Section 1 Legislative Power

Banda Vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010 Is the issuance of EO 378 an invalid exercise of legislative power? No. In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a self-reliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison28 that: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Emphasis ours.)

Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. ***If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,29 we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.30 Lokin Vs. Comelec, G.R. 179431-32, June 30, 2010 Is there unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules? The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25 Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26 The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating

IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27 To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:28 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable. The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30 The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft

additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33 Francisco Vs. TRB, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010 Can Congress delegate its franchising power and prerogative? Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress. ] The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than accurate. As stressed in Albano v. Reyes a case decided under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution there is nothing in the Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may operate, thus: That the Constitution provides x x x that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply x x x that only Congress has the power to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified agencies in the Executive Branch the power to issue such authorization for certain classes of public utilities. (Emphasis ours.) In such a case, therefore, a special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract. This is the same view espoused by the Secretary of Justice in his opinion dated January 9, 2006, when he stated: That the administrative agencies may be vested with the authority to grant administrative franchises or concessions over the operation of public utilities under their respective jurisdiction and regulation, without need of the grant of a separate legislative franchise, has been upheld by the Supreme Court x x x. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative

authority, under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative agencies. In Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., We explained the reason for the validity of subordinate legislation, thus: Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. (Emphasis ours.) Biraogo vs. Phil Truth Com. 2010, G.R. No. 192935 & 193036, Dec to creat. 7, 2010 Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress empowering the President to create a public office? Is EO No. 1, creating the Phil Truth Commission, violatative of the legislative power of Congress? While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the President s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52 x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executive s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the

performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Note: EO 1 was struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. Pimentel Vs. Senate, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011 Will the invocation of the doctrine of separation of powers preclude the Supreme Court from resolving the legal issues of a petition? Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice."16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled: x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a

remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18 The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.19 As regards respondent s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."20 Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

SECTION 5 COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPS

BANAT Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009 Must Congress enact a law to increase the total number of legislative districts? Does the principle of proportional representation apply to the party-list system? Article VI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides: Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system4 of representation by allowing different sectors, parties, organizations and coalitions to win a legislative seat. It diversifies the membership in the

legislature and "gives genuine power to the people."5 As aforesaid, the Constitution desires the people s widest representation in Congress. The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Aquino Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Is the 250 thousand population requirement applicable to both the province and the city? There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a

representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26 The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.

SECTION 13 DISQUALIFICATION
Liban Vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat? The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the

Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers. Liban Vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, Jan. 18, 2011 By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate seat? The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in general having larger resources than the Societies, working towards comparable ends in a given sector. x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government s humanitarian partner while remaining independent. (Emphases ours.) It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the government s humanitarian

partner. To be recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner. However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private and profit-making entities. It is the main characteristic of National Societies that they are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to the Community. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a caseto-case basis.

SECTION 17 ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Vilando Vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23, 2011 Can the HRET look into the eligibility of Limkaichong even if, as an incident thereto, it would mean looking into the validity of the certificate of naturalization? True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its

Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus: Rule 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination: xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father - Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office. Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

SECTION 18 COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Madrigal Vs. Villar, G.R. No. 183055, July 31, 2009 Can a Senator challenge before the Supreme Court that she was denied proportional representation with the Commission on Appointments? Senator Madrigal s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court.40 Senator Villar s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken, as is the following observation of Speaker Nograles, citing Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:41 In order that the remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of, there must be "no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law".

It is worth recalling that, in the 11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel advocated the allocation of a position in the Commission on Appointments for the Party-List Representatives. Just like the Petitioner in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first wrote to the Senate President, requesting that the Commission on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional provision on proportional representation. xxx Without awaiting final determination of the question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court. In the said case, the Honorable Court ruled: "The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber s respective electoral tribunal. xxxx Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioner s direct recourse to this Court is premature.

SECTION 23 CONGRESS IN TIMES OF WAR AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Ampatuan Vs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011 Was the President s exercise of emergency powers pursuant to Proclamation 1946 violative of Section 23, Art. VI of the Constitution? Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. which provides. SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

SECTION 24 & 25: APPROPRIATIONS BILL

REVENUE

AND

Sanchez Vs. COA, G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008 What are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation may be allowed? Are those present in this case? Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and the heads of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the

Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the realignment (of savings). However, [B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made. The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the profligate spending thereof. With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor proof that the amount transferred was savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer was made. Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was not in accordance with the purposes laid down by the Special Provisions of R.A. 7180. Biraogo Vs. PTC, 2010, G.R. No. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010 Does EO No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office? On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission." Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

The Court has refused in the past to subject to heightened scrutiny presidential certifications on the urgency of the passage of legislative measures. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, petitioners in that case questioned the sufficiency of the President s certification of a growing budget deficit as basis for the urgent passage of revenue measures, claiming that this does not amount to a public calamity or emergency. The Court declined to strike down the President s certification upon a showing that members of both Houses of Congress had the opportunity to study the bills and no fundamental constitutional rights were at hazard : It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a growing budget deficit not being an unusual condition in this country. It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President s certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. (Emphasis supplied) As in Tolentino, Congress, in passing RA 10153, found sufficient the factual bases for President Aquino s certification of HB 4146 and SB 2756 as emergency measures. Petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 do not allege, and there is nothing on record to show, that members of Congress were denied the opportunity to examine HB 4146 and SB 2756 because of the President s certification. There is thus no basis to depart from Tolentino.

SECTIONS 26 & 27 LEGISLATIVE MILL

Kida Vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011 Did the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution?

SECTIONS 28 THE POWER OF TAXATION

Fortune Tobacco Vs. CIR, G.R. No. 180006, September 28, 2011 What is the rule of uniformity in taxation? Does Section 1, RR17-99 violate the rule of uniformity of taxation? The Constitution requires that taxation should be uniform and equitable. Uniformity in taxation requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. This requirement, however, is unwittingly violated when the proviso in Section 1 of RR 17-99 is applied in certain cases. To illustrate this point, we consider three brands of cigarettes, all classified as lower-priced cigarettes under Section 145(c)(4) of the 1997 Tax Code, since their net retail price is below P5.00 per pack: (D) (A) Net Retail Price per pack (E) New New Specific Specific Ad Specific Tax Specific Tax Due Valorem Tax Due imposing Tax under by Jan Tax Due Jan 1997 12% Section 2000 per prior to to Dec increase 145(C)(4) RR 17-99 Jan 1997 1999 by Jan 2000 5.50 1.00/pack 5.50 1.12/pack 5.50 3.30 1.00/pack 3.30 1.12/pack 3.30 (B) 1.09 1.00/pack 1.09 1.12/pack 1.12 (C) In the process, the CIR also perpetuated the unequal tax treatment of similar goods that was supposed to be cured by the shift from ad valorem to specific taxes. Diaz Vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 193007, July 19, 2011 Is a toll fee a user s tax so that to impose VAT on toll fees is tantamount to taxing a tax? In sum, fees paid by the public to tollway operators for use of the tollways, are not taxes in any sense. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are collected by private tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the construction, maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well as to assure them a reasonable margin of income. Although toll fees are charged for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax. Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership. Parenthetically, VAT on tollway operations cannot be deemed a tax on tax due to the nature of VAT as an indirect tax. In indirect taxation, a distinction is made between the liability for the tax and burden of the tax. The seller who is liable for the VAT may shift or pass on the amount of VAT it paid on goods, properties or services to the buyer. In such a case, what is transferred is not the seller s liability but merely the burden of the VAT. Thus, the seller remains directly and legally liable for payment of the VAT, but the buyer bears its burden since the amount of VAT paid by the former is added to the selling price. Once shifted, the VAT ceases to be a tax and simply becomes part of the cost that the buyer must pay in order to purchase the good, property or service. Consequently, VAT on tollway operations is not really a tax on the tollway user, but on the tollway operator. Under Section 105 of the Code, VAT is imposed on any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells or renders services for a fee. In other words, the seller of services, who in this case is the tollway operator, is the person liable for VAT. The latter merely shifts the burden of VAT to the tollway user as part of the toll fees. For this reason, VAT on tollway operations cannot be a tax on tax even if toll fees were deemed as a user s tax. VAT is assessed against the tollway operator s gross receipts and not necessarily on the toll fees. Although the

Brand

Camel KS 4.71 Champion 4.56 M 100 Union 4.64 American Blend

Although the brands all belong to the same category, the proviso in Section 1, RR 17-99 authorized the imposition of different (and grossly disproportionate) tax rates (see column [D]). It effectively extended the qualification stated in the third paragraph of Section 145(c) of the 1997 Tax Code that was supposed to apply only during the transition period: The excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each brand on October 1, 1996[.]

tollway operator may shift the VAT burden to the tollway user, it will not make the latter directly liable for the VAT. The shifted VAT burden simply becomes part of the toll fees that one has to pay in order to use the tollways.