes of analysisin our discipline.This critiquecomes at a most opportune time, for advocatesof historical sociologyhave hithertoconcentrated more on exposing the inadequaciesof mainstreampractices and assumptions- an understandableemphasis given their marginal status- and hence have not offered a systematicor comprehensive justification of their own procedures. Goldthorpe's direct and l informed challenge should, accordingly,occasiona more advanced exchange on matters of theory and method, one which holds the promiseof greateranalytical sophistication all partiesconcerned. for Whatfollowsis a preliminary partialresponseto certainaspectsof and Goldthorpe's assessment, objectives my beingto (a)redrawthe linesof contention in accordancewith actual problemsof investigation,as opposed to traditionaldisciplinarypreserves;and (b) reaffirm the necessaryinterdependenceof historical sociological and analysis.
I. ON EVIDENCE,HISTORICALAND SOCIOLOGICAL

While acknowledgingthat a continuingdialogue between historians and sociologistsis essential for both disciplines,Goldthorpeis disturbed by recent interdisciplinary trends and by more extreme calls for an amalgamation explanatorylogics.These efforts - rooted in of the 'reaction againstpositivism' a 'failureof nerve'over the ideaof and 'socialscience'- havegone too far in his view,illegitimately overriding aspects of the traditionalidiographic-nomothetic distinctionwhich should be maintained(Goldthorpe1991:212 - from here on all page referencesto this paperwillappearin squarebrackets.). brief comIn pass, Goldthorpe reassertsthat historiansmust contextualize,with datesand places,whereassociologists shouldstriveto widenthe scope of their explanatoryarguments.That proposed division of labour suggestsone obviousfunctionfor historyin sociological analysis
BJS Volumeno. 45 *ssucno. l March l 994

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for category' sociology, Historymayserveas, so to speak,a 'residual marking the point at which sociologists, in invoking 'history', thereby curb their impulse to generalise or, in other words, to and explainsociologically, acceptthe role of the specificand of the the contingentas framing- thatis, as providingboth the settingarml limits- of theirown analyses[p. 212]. objectivewouldthus seem to entaila returnto the status Goldthorpe's ante, point where sociologistsand historianswould restrainand a quo the correcteach other'snaturalexcessesor limitations, one imparting the the gift of theory,of generalization, other yieldingconcretedetail and bounded specificities. Given their respective research foci, Goldthorpeendorses the view that the two disciplineswill employ distinctiveexplanatorylogics,even if'generalizing'and 'particularizing'are mattersmoreof emphasisthan strictprinciple. however,are neither the sole nor the major Different explicanda, rationalefor upholding the traditionalacademicdivide. Muchmore view is the fact that the two disciplinesare importantin Goldthorpe's bases, empirzcal featuringdifferencesboth in founded upon distinctive the nature of the evidence utilized and in the manner in which evidencecomes into being. The basiccontrastis presentedas follows: whereas modern sociologicalresearch typically'generates'or 'produces' its own data or evidence, primarilythrough interviewsand from or evidenceconsistsof chancesurvivals 'relics' surveys,historical the past. The immense disadvantagesand problems posed by the Goldthorpecontends,havebeen largelyignored lattercircumstance, by proponentsof historicalsociology,resultingnot only in mistaken views on the relationshipbetween historyand sociology,but also in practice. in materials sociological of misapplications historical turnon critiquewillobviously of Assessingthe validity Goldthorpe's the adequacy of his distinction between 'sociological data' and fact 'a relics'.His startingpointis uncontroversial: historical 'historical is an inference from the relics'[p.213]. Nor can one challenge the observationthat historicalrelics - essentiallymaterial artifactsof variouskindsand a wide rangeof literarydocuments-are both finite and incomplete.Equallysound is the suggestionthat, for any given period or setting, the survivingrelics are likely to constituteonly a small and unrepresentativeselection. Given these limiting circumprove to be both partial stances,historicalknowledgewill invariably and lacunary,restrictedto the inferencesthatcan be drawnfrom the remainsof the past. fragmentary A reminder that historiographyis a demanding enterprise is salutaryin itself; but Goldthorpe'sdiscussionimplies rather more, that the evidentialbase upon which historicalresearchdepends is facts' distinctivelyproblematic,with the consequencethat 'historical sustainableas a are inordinatelyinferential.Is this characterization

Evidence explanation history sociology and in and

category distinction, marking off disciplines,or should we rather decide such matterson the basisof substantive concernsand particularquestionspursued?Finitudeand incompleteness, afterall,seem to be characteristic most forms of scientificinquiry.The exhaustive of representation recountingof 'reality' not the objective practice or is or of any empirical science, and all confront, in varying degrees, limitations sourcematerials, in eitheras actualdeficienciesin 'data'or as cognitiveor technicallimitsin accessing'allthat there is'.2Moreto the point, these limitationsvary in accordancewith the problems investigated:a biologist studying cell division in garden vegetables confronts an empiricalsituationmarkedlydifferent from that of a biologist investigatingthe transmissionof the AIDS virus or the molecular mutations that promote cancer malignancy;a physicist concerned with the propertiesof subatomicelements confronts an empirical situtation different from that of a physicist studying chemicalkineticsor interstellar magnetism; historianwho investithe gates the causesof WorldWarI confrontsa researchchallengequite distinct from that of a historian whose object is to identify the diplomatic maneuvers that resulted in the Treaty of Versailles;a sociologist concerned with fertility patterns among developing nations confronts an empirical situation different from that of a sociologistinvestigating betweencorporateand politicalelites- or ties for thatmatter,quitedifferentfrom a demographerstudyingfertility in developednations! If the finitudeand incompleteness datasets are to be assessedon of the basisof substantive problemsratherthandisciplinary boundaries, the same principleshould hold with regardto the issue of inference. Scienceis of coursean inferentialenterpriseat itsverycore, in thatthe phenomenalrealm providesan experientialor empiricalbase from whichwe 'deduce'or 'infer'certainproperties,patterns,and relations. In actual practice,this quest for intelligibilitytypicallyinvolves an ongoing dialectic between observation and conceptualization,inductionand deduction:theories,concepts,and factsare all mutually implicated.The qualityof scientificinferenceswill thus varywith the qualityof the availableevidence, the existing technology of observationand measurement,and the analytical cogencyof the concepts and theories employed; 'strong' and 'weak'areas of research will accordingly found both acrossand withindisciplines.The convenbe tionalviewthatthe sciencesstandin a definitehierarchy wherebyall that is carried out within the domains of physics or chemistry is deemed more accurateand establishedthan anythingthat has been produced in sociology or history - that view is quite misleading. Indeed, there are some forms of knowledgein the social-historical scienceswhich are more secure than select areas within the natural sciences.3Nor should it be overlooked that whatever the field of investigation,the logic of inferential procedure remains basically

JosephM. Bryant

uniform. The sociologistwho correlatescrime statisticsand sundry socio-economicindicatorsin order to postulatesome form of causal connectionis engaged in basically same analytical the processas the archaeologistwho infers widening stratification the basis of the on changing composition of burial remains and signs of increased agricultural productivity monumentalarchitecture. and Our remaining concern over the nature of historicalevidence would seem to be the issue of 'representativeness', this is indeed and the main focus of Goldthorpe'scritique. Owing to the distinctive manner in which historical evidence 'comes into being', i.e., as survivals 'relics'from the past, the historiantypically or encountersa two-foldlimitation:not only is the supplyof extant materialspartial and fragmentary, designand samplingcontrolsare usuallyabsent but given the haphazardand uneven circumstances which 'relics'are by preserved.Determiningwhether a particularinscription,poem, or paintingconveysrepresentative aberrantinformationis, to saythe or least, anything but straightforward.And even if we allow that historianshave worked out methods and inferentialrules for such problems(usually subsumedunderthe broadrubricof Quellenkrztik or 'source-criticism'), there is no denyingthe difficultiesinvolved. For Goldthorpe,this is the difference that divides:for unlike the historian, the sociologist is in a position to 'generate'or'invent' evidence,withattendingcontrolsoversamplingand selection.Dependent upon whatthe pasthas bequeathed,the historianis constrained to followin pre-determined paths,a prisonerof the vestigestime has preserved.The sociologist,by wayof contrast,can chartan independent courseof research,framingquestionsand then activelyintervening to create materials'thatdid not existbefore' [p.214]. And while Goldthorpeoffers passingacknowledgment 'generatedevidence' that posesits own specialproblemsas regardscompleteness, reliability and validity,he is confidentof the analytical advantages obtain that where the natureand extent of available evidenceis not restricted by the mere accidentsof physicalsurvival;where, moreover,the collectionof evidence can be 'designed'so as to meet the specific requirementsof the inquiryin hand; and where questionsof the quality of evidence can always be addressed, as they arise, by generatingyet furtherevidencethroughwhichto checkand testthe original[pp. 21X15]. The distinctionbetween researchthat investigates'the past' and researchconcernedwith 'the present'is a familiarone, and obviously subsumesmore than the disciplinesof historiography sociology. and It is, moreover, a distinctionill-suited to serve as a criterion for disciplinary demarcation, withineveryempiricalscience,physical for as well as social,one willfind a vastarrayof questionsand problemstheoretical wellas substantive-thatare intrinsically as 'historical', i.e.,

Evidence explanation history sociology and in and

concerned with processes and events that are both sequentiallyordered and time-dependent.4 That said, it is undoubtedlytrue that accessing the past and accessing the present pose distinctivechallenges, and that, accordingly,certain peculiarities procedurewill of mark the two orientations.The question is, are we to presume an inherentsuperiorityof one to the other, or is it not the case thateach will feature advantagesand disadvantages, with these in turn being assessed on the basis of specific research concerns? Proceeding categoricallyrather than substantively,Goldthorpe'sanswer takes the form of a decidedlyuneven 'balancesheet',with all methodological creditsaccruingon the sociologicalside of the ledger, principally on the ground that survey techniquesgenerate 'data'that are more representativeand complete than the 'relics'which constitute the limitedempiricalfund of historiography.5 At first glance, Goldthorpe'saccountingseems plausible,almost axiomatic.After all, what historianwould not jump at the chance to return to the past armed with questionnairesfor mass-mailing and audio-videorecordersof unlimitedtape?The obviousanswerto that hypotheticalis not conclusive,however, for the analogoussituation also holds: what sociologistwould not be keen to view the present from the vantageof the future, with retrospectiveknowledgeof the trends that emerged triumphantand those that fell by the wayside (often contraryto the subjectiveexpectationsof the participants!), and with the opportunityto peruse officialand privaterecordsthat were sealedfrom contemporaries? Goldthorpe's invidiousdistinction between 'sociologicaldata' and 'historicalrelics'is likewisemisleading, not so much for whatit says,but for whatit leavesout of account. Admittedly,there can be few who would questionthat investigating the present provides distinct advantages in matters of research design and sampling. But 'representativeness' a dual meaning: has 'typification' a samplingor probabalistic in sense is certainlyencompassed,but there is also a 'constitutive' dimension,i.e., the notion of corresponding to or embodying what is essential, what is 'real'. Goldthorpe'scontrastbetween evidence 'discovered' (historical) and evidence 'invented'(sociological)attends only to the issue of sampling representativeness, bypassingsubstantive contentaltogether.A reassessment that score is therefore urgentlyrequired.6 on To begin with the most fundamentalpoint, we need to appreciate that historical 'relics' are, for the most part, naturalor authentic elements pastsocialworlds. of That is to say, human beings orient their lives amidst the architecturalforms that frame and define their private and public spaces; they fashion their motives, ideals, and inspirationsin and from the songs, poems, and prose that constitute their primarymeans of communicative discourse;they projecttheir heartfelt hopes and anxietiesonto the funerarymotifs which grace the graves of the departed; they objectifyand preserve significant

JosephM. Bryant

collectiveexperiencesin the socialritualswhichregulatethe rhythms of communitylife; they administertheir publicaffairson the basisof createdpoliticalinstitutions codifiedlegaldecrees;their relationand ships with other communities and with nature are mediated by inventedinstruments warand economy,i.e., the panoplyof armour of and weaponrywieldedby the warriorand the inventoryof tools and machinesemployedby the worker.Regarding otherbasicformsof the historical evidence, much the same can of course be said: from potsherds and pollen deposits to trash heaps and bureaucratic inventories all such'relics' representeitherthe meaningfulcreations or by-productsof social activity,or the bio-physicalrealitieswhich circumscribedhuman experience. As residual 'traces'or 'objectifications' pasthumanactionsand existential of conditions,the empirical materialsof historiography bring us into ratherimmediateor direct contactwithour subjects, 'theirworldsas experienced',and that kind of authenticity- the 'hardness'of such data, one might say- must surelyrankhigh in the desiderata any scientific of enterprise.7 Against the 'naturalness' 'socialauthenticity'of historicalevior dence, it is necessaryto consider the 'artificiality' much standard of sociologicaldata. Goldthorpe'scharacterization survey or interof view-generated evidenceas 'invented'is unintentionally apposite,for it is clear that research of that sort typically entails significant modifications deformationsof the subjectinvestigated.Not only is or that kind of'invented' information fashioned and extracted in a somewhat stilted and artificialmode (e.g., responses mechanically scaled and transcribedin quantitativeform), and in an unnatural setting(i.e., the promptedresponseact is not partof the normalflow of social life), but the intrusion - whether as questionnaireor as interviewer is recognizedas suchby the subject,thusconditioning or 'contaminating' response (the so-called 'reactivemeasurement' the problem).What must be confronted here are obviousparallelswith the UncertaintyPrinciplein particlephysics,wherebyinterventionist efforts to measure reality invariablyoccasion significantdisplacementsor distortionsin that reality.The frequentlyheardlamentthat 'real'human beings and 'real'socialprocessesare obscuredor lost in the trappings of modern research techniques and methods (or perhaps never found!) attests to the very real problem tryingto of apprehend elusiveand highlyreactive the realities sociallife through of procedures areboth that unnatural obtrusive.8 and Evenapartfrom the problemsof artificiality 'invented' with data,it needs to be stressedthat surveysand fieldworkcannotbe considered fully representativeeven in the sense Goldthorpeemphasizes,for these formats are severely limited in their capacityto lay hold of certain features of social totality. As regards survey methods, the coded and statistically processedself-declared attitudesand actionsof individualsyield a rather inadequateprism through which to view

and in and Evidence explanation history sociology

scale; developments and transformationson the macro-structural restricted observersare for the most part physically while participant milieux.9The to workingin 'micro'settingsor other circumscribed informationor data gatheredby such meanswill accordinglyconstiof tute only a limitedand partialrepresentation sociallife - useful to be sure for variousspecificresearchquestions,but hardlyadequateas the empiricalbasisfor socialsciencein general.10 evidencerelevantto the issueof of Anothercharacteristic historical substantiverepresentativenessis what might be called its socially quality,i.e., the fact that,as an objectification 'loaded'or 'multivalent' objecttypically of humanactionor experience,the 'relic'or historical embodiesor is stampedbyvariousaspectsof thatcontext.A particular poem or text of legal discourse,for example, will articulatecertain valuesand ideals,but in additioncarrya descriptionof dietaryhabits, residentialpatterns,and fashionsof dress; a particularpaintingwill disclose somethingof the aesthetictastesof artistsand patrons,but also provide a window onto sundry routines of everyday life; the of and materials methodsused in the construction wallsand buildings willrevealmuch regardingthe economicand technicalcircumstances under which the inhabitantslived, but also yield information on geo-politicalconcernsand realities;funeraryinscriptionsand grave depositswill bear testimonyto the statusclaimsof the interred,but of alsoexpresssomethingof the religiousand culturalsensibilities the a bronze cuirass and helmet will enable us to recreate period; conditions on the field of battle (including the physiology of the combatants),but in addition testify to levels of craftsmanshipand wider linkagesof commerceand trade. In short, by subjectingsuch are historians often ableto colligation, to disparatematerials analytical drawout from a singlesourcea wide rangeof insightsand cluesabout because evidence that implicatedsocialprocessesand relations- precisely and routines, element theactions, of or i.e., is 'natural', an integral component worlds. own beings their social in of experienceshuman existential Here again a comparisonwith 'invented'sociologicaldata would seem to run counter to Goldthorpe'sone-sided assessment. The commonplace charge that much of the information supplied by survey researchis 'thin'or trivial(especiallyin regard to behavioral and aspects)reflectsthe fact that, given the problemsof artificiality describedabove,there are groundsfor doubtingboth unnaturalness the validity and the significanceof the abstractedresponses. As a template of the social world, the research-inducedpsychological reactionsof individualsto a batteryof formalquestionsmustbe seen as quite limited, all the more so when methodologicalpressuresfor the out' and standardization mass-processing'flatten or 'pre-package' qualityand range of response.ll In contrastto historicalrelicswhich in are typicallymultivalent,i.e., 'saturated' the social, there exists a very real possibilitythat 'invented'sociologicaldata captures little

Evidence explanation histo andsociology and in

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immersed, and the field within which they become intelligible' (1953:27-28). For a political party that repeatedly loses general elections, each new campaign and subsequentloss is not a homogeneousdatum,but a realitythatis overladenor 'surcharged' what by transpiredbefore. For an individualcontractinga second or third marital(or adulterous)relationship,the preceding experienceswill bear significantlyon the present and future. The act of protesting againstan authoritarian regime- its very meaningand significance will be defined by its occurrenceon the sociologicaltime-curve,its contextual embeddedness in the preceding history of state-civilian relations.The attitudeof consumerstowardthe productsof certain companiesis not simplya functionof currentcost-benefit calculations, but also encompassesperceptionsof past serviceand reliability. The courseof revolutionary upheavalor transformation conditionednot is only by the present constellationof social forces, but by the past experiencesof the participants, their sense of the 'historical moment' and their appreciationof the collective'destiny'of the nation. The variable rhythmsof experientialtimethusenter into all facetsof social life as a determinantfeature, extending from the personalor micro level on up to that of institutionsand macrostructures.l3 Geneticor historical modes of explanation are accordingly indispensable to sociologicalanalysis,given that temporality- not as a homogeneous metricbut as a culturally defined apperception- providesone of the essentialframesof meaningfor socialaction.l4 The time-as-measurement view, with historyproviding'boundary conditions'for sociologicalgeneralization,is likewiseinadequateto captureanother fundamentalaspectof the ontology of social phenomena: the fact that present arrangements institutions, roles,cultural forms- are theproducts pasthuman of actions. The 'past'is thus never really 'past', but continuously constitutive of the 'present', as a cumulativelyand selectivelyreproduced ensemble of practicesand ideas that 'channel' and impart directionalityto ongoing human agency.The present,in otherwords,is whatthe past- as receivedand creativelyinterpretedby the present- has made it, with the consequence that socialscience invariably confrontssituationsof 'layered' or 'ramifiedcausality',i.e., chains of dependence that repeatedly recede into preceding constellationsof social factors.l5An investigation into the 'causes'of gender inequalitiesin the workplace,for example, cannot simplydraw up an inventoryof current attributes, interests,and power relations;it will also be necessaryto show how presentcircumstances the resultant'moments'of a long chain of are linked and contingentantecedents,a 'trajectory' 'path'that, in this or particular case,begins no laterthan the dawnof complexcivilization. History,as a phenomenon,is 'the cumulativeeffect of pastevents on events of the present' (Tilly 1981:12). A sociologythat ignores the path-dependentnature or sequentialordering of social phenomena

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is, in truth, no sociologyat all, for it fails to appreciatethat 'present forms have their particularnature byvirtueof their past' (Manicas 1987:274).l6 The dual temporalityof social phenomena- experientialtime as one of the dimensionalframesfor intentionality, the ontological and rootednessof presentarrangements pastpractices wouldseem to in necessitate'historical socialscience',and therewitha transcending of the old idiographic-nomothetic antinomy.Insteadof artificially separating the particular from the general,the unique from the recurrent, the conjuncturalfrom the structured,these qualitiesmust be explicated in terms of their ontologicalinterconnection,their relational immanence. To assign one discipline the task of understanding humanityby way of spatio-temporal specifications, while enjoining another to do so via generalizations abstractions, and clearlyviolates the essential unities and interrelationsof social life. Historicalsociology,in contrast,proceedsin conformitywith its object,by fusing idiographicand nomotheticmodalitiesthrough a contextual in logzc which phenomena explicated understood tracing their are and by both genesis andtheir intrtnsic relations other to mediating structures processes. and This contextual logic is at once sociological,in that it attends to roles, institutions,and structures,and historical,in that it comprehends human agency in all its various forms as temporallyordered and conditioned. Those who would challenge either the logic or the necessity of historical-sociological explanation accordingly face a formidable task,for ratherthaninvokedatedmethodological maxims - canons that were in part formulated as self-legitimizingand domain-preserving mechanisms- they are obligatedto demonstrate that human actions are neither inherently social nor inherently historical. cadit quaestio.
III. A NOTE ON 'GRAND'HISTORICALSOCIOLOGYAND THE USE AND ABUSE OF SECONDARYSOURCES

The closingsectionof Goldthorpe's critiqueis in my opinionthe most cogently reasoned and significant. His basic point is that 'grand historicalsociology',i.e., that genre of researchfeaturing'the tracing out of long-termdevelopmentalprocessesor patternsor the making of comparisonsacross a wide range of historicalsocieties or even civilizations', typically is constructed the basisof extremely'tenuous on and arbitrary'links between evidence and inference [pp.220-22]. Given their expansive analyticalrange, grand historicalsociologists are heavilydependentupon derivative secondary or accountsfor their basic data, a position which Goldthorpecontends reduces them to offering 'interpretationsof interpretations'.More strikingly and ironically, Goldthorpemaintainsthatthis sociological reprocessing of

in Evidence expkznationhisto andsociology and

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is historical'rawmaterials' virtuallyidenticalwith HerbertSpencer's positivistic conception,whereinhistoryis to provide'stonesand bricks' designsof sociology for the vaultingarchitectural Grand historicalsociologists have to treat the facts, or indeed concatenations of facts or entire 'accounts',that they find in discreteand stableentities were secondarysourcesasif they relatively that can be 'excerpted'and then brought together in order that some largerdesign maybe realized[p. 221]. Goldthorpegoes on to point out thatin contrastto secondaryanalysis of survey-basedresearch,wherein primarydata and original questionnairesare reanalyzed,grand historicalsociologistsdo not make contact with primarysource materials,but simply offer reinterpreoffered by historians. tationsof the interpretations The charge that grand historicalsociologistsare engaged in 'scishistoriographyis obviouslya serious one, and it fosors-and-paste' cuses much-neededattentionon a methodologicalproblemthat has quitesimaddressed.An annotatedbibliography, not been adequately inquiry,and it is to ply, is not enough to sustainhistorical-comparative pointedchallengewillelicitfullerdisclosbe hoped thatGoldthorpe's proceduresfrom practicinghistoricalsociologistsin ure of analytical will the future.l7That said, a few observations be offered here in an loose' as Goldeffort to show that the situationis not as 'impossibly sources who employsecondary thorpemakesout, and thatsociologists as are not nearlyso far 'removedfrom the empirical' is suggested. What Goldthorpe'saccount overlooksis that all works of historistrands:what might be ographyare woven from two distinguishable on on called reportage the one hand, and interpretation the other. Reportageconsistsof informationthat pertainsto basicquestionsof what,where,when,who, how many,etc. As an exampleone mightcite an episcopalletter from the mid-thirdcenturywhich relatesthat the church in Rome was then maintaining46 prebyters,7 deacons, 7 sub-deacons,42 acolytes,readers,and doorkeepers,exorciststo the number of 52, and more than 1500 widows and poor people.'8 the Interpretation involvesestablishing meaningand the significance of these historical'facts',i.e., the materialsthat constitutereportage. As to the famous letter just mentioned, historianshave long been waging various 'interpretive'wars over, for example, what can be structureof the third-century inferred regarding the ecclesiastical church, the socialcompositionof believers,the probablepercentage the of Christians vis-a-vis totalpopulationof the RomanEmpire,and weavingsof most so on. Now whileit is true thatthe intricatenarrative integrateand collatethe 'facts'of reportage worksof historiography within interpretativestylings,it is usuallypossiblefor the informed wheneverother reader to distinguishbetweenthe two- particularly purposes.Historical secondarysourcesare consultedfor comparative

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in sociologists,grandor otherwise,thus encounterprimarymaterials and the reportageof historians, thoughthisformof mediatedaccessis limited - most seriously, one is dependent upon someone else's sociologyis selectionof the 'facts' it is incorrectto claimthathistorical a second-orderconstructionwithoutempiricalgrounding.l9Sociologists should of course examine primarysources directlywhenever questionsrequire sociological but possible; giventhatmanysignificant extensive knowledge of different times and places, a cautious and is of relianceupon the reportageand interpretations specialists critical obviouslyessentialfor advancesin suchareas.20 sociology chargethatthe offeringsof grandhistorical Goldthorpe's is are inherentlyarbitrary basedupon his perceptionthatsuch works are tenuouslyconnectedwith primaryevidence- a viewwe corrected in light of the distinction between historiographicreportage and interpretation.There is, however,another point to consider.When Goldthorpedoubtinglyinquiresof the criteriaby which sociologists can possiblyreinterpretor adjudicatebetweenconflictingsecondary accounts,the obviousansweris, by meansof theoryand comparative evidence. The disparatefacts of reportagedo not 'speakfor themmeaningful,onlywhenset within selves',but are renderedintelligible, some kind of interpretiveor analyticatframework.How well these 'facts'are accounted for, the scope and internal consistencyof the of analysis,the compatibility an interpretationwith that established for comparablecases, all this will prove relevantin the evaluationof anyscientificexplanation.Goldthorpehimselfinvokessuchcriteriain allegingthat sociologists, of his criticisms severalprominenthistorical and sundrytheoretical ideologicalbiaseshavedistortedtheiranalyses, offeringshaveunderminedthe evidenceupon or thatlaterrevisionist of which they indirectlyrelied. And for a definitivedisconfirmation charge, one need only examine the many critical the arbitrariness wherequestions themselves, sociologists exchangesamongsthistorical of empirical and theoretical adequacy are continuously raised.2l Grand historicalsociologymay not have established'fixed rules' to Goldthorpe'sliking governing the utilizationof secondarysources but general scientificstandardsor criteriado currentlyfunction to determine the respective strengths and inadequaciesof published and research.Indeed, a casecould be made thatinternalcriticism the in feasible historical knowledgecumulationare bothmore of possibility sociology, given the stability of the 'facts' of reportage and the problems. and avoidanceof reactive-measurement design-variability
IV. CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to establishthree fundamentalpoints:(1) that by historicalevidence is characterized certain intrinsicstrengthsor

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advantages- most notably the qualities of social authenticityor 'naturalness' informational'multivalence'; that the temporal and (2) nature of social phenomena mandates a fusing of historicaland sociologicalmodes of analysis,i.e., the adoptionof a contextuallogic of explanation;and (3) that the employmentof secondaryhistorical sources - while entailing certain limitations- does allow for nonarbitrary linkagesbetweenevidenceand interpretation. addition,it In has been suggestedthat researchproceduresmust be adaptedto the types of problems investigated; neither traditional disciplinary boundariesnor peremptorymethodologicalformatsshould delimit t ze rangeot sclentlhclnqulry. The case against historicalsociology,I offer, has not been made. Goldthorpe's variousstricturesmischaracterize natureof historithe cal evidenceand misconstrue logic of sociological the explanation.As a call to greatermethodological self-awareness, cautionary to be his is welcomedand endorsed;as a callto haltor reversethe trend towards interdisciplinary synthesisand the consolidationof historicalsocial science,it must, I submit,be rejected. The caseforhistorical sociologyis stillin the making.But it canclaim one manifest advantage: its analyticalprocedures have not been modelled after the idealizations and elisionscharacteristic formal of treatiseson theory and method, nor have they been imported from disciplinesthat investigatefundamentallyalien ontological orders. Historicalsocialscienceis a 'grounded'science,in that it proceedsby comprehendingthe distinctiveand essentialpropertiesof its object: human agency as mediatedby the constitutivecontextualframesof historical time and culturalmilieu.All methodological considerations shouldbe similarly grounded.
, . . # . .

(Dateaccepted:July 1992)

JosephM.Bryant Department Sociology, of University New Brunswick of

NOTES

* I wouldliketo thankIrvingZeitlin, RandallCollins,Rod Nelson, Noel Iverson, Jim Richardson, Allan Macdonnell, Marc Milner,Steven Turner, and Jack Goldstone theirhelpfulcomments for on earlierversionsof this paper.Fellowship support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Councilof Canada is alsogratefully acknowledged. 1. But see the annotated bibliographyin Theda Skocpol,(ed.), V"ion andMethod Historical in Sociology (1984);

and of course the methodologically explicit offerings of Charles Tilly, most notably SociologfMeetsHistory( 1981). As 2. Jennifer Platt's 'Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research' (1981), provides an excellent overview of the challenges involved, some unique to historicalresearch,but most shared by other standard sociological methods. Goldthorpe's paper would have gained 'balance'by engagement with this discussion,and fromconsideration some of

16 of the commonphenomenological dilemmasraisedin PaulRock's 'Someproblems of interpretive historiography' ( 1976). 3. I thinkit safe to say,for example, that we know more about the originsof civilization wedo abouttheoriginsof than the universe,more aboutthe causesand processes socialrevolutionthan about of the formation galaxies the transition of or frominorganic organic, to moreaboutthe dialecticof social structureand human agencythan aboutthe paradoxof waveparticleduality.For a generalanalytical discussion, theimportantessay Fritz see by Machlup,'Are the SocialScienceReally Inferior?' (1963). 4. One is reminded here of Marx's famousand - in lightof currenttrendsprescientremarkin The GermanIdeology: 'We know only a single science, the scienceof history.History be contemcan plated from two sides, it can be divided into the historyof natureand the history of mankind.However,the two sides are not to be dividedoff; as longas menexist, the historyof natureand the historyof men are mutually conditioned'. The trend I am referringto of course is the recent surge of interest in non-linear dynamics,systemturbulence,hysteresis effects, and contingenciesthat is subsumed under the general heading of 'chaostheory',and extendsfrom physics to biology and beyond. This broad intellectualcurrentcan perhapsbest be characterized 'bringingHistoryback as in'to the natural sciences. 5. The conventionalimage that historians confront a chronic dearth of materials let it be noted, typicallyfar is, from the actualities problem-centred of research. To be sure, extensive 'dark ages'anddimlyillumined aspects social of life precludeany comprehensive reconstruction, but the sheer volume and varietyof materialsbequeathedby the past is not only unassimilableby the historical profession, but even most specialists it difficultto mastermore find thanselectedareasin theirfields.Not 'too little data', but 'too few fellow-workers and too little time' is a more realistic characterization the historian's of plight. Goldthorpe appearsto havebeenunduly influenced here by the partisandero-

JosephM. Bryant
gation of mainstream historiography offeredbyquantitative 'cliometricians'. 6. Whilemodernsociology undoubtedlyenjoysadvantages research in design andsampling theory,practice usually in is less impressive. The followingdatum is particularly worth noting, for it bears directlyon many of the most basicand important of sociological questions. Whereas historians are typically constrainedto workwith artifacts and literarydocuments derivefromthe comthat mandsand reflectionsof the privileged and powerful,i.e., thosewhoseresources enabledthem to dominatethe mediaof cultural expression(andso the 'historical record');surveyresearchers usually are hamperedby the oppositeproblem,that of gaining access to the commanding heightsof their societies,withthe consequencethatrandomsamples 'ordinary' of respondents loom disproportionately large in most sociologicalprojects. If power is at all relevantto socialreality, then 'selective access' wouldseem to be a rathermoreconsequential problemthan 'selectivedeposit'. The broad push to rewrite'history frombelow'by attending to the marginalized expressions disand courseof variousdisprivileged groupsthe lower classes, women, religious or ethnicminorities, conquered the the and colonized isof courseintendedto complement and correct the perspectival/ ideologicalbiasesof more conventional sources. 7. Forthose who wouldquestionmy use of the term'immediate' - on the here ground that the analystmust interpret the meaningand significance the hisof torical object,thereby creating 'mediated' information-the point I am trying to make is that 'relics'are aspects of the natural environment of past social worlds,unlikethe artificially-induced responses of survey research (which of coursealso requireinterpretation!). Historical interpretations, other words, in are interpretationsof objectifications; sociological interpretations survey of data are one-step removed, being interpretationsof the respondent's subjective interpretations commonly'forced'into pre-selectedcategories- of his or her actionsand orientations.

Evidence explanation history sociology and in and


8. As documented the classic in study by Eugene Webb, et al., Unobtrusive Measures:'Interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would describe,they createas well as measureattitudes,they elicit atypicalroles and responses,they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate, and the responses obtainedare producedin partby dimensionsof individual differencesirrelevant to the topic at hand' (1966:1). A thorough review of these and related problemsinvolvedcan also be found in AaronCicourel,Methodand Measurement in Sociology (1964).See also PierreBourdieu, Jean-ClaudeChamboredon,and Jean-ClaudePasserson,The Craft of Sociology:
(1991).

17

Epistemological Preliminartes

9. See, most famously, C. Wright Mills'critiqueof 'abstracted empiricism' and the attendantdangersof 'psychologism',i.e., 'the tendencyto reducesociologicalrealities psychological to variables, chapter 3 in The SociologicalImagination (1959).TheodorAdorno's 'Sociology and Empirical Research' (1976),likewiseemphasizes the 'epiphenomenal subjectivism' the surveyand its inattention of to determinant structural relations.To this one should add FernandBraudel'srepeatedinsistenceon the limitedpurview of contemporaries,i.e., the fact that because actors are bound up in the immediate, the flux of the short-term, in 'livingworlds'are to some extent 'blind worlds', unaware of deeper historical currents and enveloping structuralrealities.See especiallythe essayscollected in On Htstoo (1980). For a discussionof the exigenciesof field research,consult HowardS. Becker(1970). 10. Andthatqualification holdsevenif one assumes that problemsconcerning the stability univocity meaningin and of bothquestions repliescanbe reasonand ably managed - a large assumption indeed! As Cicourelnotes, the problems of interaction effects alone are such that the survey instrument might best be limited to 'providingsimple descriptive material a non-threatening froma of type large sample of individualsfor some practical purpose' (1964:115). That

survey-basedresearch has not to date yielded the 'science' its proponents prophesied, see Christopher G. A. Bryant (1985); and Peter Manicas (1987). 11. Someone checking off responseboxes on a questionnaire hardly 'enis gaged' in the way an individualis, say, when composinga poem, a diary, or a theological tract. To assume that the 'documentary'value of the survey is superiorto the latterentailsquite a leap of faith, and certainlyconfirmsthe suspicion that far too much sociology is drivenby methodological expediency. 12. Mills(1959:70). Cicourel's Method and Measurement providesa detailedaccount of these intrusive'contamination' effects and the attending problemsof artificiality. wouldbe difficultto chalIt lenge his summary observation:'The correspondence between the hypothetical world inferred from questionnaire items and actual behaviorof the actor remainsan open empiricalproblem' (1964:113). Or with Bourdieu, et al., thatthe 'classic techniques empiriof cal sociology are condemned by their very nature to create situationsof fictitious experimentationessentiallydifferent from the socialexperimentations that are constantlyproducedin the unfolding of social life' ( 1991:43). All things considered, extrapolatingfrom 'survey-invented' materialsto the real world of situationalcontingenciesand emergentprocessesis perhapsmore 'inferential'than extrapolatingfrom 'discovered relics'that do not entail corresponding researcher-respondent
. .

nteractlon.

13. These points, though obvious, need continual restating, because sociologyas a disciplinehas long cultivated a systematicdisregardfor temporality, largely as a consequence of the misguided effort to imitatenomotheticsciences like physicsand so gain distance from allegedlyidiographic inferiorslike historiography. examinethe disastrous I falloutof thisenduringlegacyin 'Positivism Redivivt4s?' (1992a),and reply to attending commentsby Steve Fuller and JonathanTurner in 'Towards respecta able, reflexive, scientific sociology: A

18 note on the reformation required' (1992b). 14. Theoreticalattentionto the 'temporalstructure everyday is one of of life' the virtuesof PeterBergerand Thomas Luckmann'sThe Social Constructionof Reality.As they note: 'Temporality an is intrinsicpropertyof consciousness. The stream consciousness always of is ordered temporally . . All of my existencein this . worldis continuously orderedby its time, is indeed envelopedby it' (1967:26-7). Humanagency,in otherwords,is fundamentally time-referential, the consewith quence that social actions are to be understood not as episodic events or discrete occurrences, but as complex durationalprocesses, constitutivelyinformed by past, present, and future temporal considerations. 15. The law of entropy, in other words, non-operative the domainof is in social-historical phenomena: certain events

JosephM. Bryant

'strategicconcealments' characteristic is of all 'publicscience'.The information gap between research-as-practiced and research-as-presented of course paris tlCU y pernlclousln SOCIO ogy, glven ar our fundamental disagreements over methodological procedure. 18. This epistlewasauthoredby Cornelius,the beleagured bishopof Rome,in A.D.251, and is preservedin Eusebius's Ecclesiastical Histoo, VI.43.5-11. 19. The content-ratio reportageto of interpretation varies considerably, in works of historiography well as in as works of grand historical sociology. Whenever that ratiois low, groundsfor uneaserise appreciably. One expedient thatreadilysuggestitself is for historical sociologists include detailed appento diceson sourcematerials, discussingthe secondaryliteratureand the kinds of primary contained data therein. 20. More fundamentally,works of anddevelopments 'pivotal'in that they scholarly are synthesis forman indispensable deczsively the arc of histortcal alter possibility, component within every branchof scithereby continuing 'condition' subsequent ence,and to insist to all upon contact with developments. distinctivepatternsof The primary for allresearch to endorse data is interfacebetween 'religion' and 'civil the fallacies crudeempiricism. of Science society' Christianand Islamicciviliz- is, in afterall,a collaborative enterprise. ations, example,reflects enduring for the 21. Skocpol"s Visionand Method(1984) or 'reverberative' thatthe founderof fact isa convenient place to start, for in the earlierfaithwascrucified a hostile addition the by to informativecriticalrestate power,whereasthe prophetof the viewsof several distinguished praclatter conqueredall before him, success- titioners, bibliographicreferences are fully fusingspiritual temporal and power extensive and include citations of the from outset. the major debates. 16. AndrewAbbott's seriesof articles (1988; 1990; 1992) which expose the limitations the 'variable of paradigm' in BIBLIOGRAPHY mainstream quantitative research addresses these issues in a highly original Abbott, Andrew 1988 'Transcending manner, with the aim of developing GeneralLinear Reality', Sociological generalizable, formalnarrative methods. Theoty 6 (Fall):169- 186. Particularly relevantin this regardis his Abbott, Andrew 1990 'Conceptionsof demonstration that time-series and Time and Events in Social Science event-history methodsdo not adequately Methods', Historical Methods 14>50. 23: solve problemsof context and temthe Abbott, Andrew 1992 'FromCauses to porality, they are rendered compuas Events: Notes on NarrativePositivism', tationally unworkable once they attempt SociologicalMethods and Research to advancebeyondontologically 'simpli20(4): 428-55. fied' cases, i.e., rudimentarynarrative Adorno, Theodore 1976 'Sociology and 'stages' focusing on only one or two Empirical Research', pp.6v86 in variables. Adorno, al. The Positivist Dispute in et 17. Let it be noted, however, that German Sociology,translated G. Adey by recourse to 'sanitizing abridgements' and and Frisby, D. NewYork:Harper&Row.
. . . . . .

Evidence explanation history sociology and in and


Becker, Howard 1970 Sociologzcal Work: Method Substance, arul Chicago: Aldine. Berger, Peter and T. Luckmann 1967 The Social Construction Reality, New York: of Anchor Books. Bloch, Marc 1953 The Historian'sCraft, translated by P. Putnam, New York: Vintage Books. Bourdieu, Pierre et al. l 991 The Craftof Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries, translated by R. Nice, New York: Walter de Gruyter. Braudel, Fernand 1980 On Hzstoo, translated by S. Matthews, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bryant, Christopher G. A. (1985) Positivismin Social Theoo and Research, London: Macmillan. Bryant, Joseph M. 1992a. 'Positivism Redivivus?',Canaduzn Journal of Sociology 17(1): 29-53. Bryant, Joseph M. 1992b 'Towards a respectable, reflexive, scientific sociology: A note on the reformation required', CanadianJournal of Sociology17(3): 32231. Cicourel, Aaron 1964 Method and Measurement Sociology, in New York: The Free Press.

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Goldthorpe, John H. 1991 'The uses of history in sociology: reflections on some recent tendencies', British Journalof Sociology 42(2): 211-30. Machlup, Frits 1963 'Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?', pp.15v80, in M. Natanson (ed.) Philosophy theSocial of Sciences, York: Random House. New Manicas, Peter 1987 A HistooandPhilosophyof the SocialSciences, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mills, C. Wright 1959 The Sociological Imagination, York: Oxford UniverNew sity Press. Platt, Jennifer 1981 'Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research', Sociological Review 29(1): 3146. Rock, Paul 1976 'Some problems of interpretive historiography', British JournalofSociology 27(3): 35349. Skocpol, Theda (ed.) 1984 Visionand Method Historical in Sociology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles 1981 As Sociology Meets Histoty, York: Academic Press. New Webb, Eugene, et al. 1966 Unobtrusive Measures, Chicago: Rand McNally and
Co.

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