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ANATOMY OF A CRISIS RESPONSE: A CHECKLIST A recent, informal study of more than a dozen multinational corporations reveals that top

company executives respond to crises with a relatively universal order of behavior. Public relations professionals, therefore, who understand the way these executives navigate their organizations through a crisis will be more effective at counseling top management and implementing corporate strategies should a crisis hit. Moreover, studying this common response may even reveal options not altogether obvious under pressure and stress at crisis-time. Order of Action The telephone study reveals that the principal considerations and steps for responding to a crisis are similar for almost all companies. They include, in order:

Responding to the actual event, primarily to people's needs (victims', employees', owners') and to the situation (contain the problem, establish safety parameters, assess and respond to damage); Notifying required government agencies and appropriate manufacturers or vendors; Establishing internal procedures for managing the crisis until it is resolved. Communicating and addressing internal and external concerns and issues, including employee communications, customer/vendor communications, community relations - among them, community perceptions, legal questions, and corporate responsibility issues, and media relations. (Note that media relations appears at the end of the chain of executives' initial concerns, in marked contrast to the media's demands to be informed early in the process.)

Executive Response Interestingly, the study also reveals a common pattern of attitudes, behaviors, and actions exhibited by executives within corporations in crisis. Managers, it seems, pass through four distinct phases as they accommodate, deal with, and resolve the disaster situation: RECOGNITION. There may be smoke, an explosion, a telegram, or an unexpected media call, which, along with the knot forming in the executive's stomach, indicates that a crisis is underway. The recognition phase progresses in stages, which, when completed, lead to information control and management.

Surprise. The sense of helplessness and irritation is immediate and frustrating. Also comes a sense of grief and a feeling of dread in knowing that the worst may not yet be known. Concentration. A leader is identified, a steering group chosen, and the group sets to work. The information and decision structure for this group often follows the army's field medical-crisis management configuration:

Fire control: to handle spot information problems, some of which can be quite serious. o Police control: to keep proprietary information secure and control access to property, people, and facts. o Medical services: to treat and minister to the corporate body to ensure that it survives its current injuries. Containment. Internal processes freeze as managers try to understand what has happened and what it all means. Control. Unlike other types of events, the speed of actions in a crisis doesn't allow the media time to develop other sources; they must rely on corporate or government authorities for information. Managers come to recognize that, used effectively, this control can be a critical operational advantage for effective communication. When the corporation doesn't talk, though, credibility with the media breaks down.
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DEFINITION. With successful completion of phase one, executives are better able to manage information. Now they must move toward managing attitudes. The definition stage helps create an atmosphere for truthfulness, where the reality of the situation can be digested in preparation for action.

Fear. Executives reach the healthy realization that matters are extremely serious: people are affected, threatened, perhaps even dead. They anticipate the upcoming issues of responsibility, even blame. Facts. Managers' need for information grows. They must understand what has happened before the organization talks to - or decides whether to talk to - anyone. Focus. Work is begun on specific tasks, while extraneous ideas, actions, and distractions are intentionally minimized.

STRATEGIC PLANNING. All eyes now turn toward resolving the disaster with minimal disruptions in service, revenue, and facilities. Appropriate internal and external resources are called to help maintain the organization's reputation. These include everything from building support among key audiences, to controlling and coordinating corporate issues and messages, to keeping peace in the corporate family and keeping the channels of communication open and active. Plans begin to come into focus. Managers consider how to publicly react, counteract, initiate, and preempt; keep issues and questions focused and localized; prepare for opposition or adverse reception of messages; monitor the media, forcing balance by correcting the record when necessary; bypass the mass media with direct communications; and track effectiveness of the communications strategy. Three processes are involved:

Forecasting. Surprises can be virtually eliminated if all aspects of the disaster are anticipated. Even if the worst doesn't happen, the company can move through the crisis more smoothly. Moreover, forecasting can set the scope of the media's speculative playing field.

Facilitating. Topics for discussion and communication pipelines are identified. Audiences are put into priority and alternative scenarios are explored. The corporate bureaucracy now moves from reflection to action. Follow-up. Procedures to tie up loose ends are also put into place, as executives look to mark the end of the disaster.

REACTION. Response strategies and specific spokespeople are finalized. Execution of the plan begins. Experience suggests that spokespersons and responses must have these unique attributes to deal effectively with the crisis:

Stoicism. Those involved must remain impassive to the excitement and tension of events. Steadiness. Rock-hard concentration for spokespeople is, not surprisingly, imperative. Stamina. Crises can last for hours or, less commonly, for years. Those involved must accommodate fatigue and retain their responsive edge at all times. Sensitivity. Understanding the people, politics, and problems involved, as well as the ramifications of corporate and individual actions, are key for getting through the crisis. Though many spokespeople have a sense of message (i.e., What am I going to say?), successful spokespeople also must have a sense of audience, conveying that the organization cares about individual needs. It can be as simple, for example, as making sure that employees and supervisors get their information ahead of outsiders.

LESSONS LEARNED #2 REGAINING PUBLIC CREDIBILITY FOLLOWING A DAMAGING SITUATION How a Relatively Simple Product Problem in Europe Turned Into an Avoidable Career-Defining Moment for the Chairman of Coca-Cola Experience teaches a powerful pattern of operational decision making and corporate behavior that can quickly restore credibility in damaging situations. A positive, rational, response strategy, coupled with seven key operational steps, is required to begin promptly rehabilitating trust and credibility. All seven steps need to be completed in a prescribed order. It is their order and the velocity of action that make the approach so strategically powerful. The response strategy is: first, resolve the problem itself; second, deal with those most directly affected and victims; third, answer employee questions and help employees understand what's going on; fourth, involve those indirectly affected, neighbors, colleagues, partners, government officials; lastly, accommodate the self-appointed, self-

anointed including critics, the media, competitors with a point of view, and public commentators. Action within minutes of crisis recognition is crucial. The Coca-Cola European contamination scare, which occurred during the last half of 1999, is an excellent example of what happens when this established set of steps is ignored, delayed, or short circuited. Rule #1 of crisis management is that virtually anytime there is a threat to people's health and safety - whether the situation occurs in South Africa, south Boston, Trinidad, or Toledo - a full scale, no-holds-barred response is required. The bigger the brand, the more powerful and prompt the response has to be. A useful way of analyzing and learning lessons from situations like Coca-Cola's is to do what I call an "expectations analysis." Simply stated, this is an approach that compares what a directly affected public, constituency, or victim group expects to the company's proposed or actual behaviors. This analysis produces some self-evident lessons in both crisis management and crisis communication management. COMMUNITY/VICTIM/PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 1. Candor: Outward recognition, through promptly verbalized public acknowledgement (or outright apology), that a problem exists; that people or groups of people, the environment, or the public trust is affected; and that something will be done to remediate the situation.

COCA-COLA'S RESPONSE No acknowledgement at first. Coke appeared to be unconcerned that hundreds of children were made ill and that its product was the probable cause. Chairman/others finally take notice 14 days after the first warning that incidents occurred. Coke's response was always in terms of quality - that quality was the #1 issue. Since quality was never higher, it was unlikely that there was a problem with the product. Coke claimed these were isolated incidents. Coke said drinking the tainted soda could cause headaches, nausea, and cramps, but didn't present any health risk. The head of Coke's French packaging and distribution unit stated, "It has been formally established that the drink itself is

2. Explanation (no matter how silly, stupid, or embarrassing the problem-causing error was): Promptly and briefly explain why the problem occurred and the known underlying reasons or behaviors which led to the situation (even if we have only partial early information). Also talk about what you learned from the situation and how it will influence your future behavior. Unconditionally commit to regularly report additional information until it is all out, or until no public interest remains. 3. Declaration: A public commitment and discussion of specific, positive steps to be taken to conclusively address the issues and resolve the situation.

without fault. Its quality is irreproachable."

There were problems with mold, a coating on some of the shipping flats, and other issues. Coke issues a formal public apology on June 22, seven weeks following the first incidents of illness. Coke's real commitment to resolving the issues comes more than five weeks after the initial series of illnesses. CEO Ivester's July 1 letter to shareholders begins "You have likely heard about . . . [Coke] is focused on quality, customer confidence, . . ." Coke made no early mention of compensating those who became ill. Coke blamed uncooperative bottlers; advice the company got from government; and media that blew the problem out of proportion.

4. Contrition: The continuing verbalization of regret, empathy, sympathy, even embarrassment. Take appropriate responsibility for having allowed the situation to occur in the first place, whether by omission, commission, accident, or negligence.

5. Consultation: Promptly ask for help and counsel from "victims," government, and from the community of origin - even from your opponents. Directly involve and request the participation of those most directly affected to help develop more permanent solutions, more acceptable behaviors, and to design principles and approaches which will preclude similar problems from re-occurring. 6. Commitment: Publicly set your goals at zero. Zero errors, zero defects, zero dumb decisions, and zero problems. Publicly promise that to the best of your ability situations like this will never occur again. 7. Restitution: Find a way to quickly pay the price. Make or require restitution. Go beyond community and victim

Coke warns investors that "second quarter earnings will be hurt due to temporary product withdrawals . . . some losses covered by insurance . . . the worst is behind us," said Ivester. "One day soon every Belgian will get a free, ice cold Coca-Cola to help forget about a health scare

expectations, and what would be required under normal circumstances to remediate the problem. Adverse situations remediated quickly cost a lot less and are controversial for much shorter periods of time.

related to the famous soft drink," Coke Chairman M. Douglas Ivester promised.

Epilogue: Just as the contamination episode began to fade from view at the end of 1999, it was revealed that Coca-Cola might test a pricing scheme that would raise the price of the soft drink in certain circumstances when its "marginally utility," according to Ivester, was more valuable (like during hot weather). Who needs enemies? The Big Lesson: Despite months of embarrassment and gaffs culminating in the "surprise" resignation of Coke's chairman, the soft drink's loyal customers appeared as committed to the drink as ever. The dramatic changes now going on at Coke would have far less visibility had the European situation been handled more positively, promptly, and conclusively. Reputation is created from the inside out. Senior managers must be able to recognize and proactively prevent the predictable risks and threats that arise from timeto-time. Active daily management of the company's identity, especially when obvious social, ethical, and reputational risks are involved, is one of the principal responsibilities of the most senior managers. Minimizing this responsibility can redefine careers when bad things happen. James E. Lukaszewski, APR, Fellow PRSA, is a specialist in managing tough, touchy, sensitive situations for very large businesses and organizations worldwide. He teaches crisis management strategy at New York University's School of Continuing and Professional Education where he is an adjunct associate professor.

By James E. Lukaszewski, APR, Fellow PRSA As Published in PBI Media LLC's PR News, February 28, 2000 Copyright 2000, James E. Lukaszewski. All rights reserved.
Copyright 2000, James E. Lukaszewski. Permission granted to reprint with attribution.

By James E. Lukaszewski, APR, Fellow PRSA As Published in Public Relations Journal, November 1987 (Revised June 2000) Copyright 1987, 2000, James E. Lukaszewski. All rights reserved.

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