DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

[FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS]

FROM THE COMMITTEE DESK OF HAMZA ASIF BUTT

Greetings Delegates, Having attended nearly 20 MUNs, including LUMUN, GIMUN and BMUN, I can assure you I have found such committees to be my favorite. This is the 7th time I have been offered to be the Director of a committee, having previously chaired at MUNPK, FROMUN and BMUN to name a few. Apart from that, I have had the honour of being the Assistant Secretary General for BMUN 2011 as well as the Chief of Staff for IBMUN and BMUN 2012. As disappointing as it seems, the level of MUNs have dropped in the recent years. It used to be a hard fight to obtain the few Outstanding Diplomacy awards given to committees in the past, battling past delegates from LSE, LUMS as well as KGS. However, it is important to realize that in parallel to my experience as a debater, I have no strict quotas for awards. The Outstanding Diplomacy awards will be given to those that deserve them, be that 3, 4 or even none if the situation demands. DISEC is one of the most technical committees of the UN. With so many legal clauses in its statute, as well as being the first committee in the UN, it is a powerful instrument in world politics. There is only 01 topic set for debate since the topic itself is very research-orientated. Personally, I shall expect the highest level of debate, formality and of course, knowledge of UN proceedings. So prepare well before hand, I expect delegates to know the difference between what states can do, and what they cannot. Believe me, when it comes to international laws, know the clauses, a command over knowledge will do you no harm. I intend to run this committee according to standards followed by MUNs worldwide, hence I encourage even the most experienced debaters to attend the help sessions (If any). While it is not expected of delegates to come up with a new disarmament treaty, I will look favourably upon any individual who attempts to do so. Coming up with a new treaty is tedious yet rewarding nonetheless. For guidance purposes, I have integrated a previous MUN Protocol in the end of the document to provide you with a template to such treaties. Do go through the study guides (Yes, they are meant to be read); they give you an outline of what is needed from the debate. However, more importantly, it is essential to enjoy the debate as well. A spicy debating atmosphere, coupled with the random entertainment sessions will ensure that at no point will this committee suffer from lack of activity. Plus, be sure to hand in the Position Papers at least three days before the debate starts. Feel free to contact me for additional queries.

Committee Director - DISEC Hamza Asif Butt (hamza_butt32@yahoo.com)

Position Papers: Position papers are documents handed before the start of debate. They are necessary to qualify for a participation certificate, let alone an award. Separate position Papers are given for separate topics. The quality of your position papers is considered when awards are decided. Position Papers normally have three paragraphs. The first contains a synopsis of the topic; discussion of the problem at hand. The second contains the stance of your respective countries towards the problem. The third contains solutions to the issue that your country proposes. Please do not plagiarize position papers as you will be immediately disqualified. Your position papers WILL be read and checked for consistency. When sent to the email given to you, name the file as: PP_Committee_Country_Topic For instance: PP_DISEC_PAKISTAN_A Only the following formats are acceptable: PDF DOC/X TXT

Please attach files to the email. Do not write your position papers in the actual email.

History of the Committee: The Disarmament and International Security Committee, or the First Committee of United Nations General Assembly, is one of the most crucial bodies of the United Nations. Dealing with issues related to security and international law, the committee discusses conflicts that are of uppermost importance to the international community. Every UN member state of the total 192 states has the right of representation within DISEC with equal voting rights. Until the 1970s, the First Committee was in charge of the political conflicts as well and was called the Political and Security Committee. In fact, there also existed a committee called Special Political Committee to help the United Nations deal with the numerous political conflicts it was facing. As the number of decolonization matters decreased the Fourth Committee, which dealt with trusteeship and decolonization conflicts took over the political aspect of the First Committee during the 1990s. The Disarmament and the International Security Committee, known as the First Committee, is a part of the United Nations General Assembly and is one of its six main committees. Taking place each year in New York in October, the committee allows all the United Nation member states to participate in its sessions. The Committee elects a chairman, three vice chairmen and a rappoteur each session to conduct its meetings. The Disarmament and International Security Committee discusses mainly key disarmament issues and international security related problems. Among the most notable accomplishments of the First Committee include the passage of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty), the establishment of NuclearWeapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) in Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty, or the Ottawa Treaty). However, the enactment of legally binding acts and therefore the coercion of states to take action or the prohibition of a certain course of action remains the task of the Security Council. Whereas the dispatch of peacekeeping forces is delegated to the domain of the Security Council, the planning of technical details concerning UN disarmament policies and their feasibility comes under the jurisdiction of the Convention on Disarmament. Consequently, DISEC cannot dictate action to be taken by any nation and its powers are restricted to passing resolutions having the character and force of recommendations. DISECs final suggestions are communicated in the form of Resolutions to the General Assembly and Security Council. Nevertheless, the character of the committee leads to resolutions that are highly respected, because they are the result of genuine agreement among the states and as a result are more likely to result in the desired action. The reason for that is the broad representation of nations and the equal voting structure within DISEC. In the past, DISEC has proved to be a valuable platform for general debate over

problems being concerned with international security; an example being the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the realization of which the Committee has made a major contribution. Nonproliferation and reduction of nuclear stockpiles and chemical or biological weapons has always been of major concern to DISEC: The Committee has attempted to establish the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and Central Asia, various arms agreements, and broad adherence to the Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The committee has also devoted itself to the peaceful development of outer space (including the establishment of a special committee to assist DISEC).

Agenda The Race to Global Zero: Prospects and Feasibility

The fact that DISEC is UNs First Committee gives us an idea of how serious the UN is about International Security. In fact, if DISEC fails to achieve its goals, the UN will soon follow the footsteps of the now obsolete League of Nations. The demand is simple Global Zero. Yet the method to obtain it is debatable. In fact, so controversial a topic has it become that some nations have lost faith in the possibility of a global zero, citing it is being practically impossible to achieve due to various reasons, which includes conflicts of interest. Past Actions: The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. While not banning tests underground, the PTBT does prohibit underground nuclear explosions that cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. The Treaty was initialed on 25 July and formally signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963. It entered into force on 10 October when the three original signatories (US, UK, USSR) deposited their instruments of ratification. The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty has not been signed by France or China. More Information: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) refers to two arms control treatiesSALT I and SALT II that were negotiated over ten years, from 1969 to 1979. The two treaties became the basis of all subsequent arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. SALT I was signed in 1972, and SALT II in 1979. The first one was ratified by both sides; the second one was observed without being ratified. More Information: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/salt2-1.htm After almost 10 years of difficult negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on 31 July 1991. Five months later, the Soviet Union dissolved and four independent states with strategic nuclear weapons on their territory came into existence -Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. START includes an intrusive verification regime consisting of a detailed data exchange, extensive notifications, 12 types of on-site inspection, and continuous monitoring activities designed to help verify that signatories are complying with their treaty obligations. Baseline inspections to confirm the accuracy of the numbers and types of items were conducted at 72 former Soviet and 35 U.S. facilities from March through June 1995. In January 1995, the United States began continuous portal monitoring activities at missile assembly plants. START contains provisions that permit up to 30 inspectors to conduct continuous portal monitoring at one U.S. and two former Soviet sites. Accordingly, a U.S. START portal was designated at a Thiokol Corporation facility in Promontory, Utah (a former Peacekeeper missile final assembly plant). In the former Soviet Union, the United States

was permitted to conduct portal monitoring at a plant in Votkinsk, Russia (an SS-25 ICBM assembly site) and a plant in Pavlohrad, Ukraine (an SS-24 ICBM assembly site). Since START's entry into force in December 1994, Russia has not exercised its treaty right to conduct continuous portal monitoring at the Thiokol facility in Promontory. Assembly of Peacekeeper missile components at Promontory ceased well before START entered into force. The U.S. has exercised its rights at Votkinsk and Pavlohrad. However, by mutual agreement with the Republic of Ukraine, the U.S. ceased perimeter and portal monitoring at the Pavlohrad Machine Plant on May 31, 1995. More Information: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/text/treatytc.htm#TREATYTOC The START-2 Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993 by President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. The Treaty codifies the Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents at the Washington Summit on June 17, 1992. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty on January 26, 1996. Ratification of the Treaty in the Russian Duma, pending since 1996, was finally completed on 14 April 2000. More Information: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start2/text/treatyar.htm New START (for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation with the formal name of Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It was signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague, and, after ratification, entered into force on 5 February 2011. It is expected to last at least until 2021. New START replaced the Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which was due to expire in December 2012. In terms of name, it is a follow-up to the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009, the proposed START II treaty, which never entered into force, and the START III treaty, for which negotiations were never concluded. Under terms of the treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers will be reduced by half. A new inspection and verification regime will be established, replacing the SORT mechanism. It does not limit the number of operationally inactive stockpiled nuclear warheads that remain in the high thousands in both the Russian and American inventories. More Information: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature on 01 July 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970. China acceded to the NPT on 09 March 1992, and France acceded on 03 August 1992. In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining former Soviet nuclear weapons located within their territories, and each of these nations has become a State Party to the NPT, as a non-nuclear-weapon state. In June 1997 Brazil became a State Party to the NPT. The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been signatories of the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003. In accordance with the terms of the NPT, on May 11, 1995 more than 170 countries attended the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York. Three decisions and one resolution emanated from NPTREC. First, the NPT was extended for an indefinite duration and without conditions. Second,

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were worked out to guide the parties to the treaty in the next phase of its implementation. Third, an enhanced review process was established for future review conferences. Finally, a resolution endorsed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. There have been no confirmed instances of official states party transfers of nuclear weapon technology or unsafeguarded nuclear materials to any non-nuclear-weapon states party. However, some non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iraq, were able to obtain sensitive technology and/or equipment from private parties in states that are signatories to the NPT. South Africa conducted an independent nuclear weapons production program prior to joining the NPT, however, it dismantled all of its nuclear weapons before signing the Treaty. In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an "Agreed Framework" bringing North Korea into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In 2003 North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Treaty effective immediately, and on October 9, 2006 became the eighth country to explode a nuclear device. More Information: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html The Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed at Moscow May 26, 1972, and ratified by the US Senate August 3, 1972. It entered into force October 3, 1972. The US and the USSR signed a Protocol to the treaty which entered into force in 1976 which reduced the number of ABM deployment areas from two to one, deployed either around each party's national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The USSR deployed an ABM system around Moscow, but the US elected not to deploy an ABM system and in 1976 deactivated its site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, around a Minuteman ICBM launch area. The Treaty was further modified by amendments, various common understandings, and protocols. Five-year review meetings are held in Geneva. On 13 December 2001 President Bush submitted to the Russian Federation formal notification of intent to abrogate the Treaty. This presents a serious challenge to maintaining international peace, security, and multi-lateral arms control agreements. On 13 June 2002 the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the ABM Treaty came into effect. More Information: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at a Washington Summit on December 8, 1987. On January 15, 1988, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 296 which instructed Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci to establish a new agency -- the On-Site Inspection Agency -- to implement the Treaty's unprecedented on-site inspection and escort responsibilities. Thirty days after the INF Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988, OSIA began inspections of 130 Soviet INF sites in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and the escort of Soviet inspection teams at 31 INF sites in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the United States. Continuous monitoring operations began in the Soviet Union and the U.S. in July 1988. By May 1991, all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers, related support equipment and support structures were eliminated. Both sides have conducted hundreds of INF inspections since 1988. INF inspection activity will continue through June 2001.

Negotiated and concluded during the Cold War, the INF Treaty contains the most comprehensive verification regime ever achieved to that point. In addition to measures to enhance national technical means of verification, the Treaty contained pioneering on-site inspection provisions, including baseline data inspections, inspections of closed-out facilities, short-notice inspections of declared sites and inspections to observe eliminations of the missile systems. It also established the first ever continuous monitoring operations at the portal and perimeters of a former missile production facility in each country to confirm that production of prohibited missiles had ceased. Altogether it resulted in the elimination by May 1991 of 846 longer-and shorter-range U.S. INF missile systems and 1846 Soviet INF missile systems, including the modernized U.S. Pershing II and Soviet SS-20 missiles. Negotiated and concluded during the Cold War, the INF Treaty contains the most comprehensive verification regime ever achieved to that point. In addition to measures to enhance national technical means of verification, the Treaty contained pioneering on-site inspection provisions, including baseline data inspections, inspections of closed-out facilities, short-notice inspections of declared sites and inspections to observe eliminations of the missile systems. It also established the first ever continuous monitoring operations at the portal and perimeters of a former missile production facility in each country to confirm that production of prohibited missiles had ceased. More Information: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf.htm The U.S.-Russian STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS (SORT / TREATY OF MOSCOW) summit held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on 24-26 May 2002, capped the process of rapprochement between the two States that began in earlier summits in Ljubljana, Genoa, Crawford, and Shanghai, with both aspiring to leave behind the logjams of the Cold War. Several documents were signed on a set of issues ranging from arms control to cooperation in the economic, energy, and information technology areas. The most publicized event of the summit was the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. This document was largely a result of compromise: the United States insisted that the two countries did not need a treaty at all, but agreed to insistent Russian proposals to conclude one. At the same time, the United States did not compromise on its top priority, freedom of choice on the fate of its decommissioned warheads, while Moscow gave up its earlier proposals for the guaranteed destruction of warheads. More Information: http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptsort.pdf The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature in 1996, is intended to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions. The CTBT has achieved near universal adherence, however, Article XIV of the Treaty requires ratification by 44 named states, before the Treaty can enter into force. Of these 44 states, three - India, Pakistan, and North Korea - have not signed the Treaty. A further six states - China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States - have signed but not ratified the Treaty. As of early 2011, Indonesia has been signalling that it will soon ratify the treaty and following the US Senate's ratification of New START, the Obama Administration has indicated that CTBT ratification will be next in line. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remains a key piece of unfinished business of the nuclear age. As a growing number of governments and decision makers put forward ideas to move the world toward abolishing nuclear weapons, much can be learned from how the CTBT was fought for, opposed and finally negotiated between 1994 and 1996. The treaty's necessity was

underlined when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted a nuclear test explosion in 2006, but more than a decade of political and institutional obstacles have prevented the CTBT from entering into full legal effect. More Information: http://disarmament.un.org/treatystatus.nsf/44e6eeabc9436b78852568770078d9c0/0655d51a3069263 2852568770079dda2?OpenDocument

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

What are the flaws of previous disarmament treaties? What ideologies should be kept in mind while making disarmament treaties? Are new verification protocols necessary for the success of any prospective disarmament treaty? Why did the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) fizzle out? What were the prospects of the Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and NonProliferation, 2010? Do we need a globalized disarmament plan or should the treaties be separate for every nation? Should a new Disarmament Treaty be constructed?

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE TREATY/CONVENTION/PROTOCOL

PROTOCOL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE Preamble The State Parties to this Protocol,
Recalling the promise of this body to ensure the peace and protection of the people of this world as well as the articles of United Nations charter, Recognizing the danger posed to the world population and to civilization as a whole due to the advent and spread of nuclear weapons technology, Reaffirming our commitment to the Non Proliferation treaty which was signed here on the 1st of July, 1968 and has since been in effect and the 1996 UN resolution calling upon the setting up of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, Alarmed by the ambiguous nature of some nations nuclear programs, Taking into account the right of every nation to pursue the research and development of nuclear technology for peaceful and civilian purposes, Guided by the definition of Civilian, Nuclear and Nuclear weapons technology as defined by the IAEA, Concerned for the survival and continuity of the Human species, Mindful of the consequences and dangers as well as potential benefits of nuclear technology both that of military and civilian nature,

Hereby agree on the following: I. General provisions Article 1 Statement of Purpose

The purposes of this protocol are: (a) To lay down the basis for establishing a nuclear weapons free zone keeping in mind the sovereignty of a nation; To promote co-operation between member States to achieve this goal.

(b)

Article 2 Boundaries of a nuclear weapons free zone formed under the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Zone Treaty
A nuclear weapons free zone under the NPZT will constitute as the following: 1. An area where the testing, procurement, production, possession and/or acquisition of nuclear weapons (of any sort) or nuclear weapons components (of any sort) or nuclear weapons fuel (of any sort) is prohibited. All nuclear facilities for civilian, medical and/or research use (or for any other peaceful use) must be de-militarized (apart from the normal minimal security protocols needed for protection), be open for full inspection from the IAEA (as it seems fit, whenever it seems fit) and must be declared to the IAEA (if they have not been done so already) 6 months prior to their operation (if they are not already operating) within implementation of this treaty. Countries in an area under the articles of this treaty are not ordered to suspend research, development and/or production of conventional weaponry. All nations within the area/s where the NPZT is being implemented will be allowed to pursue civilian nuclear technology, regardless of the fact if they are signatories of the NPT or not, but they must be signatories of some form of IAEA acknowledged Safe guards agreement, but only if all facilities are open for unhindered inspections from the IAEA. All nations under the area/s where the NPZT is enforced must stop production (and must dismember already existing systems) of nuclear weapons delivery systems capable of firing any form of nuclear warhead over any kind of range.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Article 3 Methods of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons

The UNSC may decide to implement a nuclear weapons free zone onto a geographical area of land or on areas of land occupied by specific nation states. The NPZT can only be applied on an area if the current and legal governments/representatives of the people living in that area agree to it and have ratified this treaty and understand each of its clauses without ambiguity. Within 6 months of implementation of this treaty within an area the method of procedure will be as follows: 1. Following the end of the 6 month period an IAEA delegation (of any number, nationality and/or rank), personally chosen by the UNSC, will visit all the countries within the area to begin fully transparent inspections of all the declared and undeclared nuclear facilities within the designated countries. All nations within this zone, in adherence to this treaty will allow them to carry out unhindered inspections and will guarantee their security and well being. These IAEA inspection teams will enter all countries within the zone on which the NPZT is being implemented, at latest 2 months after the end of the 6 month preparatory period earlier mentioned.

2.

3.

The IAEA delegation will be allowed to take up to a year (from the moment they enter the country that is being inspected) to carry out their inspections in a truly comprehensive manner and at the end of that year provide a report on their findings. Countries with an already active nuclear program (military or civilian) public or covert will formally suspend enrichment (of any kind) of nuclear fuel (of any kind). The IAEA delegation will, at the end of its inspection, release a report on its findings. It will highlight any discrepancies found and will provide an assessment of its findings. Teams handling separate countries might complete their reports earlier but they will only be published together at the end of the year. The UNSC and the general assembly of the UN (exclusively DISEC) will only be able to view these reports. These reports will only become public after 10 years of their publication. Nuclear weapons found by the IAEA in the NPZT area/s countries will be de-armed: their nuclear fuel will be extracted and sold to the NSG with a waiver of special considerations, it will be ensured that the NSG does not take advantage of these nations and pays them an equal amount of money to the nuclear fuel bought at the standard market rate. The IAEA will inspect this process with great scrutiny and the fuel sold to the NSG will be inspected as to ascertain it is handled and used responsibly. The IAEA will inspect all Civilian nuclear facilities in the area/s of the NPZT and will award it a safety rating, only with an adequate rating will the facility be allowed to operate, any money earned by selling the weapons grade nuclear fuel will be used by the country to refurbish and renovate the facility to make it up to the standard. All nations within the NPZT area/s which wish to use nuclear weapons hardware, technology and/or fuel for research purposes can only do so by the approval of the IAEA and UN general assembly (exclusively DISEC). If the IAEA allows them a waiver to procure or build said technology and to use and test it, it will be done so under the scrutiny of IAEA inspectors, after which the disposal of said technology or fuel will also be carried out in a responsible fashion under the scrutiny of these inspectors.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Article 4 Maintenance of the Nuclear weapons free zones under the NPZT
All signatories of this treaty hereby ratify that they will: 1. Not provide, help in the production of or sell nuclear weapons technology to the nations under the NPZT area/s. Not provide any form of nuclear fuel enriched to a higher level than needed for civilian purposes and will not provide any information on how this enrichment is possible to nations in the NPZT area/s. Not threaten to or attack any nation under the NPZT area/s with (any form) of nuclear weapons technology. Restrict any hostile attentions and will pursue every course of diplomatic action before pursuing a military action against nations in the NPZT area/s. Promise to provide to: in the form of aid, military technology and/or soldiers, a UN mandate within the NPZT area/s either to maintain peace or enforce this treaty.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

Respect the national integrity and sovereignty of the nations within the NPZT area. Provide any and all information they might have of this treaty being violated in any way by any state or non state actor of the global community to the UNSC, may the violator be part of the NPZT area/s or not or a signatory of this treaty or not. The IAEA under a mandate of the UNSC will keep running inspections (as and whenever it seems fit) in an NPZT area and will keep producing reports annually which will be presented to the UNSC upon completion of inspection. All nations in the NPZT must not and cannot hinder the inspection process in any way or form and must make all information and sites available to IAEA inspectors. Adhere to all articles of this protocol within the NPZT designated area/s and will enforce this adherence on all state and non state actors within the area/s if their country is within the defined NPZT area/s.

8.

9.

Article 5 Definitions of terms

All terms within this protocol are defined as follows: 1. This treaty means the present protocol. 2. 3. The Nuclear prohibition zone treaty (NPZT) means present protocol. The definitions of Nuclear, Nuclear weapons, Nuclear weapons technology, Nuclear weapons fuel, Nuclear weapons hardware, Civilian nuclear technology, Nuclear facility and any other nuclear terms are the definitions followed by the IAEA and the UN.

4. The UNSC means the United Nations Security Council. 5. The P-5 members mean the current five permanent members of the UNSC, who have the ability to veto any resolution, which at the signing of this treaty are: the United States of America, The United Kingdom, the Republic of France, the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China.

6. The NSG means the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries. 7. The IAEA means the International Atomic Energy Agency. 8. The UN means United Nations. 9. The UN charter means the charter that was produced on 26th June 1945 and has been signed, ratified and been accepted by all UN countries.

II.

Non-compliance Article 6

Consequences for violators of the NPZT

Violators of the NPZT are any nations or individuals that do not adhere to or blatantly violate any of the articles or clauses of this treaty within a designated NPZT nuclear weapons free zone. The UNSC P-5 members resolve to take immediate and timely action against any state or non state actors, if any such valid evidence of the said violation of this treaty is presented towards them. The UNSC promises to pass binding resolutions asking the violator/s to halt whatever action/s they are committing, which violate the treaty, within a deadline of 30 days. If at the end of those 30 days (or whenever sooner at the discretion of the UNSC members) the P5 will vote on passing resolutions which might and will include: 1. 2. An enforced economic, trade and arms embargo on the violating nation/s or organization/s or person/s. Confiscation of travelling rights of those individuals responsible for the violation

3. Sanctions 4. Appropriate military action in the form of a UN mandated military force.

III.

Final Provisions Article 7

Settlement of disputes
1. States Parties shall endeavor to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol through negotiation. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Protocol that cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court. Each State Party may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Protocol, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 2 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 2 of this article with respect to any State Party that has made such a reservation. Any State Party that has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2.

3.

4.

Article 8 Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession

1. This Protocol shall be open to all States for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York until 12 December 2012.

2.

This Protocol shall also be open for signature by regional economic integration organizations provided that at least one member State of such organization has signed this Protocol in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. A regional economic integration organization may deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval if at least one of its member States has done likewise. In that instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, such organization shall declare the extent of its competence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. Such organization shall also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of its competence. This Protocol is open for accession by any State or any regional economic integration organization of which at least one member State is a Party to this Protocol. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At the time of its accession, a regional economic integration organization shall declare the extent of its competence with respect to matters governed by this Protocol. Such organization shall also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of its competence.

3.

4.

Article 9 Entry into force

1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, except that it shall not enter into force before the entry into force of the Convention. For the purpose of this paragraph, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by member States of such organization. For each State or regional economic integration organization ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Protocol after the deposit of the fortieth instrument of such action, this Protocol shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or organization of the relevant instrument or on the date this Protocol enters into force pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is the later.

2.

Article 10 Amendment
1. After the expiry of five years from the entry into force of this Protocol, a State Party to the Protocol may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereupon communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties and to the Conference of the Parties to the Convention for the purpose of considering and deciding on the proposal. The States Parties to this Protocol meeting at the Conference of the Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agreement has been reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, require for its adoption a two-thirds majority vote of the States Parties to this Protocol present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of the Parties. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote under this article with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such organizations shall not exercise their right to vote if their member States exercise theirs and vice versa.

2.

3.

An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States Parties. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article shall enter into force in respect of a State Party ninety days after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of such amendment. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties which have expressed their consent to be bound by it. Other States Parties shall still be bound by the provisions of this Protocol and any earlier amendments that they have ratified, accepted or approved.

4.

5.

Article 11 Denunciation
1. A State Party may denounce this Protocol by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such denunciation shall become effective one year after the date of receipt of their notification by the Secretary-General. A regional economic integration organization shall cease to be a Party to this Protocol when all of its member States have denounced it.

2.

Article 12 Depositary and languages

1. 2. The Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated depositary of this Protocol. The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol.

Approved by the General Assembly Passed unanimously by the UNSC

Signed and approved Secretary General