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ORF Discourse
Vol.2 No.3 March 2007 Published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Contemporary Conicts in Jammu & Kashmir

Summary of an interaction organised by the Chennai Chapter of ORF he internal dynamics of Jammu and Kashmir have assumed signicance in the context of the ongoing India-Pakistan normalisation process, on the one hand, and the Centres continuing efforts at peacebuilding with non-militant political groups in the State, on the other. Often, efforts aimed at understanding the complexities of the issues are bogged down by the past, or are conned to the Indian angle. There is very little reference to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), including the Northern Areas, even in discussions inside India. An acceptable solution on all fronts would require a broader and deeper study of the current realities, which at times are vastly at variance with the limited understanding in some circles. The Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF-C) organised an Interaction on the Contemporary Conicts in Jammu and Kashmir on February 15, 2007, where the discussants focussed on the prevailing situation on both sides of the border, with added focus on PoK.

Dr Suba Chandran
Much of the discussion on the conicts in Jammu and Kashmir has focussed mainly on conict in the Kashmir Valley in India. With Pakistan President Pervez Musharaff coming out with fresh ideas on solving the Kashmir issue, other related conicts also need to be taken into account. There is a lot of discussion in and about the three regions in the Indian border-State, namely, Jammu,

Kashmir Valley and Ladakh, but what happens in PoK, which Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir and comprising PoK proper and Northern Areas, never comes into the picture especially with a series of conicts going on there, almost constantly. The people Northern Areas are citizens of neither PoK, nor Pakistan. They have no constitutional status, or fundamental rights and no government, either. The six districts comprising the Northern Areas are governed directly by Islamabad through the Northern Areas Legislative Council with 36 members 24 elected and 12 nominated. The Council has no power worth the name, and the region is governed by KANA, or the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs-Northern Areas in Islamabad, with a Minister and a Secretary. With all but Asthod district (98 per cent Sunni) having majority Shia population, sectarian violence has claimed human lives, destroyed property and disrupted normal life over the past couple of years. There are reasons to believe that Pakistan has been sponsoring the same as a deliberate policy for largely strategic reasons the Karakoram Highway, and water-supply for Islamabad from the North-West Frontier Province (NFWP) pass through. From Gwadar to Kashgar, in Singkiang, the Karakoram Highway passes through Shia-dominated areas, mainly Gilgit. The Chinese have been investing a lot in the Northern Areas and the Karakoram Highway, which they aim at making a trouble-free highway. While the bus service between Jammu and Kashmir and PoK is being

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talked about, there is hardly any focus on the bus service between Kashgar and Gilgit, which started in June 2006. Because of the shared strategic interest of the Chinese and the Pakistanis in the Karakoram Highway, they do not entertain Shia dominance in those areas. With 60 per cent Shia population, Gilgit is a major transit-point, and the Pakistan Government wants the sectarian-composition changed in favour of the minority Sunni community, among which is included Sunni Pushtun. Reservoirs constitute another source of problem, with the people of Northern Areas and NWFP quarrelling over the royalty for the Basha-Diamer hydro-electric project. The reservoir across the Basha river is located in the Northern Areas but the turbines are located at Diamer in NWFP. Local rules provide for the royalty going to NWFP but the people displaced by the reservoir are located in the Northern Areas. It is emerging into an armed struggle against Islamabad, which Pakistan does not want, leading to more sectarian violence. There are manifold problems in PoK proper. There is a total emasculation of political representation and the peoples bargaining power vis a vis Islamabad. There are two major parties, one is the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its offshoot and the Muslim Congress, with the latter being in power for long. Compared to the rest of Pakistan, where provincial Assemblies have never completed their term since 1947, the PoK Assembly did complete the veyear term the last three times round. It is forced stability but it does not mean democracy or representation. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), for instance, has never contested the election because of refusal to le a declaration, agreeing to PoK merging with Pakistan. The second conict, pertaining to developments after the 2005 earthquake, is signicant to India but has not got the importance it deserves. The earthquake destroyed all school buildings in Muzaffarabad and Bagh district, and accounted for the death of most teachers. Thousands of children have no schools to go to, other than the tentschools sponsored by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and those run by the madrasas. It was the madrasa-trained Afghan refugees who made up the Taliban cadres in the Nineties, and there is every possibility that unlike the liberal Islam being practised in the PoK, those coming out of these schools could have a Wahabbi inuence. This is the rst point. The second point is that thanks to the quake-relief made available by international agencies, the fund position of jihadi organisations has shot up in recent months. There were reports in October-November that some quake-relief funds coming from the UK, Canada and Europe were diverted back to London, for terrorist activities in the UK. This has not been proved, but nor has the UK rebutted the reports in any serious way. The third important jihadi-centric issue pertains to the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba, though not to the Hizbul Mujahideen. The Lashkar and the Jaish are mostly from Punjab, and the Punjabis and Sindhis are not known for their respect for women. The harassment of women, particularly sexual harassment, had put the jihadis in negative light in PoK but their quake-relief work helped them retrieve it to some extent. Against it, the Hizbul is still a militant force, and cannot be called jihadi.

Not Much in Common

In Jammu and Kashmir, despite the increasing militancy of the past 15 years, there is a considerable Hindu population in the Jammu region, which comprises Jammu, Rajouri and Poonch districts, with their own traits and languages. Dogri is the more popular language in Jammu district, while it is Pahadi in Rajouri and Poonch. They do not have much in common with the Kashmiri-speaking ethnic Kashmiris, and are a mixed group of Gujjars, Pahadis, Bakarwals, Hindus and Sikhs. The Wazwan style of cuisine, for which Kashmir is famous, is not heard of in Rajouri and Poonch. It is still the traditional rajmachawaal here. The presence of PoK refugees in the region has the potential to escalate into a burning issue. Poonch in particular is one of the most underdeveloped districts in the country. The 250-km road from Jammu is pathetic, the telephone lines are defunct, and internet connection available only in the District Commissioners ofce. Top police brass in the district have to depend on the communication lines of the armed forces for staying in touch with their superiors. In comparison, the roads, for instance, are absolutely marvellous in the Kashmir Valley. There is thus discontent in Rajouri and Poonch about governmental indifference despite their continuing support for ghting militancy. There is a clear message: Do not to take the local population for granted. An additional angle has been added by the Congress-led State Government conferring Scheduled Tribes status on the Gujjars, who are Muslims and traditional supporters of the Opposition National Conference. There is now a demand from the Pahadis, who are traditional Congress supporters, for ST status, but the Gujjars, it is said, are against governmental initiatives that would result in an all-round upward mobility of the kind. This Gujjar-Pahadi politics and the Gujjar-Pahadi dynamics has the potential for big trouble in the next couple of years. On the positive side, militancy has considerably reduced in the Poonch region over the last three years. Today, there are not more than 40-50 militants operating in the Rajouri-Poonch region, of whom three-fourths are

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Pakistanis belonging to either the Lashkar or the Jaish. There is absolutely no support for the Hizbul Mujahideen, the so-called Kashmiri Muslims organisation of Jammu and Kashmir. The decision of the local Hindus and Sikhs to withstand militancyunlike their Pundit counterparts in Jammu district who migratedand the consequent inevitability of continuing interaction is among the reasons for the declining militancy. The presence of a heterogeneous community has ensured that militants cannot move between scattered houses in these villages without being sighted and reported. However, there is no ofcial mechanism to systematically tap into this inherent strength. Many changes have been taking place in the politics of Kashmir Valley over the past ve years. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which shares power with the Congress, does not want the latter to register any political gain. Whatever may be the problem that the Congress party has, whatever may be the current Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azads background and initiative, even his critics say he is a clean leader. The PDP seemingly does not want Azad to build up on his image. The PDP is thus seen as working with the Hizbul Mujahideen militants, but no one wants to acknowledge it, or discuss it. There are reports of the Hizbul breaking up, and at the level of commanders, whose casualty gures are the highest for any militant outt in the region. This is not a good sign as the Hizbul is still a militant, and not jihadi group, whose exit could create a vacuum. The Lashkar has already taken up armed conict in the Valley, and the 2000-odd mosques on the Jammu-Srinagar Highway that did not merit a second look in the past, have been transformed into the colourful Wahabbi, Saudi-style mosques, demanding attention. Where did the money come from? Who is funding it? Related developments also need to be watched. The politics of the madrasas attached to these mosques, and the mechanics of their operations are aimed at inuencing the thought and action in the Valley. The Dukhtaran-eMillat, DeM, (Daughters of the Faith), led by its founder Asiyah Andrabi and afliated to the Lashkar, is slowly introducing a radical streak through moral-policing at the social-level. Another Lashkar front, the Save Kashmir Movement of student bodies, has an urban base and is spreading out into the rural areas. The emergence of Lashkar has also contributed to the fast disappearance of the legendary spirit of Kashmiriyat with the result, the days of Hindus and Muslims living in harmony are gone. Against this, Ladakh has a majority Buddhist population with a substantial Shia presence in Kargil speaking Purki and identifying themselves better with the residents of Skardu and the Northern Areas than the Kashmir Valley. They have a congenital grouse against the Kashmiris, for following a policy of ignorance, suppression and neglect, and thus treating Ladakh and Kargil as a colony. There is a feeling of contrition, of the Shiite Kargilis vs the Kashmiris on the one hand, and the of Buddhist Ladakhis vs the Kashmiris, on the other. Over the past three or four years, the Buddhists have been demanding a Union Territory status, as it would ensure development funding from the Centre, and also because their greater afliation is to the Union of India. With the politics of Union Territory now on the anvil, the Kargilis feels that they would be better off with the Kashmiris than the Ladakhis. This schism betweent he Ladakhis and the Kargilis too needs to be handled.

Self-Rule and Demilitarisation

In this background, people of the Northern Areas and PoK would be the rst to demand self-rule, when Pakistan President, Gen Pervez Musharaff, mentions the same. While seeking to exploit the same, the Government of India should also take into account the aspirations of the people in Rajouri-Poonch, and also Ladakh, vis-a-vis Srinagar. In this context, demilitarisation is not a bad idea, purely from an internal perspective, as the Army cannot continue to be deployed for counter-insurgency measures for an unlimited length of time. It is not good for the Armys morale, and charges of corruption in the armed forces are also slowly creeping in. Another option is to look at the J&K Police, which is a better force than it was in the Nineties. They are locals, can collect better intelligence, and are also living with their families. No anti-militancy operation in the State is conducted now without their involvement, but New Delhi still does not trust the J&K Police. There could now be a phased withdrawal of the Army, the Rashtriya Ries (RR), from counter-militancy operations, the place being taken by CRPF which can , work with the State police. For long, we have been seeing Jammu and Kashmir as the end, of our land-border. It is time we saw it as a means, as a point-of-contact. There are ve major overland routes traversing the State, namely, Jammu-Sialkot, RajouriPoonch, Uri-Muzaffarabad and Skardu-Kargil apart from the Manasarovar route. The concept of joint management will play into this. Two weeks back, Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad welcomed what he called tourism security, of joint management on the tourism and economy front. We need not have to say a blunt No to President Musharrafs proposal but could nuance our response, to be able to work together in select elds, which will be mutually benecial to the government and the people on both sides. If we are to start with the notion that Line of Control

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(LoC) as the International Border (IB) is acceptable to us, we will have no bargaining chip. We should rather start with our 1993 resolution, which says that the entire Jammu and Kashmir belongs to us and that the problems of PoK are also ours. This would make for a more conducive atmosphere, and facilitate a dialogue. freedom and took away our children. We have not got our freedom, where are our children? It is a very powerful statement, especially in the rural areas, for which the Hurriyat does not have an answer. The distinction between a militant and a jihadi is not academic rhetoric. There is a clear distinction between the Hizbul Mujahideen on the one hand, and the LashkarJaish variety, on the other. For the Hizbul Mujahideen, independent Kashmir, or even accession to Pakistan, is an end in itself. For the jihadi groups, an independent Kashmir is the means to an end, a stepping stone to the establishment of a greater Islamic regime, an Islamic umma, from Istanbul to the Philippines, and including Pakistan. In terms of religious outlook, the Hizb, in a way, can be called secular because there is no religious fanaticism. In contrast, the Lashkar and the Jaish not only enforce Islam but also impose their brand of the faith, which is the Wahabbi. This is not to demonise the madrasas but they are now beginning to be exploited in Kashmir now, just as it was in Pakistan 15 years ago. These developments should not be ignored if we are not to draw wrong conclusions.

Who Decides Governments or the People?

P K Doraiswamy If Gen. Musharrafs proposal is the starting-point, does it boil down to the two governments deciding for the people? What do the people want, and what is the process by which that can be ascertained? Secondly, there seems to be a subtle distinction in the presentation between the militant and the radical, the jihadi. What does it mean? Suba Chandran We are not talking about a single people and a uniform opinion. In the Valley, you have the urban Kashmiri in Srinagar, Sopore, Anantanag, Baramulla and Kupwara, where a majority of the population wants total independence without India and Pakistan. But the rural Kashmiris, even though they have problems, and they have all those grouses that the urban Kashmiris have, they do not seem to have a problem with the rest of the country. This is strength that the Centre should exploit in reaching out to them. The opinions of the Rajouris, the Poonchis and the Dodaites have been totally different from that of the Kashmiris. The Partition-divided families are not in the Kashmir Valley but in Rajouri and Poonch. That was why the rst bus-link between India and Pakistan was not successful but the second one was. Again, the people of Rajouri and Poonch have absolutely no problem in living with the rest of India. They are not asking for an independent Kashmir, in which they will be at the receiving end of a colonisation process. The Ladakhis and the Shias also have a different perspective. If countries took into account public opinion, governance would have been different. Gen. Musharrafs suggestions on self-rule and demilitarisation, which in turn go beyond UN resolutions, are based on his personal conviction. Everyone in Jammu and Kashmir now understands that decisions would be taken by New Delhi and Islamabad. Now everyone is trying to bargain, especially the Kashmiris. The ethnic Kashmiris are trying to bargain, as much as they can, vis-a-vis India and Pakistan, so that their voice is heard. There is a lot of support whenever the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), for instance, calls for a hartal, but that may not convert into votes, given the highly-polarised nature of political representation. The Hurriyat has no answer for the common mans question: You promised azadi, or,

Self-Rule: Different Things to Different Groups

S. P. Ambrose What exactly does self-rule mean to the Kashmiris, and is it the same in the eyes of all of them including those in PoK and the Northern Areas, who seem to be Punjabis and not Kashmiris? Suba Chandran Self- rule means different things to different groups of Kashmiris. The people of Northern Areas are not looking for independence, but to be recognised as the fth province of Pakistan. They pay taxes but have no political representation beyond NALC. The Pakistan Supreme Court gave a verdict in 1999, extending all fundamental rights and constitutional provisions applicable to the other four provinces to Northern Areas. Against this, the people of PoK want freedom to decide their own polices, at least vis a vis their own people, leaving all matters pertaining to defence, foreign relations, currency and other ground realities to Islamabad and the ISI. Ideally, after the earthquake of October 2005, the local administration should have dealt with relief, but it was the Army that got into the act. The Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) had no Kashmiri in its fold. In Jammu and Kashmir, the National Conference has stuck to the demand for greater autonomy from the days of party-founder Sheikh Abdullah, and also under his son Farooq Abdullah and the latters son, Omar Abdullah. The

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State Assembly even passed a resolution when Farooq Abdullah was Chief Minister in 1998. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has added a Kashmiri currency and the like in its demand for self-rule but has overlooked the aspirations of Rajouri, Poonch and Ladakh. The two national parties, namely, the Congress and the BJP, have conned themselves to autonomy already granted under Article 370. Yet, they have been assuaging the sentiments and demands of the two regional parties. A lot of money is owing, and there is no accountability whatsoever. With the result, the NC-PDP cadres have never had it so good and will never have it better, even in an independent State. T. Ananthachari What are the implications of the anti-national sentiments on the ground, as even political parties are at best cagey? In the context of demands for demilitarisation, can the good intentions of the State police produce results, as it did in the case of Punjab, earlier? Suba Chandran The issue of anti-India sentiments is thorny and sensitive. Hurriyat Conference leader Mirwaiz Farooq wrote a very interesting and important article in February 2005, where he concluded for the rst time that Kashmiris, having been victims of violence for 16 years, should not become the villains when peace is knocking. Of course, there is the hard-line section in the Hurriyat, and also the likes of Hizbul, who feel that the Kashmiris have sacriced enough and more. In a pluralistic society like ours, such differences are common just as the ghters in the Kashmir Valley calling themselves jihadis even as they are referred to as Mujahideen by the locals, and as militants in Jammu and Ladakh. A churning process is already on, and there is no way to judge which way the wind will blow, or change course. Different members of the same family often differ in their political views and loyalties, and this is again something that the Centre can leverage. There is a difference between demilitarisation and withdrawing the Army from the LoC, even if it became the international border. Gen Musharraf too is not suggesting the latter. Instead, the demand is for withdrawing the Army from counter-insurgency operations which again will have to be done in stages and phases. The State police will have to take over the responsibilities, and there is a personal touch to it all in the eyes of the average Kashmiri, compared to his being hauled up by a soldier, who invariably is not a local. The police invariably have better intelligence at local levels, and their response too is also different and milder than that of the armed forces. It is not a question of nding a solution, which is too early to talk about but of looking at the processes involved. Perhaps, a soft border, a joint parliament and the like may be acceptable to the Kashmiris.

Discussants
Dr Suba Chandran Assistant Director, Institute of Peace and Conict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. S. P. Ambrose, IAS (Retd.) Ex-Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu T. Anantachari, IPS (Retd.) Formerly Director-General, Border Security Force (BSF) P. K. Doraiswamy, IAS (Retd.) Former Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh

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