Analysis

January 5, 2012

Summary: When the French National Assembly approved a bill that stipulates that those who deny the occurrence of an event accepted as genocide by the French parliament will be penalized with up to one year in prison and up to 45,000 in fines, it touched off a flurry of activity in Turkish-French relations, which reached a new low point. While the excitement appears to have died down now, how much lasting damage the relationship has suffered can only be assessed over a longer period. It appears unlikely that the bill that has cleared the French National Assembly will become law before the French parliament goes on presidential election recess at the end of February. Yet the issue of Western allegations of an Armenian genocide will haunt Turkeys relations with other countries.

Legislating History and its Effects on Foreign Policy

by lter Turan

December is generally perceived to be a month where political activity tends to slow down as first Christmas and then the New Year arrives in Europe. Yet this year, it was characterized by an unusual flurry of activity in TurkishFrench relations, which reached a new low point. While the excitement appears to have died down now, how much lasting damage the relationship has suffered can only be assessed over a longer period. Turkish-French Relations Hit a New Low The event that triggered the quarrel is the approval of a bill in the French National Assembly, the lower chamber of the French legislature. The bill stipulates that those who deny the occurrence of an event accepted as genocide by the French parliament will be penalized with up to one year in prison and up to 45,000 in fines. Since the French parliament has already declared as genocide the events of 1915 regarding the forced migration of Armenians from Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, during which thousands died from hunger, disease, and under the attacks of bandits, there was little doubt about who the action targeted.

Offices Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels BelgraDe ankara BuCharest WarsaW

Although technically the parliamentary action was not initiated by the French government but took the form of a bill submitted by a deputy, the Turkish government believed that the process was initiated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy who, a few months prior, had traveled to Armenia, and, holding hands with the Armenian president, promised that he would have such a bill enacted into law before his term ended. Sarkozy did nothing to stop the deputy from his own party from submitting the bill, despite appeals from Turkish political leaders that its passage would have serious consequences for bilateral relations. Further, he refused to communicate with Turkish political leaders, declining a request from the Turkish president to have a telephone conversation. It also seems that Sarkozy ignored the advice of several leading members of his government, most notably that of his experienced foreign minister, Alain Jupp, who advised that relations with Turkey were critical and that it was not a good idea to go on with a project that would clearly arouse the wrath of the Turkish government and people. The bill was accepted in the lower house by a show of hands in a session

Analysis
where only about 50 deputies were present, out of 577. Thirty-eight voted for the bill. The government was not represented by a minister with portfolio but by the presidents minister for parliamentary liaison. Those who took the floor were at pains to tell that their motives were all noble and did not aim to insult Turkey, but they added that Turkey should be willing to face its past. It also so happened that many, including Valerie Boyer, the deputy who introduced the bill, had significant numbers of French-Armenians in their constituencies. Turkish reaction was quick and strong. The Turkish government called its ambassador in Paris. Prime Minister Recep Teyyip Erdoan announced that three sets of measures would be put consecutively into effect depending on how the bill fared in the French Senate and whether it was signed into law. The first step, in addition to recalling of the ambassador, included the suspension of a package of authorized flights over Turkey by French military aircraft (rendering it necessary that advance approval be obtained for each individual flight), suspension of joint military exercises, suspension of future partnerships with France in EU projects, suspension of cultural programs, and ending political consultations. These measures were introduced in an atmosphere of emotional frenzy where the prime minister reminded the French of the genocidal acts that they had committed in Algeria and Rwanda as well as toward its own citizens of Islamic faith in France, announcing that Turkey would work around the world to publicize these French misdeeds. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu joined the debate by explaining that rendering a crime the opinions people may have about particular events whose nature were yet to be determined by scholars, was a infringement of the freedom of expression that would put France into a category of authoritarian states like Muamar Gaddafis Libya or Saddam Husseins Iraq. Everyone agreed that for populist politics to cater to a small minority of French citizens, ostensibly for electoral gain, was poor politics, which would inflict higher costs on its perpetrators in the long run even if it might offer some short-term gains. The Turkish public was, for the most part, equally incensed. People talked about initiating a boycott of French goods. Some suggested that Turkish airlines should cancel any orders of Airbus planes. Others said that nobody should

Everyone agreed that for populist politics to cater to a small minority of French citizens, ostensibly for electoral gain, was poor politics.
travel to France. Hackers invaded the websites of French politicians, some sending threatening, insulting letters. Gradually, the emotions have subsided. A process of damage control has begun. The Turkish government has explained that while they reject Sarkozys politics, they have warm feelings and the highest regard for the French people. The minister for external trade has emphasized that French investments in Turkey continue to be welcome and are assured of protection. He added that the existing Frenchowned establishments should be seen as Turkish companies. The Background to the Worsening of TurkishFrench Relations Most Turks believe that Sarkozys motive for tacit support of the bill was simply to insure himself of French-Armenian votes in a presidential race in the late spring, which everyone expects will be tight. Since Turkey does not have effective constituencies in France, Sarkozy may have felt that this would be an easy way to improve his electoral chances. Some reports have suggested that the French government was surprised by both the unusually strong Turkish reaction and the critical debate that has ensued in France itself. While Sarkozys electoral concerns may explain the timing and the content of the proposed legislation, it should be noted that the incident constituted a new low point in the already declining Turkish-French relationship. Why the decline? We may begin by noting that ever since the ascent of Nikolas Sarkozy to the French presidency, the bilateral relationship has come under strain. The French president has made no secret of the fact that he does not want Turkey in the European Union. He has defended his choice by arguing that Turks do not belong in Europe because their culture is not within the European tradition (i.e. Turks are not Christians) and that Turkey is geographically not in Europe. To stop the progress of Turkeys acces-

Analysis
sion negotiations to the European Union, he has chosen five chapters as being directly linked with membership (as if the others were not) and has said that France will not allow the opening of negotiations on those chapters. Sarkozy has not limited his opposition to Turkeys membership in the European Union as a question of foreign policy; he has also chosen to display his lack of warmth toward to Turkey by personal gestures. For example, during the visit of the Turkish President Abdullah Gl in late 2010 to France on the occasion of the Turkey Year in France (programmed before Sarkozys presidency), he spent a total of five minutes with Gl and chewed gum as the two exchanged words of courtesy. People close to him acknowledge that he has a personal dislike of the country and its people. Why this is the case is a matter of conjecture but that it affects how the president formulates Frances foreign policy is evident. It would be less than persuasive, however, to argue that the French policy toward Turkey is no more than a reflection of the cultural and psychological dispositions of its president. A judgment shared in other European Union member countries is that Turkey is too big and would constitute a undefeatable challenge to the capacity of the union to expand when problems of absorption of smaller countries like Bulgaria and Romania have already proven difficult. In the case of France, there is a further reason, apparently pronounced to some Turkish political leaders by French bureaucrats behind closed doors, that the French would not allow the admission of such a large member as Turkey into the Union because it would pose a serious challenge to the dominant position France enjoys at the moment. For example, Turkey would have more members in the European Parliament than France. But more importantly, if Turkey were to accede to membership, the continuation of the EU as a Franco-German condominium could no longer be sustainable. Finally, France and Turkey appear to have a competitive relationship in the Middle East. The rising activism of Turkish foreign policy in the region has not been welcome by France, which perceives the area more as a region where its leadership should prevail. Such competition had already become manifest in Libya and Syria, where France displayed a distinct reluctance for the inclusion of Turkey in helping address problems deriving from domestic demands for political change. Under such circumstances, some observers have suggested that Sarkozys choice of an issue about which Turks are exceptionally sensitive may have been a calculated act. Anticipating excessive Turkish reactions, the French president may have felt that he would find new material for arguing that Turkey does not belong in Europe. But why are the Turks so sensitive? Historical Legacy Out of Context Turkish sensitivities about allegations of genocide derive in part from not knowing enough about a period of their history, which includes difficult pages, but also in part from a deeply felt sense of injustice about such allegations. The lack of sufficient knowledge about the events of 1915 and a few other incidents has been the outcome of a deliberate government policy to not discuss these old pages, to teach it to the new generations, or even, until recently, to make documents available. As Turkey has become a more open society, and as its interactions with other members of the community of democratic nations have intensified, Turks are becoming more familiar with darker incidents in their history. Therefore sensitivities of unfamiliarity are likely to decline rapidly in importance in time. The sense of injustice about such allegations, on the other hand, runs deep and is closely tied in with Turkeys historical experience including its relations with Western European countries and the United States. The multi-national Ottoman Empire experienced continual decline and dismemberment during the 19th century. Typically, a nationality concentrated in a particular geographical region would make common cause with one or more Western imperialist powers to break away from the Empire and become independent. Feeling insecure, these new states turned to the

Some observers have suggested that Sarkozys choice of an issue about which Turks are exceptionally sensitive may have been a calculated act.

Analysis
ethnic cleansing of Turks and other Muslims populations to achieve greater ethnic homogeneity. Both massacres and forced migration were employed. No one expressed sympathy or understanding to those suffering at the time. Drive the Turk back to Asia where he came from was then the prevailing motto. The First World War presented the Ottoman Empire with an existential threat. Armenian nationalists made common cause with the Russians advancing into the Turco-Muslim heartland of the Empire. As Armenian soldiers and irregulars progressed, trying to cleanse the territory of Muslims, the Ottoman government turned to a policy of forced migration at great cost to civilian populations. Many Turks are aware that their kin did horrible things. But they also feel that this was a settling of accounts among the various nationalities that comprised the empire, each nationality committing horrible deeds against the other in which Turks were also often targets. Therefore, they judge that singling out the Turks and one event is unjust and prejudicial. They find it even more disturbing that many more recent manifestations of conflict that may meet the conditions depicted in the 1948 Treaty on Genocide are ignored while they are made a target. Difficult Times Ahead It appears unlikely that the bill that has cleared the French National Assembly will become law before the French parliament goes on presidential election recess at the end of February. France and Turkey, with so many interests in common, will probably manage to patch up their relationship, certainly more easily if Sarkozy is not re-elected. Yet the issue of Western allegations of an Armenian genocide will haunt Turkeys relations with other countries. It is only too well known that the issue frequently comes before the U.S. Congress, and each time it does, U.S.-Turkish relations come under strain. It is possible the issue will pop up in other parliaments as well. It is not clear that such symbolic activity will modify Turkish thinking on the matter; it is more likely that it will undermine trust in its Atlantic and European allies and promote the go it alone or look for other friends proclivities in Turkish foreign policy. It may be better, as Turkish political leadership has frequently stressed, to let the academics debate the matter and for parliaments not to legislate history. This may also give relief to Turks and allow them to reflect on the problematic pages in their history.

About the Author

lter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbuls Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His previous employment included professorships at Ko University (1993-1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the chair of the International Relations Department (19871993), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East (1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Committee and a vice president of the International Political Science Association (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members, and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish politics on TV and newspapers.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www. gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database. gmfus.org/reaction.