The Peace Process and the Politics of Conflict Resolution Author(s): Amr G. E.

Sabet Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer, 1998), pp. 5-19 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538127 . Accessed: 13/06/2011 07:24
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THE

PEACE PROCESS

AND THE

POLITICS

OF CONFLICT

RESOLUTION AMR G. E. SABET

This analysis the of Middle Eastpeace process the arguesthat applicationofconventional Western resolution mechanisms athas conflict tempted remove justice to the principle fromtheArab-Israeli conflict. Theauthor contends the that shiftfrom"closed a agenda"determined bycorevaluestoan "open agenda"where is everythingopen barfor gaining and froma justice-driven matrix "entitlement-benefits" to a utility-driven 'cost-benefits" can only lead toissuetransformation one, and theprogressive scalingback ofgoals.Acceptance theadverof sary'sframework reduced has Arabnegotiators supplicants to rather thancounterparts whose can perceptions be managedby theopponent.AfterexaminingArab options,the author concludesthat whatever settlement emerges fromthecurrent is process boundto fail becauseitcannotfulfill demandfor basic in justice, resulting a redefinition theconflict itsbroader of in and religious strategic horizons.
THE FANFARE SURROUNDING THE MIDDLE EAST "PEACE PROCESS"

has obscuredhow little has been subjectedto systematic it and objectiveanalysis.Nor have its negotiation principles been sufficiently scrutinized bringout the underlyto ingnatureand structure theprocess or itsability deliveron itspromises. of to If a yet more violentand bitter future the Arab-Israeli of collision is to be avoided, distinction mustbe made between conflict resolution "thetransas formationof relationshipsin a particularcase by the solution of the problemswhich led to the conflictual behavior in the first place" and "the suppression or settlement conflict coercive means, or by bargaining of by and negotiation whichrelative in power determines outcome."1The disthe tinction mustbe made, then,between resolution and settlement. unless For the former obtains and incorporates principleofjustice (particularly the in theconflict's core Palestinian issue), the "peace process"cannotbutcollapse into a reduced and unstablesettlement arrangement.
PEACE TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE

The current "peace process" has attempted circumvent, to and transform, conceptuallyobliteratethe justice principleof the Arab-Israeli conflict by

AMR

G. E. Finland.

SABET

is visitingassociate professor of political science at Tampere University,

Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 5-19.

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STUDIES

resorting conventionalWesternconflict to resolutionmechanisms. These mechanismshave fundamentally alteredthe politicalagenda of the conflict and issue transformation. developmentwas faciliThis through subterfuge tatedby systemic and regionalchanges arisingfromthe collapse of the SovietUnion,the second GulfWar and the destruction Iraq, and Americanof Israelimilitary scientific and cooperation. The applicationofWestern"conflict resolution" mechanisms requiredthe introduction superordinate of axes to change the region's regime of alliances. "Moderate"Arab and Jewishforcessupporting"peace" were to be aligned against"radicals"or "extremists" opposing it in both societies.Arab leaders were to make common cause withIsrael in fighting extremism not per se, but Islamic resistanceto the concessional schemes being worked out-in other words, they were to fight theirown so as to claim shared groundwithIsrael.Parallelto thesechangesin thepoliticalconstellation was a shift froma "closed agenda" determined immutable by core values to an is "open agenda" where everything open forbargaining. Thus, insteadof a closed agenda setting Islamists and existing allies against regimesas natural a common Israeli enemy,the new open agenda evolved into one of conof the thanits causes. fronting effects injusticerather The negotiating strategy adopted by theArabsafter GulfWar was arthe ticulatedby PresidentHusni Mubarakof Egypt,who in January1989 proclaimed thathe and otherArab leaders were supportedin theirsearch for all peace by "thepeace lovingforcesin Israel itself." indicatedthatafter He in the sacrifices previouswars withIsrael,he "was not readyto take more risks."2 This statement basicallyacknowledgestheconflict be one of costs to rather thanof entitlements, pragmatism of rather thanrights, conveysa and limto his willingness play by the rules of the opponent. Expressing rather of itedunderstanding theVietnamesecase as an example of a war that"was settledonly through Mubarakfailedto relatethe outcome to negotiations," conditions theground.The Vietnamese on in were successful imposingtheir will on a farmore powerful because theyhad been willadversary precisely ing to takerisks, while theArabparty's was to starting pointfornegotiations concede entitlement claims.Since the Arabswere willingto relinquish what theyhad consideredsacred since 1948,further pressurecould be expected to lead themto concede otherrights as and Jerusalem well-after all, the precedenthad been set. This introduced structural transformnations capable of changingthepsychological of of distribution power heavilyin favor Israel and altering Arabpositionfrom the one of defianceto one ofvirtual submission. As a settlement mechanism,the "peace process" has recastthe substance of the conflictby steadilycreatingthe appropriateenvironmental for means-endsframework such "concessions"to be made. Negotiationconstitutes the "artof the dialecticsof wills thatuse force and tactics, (and/orpeacefulmeasures) to resolvetheirconflict."3 Strategies in additionto options and the available resources,constitute pillarsof the Theiroverriding negotiating dynamics. principleis to take advantageto the

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The weaknesses and oversights. configuraextent possible of theadversary's reached and how theyare implethe tive outcome determines agreements is mented. In thissense, negotiation a double-edged sword: it can resolve or conflicts exacerbatethem.While it is impossibleto predictwithcertainty process, a numberof premisesmay indicateits the resultof a negotiating the usuallyreflects relative direction. Thus,thefinaloutcome of negotiations of power configuration thepartiesconcerned;"whereone ends up depends obon whereone starts";4 negotiating and outcomesemanatenot onlyfrom from conditions but,as importantly, subjectivepsychological jectivematerial mustthusexhibitconsiderablefirmfortitude. weaker side in particular The to threshold sufficient make demands or upness to establisha credibility will power, diminished in hold positions.Otherwise, cases of asymmetrical into a one-sided open agenda in which-as faras the inevitably translates be privileged party concerned-agreementmay not necessarily preferred is of alteration to nonagreement. Failureof will also allows forthe unilateral the all therulesofthegame and forredefining normsthat actorsmustfollow subin their Once thisstagehas been reached,negotiation mutualrelations.5 stantivelyceases, since, as Henry Kissinger noted, "the weak do not negotiate."6 rather Both the Americansand the Israelis believed thata step-by-step to thana comprehensive negotiating approach would contribute underminno no ing theArabconsensus of "no talks, recognition, peace" thatemerged in at theKhartoum summit August1967. The purpose was to dividetheArab of position world,win de factorecognition Israel,and putIsraelin a stronger withthefront-line statesand thePalestiniwhen itcame to negotiatedirectly ans.7Israel'stacticwas to bringtheArabsinto "stepby step,practicalsettlements and interim agreements as a gradual incrementalprocess of which may make it more the 'interlocking' rivalsintopositivearrangements to and were condifficult themto revert open conflict war."8Such tactics for from Arab-Israeli conof the Egypt sistent withtheoverallstrategy detaching pursuing a policy of flict, isolatingSyria,and, on the Palestinianfront, in cantonization Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, the approach sucand ceeded in breakingthe necessarylinkbetween statecraft war. Once all thishad been achieved,Israel reversedits position,withthe current prime callingfor"a package approach"thatcircumminister, BenjaminNetanyahu, ventsthe agreements signed earlier.9
PEACE-JUSTICE DIALECTICS

offenda Power relationsbased on considerationsof mightfrequently and anger thatulti"sense of justice"and fuel the emotionsof resentment matelylead to violence. Notions of injustice"as a reactionto a perceived and between entitlements benefits" always remainan inherent discrepancy of ofviolence rather thanas a reflection riskfactor.10 "Peace" as theopposite inflicted the to by justiceis unlikely overcomesuch concerns.Bereavements

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Weston theArabsin general,and on thePalestinians particular, in have from in theoutsetcharacterized conflict Arabeyes as one ofentitlement-benethe fits(as opposed to the more pragmatic bargaining approach of cost-benefits), meaningthatitis the notionof rights thatis the determining factor and thatwhateverbenefitsderive fromthe conflict's resolutionare secondary. The Arab sense of injusticehas triggered intenseemotionalresponses that cannotbe quantified solely in tangibletermsor reduced simplyto an aversion to loss. Phenomenologically, sense of justice "engage(s) powerful the of of the passions thathave theeffect increasing stridency demands,amplifyining intransigence, reducingsensitivity threatsand value trade-offs, to to and increasing likelihoodofviolent the creasingthewillingness runrisks, Muslim behavior."" This helps explain theviolence associatedwithmilitant organizationssuch as Hamas, Hizballah, and IslamicJihad.Their acts are of largelythe observable symptoms the unobservableneed to respond to group insultwithrage.12 Referring the Islamistorganizationsas terrorist to structures opposing discursive peace is partof an alternative mechanismthatseeks to eliminate the entitlement-benefits discrepancy contextin favor of one based on cost-benefits, Historical experience shows the formerbeing that when basic depicted as irrational and the latteras rational.But historical experience shows thatwhen basic entitleentitlementsare at stake mentsare at stake against overrwhelming against overwhelming odds, less odds, less rationality rationality actuallyfaresbetterthanmore rationality. For instance,the Czechs' behavior with respect to actually fares betterthan more rationality. Nazi Germany'sdemands for their land was "too rational" the face of a military in threat theybelieved In theycould not win againstin the long run.13 contrast, Finnsand the the NorthVietnamesewere less rational and more emotional, more determined to fight of the SovietUnion and theUnited againstthe overwhelming power States, respectively. Finland, while losingtwice,earned respectand perhaps made itself less attractive a potentialsatellite. as The NorthVietnamese,of course,ultimately prevailed,14 winning war in whichtheyhad lostvirtually a all thebattles. hardly It bears mentioning that, within contextof the U.S.the constructed "peace" discourse,it is fareasier to manipulatepartieswhose drifts towardcost-benefit calculatingmatrix quantifications (the Czech option) than parties who are not prey to such calculations (the Finn or Vietnameseoption). The justice motivediffers fromaversion to loss both prescriptively and the extensively. Prescriptively, desire to see justicedone "thoughthe earth may perish"is a driveembedded in basic humanvalues and is indifferent to material valuationsbased on economy or self-interest. Extensively, justhe from in tice motivediffers gain-lossconsiderations thatit involvesnot what people would like to have but what theyconsider theirdue, theirentitlements.People withinthe entitlement-benefits matrix value usuallyare willing to incur a heavy price for potentially less useful thingsthey consider

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of theirs a matter right as and are willingto tradeoff foreswear or goods that theywould like to have but to whichtheydo notfeelentitled. "The mode of reasoninginvolvedin the defenseof one's entitlements," therefore, "differs from mode of reasoninginvolvedin the pursuit other of fundamentally the goods: it tendsto be categoricaland deontologicalrather thanutilitarian."15 if In substance,Israel,aided by Americanindifference not complicity, attemptedto reconcile the entitlement-benefits discrepancynot by meeting legitimate Palestinian demands but by transforming rules in such a way the would increasingly thatthe Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Yasir Arafat, act-if not actually believe-as ifithad misconceivedthe scope and content of Palestinian As chiefof Israeli entitlements.16 YehoshafatHarkabi,former military intelligence, pointedout: "Makingthe opponent uneasy and apologetic about his objective,is a first small step in the process of its erosion, inducinghimto start discarding it."17 Thus,recentyearsappear to have witnessed a progressive scaling back of Palestinianexpectations. Indeed, with theexceptionof thehighly skillednegotiator Hafizal-Asadof Syria, look at a of the negotiating patterns Arab decision makersreveals a significant proto pensity modify values at stakein a fashionthatultimately the challenges theirown entitlements. Israel,on the otherhand, continuesto maintainits in own constants and payoffs terms a unified of Jerusalem underitscontrol, possession of most of the West Bank (despite redeployment maneuvers), of monopolized access to nuclearweapons, priority Israelisecurity concerns over all otherconsiderations, and eventualaccess to the waterresourcesof the Nile and the Euphrates.18 fromchanges on the ground in Jerusalem Israel's delinkingof security from politicalheartof the "peace prothe and theWest Bank, and therefore a further to necess," reflects attempt divestthe purported Palestinian/Arab of formula itssubstance.Duringhis August1997 visitto the region gotiating in the wake of Hamas bombings in Jerusalem, U.S. envoy Dennis Ross to withinthis delinking soughtfurther entrenchthe Palestiniannegotiator structure. called upon Israelisand Palestinians workas partners to He against the "commonthreat" from that"security something is militants, emphasizing thatserves Israeli interests Israeli security was and Palestinianinterests."19 thusto become the PA's objective,whetheror not Palestinian demands for for of statehoodcould or would be met.In return Arafat's resumption securitycooperation with Israel, Ross gave a vague promise of an upcoming comthat broad U.S. peace initiative supposedlywould addressPalestinians' plaintsagainstIsrael,including"some kind"of freezeon settlement expanof visitedthe regionthe sion.20Butwhen Secretary StateMadeleineAlbright thatIsraelwas strengthening she following month, respondedto complaints itsgripon Jerusalem, expandingcolonies, and levelingthe homes of Palestinians declaringthat"thereis no moralequivalentbetween killing by peomusttake unilateral ple and buildinghouses.... The Palestinian Authority steps and actionsto root out the terrorist infrastructure."'21

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The problemwithunilateral gestures, Kissinger as noted,is thatthey"remove a key negotiating asset. In general,diplomatsrarelypay forservices already rendered."Moreover,he continued,they temptthe adversary"to in dragout thenegotiations orderto determine whether otherunilateral gesturesmay be forthcoming."22 only did Albright Not demand such unilateral gesturesof thePalestinians, refused acknowledge any connectionbeshe to tween the militant acts of some Palestiniangroups and the Israeli government'sbreaking agreements of and settlement expansion.Ross's promisesto Arafat be likenedto Britain's can WorldWarI commitments supportindeto pendence forArabsiftheyjoined the war effort againstOttomanTurkey. Arafat's relationship withIslamist groups,however,is too complex to enable him to accede to U.S.-Israeli demands fora crackdownon theirinfraat structure, least not to the extentdesired.For much as Arafat would like to clamp down on the Islamists, knows thatdestroying he themcould mean politicalsuicide. Eradicating Hamas and IslamicJihadwould diminishhis as usefulness a negotiator: Islamists his lasttrump the are card.This is where the inherentcontradictions a common security of framework can be felt moststrongly. While the Israeliswould like to see Islamicoppositioneliminated totally, Arafat cannot without jeopardizinghis own survivaldo more thancontainand weaken them. Thus,thePA and Israelcannotpursuea common security policy,but only a parallel one. Arafat's dilemmais thatthis situation as projectshim simultaneously a collaborator(to the Islamists, as well as to some secularnationalists) as an ineffective uncooperative and and leader (to theAmericans and Israelis).The result a concessionary is outcome thatcan lead only to the erosion of the PA's legitimacy, it forcing to control its own people by increasingly coercive measures.23 However much Israelis may loathe Arafat, representsfor them the he lesser of evils and a kind of safety valve. His rumblings about not being to dictated by Israelcannotconceal thathis real concernis fearofgenerating for sympathy Islamicmilitants acquiescing in Israelidemands.Moreover, by of the concentration power in Arafat's hands, his personal controlof the fundsprovided by international donors, his virtuallack of accountability, to and his efforts weaken all otherforcesand social institutions-in the short, factthathe has become the PA in all but name24 significantly consolidates Israel's position.Thus, and notwithstanding Islamistmilitants, the Israel by In the the controlling "chief'can control "tribe." thisrespect,thePA, though shortof being a state,is not an aberration a typicalregionalplayer. but
PEACE CONCESSIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF DEFEAT

winnersand losers in negotiations indicate Empiricalstudies regarding thatthe partieswithhigheraspirationlevels actuallyget more. Opponents withhighaspirations, of irrespective theirskillor power, ended up as winnersin everycase where theyopposed low aspirants. Furthermore, negotiators who made the firstcompromise ended up the losers in the final

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it concesoutcome.25In the lightof such findings, followsthatthe strategic Anwar Sadat through the Camp David sions initiated the late President by regime,and in whose footstepsa numberof otherArab leaders have followed, can only lead to disastrousconsequences forthe Arab world. The of resultswhen one partyvirtually depattern concessions thatinevitably while the otherremains clares itself desperate to opt out of confrontation determined never be just,forseveralreasons. can have no need to First, concessions are faironlyas long as the negotiators revise theiroriginalexpectationsabout the overall shape of the ultimate or Leavingaside the agreement about theirstrategic goals of entitlement.26 of downgrading Palestinianexpectationsthatpreceded Oslo, the Oslo aca statecovto cordsallowed thePalestinian negotiator anticipate Palestinian eringmostof theWest Bank and Gaza at the end of the process. Since then, it pattern has folthe PA appears to have been reduced by the negotiating Israeli security structure. Indeed, lowed to nothingmore than an auxiliary scalingback of goals. theentire Arabworld has undergonean extraordinary As Mubarak'schiefpoliticaladviser Osama Baz remarked, conflict the between the Arabs and Israel is now over boundaries and no longer over 27 Israeli chiefof staff Raphael Eitan Israel's existence. (In contrast, former declared the conflict be "civilizational.") to Second, negotiation requiresthatpartiesbe governedby the same rules, to Giventhatnegowithneither side havingtheright alterthemunilaterally. is of as principleand tiation a matter finding properformula a referent the thenimplementing if can change thenegotiating formula detail,28 one party at will and the otheris constrained it-that is, ifthe partiescease to have by equal stalemating power-then no mechanismof jointdecision makingexistsand the talksno longerconstitute negotiations.It is thusthatIsrael has alteredthe formulafromland forpeace, as was agreed at the unilaterally for to October 1991 Madridconference, peace forpeace or security peace. This change,whichfundamentally reorders process in Israel'simage,bethe to albeitless overtly;29 personalizethe isgan undertheLabor government, sue by presenting as a Netanyahuinitiative, many Arabs tend to do, it as of is alrather than as a matter Israeli strategy to blur the deeper factors, thata lowingtheoptionlessArableadersto buytimeby deludingthemselves of return Labor will set thingsright. while any concessions made by the Israeli side can only come Finally, from gains acquired at the expense of theArabside, reciprocalconcessions of own capital.A framework come out of their by theArabsmustinevitably hides a substanfair, mutualconcessions,while in appearance procedurally are on Whateverjustifications tive injusticeinflicted one negotiating party. cited for this state of affairs-thebalance of power, the situationon the exercise negotiating ground,the factthatIsrael won the land militarily-the is essentially reducedto thevictor's imposingitswillon thevanquished.This invitestermsof surrender rather than the conciliationthatcomes situation fromconflict resolution.

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The Palestinian leader thuscommitted seriousstrategic a mistakeby signing interim agreements thatdeferred a laterstage such fundamental to issues as Jerusalem, refugees,and Jewish colonies-in other words, by signing the of agreements emphasizing process ofinteraction rather thanthecontent the negotiating positions.30 Such a blunderwas a reflection theArab/Palof estinian negotiators' inability rankpriorities nationalinterests goals, to of and as well as theirconfusionof means and ends. Withinthe framework a of confidence-building process (as opposed to one based on content), priority at goes to current ad hoc problemsof whatever and magnitude the expense in in of long-term strategic considerations, essence resulting a policy that gives equal weightto all issues. Indeed, thisprocess-orientated framework are actuallyleads to a confusionof priorities, ifpriorities confused,no and long-term national intereststrategy can be focused upon, nor decisions about the channelingof resourcesmade. Process becomes an end in itself rather thanthe means it is supposed to be. This loss of strategic balance is whatmade itpossible forIsraelto "screw" the Palestinians Oslo II, to use Labor leader ShimonPeres's frank at expression.31Indeed, whateverWesternconflict is managementframework utilized, the Arabswill lose everytimetheyagree to be placed in an external rulestructure. Carl Schmitt As observed,ifa people permits to anotherparty on of determine its behalfthe distinction friend and enemy,"thenit is no longer a politicallyfree people and is absorbed into another political system."32 In endingtheintifada signing Oslo accords,Arafat and the gave up two of his most important trumpcards without receivinganything substancein of His return. error further absolved theAraband otherstatesof anyembarrassmentthatmight relations withIsrael, have prevented themfrom normalizing its statusand endingitsisoeffectively bolstering regionaland international lation.In so doing,the PLO squandered theverylimited leverageithad and placed itselfin its enemy's grip,or at best in thatof its Americanally (in much the same fashion,thoughunder farworse conditions,as Egypthad done earlier).Nothingin the PA's negotiating would seem to allow pattern forthe realizationof its rights and demands forstatehood,even as parallel continueto decrease in lightof the expectationson the broaderArab front initiative adversary's dynamics.
ARAB OPTIONS

The perenniallegitimacy crisisand personalizedrule of theArabregimes inevitablyaffecttheirnegotiating performance and conflictmanagement in thatled a competence.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, key figure the negotiations to the Camp David accords,wrotein his memoirsthatthe Egyptian delegationnot onlydid not know how to prepareforthe comingnegotiations, but did not even know the general strategy which to base its moves. "It upon would come to us when we arrivedat dallied my hopes thatinspiration

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Camp David,"he wrotein a perhapsunwitting devastating but indictment of the Egyptian negotiating pattern.33 Given thatSadat was at a loss as to what step to take afterhis visitto Jerusalem, "put himselfcompletelyinto he American hands,"willing"to take Carter's word thata givenstep was necessary" and unable, unlike the U.S. president,"to separate business from friendship."34 result The was a diplomatic framework includednot only that traditional negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, also the but conciliation, presumably more advanced methodsof conflict resolution thatemphasized not the contentof the negotiating positionsbut the process of interactionconfidence building, educationformutualunderstanding, the pursuit and of superordinate goals, includingeconomic incentives.35 two overlapping The approaches compromisedcore issues,leading Sadat to sacrifice Arab stratein gic entitlements favor short-term of Egyptian territorial financial and gains. The tragedy thatthePA seems to be following same pattern conis the of cessions, but withoutthe assets and leverage that Egypt possessed. For Egypt,as the most powerfulArab country, could offer Israeli side the the strategic concession of droppingout of the conflict equation and in return could be rewardedwithterritorial gains (even ifat thecost ofa loss of sovereignty and self-respect diminished and regionalstatus). The Camp David accords,in otherwords, constituted high point of the peace strategy the that could onlybe followedby the reversalof opposites:the more peace is puruntila point is reached where thereare only sued, the fewerthe returns, whichis whatwe are witnessing negativeresults, contoday.This essentially stitutes dynamicsof the peace dialectics. the Giventhecurrent the have threemain options. situation, Arabnegotiators First, theycan accept whateveris being "offered" imposed, seeking the or best conditionsunder the circumstances. Second, they can stall for time, hoping fora change in circumstance thatwill permit reversion the landto the rulesby introfor-peaceformula. Finally, theycan transform negotiating own formula in and redefining conflict terms itsbroader the of ducingtheir religious and strategic while working towardtheconstruchorizons, actively tion of new regionaland systemic alliances. In the shortrun,it is the first option thatappears the most likelyto be adopted. Mubarak'sremarkto Netanyahuthatwar is "an old (fashioned) ... matter and will not solve any cause"36boils down to a peace-for-peace formula.Even when theArabLeague raisedthe threat economic boycott of followingIsrael's decision to build a new colony on Jabal Abu Ghunaym it rather (Har Homa) in occupied EastJerusalem, was as a "recommendation" thana commitment.BothEgyptand Jordan declined associatedcalls forthe Arabs to freezetheirnormalization relationswithIsrael on the grounds of thattheywere tiedto peace agreements themfrom thatprevented doing so. Whatever their actual policies,theArabstatescontinueto call fora return to land forpeace. This formulainvolves conditionality, implicitin the for is there land-for-peace configuration a presumedveto:ifno land is returned, will be no peace. But to what extentcan the Arabs crediblycall forobser-

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in The vance of theformula? June1996 Arabsummit Cairo announced peace choice." Such a declarationde factorendersland a residual as a "strategic war nor economic and diplomaticsanctionsare opcomponent.If neither is veto or conditionality) in (withitsinherent tions,thenthe Madridformula theformula peace to reduced thuseffectively essence dissolved.The summit to But forpeace, in line withMubarak'sremark. nationsthatattempt present by themselvesas unfailingly peaceful can hope to obtain little way of suasion fromany forcestheymay have.37Nor can the veto capabilitycome as from bombings:sporadicviolence is notthesame thing war capaIslamist the level rather thanwithin and can be dealt withat the local security bility broadercontextof the "peace process." In sum, lackingcontrolover theirconcessional behavior,the Arab deciof to sion makershave contributed the elimination the second option altoThis to gethereven while continuing demand itsimplementation. being the security case, theycan only act withinthe confinesof an American-Israeli option. Netantilting balances heavilyin favorof the first the framework, and for do yahu's intransigence disregard the signed agreements not merely his his to reflect commitment his electoralpromises, commonsense negotiatheyare also tion calculations, and his firm grasp of the evolvingsituation; withIsraelistrategy beliefs, albeitwithout Labor'sfinesseand consistent and themselvesare willingto underAnd ifthe Arab negotiators fig-leaf offers. opponenton his minetheir then surprising their that entitlements, itis hardly does not revert the less favorablelinkageof land forpeace. to own
THE THIRD OPTION

only fuelsbitterness, In what amountsto a vicious circle,capitulationism the and, ultimately, mobilizationof the forces of indigenous resentment, opThis can be expected,even ifin the long run,to bringforth resistance. tionthree. conflict obscured the underlying The Palestiniancore of the Arab-Israeli wills.As long as the focus foundations conflicting of religiousand strategic Jewishand was on the presumedconfrontation between two nationalisms, contradictions over the same piece of land,these more inherent Palestinian, remainedin the background.But withthe gradual collapse of nationalistic and coming to the fore,the Arabjustifications withthe issue ofJerusalem underpinnings-a Israeli conflictis being reduced to its religiostrategic linkage emergingfromthe fact that "a nation's interestderives fromits "38 identity. is Since Jerusalem a religiouscause, the clash over it cannot be secularthatreliized-that is, itcannotbecome a solelypoliticalissue. To the extent the categorical, citycannotbe the object of compromise. gion is entitlement This being the case, "peace" outcomes and legalitieswill remainmarginal, that applicable in the domain of politicsas long as the coercive framework however,such produced themcontinuesin place. In the realmof religion,

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constraints may not function a long-term as viable deterrent indeed are and more likelyto promoteconflict insofar theyfrustrate pursuit entitleas the of ments,identity, basic values.39 and In theArab/Islamic world,Islamist groupsare drivenmainly thejustice by motive, whichis value-oriented while (entitlement-benefits), actorscommitted to the "peace process"tendto be moreutility-oriThis poses an acute problem Islamist groups are driven ented (cost-benefits). for the application of Western conflictresolution mainly by thejustice mechanisms in an Islamic context. First,militant motive, which is valueIslamist groupsand Muslimsin generalcontinue, a as oriented, while actors matter faithand values, to rejectthe enemy irreof committed to the 'peace process" tend to be more spectiveofwhattakesplace at thepoliticallevel. Second, the contending partiesto the conflict not see do utility-oriented. in anything common with one another,nor is there desire to coexist.40 Third,while the Palestinianissue is being transformed through peace strategy, is also being countertransformed a core the it into religiousprinciple-a substantive change thatcould foreshadowa future Islamic-Jewish conflict. Whateverthe outcome of the "peace process" in the politicaldomain, it is unlikelyto resolve the broader confrontation is that now slowlybut ominouslytakingshape. External mechanisms seekingartificially construct to commongoals or interests between the adversariesdo not apply in the case of Jerusalem and would be seen as yetanotherattempt impose alien structures. to This is especiallytruewhen conventional Westernconflict resolution principleshold that"peacemaking" notpossible untilconflicts is thatis,until have "ripened," costs have escalated to the pointwhere partiesare preparedto settle.41 War maybe condemned,but "sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protectionof treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain."42The harvest in the Arab/Islamic world is there to see: Egypt prostrate ineffectual; and Syriaisolatedand pressured; Jordan, Americanan Israelivassal; Palestinians cantonized;Iraq destroyed; Libyaand Sudan embargoed; the Arabianpeninsula virtually occupied; Algeriain the grip of a Islamist bloodbath;Iran and militant groupsto be containedor crushed.On theotherside is a robust Jewishstatewitha nuclearcapability and militarily farmore powerfulthanall itspotentialadversaries combined. It has been said thatthesecond GulfWarwas an issue-transforming event thatcaused the Arabsto recognize "notonlythattheycould not fight Israel in of but thatmanyof themhad no interest doing so."43While the majority theArabpeople-as distinct not from their largely delegitimized rulers-may share thisconclusion,it is one thatperception-altering mechanismsseek to induce.44Within such a reconstruction the regionalorder,Samuel Huntof ington's"clash of civilizations" argument be perceivednot simplyas an can intellectual exerciseto be supportedor refuted the analytical at level,but as the theoretical fora policy in the actual process of implementation. cover This policy attempts createthe ripe environmental to conditionsforthe es-

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of the tablishment "peace" while reconstructing Muslimworld and crushing Islamistgroups. However, to the extentthatIslam is an active grass-roots the value thatdetermines subjective(and where possible the objective)nathat it countermechanism an tureof the conflict, constitutes organizational In of structure. Arab and will continueto block the alteration the conflict efforts convince them otherto Muslimeyes, and despite American-Israeli is "peace" is to wise, thisconflict a zero-sumgame, forifAmerican-Israeli of the this constitute region's new interest, will requirethe transformation the region'sidentity. (focusingon conis The factthatIslam ontologically entitlement-driven is (focustent)while the "peace process" epistemologically cost-articulated ing on process) sets them on incommensurableplanes of interaction. however, requires thatthey be positioned Harmonizingthoughtsystems, To logic" of withinthe same logical framework.45 harmonizethe "thought world with that of the "peace" strategyrequires that the Arab/Muslim and ifnecessarycrushed.Whatis at stake counterthoughts peripheralized be problem of usurpationof consequentlyis no longer the politico-national and of the land butrather veryextraction a nation'sreligio-national historical withinthe An Arab negotiatorwhose thoughtis reconstructed heritage. of reduced to a supplicantrather framework his adversary'sis essentially His continueto be manthana counterpart. will and perceptionsof reality likelyto hinge on aged and alteredby the opponent,with any settlement Hereinlies the essence of theso-called "civilizapower relations. contingent tionalclash" and its camouflagedlinkto the "peace process." In focusingon the new Islamic enemy,the United States has targeted what it calls "terrorist" groups, aiming,withthe collaborationof clientregimes and withvaryingdegrees of success, to neutralizeand marginalize of them.Any Islamistoppositional group is thus depicted as a "disturber Whileitmaybe peace . . . [and]designatedto be an outlaw of humanity."46 power of the state feasibleto crushsuch groupsthrough overwhelming the and/orexternalassistance,this does not solve the problem as long as the environmental conditionsleading to theiremergence remainin place and lead to the containment Nor does theirsuppressionnecessarily regenerate. of Islamicdynamism, since thevitality Islam is not constrained or deof by, even thoughmany of those groups pendentupon, theirexistence.Finally, have succeeded in could be (or have been) marginalized, theynevertheless Islam in public lifeand victoiyby mainstreaming scoringa major strategic the societyat large.Islamic symbolspenetrate societyand the politicaldisthe course ofthe Muslimworldmore thanever,and, in a dialecticalfashion, of retreat politicalIslam has been accomplishedby the advancementof Iswould these subtle undercurrents lam as a social condition.47Neutralizing out the militants, in effect but snuffing the value requirenot only crushing are systemon which theirmotivations based. In otherwords, the system would have to be attackedin its basic values and not merelyits political agenda.

THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POUTICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

17

CONCLUSION

Defining Islamas thenew enemyafter collapse of communism the constitutes a strategicdecision foreshadowingthe American-Israeli project of redrawing politicalmap oftheArabworld.The expectation the among many Muslimsthatthisprojectwill target onlymarginalized not Islamist groupsor Muslimregimesbut,more broadly, mainstream Islam has slowlyintroduced to a subtlemessianicstreakinto theirconflict perceptionsand contributed of raisingforebodings upcomingapocalypticevents. As these interest-identity adverse linkagesbecome increasingly transparrecognize ent,and as contiguousArabcountries, especiallyEgypt, gradually will once morethatIsrael is not a threat the onlyto the Palestinians, conflict continueto change in proportion the intensity those feelings. to of That Islam is being politicizedis not,therefore, simplya matter a religiousdocof trine thatdoes not allow forthe separationof religionand politics, more but a of fundamentally matter justiceand strategic considerations well. In its as it call to arms, Islam is not about violence and extremism; rather, is about the legitimate unequivocal right self-defense. and to Threats security, to identity, and religiousvalues cannotbe containedby suppressionor by mere settlement arrangements. the same token,the "peace" being offered not By is about negotiations and cooperationbut about the destruction values. The of "peace process" is sayingthatmotivesat the verycore of humanneeds will have to be neutralized. Westernconflict resolutionmechanismsdo not seem well-equipped to of Arab-Israeli ancope withthese unique characteristics presentand future constructs have externalizedreligiousbetagonisms.Available theoretical liefs as determining components, reducing them to culturallyalterable variables.Religious convictions, however,and especially Muslimviews of Conflict thetheJewish/Zionist remainfixedconflict adversary, parameters. as ory'sreactionhas been to rejectsuch factors a source of cognitivedissoof nance and to dismissreligionas a matter unwelcome complexity falls that largely outsideitsken. Meanwhile,these conflict theorieshave failedto adto dress crucialquestions as to whether"theweak have the right make a different of rulesforthemselves."48 set More importantly, have failedto they showdown as one facetof a multidimencope withthe Israeli-Palestinian in sional conflict which religionis a parameter, a variable.The fearthat not the Western settletheArab/Muslim worldwillgo ''Islamist" reflects fearthat mentmechanismsdo not and cannot meet the basic human needs of the region'speople.
NOTES 1. John Burton,Con,flict: Resolution and Prevention (London: Macmillan Press Limited,1990), p. 3. 2. "PresidentHosni Mubarak: The Inof evitability Peace (21 January1989)," in WalterLaqueur and BarryRubin, eds., The Israeli-ArabReader, 5th ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 546-47. Strategy(Cam3. Edward N. Luttwak, bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard UniversityPress, 1987), p. 241.

18 4. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1982), p. 215. 5. Raimo Vayrynen,ed., New Directions in ConflictTheory (London: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 4-5. 6. Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Verso, 1995), p. 237. 7. Michael Field, Inside the Arab World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1994), p. 384. 8. Yehoshafat Harkabi,Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 103. 9. Interview, Newsweek, 23 June 1997, p. 39. 10. MelvinJ. Lerner,"The JusticeMotive in Human Relations,"in MelvinJ. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner,eds., TheJustice Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to Times of Scarcityand Change (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 12-13. 11. David A. Welch, Justiceand the Genesis of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 20. 12. John W. Burton,Global Conflict (London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.,1984), p. 13. 13. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System(London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 93. 14. Ibid. 15. Welch,Justiceand the Genesis of War, pp. 20-21. 16. Ibid., p. 20. 17. Harkabi,Arab Strategies,p. 88. 18. In Report of a Study Group Convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, it was proposed that "regional water plans would be an important component of the bilateraland multilateral accords. The opportunity increase to access to water would serve as one of the inducements forIsrael to negotiate securityaccords with its neighbors. Projects to be given high priority would include the UnityDam on the Yarmouk Riverinvolving Jordan,Syriaand Israel, pipelines for water fromthe LitaniRiverin Lebanon and fromTurkeyor Egypt,and a joint desalinization plant in Eilat/ Jordan-Israel Aqaba." The reportis in Ann M. Lesch, Transition to Palestinian Self-Government (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 158. Note the pafternof concessions required of the Arabs in order forIsrael to accept negotiatingsecur-

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STUDIES

ityaccords with them,Israeli security being paramount.Even before the advent of Netanyahu,"security peace" rather for than "land forpeace" was essentially what was being demanded. 19. Howard Goller, WashingtonPost, 12 August 1997. 20. Samar Assad, Los Angeles Times, 12 August 1997. 21. BarrySchweid, WashingtonPost, 10 September 1997. 22. Henry Kissinger,Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster,1994), pp. 467 and 488. 23. See further Glenn E. Robinson, of "The Growing Authoritarianism the Arafat Regime,"Survival 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 54. 24. Ibid., 45. 25. Chester L. Karrass,The Negotiating Game (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970), pp. 17-19. 26. Otomar J. Bartos, "Simple Model of Negotiation"in I. William Zartman,ed., The Negotiation Process (London: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 22. 27. Kayhan al-Arabi, 17 March 1998, p. 11. 28. I. William Zartman,"Negotiationas a JointDecision-Making Process," in Zartman,ed., The Negotiation Process, 29. According to Benjamin Netanyahu, Yitzhak Rabin, the assassinated Labor partyleader and formerprime minister, "was vely clear thattherewere no limitations whatsoever on Israeli construction in Jerusalem.Rabin was the one who authorized the building of Har Homa (Jabal Ghoneim settlement)," NewsInterview, week, 23 June 1997, p. 39. 30. Commentingon the result,and perhaps justifying Netanyahu's position and his own call forredesigning the Oslo agreements,Kissingerstated thatany analogy to the early stages of the peace process was illusory.As he put it "in the earlier negotiation,step-by-stepprogress relieved tensions and built confidence. On the West Bank, the opposite was the case. Both sides had jumped into the 'peace process' withouthaving clarified workable objectives and expected to wrest thatclarity fromthe process itself. Instead, it has compounded theirperplexities.This was no accident. Clearly,Arafat was led to believe by Israeli,American thatthe final and European interlocutors

pp. 76-77.

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destinationwas at least the '67 borders and recognitionof a Palestinianstatehood. But thatignored the vast difference in the negotiationsbetween Israel and the PLO compared with those between Israel and the neighboringArab states." Henty Kissinger,"The Oslo Piecemeal Process," WashingtonPost, 24 August 1997. 31. As quoted by Noam Chomsky, "EasternExposure: Misrepresenting the Peace Process," Village Voice, 6 February 1996, p. 6. 32. Carl Schmitt,The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick:RutgersUniversity Press, 1976), p. 49. 33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Tariq Misr ila al-Quds [Egypt's road to Jerusalem], Center forTranslation (Cairo: Al-Ahram and Publication,1997), p. 137. Author's translation. 34. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington,D.C.: United of StatesInstitute Peace Press, 1995), pp. 55-56. On the Egyptian-U.S.relationship, Cohen writes(p. 56) thatrarely"can a patron-client relationshiphave achieved such pronounced expression." 35. Luc Reychler,"The Artof Conflict Prevention:Theory and Practice,"in Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler,ed., The Art of Confflict Prevention (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 5-7. See also Roger Fisher and William Ury,Gettingto Yes (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as a of representative the Harvard Negotiations Project. 36. Interviewwith Husni Mubarak. AlHawadeth, 21-27 February1997, p. 21.

p. 37. Luttwak, Strategy, 194. "The Ero38. Samuel P. Huntington, Forsion of American National Interests," eign Affairs5, no. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), p. 1. 39. Burton,Global Conflict,pp. 137-38. 40. Mohammed Abu-Nimer,"Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context,"Peace and Change 21, no. 1 (January1996), pp. 33-34. 41. Burton,Conflict.Resolution and Prevention, p. 88. The Concept of the Polit42. Schmitt, ical, p. 79. 43. Field, Inside the Arab World,p. 385. Emphasis added. 44. Commentingon several polls in Edthe Arab world related to this matter, ward Said observed: "In evety instance public opinion has in factexpressed no enthusiasmfornormalizationwith Israel. On mass level this suggests thatthe sense of defeat is not quite as widespread and prostrateas officialpolicy and the logic of capitulationist intellectualswould have us believe." See his Peace and its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 134. Resolution and 45. Burton,Conflict. Prevention, p. 89. The Concept of the Polit46. Schmitt, ical, p. 79. 47. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans.Carol Volk (Cambridge: Press, 1994), p. 78. Harvard University 48. George Orwell, A Collection of Essays (New York: Harcourt,1981), p. 40.