Pembunuhan-Pembunuhan Massal Yang Terjadi Di Indonesia!

Anti Communist Massacres

Guest Writer Spew It All writes about the nature of the anti-communist massacres of 1965-66.

Misunderstandings
One regular writer for Indonesiamatters.com (Ross) submitted his article on communism and genocide in Indonesia, a riposte to a piece by Julia Suryakusumah in the Indonesian English-language newspaper the Jakarta Post. The article succeeded in provoking much debate, but sadly, some of the discussion still reflects how poorly misunderstood the killings of 1965/66 are.

History
The massacres of 1965 have been the biggest conundrum in Indonesian history. The communist members and their partisans were hunted and killed gruesomely by their fellow Indonesians with support from the military. The killings took place following the failed coup attempt carried out by several military officers and a few members of the Communist Party. Parallel to this, transition of power also occurred. Sukarno, who reigned in the country for more than twenty years, was replaced by Suharto, an army general who later headed Indonesia for more than thirty years.

Official Accounts
During the Suharto period, the stories of massacres seemed to be forgotten. Official history only highlights the heroic action of the Indonesian army that successfully crushed communism in Indonesia. This constructed truth is perpetuated further through enactments in various museums, films and school history textbooks. Much worse than that is the New Orders representation of that bloody event seeing it as merely horizontal conflicts between the PKI masses and their bitter rivals. Any alternative interpretation was an anathema in Indonesia during Suharto regime. Gaol and others sanctions would be the consequence for contesting the New Order version of history. Books written by scholars were banned and the writers were refused to enter the country.

Research
Despite these problems, some scholars succeeded in conducting researches on what happened in 1965 including Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz, Geoffrey Robinson, Harold Crouch, and John Roosa. Not all these scholars agree with the idea that the killings were state-sponsored violence.

Horizontal-Spontaneous Conflict
Sulistyo, Sudjatmiko and Geertz are the proponent of horizontal theory. There seems to be no dissimilarity between their conclusions and the official version released by the government of Indonesia. The Army Information Centre (PUSPENAD), which launched its report a year after the coup took place, suggested that the mass anger could not be controlled. [1] Likewise, twenty years later, the Indonesian State Secretary used the term, spontaneous mass action against the PKI to describe the ferocity of the event. [2]

Military-State Sponsored Violence

A differing view is put forward by another historian, Hilmar Farid, who suggested that the task of disputing this view is not too intellectually challenging, because blatant evidence can reveal the involvement of state apparatus. [3]

Early Military Role

There are important factors that should be taken into account, if we want to look at the military role in the killings. Firstly, the militarys immediate action to control media by closing down all media except Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha, which were owned by the Army. [4] By closing down media outlets, it enabled them to create fear through propaganda and the fabricated story of the PKI as the main culprit in the killings of seven generals spread out easily. Moreover, the military publications also reported that military operations to purge communism in Indonesias outer region had succeeded in seizing firearms, grenades and documents revealing the coup plans. This would clearly make people under the impression that the PKI was ready to launch a coup. Secondly, Suharto was appointed to head the Operational Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkokamtib) and commenced an effective campaign against the PKI. In conjunction with the military campaign, KAP Gestapu (Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement) was formed by an alliance of anti-Communist organisations and their overall campaign mantra and objective was to crush the PKI down its roots.

Secret Cable Message

There was also a report that the military was involved in the training of youth organisations. According to a cable sent by the US embassy in Jakarta to State Department in November 1965, the Indonesian Army would try to avoid direct confrontation with the PKI. In Central Java, Army (RPKAD) is training Moslem Youth [probably either Banser or HMI] and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against the PKI. Army will try to avoid as much it can safely do so, direct confrontation with the PKI Army is letting groups other than Army discredit them [the PKI] and demand their punishment. [5]

Having said this, it can be argued that the training was inextricably linked to the campaign programme and the strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with the PKI.

Bali
The support from the military is significant as in some areas the number of the PKI members and its opponents seemed to be on a par. For example, the killings in Bali did not take place until the middle of December 1965. Although tension heightened between two dominant factions in Bali, the PNI and the PKI, it did not culminate in the bloodshed. With the arrival of troops from Jakarta, the anti-communist camp held more sway. [6]

Central Java
In Central Java, the arrests and killings took place not long after the arrival of RPKAD (the Indonesian Special Forces) headed by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. The troops arrived in Semarang on 18th October 1965 and then fanned out to other towns. A witness, Suparno, recalled what happened before he was accused of planning to overthrow the head of the region and arrested and imprisoned for decades. He remembered that the troops paraded in his town Pati, before stopping at the town hall and delivering a speech on what had happened in Jakarta. The operations were then carried out in the next days. [7] With the support from civilian militias, the operations were done easily. The military provided trucks and the militias helped with information or even took part in the killings.

Rivers of Blood
As many may have heard the colour of the River Brantas in East Java, turned to red during the horrific months. Rivers were perhaps the favourite places for the killers to dump the bodies. The reason might be practical as the current would take the bodies away. However, the floating bodies in the river might be containing a powerful message for Indonesians. As if they liked to say through the river: communists should end up like this!

Associate Organisations
Noteworthy, not all of victims were actually communists. Even Gerwani and the labour unions were not officially part of the Communist Party. These organisations worked together with the PKI on several occasions, unlike Pemuda Rakyat, which was officially the youth wing of the party. One survivor admitted that he was a member of an Islamic party, Masyumi, but was arrested. [8] It is denunciation behind this false accusation. Chinese people were amongst the victims but they were by no means a majority.

Imprisonment
The fates of victims in prisons were not better than those who were summarily executed. Tortures and killings could happen even in the prisons. Some commentators

suggested that the number of inmates shrank in several regions. Zakaria, a leader of youth organisation, who carried out interrogations of prisoners in Lombok, admitted that after August 1966, the number of communist prisoners had decreased. [9] In Kediri, this similar method of killings also took place, albeit under the different name of Operasi Teratur or Organised Operation, and resulted in a greater number of victims. [10] For female prisoners, beside tortures, they were also subject to sexual harassments. Nona, a woman who was arrested, was forced to have sex with the military officer and then became pregnant and delivered her baby in the camp. [11] For three decades this horror remained untold. But following the downfall of Suharto, many stories of the massacres began to emerge. Survivors who were released from prison wrote their memoirs giving their accounts on that crucial moment in Indonesian history.

The Future
Discussion on what happened on 1965 is still centred on the mastermind of the coup, however. The pitfall of this over-attention on mastermind may lead to assuming the killings as separated from the establishment of the New Order. As Robert Cribb lamented in his article, the unsolved biggest question is not whodunit but can it happen again? [12] It is important for Indonesians to contemplate the later question if they want to build a more democratic Indonesian in the future.

Anti Komunis Massacres

January 25th, 2008, in Opinion , by Guest Writer 25 Januari 2008, di Opini, oleh Penulis Tamu Guest Writer Spew It All writes about the nature of the anti-communist massacres of 1965-66. Penulis Tamu memuntahkan Semua ini menulis tentang sifat yang antikomunis massacres dari 1965-66.

Misunderstandings / Kesalahpahaman
One regular writer for Indonesiamatters.com ( Ross ) submitted his article on communism and genocide in Indonesia , a riposte to a piece by Julia Suryakusumah in the Indonesian English-language newspaper the Jakarta Post. Biasa satu penulis untuk Indonesiamatters.com (Samarinda) diajukan artikelnya pada komunisme dan Genosida di Indonesia, untuk suatu tindakan balasan oleh Julia Suryakusumah di Indonesia bahasa Inggris-koran Jakarta Post. The article succeeded in provoking much debate, but

sadly, some of the discussion still reflects how poorly misunderstood the killings of 1965/66 are. Artikel berhasil membuat banyak perdebatan, tetapi kurang sehat, beberapa dari diskusi masih mencerminkan bagaimana disalahfaham yang buruk dari pembunuhan 1965/66 adalah.

History / Sejarah
The massacres of 1965 have been the biggest conundrum in Indonesian history. Massacres 1965 yang telah menjadi teka-teki terbesar dalam sejarah Indonesia. The communist members and their partisans were hunted and killed gruesomely by their fellow Indonesians with support from the military. Anggota yang komunis dan mereka dan partisans buruan yang dibunuh oleh mereka gruesomely sesama Indonesia dengan dukungan dari militer. The killings took place following the failed coup attempt carried out by several military officers and a few members of the Communist Party. Pembunuhan yang terjadi setelah gagal membalikkan upaya dilakukan oleh beberapa pejabat militer dan beberapa anggota Partai Komunis. Parallel to this, transition of power also occurred. Sejajar dengan ini, transisi kekuasaan juga terjadi. Sukarno, who reigned in the country for more than twenty years, was replaced by Suharto , an army general who later headed Indonesia for more than thirty years. Sukarno, yang memerintah di negara untuk lebih dari dua puluh tahun, diganti oleh Suharto, an army umum yang kemudian kepala Indonesia selama lebih dari tiga puluh tahun.

Official Accounts / Resmi Account

During the Suharto period, the stories of massacres seemed to be forgotten. Selama periode Suharto, kisah dari massacres nampaknya akan lupa. Official history only highlights the heroic action of the Indonesian army that successfully crushed communism in Indonesia. Sejarah resmi hanya menyoroti tindakan heroik dari tentara Indonesia yang berhasil dilumatkan komunisme di Indonesia. This constructed truth is perpetuated further through enactments in various museums, films and school history textbooks. Ini adalah kebenaran dibangun perpetuated lebih lanjut melalui enactments di berbagai museum, film dan buku sejarah sekolah. Much worse than that is the New Orders representation of that bloody event seeing it as merely horizontal conflicts between the PKI masses and their bitter rivals. Jauh lebih buruk daripada yang Orde Baru's keterwakilan yang melihat peristiwa berdarah itu hanya sebagai konflik horisontal antara massa PKI dan pahit saingan mereka. Any alternative interpretation was an anathema in Indonesia during Suharto regime. Setiap alternatif interpretasi adalah anathema di Indonesia selama rezim Soeharto. Gaol and others sanctions would be the consequence for contesting the New Order version of history. Penjara dan sanksi lain akan memperhatikan Menyoal Orde Baru versi sejarah. Books written by scholars were banned and the writers were refused to enter the country. Buku-buku yang ditulis oleh cendekiawan telah diblokir dan penulis telah menolak untuk memasuki negara.

Research / Penelitian
Despite these problems, some scholars succeeded in conducting researches on what happened in 1965 including Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz, Geoffrey Robinson, Harold Crouch, and John Roosa. Walaupun masalah ini, beberapa

cendekiawan berhasil melakukan penelitian tentang apa yang terjadi di tahun 1965 termasuk Hermawan Sulistyo, Iwan Sudjatmiko, Clifford Geertz, Geoffrey Robinson, Harold Crouch, dan John Roosa. Not all these scholars agree with the idea that the killings were state-sponsored violence. Tidak semua beasiswa tersebut setuju dengan ide bahwa pembunuhan yang disponsori negara-kekerasan.

Horizontal-Spontaneous Conflict / Konflik horizontal-spontan

Sulistyo, Sudjatmiko and Geertz are the proponent of horizontal theory. Sulistyo, Sudjatmiko dan Geertz adalah pendukung dari "horisontal teori". There seems to be no dissimilarity between their conclusions and the official version released by the government of Indonesia. Sepertinya tidak ada perbedaan antara mereka dan kesimpulan versi resmi diluncurkan oleh pemerintah Indonesia. The Army Information Centre (PUSPENAD), which launched its report a year after the coup took place, suggested that the mass anger could not be controlled. [1] Likewise, twenty years later, the Indonesian State Secretary used the term, spontaneous mass action against the PKI to describe the ferocity of the event. [2] Angkatan darat Information Center (PUSPENAD), yang meluncurkan laporan setelah satu tahun pemerintahan berlangsung, mengemukakan bahwa massa marah tidak dapat dikontrol. [1] Demikian pula, dua puluh tahun kemudian, Sekretaris Negara Indonesia istilah yang digunakan, "spontan massa tindakan terhadap PKI "untuk menjelaskan kekejaman dari acara. [2]

Military-State Sponsored Violence / Militer-negara yang disponsori kekerasan

A differing view is put forward by another historian, Hilmar Farid, who suggested that the task of disputing this view is not too intellectually challenging, because blatant evidence can reveal the involvement of state apparatus. [3] Sebuah tampilan yang berbeda diletakkan maju lain oleh sejarawan, Hilmar Farid, yang mengemukakan bahwa tugas disputing pandangan ini tidak terlalu layan menantang, karena ribut bukti dapat mengungkapkan keterlibatan aparat negara. [3]

Early Military Role / Peran militer awal

There are important factors that should be taken into account, if we want to look at the military role in the killings. Ada faktor penting yang harus diperhatikan, jika kita ingin melihat peran militer dalam pembunuhan. Firstly, the militarys immediate action to control media by closing down all media except Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha, which were owned by the Army. [4] By closing down media outlets, it enabled them to create fear through propaganda and the fabricated story of the PKI as the main culprit in the killings of seven generals spread out easily. Pertama, militer's tindakan segera untuk mengontrol media dengan penutupan semua media kecuali Angkatan Bersenjata dan Berita Yudha, yang dimiliki oleh Angkatan Darat. [4] Dengan penutupan outlet media, ini memungkinkan mereka untuk membuat takut melalui propaganda dan yg siap untuk dimakan kisah PKI sebagai jahat utama dalam pembunuhan dari tujuh Umum tersebar dengan mudah. Moreover, the military publications also reported that military operations to purge communism in Indonesias outer region had succeeded in seizing firearms, grenades and documents revealing the coup plans. Selain itu, militer publikasi juga melaporkan

bahwa operasi militer untuk menyingkirkan komunisme di luar wilayah Indonesia telah berhasil dalam perebutan api, grenades dan dokumen yang mengungkapkan rencana tindakan. This would clearly make people under the impression that the PKI was ready to launch a coup. Hal ini jelas akan membuat orang di bawah kesan bahwa PKI telah siap untuk memulai minggu. Secondly, Suharto was appointed to head the Operational Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkokamtib) and commenced an effective campaign against the PKI. Kedua, Suharto diangkat ke kepala Komandan Operasi untuk Pembangunan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Pangkokamtib) dan mulai kampanye yang efektif terhadap PKI. In conjunction with the military campaign, KAP Gestapu (Action Front to Crush the Thirtieth of September Movement) was formed by an alliance of anti-Communist organisations and their overall campaign mantra and objective was to Dalam kaitannya dengan kampanye militer, KAP Gestapu (Front Aksi untuk Crush yang ketigapuluh September Gerakan) telah dibentuk oleh sebuah aliansi anti-Komunis dan organisasi wartawan dan keseluruhan kampanye ini bertujuan untuk crush the PKI down its roots. "Crush PKI bawah akarnya."

Secret Cable Message / Rahasia Kabel Pesan

There was also a report that the military was involved in the training of youth organisations. Ada juga melaporkan bahwa militer telah terlibat dalam pelatihan dari organisasi pemuda. According to a cable sent by the US embassy in Jakarta to State Department in November 1965, the Indonesian Army would try to avoid direct confrontation with the PKI. Menurut sebuah kabel dikirim oleh kedutaan Amerika Serikat di Jakarta untuk Negara Departemen pada bulan November 1965, Indonesia Angkatan Darat akan mencoba untuk menghindari konfrontasi langsung dengan PKI.

Bali
The support from the military is significant as in some areas the number of the PKI members and its opponents seemed to be on a par. Dukungan dari militer yang signifikan seperti di beberapa daerah jumlah anggota PKI dan lawan nampaknya akan di par. For example, the killings in Bali did not take place until the middle of December 1965. Misalnya, pembunuhan di Bali tidak berlangsung sampai pertengahan Desember 1965. Although tension heightened between two dominant factions in Bali, the PNI and the PKI, it did not culminate in the bloodshed. Meskipun heightened ketegangan antara dua golongan dominan di Bali, yang PNI dan PKI, tidak berujung pada darah. With the arrival of troops from Jakarta, the anti-communist camp held more sway. [6] Dengan kedatangan ekspedisi dari Jakarta, anti-komunis kamp diselenggarakan lebih lenggok. [6]

Central Java Jawa Tengah

In Central Java, the arrests and killings took place not long after the arrival of RPKAD (the Indonesian Special Forces) headed by Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. Di Jawa Tengah, penahanan dan pembunuhan berlangsung tidak lama setelah kedatangan RPKAD (Indonesia Angkatan Khusus) dipimpin oleh Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. The troops arrived in Semarang on 18th October 1965 and then fanned out to other towns. Pasukan yang tiba di Semarang pada tanggal 18 Oktober 1965 dan kemudian fanned ke kota-kota lain.

A witness, Suparno, recalled what happened before he was accused of planning to overthrow the head of the region and arrested and imprisoned for decades. Seorang saksi, Suparno, mengingat apa yang terjadi sebelum dia dituduh perencanaan untuk menggulingkan kepala daerah dan ditangkap dan dipenjarakan untuk dekade. He remembered that the troops paraded in his town Pati, before stopping at the town hall and delivering a speech on what had happened in Jakarta. Dia diingat bahwa pasukan paraded di kota Pati, sebelum berhenti di balai kota dan menyampaikan pidato pada apa yang telah terjadi di Jakarta. The operations were then carried out in the next days. [7] With the support from civilian militias, the operations were done easily. Operasi ini kemudian dilakukan pada hari berikutnya. [7] Dengan dukungan dari milisia sipil, operasi yang dilakukan dengan mudah. The military provided trucks and the militias helped with information or even took part in the killings. Militer dan truk yang disediakan milisia membantu dengan informasi atau bahkan ikut serta dalam pembunuhan.

Rivers of Blood / Sungai dari Darah

As many may have heard the colour of the River Brantas in East Java, turned to red during the horrific months. Seperti banyak yang memiliki warna mendengar dari Sungai Brantas di Jawa Timur, menjadi merah selama bulan menyeramkan. Rivers were perhaps the favourite places for the killers to dump the bodies. Sungai yang mungkin "favorit" tempat bagi orang untuk dump badan. The reason might be practical as the current would take the bodies away. Sebabnya mungkin praktis seperti saat ini akan mengambil badan jauh. However, the floating bodies in the river might be containing a powerful message for Indonesians. Namun, badan apung di sungai mungkin berisi pesan yang ampuh untuk Indonesia. As if they liked to say through the river: Karena jika mereka suka mengatakan melalui sungai: communists should end up like this! komunis harus berakhir seperti ini!

Associate Organisations / Associate Organisasi

Noteworthy, not all of victims were actually communists. Penting, tidak semua korban yang sebetulnya komunis. Even Gerwani and the labour unions were not officially part of the Communist Party. Bahkan Gerwani dan serikat pekerja tidak resmi bagian dari Partai Komunis. These organisations worked together with the PKI on several occasions, unlike Pemuda Rakyat, which was officially the youth wing of the party. Organisasi ini bekerja sama dengan PKI pada beberapa kesempatan, tidak seperti Pemuda Rakyat, yang secara resmi sayap pemuda dari partai. One survivor admitted that he was a member of an Islamic party, Masyumi, but was arrested. [8] It is denunciation behind this false accusation. Satu club mengakui bahwa dia adalah seorang anggota dari sebuah partai Islam, Masyumi, tetapi telah ditangkap. [8] Ini adalah pengkhianatan di belakang tuduhan palsu ini. Chinese people were amongst the victims but they were by no means a majority. Orang Cina di antara para korban, tetapi mereka tidak mayoritas.

Imprisonment / Penjara
The fates of victims in prisons were not better than those who were summarily executed. Ini nasib korban dalam penjara tidak lebih baik dari orang-orang yang ringkasnya dilaksanakan. Tortures and killings could happen even in the prisons. Penyiksaan dan pembunuhan bisa terjadi bahkan dalam penjara. Some commentators suggested that the number of inmates shrank in several regions. Beberapa komentator mengemukakan bahwa jumlah kapel shrank di beberapa daerah. Zakaria, a leader of youth organisation, who carried out interrogations of prisoners in Lombok, admitted that after August 1966, the number of communist prisoners had decreased. [9] Zakaria, seorang pemimpin organisasi pemuda, yang dilakukan interrogations narapidana di Lombok, mengakui bahwa setelah Agustus 1966, jumlah narapidana komunis telah menurun. [9] In Kediri, this similar method of killings also took place, albeit under the different name of Operasi Teratur or Organised Operation, and resulted in a greater number of victims. [10] Di Kediri, metode ini serupa juga terjadi pembunuhan, walaupun di bawah nama yang berbeda Operasi Teratur atau diatur Operasi, dan menghasilkan lebih banyak korban. [10] For female prisoners, beside tortures, they were also subject to sexual harassments. Untuk tahanan perempuan, selain Penyiksaan, mereka juga tunduk pada pelecehan seksual. Nona, a woman who was arrested, was forced to have sex with the military officer and then became pregnant and delivered her baby in the camp. [11] Nona, seorang wanita yang telah ditangkap, dipaksa melakukan hubungan seks dengan aparat militer dan kemudian menjadi hamil dan melahirkan bayinya di kamp. [11] For three decades this horror remained untold. Untuk tiga dekade ini horor tetap tak terhingga. But following the downfall of Suharto, many stories of the massacres began to emerge. Tetapi setelah kejatuhan Suharto, banyak cerita dari massacres mulai muncul. Survivors who were released from prison wrote their memoirs giving their accounts on that crucial moment in Indonesian history. Korban yang dilepaskan dari penjara wrote mereka memberikan riwayat account mereka pada saat yang penting dalam sejarah Indonesia.

The Future / Masa Depan

Discussion on what happened on 1965 is still centred on the mastermind of the coup, however. Diskusi tentang apa yang terjadi pada 1965 masih terpusat pada otak dari pemerintahan, namun. The pitfall of this over-attention on mastermind may lead to assuming the killings as separated from the establishment of the New Order. Jebakan yang selama ini-perhatian pada otak dapat mengakibatkan anggap sebagai pembunuhan yang terpisah dari pembentukan Orde Baru. As Robert Cribb lamented in his article, the unsolved biggest question is not Seperti Robert Cribb almarhumi dalam artikelnya, pertanyaan yang belum terjawab terbesar adalah tidak whodunit "Cerita detektif" but tetapi

can it happen again? [12] "Bisa terjadi lagi?" [12] It is important for Indonesians to contemplate the later question if they want to build a more democratic Indonesian in the future. Adalah penting untuk Indonesia untuk memikirkan pertanyaan yang nanti jika mereka ingin membangun Indonesia yang lebih demokratis di masa depan.

May 1998 Jakarta Riots

May 16th, 2008, in Opinion, by Guest Writer Spew looks back on the May 1998 riots and the issues of mass rapes, anti-Chinese sentiment, and how the rioters came to be judged. It has been a decade since Reformasi (reform) movement took place in Indonesia that succeeded in forcing Suharto to step down. Every year after the movement, media and political and social analysts reflect on what has happened and has been happening since Suharto was ousted. Since reform is the grand theme, these reflections therefore highlight the progress of reform in Indonesia. Although many topics can be written regarding reformasi in Indonesia only democracy and political reforms are arguably having much more attention than other issues. Having said this, I would like to shift the focus away from political reforms and democracy and reflect on the riots that took place in Indonesia. The riots shocked the international community and may have changed their views on the Indonesian people. To some extent, the riots may have confirmed the wide representation of Indonesian people as having an amok culture. The friendly, hospitable, and inclusive attitude can suddenly turn into vicious, violent, and barbaric acts. When one of the Bali Bombing perpetrators Amrozi had his picture taken in foreign media, people bewildered with his smile: how can he smile after killing innocent people? There seems no other alternative to explain this perplexing phenomenon but put it into a cultural category box called amok. Not long after the riots which took place in Solo, Medan, Jakarta, and Surabaya, Indonesians were shocked to know that many people were burnt to death in malls and shopping centres. The government, however, labelled them looters. Quoting the government, media outlets played an important role in perpetuating the representation of people who were burnt to death in malls. In their headlines, looters emerged as a product of discourse on representation of poor people in Indonesia. Labelling them looters instead of victims will impact on how big was the states responsibility for the dead people. Looters can be equated with criminals and with their deaths, the state should not be responsible for dealing with criminals. Labelling them looters also denies the history of well-being of the poor in Indonesia. These looters are victims of structural violence stemming from unfair economic development. According to a report released by Jakarta based non-governmental organisation, Volunteer Team for Humanity, the total death toll was about 1200 people [1]. The majority of the dead were those who were trapped in the burning shopping centres.

What made the riot gaining more attention, however, was the rape of the Indonesian Chinese. The stories of rapes appeared publicly not long after the news of more than a thousand deaths in malls emerged. It was Jakarta based NGO, Volunteer Team for Humanity (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan-TRuK) that brought up the issue about the rapes. According to their report, hundreds of Chinese women were gangraped. [2] Yet, this appalling news did not immediately receive sympathetic gestures. In fact, doubts were voiced publicly as to whether the rapes indeed had taken place. In response to the rapes issue, the Indonesian Minister of Womens Affair Tutty Alawiyah, for instance, contested the data provided by TRuK and asked for concrete proof regarding the mass rape. [3] Similarly, Roesmanhadi the Chief of the Indonesian Police contended that the failure of providing concrete data meant that NGOs could be charged with disseminating lies. [4] Responding to the furore over mass rapes as well as international pressure to deal with these rapes the Indonesian government formed a joint fact finding commission (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Kerusuhan Mei 13-15) in which government and NGO were expected to work together to solve this puzzle. Although working within a strict time constraint, this commission finally completed its report and suggested that the riot was a result of political tension at elite level and worsening economic condition. The report, however, did not draw a conclusion that mass rapes were systematic violence but only confirmed that such acts happened simultaneously with the riot and that among those rapes were some that were carried out with particular purposes. [5] The raging debate over the mass rapes seemed to impact on the representation of the riots. Once the stories of rapes unfolded, discourse on rapes submerged the other gloomy stories such as those who were burnt to death in the shopping centres. During that time, anti-Chinese became a lexicon that is often used to understand the riots. Indeed, anti-Chinese sentiment was played up at that time. But one should bear in mind that political marginalisation towards Chinese people throughout Indonesian history may have contributed to Indonesian peoples understanding of their identities. AntiChinese sentiments, in this respect were constructed in order to lay foundation of what constituted Indonesia or pribumi. When the riots took place, the anti-Chinese sentiments were played up in order to represent the violence as something natural which stemmed from the tension between pribumi and non-pribumi. In other words, these urban poor were dead when they would like to loot things from Chinese stores. And the rapes were merely manifestation of frustration derived from imbalance economic status between Chinese and non-Chinese. As one crucial element to understand violence are the victims, the existence of victims who died in shopping malls and Chinese victims could help us to deconstruct the representations of May 1998 violence. Yet, in doing so we should not be differentiating them based on racial lines as this will only perpetuate the New Order logic. What we should look at regarding the May violence is that race can be a powerful discourse in producing the knowledge of that violence. Only radical understanding of victims of May Riots which weighs much on the interrogation of dominant discourse may lead to a better comprehension on what happened in those three days of atrocities.

* 1 Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998 (TGPF), Laporan Akhir Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998, Jakarta, 23 Oktober 1998. available from: http://semanggipeduli.com/tgpf/bab4.html, [Accessed at 8 May 2008] * 2 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Damaging Debate on Rapes of Ethnic Chinese Women, 1 September 1999, available from: http://www.hrw.org/reports98/indonesia3/rapes.htm, [Accessed at 10 May 2008]. * 3 Karen Strassler, Gendered Visibilities and the Dream of Transparency: The Chinese-Indonesian Rape Debate in Post-Suharto Indonesia, Gender & History, Vol.16 No.3 November 2004, pp. 689725. * 4 Ibid. * 5 TGPF, Laporan Akhir. For more discussion on TGPF, Jemma Purdey provides an excellent account on the dynamic within the fact finding commission. See, Jemma Purdey, Problematizing the Place of Victims in Reformasi Indonesia: A Contested Truth about The May 1998 Violence, Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 4, The Legacy of Violence in Indonesia, (Jul-Aug, 2002), pp. 605-622.

Kerusuhan Jakarta Mei 1998

16 Mei 2008, di Opini, oleh Penulis Tamu Memuntahkan terlihat kembali pada Mei 1998 kerusuhan dan isu-isu massa perkosaan, sentimen anti-Cina, dan bagaimana rioters datang untuk dinilai. Sudah satu dekade sejak reformasi (reformasi) gerakan terjadi di Indonesia yang berhasil memaksa Suharto turun. Setiap tahun setelah pergerakan, media dan analis sosial politik dan mencerminkan pada apa yang telah terjadi dan telah terjadi sejak Suharto telah ousted. Sejak reformasi adalah grand tema, maka ini tercatat menyorot kemajuan reformasi di Indonesia. Meskipun banyak topik dapat ditulis mengenai Reformasi di Indonesia hanya demokrasi dan reformasi politik adalah Rasulullah memiliki lebih banyak perhatian dari isu-isu lain. Di bawah ini, saya ingin menggeser fokus dari reformasi politik dan demokrasi dan mencerminkan pada kerusuhan yang terjadi di Indonesia. Kerusuhan kaget masyarakat internasional dan mungkin telah berubah pandangan mereka terhadap masyarakat Indonesia. Untuk beberapa hal, kerusuhan Mei telah dikonfirmasi yang luas dari perwakilan masyarakat Indonesia yang memiliki budaya amuk. Yang ramah, ramah, dan termasuk sikap dapat tiba-tiba menjadi ganas, kekerasan, dan tindakan biadab. Ketika salah satu dari pelaku ledakan bomb di Bali Amrozi telah diambil itu gambar di media asing, orang limbung dengan tersenyum: bagaimana dapat tersenyum setelah dia membunuh orang bersalah? Seolah-olah tidak ada alternatif lain untuk menjelaskan fenomena ini membingungkan tetapi memasukkannya ke dalam kotak yang disebut kategori budaya amuk. Tidak lama setelah kerusuhan yang terjadi di Solo, Medan, Jakarta, dan Surabaya, Indonesia yang terkejut mengetahui bahwa banyak orang mati dibakar di mal dan pusat perbelanjaan. Pemerintah, namun, label mereka looters. Penawaran pemerintah, outlet media memainkan peranan penting dalam memperkekalkan dengan perwakilan dari orang-orang yang dibakar sampai mati di mal. Dalam utama mereka, looters muncul

sebagai produk dari wacana perwakilan dari masyarakat miskin di Indonesia. Label looters mereka bukan korban akan berdampak pada seberapa besar negara adalah tanggung jawab untuk orang mati. Looters dapat menyetarakan dengan kriminal dan dengan kematian mereka, negara tidak harus bertanggung jawab untuk menangani kriminal. Label looters mereka juga denies sejarah kesejahteraan masyarakat miskin di Indonesia. Ini "looters" adalah korban kekerasan struktural berasal dari pembangunan ekonomi yang tidak adil. Menurut laporan yang dikeluarkan oleh Jakarta berbasis organisasi nonpemerintah, Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan, jumlah korban jiwa adalah sekitar 1200 orang [1]. Sebagian besar yang mati adalah orang-orang yang terperangkap dalam pembakaran pusat perbelanjaan. Apa yang membuat kerusuhan mendapat lebih banyak perhatian, namun, adalah perkosaan dari Indonesia Cina. Cerita-cerita perkosaan muncul publik tidak lama setelah berita lebih dari seribu kematian muncul di mal. Ianya Jakarta berbasis LSM, Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan (Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan-Truk) yang dinyalakan isu tentang perkosaan. Menurut laporan mereka, ratusan perempuan Cina gangraped. [2] Namun, berita ini menggemparkan tidak segera menerima bersimpati gerak gerik. Bahkan, yang meragukan untuk menyampaikan kepada publik sebagai apakah kasus perkosaan memang telah terjadi. Menanggapi masalah kasus perkosaan, Indonesia Menteri Perempuan Affair Tutty Alawiyah, misalnya, mengeluhkan data yang diberikan oleh Truk dan meminta bukti konkret mengenai perkosaan massa. [3] Demikian pula, Roesmanhadi sebagai Kepala Polisi Indonesia contended bahwa kegagalan memberikan "beton data" dimaksudkan LSM yang dapat diisi dengan sosialisasi terletak. [4] Menjawab kemarahan massa atas kasus perkosaan serta tekanan internasional untuk menangani kasus perkosaan ini dengan pemerintah Indonesia membentuk komisi bersama Pencari Fakta (Tim Gabungan Pencari tahta Kerusuhan Mei 13-15) di mana pemerintah dan LSM tersebut diharapkan akan bekerja sama untuk menyelesaikan puzzle. Walaupun bekerja dalam waktu yang sangat ketat kendala, komisi ini akhirnya selesai laporan dan mengemukakan bahwa kerusuhan merupakan hasil dari ketegangan politik di tingkat elit serta kondisi ekonomi. Laporan Namun, tidak menarik kesimpulan bahwa massa perkosaan pada kekerasan sistematis tetapi hanya menyatakan bahwa perbuatan tersebut terjadi bersamaan dengan kerusuhan dan yang di antara mereka ada beberapa kasus perkosaan yang dilakukan dengan tujuan tertentu. [5] Perdebatan yang hebat atas kasus perkosaan massa nampaknya terhadap perwakilan dari kerusuhan. Setelah cerita dari kasus perkosaan yang terbuka, wacana pada kasus perkosaan yang terendam mendung cerita lain seperti orang-orang yang dibakar sampai mati di pusat perbelanjaan. Selama masa itu, "anti-Cina" menjadi kosa kata yang sering digunakan untuk memahami kerusuhan. Sesungguhnya, sentimen anti-Cina telah diputar di waktu itu. Tetapi kita harus ingat bahwa politik marginalisation terhadap orang Cina di seluruh Indonesia sejarah mungkin telah menyumbang kepada masyarakat Indonesia untuk memahami identitas mereka. Sentimen anti-Cina, dalam hal ini sudah dibangun untuk meletakkan dasar apa yang pertama atau Pribumi Indonesia. Bila terjadi kerusuhan, maka sentimen anti-Cina

yang diputar dalam rangka untuk mewakili kekerasan sebagai sesuatu yang membatasi alam dari ketegangan antara Pribumi dan non-Pribumi. Dengan kata lain, ini miskin perkotaan yang mati ketika mereka ingin menjarah sesuatu dari toko Cina. Dan perkosaan pada hanya manifestasi dari kekecewaan yang berasal dari status ekonomi ketidakseimbangan antara Cina dan non-Cina. Sebagai salah satu elemen penting untuk memahami kekerasan adalah korban, keberadaan korban yang meninggal di mal dan Cina korban dapat membantu kami untuk gagas pernyataan kekerasan Mei 1998. Namun, dalam melakukan hal ini, kita tidak boleh membedakan mereka berdasarkan ras baris seperti ini hanya akan melanggengkan Orde Baru logika. Apa kita harus melihat tentang kekerasan Mei adalah ras yang dapat menjadi wacana kuat dalam memproduksi pengetahuan yang kekerasan. Hanya radikal pemahaman korban Mei Riots Berat yang banyak di interogasi dari wacana dominan dapat mengakibatkan pemahaman yang lebih baik mengenai apa yang terjadi dalam tiga hari kerusuhan. * 1 Tim Gabungan Pencari tahta Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998 (TGPF), Laporan Akhir Kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998, Jakarta, 23 Oktober 1998. tersedia dari: http://semanggipeduli.com/tgpf/bab4.html, [Diakses pada 8 Mei 2008] * 2 Human Rights Watch, Indonesia: The Merusak Debat pada perkosaan dari Etnik Cina Perempuan, 1 September 1999, tersedia dari: http://www.hrw.org/reports98/indonesia3/rapes.htm, [Diakses pada 10 Mei 2008]. * 3 Karen Strassler, "Jender dan Visibilities Dream of Transparansi: The IndonesiaCina Rape Debat di Post-Suharto Indonesia", Jender & Sejarah, Vol.16 No.3 November 2004, pp. 689-725. * 4 Ibid. * 5 TGPF, 'Laporan Akhir'. Untuk diskusi lebih pada TGPF, Jemma Purdey menyediakan akun yang dinamis dalam Pencari Fakta komisi. Lihat, Jemma Purdey, 'Problematizing di Tempat Korban Reformasi di Indonesia: mengeluhkan tentang kebenaran Mei 1998 Kekerasan', Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No 4, Legacy Kekerasan di Indonesia, (Juli-Agustus, 2002), pp. 605-622.

Ini tentang penghilangan orang2 ; Political Disappearances

May 19th, 2006, in Opinion, by Sarawut Pratoomraj Guest writer Sarawut Pratoomraj discusses cases of political disappearances in the last years of the Suharto regime. Political Disappearance: A Neverending Story in Reformasi Regime I was shocked when I heard that my son was arrested in 1998, eight years ago. I searched for him everywhere but there was no information. I feel a little hope that he is still alive somewhere. - Pak Dionysius Utomo, 60, father of Bimo Petrus.

a friend of my son came and told me that my son was arrested by the military in Tanjung Priok. I immediately went to the military station to ask for Yani Afris whereabouts. The officers said that he was released and no longer in their custody, and told me to find his friend. I went to look for his friends but they didnt know. I returned to the military station crying. The officer said the same and showed me my sons release paper - Ibu Tuti Koto, 68, mother of Yani Afri. About 10 people came into my room - two were in military uniform while most were in plainclothes. I was taken somewhere, not the police station. I was psychologically shaken because those who arrested me werent police. I was afraid that I would be killed. I was tortured and electrocuted. I am a lucky guy - I survived and not dead or disappeared like many friends. Other people still dont know if their relatives are dead or alive. - Mugiyanto, 32, Chairperson of IKOHI. Above were testimonies of victims and relatives of victims of human rights violations who suffered under the crackdown of the Soeharto regime in 1997-1998. Mugiyanto or Mugi, chairperson of the Indonesian Association of Families of the Disappeared (IKOHI), was a victim of human rights violation. He was an activist in 1998, as many university students were at that time, to campaign to abolish the five unjust acts issued by the Soeharto government namely: act on political parties, act on general elections, act on mass organizations, act on the composition of the parliament, and act on referendums. Only three political parties were allowed during the Soeharto regime. The activists demanded the change of the regime as it was against the Dual Function of the Armed Forces that supported Soehartos authoritarian regime. The government banned his organization by linking it to the Communist Party of Indonesia, an illegal political party accused of subversive acts. Mugi and many students worked underground. He was arrested by the military on 13 March 1998 and released three months later on 8 June 1998, when the then President B.J. Habibie was overthrown. He immediately joined his friend Munir at KontraS, the Commission for Involuntary Disappearance and Victims of Violation, to bring his case to Europe and the Unites Nations. Mugi worked as correspondent with a Dutch television network in 2000-2001. In his mind were his friends and other people who were arrested at the same period but still missing. He decided to resign from his job and joined IKOHI. One of Mugis friends who disappeared in 31 March 1998 is Bimo Petrus, a student from the Department of Philosophy at the Driyakara Jakarta University, and Dionysius Utomos son. Dionysius was an administrative officer at Malang Central Mental Hospital. He immediately searched for him when he learned about his sons case. He went to the government house and many military and police stations but found nothing. Aside from knowing whether his son is dead or alive, when asked for other reasons, he thinks for a while and said with mournful eyes

I had a lot of hope in the government during the Reformasi, but it was hopeless. The President has never set up any independent body to look into my case, no response in any way. I need to know, I have the right to know. If he is dead, I have to bury him according to the Catholic custom. I need to charge those who were involved in his disappearance. I hope that violations would stop now. I dont want to see it happen again - not to any single family. Similarly to Ibu Tuti, her son Yani Afri disappeared on 26 July 1997. She asked every government agency but failed. When she heard about Kontras, she immediately went to ask for help. She met Munir who helped her to search for Yani in various military headquarters and government offices and had a personal dialogue with former President Abdurrahman Wahid and Armed Forces Chief Wiranto, but still with no results. I got assistance from KontraS but I cry every time I went there and saw the street singers. I always remember my son. He was poor but he was an artist. He liked to play guitar and sing for me. While my son was still around, he would assist me financially by working as a driver while pursuing his studies. Now, I dont have any regular source of income 1 IKOHI was established in 1998 by Munir and other human rights activists. It held its 2nd Congress in Makassar, South Sulawesi on 7-10 March 2006 and chose Mugiyanto as Chair. The congress was attended by victims and families of human rights violations during the Soeharto regime from 1965 to1998. There were about 80 participants from the west of Indonesia, Aceh, to the east, and Papua. The purposes of the Congress were to review the constitution, mandate, activities; and election of committee members to continue the work and to follow-up the disappeared cases. after Soeharto, every Indonesian government cant resolve the issues of the families of the disappeared; there were no compensation, no social welfare, and no solution for the victims of human rights violations. We should do more for our justice. We urge for government commitment and political will for the victims and families, Mugi explained and added; The public is not interested with the victims of human rights violations now even when we are in the so-called Reformasi system. There are so many social crises in our country that human rights is not a priority. Indonesians try to forget what happened during the New Order period, they have short memory. The last words short memory seems like the situation in Thailand. Thai people also have short memory with what happened on 6 October 1976 or May 1992 were many disappeared, died or wounded. The disappearance of lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit in 2004 or those who are still missing in southern most Thailand are also quiet. The pains and cries of the families have no meaning. Indonesia and Thailand are in the process of political reform and should learn from each other. Political reform in Thailand started in late 1990s with the enforcement of the 1997 constitution that stated three main reforms: strengthen the political system (Prime Minister and Senator system), people participation in every level of administration, and human rights protection system. The crisis to oust Thaksin is the second stage of reform. There is still not much progress since political reform in Thailand was initiated more than 10 years ago.

Indonesia should also question its Reformasi. IKOHI and strengthening the families to pressure more politicians to work for justice are good examples for people participation in political reform. It does not only benefit the families but also the progress of democracy and human rights in general. Reformasi means people participation in every level of administration, state agencies practice the Rule of Law, the National Institute undertake its roles efficiently and independently, politicians respect and disseminate the universal standards of human rights, and the government develop the country under the concept of indivisibility, which means the economic development of the country is parallel with civil and political development. The IKOHI task is not yet finished. The strength of the people in political reform should be the strength of human rights. A strengthened people will result to the end of political disappearances and violations of human rights. Footnote 1: Tuti Koto, Losing Ones Faith in the Law, Healing Wounds, Mending Scars, published by AFAD, 2005, page 61.

Terjemahannya ; Politik Kehilangan

19 Mei 2006, di Opini, oleh Sarawut Pratoomraj Tamu Sarawut Pratoomraj penulis membahas kasus politik Kehilangan di tahun terakhir dari rezim Soeharto. Politik Kehilangan: A Neverending cerita dalam reformasi rezim "Saya kaget ketika saya mendengar bahwa anak saya telah ditangkap pada tahun 1998, delapan tahun yang lalu. Aku mencari dia di mana-mana tetapi tidak ada informasi. Saya merasa sedikit berharap bahwa dia masih hidup suatu tempat. " - Pak Dionysius Utomo, 60, ayah dari Bimo Petrus. "" | Teman anak saya datang dan mengatakan kepada saya bahwa anak saya telah ditangkap oleh militer di Tanjung Priok. Saya segera pergi ke stasiun militer untuk meminta Afri Yani's yang sedang dikerjakan. Pejabat mengatakan bahwa ia telah dirilis dan mereka tidak lagi di penjara, dan mengatakan kepada saya untuk menemukan temannya. Aku pergi untuk mencari teman-temannya tetapi mereka tidak tahu. Saya kembali ke stasiun militer menangis. Kata petugas yang sama dan menunjukkan saya putra lepaskan kertas "|" - Ibu Tuti Koto, 68, ibu dari Yani Afri. "Sekitar 10 orang datang ke kamar saya - dua orang dari seragam militer di saat yang paling di plainclothes. Saya telah diambil suatu tempat, bukan polisi. Saya psikologis digoncang karena orang-orang yang ditangkap polisi tidak me. Saya takut bahwa saya akan dibunuh. Saya telah disiksa dan electrocuted. Saya beruntung penjahat - saya selamat dan tidak mati atau hilang seperti banyak teman. Orang lain masih tidak tahu jika saudara mereka yang hidup atau mati. "?

- Mugiyanto, 32, ketua IKOHI. Di atas adalah bukti dari korban dan keluarga korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia yang menderita di bawah tindakan keras dari rezim Soeharto pada 1997-1998. Mugiyanto atau Mugi, kepala dari Asosiasi Keluarga Indonesia yang hilang (IKOHI), adalah korban pelanggaran HAM. Beliau adalah aktivis pada tahun 1998, karena banyak mahasiswa yang pada waktu itu, untuk promosi untuk meniadakan lima tindakan tidak adil yang dikeluarkan oleh pemerintah Soeharto yaitu: bertindak pada partai politik, bertindak pada pemilihan umum, bertindak pada ormas, bertindak sesuai dengan komposisi dari parlemen, dan bertindak pada referendums. Hanya tiga partai politik yang diperbolehkan selama rezim Soeharto. Para aktivis menuntut perubahan dari rezim yang seperti ini terhadap Dual Fungsi TNI yang didukung rezim Soeharto yang otoriter. Pemerintah dilarang oleh organisasi itu dikaitkan dengan Partai Komunis Indonesia, sebuah partai politik ilegal terdakwa dari tindakan murtad. Mugi dan banyak siswa bekerja di bawah tanah. Ia ditangkap oleh militer pada 13 Maret 1998 dan merilis tiga bulan kemudian pada tanggal 8 Juni 1998, ketika kemudian Presiden BJ Habibie telah terguling. Dia segera bergabung dengan temannya Munir di KontraS, Komisi untuk secara Kehilangan dan Korban Pelanggaran, untuk membawa kasus itu ke Eropa dan Amerika Serikat Bangsa-Bangsa. Mugi bekerja sebagai wartawan dengan jaringan televisi Belanda pada tahun 20002001. Dalam pikiran adalah teman-temannya dan orang lain yang ditangkap pada periode yang sama tetapi masih hilang. Dia memutuskan untuk mundur dari pekerjaannya dan bergabung dengan IKOHI. Salah satu Mugi's yang menghilang pada 31 Maret 1998 adalah Bimo Petrus, seorang siswa dari Departemen Filsafat di Universitas Driyakara Jakarta, dan Dionysius Utomo anak. Dionysius adalah petugas administrasi di Malang Rumah Sakit Pusat Mental. Dia segera mencari dia ketika dia belajar tentang kasus anaknya. Ia pergi ke rumah dan banyak pemerintah militer dan polisi tetapi tidak ditemukan. Selain dari mengetahui apakah anaknya sudah mati atau hidup, ketika diminta untuk alasan lain, ia berpikir untuk sementara waktu dan berkata dengan mata sedih: Bimo Petrus Bimo Petrus, salah satu hilang. "Saya memiliki banyak berharap pada pemerintah selama reformasi, tetapi sia-sia. Presiden tidak pernah menyiapkan semua badan independen untuk melihat kasus saya, tidak ada respon dengan cara apapun. Saya perlu tahu, saya memiliki hak untuk tahu. Jika dia sudah mati, saya harus mengubur dia sesuai dengan adat Katolik. Saya perlu biaya untuk orang-orang yang terlibat dalam hilangnya. Saya berharap bahwa pelanggaran akan berhenti sekarang. Saya tidak ingin melihatnya terjadi lagi - tidak untuk satu keluarga "?. Dionysius Utomo Dionysius Utomo, ayah dari Bimo Petrus.

Demikian juga kepada Ibu Tuti, anaknya Yani Afri menghilang pada tanggal 26 Juli 1997. Dia meminta setiap instansi pemerintah tetapi gagal. Ketika ia mendengar tentang Kontras, dia segera pergi untuk meminta bantuan. Dia bertemu Munir yang membantu untuk mencari Yani di berbagai markas militer dan kantor-kantor pemerintahan dan pribadi telah dialog dengan mantan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid dan TNI Chief Wiranto, tetapi masih tanpa hasil. Tuti koko Tuti koko, ibu Yani Afri. "Saya mendapat bantuan dari KontraS tetapi saya menangis setiap kali saya pergi dan melihat ada jalan penyanyi. Saya selalu ingat anak saya. Dia miskin tetapi dia seorang artis. Dia suka bermain gitar dan bernyanyi untuk saya. Sementara anak saya masih sekitar, ia akan membantu me finansial dengan bekerja sebagai sopir sambil mencari dalam kajiannya. Sekarang, saya tidak memiliki sumber pendapatan reguler "|"?? 1 IKOHI didirikan pada tahun 1998 oleh Munir dan aktivis hak asasi manusia. Ini 2nd kongres yang diadakan di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan pada 7-10 Maret 2006 dan memilih Mugiyanto sebagai ketua. Kongres ini diikuti oleh keluarga korban dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia selama rezim Soeharto dari 1965 to1998. Ada sekitar 80 peserta dari barat Indonesia, Aceh, ke timur, dan Papua. Tujuan dari kongres adalah untuk meninjau konstitusi, mandat, kegiatan, dan pemilihan anggota komite untuk melanjutkan kerja dan untuk menindaklanjuti kasus-kasus yang hilang. Kongres IKOHI IKOHI Kongres. "" | Setelah Soeharto, setiap pemerintah Indonesia tidak dapat menyelesaikan masalah dari keluarga yang hilang; tidak ada kompensasi, tidak kesejahteraan sosial, dan tidak ada solusi untuk korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Kami harus berbuat lebih banyak untuk kami keadilan. Kami mendorong pemerintah untuk komitmen dan politik bagi korban dan keluarga "?, Mugi dijelaskan dan ditambahkan;" Masyarakat tidak tertarik dengan korban pelanggaran hak asasi manusia sekarang bahkan ketika kita berada dalam apa yang disebut "reformasi"? sistem. Ada begitu banyak krisis sosial di negara kita yang hak asasi manusia bukan merupakan prioritas. Indonesia mencoba untuk melupakan apa yang terjadi pada masa Orde Baru, mereka memiliki memori singkat "?. Terakhir kata "memori pendek"? tampaknya seperti situasi di Indonesia. Orang Thai juga memiliki memori pendek dengan apa yang terjadi pada tanggal 6 Oktober 1976 atau Mei 1992 banyak yang hilang, meninggal atau luka. Kehilangan Somchai Neelaphaijit pengacara pada tahun 2004 atau orang-orang yang masih hilang di selatan Thailand adalah juga paling sepi. Yang payah dan cries dari keluarga tidak memiliki arti. Indonesia dan Thailand sedang dalam proses reformasi politik dan harus belajar dari satu sama lain. Reformasi politik di Thailand dimulai pada akhir tahun 1990-an dengan penegakan konstitusi 1997 yang menyatakan tiga utama reformasi: memperkuat sistem politik (Perdana Menteri Senator dan sistem), partisipasi masyarakat di setiap tingkat administrasi, dan sistem perlindungan hak asasi manusia. Krisis untuk mengusir

Thaksin adalah tahap kedua dari reformasi. Ada yang masih belum banyak kemajuan sejak reformasi politik di Indonesia telah dimulai lebih dari 10 tahun lalu. Indonesia juga harus sering mempertanyakan "reformasi"?. IKOHI dan keluarga untuk memperkuat tekanan lebih politisi untuk bekerja untuk keadilan adalah contoh yang baik bagi partisipasi masyarakat dalam reformasi politik. Ia tidak hanya menguntungkan keluarga tetapi juga kemajuan demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia pada umumnya. "Reformasi"? berarti partisipasi masyarakat di setiap tingkat administrasi, lembaga negara mempraktekkan "Peraturan UU"?, National Institute melakukan peran efisien dan mandiri, politisi menghormati dan menyebarkan universal standar hak asasi manusia, dan pemerintah negara berkembang di bawah konsep "tdk dpt dibagi"?, yang berarti pembangunan ekonomi negara adalah sejajar dengan sipil dan politik pembangunan. IKOHI tugas yang belum selesai. Kekuatan masyarakat dalam politik reformasi harus kekuatan hak asasi manusia. Sebuah masyarakat akan diperkuat dengan hasil akhir Kehilangan politik dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Catatan kaki 1: Tuti Koto, Hilangnya Satu's Iman dalam Hukum, Penyembuhan terluka, baik melalui perbaikan, diterbitkan oleh AFAD, 2005, halaman 61.

Dutch War Crimes

September 9th, 2008, in Opinion, by Lairedion Lairedion on the Dutch state being sued over war crimes at Rawagede, West Java. Dutch State sued by Indonesians On Monday 8 September 2008 10 Indonesian survivors of Dutch post WWII violence have sued the Dutch State for the assassination of their family members during the First Police Action (Agresi Militer Belanda I) after WW II. They want financial compensation, explanations and recognition for their suffering, as announced by their lawyer Mr. Gerrit Jan Pulles. According to Pulles it is for the first time Indonesian victims of the fighting of 19451949 hold the Dutch State responsible. Mr. Pulles acts on behalf of ten villagers from Rawagede, West Java. They survived the bloody attack of the Dutch Army on 9 December 1947. According to the Dutch Honorary Debts Foundation, 431 (almost all the male) villagers were slaughtered. According to the Dutch Indulgence Note from 1969 150 people were killed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced they will study the matter. Well into 2008, 63 years after Indonesian independence, the Dutch, due to their stubbornness, ignorance and patronizing behaviour, are being haunted again by their crimes in the aftermath of Soekarnos declaration of 17-8-45 and they rightfully should. Only just being liberated themselves from the Germans the Dutch wanted to continue the situation as it was before WWII and re-occupy their former territories now being declared independent and bearing the name Republik Indonesia.

Rawagede is one of the most notorious events in the history of Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch. On 9 December 1947 Dutch forces raided the West Javanese village to look for weapons and Indonesian freedom fighter Lukas Kustario who often spent time in Rawagede. They didnt find any weapons neither did they find Lukas. Apparently dissatisfied by their lack of success the Dutch commander directed all males to be separated from the rest in order to execute all of them, despite the fact there were some young males of 11-12 years old among them. Indonesian leaders reported the mass killing to local UN officials. The UN made an inquiry and concluded the killings were deliberate and ruthless but failed to prosecute and to have the Dutch punished and sentenced for these obvious crimes against humanity and this is still the situation today! Last month Pulles (of mixed Indo-Dutch blood like yours truly) visited Rawagede together with people from the Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda (KUKB), including its chairman Jeffry Pondaag, to collect witness accounts and endorsements from survivors in order to hold the Dutch State responsible. While financial compensation is sought after it must be noted that most survivors only want the Dutch State to take moral responsibility and offer official apologies to the Indonesian people. Furthermore they do not seek punishments for the people directly involved in the killings. One survivor just wants the Dutch not to forget what has happened. At the same time more and more Dutch veterans, haunted by the crimes and horror they experienced, are supportive of the Rawagede survivors claim. It is very disappointing to see that of all the Dutch political parties only the left-wing Socialist Party support the claim while the conservative-liberal VVD on behalf of MP spokesman Hans van Baalen even denied Dutch crimes against humanity in Indonesia! 63 years of ignorance and subtle racism have been persistent obviously, a disease many Western nations still suffer from. It is because of this the KUKB has been founded by Netherlands-based Indonesian Jeffy Pondaag in 2005. They demand the Dutch government: 1. to recognize 17 August 1945 as the day Indonesia became independent. 2. to offer apologies to the Indonesian people for its colonialism, slavery, gross violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. The foundation is a non-subsidized independent foundation with branches in the Netherlands and Indonesia and would be happy to accept any donations. They look after the interests of civilian victims who suffered from violence and war crimes committed by Dutch military. Their website have more information on the Rawagede story and on the infamous Raymond Westerling who murdered thousands of innocent people in South Sulawesi. Back in 2005 Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, obviously speaking on behalf of the Indonesian people, made it clear Indonesia is not seeking apologies or compensation from the Dutch. This reaction came after then Dutch Foreign Minister

Ben Bot (who is Jakarta-born) expressed regrets and morally accepted the de-facto independence of Indonesia on 17-8-45 while he was representing the Dutch government during the festivities of Independence Day on 17-8-2005. Bots remarks were widely criticized in the Dutch media for being insufficient and way too short of a full apology and recognition of 17-8-45. Of course it is irrelevant if Indonesia is demanding apologies or compensation or not. It should come from the Dutch themselves but their stubbornness and ignorance are still hindering them anno 2008. The Netherlands have constantly refused to express a full apology and recognition but were always quick to raise their finger and lecture its former colony on alleged human rights violations during the Soeharto reign. Im fully supportive of the Rawagede villagers and any future similar cases, seeking for Dutch responsibility, recognition and financial compensation. Evidence is clear, witnesses and next of kin are still alive, were dealing with war crimes, gross violation of human rights and crimes against humanity and here lies an opportunity for the Dutch to finally deal with its own past by recognizing and helping those poor villagers. Sources and links: News article from Dutch daily Parool (Dutch) : Indonesirs klagen Nederlandse staat aan Website of KUKB (Dutch and Indonesian): Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda 1948 (English) Word document approx. 7.8 MB: Report of the Rawahgedeh observation team Broadcast of Dutch news show Netwerk with topic on this story: Netwerk 8 September 2008 (witness accounts from survivors (Dutch-Indonesian-Sundanese). Streaming media, requires broadband internet access.

Terjemahannya : Belanda kejahatan perang

9 September 2008, di Opini, oleh Lairedion Lairedion di negara Belanda yang susu atas kejahatan perang di Rawagede, Jawa Barat. Negara Belanda susu oleh Indonesia Pada Senin 8 September 2008 10 Indonesia korban Belanda pasca PD II kekerasan telah susu Negara Belanda untuk pembunuhan anggota keluarga mereka selama Pertama Polisi Aksi (Agresi Militer Belanda I) setelah WW II. Mereka ingin kompensasi keuangan, penjelasan dan pengakuan untuk mereka menderita, sebagai pengacara mereka diumumkan oleh Bapak Gerrit Jan Pulles. Menurut Pulles ini untuk pertama kalinya Indonesia korban yang memerangi 1945-1949 pegang dari Negara Belanda bertanggung jawab. Bapak Pulles bertindak atas nama dari sepuluh desa Rawagede, Jawa Barat. Mereka bertahan berdarah serangan dari Tentara

Belanda pada tanggal 9 Desember 1947. Menurut Yayasan Utang Kehormatan Belanda, 431 (hampir semua laki-laki) desa yang dipotong. Menurut Belanda Indulgence Catatan dari 1969 150 orang tewas. Departemen Luar Negeri telah mengumumkan mereka akan mempelajari masalah. Baik ke 2008, setelah 63 tahun kemerdekaan Indonesia, Belanda, karena sikap keras kepala, kebodohan patronizing dan perilaku, sedang angker lagi oleh mereka dalam kejahatan setelah Soekarno's Deklarasi 17-8-45 dan mereka harus tepat. Hanya saja yang liberated diri dari Jerman Belanda ingin melanjutkan situasi seperti ini sebelum PD II dan kembali bekas-membeset mereka wilayah yang sekarang dinyatakan independen dan peluru nama Republik Indonesia. Rawagede adalah salah satu yang paling terkenal jahat dalam peristiwa sejarah perjuangan Indonesia untuk kemerdekaan melawan Belanda. Pada tanggal 9 Desember 1947 Belanda memaksa raided Jawa Barat desa untuk mencari senjata dan pejuang kemerdekaan Indonesia Lukas Kustario yang sering menghabiskan waktu di Rawagede. Mereka tidak menemukan senjata mereka tidak menemukan Lukas. Tampaknya mereka tidak puas dengan keberhasilan Belanda komandan diarahkan untuk semua laki-laki dipisahkan dari sisanya untuk melakukan semua itu, meskipun ada beberapa fakta laki-laki muda dari 11-12 tahun di antara mereka. Indonesia dilaporkan pemimpin massa lokal untuk membunuh pejabat PBB. PBB telah dijalankan dan menyimpulkan pembunuhan yang telah "sengaja" dan "buas" tetapi gagal untuk menuntut dan agar Belanda dihukum dan hukuman ini jelas kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan dan ini masih dalam situasi hari ini! Bulan lalu Pulles (dari campuran Indo-Belanda darah seperti Anda benar-benar) dikunjungi Rawagede bersama-sama dengan orang-orang dari "Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda (KUKB)", termasuk ketua JEFFRY Pondaag, untuk mengumpulkan saksi dan account endorsements dari korban untuk terus Negara Belanda bertanggung jawab. Sementara kompensasi keuangan yang dicari itu harus dicatat bahwa kebanyakan korban hanya ingin Negara Belanda untuk mengambil tanggung jawab moral dan menawarkan apologies resmi kepada masyarakat Indonesia. Selain itu mereka tidak mencari hukuman bagi orang-orang yang terlibat langsung dalam pembunuhan. Satu club hanya ingin Belanda untuk tidak lupa apa yang telah terjadi. Pada saat yang sama lebih dan lebih Belanda yang terluka, angker oleh kejahatan dan kengerian yang dialaminya, yang mendukung dari Rawagede korban klaim. Sangat mengecewakan untuk melihat bahwa semua partai politik Belanda hanya sayap kiriPartai Sosialis mendukung klaim sementara konservatif-liberal VVD atas nama MP juru bicara Hans van Baalen bahkan ditolak Belanda kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan di Indonesia! 63 tahun kebodohan dan halus rasisme telah tetap jelas, penyakit banyak negara-negara Barat masih menderita. Hal ini karena ini KUKB telah didirikan oleh Belanda berbasis Jeffy Pondaag Indonesia pada tahun 2005. Mereka menuntut pemerintah Belanda:

1. mengenali 17 Agustus 1945 sebagai hari Indonesia menjadi independen. 2. apologies untuk menawarkan kepada masyarakat Indonesia untuk kolonialisme, perbudakan, kotor pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan. Yayasan adalah non-subsidi yayasan independen dengan cabang di Belanda dan Indonesia dan akan senang hati menerima sumbangan. Mereka menjaga kepentingan korban sipil yang menderita dari kekerasan dan kejahatan perang oleh militer Belanda. Situs web mereka memiliki lebih banyak informasi mengenai Rawagede cerita dan pada jahat Raymond Westerling yang bersalah membunuh ribuan orang di Sulawesi Selatan. Kembali pada tahun 2005 Indonesia Menteri Luar Negeri Hassan Wirayuda, jelas berbicara atas nama masyarakat Indonesia, menjadikan Indonesia tidak mencari apologies atau kompensasi dari Belanda. Ini reaksi datang kemudian setelah Menteri Luar Negeri Belanda Ben Bot (yang lahir di Jakarta) dinyatakan menyesalkan dan moral mengakui secara de-facto kemerdekaan Indonesia pada 17-8-45 sementara dia mewakili pemerintah Belanda selama acara-acara dari Hari Kemerdekaan pada tanggal 17 -82005. Bot's tersebut telah dikritik secara luas di media Belanda untuk menjadi kurang terlalu pendek dan cara yang penuh maaf dan pengakuan dari 17-8-45. Tentu saja, sudah tidak relevan lagi jika Indonesia menuntut apologies atau kompensasi atau tidak. Ia harus datang dari Belanda mereka tapi mereka sikap keras kepala dan kebodohan masih Hambat mereka anno 2008. Belanda telah terus menolak mengungkapkan penuh maaf dan pengakuan tetapi selalu cepat untuk meningkatkan jari mereka dan para bekas koloni kuliah pada dugaan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia selama pemerintahan Soeharto. Saya mendukung sepenuhnya dari desa Rawagede dan kasus-kasus serupa di masa depan, Belanda untuk mencari tanggung jawab, pengakuan dan kompensasi keuangan. Bukti yang jelas, saksi dan keluarga terdekat berikutnya masih hidup, kami berurusan dengan kejahatan perang, kotor pelanggaran hak asasi manusia dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan dan terletak di sini kesempatan untuk Belanda akhirnya untuk berurusan dengan masa lalu sendiri oleh orang-orang yang mengenali dan membantu miskin desa. Sumber dan link: Berita artikel dari Belanda harian "Parool" (Belanda): Indonesirs klagen Nederlandse staat aan Situs KUKB (Belanda dan Indonesia): Yayasan Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda 1948 (Inggris) sekitar dokumen Word. 7,8 MB: Laporan dari pengamatan tim Rawahgedeh Menyiarkan berita Belanda Netwerk dengan topik memperlihatkan pada cerita ini: Netwerk 8 September 2008 (account dari saksi korban (Belanda-Indonesia-Sunda). Streaming media, membutuhkan akses internet broadband.

Ini tentang Timtim, terjemahannya atur sendiri!

Tortured Beginnings Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor Map of East Timor
I. Introduction Key Recommendations II. Methodology III. Background Establishing the East Timor Police Force Composition of the East Timor Police Force Responsibility for Training, Discipline, and Investigating Police Abuse IV. Police Abuse Arbitrary Detention Unauthorized Use of Firearms Impunity for Rape Legal Standards on Torture and Other Physical Mistreatment V. Reforms, Institutions and Practices Needed to Create Police Accountability in East Timor A. Addressing Impunity B. The Development of Oversight Institutions Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit The Office of the Provedor C. Legal Gaps D. The Need for More and Better Training E. Problematic Past Training Approaches F. Current Initiatives G. Monitoring VI. Detailed Recommendations Recommendations to the Government of East Timor Recommendations to Donors and Others Providing Assistance to the Police VII. Acknowledgements

I. Introduction

I think that if the police arrest people, they can't beat them. You have to ask first if he is guilty, then arrest him, and then take him to the court in Dili. But because they [the police] have a bad attitude, they just arrest and straight away beat people. I think they should be fired, or arrested themselves. Carlito Gusmao, victim of police beating, Aldeia Tasmasak, Bobonaro[1] Carlito Gusmao was arrested by the police after he refused to take part in the national census. He was accused of threatening the census takers with a knife when they visited his village. He told Human Rights Watch how uniformed police officers arrived at his house at about 9:30 in the morning and took him in a police car to Maliana district

police station in the western region of East Timor.[2] He was beaten as soon as he got out of the car and then put in a cell. While in the cell he said he witnessed police officers severely beating another detainee, using a bulletproof vest. That evening other police officers came into his cell and sprayed pepper spray into his eyes. He has not made a complaint about the abuse he alleges, for fear of retribution, and also because he believes nothing will come of it.[3] Over the past two years police abuse has become one of East Timor's most worrying human rights problems.Police officers regularly use excessive force during arrests, and beat detainees once they are in custody. This behavior seems to have become so common that officers rarely try to hide their actions from the general public. Human Rights Watch experienced no shortage of cases to document wherever we went in East Timor. One East Timorese activist working for a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Dili that has been monitoring police violence in East Timor told Human Rights Watch: Beatings during arrest are already prevalent. Why? Because of the attitude of the police that they are an institution that has to be respected. They do not accept the questioning of their role or authority. If I am a PNTL officer and say to you that you are guilty, you have to say, "I am ready to be guilty." Beatings are already routine.[4] Many of these abuses, as described to Human Rights Watch, rise to the level of torture. Mario Belo, a twenty-seven-year-old man recounted what happened after he was arrested in Mulia village, Baucau, for throwing rocks at some people he suspected of tampering with his fishing boat: By the time I got to the prison it was about 7:00 p.m.; I think it was June 18. I was ready to answer [a question], but before I could answer [the police officer] straight away hit me, kicked me on my chin. My face turned and he hit me again on my left chin and jaw. He kicked me with his feet, kicked my groin [kemaluan]. He was wearing police boots, full police uniform. He kicked my right side and I fell. It was inside the examination room in the prison. I stood up and then straight away he kicked me here [in the mouth]. He cut my lip, both the top and the bottom. For about a week I couldn't eat. They took me to the hospital in Baucau. The police officer from Laga took me to the hospital. In the room at the time [the beating took place] there was the officer from the prison, the perpetrator, two policemen from Laga, and me. They all just watched, didn't try and stop it. It was about thirty minutes this violence. Finally he took out his gun and threatened me. He was about one meter away from me. He said, "Later, I will kill you." I answered, "I haven't done anything wrong. Why do you hit me?" He said, "You be quiet, later I will shoot you."[5] Many individuals whom Human Rights Watch interviewed also described their arrest by the police as illegal. Many said that they were not told what the allegations against them were, and many were held without charges for more than the seventy-two-hour period allowed by East Timorese law. Police officers appear to habitually utilize the full seventy-two hours of detention as a punitive, rather than procedural, measure. The police and other state institutions have often failed to respond to incidents of police abuse appropriately. There is a lack of understanding among those investigating

complaints that police officers committing a crime such as assault should be prosecuted through the criminal justice system as well as through the internal disciplinary system. The internal police oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit (PEDU, until recently called the Professonal Ethics Office, PEO), has often failed to take cases of police abuse seriously, follow up on complaints, or appropriately discipline the officers involved. Insufficient police training on internal investigations and follow up, and the absence of a functioning external, independent oversight and accountability mechanism for the police service have meant that such complaints are often dealt with inconsistently, or in some cases not at all. Where cases are taken up, victims are usually left uninformed about developments and outcomes of their cases. Human Rights Watch spoke to many victims and their families about their attempts to seek accountability for human rights violations committed by the East Timor police force. Many were frustrated and perplexed by opaque bureaucratic procedures and long delays. Within the East Timor government, the portfolio for internal security lies with the Ministry of Interior. Ultimate responsibility for accountability for policing therefore lies with the minister of interior, currently Rogerio Lobato. However, while institutionally subordinate to the Ministry, the East Timor police service also has its own distinct legal personality and operational structure.[6] This includes a general commander and deputies, separate heads for each specialized unit, and thirteen district commanders. Together with two Ministry-appointed officers, this group comprises the Superior Police Council, which ordinarily convenes every six months to discuss disciplinary matters such as those arising from rights violations.[7] Swift and appropriate disciplinary action and prosecutions against police officers responsible for human rights abuses and abuse of authority are critical indicators of the commitment of East Timor's government to creating a professional police force. They are also an indicator of how seriously the government takes its human rights obligations under the country's constitution and the many human rights treaties it has acceded to. It is worth noting that the country's leaders often talk about the deficit of human resources in the country and the need for increased training. This is certainly necessary, but it will only make a difference if at a political and policy level the kind of violence described in this report is punished. Otherwise, the failure to penalize human rights violators will create a climate of impunity that in turn will undermine training as an effective tool to decrease the level of police violence. With the legacy of brutal Indonesian policing during the nearly twenty-five-year occupation that ended in 1999, it is perhaps not surprising that new recruits into East Timor's police are mirroring past experience in ignorance of professional standards. However, such behavior also reflects poor training, accountability and oversight, and can no longer be excused nearly six years after the first new police graduated in July 2000. In fact it is now more likely that the lack of institutionalized responses to police brutality has been a key factor in the emergence of police abuse as one of East Timor's most pressing and current human rights problems. One serious consequence of this emerging pattern of abuse and impunity in East Timor is the potential for long-term erosion of public respect and support for the police, both as individual officers and as an institution. With the creation of a new country, the East Timorese people expected that its police would behave differently than the Indonesiancontrolled forces during the occupation. But ineffective control, inadequate training,

poor accountability mechanisms and lack of proper vetting of police officers have meant that abuse of powers by police remains a serious challenge to the rule of law in East Timor. The United Nation's failure to address this issue effectively while it was in charge during the transition to independence was also a contributory factor. East Timor is now at a crossroads. While it is recognized that resources in East Timor are at a premium, the importance of establishing a professional and accountable police force is crucial to the country's future stability. A lack of accountability for abuses will undermine trust in the police and therefore its effectiveness and capacity to uphold the rule of law. Tolerated police abuse will make individuals reluctant to report crime to the police, or cooperate with them in criminal investigations, either as witnesses or victims. This in turn may lead to a vicious cycle in which a police force increasingly criticized for an inability to do its job effectively turns to ever harsher tactics and increasingly resorts to violence to achieve results. If present violations are not addressed as an institutional problem, they run the risk of becoming part of an endemic culture of abuse and impunity in the world's newest national police force, a culture that will be hard to eliminate once it takes hold. Key Recommendations Human Rights Watch found evidence of human rights violations by police officers to be widespread, although not yet endemic, in East Timor. Now is the time to address this problem before it becomes endemic. Human Rights Watch urges the East Timor government to: * Ensure through public measures and statements that there is a clear, unambiguous and consistent signal from the top that police use of torture, arbitrary detention, and excessive force will not be tolerated. * Ensure that legislation, policy and procedures are all in place so that the police operate under a coherent and clear legal framework that specifies police powers and their limits. This should include provisions to hold police publicly accountable in a transparent and credible manner. * Support the Provedor's Office in creating a unit dedicated to oversight of the police. * Task the minister of interior and the police commissioner to strengthen the police force's Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit by providing strong support for the unit's authority to enforce its decisions and by penalizing officers who do not comply with its directives. * Ensure all oversight mechanisms coordinate and work together. We also urge the East Timor police service (PNTL) to: * Take swift and meaningful action against police officers who torture, arbitrarily detain, or use excessive force against members of the population. This should include administrative measures up to and including dismissal, and, where appropriate, criminal prosecution. * Take appropriate disciplinary action against commanding officers who know or should know of such acts, and who fail to take action to prevent and punish them. The police commissioner should issue a directive to each district commander advising that he or she will be held personally responsible for ensuring the officers under his or her

command comply with the existing disciplinary regulation and Rules of Organization Procedures (ROPs). Donors should: * Raise with the government of East Timor in all official meetings, and at the highest level, concerns over police violence, including torture. Call on the East Timor government to ensure that police treatment of all individuals conforms to international human rights standards. * Substantially increase support for effective human rights monitoring in East Timor through existing mechanisms, such as civil society. As an integral part of this strategy, provide assistance for the development of local human rights groups with the capacity for independent monitoring of police violence, and to agencies that can provide services for victims. * Initiate and support joint meetings between the East Timorese government, NGOs and the PNTL to coordinate, fund and plan for long-term strategies on capacity building, training, and other support to the PNTL.

II. Methodology
Human Rights Watch visited East Timor in May-June 2005 and interviewed over eighty individuals on the issue of police violence and growing impunity. Research interviews were conducted primarily in Baucau, Bobonaro and Dili districts. All interviews were conducted by a Human Rights Watch researcher directly in Indonesian or English. Human Rights Watch interviewed more than thirty victims and witnesses to police violence. We also interviewed a range of domestic and international NGOs, United Nations (U.N.) agency and United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) representatives, including Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Sukehiro Hasegawa, and staff from the UNMISET Human Rights Unit and Political Affairs Unit. UNMISET has since been stood down, but many of these staff now work for the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) and have continued to provide information and assistance to Human Rights Watch. U.N. police in East Timor extended much cooperation at both national and district levels; Human Rights Watch is especially grateful to the U.N. Police Senior Advisor Saif Ullah Malik for his time. Human Rights Watch met with a range of East Timor government and police officials. We are grateful for the cooperation of East Timor's Police Commissioner Paulo Martins and Vice Minister of Interior Alcino Barris for assistance extended during the course of our research. East Timor's police force extended a high level of cooperation throughout the research trip, and allowed Human Rights Watch access to several police stations, detention facilities, and the national training academy. Despite several written and telephone requests by Human Rights Watch, we regret having been unable to meet with more members of East Timor's government, including with a representative from the Prime Minister's Office or the Ministry of Justice.

For the purposes of this report Human Rights Watch has only looked into the conduct of the regular police force in East Timor, and not the specialized units. Except where noted, Human Rights Watch offers no conclusions as to the guilt or innocence of criminal charges of any victim of police abuse described in this report.

III. Background
After almost twenty-five years of brutal occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, in September 1999 the Indonesian National Army (TNI) and Timorese militias went on a campaign of extreme violence when the people of East Timor voted for independence in a U.N.-administered referendum. An estimated 1,400 East Timorese civilians lost their lives in the months before and the days immediately after the voting. Approximately half a million people were forced from their homes or fled to seek refuge. The violence was part of a systematically planned policy by elements of the Indonesian government and TNI to prevent the people of East Timor from freely participating in the referendum, and to punish them for voting for independence.The crimes committed against East Timorese included mass murder, torture, assault, forced disappearance, mass forcible deportations, the destruction of property, and rape and other sexual violence against women and children. These crimes were part of a pattern of gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which, in many cases, constituted crimes against humanity. Indonesia's subsequent withdrawal in late 1999 left not only a country devastated and traumatized by occupation and conflict, but it also left an institutional vacuum at all levels of civil administration and government. Many of East Timor's former civil servants were Indonesian or pro-Indonesia, and thousands left the country after the referendum. After four hundred years of Portuguese and then Indonesian occupation, the colonial legacy left to East Timor was one of very few functioning institutions, a huge human resource deficit, and an overwhelming and urgent need to build a government from scratch. The most effective environment in which to build functioning public institutions is a secure and stable one. Although East Timor benefited from a relatively stable and smooth transition from occupied territory to independent state under the stewardship of the United Nations, the country still faces a myriad of post-conflict problems. It remains one of the world's poorest countries and ranks as one of the lowest on the Human Development Index (HDI).[8] Unemployment and underemployment are estimated to be approximately 50 percent,[9] while recent figures estimate the annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to be equivalent to only U.S.$370, falling to as low as U.S.$150 in rural areas.[10] The population is largely rural, and infrastructure for basic social services, health care, and economic support outside the capital, Dili, is extremely limited. Much of the population remains traumatized by the Indonesian occupation, and the six years since it ended have left people dissatisfied and frustrated by the slow pace of reconstruction and development.

East Timor has made formal commitments to human rights: The constitution includes important human rights protections and, on the first International Human Rights Day after independence (December 10, 2002), East Timor's parliament approved accession to seven major international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[11] Ratification and reporting on these treaties is a key priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also a human rights advisor permanently appointed to the Prime Minister's office who, in 2004, convened an inclusive government and NGO working group to discuss the drafting of a Human Rights Action Plan for East Timor (to include public consultations on what should be included). In 2005 East Timor established a Provedor's Office (see below), similar to an ombudsman institution in other countries. Establishing the East Timor Police Force Establishing a new police force for East Timor was one of the priorities for the United Nations before sovereignty was passed to the new state in May 2002. Under a clear mandate to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the country, successive U.N. missions in East Timor were instructed and authorized to help enable the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial police service.[12] U.N. Civilian Police (CivPol) began recruitment drives for the new East Timorese police service in early 2000 and basic training commenced on March 27, 2000, under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The initial graduating class of the newly inaugurated PoliceCollege numbered 1,700, the first fifty of whom took up their functions as police officers on July 12, 2000.[13] Just over a year later, on August 10, 2001, the East Timor Police Service was officially established, working alongside CivPol.[14] It later changed its name to the Timor-Leste Police Service, before finally adopting its current title of the PoliciaNacional de TimorLeste (PNTL). The joint policing arrangement between the new East Timor police and CivPol lasted into the initial independence period, and it was not until independence, on May 20, 2002, that an agreement was signed outlining the terms and timetable of the handing over of full policing duties from CivPol to the PNTL. This process started with the PNTL successively taking over control of policing district by district. Foreseen for a shorter timeframe, the process eventually took eighteen months, the PNTL finally assuming responsibility for general day-to-day policing for the whole country on December 10, 2003, when the handover of policing duties was effected for the thirteenth and final district, Dili. UNTAET's successor mission from May 2002, the U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was also mandated to provide interim law enforcement and public security, and was authorized to assist in the continued development of the PNTL. Originally envisaged to last one year, UNMISET's mandate was twice extended (in May and November 2003), partly reflecting the fact that the critical threshold of selfsufficiency in key government institutions was taking longer than originally anticipated. It was at this juncture that the East Timorese national government finally assumed full responsibility for nationwide policing with the transfer of all executive responsibilities for policing, internal and external security from the U.N. to the Government of East Timor as of May 20, 2004.[15]

In May 2005 the U.N. Security Council replaced the Support Mission of UNMISET with a much smaller special political mission, the U.N. Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL).[16] Composition of the East Timor Police Force The Organic Decree-Law of the National Police of Timor-Leste was promulgated by the President in May 2004.[17] It is the legal instrument governing the structure and role of the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), and specifies the role of the police in relation to the army, Falantil-FDTL, in internal and external security. ThePNTL is divided into the regular police and five specialist units. A July 2005 government press release stated that the PNTL had a total force strength of approximately three thousand officers. The focus of this report is the regular police force. (Two of the special units are nevertheless of particular interest and are mentioned elsewhere in this report: the Rapid Intervention Unit-Unidade Intervensaun Rapida, UIR-and the Border Patrol Unit-Unidade de Patrulhamento de Fronteira, UPF.[18]The function of the UIR is to respond to civil disorder, particularly in urban areas, while, as its name implies, the Border Patrol Unit is primarily concerned with the security, patrol, and management of the border regions.[19] Therefore, both internal disturbances and border security remain under the auspices of the police and the Ministry of Interior rather than with the military.[20] As of July 2005, there were 292 officers in the Border Patrol Unit and 217 in the Rapid Intervention Unit.[21]) The passing of the police decree-law was followed by the adoption of a disciplinary regulation in June 2004.Neither the disciplinary regulation nor the police decree-law was subject to parliamentary scrutiny or public debate. Instead both pieces of legislation were submitted to the President by the Council of Ministers and duly promulgated. Oversight mechanisms (such as those outlined below) are not mentioned in the police decree-law or the disciplinary regulation. The police continue to have a number of institutional weaknesses including limited professional skills and experience, particularly in the areas of policy and law. The force is hampered by a lack of professional expertise in many administrative and management functions, and continues to face problems due to a lack of logistical capacity and a general lack of resources for equipment and infrastructure development. It is also a very new and fragile police service which remains dependent on foreign aid for equipment and training support. There is a serious need for institutional strengthening across the board, but particularly in the area of mainstreaming human rights and ensuring that all police powers and procedures meet with international standards, and are implemented in accordance with them. (This is explored in detail in section V.D of this report). Responsibility for Training, Discipline, and Investigating Police Abuse Replacing a Code of Conduct for the East Timor police adopted by the United Nations administration during UNTAET,[22] the disciplinary regulation of June 2004 sets out the duties of PNTL officers, imposes limits on police powers and outlines the disciplinary processes that would follow any breaches of the standards set out in the regulation. In its own words, the regulation claims to provide "a systematized corpus of rules and principles to guide the action of [PNTL members] thereby guaranteeing the

professionalism and prestige of the institution."[23] Fifteen Rules of Organisation Procedures (ROPs) have also been prepared in areas including use of force; community policing; preliminary investigation of crime; search and seizure; handling of child abuse cases and handling at-risk children; investigation and reporting of traffic accidents; police vehicle operation; court duties; and training.[24] There are three main bodies in East Timor that have responsibility for police oversight. First, the internal police Professional Ethics and Deontology Office (PEDU, formerly the Professional Ethics Office, PEO) is charged with investigating allegations of police misconduct or abuse (which are usually made by members of the public). The results of any investigations, together with any recommendations for discipline, are sent to the Minister of Interior, who decides what action should be taken.[25] Second is the office of the Inspectorate, comprising representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the police, the office of the human rights advisor to the prime minister, and the prosecutor general's office. Created in August 2003 in accordance with the Decree Law on the Organic Structure of the Ministry of Interior,[26] this body has disciplinary competence over all structures and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, including the police (although the legislation is not explicit on the mandate of the Inspectorate to deal with police disciplinary matters).[27] Third, there is the Office of the Provedor, the only external oversight mechanism, which has far-reaching powers to investigate and report on complaints against government officials and institutions, including the police.[28] (Analysis of the PEO/PEDU and the Office of the Provedor is provided in Section V.B of this report.) The Ministry of Interior retains operational control over the police force, and ultimately all members of the police force, including the police commissioner, are answerable to the minister of interior.[29] The police commissioner has the authority to recommend dismissals of members of the police force found guilty of human rights and other violations, but the power to enact the dismissal lies solely with the minister of interior.

IV. Police Abuse

Since independence in 2002, police abuse has become one of East Timor's most worrying human rights problems. Police officers regularly use excessive force during arrests and beat detainees once they are in custody. The police and other state institutions have often failed to respond to incidents of police abuse with appropriate disciplinary measures or criminal proceedings. In the course of our research the number of accounts of severe ill-treatment, including torture that former detainees and prisoners described to us at the hands of police officers was striking. Several people whom Human Rights Watch interviewed had had to be hospitalized because of the severity of their injuries.[30]While this level of severity of abuse may not yet be systematic or systemic in East Timor, the ease with which we found illustrative cases was alarming. In his February 2005 report to the Security Council on the United Nations mission in East Timor, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that major problems within the East Timor police force remained a cause for concern, and that "reports of police misconduct, including excessive use of force, assaults, negligent use of firearms and various human rights abuses, have increased since May 2004." He continued that "lack

of transparency and a slow-paced investigation mechanism have contributed to a poor level of police accountability."[31] Six months later, he again noted that "although the skills and competencies of the East Timorese police have been considerably enhanced, instances of excessive use of force and human rights violations by police officers, including against members of political opposition groups, continue to be reported."[32] Human Rights Watch interviewed Mario Sarmento, who was badly beaten by police officers in Dili in January 2005 after a fight between some youths on a bridge. The police were using a microphone to instruct residents to remain inside their houses while they searched for the suspects. Mr Sarmento, worried about his son, Justo, went out looking for him. He described what happened: I called out for my son two times, called his name. Then the police, two cars, came at great speed to where I was standing. Both cars stopped right in front of me. [One car then continued and the other stopped.] They got out of the car straight away. At first two of them came in my direction. I thought they wanted to ask me some questions but they punched me straight away in the chest-one person, without any words. After that I was ready to apologize, and asked what was the matter, and asked them not to hit me. Two more people got out of the car and one of them punched me again in my chest. Then they all took out their sticks. They were wearing full police uniforms. I said "I don't accept actions like this, I ask you to give me your names." After I said that they got more vicious and then they put one of the sticks under my neck. Four men, all of them carried out a beating. I was propped up against the wall. Then because it was so chaotic my wife arrived from the house, heading in my direction to try and stop what was happening. After my wife arrived she asked for their forgiveness and said that her husband had not done anything wrong and not to hit him. The four of them just continued their actions. My wife grabbed my wrist to pull me so that they would not hit me. One of the policemen grabbed the other wrist and was pulling me one way, with my wife pulling me in the other. Then the policeman pulled me strongly so that my wife fell down with my four-year-old child onto the ground. Then Vincent [another son] arrived to intervene in this incident. He talked to the police politely and asked them not to hit his father. They didn't listen and hit him, two of them hit him. They kicked him one time in his chest. Their faces were not clear because it was dark. So he fell, finally they took out handcuffs, and wanted to handcuff my son, and started threatening, "This uniform is not scared of anyone!" I went over to my son. I asked them to help not make him a victim. They released him and they faced me again. This all lasted about thirty minutes Then the streetlights came on. After the light came on they stopped their action.[33] Arbitrary Detention Arbitrary detention is a recurring problem in East Timor. Human Rights Watch interviewed many individuals who described their arrest by the police as illegal. Many were not told by arresting officers what the allegations against them were. East Timor criminal procedure allows for a suspect to be held without charge for up to seventy-two hours, whereupon he or she must either be charged or brought before a judge to have the detention extended. Human Rights Watch found that people were regularly held for more than the seventy-two-hour period without charge or appearance before a judge.

One young man was picked up by police officers after he had shouted coarsely at them. It appears that his detention was as punishment for his words, even though he had committed no recognizable criminal offense. He told Human Rights Watch: After that they took me to the cell in Baucau. For seventy-two hours I was detained in the cell in Baucau. On the second night, it was Sunday, [officer D, name withheld] called for me. After I was called, another police officer, [officer E, name withheld] hit me in the chest, through the bars of the cell. [Officer D] called for me to come to the front of the cell and put my hands up. [Officer E] then hit my chest. That night I didn't eat. My chest was hurting. After that on Monday, after seventy-two hours, I was released. There was no hearing or investigation. I was just let go and went straight home. That's it.[34] Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone "has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." To ensure freedom from arbitrary detention, Article 9 further requires that detention must be examined for its lawfulness by an impartial adjudicator.East Timor's constitution also states in Section 30: 2. No one shall be arrested or detained, except under the terms clearly provided for by applicable law, and the order of the arrest or detention should always be presented for consideration by the competent judge within the legal time frame. 3. Every individual who loses his or her freedom shall be immediately informed, in a clear and precise manner, of the reasons for his or her arrest or detention as well as of his or her rights, and allowed to contact a lawyer, directly or through a relative or a trusted person.[35] One reason for illegal detention in East Timor is the failure to implement key training on this issue. A senior U.N. police advisor, Nuno Anaia, told Human Rights Watch that some targeted training had been devised to address this issue, and that the result was a demonstrable decrease in the number of illegal detention complaints that they were receiving. Anaia told Human Rights Watch: This is a good example of how provision of resources and training can have an effect. In the first six months of UNMISET, we received sixty-two complaints about violations of the seventy-two hour rule. We then designed the training for investigators and called in the prosecutors etc. to explain that the seventy-two hours was not for investigations So, in the last six months only three cases have been reported, and those are mostly because of holidays [causing non-availability of judges] etc.[36] However, another key problem with meeting the maximum seventytwo-hour detention rule remains the weakness of East Timor's criminal justice system, and basic lack of resources. Outside of the capital the courts are seriously understaffed and their workers under-resourced, and limited availability of judges and public defenders means that hearings to rule on detention being continued beyond seventy-two hours do not take place, or take place without the suspect having legal representation. This represents a real operational problem for the police's compliance with legal provisions for holding and detaining suspects. At a more basic level a lack of resources such as cars, fuel, and car maintenance is contributing to unlawful detention and inadequate investigations

simply because, without transportation to meet with victims and witnesses, police may resort to prolonging a suspect's detention without charge until such time as they can conduct a basic investigation.[37] The under-resourcing of the judiciary may affect not only suspects who are held unlawfully beyond the seventy-two hours without charge, but also persons who are properly remanded in pre-trial detention. Some accused can spend six months in pretrial detention with no judicial oversight, or without an indictment being filed against them.[38] Mario's wife also described the incident to Human Rights Watch, adding: I don't know why they began to hit straight away, I don't understand those people. They beat a lot that night. That night the back of my husband was all black, he was really sick. He was bruised all over, from that police stick. There were many witnesses. The community was standing in the road. There were so many witnesses.The police took out their guns, took out their sticks, then the lights came on and they left very quickly.[39] Mario Sarmento has repeatedly tried to find out what is happening with a case he has lodged against the police. He told Human Rights Watch: I have already checked four times at the district court but there is not yet any explanation I like it if you use my name because we want to improve the PNTL so that they can't do things like this again. I have given a report to the police, the process is taking a long time. Because the investigation is long I also submitted a complaint to the Professional Standards Unit. I went to the hospital to get my surat keterangan [doctor's note],for the bruises on my back. I got some letters asking me to be a witness in a different case; I believe this is manipulation to stop the process in my case. The process is still with the prosecutor in Dili district. Last time I went to check he said that my case was still being processed. The police had been summoned, but the first time they did not come. Then the keterangan was in Indonesian so it is still being translated [into Tetum] to go to the court. I have not yet heard if there is a process with the perpetrator; he is still free, not detained. There has been no action from the commander.[40] Another man, Cristiano da Costa, thirty-four, told Human Rights Watch about an incident that happened in November 2004 after some policemen accused him of hitting a government minister's car with his truck and then not stopping, on a road just outside Dili. He told Human Rights Watch that there were two policemen who had followed him to his home in Taibesse, Dili, where they wanted to arrest him. He agreed to go to the police station with them to try and resolve the matter in the presence of his boss, who worked for Perkumpulan HAK, a human rights organization in the capital.Cristiano told us: They wanted us to all go in the police car and I said it was better if I took my truck to the station so that we would know better if there was any damage. They said you take your truck, you in front, us behind. My house is on top of the hill. We drove down until we got to the river. Everything was dark, it was about 10 or 11 at night. They flashed their lights and told me to stop there. I thought maybe they wanted to take my truck and I would go in the police car. That is what I thought. They got out of their car, and I was still in my truck. They told me to turn off the engine, and turn off the lights. They

ordered me to open the door, saying they wanted me to get out. I opened the door and before I had even got my foot on the ground I was hit. Once on my [left] cheek and two times in my chest. It was one of the policemen, with his hand. Then he said, "If you do anything you will be killed." Then they put me in the police car, one of the policemen drove my truck to the police station in CaicoliI told the commander that I had to go to the hospital. My cheek was injured.[41] Perkumpulan HAK has been assisting Cristiano da Costa with his complaint against the police for assault and arbitrary detention. They told Human Rights Watch: The case has already had a hearing in the court. The result of the investigating judge's decision is that the two perpetrators would have an unconditional release [i.e. charges dropped]. Until now there has been no action from the PSU [Professional Standards Unit, now called the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit]. On March 17, 2005, the prosecutor's case went to the court. At the time of the hearing Cristiano was not present. He was not informed, not allowed to attend. Since that hearing there have not been any further developments in the court, and the perpetrators still continue their duties as police. There are many cases like this. There is an incident, but then there is no process.[42] In August 2004, several men who had been involved in a fight with residents of a rival village were arrested and taken into police custody in Maliana police station. One described what happened to him that night in the cell: At midnight, police from Maliana arrived and called for me in the cell. They said for me to come out to get some medicine. However, as soon as I started to stand up, then they hit me-kicked me on the stomach and punched me on the chest. [The interviewee gives the first names of the first officer to hit him and of two others who hit him when he came out of the cell.] Then they ordered me to go back into the cell. In the morning I was taken to Maliana hospital for treatment.[43] One man who witnessed this told Human Rights Watch: They took him out of the cell and took him right in front of the cell. I witnessed the beating. They used their fists and punched him in the stomach. When they ordered him to leave the cell, it was said it was to take some medicine but after he exited he was ordered to raise his hands and put his back against the wall. Then he was beaten by those two policemen. Maybe for about fifteen minutes. We didn't call out. We were just quiet.[44] Maliana hospital records seen by Human Rights Watch show that the victim was admitted to the hospital in August 2004 with a "cut on the head (above the right ear). Approximately 3cm. Scratches on the left side of the head."[45] Several of the men submitted a complaint to the police regarding excessive use of force at the time of their arrest and ill-treatment during their detention in Maliana police station in August 2004. One of the victims told Human Rights Watch: The three of us went to Maliana to initiate an investigation against the PNTL in Maliana. We don't yet know the result. We went again on March 17, 2005, and were told

to wait for the result of the investigation. We are not satisfied with the actions of the police. We do not accept it because their violence is as if Indonesians are still here in East Timor.[46] In August 2004, a man from Dili was detained with about fifty other members of his martial arts group while on a group visit to the district of Ainaro, about forty kilometers from Dili. The men believe they were targeted merely for membership in the martial arts group.[47] They were told they had been arrested on suspicion of burning down a house in a nearby village the night before. Human Rights Watch talked to one of the men about what happened. He recounted: The police met us in the road and immediately searched us. We had knives-they took all of them. There was a friend of mine who was wearing a PNTL uniform but he is not PNTL. He was ordered to do push-ups by the police and the UIR [Rapid Intervention Unit] for about thirty minutes. After that we walked for about a hundred meters. We passed by the house that had been burnt and they hit us. I was beaten on my back and kicked. We were handcuffed first and then ordered to run to Ainaro townabout forty-five of us were handcuffed. When we got to Ainaro police station we were ordered to line up and take off our clothes-trousers, everything, just left in our underwear. Then we were ordered to stand on one foot with our arms stretched out to the sides. If we put our foot down we were beaten. We were also tortured with pepper spray sprayed directly into our eyes. I was beaten on the chest. I was hit four times. We arrived there at 3:00 p.m. At 10:00 p.m. we were finally put in the cell We were detained for three days, then in the morning of the fourth day we were released to return [i.e. to be transferred] to Dili. We went in the cells again in Dili. Forty-five of us were in a cell in Dili for another seventytwo hours.[48] Human Rights Watch interviewed several men who were victims and witnesses of excessive police force at an incident in Bobonaro sub-district on August 13, 2004. A meeting to settle a land dispute turned violent after a police officer allegedly hit someone present at the meeting. At least two police officers were attacked and fled the scene. Police backup was then called into the village. One man told Human Rights Watch what happened next:. The [extra] police to arrive were from Bobonaro. They straight way started arresting and beating people here. The police were kicking my father and beating him with the police stick. They hit him on the left side of his body. There were about seven or eight men. After they beat my father, my older brother arrived and told them that there was no need to beat his father. If they wanted to beat someone they should just beat us. Then the police let go of my father, didn't beat him anymore, and started beating my brother with a stick and a bulletproof vest. They beat him on his head, until it started bleeding.[49] The man's brother told Human Rights Watch what happened to him: After they let go of my father they started beating us. First they beat me with a bulletproof vest that they were carrying. The policeman kicked me with his feet, and beat me with his fist and the vest. Hit me on my head until it was bleeding. He kicked me in the chest. There were also other people hitting me from behind. Then the police from Maliana said that they were there to calm the situation not to beat up victims. So,

the police from Maliana were able to save us. I think if the Maliana police had not arrived, we would have been half dead.[50] Unauthorized Use of Firearms The most high profile example of excessive use of force and resort to lethal force remains the police response to riots in Dili in December 2002. At that time hundreds of rioters smashed and looted their way through Dili and burnt several buildings to the ground. In several instances the response of panicked and poorly trained East Timorese police officers was to use tear gas and open fire on members of the crowd with live ammunition. This resulted in the death of two young men and the hospitalization of another thirteen people with gunshot wounds. Several victims of the shootings claimed that they were shot and wounded when police drove through the streets and fired directly at suspects.[51] The government report into the incident was not published until nearly a year later, in November 2003. It confirmed the number of casualties, but was inconclusive as to the identities of the perpetrators of the shootings. Although an earlier internal police investigation had identified and suspended six UIR members who had discharged their firearms during the riots, they were not held responsible for the fatalities and injuries caused.[52] The U.N. account of the episode criticized the "high incidence of contradictory statements" by police, which had hindered resolution of the matter.[53] To date, there has been no clarity on the status of any disciplinary action against police officers involved in the riots of December 2002. Likewise, the fatal police shooting of one man during disturbances in Baucau one month earlier has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, and to date no one has been held accountable for the killing. Although not yet a widespread problem, Human Rights Watch found other more recent incidents of disproportionate, unnecessary, and illegal use of firearms by police in East Timor. One twenty-two-year-old man described his experience to Human Rights Watch. On July 12, 2004, he had been involved in an early morning fight with other men in the town of Tilolai. He told Human Rights Watch that the fight had only lasted about twenty minutes and no one had been injured. That afternoon the police arrived at his village: We were playing football in the field here at about four o'clock in the afternoon. Then the police-not with a patrol car, with a normal car-arrived in a passenger minibus. They got out of the bus and we saw the police. They said, 'Hey! Stop!' then they took out their guns. We were scared and so we ran. I don't know how many policemen there were. I just saw one policeman get out of the bus. As soon as I saw the gun I started running. My friends who had not been involved in the incident did not run. Just the three of us ran. The police straight away shot at us. They shot four times-I didn't see it because I was running but I heard it. [None of the three were injured.] We have not yet reported to the police about the shooting. I'm scared they will want to arrest us again.[54]

Another man described an incident that occurred in January 2005. He and his nephew were out picking fruit and vegetables when they came across a PNTL officer who accused them of having stolen cattle. He told Human Rights Watch: We went up to the hill at about ten o'clock in the morning.It was January 23, 2005 When we got to the top we met this PNTL man.They [the PNTL officer and family] were looking for cattle. They said someone had stolen them, and then they met us.When they came across us he readied his gun. The PNTL, one man, with his family, four of them altogether. He was wearing normal clothes. He was ready to shoot and told us not to do anything We were carrying one bag and two umbrellas, and two small machetes. The PNTL ordered us to give them to him. He put all the things in his waistband. Took all of it. He also took cigarettes and some tobacco. I had a small amount of tobacco wrapped in some plastic. He took all of it. After that he told us to walk. He forced us to walk. He was holding his gun at the ready, behind us. We were in the middle. His family was in front. After we had walked maybe two hundred meters we saw cattle footprints. Two sets and we had to follow them. The PNTL was behind, always behind. We were walking for about twenty minutes and it was raining really hard. We saw the prints again and then maybe less than one hundred meters later we found the cattle. The PNTL was maybe half a meter behind me and then he shot his gun. I don't know where he shot it. I was still looking forward and the PNTL was behind me. He fired his gun one time and said, "If you don't want to die, then leave." When he fired his gun the two cows ran off. We were looking for the cows for maybe three hours. It was already afternoon by the time I went home He is very wrong using a weapon that belongs to the government.[55] The man went to file a complaint with the police but later agreed to meet with the police officer to resolve the matter informally. Had the system been working properly the officer would have been disciplined by his superior officer, who knew about the case but took no action. Regarding the case above, the chief of the PEO office in Bobonaro told Human Rights Watch that once the perpetrator had made peace with the community then maybe there would also be a disciplinary measure imposed by the PNTL on this officer (he suggested that this might be a two-month suspension, or whatever the commander decided). When asked about the unauthorized use of the firearm, as if to explain, he responded: Normally pistols are distributed in the morning and in the afternoon they are returned to the stock room. In this case the officer came in the morning, received his gun, then went home for breakfast. He changed his clothes and then heard about the cattle. That's why he had his gun.[56] As with other types of violations the failure to discipline and hold officers involved accountable is undermining efforts to enforce strict adherence to use of firearms policies in the police force. The U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state that firearms may only be used in very specific circumstances: "Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defense or

defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury [or] to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life."[57] According to the Basic Principles, "Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their law."[58] Although the Code of Conduct and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms are not binding international law, they constitute authoritative guidance for interpreting international human rights law regarding policing. When Human Rights Watch asked the Bobonaro sub-district police commander about this incident, he stated: The PSU [Professional Standards Unit] is already investigating this. I have already given them all of my reports. The result is still being processed in the PSU. It is still being considered where the truth is. It is not yet resolved Am I a perpetrator or a victim? This is not a small case, this case has gone all the way up to the minister [of interior]. My members [officers] didn't eat for a week afterwards [i.e. after the incident] because their faces were so swollen. The community think because it is already a democracy they have the right to do anything at all. They also have to recognize that the police have the rights to defend themselves. If the U.N. Human Rights Unit or HAK come here I don't receive them. They document differently and always conclude that the police are the perpetrators.[59] Human Rights Watch then interviewed the head of the Professional Ethics Office in Bobonaro who was overseeing the case. He told us that the case had already been processed and they were waiting to send the details to Dili. He confirmed that allegations had been made against four PNTL officers from Bobonaro sub-district police station, and one from the Maliana police station.[60] Elisio Dominggos da Piedade, of Baucau district, told Human Rights Watch about an experience in late July 2004. He said he was arrested for an incident involving two policemen and another man who had borrowed his motorbike. On the day in question he was at work, with his motorbike outside, when two police officers in a patrol car arrived. He was mistakenly identified as the suspect, handcuffed, and taken to Baucau police station. He told Human Rights Watch: All the way there I was asking, "Why are you arresting me?" The two men just told me to be quiet. [He identified the two officers, one by name.] As soon as they released the handcuffs, [officer's name withheld] sprayed pepper spray in my eyes. I was standing and he was nearby, very close to me. He sprayed me once in the eyes. After that they took me to the interrogation room and I was kicked in the chest. It was [name withheld] again. He kicked me here [shows chest] and I fell backwards against the wall. Then he kicked me again. I fell again onto the wall in front of me. I don't know how long he was kicking me for, maybe for about ten minutes.He didn't ask anything at all, he was still annoyed [jengkel] with me. Then I was put in a cell for seventy-two hours. It was completely empty. I didn't report [the assault] to anyone at the station. My eyes are still sore because of the gas.[61]

Baucau hospital records show that a doctor's note was written for Elisio's case detailing his injuries. It shows that Elisio was given medication for a medical complaint over a period of three days in July 2004 for a trauma to his back caused by a beating.[62] The charges against Elisio were dropped but during the criminal proceedings against Elisio at a court in Dili he did submit a complaint about his ill-treatment during his time in police custody. He has subsequently repeatedly sought accountability for the abuse. He told Human Rights Watch what he did after he was released from detention: I submitted a complaint about [the policeman whom he alleges beat him and sprayed him with pepper spray, name withheld]. It is already being investigated by the police but has not yet finished. At the time of my hearing in Dili I also complained to the court [about the abuse]. I feel sad because it has not been submitted, and the process is still ongoing. About the original incident, no one was ever arrested for it. Just me and it was a mistake. Because I was wrongly arrested I was unconditionally released. After the decision in my case my defense lawyer Pedro asked the prosecutor and the Baucau police to investigate the wrongful arrest and abuse. So, after the letter of request to the police and the prosecutor, they said we have to wait for the process to proceed. Until now it has not been brought to court. I am dependent on the process. If it is investigated then [name withheld] has to be brought to justice. My opinion is that I am ready to go to court.[63] Elisio's father, who works at the district hospital, complained to Human Rights Watch about the lack of movement on his son's case: My son was beaten in the prison (cell) but he was not taken to the hospital. I asked them to take him to the hospital, to be given medicine, but they didn't take him. Until now we are still waiting for the case to be resolved. It has not yet been resolved, we have not yet received any information.[64] Another young man, who did not wish to be identified, told Human Rights Watch about what happened to him when he was arrested in his village in Holsa: On June 25, 2004, I was arrested by the PNTL, and put in a cell for two days and two nights. I was continuously tortured, sprayed with pepper spray, beaten, and drenched with water. They constantly threatened me saying, "If you oppose the police then you will know the consequence." Three police came into the cell, locked the door, took off their jackets, then hit me. They were all Maliana PNTL. They were the night guards, and were wearing PNTL uniforms. On the first night they beat me at around 1:00 a.m., on the second night they beat me around 3:00 a.m. Both nights were different people, but both times they were beating me. The first time I was in a cell with my friends. The three of them arrived and called for me, "[name withheld], you come with us." They took me alone to another cell. When we got there they started beating me. For about an hour they were beating me. They hit me with a shoe, and kicked me on my back and on my feet. They were wearing police boots. The light was off. I was shouting for help but no one came. When they finished they took me back to the cell. I couldn't walk so they lifted me into the cell. Then they went back to their office. I was injured. On the second night we slept until 3:00 a.m., then they came again. They arrived, called for me again, and took me again to the cell-that torture room. They beat me until I was

unconscious. I collapsed and they took me to the hospital... When we got to the hospital the doctor said, "This man is almost dead, you are still doing things like this?" The doctor examined my ribs. Here [points to right side of forehead] my head was cut and bleeding. The doctor continued examining me and said that I had to spend the night in the hospital. The police said, "Let him die, die in the police station." Then they took me back to the police station and put me back in the cell.[65] One thirty-five-year-old man detailed a traumatic encounter he had with a police officer in May 2004 in his village in Batugade, Bobonaro. He told Human Rights Watch: I saw a man standing in front of my door, he was wearing a black top and it had "police" written on the back of it. I also saw that he was carrying a gun under his left armpit. After I shone my torch he ran in my direction and took hold of my right hand. He said, "Do you know me or not?" I saw he had a gun so I told him I knew him and apologized to him but he straight away hit me once in the chest with his hand. I asked for his forgiveness three times and then he hit me again and took me from my house to my brother's. When we got to the front of my brother's house I called for him to come out and my brother asked the policeman not to beat me anymore. He said if there was a problem with us then we could resolve it in a manner which was better. And then the PNTL kicked my brother My brother was scared and ran away. So I was dragged and hit again in my stomach. It was a severe beating and I fell backwards and my head collided with the asphalt, and then I was dragged again. I was already unconscious. There was lots of blood on my head and I only came to when the PNTL dragged me to stand up again. I was dragged about a hundred meters and I fell. I was unconscious. The policeman held my hands and stamped on my stomach, and then took out a sangkur [type of bayonet/knife] and wanted to stab me. He ordered the community to say if anyone knew me or not, if no one knew me he was going to stab me because I was a militia [militiaman]. My brother ran forward and said, "I know him. He is my brother." The policeman released me and my family took me to my brother's house. The PNTL member left and my brother waited with me until four o'clock in the morning and then went to rent a car from Balibo to take me to the hospital in Balibo. At the hospital the healthcare official gave me some medicine. I then went to Balibo police station [to make a complaint] The police called the PNTL officer and ordered him to go to the Balibo police station. I heard them do it when I was in the station. My head was spinning but I heard. Because the PNTL [officer] did not arrive, I went home.[66] This man is still suffering from trauma brought on by the event. He told Human Rights Watch that he is too scared to go out by himself now, and therefore a member of his family has to accompany him everywhere he goes. It appears that the perpetrator may have been punished for the offense, but the victim has not been given any information on his complaint. He told Human Rights Watch: The next morning [after the incident], about 8:00 a.m., the commander from Mota'ain visited my house. He promised that the next day he would meet me and we would go to Maliana. After two days I waited, he didn't arrive, and on the third day he arrived. The police commander together with the perpetrator came to my house to resolve things. At that time I said that I didn't want to, I am an ordinary citizen, I want the problem to be resolved from above, in the court. As an ordinary citizen I know the legal process. So, I went to the Dili court to give a complaint and also to Yayasan [i.e. Perkumpulan] HAK.

The result? I don't know. I don't know where the perpetrator is, I haven't been told. I came home and until now I only heard that the perpetrator is in prison but I haven't seen it myself. No one has come here to tell me, not from HAK either.[67] In April 2004, Baltazar Fatima Correia, a twenty-two-year-old from Mulia village in Baucau district, was picked up by several drunk police officers, beaten and threatened. He told Human Rights Watch: The five police were drinking tuak putih [palm wine] with my father and their friend [name withheld] at the police checkpoint. After they finished drinking tuak the five police wanted to return to Baucau. I've known them a long time. They arrived at the place where I was sitting on the road. I called out to my younger brother in a coarse way whether or not he also wanted to go to Baucau. But the police thought I was provoking them, they interpreted me wrongly. The car stopped. One PNTL [officer A, name and rank withheld] got out from the car. Four of his friends were still in the car. As soon as he got out of the car he straight away kicked me in my chest. After that I fell to the ground. There were two other PNTL, they got out of the car. [The interviewee names these two, officers B and C, names withheld, and a third officer who punched him once on the back of his neck.[68]] After that [officers B and C] handcuffed my hands behind my back and put me in the car and took me to Baucau police station. When we got as far as the river-it's not far, maybe about a hundred meters-[officer B] said to his friends, "Is there an empty house here or not? If there is we can let him out and torture him here." There was no response. About 500 meters later at the cemetery [officer A] said, "Turn the car back," then [officer C] responded, "No, it's better if we take him to Baucau first." When he replied he then burned me with his cigarette, under my left wrist [shows scar]. I was at the back on the floor. They were constantly kicking me. They were sitting above. After he burnt me, [officer C] shouted at me, "If you do anything I will shoot you." [69] One man in the village who witnessed the event told Human Rights Watch what he saw: We were working here for Easter, about nine or ten o'clock in the morning. I was here, working at the church, and saw the car. I saw [officer A] get out of the car and straight away hit Baltazar Then he was hit by [officer B] who hit him and grabbed his head and smashed it on the car. At the time I was about twenty meters away. I saw it and ran over. I told [officer B], I said, "Why is that kid being hit. What has he done wrong?" After that they didn't hit him anymore. They put Baltazar in the car. I saw them going to Baucau but I couldn't say anything because the PNTL were very emotional They were wearing uniforms and driving a TATA Sumo car with "police" written on it. There were lots of people around, tens of people.[70] Over a year after the original incident, Baltazar Fatima Correia is still trying to get some redress for the treatment he experienced in police custody. He told Human Rights Watch: I went to the prosecutor's office and he promised he was ready to take the case to the police, but there has been no result. Only [Perkumpulan] HAK sent a letter to the PSU but it has not yet been investigated. This case is already at the prosecutor level, but has not yet had a hearing [disidang]. It is with the PSU in Dili I often go to the Baucau

police about my case. The police only chase me out [mengusir] and threaten me saying, "Just go back, go back home, don't come here, if you come here I will shoot you or hit you." I have already been three times to check my case there. The last time was September 2004. I'm not afraid to go back, the problem is the money to get to Baucau.[71] When Human Rights Watch questioned Baucau's police commander about this case he stated, "About the Mulia case it has already been resolved. There is no evidence that they [police officers] were involved. It went all the way to court and there was no evidence. They were all released. It was a long time ago. All the files are in Dili."[72] Impunity for Rape The failure to hold anyone accountable for the rape of a teenaged girl, allegedly by nine PNTL officers on May 10, 2004, is another example of the effective impunity that police officers have come to expect in East Timor. In this case, the nine policemen were originally arrested and charged with rape, accused of taking the girl in an official police vehicle to a police training compound in the Tasi Tolu area of Dili, where they sexually assaulted her; there was also a tenth man, a civilian, who was charged in relation to having "procured" the girl for the police officers.[73] Following preliminary hearings, six of the suspects were conditionally released pending trial while four (three PNTL and the civilian) were kept in custody. The preliminary hearings in June 2004 and the trial in April 2005 were monitored by the East Timorese NGO Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), which reported deep concerns about the unorthodox manner in which the proceedings were conducted and factors which demonstrated, in their view, that"neither the rights of the accused to proper legal representation, nor the expectations of the victim and the community to have an independent tribunal hold a proper trial in regard to her allegations, have been respected."[74] JSMP noted that during the hearings on the continued detention of the men, a substantial number of PNTL members were present in the courtroom and court compound. They also reported that police officers, under questionable authority, cordoned off the public court building, reportedly harassing and verbally abusing the victim when she left the courtroom.[75] One report quoted a judge as saying that "justice was powerless since the government kept intervening in the process."[76] JSMP has also noted that "[t]he investigating judge assigned to the case told JSMP monitors that he could not control their [PNTL and UIR officers present at the court] conduct."[77] When the case came to trial only the three police officers and the civilian in custody were tried, with the outstanding charges against the six police officers conditionally released seemingly ignored. At the trial session of April 13, 2005, both the defense lawyers and the prosecutor claimed to have had no prior involvement in the case and to be ignorant of the evidence. The presiding judge then decided that the defendants should be released due to lack of evidence against them, and the police officers were set free. No further charges against any accused have been pursued, and no one has been held accountable for the rape.

The failure to prosecute this case is just one example of an unwillingness to tackle police abuse, as well as demonstrating that violence against women is often not treated with appropriate seriousness by the formal justice system.[78] In its human rights report for 2005, the U.S. Department of State noted that there had also been "no significant developments in the September 2004 case of an off-duty police officer who forcibly entered the home of a twelve-year-old girl who had allegedly been statutorily raped by the officer's nineteen-year-old brother." It appears that the Professional Ethics Office had initially opened an investigation, but by the end of 2005 no further action had been taken.[79] Legal Standards on Torture and Other Physical Mistreatment Even if an individual is guilty of a criminal offence, the use of torture and other forms of mistreatment against that individual is wholly prohibited under East Timorese and international law. Few prohibitions in international human rights law are as clear as the ban on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. A large body of international legal authority exists that prohibits any derogation from the prohibition on the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The prohibition, which forms part of customary international law, is to be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[80] and is also entrenched in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).[81]East Timor acceded to the CAT in April 2003 and to the ICCPR in September 2003. East Timor's constitution also explicitly prohibits the use of torture, stating that "no one shall be subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."[82] The constitution also specifically refers to East Timor's obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international treaties.[83] The Convention against Torture defines torture as intentional acts by public officials that cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, or for punishment, intimidation, or discrimination.[84] In cases where beatings and humiliation of detainees and prisoners by police do not rise to the level of torture, they may nevertheless constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Cruel and inhuman treatment includes suffering that lacks one of the elements of torture or that does not reach the intensity of torture. Particularly harsh conditions of detention, including deprivation of food, water, and medical treatment, may also constitute inhuman treatment. Degrading treatment includes treatment that involves the humiliation of the victim or that is disproportionate to the circumstances of the case.[85] In addition to binding treaties on torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the United Nations has developed detailed principles, minimum rules, and declarations on the actions and use of force by police. The U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials limits the use of force by police to situations in which it is "strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty."[86] Similarly, the U.N.'s Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states that law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force and

firearms.[87] When the use of force is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must, among other things, "(a) exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; [and] (b) minimize damage and injury."[88]

V. Reforms, Institutions and Practices Needed to Create Police Accountability in East Timor
The police are not brave enough to investigate cases where there are police involved. Cases where there are beatings of civilians are not investigated. Sometimes police who have beaten or threatened people are not investigated, so they do not want to open an internal investigation. Tiago Amaral Sarmento, head of the nongovernmental Judicial System Monitoring Programme in East Timor[89] It is clear that police abuse is a serious and pressing problem, yet initiatives to address it have been inadequate. Existing oversight mechanisms are weak and need further support and strengthening, and new institutions and practices are needed to effectively eradicate this problem. In March 2005 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) identified many of the problems when it stated in its report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that: Accountability mechanisms remain unclear and inadequate. The result is an emerging pattern of impunity for PNTL abuses. The Professional Ethics Office (PEO) of PNTL is increasingly unable to investigate cases of misconduct due to lack of resources for field work and at times political interference. For unclear reasons, some cases are dealt with by PEO, while others, sometimes cases with particular sensitivity, are investigated by the Ministry of Interior. A number of allegations of criminal acts are addressed through the administrative process only and are not subject to any criminal processes. Delays are reported in investigations and decisions on disciplinary action. Disciplinary actions are not always in proportion to misconduct.[90] Two studies published in 2004 show mixed public views of the police. One survey commissioned by the Asia Foundation in East Timor encouragingly found that "of the only 11 percent of respondents who had brought disputes to the police, most did so because they considered their dispute to be a serious matter and they believed that they would be treated fairly by the police." However, these perceptions are not likely to remain static. The survey also found that "many feel the laws are not actually enforced, particularly those laws enacted to protect anyone arrested and accused of a crime. Less than half the public (49 percent) believe the law requiring court approval to detain a suspect for more than three days is respected, and only four in ten think the law genuinely protects the accused from police brutality or allows them access to a public defender." Most telling is one of the survey's conclusions that "confidence levels in East Timor's new and inexperienced police force are likely to drop dramatically unless they are effectively trained and professionalized."[91]

The second study, undertaken jointly by the Dili Institute of Technology and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), found that the public's respect for the work of the police was still quite high at 69.6 percent overall, but much less in the districts of Baucau, Bobonaro and Viqueque.[92] In Bobonaro the figure was only 32 percent, perhaps reflecting negative attitudes towards the police in a district with a high number of reported cases of police brutality. Although neither study can be used as conclusive indications of public perceptions of the police, the results do show already mixed feelings toward East Timor's new police force. One conclusion that could be drawn is a general public reluctance to criticize the PNTL as a force. However, more specific questions on detention and abuse resulted in quite negative responses indicating that when people have come into direct contact with the police their experiences have been less positive. Another caveat is that although community confidence is generally a good indicator of the level of police abuse, the results may just reflect an attitude that the PNTL is far less abusive than the Indonesian police force-a pretty low threshold for professionalism. However, the surveys are useful in highlighting what communities believe are positive elements within the police force. The challenge for the East Timor government will be to build and support those positive elements, whilst also addressing the problem areas. A. Addressing Impunity Police abuse can become a serious problem when police officers and their superiors enjoy impunity for their actions. One of the most common reasons that police abuse can become commonplace within a police force is the effective impunity enjoyed by police officers and their superiors who participate in, order, or ignore it. In East Timor effective institutional mechanisms for accountability are essential if impunity is to be tackled. More robust and effective enforcement of existing legislation and stronger media vigilance and independent monitoring of the problem will also be key. The early indications are that East Timor risks allowing impunity to become a grave and systematic problem if it does not respond appropriately. In spite of the kinds of abuses documented in this report, thus far meaningful sanctions for police officers involved in serious human rights violations have been rare. According to the OHCHR, in March 2005 the East Timor police commissioner reported that ten police officers had been dismissed from the service.[93] However, it was unclear whether the dismissals were linked to human rights violations or mere criminal activity. An international advisor to the minister of interior told Human Rights Watch that for the period from January to March 2005, fifty-five cases had been reported through the PEO.[94] The U.S. Department of State, in its annual human rights report on East Timor noted, for example, that for 2005 "[s]ome officers were punished for relatively minor misconduct, and in several cases police officers were convicted and sentenced for assaults committed while on duty; however, by year's end, no action had been taken in a number of cases involving serious misconduct. There were allegations that personal connections within the police force or the Ministry of Interior were a factor in some cases."[95] The failure to properly investigate police misconduct undermines the police force's credibility in holding its members accountable. This is as true for high profile incidents as for day-to-day violations. For example, in July 2004 a group of approximately one

hundred persons, including many Falintil veteran resistance fighters, staged a protest outside the main government building in Dili. On July 20, the second day of their protest, police officers, together with members of the elite Rapid Intervention Force, used tear gas to disperse the crowd, and subsequently arrested over thirty people. Although many of those held were detained for more than thirty hours, the exact grounds under which they were held were never clarified. Television footage showed at least one police officer beating a protester, and there were several other reports that several detainees were beaten in police custody. Ironically, many of the demonstrators' banners, trampled under foot by the security services, had proclaimed messages calling for greater democratization and reform of the police force. This incident received much attention at the time from the government, the United Nations in East Timor, and the media. However, once again there has not yet been a satisfactory outcome either in respect of disciplinary measures against the police officers responsible for excessive use of force, or in respect of the arbitrary detention of over thirty protestors. In his February 2005 progress report on UNMISET, the U.N. secretary-general noted the negative consequences delays in accountability could produce, commenting: "the report of the special investigation into the incident of 20 July 2004, in which the police used excessive force to disperse a largely peaceful demonstration, has not yet been completed. These delays are perceived by the community as voluntary inaction and hence undermine the general trust in the professionalism of the police."[96] Yet at least part of this problem is a legacy of the U.N.'s failure to prioritize police disciplinary measures. Few strategies were implemented at an early stage in the U.N. transitional administration to stop inappropriate police behaviors before they became too entrenched. (Deficiencies in the UNPOL training regime are explored in detail in section V.D of this report.) Human Rights Watch spoke with Police Commissioner Paulo Martins, who conceded that there was a problem and that this had implications for creating a culture of impunity. He was clear in his understanding that proper punishment for violators would be an effective deterrent: We are trying to improve this which is not very good within the police. We already have a police disciplinary regulation and have taken strong measures against those who commit abuse or violence against the people I don't think it is because of training but an increase in understanding from the commanders and the communities that the police have to respect human rights. And also because the police officers realize that sanctions are heavy if they commit an abuse.[97] The tardiness of an appropriate response to the police violence at the July 2004 demonstration shows that there is some way to go before the commissioner's words about internal disciplinary processes translate into concrete measures. There have, however, been encouraging signs that some things can be done right. For example, in April 2005 several thousand people joined anti-government demonstrations in Dili. They were protesting a proposal by East Timor's Council of Ministers to designate religious education as an optional subject in some primary schools. Police were deployed to patrol these demonstrations, which they did in a manner widely

regarded as professional and restrained. This display of professionalism has improved the public image of the police force, and significantly also appears to have given a confidence boost to the police force itself, which saw the positive outcome from implementing the standards provided by appropriate training. Looking to the future, attitudinal change within the police force is going to have to be a priority and will need a long-term strategy to have impact. Combined with training there needs to be a strong system of discipline, effective leadership and support by the management of PNTL over time, together with positive reinforcement for appropriate police behavior, for that attitudinal change to take place. B. The Development of Oversight Institutions Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit The first port of call for investigating police violations is usually the PNTL's internal oversight body, the Professional Ethics and Deontology Unit (PEDU, formerly known as the Professional Ethics Office, PEO, and before that the Professional Standards Unit, PSU).[98] Staffed by serving police officers and working under the general commander of the PNTL, the unit is charged with investigating allegations of police misconduct or abuse. Such allegations are usually made by members of the public, although, according to the police Organic Decree-Law, the Ministry of Interior can also order the PEDU to conduct inquiries, especially in sensitive cases. The results of any investigations, together with any recommendations for discipline, are sent to the minister, who then decides what action should be taken.[99] Unfortunately, the PEDU lacks institutional authority over the various branches of the police. One then-PEO officer in Dili told Human Rights Watch that although in theory PEO officers could investigate police officers of superior rank to themselves, in practice it was the district commanders who ultimately decided which cases would be investigated in the district, which ones would be sent to Dili, and which ones would be set aside.[100] Another problem is the lack of understanding by police of the rights and interests of those filing complaints. It seems little thought or consideration has been given to the rights of the victims in this process, with the PNTL disciplinary regulation not even envisaging that complaints could come from outside the force. The PEO/PEDU has also been weak and very slow to take action, if at all. In cases where complaints have been taken up by the PEO/PEDU, punishments for police officers have often just been temporary suspensions, transfers, or, in some cases, transfers followed by promotions. There is no automatic suspension for police officers under investigation for alleged offenses. As one example, Simao Lopes, the chief of the then-PEO office for Bobonaro district, told Human Rights Watch about an incident earlier in 2005 when a uniformed police officer in his district had fired his gun in the air at the market in Maliana. Lopes recommended that the officer be discharged from the police force, but instead he was only transferred to Dili.[101] At a more basic level the PEO/PEDU continues to be restricted by a lack of human and financial resources. In some cases PEO/PEDU staff do not have access to transport to conduct investigations, or to return to complainants to update them on the status of their

case.[102] As Carlos Moniz Maia, the deputy head of the then-PEO national office commented: We have several problems. First of all are the limitations in personnel and transport. The statistics of cases involving the PNTL every year is increasing. Cases from 2001 to 2003 have already finished being investigated, but there are still about 50 percent of cases from 2004 which have not yet been resolved because of restrictions of transport and staff. Likewise for 2005 we've finished about twenty cases and still have about seventy left.[103] One U.N. police officer in Bobonaro district had a poor opinion of the then-PEO in Maliana, pointing out to Human Rights Watch that the previous experience of its chief, as a patrol officer within the occupation-era Indonesian police force, did not provide him with the skills necessary to lead investigations or manage staff. In his opinion, a change of personnel in the office would improve the office's strength.[104] When he was interviewed by Human Rights Watch the chief of the PEO office in Maliana conceded that he lacked essential experience, but he was keen to stress his willingness to receive more training in the area of internal investigations. He told Human Rights Watch: Before I was with the PEO I was a community police officer. I received just two days' training from the PNTL. We would be happy to participate in more training. I ask you to recommend for us to have more training about the role of the PEO so that we can understand it in more depth. We want to work but we do not get strong enough support.[105] It appears that lack of faith in and/or fear of the new police force is already preventing people going directly to the police to register complaints. One young man who was severely ill-treated in police detention told Human Rights Watch that he was too scared to seek accountability for the abuse he suffered at the hands of three police officers in Maliana police station. He said, "I have not yet submitted a complaint because they threatened me. I do not want to go back to Maliana police station. I don't want to be summoned again by the PNTL."[106] A U.N. police advisor told Human Rights Watch that he heard a district police commander threatening a man who had come to complain about the police treatment of some people involved in martial groups in the district. The U.N. officer heard the commander tell the man that they wanted to solve the matter through traditional dispute mechanisms. When the man protested the commander issued a stark warning, stating, "Go to the U.N. human rights unit then and see what they will do. The U.N. will leave soon and then it will just be us." The U.N. advisor told Human Rights Watch that in his opinion it was clearly a threat.[107] Tiago Amaral Sarmento from JSMP told Human Rights Watch, "If there are violations the communities don't know who they can report it to. They are scared and just stay quiet. The police are a strong institution. The communities don't yet know or understand that they can report to someone."[108] Where such knowledge exists, the lack of resources and experience resulting in delays and incompetence of the PEO/PEDU in dealing with complaints has led to frustration amongst affected communities about lack of transparency and efficiency in dealing with their cases. This has only further

increased the distrust people have in the impartiality of the office. The Office of the Provedor The East Timor constitution provides for a special office to scrutinize human rights practices throughout the territory. A law to establish such a position, the office of the Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justicia, was promulgated in May 2004, although as parliament initially found it hard to agree on a candidate, the position of provedor was not filled until Sebastiao Dias Ximenes was inaugurated in the post June 16, 2005. The Office of the Provedor has far-reaching powers to investigate and report on complaints against government officials and institutions, including the police. Issues within the purview of the office include abuse of power, maladministration, lack of due process, nepotism, collusion and corruption.[109] In his August 2005 report to the United Nations Security Council on the U.N. Office in Timor-Leste, the U.N. secretary-general noted that the Provedor's Office "provides an important legal instrument to address inter alia, the continued reports of human rights violations by the East Timorese police, including excessive use of force, ill-treatment and arbitrary arrest and detention."[110]In a previous report he had expressed concern at the delay in electing the provedor, "especially in light of the recent increase in reported cases of abuse of police power, including assaults and threats, which are not being adequately addressed by internal disciplinary processes and are rarely taken up by the Public Prosecutor for institution of criminal proceedings."[111] In June 2005 Human Rights Watch met with Sebastiao Dias Ximenes shortly before his inauguration as provedor. Already aware of the limitations of his new office, he discussed his main concerns and what he saw as the priority challenges of his new role: The Provedor has limits. I can give recommendations but not follow up. It's a problem. I don't have the power to make decisions, just recommendations. We also have limited human resources. We need training and maybe comparative studies so that we can increase our experience and knowledge. The budget for the Provedor is small. We are an independent institution but receive our budget from the government. Our program cannot go forward if we don't have facilities or a budget. But what is most important is the people and all the communities. If they don't work with the Provedor, this office cannot be a success without their support.[112] By the end of 2005, the Office of the Provedor had still not been fully established or staffed. As a relatively new body, it is hard to accurately gauge the effectiveness of the Provedor's Office. It is to be hoped that the office will contribute to an increased culture of respect for human rights and accountability. Its strengths are that it can undertake investigations on its own initiative, without waiting for a complaint, and has the power to order a person to appear for questioning. However, there are concerns about the capacity of this new institution to comprehensively or effectively carry out the role of a police oversight body, considering the many other functions it has also been tasked with. Another major weakness of the office is that it does not have the power to make enforceable decisions-any of the provedor's recommendations can be ignored.The office can also only make

recommendations to the relevant bodies such as the police, offer to act as a mediator between the complainant(s) and representatives of the public body involved, or refer a grievance to a competent jurisdiction or other recourse mechanism. (For comment on the need to formalize coordination and cooperation between the various institutions entrusted with acting as oversight mechanisms, see below.) C. Legal Gaps The process leading to the establishment of the PNTL led to the existence of a range of different and sometimes competing rules, procedures and practices which govern the PNTL. The promulgation of the Organic Decree-Law in May 2004 went some way towards clarifying the legal framework for the police, but there remains little knowledge and understanding by the police about definition of crimes under the Criminal Code, or police powers under the Criminal Procedures Code and the Rules of Organization Procedures.[113] There is also little training on these areas made available to the police force. At quite a basic level, the June 2004 disciplinary regulation is only available in Portuguese, a language not understood by most PNTL personnel; as a result, the authorities continue to use the previous U.N. Code of Conduct. Even if the disciplinary regulation were available in Indonesian or Tetum, languages understood by most police officers, it has been criticized by police experts for being incoherent. Ray Murray, advisor to the minister of interior, told Human Rights Watch that the disciplinary regulation "has a formula to determine discipline that is virtually unusable and cannot be understood by the vast majority of the PNTL including trainers and advisers." [114] Equally important is for the PNTL to finalize its Rules of Organization Procedures (ROPs). While many ROPs have been finalized (see above), more need to be finished, including ROPs on the treatment of vulnerable persons, including persons with mental illness and victims of gender-based violence.[115] While there have been some developments at addressing the legal vacuum, including a new policy introduced in 2003 restricting the use of force, and the 2004 regulation providing a new disciplinary code for police, there now seems to be an urgent need to formalize coordination and cooperation between the various institutions entrusted with acting as oversight mechanisms for the fledgling police force. Legislation or regulations need to be adopted to clarify the various responsibilities of the PEDU, the Inspectorate and the Office of the Provedor. There is substantial overlap between the different agencies, which is not necessarily a problem but leads to a certain amount of confusion among the public about how to report incidents or hold the PNTL accountable. The U.N.'s senior police advisor, Saif Ullah Malik, told Human Rights Watch in May 2005 about a working group established to harmonize all the different institutions including the then-PEO, Provedor and Ministry of Interior, and that this group would also include participation from the PNTL, the Inspectorate and the U.N. Human Rights Unit.[116] However, at the time of writing it was understood that this group had not met since March 2005. D. The Need for More and Better Training

Although not a solution on its own, police training is an important tool for addressing human rights violations by the police. Reports of human rights violations and inappropriate behavior by officers, combined with the lingering legacy of Indonesian policing techniques, mean that continued strengthening of the human rights dimension of training for experienced officers, trainees, and police academy graduates is essential. Unfortunately, during both UNTAET and UNMISET the fledgling police force received largely inadequate and sometimes contradictory training from UNPOL and CivPol personnel. The first batch of new cadets received three months of basic training at the rehabilitated PoliceAcademy in Dili followed by six months of on-the-job training in the field. Former POLRI officers (members of the Indonesian police force responsible for security in the territory before the vote for independence in 1999, who comprised 350 of the first 1,700 East Timorese police academy graduates) simply underwent a four-week "Intensive Transitional Training Course."[117] Standard training for new recruits is now a four-month training course at the PoliceTrainingAcademy in Comoro, Dili, followed by nine months of field training. In these courses, there is some training in specialized areas of investigations, intelligence gathering, and community policing. The curriculum at the academy has also been recently re-written by an Australian/U.K. police training team (see also below), with human rights material incorporated throughout the course. After graduation a further six months of formal field training is undertaken for probationary officers, who do not become full PNTL officers until after successful completion of this additional training.[118] The U.N. Secretary-General noted in February 2005 that U.N. civilian police advisors were providing training to the East Timor police through a skills development plan which was based on the results of a national survey of police officers to identify gaps in capacity, but that "of the approximately 1,700 police officers who completed the first phase of the plan in December [2004], only half were able to achieve the desired level of competence."[119] There is still a huge lack of management and mentoring capacity in the police force, and a need for a great deal more specialized skills training, including in the area of internal investigations of police misconduct. There is also little awareness of the appropriate treatment of women, children, or other vulnerable groups, or mainstreaming ideas such as the method of investigation into gender-based crimes. One child protection officer with UNICEF in East Timor told Human Rights Watch: There is a notion that if children are victims there is an awareness of special treatment from the VPU [Vulnerable Persons Unit] and rights, etc. But, if they are offenders, those rights are not always recognized It is not entirely clear within the police who is doing what. Not all children will be dealt with by the VPU, just normal investigators... We are trying to encourage children to be aware that if they have a problem they can go to the police, but you run the risk that you are not exposing children to greater risks by going to the police.[120]

Police in East Timor rely heavily on confessions as their sole means of "solving" crimes. This inherently creates an incentive to resort to excessive use of force to extract a purported "confession" from a suspect, and undoubtedly contributes to the current climate where beating of suspects is routine. More intensive training in basic investigation and forensic techniques, including the use of other sources of information and evidence, not only offers the police an alternate and better way to do their job, but would help reduce abuse of power. To reinforce this message it is essential that the judiciary rigorously and consistently refuse to allow evidence where there are credible allegations that it was obtained through illegal use of force by the police. When Human Rights Watch met with the head of Dili's PoliceTrainingAcademy he was emphatic about the volume of human rights materials included in the basic training package taught at the academy, and the good cooperation the Academy had with the U.N. Human Rights Unit, UNDP and UNICEF, all of whom had provided materials for the training courses. However, he was also quite frank in admitting how much further they had to go. He told Human Rights Watch: There is a Code of Conduct for the PNTL. It has already been socialized [disseminated] to all the Commanders but not yet fully to all members of the PNTL.[121] Because of that we are less sure that the Code will hold [be put into practice]. There is not yet a course about it. We need a course for the PEO [now PEDU] so that they can carry out their duties well... However we are still new. The education that they receive here is still a little.[122]

E. Problematic Past Training Approaches

The majority of U.N. training during UNMISET was conducted by UNMISET police advisors at the district and sub-district level, the focus being on the training of trainers in the field. A problem affecting this approach is one that is common to most U.N. police missions around the world: The U.N. civilian police staffing the mission were from a wide range of countries, each with varying adherence to international standards on policing. Their experience and consequently their teaching was therefore not standardized, so PNTL officers were exposed to different approaches to policing and not all were consistent with what was being taught at the Academy, or with international standards. There had been a recommendation from the Ministry of Interior that before this program started the UNPOL officers should be given a "training of trainers" course, so that the training delivery could be uniform across the country. As most of the UNPOL were police officers and not trainers, this would have improved some of the training delivery, but this recommendation was not followed. A UNOTIL staff member was extremely critical of the support which UNPOL had previously provided: I don't think UNPOL knew what they had to do when they were in charge. What we have now is the result of a lack of training. It would have been better to have one police force from one country, rather than a mix without any common members to work. Further problems with the UNPOL training of East Timorese police recruits and officers included communication difficulties caused by language problems that restricted the ability for training sessions to be participatory and inclusive, rather than taught lecturestyle. It also limited interaction between U.N. and East Timor police, and implementation of training scenarios.

Quite crucially the six-month rotations for U.N. police personnel also hindered the effective development or long-term implementation of policies. For peacekeeping this approach may be appropriate, but for institutional development it had negative consequences. There is a sense that the U.N. was in crisis management with no coherent strategic development plan for the PNTL. Their key goal was to set up and handover to an East Timor police force, with no coherent plan for establishing oversight mechanisms and enforcement of disciplinary measures against police officers. A senior diplomat in East Timor commented: "The biggest criticism of UNPOL is that they've been here for four or five years, so you would expect four or five years of training. But they just ticked a box." This diplomat identified the further problem that "the government never refuses aid, so there is a problem in trying to coordinate all the training," and that combined with the tick-the-box approach of UNPOL meant that "their counterparts don't have a clue." There are two other main reasons why current training has taken such a long time to halt police abuses. The first is that current training has failed to address the overall institutional culture of policing methods. The second is that there are few penalties if the officers do not implement what they learn in training and few incentives to follow it. In other words, for training to be meaningful, there must be consequences for failing to abide by it. Vice Minister of Interior Alcino Barris told Human Rights Watch that amongst the police force "there is still very little real understanding of what human rights are."[126] While it is important to teach human rights, it is equally important to train officers about their responsibilities to act professionally, something that the minister also acknowledged. Ray Murray, the international advisor to the Ministry of Interior, told Human Rights Watch, "You should not only teach on what should be done, but also on why it should be done." F. Current Initiatives Recognizing the urgent and ongoing need of the PNTL for further training and assistance, a large part of UNOTIL's mandate is in the area of continued support and development of the East Timorese police. In establishing UNOTIL in May 2005, the Security Council authorized the deployment of up to forty police training advisors, primarily targeted at the specialist police units such as the Border Patrol Unit and the Rapid Intervention Unit. Assistance has also been given to the Professional Ethics Office. Human rights training and courses have already been provided by these advisers. The UNOTIL Human Rights Unit has also been working in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior to provide human rights and use of force training to the national police, most recently through a "training of trainers" course and the launching of a training manual on human rights for the police in mid-2005. International funding also plays a critical role in East Timor in all areas, not least the development of the police service. There is a wide range of bilateral international assistance to the PNTL, including training programs as well as equipment and infrastructure support. Amongst the international support, Canada and Japan have both provided small grants and provided equipment. Indonesia has been hosting a series of exchange programs for PNTL officers to visit and acquire in-house training with the Indonesian police force. At various stages Malaysia and Portugal have also extended training to various units of the PNTL. The United States is funding specialized training courses for supervisors and investigators. One of the problems with this approach is that, as with the U.N. under UMISET (see above), the training is inconsistent in standards, with different countries' domestic procedures being taught. Recognizing this problem, the U.K. and Australia have

embarked on a joint development program for the PNTL focusing on mainstreaming international policing standards across the board over the long-term. When UNPOL leaves (currently scheduled for May 2006), the U.K./Australian initiative will fill the vacuum on advice and training created by UNPOL's departure. Part of the joint U.K.-Australian plan is to integrate standard operating procedures into all aspects of the training. The first phase will concentrate on training of trainers. Noting the wide variety of bilateral and U.N. training currently underway with the PNTL, Kevin Raue, team leader for the U.K.-Australian initiative, concedes that "bad" training was a problem. He commented "There is a problem of inconsistency in the standard of training. That problem is not yet resolved. There is a need also to avoid duplication of training and inappropriate training." G. Monitoring The presence of human rights officers here, and our readiness to report on human rights violations to the international community, does constitute a deterrent to perpetrators. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Sukehiro Hasegawa A critical issue for the future will be to ensure independent monitoring of police behavior in East Timor. Though, as noted, there are formal internal and external oversight mechanisms of the police, for most victims of police brutality the first place they turn is normally either the U.N. Human Rights Unit or an East Timorese human rights NGO, primarily Perkumpulan HAK or FOKUPERS, the two biggest rights organizations in East Timor and the main Timorese bodies in the country monitoring police abuse. With the U.N. Human Rights Unit due to close with the end of UNOTIL's mandate (foreseen for May 2006), the urgency of strengthening civil society mechanisms to provide human rights monitoring and reporting has never been greater. Training for the police on the role of civil society, and the valuable place it has as a counterbalance to government, will also be crucial to ensure mutual respect and cooperation. A lack of monitoring will create a vacuum in which violations will be committed with impunity. As the head of the JSMP told Human Rights Watch: I think that if the U.N. leaves and there are no more advisors the police will increase committing violations in the future. They will think that their behavior is correct because there will be no one to give the recommendation that they have to be processed and brought to justice. The senior U.N. Police Advisor in East Timor, Saif Ullah Malik, concurred, saying: "We need support in terms of training, monitoring and in terms of advance training. After the withdrawal there will be a big gap in monitoring. The U.N. cannot stay forever. Local civil society needs to be activated." He continued: "As an exit strategy we are incorporating local NGOs to monitor the human rights situation in each district. The U.N. Human Rights Unit will be trying to visit districts at least once a week." Indicating that lessons had been learned from the experience of shortcomings in U.N. training of PNTL, he added: "We have adopted an approach, consistency of guidance, for example my technical advisors in the districts are advising the same thing across the board."

NGOs, donors and the East Timor government need to work more closely together to monitor the broad range of human rights violations, for multiple purposes: to remedy individual abuses, to identify patterns and perpetrators, and to highlight structural problems that allow human rights violations to emerge in the first place. Seen in this light, human rights violations by the PNTL are just one symptom of a much broader nationwide problem, and until this is analyzed and addressed then the possibility is that police abuse can only be minimized at best. The weakness of the judiciary, and emerging corruption issues, are just two areas that directly impact on police abuse and remedies for it. A participatory, partnership approach including the wide range of actors in civil society such as the media, communities of interest, and others would be the most successful way to devise an action plan for ending human rights abuse in East Timor.

40 Years Later The Mass Killings in Indonesia

By JOHN ROOSA and JOSEPH NEVINS "One of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century." That was how a CIA publication described the killings that began forty years ago last month in Indonesia. It was one of the few statements in the text that was correct. The 300-page text was devoted to blaming the victims of the killings -- the supporters of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) -- for their own deaths. The PKI had supposedly attempted a coup d'tat and a nationwide uprising called the September 30th Movement (which, for some unknown reason, began on October 1). The mass murder of hundreds of thousands of the party's supporters over subsequent months was thus a natural, inevitable, and justifiable reaction on the part of those non-communists who felt threatened by the party's violent bid for state power. The killings were part of the "backfire" referred to in the title: Indonesia * 1965: The Coup that Backfired. The author of this 1968 report, later revealed to be Helen Louise Hunter, acknowledged the massive scale of the killings only to dismiss the necessity for any detailed consideration of them. She concentrated on proving that the PKI was responsible for the September 30th Movement while consigning the major issue, the anti-PKI atrocities, to a brief, offhanded comment. [1] Hunter's CIA report accurately expressed the narrative told by the Indonesian army commanders as they organized the slaughter. That narrative rendered the September 30th Movement * a disorganized, small-scale affair that lasted about 48 hours and resulted in a grand total of 12 deaths, among them six army generals * into the greatest evil ever to befall Indonesia [2]. The commander of the army, Major General Suharto, justified his acquisition of emergency powers in late 1965 and early 1966 by insisting that the September 30th Movement was a devious conspiracy by the PKI to seize state power and murder all of its enemies. Suharto's martial law regime detained some 1.5 million people as political prisoners (for varying lengths of time), and accused them of being "directly or indirectly involved in the September 30th Movement." The hundreds of thousands of people shot, stabbed, bludgeoned, or starved to death were labeled perpetrators, or would-be perpetrators of atrocities, just as culpable for the murder of the army generals as the handful of people who were truly guilty. The September 30th Movement was Suharto's Reichstag fire: a pretext for destroying the communist party and seizing state power. As with the February 1933 fire in the German parliament that Hitler used to create a hysterical, crisis-filled atmosphere, the

September 30th Movement was exaggerated by Suharto's clique of officers until it assumed the proportions of a wild, vicious, supernatural monster. The army whipped up an anti-communist propaganda campaign from the early days of October 1965: "the PKI" had castrated and tortured the seven army officers it had abducted in Jakarta, danced naked and slit the bodies of the army officers with a hundred razor blades, drawn up hit lists, dug thousands of ditches around the country to hold countless corpses, stockpiled guns imported from China, and so on. The army banned many newspapers and put the rest under army censorship. It was precisely this work of the army's psychological warfare specialists that created the conditions in which the mass murder of "the PKI" seemed justified. The question as to whether or not the PKI actually organized the September 30th Movement is important only because the Suharto regime made it important. Otherwise, it is irrelevant. Even if the PKI had nothing whatsoever to do with the movement, the army generals would have blamed the party for it. As it was, they made their case against the PKI largely on the basis of the transcripts of the interrogations of those movement participants who hadn't already been summarily executed. Given that the army used torture as standard operating procedure for interrogations, the statements of the suspects cannot be trusted. Hunter's CIA report, primarily based on those transcripts, is as reliable as an Inquisition text on witchcraft. The PKI as a whole was clearly not responsible for the September 30th Movement. The party's three million members did not participate in it. If they had, it would not have been such a small-scale affair. The party chairman, D.N. Aidit, however, does seem to have played a key role. He was summarily and secretly executed in late 1965, as were two of the three other core Politburo leaders (Lukman and Njoto), before they could provide their accounts. The one among them who survived the initial terror, the general secretary of the party, Sudisman, admitted in the military's kangaroo court in 1967 that the PKI as an institution knew nothing of the September 30th Movement but that certain leaders were involved in a personal capacity. If the movement's leaders had been treated as the leaders of previous revolts against the postcolonial government, they would have been arrested, put on trial, and sentenced. All the members of their organizations would not have been imprisoned or massacred. With so little public discussion and so little scholarly research about the 1965-66 mass killings, they remain poorly understood. Many people outside of Indonesia believe that the victims were primarily Indonesian Chinese. While some Indonesian Chinese were among the victims, they were by no means the majority. The violence targeted members of the PKI and the various organizations either allied to the party or sympathetic to it, whatever ethnicity they happened to be: Javanese, Balinese, Sundanese, etc. It was not a case of ethnic cleansing. Many people imagine that the killings were committed by frenzied mobs rampaging through villages and urban neighborhoods. But recent oral history research suggests that most of the killings were executions of detainees. [3] Much more research is needed before one can arrive at definitive conclusions. President Sukarno, the target of the PKI's alleged coup attempt, compared the army's murderous violence against those labeled PKI to a case of someone "burning down the house to kill a rat." He routinely protested the army's exaggerations of the September 30th Movement. It was, he said, nothing more than "a ripple in the wide ocean." His inability or unwillingness to muster anything more than rhetorical protests, however,

ultimately doomed his rule. In March 1966, Suharto grabbed the authority to dismiss, appoint, and arrest cabinet ministers, even while maintaining Sukarno as figurehead president until March 1967. The great orator who had led the nationalist struggle against the Dutch, the cosmopolitan visionary of the Non-Aligned Movement, was outmaneuvered by a taciturn, uneducated, thuggish, corrupt army general from a Javanese village. Suharto, a relative nobody in Indonesian politics, moved against the PKI and Sukarno with the full support of the U.S. government. Marshall Green, American ambassador to Indonesia at the time, wrote that the embassy had "made clear" to the army that Washington was "generally sympathetic with and admiring" of its actions. [4] U.S. officials went so far as to express concern in the days following the September 30th Movement that the army might not do enough to annihilate the PKI. [5] The U.S. embassy supplied radio equipment, walkie-talkies, and small arms to Suharto so that his troops could conduct the nationwide assault on civilians. [6] A diligent embassy official with a penchant for data collection did his part by handing the army a list of thousands of names of PKI members. [7] Such moral and material support was much appreciated in the Indonesian army. As an aide to the army's chief of staff informed U.S. embassy officials in October 1965, "This was just what was needed by way of assurances that we weren't going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here."[8] This collaboration between the U.S. and the top army brass in 1965 was rooted in Washington's longstanding wish to have privileged and enhanced access to Southeast Asia's resource wealth. Many in Washington saw Indonesia as the region's centerpiece. Richard Nixon characterized the country as "containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources" and "by far the greatest prize in the South-East Asian area." [9] Two years earlier, in a 1965 speech in Asia, Nixon had argued in favor of bombing North Vietnam to protect Indonesia's "immense mineral potential." [10] But obstacles to the realization of Washington's geopolitical-economic vision arose when the Sukarno government emerged upon independence in Indonesia. Sukarno's domestic and foreign policy was nationalist, nonaligned, and explicitly anti-imperialist. Moreover, his government had a working relationship with the powerful PKI, which Washington feared would eventually win national elections. Eisenhower's administration attempted to break up Indonesia and sabotage Sukarno's presidency by supporting secessionist revolts in 1958.[11] When that criminal escapade of the Dulles brothers failed, the strategists in Washington reversed course and began backing the army officers of the central government. The new strategy was to cultivate anti-communist officers who could gradually build up the army as a shadow government capable of replacing President Sukarno and eliminating the PKI at some future date. The top army generals in Jakarta bided their time and waited for the opportune moment for what U.S. strategists called a final "showdown" with the PKI. [12] That moment came on October 1, 1965. The destruction of the PKI and Sukarno's ouster resulted in a dramatic shift in the regional power equation, leading Time magazine to hail Suharto's bloody takeover as "The West's best news for years in Asia." [13] Several years later, the U.S. Navy League's publication gushed over Indonesia's new role in Southeast Asia as "that strategic area's unaggressive, but stern, monitor," while characterizing the country as "one of Asia's most highly developed nations and endowed by chance with what is

probably the most strategically authoritative geographic location on earth." [14] Among other things, the euphoria reflected just how lucrative the changing of the guard in Indonesia would prove to be for Western business interests. Suharto's clique of army officers took power with a long-term economic strategy in mind. They expected the legitimacy of their new regime would derive from economic growth and that growth would derive from bringing in Western investment, exporting natural resources to Western markets, and begging for Western aid. Suharto's vision for the army was not in terms of defending the nation against foreign aggression but defending foreign capital against Indonesians. He personally intervened in a meeting of cabinet ministers in December 1965 that was discussing the nationalization of the oil companies Caltex and Stanvac. Soon after the meeting began, he suddenly arrived by helicopter, entered the chamber, and declared, as the gleeful U.S. embassy account has it, that the military "would not stand for precipitous moves against oil companies." Faced with such a threat, the cabinet indefinitely postponed the discussion. [15] At the same time, Suharto's army was jailing and killing union leaders at the facilities of U.S. oil companies and rubber plantations. [16] Once Suharto decisively sidelined Sukarno in March 1966, the floodgates of foreign aid opened up. The U.S. shipped large quantities of rice and cloth for the explicit political purpose of shoring up his regime. Falling prices were meant to convince Indonesians that Suharto's rule was an improvement over Sukarno's. The regime's ability over the following years to sustain economic growth via integration with Western capital provided whatever legitimacy it had. Once that pattern of growth ended with the capital flight of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the regime's legitimacy quickly vanished. Middle class university students, the fruits of economic growth, played a particularly important role in forcing Suharto from office. The Suharto regime lived by foreign capital and died by foreign capital. By now it is clear that the much ballyhooed economic growth of the Suharto years was severely detrimental to the national interest. The country has little to show for all the natural resources sold on the world market. Payments on the foreign and domestic debt, part of it being the odious debt from the Suharto years, swallow up much of the government's budget. With health care spending at a minimum, epidemic and preventable diseases are rampant. There is little domestic industrial production. The forests from which military officers and Suharto cronies continue to make fortunes are being cut down and burned up at an alarming rate. The country imports huge quantities of staple commodities that could be easily produced on a larger scale in Indonesia, such as sugar, rice, and soybeans. The main products of the villages now are migrant laborers, or "the heroes of foreign exchange," to quote from a lighted sign at the Jakarta airport. Apart from the pillaging of Indonesia's resource base, the Suharto regime caused an astounding level of unnecessary suffering. At his command, the Indonesian military invaded neighboring East Timor in 1975 after receiving a green light from President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. The result was an occupation that lasted for almost 24 years and left a death toll of tens of thousands of East Timorese. Within Indonesia proper, the TNI committed widespread atrocities during counterinsurgency campaigns in the resource-rich provinces of West Papua and Aceh, resulting in tens of thousands of additional fatalities.

With Suharto's forced resignation in 1998, significant democratic space has opened in Indonesia. There are competitive national and local elections. Victims of the "New Order" and their families are able to organize. There is even an official effort to create a national truth commission to investigate past atrocities. Nevertheless, the military still looms large over the country's political system. As such, there has not been a thorough investigation of any of the countless massacres that took place in 1965-66. History textbooks still focus on the September 30th Movement and make no mention of the massacres. Similarly, no military or political leaders have been held responsible for the Suharto-era crimes (or those that have taken place since), thus increasing the likelihood of future atrocities. This impunity is a source of continuing worry for Indonesia's civil society and restless regions, as well as poverty-stricken, now-independent East Timor. It is thus not surprising that the government of the world's newest country feels compelled to play down demands for justice by its citizenry and emphasize an empty reconciliation process with Indonesia. Meanwhile in the United States, despite political support and billions of dollars in U.S. weaponry, military training and economic assistance to Jakarta over the preceding four decades, Washington's role in Indonesia's killing fields of 1965-66 and subsequent brutality has been effectively buried, thus enabling the Bush administration's current efforts to further ties with Indonesia's military, as part of the global "war on terror." [17] Suharto's removal from office has not led to radical changes in Indonesia's state and economy. Sukarno used to indict Dutch colonialism by saying that Indonesia was "a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations." Thanks to the Suharto years, that description remains true. The principles of economic self-sufficiency, prosperity, and international recognition for which the nationalist struggle was fought now seem as remote as ever. It is encouraging that many Indonesians are now recalling Sukarno's fight against Western imperialism (first the Netherlands and then the U.S.) after experiencing the misery that Suharto's strategy of collaboration has wrought. In his "year of living dangerously" speech in August 1964 * a phrase remembered in the West as just the title of a 1982 movie with Mel Gibson and Sigourney Weaver * Sukarno spoke about the Indonesian ideal of national independence struggling to stay afloat in "an ocean of subversion and intervention from the imperialists and colonialists." Suharto's U.S.-assisted takeover of state power forty years ago last month drowned that ideal in blood, but it might just rise again during the ongoing economic crisis that is endangering the lives of so many Indonesians. John Roosa is an assistant professor of history at the University of British Columbia, and is the author of Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'tat in Indonesia (University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming in 2006). Joseph Nevins is an assistant professor of geography at Vassar College, and is the author of A Not-so-distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor (Cornell University Press, 2005). They may be reached at: jonevins@pop.vassar.edu Notes

1. A former CIA agent who worked in Southeast Asia, Ralph McGehee, noted in his memoir that the agency compiled a separate report about the events of 1965, one that reflected its agents' honest opinions, for its own in-house readership. McGehee's description of it was heavily censored by the agency when it vetted an account he first published in the April 11, 1981 edition of The Nation. Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983), pp. 57-58. Two articles in the agency's internal journal Studies in Intelligence have been declassified: John T. Pizzicaro, "The 30 September Movement in Indonesia," (Fall 1969); Richard Cabot Howland, "The Lessons of the September 30 Affair," (Fall 1970). The latter is available online: http://www.odci.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v14i2a02p_0001.htm 2. In Jakarta, the movement's troops abducted and killed six army generals and a lieutenant taken by mistake from the house of the seventh who avoided capture. In the course of these abductions, a five year-old daughter of a general, a teenaged nephew of another general, and a security guard were killed. In Central Java, two army colonels were abducted and killed. 3. John Roosa, Ayu Ratih, and Hilmar Farid, eds. Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65; Esai-Esai Sejarah Lisan [The Year that Never Ended: Understanding the Experiences of the Victims of 1965; Oral History Essays] (Jakarta: Elsam, 2004). Also consider the massacre investigated in Chris Hilton's very good documentary film Shadowplay (2002). 4. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State, November 4, 1965, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19641968, vol. 26, p. 354. This FRUS volume is available online at the National Security Archive website: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/#FRUS 5. Telegram from the Embassy in Jakarta to Department of State, October 14, 1965. Quoted in Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 283. 6. Frederick Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy Toward Indonesia in the Months Leading up to the 1965 'Coup'," Indonesia, 50 (October 1990), p. 59. 7. Kathy Kadane, "Ex-agents say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians," San Francisco Examiner, May 20, 1990, available online at http://www.pir.org/kadane.html 8. CIA Report no. 14 to the White House (from Jakarta), October 14, 1965. Cited in Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise, p. 283. 9. Richard Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," Foreign Affairs (October 1967), p. 111. 10. Quoted in Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military-Economic Development: America and the Overthrow of Sukarno," in Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia (Nottingham (U.K.): Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for Spokesman Books, 1975), p. 241. 11. Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995), p. 1.

12. Bunnell, "American 'Low Posture' Policy," pp. 34, 43, 53-54. 13. Time, July 15, 1966. Also see Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (Boston: South End Press, 1993), pp. 123-131. 14. Lawrence Griswold, "Garuda and the Emerald Archipelago: Strategic Indonesia Forges New Ties with the West," Sea Power (Navy League of the United States), vol. 16, no. 2 (1973), pp. 20, 25. 15. Telegram 1787 from Jakarta to State Department, December 16, 1965, cited in Brad Simpson, "Modernizing Indonesia: U.S.*Indonesian Relations, 1961-1967," (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Northwestern University, 2003), p. 343. 16. Hilmar Farid, "Indonesia's Original Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion 1965-66," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 2005). 17. For information on U.S.-Indonesia military ties, see the website of the East Timor Indonesia Action Network at http://www.etan.org/

INDONESIA: BENCANA ALAM ATAU PEMBUNUHAN MASSAL ?

Oleh: Andre Vitchek:[1] Lain hari, terjadi lagi kehilangan nyawa yang sesungguhnya tidak perlu: 16 orang terbunuh dan 16 orang masih hilang pada saat banjir dan longsor di Tahuna, sebuah pulau kecil dekat Sulawesi . Dengan kecepatan yang mengerikan, Indonesia telah menggantikan Bangladesh dan India sebagai bangsa yang paling rentan bencana di dunia. Jika nama Indonesia muncul pada daftar judul utama di berita Yahoo, besar kemungkinan telah terjadi lagi suatu tragedi besar yang sesungguhnya tidak perlu terjadi di salah satu pulau dari kepulauan yang tersebar luas ini. Pesawat terbang hilang atau tergelincir di landasan pacu, kapal-kapal ferry tenggelam atau rontok di lautan bebas, kereta api bertabrakan atau tergelincir satu kali seminggu, penumpang yang tak berkarcis berjatuhan dari atap yang berkarat. Tumpukan sampah yang berbau busuk dan tidak memperoleh izin telah mengubur kelompok pemulung yang tak berdaya, tanah longsor telah menghanyutkan rumah-rumah kardus ke anakanak sungai, gempa bumi serta gelombang pasang telah menghancurkan kota-kota serta desa-desa pantai.Kebakaran hutan di Sumatra telah menyesakkan nafas penduduk di daerah yang luas di Asia Tenggara. Ruang lingkup bencana sebesar ini tidak pernah terjadi sebelumnya dan sungguh aneh jika kita menyepelekannya sekedar sebagai nasib jelek bangsa atau amarah Tuhan ataupun karena keganasan alam belaka. Sebagian besar faktor penyebab bencana ini harus dipersalahkan pada korupsi, inkompetensi atau sekedar ketidakacuhan dari kelompok elite yang sedang berkuasa dan para pejabat peemrintah. Adalah kemiskinan, minimnya proyek untuk kepentingan umum, dan kegemaran [para pejabat untuk ] mencuri yang membunuh ratusan ribu pria, wanita serta anak-anak Indonesia yang tidak berdaya.

Sejak kudeta militer dalam tahun 1965 yang disponsori Amerika Serikat yang menjatuhkan Sukarno, dan menaikkan rezim militer yang sangat anti komunis, korup, dan pro pasar dari diktator Suharto , Indonesia terhindar dari pengawasan yang sungguh-sungguh dari media dan pemerintahan negara-negara Barat. Setelah jatuhnya Suharto dalam tahun 1998, Indonesia dipuji oleh media massa sebagai suatu demokrasi yang sedang tumbuh dan semakin toleran. Sebagian dari bencana ini adalah buatan manusia; [dan] hampir semuanya malah bisa dicegah. Dalam penelusuran yang lebih cermat semakin jelas terlihat bahwa orangorang mati karena hampir tidak ada upaya pencegahan, kurangnya pendidikan (Indonesia merupakan negara yang ketiga paling rendah prosentase GDP anggaran pendidikannya sesudah Equatorial Guinea dan Ecuador) dan suatu sistem ekonomi pro pasar yang buas yang membiarkan sekelompok kecil orang kaya untuk memperkaya dirinya sendiri di atas penderitaan orang banyak yang hidup d engan biaya kurang dari dua dollar sehari. Kesimpulan yang dapat ditarik terhadap bagaimana berfungsinya masyarakat Indonesia bisa sangat mengerikan. Namun, menghindari pengungkapan hal ini tidak diragukan lagi akan menyebabkan jatuhnya korban nyawa yang berharga dari ratusan ribu manusia. [Kehidupan bernegara di] Indonesia dewasa ini didorong oleh semangat mencari untung dalam bentuknya yang paling ekstrim. Ia juga merupakan salah satu dari bangsa yang paling korup di muka bumi. Dan kelihatannya tidak ada keuntungan cepat yang dapat diperoleh dari mengambil langkah-langkah preventif [terhadap bencana alam ini]. Dimanapun dunia, bendungan dan dinding anti-tsunami dipandang sebagai pekerjaan umum dan justru perkataan umumyang telah hampir lenyap dari kamus mereka yang membuat keputusan di Indonesia . Keuntungan berjangka pendek bagi sekelompok khusus orang diberikan prioritas yang lebih tinggi dari kemanfaatan berjangka panjang bagi seluruh bangsa. Keruntuhan moral dari bangsa ini terbayang dalam skala nilai, yaitu: orang korup tapi kaya memperoleh penghormatan yang jauh lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan mereka yang jujur tapi miskin. Tenggelamnya kapal-kapal ferry bukanlah "karena angin kencang dan ombak"; kapalkapal itu tenggelam karena penuh sesak oleh penumpang dan karena perawatan yang buruk. Semuanya bisa dijadikan uang, bahkan keselamatan ribuan penumpang. Perusahaan-perusaha an hanya ingat terhadap keuntungannya sendiri, sedangkan para pengawas dari pemerintah hanya memperhatikan uang suap belaka. Tenggelamnya kapal Senopati Nusantara dengan ratusan kurban dan disiarkan secara luas itu hanyalah salah satu dari ratusan kecelakaan laut yang terjadi setiap tahun di Indonesia . Walaupun tidak bisa diperoleh angka statistik yang pasti (dengan alasan yang dapat diduga, yaitu karena pemerintah Indonesia berusaha sekeras-kerasnya untuk mencegah dipublikasikannya statistik komparatif secara lengkap), beberapa rute pelayaran kehilangan lebih dari tiga kapal setiap tahun. Catatan keamanan dari industri penerbangan Indonesia merupakan salah satu yang paling buruk di dunia. Sejak tahun 1997, sekurang-kurangnya 666 orang telah meninggal dalam delapan kecelakaan pesawat di Indonesia . Latihan terhadap beberapa orang pilot sedemikian buruknya sehingga pesawat sering tergelincir di landasan pacu atau sama sekali tidak bisa menemukan landasan, atau [malah] mendarat di bagian

tengah landasan. Pemeliharaan pesawat adalah masalah lainnya: flaps sering tidak berfungsi sama sekali; roda tidak dapat dimasukkan setelah take-off, ban yang jarang diganti cenderung meletus pada saat mendarat. Sungguh merupakan suatu keajaiban bagaimana beberapa pesawat khususnya pesawat tua Boeing 737 yang diterbangkan oleh hampir semua perusahaan penerbangan Indonesia bisa lolos dari inspeksi. Setelah mewawancarai pejabat penerbangan sipil lokal (nama yang bersangkutan jelas tidak mau disebutkan) wartawan Anda mengetahui bahwa sistem navigasi dari beberapa bandar udara Indonesia berada dalam keadaan yang amburadul, terutama bandar udara Makasar di Sulawesi dan Medan di Sumatra. Rata-rata, telah terjadi satu kecelakaan kereta api setiap enam hari di Indonesia , umumnya disebabkan karena kurangnya penjagaan pada 8000 lintasan kereta api. Sebagai perbandingan, kereta api Malaysia tidak pernah mengalami kecelakaan fatal selama 13 tahun sampai tahun 2005 (satu kecelakaan terjadi tahun 2006, yang statistiknya bisa diperoleh). Walaupun kenyataan menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia secara relatif mempunyai jumlah mobil per kapita yang kecil, namun jalan-jalannya merupakan jaringan jalan yang "paling banyak digunakan" di dunia (hanya nomor dua setelah Hongkong yang justru bukan merupakan negara): 5.7 juta kend eraan-km per tahun dari jaringan jalan. (2003, The Economist World in Figures, 2007 Edition). Menurut The Financial Times, walaupun kepadatan yang luar biasa serta lalu lintas yang bagaikan merangkak ini, lebih dari 80 orang tewas setiap hari di jalan-jalan Indonesia, umumnya disebabkan oleh karena amat buruknya infrastruktur dan amat lemahnya penegakan hukum. Gempa bumi belaka tidaklah membunuh manusia. Faktor penyebab banyaknya jatuh korban adalah buruknya konstruksi rumah serta bangunan, bersamaan dengan kurangnya upaya preventif dan pendidikan preventif. Sudah menjadi pengetahuan umum bahwa Indonesia rentan terhadap bencana; bahwa ia berada di kawasan yang disebut sebagai 'lingkaran api' (ring of fire). Namun kaum miskin tidak bisa mengharapkan adanya proyek perumahan umum yang mampu menahan gempa (seperti yang diban gun di negara tetangga, Malaysia ). Hampir setiap keluarga harus mengurus nasibnya sendiri: mereka harus merancang dan mendirikan tempat tinggalnya sendiri. Gempa besar membunuh ratusan orang, kadang-kadang ribuan orang, dan menyebabkan ratusan ribu orang kehilangan rumah mereka. Sekurang-kurangnya 5.800 orang meninggal dan 36.000 luka-luka pada tanggal 27 Mei 2006 sewaktu gempa berkekuatan 6.2 skala Richter menghantam daerah Jawa Tengah dekat kota bersejarah Yogyakarta. Infrastruktur yang primitif, fasilitas media yang tidak memadai, dan korupsi yang terjadi pada saat pendistribusian bantuan merupakan faktor yang menyebabkan tingginya jumlah korban pada saat terjadinya goncangan. Pembabatan hutan secara tidak sah (illegal logging) dan penggundulan hutan merupakan alasan utama terjadinya tanah longsor. Semua orang tahu siapa yang bertanggung jawab terhadap terjadinya kebakaran hutan di Sumatera dan di tempattempat lain, tetapi para pejabat pemerintah enggan sekali melakukan penangkapan, oleh karena mereka yang bertanggung jawab terhadap penggundulan hutan tersebut biasanya

kaya raya dan mempunyai koneksi dengan [pejabat] negara dimana bahkan keadilan bisa dijual. Demikian banyak bentuk penyelesaian terhadap masalah-masalah ini, termasuk penegakan hukum, inspeksi dan upaya untuk mencari nafkah alternatif bagi masyarakat yang sedemikian putus asanya, sehingga mereka secara harfiah terpaksa ikut serta menggali lubang kuburnya sendiri dengan menghancurkan lingkungan, yang selanjutnya menghancurkan seluruh masyarakat itu sendiri. Namun hampir tidak ada yang dilakukan sama sekali, oleh karena pembabatan hutan secara tidak sah merupakan bisnis raksasa dan sangat menguntungkan, yang dapat mengisi demikian banyak telapak tangan yang menunggunya dengan sukacita. Bulan lalu, beberapa puluh orang terbunuh kaena tanah longsor dan banjir bandang di bagian utara pulau Sumatra , yang memaksa 400.000 oang terpaksa mengungsi dari rumah mereka. Pada bulan Juni 2006, banjir dan tanah longsor yang disebabkan oleh hutan lebat telah menewaskan lebih dari 200 orang di provinsi Sulawesi Selatan. Gelombang raksasa, yang terkenal sebagai tsunami, telah menewaskan lebih dari 126.000 orang di provinsi Aceh pada bulan Desember 2004. Bukan saja reaksi dari pemerintah Indonesia dan militernya amat lamban, sebagian besar dari bantuan luar negeri yang amat banyak itu lenyap karena korupsi. Jangankan membantu korban, banyak anggota tentara Indonesia memeras sogokan dari lembaga-lembaga bantuan dan merusak perbekalan atau air minum yang berharga jika sogokan tidak dibayar. Dalam suatu kasus menyolok tentang perampasan tanah oleh pemerintah, banyak korban dihambat pulang ke tanahnya sendiri, sedangkan anak-anak dipisahkan secara paksa dari orang tuanya (karena kehilangan sertifikat kelahiran) dan 'diadopsi' oleh organisasi-organisa si keagamaan; beberapa di antaranya menjadi korban perdagangan manusia (human traficking). Lebih dari dua tahun setelah terjadinya tragedi yang menghancur-luluhkan Aceh ini, ratusan ribu orang masih tinggal di rumah-rumah darurat. Masih banyak korban tsunami lainnya, yang menghantam pantai Jawa selatan pada tanggal 17 Juli 2006 yang masih menunggu bantuan yang berarti. Menurut angkaangka resmi, sebanyak 600 orang tewas, namun angka yang sebenarnya hampir pasti jauh lebih tinggi. Pejabat-pejabat Indonesia < /SPAN> telah menerima peringatan dini dari Jepang namun tidak mau bertindak, kemudian mengatakan bahwa tidak banyak yang dapat diperbuat karena daerah tersebut tidak dilengkapi dengan sirene atau pengeras suara. Indonesia sering menderita berbagai jenis bencana buatan manusia yang sungguh sukar untuk dimengerti dan diperbandingkan dengan apapun juga. "Banjir lumpur" baru-baru ini telah menenggelamkan demikian banyak desa di luar Surabaya . Bencana itu terjadi karena tidak dipatuhinya prosedur secara wajar oleh suatu perusahaan eksplorasi gas (yang sebagian sahamnya dimiliki oleh salah seorang menteri kabinet). "Kecelakaan" ini telah menyebabkan lebih dari 10.000 orang menjadi pengungsi, dan merendam lebih dari 1.000 are tanah dengan lumpur panas, menghancurkan satu-satunya jalan raya dari Surabaya serta jalan kereta api utama. Sampah telah menguburkan suatu desa pemulung miskin pada sebuah penimbunan sampah tanpa izin di luar kota Bandung . Banyak lagi kejadian seperti itu, tapi daftar lengkap akan memenerlukan banyak sekali halaman surat kabar, bahkan mungkin suatu buku yang khusus ditulis tentang hal itu.

Masalahnya adalah: kapankah rakyat Indonesia akan berkata bahwa sudah cukup apa yang terjadi itu dan kapankah mereka akan menuntut pertanggungjawaban dan keadilan, angka-angka statistik yang benar, dan 'cetak biru' yang konkrit untuk menyelesaikannya? Hampir di semua negara, dua bencana yang terjadi baru-baru ini peristiwa tenggelam yang mengerikan dari kapan 'Satria Nusantara" dan 'hilang'-nya pesawat Boeing 737 Adam Air dengan 102 penumpang sudah lebih dari cukup untuk memaksa menteri kabinet untuk mengundurkan diri. Di Indonesia, kedua tragedi ini dipandang (atau ditampilkan) ha nya sebagai suatu nasib buruk lainnya belaka tanpa meminta pertanggungjawaban atau akuntabiltas siapa pun juga. Pers dan media massa Indonesia telah melaporkan secara detail masing-masing dan setiap bencana itu. Tetapi mereka gagal untuk menegaskan bahwa apa yang terjadi itu adalah suatu keadaan luar biasa dan tidak dapat ditoleransi, bahwa mungkin tidak ada negara besar lainnya di dunia yang mengalami demikian banyak korban manusia yang tidak semestinya terjadi karena bencana buatan manusia atau bencana yang sesungguhnya bisa dicegah. Upaya mengaitkan demikian banyak bencana dengan korupsi dan sistem sosial ekonomi telah ditolak sama sekali. Surat kabar Indonesia terkemuka J akarta Post, baru-baru ini memberangus komentar ini, dan menolak menerbitkannya di halaman-halamannya. Sejak Desember 2004, Indonesia telah kehilangan sekitar 200 ribu orang rakyatnya dalam berbagai bencana, tidak termasuk kecelakaan kenderaan bermotor di jalan raya dan konflik bersenjata yang terjadi di seluruh kepulauan Indonesia. Jumlah itu lebih besar dari jumlah korban di Irak pada saat yang sama, juga lebih besar dari korban yang jatuh di Sri Langka atau di Peru selama perang saudara yang demikian lama. Sungguh, banyak orang Indonesia yang hidup dalam keadaan berbahaya dan penuh risiko seperti mereka yang hidup di daerah yang tercabik-cabik oleh perang. Sebagian besar mereka tidak menyadarinya, oleh karena statistik komparatif atau tidak tersedia atau telah ditekan. Indonesia adalah miskin, tetapi masih berada dalam posisi untuk melindungi sebagian dari warganya yang rentan. Masalah utama adalah tidak adanya kehendak politik (political will). Cukup banyak semen dan batu bata untuk membuat bendungan dan dinding untuk menghambat tsunami, untuk memperkuat bukit-bukit di sekitar kota-kota, yang terancam akan dikuburkan oleh tanah longsor. Suatu penglihatan sekilas di sekitar Jakarta berlusin-lusin shopping malls baru dibangun di beberapa tempat, dimana istanaistana mewah dari pejabat-pejabat yang korup telah memakan berhektar-hektar tanah. Keengganan untuk menyelesaikan masalah mempunyai akarnya pada korupsi. Badanbadan usaha serta pejabat-pejabat lokal telah mengemban gkan kemampuan khusus untuk mengeruk keuntungan dari apa pun juga, bahkan dari bencana dan dari penderitaan berjuta-juta rakyatnya sendiri. Dalam kalimat sederhana, korupsi adalah pencurian dari publik. Tetapi jika korban yang harus dibayar harus dihitung dengan hilangnya ratusan ribu nyawa, ia menjadi pembunuhan massal. ------------ --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------[1] Novelis, jurnalis, produser film, salah seorang pendiri dari Mainstay Press (www.mainstaypress. org), Senior Fellow pada Oakland Institute (www.oaklandinstitu te.org). Saat ini ia

tinggal dan bekerja di Asia Tenggara dan bisa dihubungi pada alamat email andre-wcn@usa. net. Naskah aslinya berjudul " Indonesia : Natural Disasters or Mass Murder?", dimuat dalam International Herald Tribune dan The Financial Times, 12 Februari 2007, dikirimkan via e-mail oleh Duta Besar RI di Ceko, Prof Dr Salim Said , MA ,MAIA, dan diterjemahkan oleh Dr. Saafroedin Bahar, Komnas HAM.

Another Bosnia Tragedy in Indonesia#

Republika*, Tuesday 4 January 2000 ========================== Three Villages Raided, Women Raped in Halmahera. In a single night, 800 Muslims massacred JAKARTA- The worst and the most heartbreaking human tragedy has occurred in North Maluku on 28 December 1999. Not less than 800 Muslim men in three villages in the district of Tobelo, Halmahera, North Maluku Province were massacred in a single night, while the women were raped in the streets. Yesterday, Thamrin Amal Tomagola of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Indonesian University, said," I was informed that some 80% of men living in three Muslim villages of Tobelo were massacred. Mr. Tomagola, who is a sociologist and was born in Galela, Halmahera, added that each of the villages was inhabited by around 200 to 300 family units. Therefore, the number of the Muslim men killed would be around 800. The massacre happened all of a sudden following social tension which has been escalating in North Halmahera. According to the Vice President of Assembly of Muslim Scholars of Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI) H Adjit bin Taher, since the tension sparked up on 26 December 1999, nearly 2000 Muslims from Tobelo were killed and four mosques burnt down, including Islamic Affair Offices (Kantor Urusan Agama-KUA) and all buildings associated with Islam. "Muslim women were also raped in the streets," he said. In this region, Muslims were indeed minority. Out of 50000 Tobelo population, only 5000 are Muslims. According to Thamrin, the indication that there would be attack on the Muslims in Tobelo was noticed on 25 December when there was a huge people gathering in Tobelo. The crowd came from some districts in North Halmahera and Ternate and the number reached about 10 to 20 thousands people. Thamrin said that he did not know who provoked them to carry out the attack. "For sure, on 26 December 1999, they did the attack on the Muslim enclaves in the city of Tobelo after [Ramadan] break fast," he told. On 28 December 1999, he continued, a convoy of trucks laden with people were roaming the streets. They were thought to have come from groups of people who had celebrated Christmas in Tobelo on 25 December. They came not only from three districts in North Halmahera (namely Tobelo, Galela and Jailolo) but also from Kao and

Pidiwang districts as well as Christians from Ternate who had sought refuge in Tobelo. When the convoy was underway, he said, the convoy leader kept agitating speech using a loud speaker mounted on the truck. The mobs on the trucks did no action when passing through Christian villages. But, he said, when coming to the Muslim areas, the mass immediately got off the trucks and then poured petrol on Muslims' houses before set on fire. "In this situation, the inhabitants left the houses and went outside. And they [the Christians] then slain the men," he said. Apart from victimising Muslims, he added, the Christians also attacked the residents of Chinese origin. Both the Muslim and Chinese people who were under attack run toward Jami Mosque in Gamsuni Village and any mosque in Dufa-Dufa village seeking for refuge. Nonetheless, the Christian mass put the people who were inside the mosques under their siege. "They then poured the mosques with petrol and burnt the people inside alive," he said. Thamrin disclosed that since a sectarian conflict erupted in Makian Malifut district on 18 August 1999, the death toll has reached 2500 people. The tension that built up in North Halmahera started when Christian community in Kao expelled Muslim inhabitants of Makian Malifut from their villages to Ternate Island. The Muslims then took revenge by driving out Christian inhabitants in Ternate who then took refuge in North Sulawesi and in majority-majority areas of North Halmahera. The social tension which has currently turned into inter-religious clashes in the upper part of the northern region of Halmahera island, Thamrin said, is the follow-up of the conflicts in Makian Malifut district on 18 August. At present, Thamrin said, the Muslims in North Halmahera were besieged. They were driven out from Tobelo and Kao districts. Only around 3000 people remains in Galela district, where Muslims are majority, whereas some 5000 of the inhabitants have fled to Ternate. About 400 [Muslim] youths have determined to defend Soa Siu City. "Apart from that, Muslim enclaves in Jaelolo district are currently under siege by Christians," he added. The Indonesian Government and the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM): Too luggish!!!!! Although the conflict in North Halmahera was extremely tragic, with thousands of people dead, Thamrin sees the Government being too slow in giving response. Indonesian Army (Tentara National Indonesia-TNI), Thamrin admitted, reacted quickly by sending additional troops from Malang, Solo and Madiun. But, he continued, no real help from Government has been given to deal with the social atastrophe in the region. "I have not seen any proper coordination and arrangement from the Government. Indeed, the real aids came from local NGOs," said Thamrin. Furthermore, Thamrin was also dismayed by Komnas HAM which was less responsive with this extraordinary human right violation in North Halmahera. To illustrate the enormous scale of the human right violation, Thamrin mentioned that the conflict has been going on for about five months, yet the dead victims have reached 2500; whereas Ambon conflict [which is relatively longer]

caused merely 1200 people died. "Komnas HAM just came over during the first conflict on 18 August 1999, but they did not even set up a special team [to investigate the following] conflicts on 26 November and end of December 1999," he said. From the reports he continuously receives, Thamrin said that hostility is still there despite of the deployment of additional troops. Muslim mujahideen have now gathered around the corridor regions of North Halmahera to launch a counter attack. They came from Tidore, Ternate, Bacan, Sanana, Galela and South Halmahera. "The Government must set up immediately a special team for and investigate this grotesque human rights violation. It has become a tragedy for humanity," he stressed. Pangdam XVI/Pattimura (=the Army Chief for Maluku Province), TNI Brigade General Max Tamaela, the Chief Commander for restoring peace and public order, has vowed to leave his position if he cannot stop this prolonged bloodshed. "I am ready to run the risk [of being sacked from my position] as a Pangdam [in my effort] to stop this human tragedy," he said in Ambon this Monday. The instruction letter of Kodal numbered TR/1291/1999, dated 28 December 1999 was implemented on the following Wednesday morning, 29 December 1999. The letter mentioned that the Indonesian Army Chief had granted permission to allow additional troops when, based on evaluation in the field, the personnel already deployed were felt insufficient to stop the clashes and restore the peace and order. "So, looking at the nature of the present conflicts, it seemed necessary to crush the attackers, regardless who are they since the facts have told that non-violence and negotiation approaches are not welcomed by the two sides. Meanwhile, Sultan Baabulah Airport in Ternate was closed temporarily since Monday to anticipate any situation caused by the series of sectarian conflicts that have occurred in North Maluku since last week.[END]

INDONESIA. Suharto the Australian elites favourite mass murderer

Justin Randell 1 February 2008 Genocidal mass murderer and former Indonesian dictator Suharto died in hospital in Jakarta on January 27, aged 86, never having faced justice for the millions of people he killed or the billions of dollars he stole during his three decades in power. While Suharto may be gone, the hypocrisy of his rich-country supporters especially Australia lives on. Through a spokesperson, US President George Bush expressed his condolences to the people of Indonesia on the loss of their former president, according to the January 28 Washington Post. In the same article, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd described Suharto as an influential leader who oversaw a period of significant economic growth and modernization.

Rudd characterised Suhartos record of genocide as merely controversial. Former prime minister Paul Keating, Attorney General Ian McClelland and Australian ambassador to Indonesia Bill Farmer attended Suhartos funeral on January 28. McClelland told AAP that while the Australian government recognised issues of controversy, it also recognised his achievements he brought Indonesia from a country that was subsistence to one with a developing economy Keating told the Australian on January 28 that focusing on Suhartos crimes was missing the point, because Suharto devoted himself entirely to the development of social conditions in Indonesia. Mass murder Keen to secure the great wealth of the Indonesian archipelago for Western corporations, Australian and US government support for Suharto goes all the way back to his rise to power via a bloody military coup in 1965. Suharto, then a top-ranking general, overthrew the nationalist government of president Sukarno, which had undertaken a number of measures that attempted to protect Indonesia from the ravages of exploitation by Western corporations. Even more concerning for Western governments was the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on the back of mass struggles by workers and peasants. By the time Suharto took power, the PKI had an estimated 3 million members and 20 million organised supporters, making it the largest communist party outside of the Soviet Union and China. With the active assistance of the CIA and the US embassy, Suharto launched his coup, utilising the military and right-wing Islamic fundamentalist militias to carry out a campaign of mass slaughter against all leftists or suspected leftist sympathisers. No-one knows the exact number killed, but at least half a million people were butchered in the space of four months. Some estimates put the figure as high as 2 million. The PKI was physically exterminated completely wiped out. Under Suharto, democratic elections and freedom of speech were completely nonexistent, while opponents were routinely killed, jailed and tortured. At a New York meeting of the Australian-American Association in July 1966, thenprime minister Harold Holt expressed his joy at this turn of events, infamously declaring with satisfaction: With 500,000 to 1 million communist sympathisers knocked off I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place. Indonesia was opened for business. Via corruption and nepotism, Suharto and his cronies became obscenely rich while any attempt by ordinary Indonesians to organise to defend their rights was brutally suppressed.

Dividing the spoils London-based Australian journalist John Pilger summed up the benefits of the Suharto regime for corporate interests in a January 28 article in the British Guardian. The deal was that Indonesia under Suharto would offer up what Richard Nixon had called the richest hoard of natural resources, the greatest prize in south-east Asia. According to Pilger, Suhartos US-trained economists agreed to the corporate takeover of their country, sector by sector. The Freeport company got a mountain of copper in West Papua. A US/European consortium got the nickel. The giant Alcoa company got the biggest slice of Indonesias bauxite. American, Japanese and French companies got the tropical forests of Sumatra. One of Suhartos greatest crimes was the invasion and annexation of East Timor, also backed by Western governments especially Australia. Up to 200,000 people around one third of the population died in East Timor as a result Indonesian occupation. Australian ambassador to Indonesia at the time of the invasion, Richard Woolcott, recommended that Canberra back the invasion, because Australia could more readily negotiate a deal with the Suharto to give Australia access to the oil and gas in the Timor Sea than with an independent East Timor. In 1985, Australia became the first country to formally recognise Indonesias illegal annexation of East Timor. The Timor Gap Treaty, signed by Australia and Indonesia in 1989, secured the division East Timors gas and oil deposits between the two countries. Nine months later, the Indonesian military killed or wounded more than 450 young mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Then-foreign minister Gareth Evans, who had signed the treaty, called this an aberration, not an act of state policy. Soon after the aberration, the joint Australian-Indonesian board overseeing implementation of the treaty awarded 11 contracts to Australian oil and gas companies. When a mass movement, led by pro-democracy students, forced Suharto from power in May 1998, then-prime minister John Howard praised Suhartos time in power as bringing stability to the archipelago. Suhartos crimes against humanity were carried out on behalf of Western interests, and could not have occurred without the support of countries like Australia. The outpouring of support for Suharto following his death is consistent with Australian foreign policy: democracy and human rights are only allowable when they dont interfere with the profits of big business. [Justin Randell is a member of the Democratic Socialist Perspective, a Marxist tendency in the Socialist Alliance. He was active in the solidarity campaign with Indonesias democracy movement struggling against Suharto as a member of Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor.]

From: International News, Green Left Weekly issue #738 6 February 2008.

Tanjung Priok 1984

Oleh Rumah Kiri, 15-02-2006 07:00 Dibuka : 990 Rubrik : Arsip,

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi HMA Sampurna

Berikut ini adalah kesaksian H.M.A Sampurna --waktu itu berpangkat Letkol dan menjabat Asintel KodamJaya-- tentang peristiwa Tanjung Priok, yang diungkapkannya kepada majalah mingguan Tempo. H.MA Sampurna, kini berpangkat Brigadir Jenderal dan menjabat Wakil Gubernur Jawa Barat, bertutur sebagai berikut. Jauh sebelum pecahnya peristiwa itu, sudah berlangsung kegiatan dakwah di Masjid alA'raf, di Jalan Sindang, Tanjung Priok, yang bernada menghasut. Di antara para penceramah, yang bersuara keras ialah Amir Biki, Salim Qadar, Syarifin Maloko, Tony Ardie, dan M. Nasir. Sebelum saya menjadi Asintel, dakwah yang "panas" itu juga sudah ada. Kemudian, terjadi pembakaran sepeda motor milik ****nsa. Sebelum peristiwa itu pecah, Amir Biki, yang mengkoordinasi para dai, sering menemui saya, minta pembebasan anggota jamaah yang ditahan di Kodim atau di Polres. Saya memang kenal baik dengan dia karena sering bertemu. Akan tetapi, permintaannya yang terakhir tidak bisa diluluskan karena saya anggap sudah keterlaluan. Kalau masalahnya kecil, misalnya soal selebaran, biasanya saya minta dia menyelesaikannya secara baikbaik. Pada tanggal 12 September itu, sekitar pukul 19.00, saya berada di depan Masjid alA'raf. Saya hampir bisa masuk, tetapi karena situasinya kurang menguntungkan, saya kembali ke Kodim, sedangkan anak buah saya segera siaga di lapangan. Ternyata situasinya makin panas karena para penceramah mulai menghasut Akhirnya, saya turun bersama Asisten Operasi Alif Pandoyo, kini ketua DPD Golkar Jawa Tengah. Pukul 20.30, saya masih memonitor situasi. Karena keadaan makin panas, saya mencoba maju ke depan, tetapi ternyata massa sudah mulai bergerak maju. Saya segera mengontak Panglima (ketika itu Try Soetrisno), yang waktu itu berada di rumah. Kebetulan, dari sumber lain beliau juga mendapatkan informasi, lalu menghubungi saya. Instruksi beliau waktu itu ialah "cepat atasi". Akan tetapi tiga puluh menit kemudian, massa sudah ke jalan menuju Polres. Di depan Polres Jakarta Utara itulah terjadi "kontak" dengan massa. Saya tidak mengetahui persis berapa jumlah mereka karena massa amat padat. Mungkin seribu lebih. Sulit pula menghitungnya karena keadaan gelap. Lagi pula sudah terjadi "kontak" sehingga saya tidak sempat menghitung. Pasukan dari Kodim hanya satu regu, yang

berjumlah 10 orang. Jaraknya amat dekat, pasukan campur dengan massa. Bahkan, saling mengejar. Massa itu ada yang di jalan dan ada yang di lapangan. Dalam kegelapan, masih bisa dilihatgerakan mereka ke berbagai arah. Ada yang menuju Priok, ada yang ke arah Sampur, ada yang bergerak ke Ancol, ada pula yang ke arah Kodim dan Polres. Malam itu posisisaya di jalan yang menuju ke arah Kodim dan Polres. Saya mengendarai jip, 10 meter di belakang pasukan. Pasukan berusaha memberitahu massa agar mereka berhenti, tetapi mereka tidak mau. Mereka malah mengejar tentara. Tentara gantian mengejar massa. Tidak jelas siapa dari massa itu yang mengejar atau dikejar. Namanya juga massa. Amir Biki memimpin mereka ke arah Kodim dan Polres, Salim Qadar memimpin mereka ke arah Priok. Sambil bertakbir, mereka membawa berbagai macam senjata tajam. Beberapa saat kemudian Panglima memberi tahu bahwa Pangab (waktu itu Jenderal LB Moerdani) sebentar lagi akan meninjau ke tempat kejadian. Lalu saya menunggu di Polres. Sekitar lima belas menit kemudian, beliau bersama panglima datang. Saya lantas melaporkan kejadiannya. Akan tetapi, di tempat kejadian sudah tidak ada masalah yang berat karena sudah "dibersihkan" dan sudah selesai, kecuali sejumlah rumah dan toko yang dilempari batu dan dibakar massa. Sekitar pukul 02.00 dini hari, saya mengantar Pangab dan Pangdam meninjau para korban yang dirawat di RSPAD Gatot Subroto, tetapi saya tidak mengetahui persis berapa jumlah korban yang meninggal. Para korban diangkut dengan truk, dikuburkan di satu lokasi di desa Ceger, Kampung Rambutan, Jakarta Timur, karena sebagian tidak dikenali identitasnya. Urusan saya ialah memproses mereka yang terlibat dan ditahan, tidak mengurusi jenazah. Sampai pagi saya tidak tidur, menahan, memeriksa, dan memproses mereka yang ditangkap, jumlahnya sekitar seratus, ditahan di beberapa tempat. Diseleksi siapa gembongnya untuk diajukan ke pengadilan, sedangkan yang lain dibebaskan. Kalau sekarang ini ada korban yang minta agar kasus ini dijelaskan, menurut saya tidak usahlah. Yang sudah, ya sudah. Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Resmi Pemerintah Orde Baru

Versi resmi peristiwa Tanjung Priok dikeluarkan sekitar sepuluh jam setelah peristiwa ini terjadi. Keterangan resmi pemerintah Orde Baru dikemukakan oleh Pangab/Pangkopkamtib L.B. Moerdani didampingi oleh Menteri Penerangan Harmoko, Pangdam V/Jaya Try Soetrisno, dan Kapolda Metro Jaya Drs. Soedjoko. Keterangan resmi peristiwa Tanjung priok diterima publik diuraikan oleh Pangab sebagai berikut. Di sekitar Masjid Rawabadak terpasang pamflet dan poster yang menghasut bersifat SARA. Karena imbauan petugas agar pamflet-pamflet dan poster-poster itu dihapus atau dicabut tidak dihiraukan, seorang petugas, pada hari jumat tanggal 7 September 1984, menutup tulisan-tulisan yang bersifat menghasut itu dengan warna hitam.

Pada hari senin, 10 September 1984, seorang petugas yang sedang menjalankan tugasnya di daerah Koja, dihadang dan kemudian dikeroyok oleh sekelompok orang. Petugas keamanan berhasil menyelamatkan diri, tetapi sepeda motornya dibakar oleh para penghadang. Aparat keamanan pun menangkap empat orang pelakunya untuk keperluan pengusutan dan penuntutan sesuai ketentuan hukum yang berlaku. Pada hari Rabu, 12 September 1984, pukul 19.30 WIB, di Masjid Rawabadak berlangsung ceramah agama tanpa izin dan bersifat menghasut. Penceramahnya antara lain Amir Biki (tewas tertembak), Syarifin Maloko (tertangkap setelah semua sidang perkara Tanjung Priok selesai), M. Nasir (bukan M. Natsir mantan Perdana Menteri dan ketua DDII), tidak pernah diketahui keberadaannya setelah peristiwa malam itu. Pukul 22.00 WIB aparat keamanan menerima telepon dari Amir Biki yang berisi ancaman pembunuhan dan perusakan apabila keempat tahanan tidak dibebaskan. Sekitar pukul 23.00 WIB ancaman telepon diulang lagi. Setelah itu, sekitar 1.500 orang menuju Polres dan Kodim. Lima belas orang petugas keamanan menghambat kerumunan atau gerakan massa tersebut. Regu keamanan berusaha membubarkan massa dengan secara persuasif, namun dijawab dengan teriakan-teriakan yang membangkitkan emosi dan keberingasan massa. Massa terus maju mendesak satuan keamanan sambil mengayun-ayunkan dan mengacung-acungkan celurit. Dalam jarak yang sudah membahayakan, regu keamanan mulai memberikan tembakan peringatan dan tidak dihiraukan. Tembakan diarahkan ke tanah dan kaki penyerang, korban pun tidak dapat dihindari. Setelah datang pasukan keamanan lainnya, barulah massa mundur, tetapi mereka membakar mobil, merusak beberapa rumah, dan apotek. Sekitar tiga puluh menit kemudian gerombolan menyerang kembali petugas keamanan, sehingga petugas keamanan dalam kondisi kritis dan terpaksa melakukan penembakanpenembakan untuk mencegah usaha perusuh merebut senjata dan serangan-serangan dengan celurit dan senjata tajam lainnya. Hari Kamis, 13 September 1984, pukul 00.00 WIB, pasukan keamanan Laksusda (Pelaksana Khusus Daerah) Jaya berhasil mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan, dan membubarkan massa. Menurut Pangab dalam versi ini, 9 orang meninggal dan 53 luka-luka. Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Intern Aparat Pemerintahan Orde Baru
Versi kedua ini diungkapkan oleh Pangab/Pangkopkamtib dalam penjelasan kepada lurah wilayah Jakarta Utara. Penjelasan Pangab/Pangkopkamtib sebagai berikut. Jumat, 7 September, di sekitar Masjid Rawabadak banyak tertempel pengumuman tentang ceramah oleh mubalig-mubalig yang terkenal ekstrem, keras, bukan mubalig

ayam sayur. Salah seorang petugas Koramil setempat, yang merasa terhina karena peringatan-peringatannya pada panitia untuk tidak mengundang penceramah seperti itu mubalig keras-- selalu diabaikan, menyiram salah satu pengumuman dengan air selokan. Senin, 10 September 1984, petugas yang menyiram pengumuman dengan air selokan itu lewat di depan sekelompok pemuda yang sedang berada di Pasar Koja. Mereka segera menghadangnya dan mencoba mengeroyok petugas tersebut. Pada saat itu ada dua warga yang mencoba menyelamatkan petugas itu. Setelah itu para pengeroyok mencoba melampiaskan kemarahan mereka dengan membakar sepeda motor dinas yang digunakan petugas itu. Selanjutnya, sesuai prosedur hukum yang berlaku, Polres Jakarta Utara terpaksa menahan dua orang penyelamat itu dan dua orang lagi yang diduga sebagai pelaku pengeroyokan untuk dimintai keterangan. Penahanan sementara diperlukan oleh aparat keamanan guna penelitian dan pengusutan lebih lanjut serta guna penuntutan sesuai dengan hukum yang berlaku. Rabu, 12 September 1984, sekitar pukul 19.30 WIB, di Masjid Rawabadak berlangsung ceramah agama oleh Amir Biki, Syarifin Maloko, S.H., dan M. Nasir. Para penceramah melontarkan ucapan-ucapan anti-Pancasila, anti asas tunggal, memecah persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa, serta mengganggu stabilitas nasional. Di akhir ceramahnya. Amir Biki yang dikenal masyarakat setempat sebagai tokoh agama dan tokoh masyarakat yang berpengaruh, mengajak pendengar agar ramai-ramai mendatangi polres Jakarta Utara untuk menuntut agar empat orang, yang sebenarnya hanya ditahan sementara guna dimintai keterangan, dibebaskan saat itu juga. Sekitar pukul 23.00 WIB peserta ceramah beramai-ramai mendatangi Polres Jakarta Utara, dipimpin Amir Biki yang membawa bendera hijau. Karena gerakan ini sudah tercium sebelumnya, pengamanan Polres Jakarta Utara diperkuat pasukan Laksusda Jaya. Sesampainya massa di depan Polres, terjadi perundingan antara Amir Biki dan Komandan Laksusda Jaya dan Danres (Kapolres) Jakarta Utara. Sementara itu, para pengikutAmir Biki mulai berteriak-teriak mencaci petugas keamanan. Mereka memaksa agar empat orang temannya dibebaskan saat itu juga. Akhirnya, karena massa terus mendesak maju dan karena sakit hati dicaci maki terus menerus, petugas keamanan sebagai biasanya manusia, hilang kesabarannya. Maka tanpa dapat dicegah, sebagian petugas keamanan membidikkan senjata mereka ke arah massa. Terjadilah hal-hal yang tidak diinginkan. Sekitar 40 orang tewas tertembak saat itu juga, termasuk Amir Biki, serta puluhan lainnya mengalami luka-luka. Selanjutnya, para peserta ceramah sambil meneriakkan "Allahu Akbar" mengamuk dan membakar toko-toko milik orang Tionghoa hingga jatuh korban orang-orang Tionghoa yang mencapai 100 orang lebih. Kamis,13 September 1984, pukul 00.00 WIB, aparat keamanan Laksusda Jaya berhasil mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan, dan membubarkan massa. Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Kronologi Peristiwa Tanjung Priok Versi Abdul Qadir Djaelani

Abdul Qadir Djaelani adalah salah seorang ulama yang dituduh oleh aparat keamanan sebagai salah seorang dalang peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Karenanya, ia ditangkap dan dimasukkan ke dalam penjara. Sebagai seorang ulama dan tokoh masyarakat Tanjung Priok, sedikit banyak ia mengetahui kronologi peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Berikut adalah petikan kesaksian Abdul Qadir Djaelani terhadap peristiwa Tanjung Priok 12 September 1984, yang tertulis dalam eksepsi pembelaannya berjudul Musuh-musuh Islam Melakukan Ofensif terhadap Umat Islam Indonesia. Sabtu, 8 September 1984 Dua orang petugas Koramil (****nsa) tanpa membuka sepatu, memasuki Mushala asSa'adah di gang IV Koja, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara. Mereka menyiram pengumuman yang tertempel di tembok mushala dengan air got (comberan). Pengumuman tadi hanya berupa undangan pengajian remaja Islam (masjid) di Jalan Sindang. Ahad, 9 September 1984 Peristiwa hari Sabtu (8 September 1984) di Mushala as-Sa'adah menjadi pembicaran masyarakat tanpa ada usaha dari pihak yang berwajib untuk menawarkan penyelesaan kepada jamaah kaum muslimin. Senin, 10 September 1984 Beberapa anggota jamaah Mushala as-Sa'adah berpapasan dengan salah seorang petugas Koramil yang mengotori mushala mereka. Terjadilah pertengkaran mulut yang akhirnya dilerai oleh dua orang dari jamaah Masjid Baitul Makmur yang kebetulan lewat. Usul mereka supaya semua pihak minta penengahan ketua RW, diterima. Sementara usaha penegahan sedang.berlangsung, orang-orang yang tidak bertanggung jawab dan tidak ada urusannya dengan permasalahan itu, membakar sepeda motor petugas Koramil itu. Kodim, yang diminta bantuan oleh Koramil, mengirim sejumlah tentara dan segera melakukan penangkapan. Ikut tertangkap 4 orang jamaah, di antaranya termasuk Ketua Mushala as-Sa'adah. Selasa, 11 September 1984 Amir Biki menghubungi pihak-pihak yang berwajib untuk meminta pembebasan empat orang jamaah yang ditahan oleh Kodim, yang diyakininya tidak bersalah. Peran Amir Biki ini tidak perlu mengherankan, karena sebagai salah seorang pimpinan Posko 66, dialah orang yang dipercaya semua pihak yang bersangkutan untuk menjadi penengah jika ada masalah antara penguasa (militer) dan masyarakat. Usaha Amir Biki untuk meminta keadilan ternyata sia-sia. Rabu, 12 September 1984 Dalam suasana tantangan yang demikian, acara pengajian remaja Islam di Jalan Sindang Raya, yang sudah direncanakan jauh sebelum ada peristiwa Mushala as-Sa'adah, terus berlangsung juga. Penceramahnya tidak termasuk Amir Biki, yang memang bukan

mubalig dan memang tidak pernah mau naik mimbar. Akan tetapi, dengan latar belakang rangkaian kejadian di hari-hari sebelumnya, jemaah pengajian mendesaknya untuk naik mimbar dan memberi petunjuk. Pada kesempatan pidato itu, Amir Biki berkata antara lain, "Mari kita buktikan solidaritas islamiyah. Kita meminta teman kita yang ditahan di Kodim. Mereka tidak bersalah. Kita protes pekerjaan oknum-oknum ABRI yang tidak bertanggung jawab itu. Kita berhak membela kebenaran meskipun kita menanggung risiko. Kalau mereka tidak dibebaskan maka kita harus memprotesnya." Selanjutnya, Amir Biki berkata, "Kita tidak boleh merusak apa pun! Kalau adayang merusak di tengah-tengah perjalanan, berarti itu bukan golongan kita (yang dimaksud bukan dan jamaah kita)." Pada waktu berangkat jamaah pengajian dibagi dua: sebagian menuju Polres dan sebagian menuju Kodim. Setelah sampai di depan Polres, kira-kia 200 meter jaraknya, di situ sudah dihadang oleh pasukan ABRI berpakaian perang dalam posisi pagar betis dengan senjata otomatis di tangan. Sesampainya jamaah pengajian ke tempat itu, terdengar militer itu berteriak, "Mundur-mundur!" Teriakan "mundur-mundur" itu disambut oleh jamaah dengan pekik, "Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!" Saat itu militer mundur dua langkah, lalu memuntahkan senjata-senjata otomatis dengan sasaran para jamaah pengajian yang berada di hadapan mereka, selama kurang lebih tiga puluh menit. Jamaah pengajian lalu bergelimpangan sambil menjerit histeris; beratus-ratus umat Islam jatuh menjadi syuhada. Malahan ada anggota militer yang berteriak, "*******! Pelurunya habis. Anjing-anjing ini masih banyak!" Lebih sadis lagi, mereka yang belum mati ditendang-tendang dan kalau masih bergerak maka ditembak lagi sampai mati. Tidak lama kemudian datanglah dua buah mobil truk besar beroda sepuluh buah dalam kecepatan tinggi yang penuh dengan pasukan. Dari atas mobil truk besar itu dimuntahkan peluru-peluru dan senjata-senjata otomatis ke sasaran para jamaah yang sedang bertiarap dan bersembunyi di pinggir-pinggir jalan. Lebih mengerikan lagi, truk besar tadi berjalan di atas jamaah pengajian yang sedang tiarap di jalan raya, melindas mereka yang sudah tertembak atau yang belum tertembak, tetapi belum sempat menyingkir dari jalan raya yang dilalui oleh mobil truk tersebut. Jeritan dan bunyi tulang yang patah dan remuk digilas mobil truk besar terdengarjelas oleh para jamaah umat Islam yang tiarap di got-got/selokan-selokan di sisi jalan. Setelah itu, truk-truk besar itu berhenti dan turunlah militer-militer itu untuk mengambil mayat-mayat yang bergelimpangan itu dan melemparkannya ke dalam truk, bagaikan melempar karung goni saja. Dua buah mobil truk besar itu penuh oleh mayat-mayat atau orang-orang yang terkena tembakan yang tersusun bagaikan karung goni. Sesudah mobil truk besar yang penuh dengan mayat jamaah pengajian itu pergi, tidak lama kemudian datanglah mobil-mobil ambulans dan mobil pemadam kebakaran yang bertugas menyiram dan membersihkan darah-darah di jalan raya and di sisinya, sampai bersih. Sementara itu, rombongan jamaah pengajian yang menuju Kodim dipimpin langsung oleh Amir Biki. Kira-kirajarak 15 meter dari kantor Kodim, jamaah pengajian dihadang oleh militer untuk tidak meneruskan perjalanan, dan yang boleh meneruskan perjalanan hanya 3 orang pimpinan jamaah pengajian itu, di antaranya Amir Biki. Begitu jaraknya kira-kira 7 meter dari kantor Kodim, 3 orang pimpinan jamaah pengajian itu diberondong dengan peluru yang keluar dari senjata otomatis militer yang

menghadangnya. Ketiga orang pimpinan jamaah itu jatuh tersungkur menggelepargelepar. Melihat kejadian itu, jamaah pengajian yang menunggu di belakang sambil duduk, menjadi panik dan mereka berdiri mau melarikan diri, tetapi disambut oleh tembakan peluru otomatis. Puluhan orang jamaah pengajian jatuh tersungkur menjadi syahid. Menurut ingatan saudara Yusron, di saat ia dan mayat-mayat itu dilemparkan ke dalam truk militer yang beroda 10 itu, kira-kira 30-40 mayat berada di dalamnya, yang lalu dibawa menuju Rumah Sakit Gatot Subroto (dahulu RSPAD). Sesampainya di rumah sakit, mayat-mayat itu langsung dibawa ke kamar mayat, termasuk di dalamnya saudara Yusron. Dalam keadaan bertumpuk-tumpuk dengan mayat-mayat itu di kamar mayat, saudara Yusron berteriak-teriak minta tolong. Petugas rumah sakit datang dan mengangkat saudara Yusron untuk dipindahkan ke tempat lain. Sebenarnya peristiwa pembantaian jamaah pengajian di Tanjung Priok tidak boleh terjadi apabila PanglimaABRI/Panglima Kopkamtib Jenderal LB Moerdani benar-benar mau berusaha untuk mencegahnya, apalagi pihak Kopkamtib yang selama ini sering sesumbar kepada media massa bahwa pihaknya mampu mendeteksi suatu kejadian sedini dan seawal mungkin. Ini karena pada tanggal 11 September 1984, sewaktu saya diperiksa oleh Kepolisian Daerah Metropolitan Jakarta Raya, saya sempat berbincangbincang dengan Kolonel Polisi Ritonga, Kepala Intel Kepolisian tersebut di mana ia menyatakan bahwa jamaah pengajian di Tanjung Priok menuntut pembebasan 4 orang rekannya yang ditahan, disebabkan membakar motor petugas. Bahkan, menurut petugas-petugas satgas Intel Jaya, di saat saya ditangkap tanggal 13 September 1984, menyatakan bahwa pada tanggal 12 September 1984, kira-kira pukul 10.00 pagi. Amir Biki sempat datang ke kantor Satgas Intel Jaya. Sumber: Buku Tanjung Priok Berdarah, Tanggungjawab Siapa: Kumpulan Fakta dan Data, Yogyakarta: Gema Insani Press.

Huru-Hara di Tanjung Priok

Sejak hari Minggu pagi lalu (pertengahan September 1984 - Ed.), corat-coret di beberapa jalan di daerah Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara, telah dihapus. Kapur tebal putih telah menutupi tulisan-tulisan yang bernada rasial dan anti pemerintah itu. Suasana Tanjung Priok sendiri sudah pulih. Di beberapa daerah yang Rabu malam pekan lalu diamuk kerusuhan, memang masih tampak tentara berjaga-jaga. Senin malam pekan ini tampak terparkir dua panser di depan kampus PTDI (Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam) di Jalan Tawes, yang ditutup sejak Jumat malam. Namun, kehidupan sehari-hari bisa dikatakan telah kembali normal. Peristiwa kerusuhan itu sendiri diungkapkan dan dijelaskan langsung oleh Pangkopkamtib Jenderal L.B. Moerdani kepada pers Kamis siang, sekitar 14 jam setelah kejadian. Banyak yang memuji langkah ini, karena gerak cepat tersebut telah berhasil mengempiskan bermacam kabar angin dan menghindarkan timbulnya berbagai isu. Yang lebih menarik, Jenderal Benny sama sekali tidak menuduh suatu pihak atau kelompok mendalangi peristiwa ini. Ia juga tidak menghubungkannya dengan kegiatan subversif apa pun.

Menurut Pangab Moerdani, pada Rabu malam pekan lalu, sekitar pukul 23.00, satu regu pengamanan ABRI di Tanjung Priok yang terdiri atas 15 orang telah menghadapi serangan gerombolan massa yang berjumlah sekitar 1.500 orang. Usaha regu pengamanan secara persuasif untuk menenangkan dan membubarkan massa tidak berhasil. Massa bahkan terus mendesak maju dengan teriakan-teriakan yang menyatakan tidak mengenal kompromi. Tembakan-tembakan peringatan ke udara tidak mereka acuhkan. "Bahkan, mereka terus menyerang dengan mengayunkan senjata celurit dan berusaha merebut senjata petugas keamanan," begitu bunyi siaran pers yang dibacakan Jenderal Benny Moerdani. "Tembakan terpaksa diarahkan ke tanah dan kekaki para penyerang, hingga jatuhnya korban tidak dapat dihindari lagi." Baru setelah bantuan pasukan pengamanan lain datang, gerombolan massa mundur. "Tapi mereka sempat membakar mobil, merusakkan beberapa rumah dan apotek, serta membunuh beberapa pemiliknya," kata siaran tersebut. Sekitar setengah jam kemudian, gerombolan massa kembali menyerang, sehingga regu pengamanan, dalam keadaan kritis dan terpaksa, melakukan penembakan untuk mencegah usaha mereka merebut senjata. "Sekitar pukul 00.00 WIB, pasukan pengamanan Laksusda Jaya berhasil mengendalikan situasi, menguasai keadaan, dan membubarkan massa," ujar Jenderal Benny, yang dalam konferensi pers di Mabes ABRI itu didampingi oleh Pangdam V/Jaya Mayjen Try Soetrisno, Menteri Penerangan Harmoko, dan Kapolda Mayjen Soedjoko. Menurut Benny Moerdani, oknum-oknum yang mendalangi peristiwa itu: Amir Biki, Syarifin Maloko, dan M. Nasir, adalah "Penduduk Tanjung Priok yang secara berkala mengadakan ceramah di Rawabadak". Sementara itu, "Dalam ucapan-ucapan mereka secara sepihak melontarkan kritik yang tidak sehat kepada sebagian pejabat pemerintah maupun pemerintah sendiri, serta siapa saja yang tidak berkenan bagi mereka. Tatkala ditanya tentang jumlah korban yang jatuh, Benny menoleh dan berbisik kepada Try Soetrisno. Setelah itu ia menyebut: 9 meninggal dan 53 luka-luka. "Mereka itu campuran antara yang terkena tindakan tegas aparat keamanan, maupun akibat kerusuhan itu sendiri," kata Benny. Selain itu, 3 mobil sedan, 3 truk, 3 skuter, 3 sepeda motor, dan 3 rumah (termasuk sebuah apotek) terbakar. "Tapi tidak ada tempat hiburan yang ikut dibakar," ujarnya menambahkan. Menurut pelacakan Tempo, asal mula peristiwa itu adalah suatu insiden kecil. Pada Jumat sore, 7 September, Sertu (Sersan Satu) Hermanu, yang menjadi ****nsa (Bintara Pembina Desa) di Kelurahan Koja Selatan, menemukan beberapa poster di Mushala asSa'adah. "Sudah 16 bulan saya menjabat ****nsa di sana, " Kata Hermanu. Dengan santun, sang sersan membuka sepatu, masuk mushala, dan berdialog dengan beberapa remaja serta jamaah yang ada. "Dia minta agar poster-poster itu dicopot," kata seorang jamaah. Pamflet itu berisi anjuran agar para wanita memakai pakaian "Islam" termasuk jilbab (kerudung). Permintaan itu ditolak. Esok siangnya, Sertu Hermanu kembali datang ke mushala yang terletak di Gang IV Jalan Raya Pelabuhan itu. Tatkala mengetahui poster itu masih ada, ia mengambil sehelai koran, mencelupkannya ke selokan di depan mushala, dan melaburkan airnya

yang hitam itu ke tiga poster yang menempel di dinding luar mushala itu. Melihat itu penghuni gang tadi mulai berdatangan. Massa pun makin mengumpul. Desas-desus pun menjalar cepat. Mula-mula beredar cerita, ada sersan masuk masjid tanpa melepas sepatu. Kemudian, berkembang menjadi tentara mengguyur masjid dengan air comberan. Tiba-tiba suasana memanas setelah muncul isu "Sersan Hermanu orang kristen", yang tak keruan ujung pangkalnya (belakangan, kepada Tempo Hermanu mengatakan bahwa agamanya Islam). Senin pagi 10 September, ketua pengurus Mushala as-Sa'adah, Achmad Sahi, serta beberapa temannya bertemu dengan Hermanu. Mereka menuntut agar Hermanu meminta maaf, yang mula-mula ditolaknya. "Waktu ditanya agamanya, Hermanu mengaku beragama Islam. Tapi ia mengucapkan kala Allah (Alloh) dengan bunyi "Alah". Jadi, ia pasti bukan Islam," cerita beberapa saksi mata. Massa pun bergerak akan menghajar Hermanu, tetapi bisa dicegah oleh Sahi dan beberapa kawannya. Entah siapa yang memulai, tiba-tiba ada yang berteriak "motornya". Maka, massa pun menyeret sepeda motor Honda GL 100 warna merah milik Sertu Hermanu ke tengah Jalan Raya Pelabuhan. Jalan pun macet. Melihat kemacetan itu beberapa anggota Polisi Militer datang. M. Nur (22 tahun), yang sedang menyeret sepeda motor itu, ditangkap. Massa yang marah lalu membakar motor tersebut. Untunglah bantuan dari Kodim 0502 Jakarta Utara segera tiba dan berhasil membubarkan massa. Achmad Sahi, Syarifudin Rambe, dan Sofwan pun diangkut petugas. Selasa siangnya, Amir Biki, seorang tokoh Tanjung Priok yang disegani, yang rupanya dimintai bantuannya untuk melepaskan keempat pemuda yang ditahan, pergi ke Skogar untuk mengurus. Esoknya, Rabu 12 September, sebuah panggung didirikan di Jalan Sindang, persis di perempatan lorong 102. Di atapnya ditutup dengan tenda terpal warna garis-garis hijau putih. Puluhan loud speaker diikat di tiang listrik di sepanjang Jalan Sindang yang lebarnya sekitar 7 meter. Dalam undangan yang disebarkan oleh Remaja Islam Sindang, acara yang akan diselenggarakan adalah pengajian remaja, yang diisi ceramah beberapa ustadz, antara lain Syarifin Maloko, Yayan Hendrayana, dan M. Nasir. Pengajian yang diadakan di persimpangan jalan (yang ditutup untuk lalu lintas), menurut beberapa sumber, biasa diadakan di kawasan tersebut Acara malam itu dimulai sekitar pukul 20.00. Ternyata, yang muncul sebagai pembicara pertama malam itu adalah Amir Biki. Ia mengenakan celana cokelat dan kemeja batik hitam. Ia juga membawa sebilah badik, yang ditunjukannya kepada massa. Pidato mengecam berbagai hal, dari gusuran tanah sampai keluarga berencana dan RUU keormasan. Ia juga menjelek-jelekkan pemerintah. Tampaknya, ia merencanakan sesuatu, karena beberapa kali ia menegaskan agar massa "menunggu instruksinya", dan "ceramah saya ini mungkin yang pertama dan terakhir". Puncak pidatonya adalah tatkala ia menuntut "kepada penguasa" agar melepaskan keempat pemuda yang ditahan. Ia mengancam akan menggerakkan massa jika mereka tidak dibebaskan sebelum pukul 23.00 malam itu. Rupanya, Amir Biki pada sekitar pukul 22.00, seperti diungkapkan Jenderal Moerdani, menyampaikan tuntutan yang sama melalui telepon kepada markas aparatur keamanan.

Amir mengancam "akan melakukan pembunuhan dan perusakan-perusakan apabila keempat tahanan tersebut tidak dibebaskan". Tuntutan melalui telepon itu diulangi lagi pada pukul 23.00. Beberapa pembicara lain setelah Amir Biki, kabarnya tak kurang "keras" suaranya. Malah ada pembicara yang menghasut massa dan isi hasutannya sangat rasialistis. "Pembicaraannya ngawur dan jelas bertentangan dengan ajaran Islam," kata sebuah sumber. Tatkala pukul 23.00 tiba, dan keempat tahanan tidak dibebaskan, Amir Biki pun menggerakkan massa. Ia membagi mereka dalam dua kelompok, masing-masing membawa bendera hijau. Amir sendiri berjalan di depan, memimpin satu kelompok yang menuju markas Kodim di Jalan Yos Sudarso, melewati Jalan Anggrek, menempuh jarak sekitar 1,5 km. Namun, setengah perjalanan, di depan kantor Polres di Jalan Yos Sudarso, mereka dihadang sepasukan tentara. Pasukan ini mencegah dan berusaha membubarkan massa. Tatkala mereka terus bergerak, petugas keamanan melepaskan tembakan peringatan. "Tapi Pak Amir rupanya sudah emosi. Ia malah memegang bendera dan meneriakkan 'maju dan serbu'," kata seorang yang malam itu berbaris di dekat Amir Biki, dan luput dari tembakan. Jarak antara petugas dan penyerbu, menurut saksi ini, sekitar dua meter. "Jadi bila petugas tak menembak, bisa jadi mereka sendiri akan tewas lebih dulu," kata seorang pejabat. Menurut suatu sumber dari luka-luka mereka yang tewas diketahui, mereka memang terkena tembak dalam jarak dekat. Massa tercerai-berai oleh tembakan. Datangnya bantuan pasukan membuat mereka mundur. Saat itulah perusakan dan pembakaran mulai terjadi, terutama dilakukan oleh sekelompok lain yang melewati Jalan Jampea. Sekitar tengah malam itu Riswanto (20 tahun), pembantu yang baru bekerja empat hari di Toko Tanjung Jaya di Jalan Jampea, terbangun. "Saya lihat asap masuk kamar dan terdengar suara ribut-ribut," kata pemuda asal Purwokerto. Bersama tiga rekan pria sesama pembantu, ia menghambur ke luar kamar --dan bertemu pembantu wanita. Toko Tanjung Jaya, yang menjual onderdil, bahan bakar, dan pelumas, memang menjadi sasaran amukan massa. Sebelumnya, massa urung membakar Apotek Tanjung di sebelahnya, setelah diberitahu pemiliknya Cina Islam. Tetapi api yang membakar Tanjung Jaya ikut meludaskan Apotek Tanjung, yang memang tidak dijaga. Esoknya, di reruntuhan Tanjung Jaya di temukan delapan mayat keluarga Tan Kio Liem serta seorang pembantunya. Dalam waktu singkat, pasukan keamanan bisa menguasai keadaan. Pangab Jenderal LB. Moerdani sendiri kabarnya ikut memeriksa situasi setempat setelah lewat tengah malam. Jumlah korban, yang pada hari Kamis tercatat sembilan orang meninggal, kabarnya bertambah. Sebuah sumber kepolisian menyebutkan, sampai Sabtu pekan lalu, korban yang meninggal tercatat 28 orang. Sementara itu, sejumlah perusuh dan tokoh yang diduga terlibat ditahan. Antara lain: Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Tony Ardie, dan Mawardi Noor. Pemerintah telah menyatakan berduka cita kepada keluarga korban yang jatuh.

Terjadinya Peristiwa Tanjung Priok ini disesalkan semua pihak. DPP Golkar, PPP, dan PDI mengeluarkan pernyataan yang menyesalkannya seraya memuji tindakan aparatur keamanan yang tegas. Sekjen DPP Golkar, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, memuji sikap Pangab Jenderal Moerdani yang sangat menolong mendudukkan perkara ini sesuai apa adanya berkat keterangannya yang tidak dibuat-buat dan tidak. didramatisasikan. Di belakang peristiwa ini, kata Sarwono, seperti terlihat konsep tertentu yang hendak dipaksakan, meski bertentangan dengan Pancasila. Pemerintah tampaknya tidak akan menuding suatu golongan mendalangi peristiwa ini. Itu terlihat dari pernyataan Pangdam V/Jaya Mayjen Try Soetrisno dalam Sarasehan DPP KNPI pekan lalu. Menurut Try, masyarakat tidak perlu khawatir akan ada golongan yang harus menerima citra akibat Peristiwa Tanjung Priok. "Kita harus tetap menyucikan agama," katanya. Sumber: Majalah Tempo, 22 September 1984

Pembunuhan yang terjadi di Aceh

Mass Murder in Aceh; A Call for Action
from TAPOL, Dec 17, 1990 After trying for more than a year to put down widespread rebellion and protest in Aceh, on the north-western tip of Sumatra, the Indonesian armed forces, acting on the orders of regional military commander Major-General Djoko Pramono, have embarked on a campaign of systematic murder. Regular territorial troops have been withdrawn from the villages and replaced by four commando units. The number of troops in the area has been doubled, to 12,000. According to AFP [The Straits Times, 16 August 1990], an airborne battalion of 600 men was parachuted into the districts of North Aceh, East Aceh and Pidie. This battalion, based in Bogor, West Java, is part of the notorious red-beret unit known as Kopassus. It is commanded by Colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto, who saw service last year in East Timor and gained a reputation for extreme brutality. Earlier in August, 300 marines and about 100 men from the mobile brigade based in East Java were sent to Sigli, the capital of Pidie. The military commander has called on the local population to take part in a mass murder campaign. In an interview with Tempo [17 November, 1990], Pramono said: "I have told the people here: if you meet GPK members, you should kill them. No need to investigate.... Just shoot them or knife them. I have told people to arm themselves with sharp weapons, machetes or whatever. If you encounter the GPK, just kill them." ['GPK' or 'security disruptors' is the term used officially for the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM, known in English as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front.] In the same interview, Pramono said many people had already been killed and that killings are occurring almost every day.

On 8 November 1990, Reuter quoted an Indonesian human rights lawyer, recently returned from Aceh, as saying that residents reported finding mass graves and a steady flow of decomposed corpses. The bodies of people not known locally have been found in plantations and by rivers; villagers working on a river bank found eight bodies tied together, weighted down and drowned. A mass grave was discovered in Akue Mira. Villagers troubled by a foul smell found an open pit with 200 bodies in it, according to a western human rights observer. On 23 November, a Reuter correspondent who visited the area wrote: "A trickle of deaths over the past year became a torrent in late September, three months before a deadline set by Pramono to end the conflict... Acehnese are being rounded up in their hundreds and taken to detention centres, often on the smallest suspicion, residents said. 'They are taken out of their houses at night. You often have a fifty-fifty chance of ever coming back,' said a non- government party politician." A TAPOL contact in Jakarta was told by a senior intelligence officer that the security forces in Aceh face two options, either to arrest many thousands of people and deal with them in the courts of law which could take years, or engage in a shoot-to-kill campaign to exterminate the 'GPK' and strike fear into the entire population. Pramono has clearly chosen the second option. Our source reports that many villagers suspected of sympathising with GAM have been rounded up, taken to nearby military centres and forced to pledge loyalty to the government; on their way home, some villagers have been set upon, killed, their bodies grotesquely mutilated and left on the roadside. There is strong evidence that bodies are deliberately left without burial for greater psychological impact. Many have been found with hands and feet tied together and a bullet wound in the head. In some cases, bodies have been buried with a foot or arm exposed. No-one has reported any attempts to identify the bodies or carry out autopsies to determine the cause of death.

Death toll
It is not possible to quantify the number already slain this year. The Reuter report [23 November] said that "hundreds of unidentified corpses have been found and hundreds of people have disappeared." According to The Economist [15 December 1990], "Some soldiers admit to killing unarmed people and leaving their corpses in public places as a 'counter-terrorist' measure.... a senior army doctor puts the toll at more than a thousand. Mutilated corpses litter the roadsides and ditches. Most of the victims are local civilians, though several members of the security forces and some of the rebels have also been killed." The Aceh National Liberation Front believes that more than five thousand people have been put to death since the beginning of the year. In a press release issued on 10 December, it listed many large detention centres each of which are being used by the army to hold up to a thousand people at any one time; according to the Front, as many

as a hundred people may be taken out from each of the camps and killed in a night. These centres are located in Lammeulo, Sigli, Keudah (Bandar Aceh), Lhok Seumawe, Rantjong, Tjot Girek, Reudeuep Lhok Sukon, Tualang Tjut, Peureulak, Langsa, Bindjai, Medan and Takengon. The Front earlier compiled a dossier of reports naming hundreds of people who had been arrested or who had disappeared. The reports, most of which were written in June, July or August this year, before the campaign of mass slaughter began, also give details of torture methods which include: - mutilating various parts of the body, - using cigarettes or hot irons to inflict burns, - electric shock, - raping women and mutilating their breasts, - squeezing a man's testicles with pliers, - nailing down the hands as if for crucifixion, - immersing the victim in boiling water, - hanging the victim upside down, - placing the victim in filthy water for hours or days, - placing the feet under the legs of a chair on which a soldier sits until the bones are broken. Need for action The campaign of extermination now under way in Aceh is the latest in a string of crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Suharto regime. In 1965-66, it was responsible for the massacre of an estimated one million communist suspects or sypathisers. Its war in East Timor, launched in 1975, has left an estimated 200,000 people dead, out of a population of about 700,000. In 1983-84, army death squads killed at least 4,000 people, a campaign which Suharto described in his autobiography as 'shock therapy' against alleged criminals. Army troops shot at least a hundred Muslims in Tanjung Priok in September 1984 who were protesting against the arrest of mosque officials. Dozens, perhaps more than a hundred, villagers were killed in Way Jepara, Lampung, South Sumatra, in February 1989. TAPOL most vigorously condemns this latest murder campaign against the people of Aceh. It calls on governments and people everywhere to exert pressure on the Suharto government to put a stop to the slaughter. It calls on human rights organisations in Indonesia (LPHAM and Infight) and abroad (Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists) to send observers to Aceh, and urges the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH) and Asia Watch to make public without delay the findings of on-the-spot investigations already carried out by them. This information should be submitted to the February 1991 session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Western governments should send officials to Aceh to assess the scale of the massacre.

The European Parliament should adopt an emergency resolution calling for an end to the slaughter. Those responsible for the killings must be brought to justice. Since this cannot be done in Indonesia, an International Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity should be convened to hold the Suharto regime responsible for its campaign of death and mass intimidation in Aceh. TAPOL calls on solidarity organisations throughout the world to exert pressure on their own governments along these lines and make their own approaches to the NGOs mentioned above. London 17 December, 1990

Ini tentang Kejahatan Jepang terhadap Indonesia!

Indonesia WORLD WAR II AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1942-50 The Japanese Occupation, 1942-45 [JPEG] A Japanese soldier watching oil tanks near Jakarta set afire by the retreating Dutch, March 1942 Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress The Japanese occupied the archipelago in order, like their Portuguese and Dutch predecessors, to secure its rich natural resources. Japan's invasion of North China, which had begun in July 1937, by the end of the decade had become bogged down in the face of stubborn Chinese resistance. To feed Japan's war machine, large amounts of petroleum, scrap iron, and other raw materials had to be imported from foreign sources. Most oil--about 55 percent--came from the United States, but Indonesia supplied a critical 25 percent. From Tokyo's perspective, the increasingly critical attitude of the "ABCD powers" (America, Britain, China, and the Dutch) toward Japan's invasion of China reflected their desire to throttle its legitimate aspirations in Asia. German occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940 led to Japan's demand that the Netherlands Indies government supply it with fixed quantities of vital natural resources, especially oil. Further demands were made for some form of economic and financial integration of the Indies with Japan. Negotiations continued through mid-1941. The Indies government, realizing its extremely weak position, played for time. But in summer 1941, it followed the United States in freezing Japanese assets and imposing an embargo on oil and other exports. Because Japan could not continue its China war without these resources, the militarydominated government in Tokyo gave assent to an "advance south" policy. French Indochina was already effectively under Japanese control. A nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 freed Japan to wage war against the United States and the European colonial powers.

The Japanese experienced spectacular early victories in the Southeast Asian war. Singapore, Britain's fortress in the east, fell on February 15, 1941, despite British numerical superiority and the strength of its seaward defenses. The Battle of the Java Sea resulted in the Japanese defeat of a combined British, Dutch, Australian, and United States fleet. On March 9, 1942, the Netherlands Indies government surrendered without offering resistance on land. Although their motives were largely acquisitive, the Japanese justified their occupation in terms of Japan's role as, in the words of a 1942 slogan, "The leader of Asia, the protector of Asia, the light of Asia." Tokyo's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, encompassing both Northeast and Southeast Asia, with Japan as the focal point, was to be a nonexploitative economic and cultural community of Asians. Given Indonesian resentment of Dutch rule, this approach was appealing and harmonized remarkably well with local legends that a two-century-long non-Javanese rule would be followed by era of peace and prosperity. The Japanese divided the Indies into three jurisdictions: Java and Madura were placed under the control of the Sixteenth Army; Sumatra, for a time, joined with Malaya under the Twenty-fifth Army; and the eastern archipelago was placed under naval command. In Sumatra and the east, the overriding concern of the occupiers was maintenance of law and order and extraction of needed resources. Java's economic value with respect to the war effort lay in its huge labor force and relatively developed infrastructure. The Sixteenth Army was tolerant, within limits, of political activities carried out by nationalists and Muslims. This tolerance grew as the momentum of Japanese expansion was halted in mid-1942 and the Allies began counteroffensives. In the closing months of the war, Japanese commanders promoted the independence movement as a means of frustrating an Allied reoccupation. The occupation was not gentle. Japanese troops often acted harshly against local populations. The Japanese military police were especially feared. Food and other vital necessities were confiscated by the occupiers, causing widespread misery and starvation by the end of the war. The worst abuse, however, was the forced mobilization of some 4 million--although some estimates are as high as 10 million--romusha (manual laborers), most of whom were put to work on economic development and defense construction projects in Java. About 270,000 romusha were sent to the Outer Islands and Japaneseheld territories in Southeast Asia, where they joined other Asians in performing wartime construction projects. At the end of the war, only 52,000 were repatriated to Java. The Japanese occupation was a watershed in Indonesian history. It shattered the myth of Dutch superiority, as Batavia gave up its empire without a fight. There was little resistance as Japanese forces fanned out through the islands to occupy former centers of Dutch power. The relatively tolerant policies of the Sixteenth Army on Java also confirmed the island's leading role in Indonesian national life after 1945: Java was far more developed politically and militarily than the other islands. In addition, there were profound cultural implications from the Japanese invasion of Java. In administration, business, and cultural life, the Dutch language was discarded in favor of Malay and Japanese. Committees were organized to standardize Bahasa Indonesia and make it a truly national language. Modern Indonesian literature, which got its start with language unification efforts in 1928 and underwent considerable development before the war, received further impetus under Japanese auspices. Revolutionary (or traditional)

Indonesian themes were employed in drama, films, and art, and hated symbols of Dutch imperial control were swept away. For example, the Japanese allowed a huge rally in Batavia (renamed Jakarta) to celebrate by tearing down a statue of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the seventeenthcentury governor general. Although the occupiers propagated the message of Japanese leadership of Asia, they did not attempt, as they did in their Korean colony, to coercively promote Japanese culture on a large scale. According to historian Anthony Reid, the occupiers believed that Indonesians, as fellow Asians, were essentially like themselves but had been corrupted by three centuries of Western colonialism. What was needed was a dose of Japanese-style seishin (spirit; semangat in Indonesian). Many members of the elite responded positively to an inculcation of samurai values. The most significant legacy of the occupation, however, was the opportunities it gave for Javanese and other Indonesians to participate in politics, administration, and the military. Soon after the Dutch surrender, European officials, businessmen, military personnel, and others, totaling around 170,000, were interned (the harsh conditions of their confinement caused a high death rate, at least in camps for male military prisoners, which embittered Dutch-Japanese relations even in the early 1990s). While Japanese military officers occupied the highest posts, the personnel vacuum on the lower levels was filled with Indonesians. Like the Dutch, however, the Japanese relied on local indigenous elites, such as the priyayi on Java and the Acehnese uleebalang, to administer the countryside. Because of the harshly exploitative Japanese policies in the closing years of the war, after the Japanese surrender collaborators in some areas were killed in a wave of local resentment. Sukarno and Hatta agreed in 1942 to cooperate with the Japanese, as this seemed to be the best opportunity to secure independence. The occupiers were particularly impressed by Sukarno's mass following, and he became increasingly valuable to them as the need to mobilize the population for the war effort grew between 1943 and 1945. His reputation, however, was tarnished by his role in recruiting romusha. Japanese attempts to coopt Muslims met with limited success. Muslim leaders opposed the practice of bowing toward the emperor (a divine ruler in Japanese official mythology) in Tokyo as a form of idolatry and refused to declare Japan's war against the Allies a "holy war" because both sides were nonbelievers. In October 1943, however, the Japanese organized the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi), designed to create a united front of orthodox and modernist believers. Nahdatul Ulama was given a prominent role in Masyumi, as were a large number of kyai (religious leaders), whom the Dutch had largely ignored, who were brought to Jakarta for training and indoctrination. As the fortunes of war turned, the occupiers began organizing Indonesians into military and paramilitary units whose numbers were added by the Japanese to romusha statistics. These included the heiho (auxiliaries), paramilitary units recruited by the Japanese in mid-1943, and the Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta) in 1943. Peta was a military force designed to assist the Japanese forces by forestalling the initial Allied invasion. By the end of the war, it had 37,000 men in Java and 20,000 in Sumatra (where it was commonly known by the Japanese name Giyugun). In December 1944, a Muslim armed force, the Army of God, or Barisan Hizbullah, was attached to Masyumi.

Data as of November 1992

THE BANKA ISLAND MASSACRE (1942)

Sister Vivian Bullwinkel's Story On 12 February 1942, with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese imminent, sixty-five Australian Army nurses, including Sister Vivian Bullwinkel, were evacuated from the besieged city on the small coastal steamer Vyner Brooke. In addition to the Australian nurses, the ship was crammed with over two hundred civilian evacuees and English military personnel. As the Vyner Brooke was passing between Sumatra and Borneo, Japanese aircraft bombed and strafed the overloaded ship and it sank quickly. The survivors in lifeboats were strafed by Japanese aircraft but some reached Bangka Island off the coast of Sumatra. Twelve Australian nurses were either killed in the attack on the ship or drowned in the sea. The remaining fifty-three nurses reached Bangka Island in lifeboats, on rafts, or by drifting with the tide. Wearing their Red Cross armbands, and having protected status as non-combatants by convention of civilised nations, the nurses expected to be treated in a civilised manner by the Japanese when they reached shore. Their expectations were short lived. The lucky survivors were rounded up at gunpoint by the Japanese and herded into a building that was filthy and overcrowded. All of the survivors were tired, thirsty, and hungry. Some were suffering from exposure to the sun after many hours immersed in the sea, and some had been wounded in the attacks on the ship and the lifeboats. The Japanese were unsympathetic to their plight and only offered the survivors a bucket of water and a bucket of rice. The unlucky survivors, including twenty-two Australian nurses, landed in lifeboats on the northern coast of Bangka Island and lit a bonfire to guide other survivors to them. Sister Vivian Bullwinkel was in this group of nurses. When the number of survivors at the bonfire reached about one hundred, it was decided that they should surrender to the Japanese. A party of male survivors went off to find Japanese. They were accompanied by civilian women and their children. The twenty-two Australian nurses stayed to look after the injured, and they made and erected a red cross to indicate to the Japanese that they were non-combatants. A patrol of about fifteen Japanese soldiers arrived from the coastal township of Muntok. While some guarded the Australian nurses, the rest herded the male survivors, about fifty in number, down the beach and around a headland. The nurses heard gunfire from this direction, and shortly afterwards, the Japanese soldiers returned alone. Some were wiping blood from their bayonets. The twenty-two Australian nurses were then ordered by the Japanese to form a line and walk into the sea. The women knew what was going to happen to them, but none panicked or pleaded for mercy. When the water had reached the nurses' waists, the Japanese opened fire on them. Sister Bullwinkel was hit in the back by a bullet and knocked off her feet. Upon discovering that she was only wounded, she pretended to be dead. After some time had passed, she risked a glance at the beach and saw that the Japanese soldiers had gone. She looked around for the other twenty-one nurses and saw none. She was the only nurse who had survived the massacre.

When she reached the beach, she was joined by an English soldier who had survived the massacre behind the headland. Private Kingsley had been bayoneted by the Japanese and left for dead. They were given food by the local village women, but after two weeks, they realised that their position was hopeless, and they decided to walk to Muntok and give themselves up. Shortly afterwards, Private Kingsley died from the bayonet wound. Realising that the lives of all survivors of the Vyner Brooke would be at risk if the Japanese discovered what she had seen, Sister Bullwinkel concealed her wound from the Japanese and treated it herself. She survived harsh imprisonment to give evidence of the massacre at a war crimes trial in Tokyo in 1947.

THE PULAU MASSACRE Banka (1942)

Adik Vivian Bullwinkel Cerita Pada tanggal 12 Februari 1942, dengan jatuhnya Singapura ke Jepang dekat, enam puluh lima perawat Angkatan Darat Australia, termasuk Sister Bullwinkel Vivian, yang diungsikan dari terkepung di kota kecil pantai kapal api Vyner Brooke. Selain itu perawat ke Australia, kapal telah crammed dengan lebih dari dua ratus sipil di daerah bencana dan personil militer Inggris. Seperti yang telah lulus Vyner Brooke antara Sumatera dan Kalimantan, Jepang bombed pesawat terbang dan kapal strafed yang berlebih dan sank dengan cepat. Para korban di lifeboats yang strafed oleh pesawat terbang Jepang tetapi beberapa mencapai Pulau Bangka di lepas pantai Sumatera. Dua belas Australia perawat yang baik tewas dalam serangan di kapal atau tenggelam di laut. Sisa lima puluh tiga perawat mencapai lifeboats di Pulau Bangka, pada rakit, atau oleh Gerakan dengan air pasang. Pakaian mereka Palang Merah armbands, dilindungi dan memiliki status sebagai kombatan dengan non-konvensi dari civilised bangsa, perawat yang diharapkan untuk diperlakukan dalam cara civilised oleh Jepang ketika mereka mencapai pantai. Harapan mereka telah berlangsung lama. Yang beruntung korban yang tercakup di ujung laras senapan oleh Jepang dan herded ke dalam bangunan yang kotor dan terlalu sesak. Semua dari para korban yang lelah, haus, dan lapar. Beberapa yang menderita terekspos sampai matahari terbenam setelah banyak jam di laut, dan telah beberapa luka dalam serangan di kapal dan lifeboats. Jepang telah unsympathetic untuk mereka berjanji dan hanya ditawarkan para korban ember air dan ember beras. Naas yang selamat, termasuk dua puluh dua perawat Australia, di lifeboats mendarat di pantai utara Pulau Bangka dan kesusasteraan bonafiditas yang lain untuk membimbing korban untuk mereka. Adik Vivian Bullwinkel di grup ini dari perawat. Ketika jumlah korban di bonafiditas mencapai sekitar seratus, telah diputuskan bahwa mereka harus menyerah kepada Jepang. Sebuah pihak laki-laki korban pergi off untuk menemukan Jepang. Mereka diiringi oleh sipil perempuan dan anak-anak mereka. Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia untuk tinggal setelah terluka melihat, dan mereka yang dibuat dan palang merah yang didirikan untuk menunjukkan kepada Jepang bahwa mereka nonkombatan. Sebuah patroli dari sekitar lima belas tentara Jepang tiba dari pantai negeri dari Muntok. Sementara beberapa perawat yang dijaga ketat dari Australia, sisanya herded laki-laki

korban, sekitar lima puluh jumlahnya, bawah pantai dan di sekitar tanjung. Gunfire perawat yang mendengar dari arah ini, dan segera setelah itu, tentara Jepang kembali sendiri. Beberapa orang dari mereka wiping darah bayonets. Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia yang kemudian disusun oleh Jepang untuk membentuk baris dan jalan ke laut. Perempuan yang tahu apa yang akan terjadi kepada mereka, tetapi tidak panik atau untuk mengaku rahmat. Ketika air telah mencapai perawat 'pinggang, Jepang api dibuka pada mereka. Saudara Bullwinkel menerima pukulan di bagian belakang dengan peluru dan terlanda lama dia kaki. Setelah menemukan bahwa dia hanya luka, dia pura-pura menjadi mati. Setelah beberapa waktu telah berlalu, dia risked dalam sekejap di pantai dan melihat bahwa tentara Jepang telah pergi. Aku belajar untuk yang lain sekitar dua puluh satu perawat dan melihat tidak ada. Dia adalah satu-satunya perawat yang telah bertahan besar-besaran. Ketika ia mencapai pantai, ia bergabung dengan tentara Inggris yang bertahan di belakang tanjung besar-besaran. Kingsley swasta telah bayoneted oleh Jepang dan kiri untuk mati. Mereka diberi makan oleh perempuan desa setempat, namun setelah dua minggu, mereka menyadari bahwa posisi mereka adalah harapan, dan mereka memutuskan untuk berjalan kaki ke Muntok dan memberikan diri. Sesaat setelah itu, Swasta Kingsley meninggal dari luka sangkur. Mewujudkan kehidupan yang selamat dari semua Vyner Brooke akan beresiko jika Jepang menemukan apa yang dia lihat, Sister Bullwinkel dia bersembunyi luka dari Jepang dan dirawat itu sendiri. Dia bertahan keras penjara untuk memberikan bukti yang besar-besaran di persidangan kejahatan perang di Tokyo tahun 1947.

THE PULAU MASSACRE Banka (1942)

Adik Vivian Bullwinkel Cerita Pada tanggal 12 Februari 1942, dengan jatuhnya Singapura ke Jepang dekat, enam puluh lima perawat Angkatan Darat Australia, termasuk Sister Bullwinkel Vivian, yang diungsikan dari terkepung di kota kecil pantai kapal api Vyner Brooke. Selain itu perawat ke Australia, kapal telah crammed dengan lebih dari dua ratus sipil di daerah bencana dan personil militer Inggris. Seperti yang telah lulus Vyner Brooke antara Sumatera dan Kalimantan, Jepang bombed pesawat terbang dan kapal strafed yang berlebih dan sank dengan cepat. Para korban di lifeboats yang strafed oleh pesawat terbang Jepang tetapi beberapa mencapai Pulau Bangka di lepas pantai Sumatera. Dua belas Australia perawat yang baik tewas dalam serangan di kapal atau tenggelam di laut. Sisa lima puluh tiga perawat mencapai lifeboats di Pulau Bangka, pada rakit, atau oleh Gerakan dengan air pasang. Pakaian mereka Palang Merah armbands, dilindungi dan memiliki status sebagai kombatan dengan non-konvensi dari civilised bangsa, perawat yang diharapkan untuk diperlakukan dalam cara civilised oleh Jepang ketika mereka mencapai pantai. Harapan mereka telah berlangsung lama. Yang beruntung korban yang tercakup di ujung laras senapan oleh Jepang dan herded ke dalam bangunan yang kotor dan terlalu sesak. Semua dari para korban yang lelah, haus, dan lapar. Beberapa yang menderita terekspos sampai matahari terbenam setelah banyak jam di laut, dan telah beberapa luka dalam

serangan di kapal dan lifeboats. Jepang telah unsympathetic untuk mereka berjanji dan hanya ditawarkan para korban ember air dan ember beras. Naas yang selamat, termasuk dua puluh dua perawat Australia, di lifeboats mendarat di pantai utara Pulau Bangka dan kesusasteraan bonafiditas yang lain untuk membimbing korban untuk mereka. Adik Vivian Bullwinkel di grup ini dari perawat. Ketika jumlah korban di bonafiditas mencapai sekitar seratus, telah diputuskan bahwa mereka harus menyerah kepada Jepang. Sebuah pihak laki-laki korban pergi off untuk menemukan Jepang. Mereka diiringi oleh sipil perempuan dan anak-anak mereka. Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia untuk tinggal setelah terluka melihat, dan mereka yang dibuat dan palang merah yang didirikan untuk menunjukkan kepada Jepang bahwa mereka nonkombatan. Sebuah patroli dari sekitar lima belas tentara Jepang tiba dari pantai negeri dari Muntok. Sementara beberapa perawat yang dijaga ketat dari Australia, sisanya herded laki-laki korban, sekitar lima puluh jumlahnya, bawah pantai dan di sekitar tanjung. Gunfire perawat yang mendengar dari arah ini, dan segera setelah itu, tentara Jepang kembali sendiri. Beberapa orang dari mereka wiping darah bayonets. Kedua puluh dua perawat Australia yang kemudian disusun oleh Jepang untuk membentuk baris dan jalan ke laut. Perempuan yang tahu apa yang akan terjadi kepada mereka, tetapi tidak panik atau untuk mengaku rahmat. Ketika air telah mencapai perawat 'pinggang, Jepang api dibuka pada mereka. Saudara Bullwinkel menerima pukulan di bagian belakang dengan peluru dan terlanda lama dia kaki. Setelah menemukan bahwa dia hanya luka, dia pura-pura menjadi mati. Setelah beberapa waktu telah berlalu, dia risked dalam sekejap di pantai dan melihat bahwa tentara Jepang telah pergi. Aku belajar untuk yang lain sekitar dua puluh satu perawat dan melihat tidak ada. Dia adalah satu-satunya perawat yang telah bertahan besar-besaran. Ketika ia mencapai pantai, ia bergabung dengan tentara Inggris yang bertahan di belakang tanjung besar-besaran. Kingsley swasta telah bayoneted oleh Jepang dan kiri untuk mati. Mereka diberi makan oleh perempuan desa setempat, namun setelah dua minggu, mereka menyadari bahwa posisi mereka adalah harapan, dan mereka memutuskan untuk berjalan kaki ke Muntok dan memberikan diri. Sesaat setelah itu, Swasta Kingsley meninggal dari luka sangkur. Mewujudkan kehidupan yang selamat dari semua Vyner Brooke akan beresiko jika Jepang menemukan apa yang dia lihat, Sister Bullwinkel dia bersembunyi luka dari Jepang dan dirawat itu sendiri. Dia bertahan keras penjara untuk memberikan bukti yang besar-besaran di persidangan kejahatan perang di Tokyo tahun 1947. sekarang kita sudah merdeka...tapi apa sesungguhnya kita memang sudah merdeka ya...rakyat kaga sejahtera sejahtera...mirip jaman penjajahan sekarang tapi dengan muka yang modern hehehe

Rawagede Massacre: An Unpublished Story

Thursday, August 14, 2008 Tonight I received an email from Batara Hutagalung, a leader of Committee of Dutch Honorary Debts a group of people that strive for The Netherlands' apology for what

they did to Indonesia years ago. The email said that the committee was planning to stage a demonstration in front of Dutch Embassy this Friday. Batara's email reminded me of my story about Rawagede Massacre that didn't get published, back when I was still an intern reporter at The Jakarta Post. Since it's been almost a year, I would like to just share the story here. Please tell me what you think okay :) ########## Up until now, Imih still could not forget the day when, at four oclock in the morning, she saw troops all over her village. There were hundreds of them. They opened fire and soon everyone was in panic, said the 74-year-old woman, recollecting a horrible day she had 60 years ago. I quickly told my husband and my father to stay in the house because I knew it was safer there, but my husband he was so frightened he ran away and got shot. The tragedy took place on December 9, 1947, after more than 300 hundreds troops of Netherlands army surrounded Rawagede, a village between Karawang-Bekasi, located about 60 kilometers to the east of Jakarta. They were in attempt to capture Mr. Lukas Kustario an Indonesian soldier who had previously attacked some Netherlands facilities. He recently had damaged a train containing weaponry with another train. Kustario, according to a report the troops received, had entered Rawagede to join the soldiers force in the city. However, the wanted soldier actually had left the village for Jakarta the day before. The troops ordered all residents to get out their houses, gather up in a yard. They separated male citizens from the crowds and made them stood in line. They asked the people: Where is Lukas Kustario?! Where are the soldiers?! None of the men said anything. Pissed off by the response, The troops started to bombard us, an 84-year-old soldier Saih said. Saih managed to survive by playing dead. As they shot, I quickly dropped myself to the ground. A bullet hit my back but I lay still. He remembered how the troops continued shooting at all dead bodies to make sure none is alive before they left the scene. They also chased other male residents who were hiding in a nearby river, Kali Rawagede, with some tracker dogs they brought.

When he thought it was safe to make a move, Saih stood up and walked home. I saw so many victims, he said. Hundreds of man died that day, making there were only women and children in this village, said Imih. All men who were lucky to be alive escaped the village for their lives because the troops were believed to come back anytime. It took us two days to bury all 431 dead bodies, she said. It is ironic that the massacre happened just one day after Indonesia and Netherlands started the USS Renville peace talk. A monument was built in 1996 in the village to honor the heroes. The Rawagede People Struggle Monument complex also has a cemetery for the victims. But not all victims were relocated and buried here. Its hard to identify all the victims. We only managed to identify 181 out of 431 victims, said head of Rawagede Foundation Sukarman, who manages the monument complex. Every year the people of Rawagede hold a ceremony at the monument to commemorate the tragedy. They sing national anthem. They make moment of silence. They pray for the heroes, and throw flowers at their graves. They read the story on how Netherlands troops had tore down the entire life of the village. Moreover, a famous poem from a namely poet Chairil Anwar, dedicated to the victims: Karawang-Bekasi. We, who have lain down between Karawang-Bekasi, cannot shout Independence! and carry weapon any more. Some elderly people are crying as they hear the poem. While Netherlands considered what happened in Rawagede a correctional action as they claimed the area as their territory at the time a group of people is currently putting effort on getting Netherlands apology for what they did. It was a crime against humanity, Batara Hutagalung, leader of Committee of Dutch Honorary Debts said. The Netherlands surrendered to Japan in 1942 while Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 so it was not also war crime as there was no war at all, said Batara. They should say sorry and pay compensation to the victims family to help them prosper. We should reach reconciliation with dignity.

Talking about compensation, Imih said she just wished to have her house repaired. Thats all. As for Saih, he only wished his family a better life. The big-hearted old man said he had forgiven Netherlands. I have no hatred in my heart against them. They were just looking for Mr. Lukas but unfortunately, we really had no idea where he was. Of course even if we did, we would not tell them anyway.

Mass Killings Under Suharto Recalled

Februari 1, 2008 pada 7:11 am (soeharto) Published on Monday, January 28, 2008 by The Boston Globe by Anthony Deutsch BLITAR, Indonesia - Hiding out in the dense, humid jungle, Markus Talam watched Indonesian soldiers herd manacled prisoners from trucks, line them up, and mow them down with round after round of automatic weapons fire.0128 04It was 1968, and the killings were part of a final offensive by forces under General Suharto to wipe out the communist party and secure his position as leader of Indonesia, now the worlds most populous Muslim nation.They gunned them down and dumped their bodies in a mass grave dug by other prisoners. I remember the sound of the guns clearly: tat-tat, tat-tat, tat-tat . . . over and over again, said Talam, 68, who was later jailed for 10 years after being named a leftist sympathizer. Suharto, who died yesterday at a Jakarta hospital, seized control of the military in 1965 and ruled the country for 32 years, suppressing dissent with force and supported by an American government at the height of the Cold War. Estimates for the number killed during his bloody rise to power - from 1965 to 1968 range from a government figure of 78,000 to 1 million cited by US historians Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, who have published books on Indonesias history. It was the worst mass slaughter in Southeast Asias modern history after the Khmer Rouge killing fields in Cambodia. A frenzy of anticommunist violence stained rivers with blood and littered the countryside with the bodies of teachers, farmers, and others. They used to dump the bodies here, recalled Surien, 70, a woman who lived near a bay used as an execution ground. People called it the beach of stinking corpses because of the smell. The CIA provided lists of thousands of leftists, including trade union members, intellectuals, and schoolteachers, many of whom were executed or sent to remote prisons.

Another 183,000 died due to killings, disappearances, hunger, and illness during Indonesias 1975-1999 occupation of East Timor, according to an East Timorese commission sanctioned by the UN. Similar abuses left more than 100,000 dead in West Papua, according to a local human rights group. About 15,000 others died during a 29year separatist rebellion in Aceh Province. In recent interviews around the city of Blitar, a former communist stronghold, survivors of the atrocities recounted a life on the run, living in caves, being beaten, and seeing beheadings of other captives. I am disappointed. I saw great cruelties and am lucky I am not dead, said Talam, whose simple two-room home overlooks a valley dotted with overgrown mass graves. Dragging on a clove-cigarette with trembling hands, he described how he was detained by police but escaped. He stumbled across dead bodies in shallow graves and slept in dank caves with hundreds of others, eating what the jungle had to offer for 50 days, until being picked up. Talam, a former member of a left-wing union for park rangers, said he was tortured and beaten repeatedly during interrogations while detained on remote Buru island, where about 12,000 political prisoners were held, 1,100 miles east of the capital, Jakarta. Why has no one been put on trial? he asked. In fact, the dark era remains largely unknown to many Indonesians. Those believed responsible still wield influence in politics and the courts. Details of the communist purge are banned from school books, and the military has blocked efforts by relatives to unearth mass graves. Near Blitar, a prominent monument and museum honors the crushing of the communist threat, and the Communist Party is still banned in Indonesia today. There is no official record of the shootings Talam said he witnessed by the Indonesian Army near Blitar, which lies 310 miles east of Jakarta. Though Suharto was swept from power in a 1998 prodemocracy uprising in this nation of 235 million people, no one has ever been tried for the bloodletting, in part because some of Suhartos former generals remain in power. One of the enduring legacies of Suhartos regime has been the culture of impunity, said Brad Adams, the head of Human Rights Watch Asia. Moreover, public interest in reviving a turbulent past is muted in the largely poor country, where people are more concerned with day-to-day survival, said Putmuinah, 80, a former communist city council member in Blitar. The ones who should be held accountable for those crimes are Suharto, his government and his regime, she said. Suharto ordered the elimination of communists and leftwing sympathizers. Putmuinah hid in a cave south of Blitar before being picked up and detained for 10 years. They robbed me of the opportunity to raise my seven children, she said. They beheaded many of us because we were members of the union for women, she added. I was spared torture because I knew the commander who arrested me.

PERISTIWA 13-15 MEI 1998, PUNCAK KEKERASAN ANTI TIONGHOA DI INDONESIA

(Disampaikan dalam Seminar Memperingati Tragedi Mei 1998 yang diselenggarakan ICAA di Los Angeles, 13 Mei 2006 dan ICA Net di San Francisco, 14 Mei 2006) Oleh : Benny G. Setiono Tanpa terasa tahun ini kita memperingati Tragedi Mei 1998 yang ke delapan kalinya. Namun sampai saat ini seperti kasus- kasus lainnya seperti Peristiwa G30S, Malari, Tanjung Priok, Talangsari, Marsinah, Udin, Trisakti, Semanggi, Kalimantan Barat, Ambon, Poso, Munir, dsb.nya tragedi ini masih diselimuti awan misterius. Memang ada beberapa kasus yang telah dibawa ke Pengadilan namun ternyata yang disidangkan hanya oknum-oknum yang dikorbankan tanpa mengungkap siapa yang menjadi otak atau dalang yang sesungguhnya. Tindakan anarkis dan kekerasan kali ini merupakan puncak dari berbagai kekerasan anti Tionghoa yang terjadi di Indonesia sejak zaman penjajahan Belanda sampai di masa Republik.Ribuan toko dan rumah tinggal milik orang-orang Tionghoa habis dijarah dan dibakar. Demikian juga ribuan kendaraan bermotor baik roda dua maupun roda empat hangus dan menjadi bangkai karena dibakar gerombolan anarkis. Demikian juga sejumlah shopping mall dan pertokoan antara lain Glodok Plaza, Supermarket Hero dan supermarket Tops, Yogya Department store, Supermall Karawaci dan City hotel berikut pusat pertokoan Glodok. Yang paling tragis adalah terjadinya perkosaan massal terhadap puluhan kalau tidak ratusan perempuan Tionghoa yang dilakukan secara brutal.Akibat aksi kekerasan ini ribuan warga Tionghoa yang merasa trauma dan ketakutan dengan berbagai jalan berusaha menyelamatkan diri dengan meninggalkan seluruh harta bendanya untuk mengungsi ke berbagai tempat yang dianggapnya aman antara lain ke Bali, Menado, Kalimantan Barat, Singapore, Malaysia, Hongkong, Australia, Eropa bahkan ke Amerika Serikat. Penyelamatan diri inilah yang dihembus- hembuskan oleh sebagian orang sebagai "eksodus" dan tindakan anasional. Padahal tindakan menyelamatkan diri adalah hak paling hakiki dari setiap machluk yang diciptakan Tuhan. Sementara itu ratusan rakyat kecil yang terdiri dari anak-anak, remaja dan ibu-ibu rumah tangga yang berhasil diprovokasi, menyerbu berbagai mall, antara lain Yogya Department Store di Klender dan Super Mall Karawaci. Mereka kemudian disuruh menjarah apa saja yang ditemukan.Namun apa yang terjadi? Pintu pertokoan tersebut kemudian dikunci dari luar dan dibakar oleh para provokator. Diperkirakan lebih dari seribu orang yang tewas akibat dibakar hidup-hidup tersebut. Jumlah seluruh kerugian diperkirakan paling sedikit Rp.2,5 triliun atau $US 238 juta. Tigabelas pasar, 2.479 ruko, 40 mall dengan 1.604 toko, 45 bengkel, 387 kantor, 9 SPBU, 8 bus dan kendaraan umum lainnya, 1.119 mobil, 821 sepeda motor dan 1.026 rumah tinggal habis dirusak, dijarah dan dibakar selama berlangsung aksi anarkis tersebut. [1][1] Yang sangat disesalkan adalah sikap pihak keamanan yaitu Kapolda Metro Jaya Mayjen Hamami Nata dan Pangdam Jaya Mayjen Sjafrie Sjamsuddin yang tidak berbuat suatu apapun untuk mencegah dan mengatasi aksi-aksi anarkis tersebut. Demikian juga Jenderal Wiranto sebagai Panglima ABRI hanya bersikap wait and see.

Peristiwa ini sangat memprihatinkan dan memalukan serta merusak citra seluruh bangsa Indonesia di dunia Internasional. Dengan adanya kemajuan teknologi di bidang komunikasi, seluruh kejadian dengan kasat mata dapat disaksikan secara langsung oleh jutaan pemirsa TV di seluruh dunia. Terjadi protes-protes dan demonstrasi di muka Kedutaan atau Perwakilan Republik Indonesia di berbagai negara, antara lain di Amerika Serikat, Kanada, Eropa, Australia, Hongkong, Taipei, dan Beijing. Untuk meredamnya Presiden B.J. Habibie membentuk Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF) di bawah pimpinan Marzuki Darusman, SH dari Komnas HAM. Namun seperti kasuskasus sebelumnya, hasil kerja TGPF ini yang berupa rekomendasi dan telah diserahkan kepada Jaksa Agung dan Menteri Dalam Negeri tidak pernah ditindak lanjuti dan hilang begitu saja bagaikan debu ditiup angin. Pada 6 Maret 2003, Komnas HAM telah membentuk tim Ad Hoc Penyelidikan Perisitiwa Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di bawah pimpinan Salahuddin Wahid, juga dari Komnas HAM yang telah menyelesaikan tugasnya dengan menyerahkan seluruh hasil penyelidikannya yaitu berupa rekomendasi dan Berita Acara (BAP) yang bersifat pro justicia kepada pihak penyidik yaitu Kejaksaan Agung. Rekomendasi Komnas HAM mengajukan nama Jenderal Wiranto dan Mayjen Sjafrie Sjamsyudin yang layak dicurigai untuk dimintai pertanggung-jawabannya. Namum hingga saat ini tidak ada kabar beritanya apakah hasil penyelidikan tersebut akan ditindak lanjuti sesuai dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 Tentang Pengadilan HAM atau mungkin akan dipetieskan saja. Apa sebenarnya yang menyebabkan timbulnya berbagai aksi kekerasan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa di Indonesia? Untuk menjawabnya baiklah kita buka lembaran sejarah kita. Hubungan Tionghoa dengan pribumi di masa sebelum kemerdekaan Sebelum kedatangan orang-orang kulit putih ke Nusantara, pendatang- pendatang dari Tiongkok hidup damai dengan penduduk setempat. Mereka hidup membaur dengan saling membawa budaya masing-masing. Orang Tionghoa hidup dengan berdagang, bertani dan menjadi tukang. Mereka tidak membawa istri dari Tiongkok karena memang ada larangan dari Kaisar membawa perempuan keluar dari daratan Tiongkok, disamping berbahayanya pelayaran di masa itu.[2][2] Mereka menikah dengan perempuan pribumi setempat atau membeli budak untuk dijadikan gundik, sehingga lahirlah keturunan campuran yang biasa disebut peranakan atau babah. Setelah Belanda (VOC ) dibawah pimpinan Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587- 1629) menguasai Jayakarta atau Sunda Kelapa yang lalu dirubah namanya menjadi Batavia, ia segera membangun koloninya tersebut dengan bantuan orang-orang Tionghoa dibawah pimpinan Souw Beng Kong yang dibujuk dan diberi janji-janji untuk pindah dari Banten. Coen segera menjalankan politik monopoli di segala bidang perdagangan dan melakukan blokade atas pelabuhan Banten. Sejak itu jung-jung dari Tiongkok dilarang merapat ke pelabuhan Banten. Sebaliknya Coen berusaha mendatangkan sebanyak mungkin tenaga dari daratan Tiongkok untuk dijadikan kuli, tukang dan pedagang eceran demi memajukan koloni dan perdagangannya. Pelaut Belanda tidak segan-segan merompaki jung-jung Tionghoa secara terang-terangan dan menahan awak kapalnya untuk kemudian dipaksa bekerja di Batavia. Pada masa itulah terjadi gelombang kedatangan orang Tionghoa secara besar-besaran ke tanah Jawa yang pada umumnya berasal dari provinsi Hokkian di bagian tenggara

Tiongkok, Jumlah orang Tionghoa naik dengan pesat, dari 3.101 orang pada 1682 menjadi 10.574 orang pada 1739.[3][3] Namun migrasi perempuan Tiongkok ke Asia Tenggara baru dimulai pertengahan abad ke-19 dan permulaan abad ke-20. Migrasi perempuan Tiongkok dimungkinkan bertalian dengan adanya fasilitas penggunaan kapal api dan murahnya tarif angkutan. Sejak itu migrasi orang-orang Tionghoa, baik laki-laki maupun perempuan meningkat dengan pesat.[4] [4] Pada permulaan abad ke-19 jumlah penduduk Tionghoa di Batavia saja hampir 100.000 orang, padahal seluruh penduduk pulau Jawa diperkirakan hanya 5 juta orang.[5][5] Akibat dibukanya kembali perdagangan Tiongkok dengan Asia Tenggara oleh Kaisar dari Dinasti Ch'ing dan berhasilnya pasukan Ch'ing mengamankan Selat Taiwan serta dimulainya liberalisasi di bidang ekonomi oleh pemerintah Hindia Belanda dengan diizinkannya pihak swasta membuka perkebunan dan pertambangan, telah mendorong mengalirnya para imigran dengan deras dari daratan Tiongkok, terutama dari provinsi Fujian/Hokkian dan Guangdong/Kwangtung. Dengan terjunnya pihak swasta di sektor perkebunan dan pertambangan dan semakin stabilnya keamanan, jumlah penduduk di Jawa meningkat dengan pesat. Demikian juga dengan imigran-imigran dari negara lain seperti dari Arab, India (Keling), Jepang dan terutama orang-orang Tionghoa dari bagian selatan Tiongkok membanjiri Hindia Belanda yang menjadi tanah harapan mereka. Jumlah kedatangan jung-jung dari Tiongkok meningkat pesat. Dari tiga atau empat buah menjadi lebih dari dua puluh buah dalam setahun. Belum lagi para imigran gelap yang diturunkan di kepulauan Seribu, di Teluk Jakarta atau di berbagai tempat di pesisir utara Pulau Jawa.[6][6] Menurut laporan Kolonial Verslag 1895, pada akhir 1893 di seluruh Hindia Belanda ada 443.945 orang Tionghoa, 290.448 orang di antaranya laki-laki. Di pulau Jawa saja terdapat 248.484 orang Tionghoa dan 235.222 orang di antaranya laki-laki.[7][7] Selanjutnya berdasarkan hasil sensus pada 1930 seperti dinyatakan dalam Volkstelling 1930, deel VII, Chineezen an andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch Indie terbitan Departement van Economische zaken, Batavia 1935, hal.88, data orang Tionghoa di Hindia Belanda adalah sebagai berikut: Laki-laki Perempuan Hokkian 309.253 245.728 Hakka 124.905 75.831 Teo Chew 63.423 24.389 Kongfu 97.740 38.390 Lain-lain 123.941 64.468 [8][8] Orang-orang Tionghoa ini hidup menyebar ke seluruh pulau Jawa, baik ke daerah pedalaman maupun di sepanjang pesisir utara. Tujuan utama mereka hanya mencari kehidupan baru dengan memasuki semua bidang perdagangan dan hidup damai dengan

penduduk setempat. Gubernur Jenderal Johan Van Hoorn (1653-1711) dalam masa jabatannya,1704-1709, mengungkapkan dalam uraian dan gambaran tentang wilayah Timur Laut pantai utara pulau Jawa (1700-1703), bahwa sejak 1683 jumlah orang Tionghoa yang terdapat di daerah tersebut tumbuh dengan pesat. Begitu mereka diizinkan untuk bermukim di wilayah kekuasaan kerajaan Mataram, mereka langsung membuktikan diri mereka sebagai orang-orang yang dapat bekerja keras. Bahkan di dalam pandangannnya, orang-orang Jawa yang baik hati telah menjadi lebih pandai dan rajin, sebagai akibat kontak-kontak yang sering mereka lakukan dengan para pendatang baru itu. Di sepanjang pesisir utara, tidak terdapat sebuah sungai, pelabuhan, teluk ataupun anak sungai yang masih dapat dipergunakan untuk pelayaran, di mana tidak terdapat sebuah pos bea cukai (gerbang tol) yang penjaganya pasti seorang Tionghoa. Sunan Amangkurat II, yang memerintah dari 1677-1703 menikmati penghasilan kira-kira 50.000 ronde realen- uang real yang bulat-bulat-dari pajak-pajak seperti itu. Disamping itu mereka pun diberi hak untuk membuka rumah judi, pelacuran dan kelak tempat menghisap candu oleh pemerintah Hindia Belanda. Karena perbuatan segelintir orang Tionghoa yang telah melakukan kolusi dengan para Sultan dan Pangeran Jawa dan penguasa Belanda inilah, mulai timbul rasa kurang senang orang-orang Jawa kepada orang Tionghoa dan menjadi benih sentimen-sentimen dan aksi- aksi kekerasan di kemudian hari.. Orang-orang Tionghoa tetap bermukim di perantauan sampai beberapa keturunan tanpa pernah kembali ke negeri asalnya. Mereka membaurkan diri baik dalam soal bahasa, makanan, pakaian maupun agama. Mereka masuk menjadi Islam dan menolak memakan daging **** dan memungut seluruh ada-istiadat penduduk asli. Banyak dari mereka yang memeluk agama Islam sebagai akibat peristiwa Pembantaian 1740 dan juga untuk menghindari pajak kepala yang khusus dikenakan kepada orang-orang Tionghoa. Karena jumlah orang Tionghoa yang memeluk Islam semakin banyak, maka VOC memisahkan mereka dari masyarakat Tionghoa yang bukan muslim dan menyerahkan pengurusan dan pengawasan mereka kepada seorang kapiten Tionghoa yang diangkat dari kalangan mereka sendiri. Tetapi jabatan mayor atau kapiten dalam masyarakat muslim Tionghoa di Batavia dihapuskan pada 1827,[9][9] setelah mereka menjadi sulit dibedakan lagi dari penduduk asli yang beragama Islam. Sejak itu istilah "peranakan" hanya digunakan bagi orang Tionghoa yang lahir di Jawa.[10][10] Banyak dari para imigran Tionghoa yang datang ke Indonesia pada abad ke 17 terutama orang-orang Hokkian sebagai pelarian, menghindari serbuan bangsa Manchu. Mereka datang ke Indonesia dengan tetap mempergunakan gaya rambut seperti pada zaman dinasti Ming. Namun pada masa-masa kemudian, para imigran Tionghoa yang datang dari Tiongkok telah menggunakan gaya rambut pada zaman dinasti Ch'ing, yaitu dengan mencukur bersih rambut di kepala, kecuali sisa di bagian belakang kepala yang dibiarkan tumbuh panjang dan dikepang (tauchang). Hal ini dikarenakan gaya rambut tersebut memang wajib digunakan di seluruh daratan Tiongkok, ketika dinasti Ch'ing telah berhasil menegakkan pengendalian sepenuhnya terhadap orang-orang Han. Timbulnya istilah "Cina kunciran" yang berkonotasi penghinaan, khusus merujuk kepada orang-orang Tionghoa pendatang baru. Hal ini berlawanan dengan golongan

peranakan yang telah berasimilasi sampai tingkat tertentu ke dalam masyarakat Jawa asli. Kemudian pejoratif sebutan Cina (berasal dari bahasa Belanda Ch'ina untuk Tiongkok) tersebut berlanjut dan berkembang terhadap seluruh etnis Tionghoa sehingga timbulnya gerakan kebangkitan dan berdirinya Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan pada 1900 dan Chung Hua Ming Kuo atau Republik Tiongkok pada 1911. Kata Chung Hua dalam dialek Hokkian adalah Tiong Hoa.[11][11] Pada saat berlangsungnya Perang Jawa (Perang Diponegoro) 1825-1830, gaya rambut orang Tionghoa ini kembali menjadi suatu masalah ketika Pangeran Diponegoro memerintahkan semua orang Tionghoa yang ingin bergabung menjadi muslim, harus disunat dan memotong kuncir mereka. [12][12] Pengaruh kebudayaan Tionghoa. Kebudayaan Tionghoa kemudian membaur dan beradaptasi dengan kebudayaan setempat baik bahasa,kesenian, tarian, pengobatan, cara berpakaian, kuliner dan sebagainya. Terdapat cukup banyak bukti yang dapat kita jumpai dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, seperti kesenian gambang kromong, cokek, topeng Betawi, Lenong atau di bidang kuliner seperti tahu, kecap, taoge, bakmi, bakso, bihun dan di bidang pakaian seperti kebaya encim, baju koko, oto, angkin dan sebagainya. Malahan naga, binatang legenda Tiongkok juga beradaptasimenjadi naga Jawa, bedanya naga Jawa memakai mahkota. Demikian juga mesjid-mesjid dan surau-surau di Indonesia pasti digantungi bedug seperti yang terdapat di klenteng-klenteng di Tiongkok. Bedanya bedug di Indonesia dipukul dengan tongkat seperti memukul tambur, sedangkan bedug dan genta di Tiongkok dipukul dengan mendorong sebatang kayu balok yang digantung di muka bedug tersebut. Bedug hanya dijumpai di mesjid-mesjid di Indonesia. Di negara-negara Arab dan Timur Tengah lainnya tak akan kita jumpai bedug-bedug yang digantung di samping mesjid.[13][13] Arsitektur mesjid-mesjid di Jawa sangat dipengaruhi kebudayaan Tiongkok yang bergaya pagoda dan beratap susun, berbeda dengan arsitektur mesjid-mesjid di Timur Tengah yang beratap dome (bulat) Contohnya mesjid semacam ini sampai saat ini dapat kita jumpai di sepanjang pesisir utara Pulau Jawa (pantura). Pendatang-pendatang Tionghoa juga mengajarkan cara menanam padi di sawah yang dibajak dan diairi yang hasilnya lebih maksimal dibandingkan menanam padi di huma yang dipelajari penduduk pribumi dari orang-orang India. Demikian juga mereka mengajarkan penduduk setempat cara berkebun tebu dan cara membuat gula. Mereka juga mengembangkan budi daya tanaman kacang tanah, kacang hijau, kacang kedelai, semangka dan nila atau tarum untuk dijadikan bahan pewarna. Sejak 1611 mereka mengembangkan penyulingan arak yang dibuat dari beras yang difermentasi, tetes tebu dan nira. Dari kacang hijau dan kedelai mereka menghasilkan taoge, tauco dan kecap. Mereka juga mengajarkan pembuatan bata dan genting sebagai pengganti batu dan rumbia untuk membangun rumah. Demikian juga mereka mengajarkan menjahit baju dan menyamak kulit untuk keperluan busana. Di bidang pengobatan, pengaruh kebudayaan Tionghoa sangat kental. Seperti kita ketahui, jamu yang sangat terkenal, yang menjadi pusaka peninggalan dari kraton-kraton Jawa sangat mirip dengan obatobatan Tionghoa. Jamu merupakan ramuan yang menggunakan bahan-bahan dari dedaunan, rempah-rempah dan akar-akaran. Cara penyajiannya dengan merebus daun-

daunan obat atau menumbuk dan menggilingnya, identik dengan obat-obatan Tionghoa yang telah berusia ribuan tahun. Pengobatan dengan jamu-jamuan ini hanya berasal dari Jawa dan Madura, tidak berasal dari kepulauan lain di Nusantara. Belum lagi permainan pencak silat, permainan judi dan kebiasaan membakar petasan atau mercon pada masa bulan Ramadhan dan menyambut Idul Fitri atau pada upacaraupacara perkawinan atau khitanan dan sebagainya, yang dilakukan umat Islam di pedesaan di pulau Jawa, jelas merupakan tradisi yang dipengaruhi tradisi Tionghoa yang membawa kebiasaan ini dari daratan Tiongkok, tempat asal petasan tersebut. Masih banyak lagi contoh-contoh pengaruh budaya Tionghoa dalam kehidupan kita sehari-hari yang tentunya tidak dapat kita tuliskan satu-persatu di makalah ini. Demikianlah sekilas keadaan masyarakat Tionghoa di masa sebelum kedatangan orangorang kulit putih dan di masa penjajahan Belanda baik di bawah VOC maupun di bawah pemerintahan Hindia-Belanda. Pembantaian 1740, aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa VOC Ketika orang-orang Belanda di bawah pimpinan Cornelis de Houtman pada 23 Juni 1596 berhasil mendarat di pelabuhan Banten, ternyata orang Portugis telah lama mempunyai kantor dagang di sana. Ketika tiba di Nusantara orang-orang Belanda dan kemudian Inggris menjumpai pemukiman-pemukiman Tionghoa di kebanyakan Bandar di Asia Tenggara seperti di Hoi An, Patani, Banten, Phnom Penh, dan Manila. Pada 1642 di Hoi An terdapat 45.000 orang Tionghoa dan pada 1600 di Banten ada 3.000 orang Tionghoa.[14][14] Terbukti dalam sejarah bahwa kedatangan Belanda ini mengubah peta poltik di seluruh Nusantara. Salah satu "jasa" Belanda adalah berusaha menyatukan seluruh wilayah Nusantara ke dalam genggamannya, yang pada ujungnya melahirkan gerakan kebangkitan nasional di kemudian hari. Dengan kedatangan Belanda, hubungan orang-orang Tionghoa yang begitu harmonis dengan penduduk setempat, berangsur-angsur mulai menjadi renggang. Belanda memandang hubungan harmonis antara etnis Tionghoa dan penduduk setempat sebagai "duri" dan suatu bahaya bagi niat mereka menguasai Nusantara. Belanda kemudian mulai menjalankan politik devide et impera atau pecah belah dan mengeluarkan berbagai kebijakan dan peraturan yang bertujuan memisahkan orangorang Tionghoa dari penduduk setempat. Antara lain dengan "mengekslusifkan" tempat tinggal mereka melalui "wijkenstelsel dan "passenstelsel". Demikian juga cara berpakaian orang-orang Tionghoa diatur oleh pihak penguasa kolonial. Ketika itu orang Tionghoa dilarang memakai pakaian model Eropa (Barat) atau memakai pakaian Jawa atau pribumi lainnya. Bagi yang melanggar diancam hukuman denda atau kurungan penjara. Kebijaksanaan memisahkan kelompok-kelompok ini menguatkan sikap acuh tak acuh di antara kelompok-kelompok, dan bagi Belanda lebih mudah untuk mengendalikan orang Tionghoa dari pakaiannya, tempat pemukimannya dan tandatanda yang mudah dikenali yang ada pada mereka. Sampai akhir abad ke-19 orang Tionghoa di Hindia Belanda dilarang memakai pakaian model Eropa, yaitu jas dan celana pantalon. Pasal 128 Regeeringreglement 1854 memerintahkan para gubernur jenderal mengatur sekolah untuk anak-anak negeri, namun tidak termasuk anak-anak Tionghoa, sehingga

mereka tidak dapat diterima baik di Europeesche School maupun Inlandsche School. Jadi bagi anak- anak Tionghoa tidak disediakan sekolah sama sekali. Sebaliknya segelintir orang-orang Tionghoa dijadikan alat pemerintah Hindia-Belanda untuk memeras rakyat dengan menjadikan mereka pachter pajak, pachter judi, pachter madat dan pachter gadai. Semua ini semakin menguatkan kesan buruk, kebencian dan sentimen anti Tionghoa sebagian orang Jawa terhadap orang Tionghoa. Pada 1854, pemerintah Hindia-Belanda melakukan politik segregasi dengan membagibagi penduduk menjadi tiga kelompok. Yang pertama kelompok orang Eropa termasuk ke dalamnya orang-orang Indo Eropa. Yang kedua kedua kelompok Vreemde Ooosterlingen atau Orang Timur Asing yang terdiri dari orang Tionghoa, Arab dan orang Asia lainnya. Yang ketiga kelompok inlander atau pribumi. Peraturan ini dimuat dalam Staatsblad No. 2, Jo.1 Pasal 131. Jo.61 Wet op de staats inrichting van NederlandschIndie atau Indische Staats regeling (IS) tahun 1855. Ketiga kelompok ini tunduk kepada sejumlah buku undang-undang yang berbeda dan diadili di pengadilan yang berbeda-beda pula. Tetapi khusus untuk masalah perdagangan, sejak awal VOC, bagi orang Tionghoa diberlakukan Hukum Dagang Belanda, sepanjang hukum itu masih dapat diterapkan. Selain dari masalah perdagangan terutama dalam masalah kriminal, status orang Tionghoa disamakan dengan golongan inlander dan perkaranya diadili di landraad atau politieroll. Dengan diberlakukannya undang-undang ini lengkap sudah politik pecah belah dan adu domba pemerintah Hindia-Belanda terhadap penduduk Nusantara terutama di Pulau Jawa. Aksi kekerasan pertama terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa di Nusantara adalah Peristiwa Pembunuhan Orang-orang Tionghoa (Chinezenmoord) 1740. Dalam aksi kekerasan yang berlangsung selama dua minggu tersebut, hampir 10.000 orang Tionghoa tewas, dibunuh secara kejam oleh tentara Belanda dengan dibantu orang-orang Eropa lainnya, para kelasi kapal, para gelandangan, orang-orang Sepoy (India), para tukang dan budak. Pembunuhan yang terjadi di masa pemerintahan Gubernur Jenderal Adriaan Valckenier ini bertujuan mengeliminasi orang-orang Tionghoa yang jumlahnya dianggap telah membahayakan posisi orang-orang Belanda. Demikian juga orang-orang Tionghoa ini dianggap telah mendominasi perdagangan dan perkebunan serta pabrik gula yang banyak berdiri di seputar Batavia. Pada 1740 terdapat 2.500 rumah orang Tionghoa di dalam tembok kota Batavia, sedangkan seluruh jumlah orang Tionghoa termasuk yang berada di luar tembok kota diperkirakan berjumlah tidak kurang dari 15.000 orang. Jumlah tersebut merupakan 17% dari seluruh jumlah penduduk di daerah tersebut. Ada kemungkinan jumlah orang Tionghoa sebenarnya jauh lebih besar, karena berdasarkan sensus yang diadakan pada 1778, sebesar 26% dari jumlah penduduk yang berada di luar tembok kota adalah orang-orang Tionghoa. Sedangkan pada masa pemerintahan Inggris (1811-1816) jumlah orang Tionghoa merupakan 24% dari seluruh jumlah penduduk yang berdiam di dalam dan di luar tembok kota. Namun suatu hal yang jelas sangat berbeda dengan apa yang terjadi dengan Peristiwa Mei 1998 adalah tindakan pihak VOC yang dengan segera mengambil tindakan dengan memecat dan kemudian menangkap Gubernur Jenderal Adriaan Valckenier di Capetown, Afrika Selatan dalam perjalanannya pulang ke Belanda. Ia kemudian dibawa

kembali ke Batavia dan dimasukkan ke penjara Robijn di benteng Batavia. Pemeriksaan Valckenier berlangsung berbelit-belit dan berkepanjangan sampai hampir sepuluh tahun lamanya. Akhirnya ia meninggal dunia pada 1751 dan pemeriksaan terhadap dirinya dihentikan. Massacre yang dipimpin VOC di Batavia terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa ini, merupakan lembaran hitam yang mencoreng muka pemerintah Belanda dan merupakan kejadian pertama dalam sejarah orang Tionghoa di perantauan. Namun ternyata pada 1762, pembunuhan terhadap orang Tionghoa perantauan terjadi kembali. Sekali ini, penguasa Spanyol di Manila membantai ribuan orang "sangley". Perlu diketahui sampai pertengahan abad ke-19, orang-orang Spanyol menyebut orang Tionghoa dengan sebutan sangley bukan "Cina", yang diduga berasal dari dari kata "sengli" yang dalam bahasa Hokkian berarti dagang. Mungkin karena kebanyakan perantau Tionghoa pada masa itu adalah pedagang- pedagang yang berasal dari provinsi Hokkian, untuk gampangnya orang- orang Spanyol menyebut orang orang Tionghoa sangley.[15][15] Baru-baru ini kita dikejutkan dengan berita bahwa pada 17 April 2006, aksi kekerasan meletup di Honiara, ibukota Kepulauan Salomon, sehari setelah anggota parlemen memilih Snyder Rini sebagai perdana menteri. Akibat kerusuhan tersebut sekitar 150 keluarga Tionghoa kehilangan rumah dan tempat usahanya karena dijarah dan dirusak/dibakar massa. Pemerintah RRT segera mengirim pesawat charter China Southern Airline dari Guangzhou untuk mengangkut 300 warganya kembali ke Tiongkok. Sebaliknya pemerintah Taiwan tidak berbuat apa-apa untuk membantu warga Tionghoa setempat yang menjadi korban aksi kekerasan tersebut, padahal Taiwanlah yang mendapat pengakuan diplomatic dari kepulauan Salomon. Aksi kekerasan tersebut terjadi karena warga setempat menuduh warga asal Tiongkok dan Taiwan menyuap anggota parlemen untuk mempengaruhi hasil pemilihan perdana menteri, namun warga Tiongkok maupun Taiwan menolak tuduhan tersebut.[16][16] Setelah peristiwa pembunuhan di Batavia sekelompok orang Tionghoa yang sakit hati dan dendam di bawah pimpinan Que Panjang atau Sie Panjang (Oei Panko) menuju Jawa Tengah dan bersekutu dengan sejumlah Pangeran Jawa untuk melakukan perlawanan terhadap VOC. Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa semasa Perang Jawa Pada 23 September 1825 yang merupakan masa awal Perang Jawa, sebuah pasukan berkuda di bawah pimpinan Raden Ayu Yudakusuma, puteri Sultan Hamengku Buwono I menyerbu Ngawi sebuah kota kecil di perbatasan Jawa Tengah - Jawa Timur yang terletak di tepi Bengawan Solo. Tanpa memperdulikan jerit dan tangisan perempuan dan anak-anak yang sangat memilukan, seluruh anggota masyarakat Tionghoa yang terdapat di Ngawi, habis dibantai. Tubuh-tubuh yang telah terpotong-potong dibiarkan bergelimpangan di muka pintu, di jalanan dan di rumah-rumah yang penuh lumuran darah. Pembantaian di Ngawi tersebut ternyata bukan satu-satunya kejadian pada masa permulaan Perang Jawa. Di seluruh Jawa Tengah dan di sepanjang Bengawan Solo, pembantaian orang-orang Tionghoa terjadi berulang-ulang. Apa yang menyebabkan pembantaian orang-orang Jawa Tengah terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa? Padahal mereka sebelumnya hidup damai dan rukun serta saling membantu dengan penduduk Jawa tempat mereka tinggal? Pemimpin pasukan yang melakukan

pembantaian di Ngawi, Raden Ayu Yudakusuma, istri Bupati Wieasari yang sering sakitsakitan, sebelumnya mempunyai hubungan yang baik dengan orang-orang Tionghoa Jawa Timur yang sering meminjaminya uang. Demikian juga banyak orang-orang peranakan Tionghoa, ikut berjuang bersama-sama pasukan Pangeran Diponegoro, terutama dalam menyediakan kebutuhan mereka akan uang perak, senjata, candu dan lain-lainnya. Malahan banyak orang Tionghoa yang ikut bertempur bahu-membahu melawan Belanda. Hubungan orang-orang Tionghoa dengan penduduk setempat di Jawa yang telah berjalan selama ratusan tahun, ternyata mengalami banyak perkembangan.Migrasi orang-orang Tionghoa yang mengalir dengan deras setelah Belanda membuka pintu demi kepentingan ekonomi kolonial yang sedang dibangunnya, memasuki segala bidang kehidupan di Jawa. Peranan orang-orang Tionghoa muslim yang semakin besar di sejumlah kesultanan Islam yang ikut dibentuknya, yang kemudian berkembang menjadi kerajaan Mataram, menimbulkan dampak semakin tergantungnya para raja dan pejabat lainnya kepada mereka. Terutama dalam pekerjaan memungut pajak untuk menjalankan roda pemerintahan dan memenuhi kebutuhan pribadinya. Orang-orang Tionghoa juga telah memberikan sumbangan yang besar dalam pengembangan ketrampilan dan teknologi militer. Pada 1636 ketika Pangeran Pekik dari Surabaya menaklukkan Giri, banyak laporan yang dibuat orang-orang Jawa bahwa raja pendeta dari Giri mendapat bantuan dari 200 orang Tionghoa penembak cepat yang dipimpin oleh seorang anak angkatnya, Tionghoa muslim bernama Endrasena. Orang-orang Tionghoa di Gresik yang telah berabad-abad bermukim di sana membangun pusat persenjataan dan memproduksi meriam kuningan berukuran besar dan panjang, kaliber 18 pon. Demikian juga senjata- senjata api dan mesiu. Ketika terjadi pemberontakan Pangeran Trunajaya dari Madura, ia dibantu oleh seorang komandan bangsa Tionghoa yang ahli senjata api. Pada masa itu para sultan, pangeran dan pejabat kesultanan banyak yang mengambil perempuan peranakan Tionghoa yang cantik-cantik dan berkulit putih bersih untuk dijadikan selirnya. Karena para sultan selalu kekurangan uang, maka mereka lalu meminjamnya dari para rentenir Tionghoa yang dengan senang hati akan selalu membantunya. Demikian juga tanah-tanah milik kesultanan banyak yang mereka sewakan kepada orang-orang Tionghoa yang dengan rajin akan mengolah sebaik-baiknya. Orang-orang Tionghoa juga dijadikan bandar-bandar pemungut pajak di jalan-jalan utama, jembatan, pelabuhan, pangkalan di sungai-sungai, pasar dan lain-lainnya. Orangorang Tionghoa ini berlomba-lomba melakukan penawaran untuk mendapatkan konsesi pemungutan pajak. Oleh karena semakin banyak yang ingin terjun di bidang yang dianggap basah ini, sudah tentu semakin mahal pula yang harus dibayarkan kepada para sultan tersebut. Malahan karena semakin ketatnya persaingan di antara mereka, kadangkadang mereka harus membayar sampai dua atau tiga kali lebih besar dari yang seharusnya mereka bayar. Akibatnya para Bandar ini mencari jalan untuk memungut pajak yang sebesar-besarnya dengan cara yang lebih kejam kepada penduduk, terutama para pedagang Tionghoa

sendiri yang kadang-kadang harus membayar sampai tiga kali lebih banyak dari yang harus dibayar orang Jawa. Sementara itu para Bandar pajak ini mendapatkan perlindungan hukum dari para Sultan atau pemerintah Hindia-Belanda, sehingga kedudukan mereka baru dapat diganti setelah ada persetujuan dari pihak kompeni. Demikian juga pemerintah Hindia-Belanda maupun Inggris yang melihat begitu efektifnya orang-orang Tionghoa dalam membantu para sultan Jawa dalam memungut pajak, melakukan hal yang sama di daerah-daerah yang telah dikuasainya. Malahan mereka juga menunjuk segelintir orang Tionghoa menjadi pachter candu dengan mengijinkan mereka membuka berbagai tempat pengisapan candu yang impornya dimonopoli mereka. Rumah-rumah judi yang pengelolaannya dilakukan oleh orang-orang Tionghoa, juga menjadi sumber penghasilan yang besar, bukan saja bagi pemerintah, tetapi juga bagi kantung para pejabat setempat. Demikian juga dengan rumah pelacuran (bordil) yang menyediakan perempuan-perempuan segar dan cantik untuk para pangeran dan pejabat kompeni Belanda. Hal ini tentu saja banyak menimbulkan ekses negatif yang berpotensi besar timbulnya konflik di antara penduduk Jawa dengan orang-orang Tionghoa, para bandar pemungut pajak tersebut. Menjelang Perang Jawa terjadilah penjarahan dan pembakaran gerbanggerbang tol tempat pemungutan pajak di berbagai tempat, yang dilakukan para bandit setempat, bahkan banyak petugas gerbang tersebut yang dibunuh. Sebagai akibatnya para penjaga gerbang tol itu mengorganisasi diri dengan membentuk pasukan pengawal yang terdiri dari orang-orang Jawa, untuk menjaga keselamatan mereka yang mengakibatkan makin meningkatnya sentimen politik terhadap orang Tionghoa. Dari sinilah mulai tumbuh "rasa benci" orang-orang Jawa,terutama orang-orang Jawa Tengah di pedalaman kepada orang-orang Tionghoa yang dianggapnya sebagai pemeras dan pembawa sial dan kesengsaraan. Padahal mereka hanya menjadi alat dari kekuasaan yang ada. Baik dari para sultan Jawa maupun dari pemerintah Belanda maupun Inggris. Banyaknya orang Tionghoa yang masuk Islam selain karena alasan praktis,menyesuaikan diri dengan masyarakat setempat dan mendekatkan diri dengan kultur Jawa, sebenarnya lebih banyak disebabkan pertimbangan ekonomi, yaitu untuk menghindari "pajak konde" dan pajak kepala yang dikenakan pemerintah Belanda kepada orang-orang Tionghoa. Dengan masuk Islam mereka terbebas dari pajak-pajak yang dirasa sangat memberatkannya. Pada awal Perang Jawa, orang Tionghoa banyak yang ingin bergabung dengan pasukan Pangeran Diponegoro, maka sang Pangeran mengeluarkan instruksi agar mereka masuk Islam terlebih dahulu dengan disunat dan memotong kuncirnya. Pembantaian terhadap orang Tionghoa pada awal Perang Jawa telah menimbulkan kekecewaan dan prasangka yang mendalam pada diri orang- orang Tionghoa terhadap orang Jawa. Sikap takut dan curiga orang- orang Tionghoa ini dibalas dengan sikap yang sama oleh orang-orang Jawa. Pangeran Diponegoro juga bersikap sama dengan melarang para komandannya melakukan hubungan yang akrab dengan orang-orang Tionghoa. Ia juga melarang mereka mengambil gadis-gadis peranakan Tionghoa menjadi gundiknya, karena ia berpendapat bahwa hubungan dengan gadis-gadis Tionghoa hanya akan membawa sial dan malapetaka. Sikap Diponegoro ini disebabkan oleh pengalamannya sendiri ketika menghadapi kekalahan pertempuran di Gowok, di luar Surakarta pada 15 Oktober 1826. Sesuai dengan apa yang ditulisnya sendiri di

dalam Babad Dipanegara, ia telah terjebak dan "dihancurkan" oleh kecantikan seorang gadis Tionghoa yang tertangkap di daerah Panjang dan kemudian dijadikan tukang pijitnya. Demikian juga ia menyalahkan kekalahan iparnya Sasradilaga, dalam pertempuran di pesisir utara, di daerah Lasem karena melanggar perintahnya dengan menggauli seorang perempuan Tionghoa di Lasem.[17][17] Kenyataan bahwa komandan-komandan pasukannya banyak yang menggauli gadisgadis Tionghoa sebagai hiburan dan penggunaan candu secara bebas di antara prajuritnya, telah menimbulkan anggapan Pangeran Diponegoro bahwa kalahnya dia dalam pertempuran dengan Belanda disebabkan orang-orang Tionghoa yang membawa sial dan malapetaka. Pandangannya yang keliru dan bersifat rasis inilah yang seolaholah menjadi "mitos" bahwa orang-orang Tionghoa hanya membawa sial, yang sampai sekarang masih dihembus-hembuskan oleh kalangan tertentu, dengan maksud memojokkan etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia.[18][18] Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa pemerintahan Hindia-Belanda Berdirinya Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) yang diprakarsai Tirto Adhi Soerjo pada awalnya sebenarnya bukan bertujuan untuk melawan pedagang Tionghoa yang dianggap pesaing utama para pedagang Islam.[19][19] SDI kemudian berubah menjadi Sarekat Islam (SI) dan berkembang dengan pesat sehingga anggotanya mencapai setengah juta orang. Dalam perkembangannya SI menjadi organisasi yang paling militan pada masa itu dalam berjuang melawan penjajah Belanda. Untuk mengalihkan konflik, pemerintah kolonial Belanda melakukan politik adu domba dan berusaha membenturkan kepentingan pedagang- pedagang Islam yang dipelopori para pedagang Arab dengan pedagang Tionghoa yang menjadi saingan utamanya. Persaingan antara pedagang batik dan rokok kretek Arab dengan pedagang-pedagang Tionghoa sengaja dihembus-hembuskan pemerintah kolonial Belanda dengan para penasehatnya dari Biro Umum Bumiputera. Terjadilah sejumlah bentrokan kecil antara kedua kelompok pedagang tersebut yang mencapai puncaknya pada Kamis malam 31 Oktober 1918 di kota Kudus yang terkenal dengan Peristiwa Peroesoehan di Koedoes. Pada malam itu semua rumah dan toko milik orang Tionghoa di kota Kudus habis dijarah dan dibakar oleh ribuan massa Sarekat Islam yang datang dari Mayong, Jepara, Pati, Demak dan daerah sekitarnya. Korban meninggal dunia ada 16 orang yang terdiri dari orang-orang Tionghoa dan para perusuh. Korban yang luka-luka mencapai ratusan orang yaitu kaum perusuh yang diserang polisi. Ada 3 mayat orang Tionghoa yang bertumpuk di kamar mandi, ada mayat yang sudah menjadi arang dan tertimbun puingpuing rumah yang habis terbakar. Ada mayat gadis yang masuk kedalam bak mandi namun karena rumahnya terbakar matang terebus. Ada 40 rumah/toko yang habis dijarah dan dibakar dan sebuah klenteng dirusak. Selain itu sejumlah pabrik rokok dan batik habis dijarah dan dirusak. Perisitiwa kerusuhan ini diawali dengan perkelahian antara sejumlah pemuda Tionghoa yang sedang melakukan prosesi arak-arakan gotong Toapekong dengan sejumlah pemuda SI. Prosesi ini di selenggarakan sebagai upaya menangkal wabah penyakit influenza yang menyerang kota Kudus dan telah meminta korban jiwa Karena wabah penyakit ini dikuatirkan akan meminta lebih banyak korban, masyarakat Tionghoa di Kudus yang masih percaya akan kebiasaan yang berbau tahayul lalu mengadakan upacara gotong Toapekong untuk menghentikan wabah tersebut. Namun ada

sekelompok haji yang menjadi pengusaha pabrik rokok kretek yang selama ini merasa dirugikan, karena kalah bersaing dengan para pengusaha Tionghoa. Mereka menggunakan kesempatan ini menghasut para pengurus dan anggota SI setempat dengan melakukan sejumlah provokasi. Ketika berlangsung prosesi, kelompok tersebut lalu mengganggu dan mengejek para peserta upacara itu. Ternyata para pemuda Tionghoa tersebut terpancing dan terjadi perkelahian yang kemudian berhasil dilerai. Namun pada keesokan malamnya terjadilah kerusuhan tersebut. Yang paling disesalkan masyarakat Tionghoa Kudus, pihak keamanan Belanda tidak segera menghentikan kerusuhan itu dan setelah jatuh banyak korban baru meminta bantuan polisi dari Semarang. Ratusan perusuh yang ditangkap, namun hanya 69 orang saja yang diajukan ke pengadilan. Pada 25 Pebruari 1919 dibacakan vonis hakim yang menjatuhkan hukuman terberat 15 tahun dan teringan 9 bulan, beberapa orang dinyatakan bebas karena terbukti tidak bersalah. Peristiwa kerusuhan di Kudus yang merupakan puncak dari berbagai kerusuhan kecil yang dimulai di Surabaya dan Solo pada 1912, adalah awal dari rangkaian kerusuhan rasial anti Tionghoa yang berlangsung selama abad ke-20. Peristiwa kerusuhan Kudus membuktikan keberhasilan pemerintah kolonial Belanda dalam mengadu domba etnis Tionghoa dengan golongan pribumi. Pembauran dan integrasi orang-orang Tionghoa dengan orang-orang Jawa yang selama ratusan tahun berjalan dengan harmonis berhasil dirusak Belanda dengan menjalankan politik segregasi di segala bidang, baik politik, ekonomi, hukum, dan kebudayaan. Namun terlepas dari semuanya, pemerintah kolonial Belanda dalam usahanya menegakkan "law and order" masih mau menyeret para pelaku dan dalangnya ke pengadilan. Masa sebelum Perang Dunia II biasa disebut zaman "normal" karena pemerintah HindiaBelanda dianggap berhasil menegakkan hukum dan menjaga kemanan sehingga penduduk merasa aman dari berbagai tindakan kejahatan (kriminal). Namun situasi ini berubah sepenuhnya pada saat tentara Jepang mendarat di Jawa. Tentara Belanda yang mengundurkan diri dari kota- kota besar mendobrak dan menjarah toko-toko P&D yang ditinggalkan pemiliknya untuk mengungsi. Perbuatan ini telah mendorong rakyat yang hidup serba kekurangan untuk meniru tindakan para anggota militer Belanda tersebut. Maka terjadilah berbagai aksi perampokan dan penjarahan toko-toko dan rumah-rumah orang Tionghoa yang ditinggalkan pemiliknya untuk mengungsi. Kerugian paling banyak dialami orang- orang Tionghoa di Jawa Barat dan Jawa Tengah. Ratusan pabrik milik orang Tionghoa dihancurkan pasukan Belanda yang sedang mengundurkan diri. Dari 130 pabrik gula yang berada di pulau Jawa pada 1940, hanya 32 yang selamat dari perusakan. Untuk mengantisipasi serangan pasukan Jepang, beberapa bulan sebelumnya, perusahaan-perusahaan Belanda telah memindahkan persediaan barangnya ke kota-kota kecil di pedalaman. Hal ini juga dilakukan pengusaha-pengusaha Tionghoa di Batavia. Di Jawa Barat kota- kota kecil seperti Cibadak, Sindanglaya, dan Bogor telah menjadi pilihan para pengusaha Tionghoa. Evakuasi mencapai puncaknya ketika pemerintah Hindia-Belanda memerintahkan agar para pengusaha Tionghoa menyingkir dari kotakota besar. Ternyata kebijaksanaan ini keliru, karena ketika pasukan Jepang mendarat di Jawa dan Sumatera, suasana menjadi chaos dan terjadi penggedoran dan penjarahan terhadap semua pabrik dan gudang milik Belanda dan Tionghoa oleh orang-orang Indonesia.

Aksi penjarahan tersebut hanya berlangsung beberapa hari karena berhasil diredam pasukan Jepang yang bertindak tegas terhadap para penjarah tersebut dan hukuman mati dijatuhkan kepada mereka yang terlibat dalam kerusuhan bersenjata. Kerugian yang diderita para pengusaha Tionghoa diperkirakan berjumlah 100 juta gulden. Tjung See Gan seorang importir dan grosir tekstil terbesar yang memindahkan stok barangnya ke Cibadak menderita kerugian 370.000 gulden. Demikian juga dengan Hioe Nyan Yoeng, pengusaha tekstil terkemuka lainnya menderita kerugian 280.000 gulden. Tan Hoan Kie, pemilik toko De Zon, department store terbesar yang memindahkan stok barangnya ke Sukabumi, mengalami nasib yang sama dengan kedua orang tersebut. Daerah Pintu Kecil, pusat perdagangan pengusaha Tionghoa dan grosir tekstil menderita kerugian terbesar, diperkirakan jumlah kerugian mencapai dua juta gulden. Demikian juga di daerah Jembatan Lima, sembilan dari sepuluh toko dijarah habis. Daerah Tanjung Priok juga mengalami nasib yang sama. Di daerah pedalaman, beras dijarah habis dari gudang-gudang penggilingan beras. Di daerah Krawang, 7080% pengusaha Tionghoa menjadi korban penjarahan.[20][20] Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Perang Kemerdekaan Pada 1 Maret 1945, Saiko Syikikan (Panglima Tertinggi Tentara Jepang ke-16 untuk Jawa dan Sematera) Letjen Kumakichi Harada mengumumkan pembentukan Dokoritu Zunbi Tyoosa Kai atau Badan Penyelidik Usaha- usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) yang susunan anggotanya diumumkan pada 29 April 1945 dibawah pimpinan Dr. KRT Radjiman Wedioningrat. Ternyata terdapat empat orang Tionghoa yang diangkat menjadi menjadi anggota yaitu: Liem Koen Hian, Oei Tjong Hauw, Oei Tiang Tjoei, dan Tan Eng Hoa. Mereka ini termasuk para founding fathers yang merancang konsitusi atau UUD 1945 sebagai persiapan dalam menghadapi proklamasi kemerdekaan.Kemudian pada 7 Agustus 1945 di Jakarta diumumkan terbentuknya Dokuritu Zunbi Inkai atau Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) yang dipimpin Ir.Soekarno sebagai ketua dan Drs. Moh. Hatta sebagai Wakil Ketua. Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing dipilih menjadi anggota mewakili etnis Tionghoa. Di dalam sidang PPKI pada 18 Agustus 1945, UUD 1945 disahkan dan Ir. Soekarno diangkat menjadi Presiden pertama RI dan Drs. Moh. Hatta sebagai wakil Presiden. Tentara Kerajaan Belanda kemudian berusaha kembali ke Indonesia dengan mendompleng tentara sekutu dan mendirikan pemerintahan NICA (Netherlandsch Indies Civil Administration) dibawah pimpinan Letnan Gubernur Jenderal Dr. H.J. van Mook. Setelah melalui berbagai perundingan yang menghasilkan berbagai perjanjian yang merugikan Republik antara lain Perjanjian Linggajati dan Perjanjian Renville, pada 20 Juli 1947 tengah malam, Belanda melancarkan agresi militer atau "aksi polisionil" yang pertama. Dimulailah periode revolusi bersenjata melawan Belanda dalam mempertahankan Republik dan mengusir penjajah Belanda untuk selamalamanya dari bumi Indonesia. Pasukan- pasukan Belanda bergerak dari Jakarta dan Bandung untuk menduduki Jawa Barat dan dari Surabaya untuk menduduki Madura dan ujung timur Jawa. Demikian juga daerah sekitar Semarang diamankan. Di Sumatera, perkebunan-perkebunan di sekitar Medan, tambang-tambang dan kilang minyak serta tambang batu bara di sekitar Palembang dan Padang diduduki. DI Jakarta pasukan Belanda menduduki kantor-kantor Republik Indonesia dan menangkap anggota-anggota delegasi yang sedang berunding dengan Belanda.

Pasukan Republik dalam keadaan bingung dan panik akibat aksi polisionil Belanda yang tiba-tiba segera bergerak mundur ke pedalaman dan melakukan taktik bumi hangus serta menghancurkan segala apa yang dapat dihancurkan. Namun dalam keadaan kacau dan tidak terkendali terjadi ekses terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa. Di berbagai tempat di Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, dan Jawa Timur terjadi perampokan, penjarahan dan pembakaran rumah-rumah, toko, bengkel, perusahaan, pabrik, dan berbagai harta benda milik orang Tionghoa. Malahan di beberapa tempat terjadi pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa yang tak berdosa dengan tuduhan menjadi agen atau mata-mata NICA. Di Medan terjadi gelombang pembunuhan, perampokan dan penjarahan yang dilakukan para gangster dan kriminal yang bekerja sama dengan oknum- oknum organsasi pemuda, malahan dengan oknum TKR. Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Jawa Barat terjadi pada 3 Juni 1946 jauh sebelum aksi polisionil yang pertama. Terjadi pembunuhan besar- besaran terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa yang berdiam di daerah sebelah barat sungai Tangerang (Cisedane).Ratusan orang Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa dibantai dengan kejam, mayatnya ditumpuk dan hartanya dijarah lalu rumahnya dibakar. The New York Times edisi 6 Juni 1946 melaporkan 600 orang Tionghoa yang dituduh bekerja sama dengan Belanda dibunuh dan desanya dibakar. Pembunuhan massal tersebut belum berhenti sampai pada 8 Juni.[21][21] Pada 3 Juni 1946, di desa Panggang (Cilongok), Lim Tjiaw Hie yang telah berusia 71 tahun, Lim Tjoen Nio seorang gadis berusia 20 tahun dan Lim Tiang Tjeng seorang anak berusia 3 tahun dibakar hidup-hidup. Menurut laporan, sejak tanggal 1 sampai 5 Juni terjadi 28 kasus pembakaran di sekitar Tangerang dimana orang-orang Tionghoa dibakar hidup-hidup. Dengan cepat aksi pembunuhan di Tangerang menyebar ke berbagai tempat. Antara lain kawasan Mauk, Serpong dan Krawang. Di daerah Mauk malah laki-laki Tionghoa diminta membuka celananya untuk kemudian disunat secara paksa. Demikian juga perempuan Tionghoa banyak yang diperkosa secara brutal.[22][22] Dalam keadaan stress, orang-orang Tionghoa mengamati dan mencatat dengan cermat seluruh kejadian yang menakutkan, termasuk perempuan dan anak-anak yang dibakar hidup-hidup. Menurut laporan yang diterima Palang Merah Jang Seng Ie Jakarta, 653 orang Tionghoa telah dibunuh di daerah Tangerang dan sekitarnya, termasuk 136 perempuan dan 36 anak-anak. 1.268 rumah dibakar habis dan 236 lainnya dirusak. Diperkirakan ada 25.000 orang pengungsi di Jakarta yang datang dari daerah tersebut. Sebagian ada yang ditampung di gedung perkumpulan Sin Ming Hui, di Molenvliet West (Jl. Gajah Mada No.188). Peristiwa keji tersebut menimbulkan kegeraman di kalangan banyak orang. Masyarakat Tionghoa lalu mengumumkan 11 Juni 1946 sebagai hari Duka Cita.Pada hari itu seluruh orang Tionghoa menyatakan ikut berkabung dengan menutup semua toko dan perusahaan miliknya dan sepanjang hari hanya berdiam di rumah.[23][23] Di Bagan Siapi-api lain lagi. Di kota yang terletak di pantai timur Sumatera yang penduduknya hampir seluruhnya nelayan Tionghoa, pada September 1946 diserang

orang-orang Indonesia. Sebelum penyerangan tersebut, para nelayan sering diganggu para perompak yang mendapat bantuan anggota Angkatan Laut Republik. Pada 18 September 1946, sekitar 4.000 orang anggota pasukan Angkatan Laut Republik, dibantu 450 orang tentara menyerbu pemukiman Tionghoa di Bagan Siapi-api. Polisi juga dengan cepat mengambil bagian dalam serangan tersebut. Menghadapi serangan yang tiba-tiba, 200 orang Tionghoa meninggal dunia, namun mereka yang selamat melakukan perlawanan dengan menggunakan senjata seadanya. Karena serangan tersebut gagal, mereka berusaha mengisolasi kota Bagan Siapi-api sehingga sekitar 14.000 penduduk Tionghoa menghadapi bahaya kelaparan. Tetapi banyak juga yang berhasil melarikan diri dan menurut Departemen Sosial Inggris, tidak kurang dari 2.000 orang menjadi pengungsi di Malaka. Menghadapi perlawanan tersebut, pihak penyerbu terpaksa mengundurkan diri ke pedalaman sambil melakukan pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa yang ditemuinya. Di Bangko 20 orang Tionghoa dibunuh, di Mentaga 40 orang, Di Telok Poelau 34 orang, di Djembra 75 orang. Selanjutnya pada Januari 1947, di Palembang 250 orang Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa dibunuh dan kerugian yang diderita diperkirakan 20 juta gulden.[24][24] Selanjutnya untuk memberi gambaran yang lebih jelas mengenai para korban selama terjadi penjarahan, perampokan, perkosaan dan pembunuhan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa sebagai ekses aksi polisionil pada Juli 1947 bisa dilihat laporan yang dikeluarkan Chung Hua Tsung Hui Batavia pada 15 September 1947 untuk Liga Bangsa- Bangsa, yaitu Memorandum, Outlining Acts And Inhumanity Perpetrated By Indonesian Bands, On Innocent Chinese Before And After The Dutch Police Action Was Enforced On July, 21, 1947. Dalam Memorandum tersebut dengan jelas dan rinci dilaporkan jumlah korban sebagai akibat penjarahan, pembakaran, pembunuhan dan perkosaan terhadap penduduk Tionghoa di daerah-daerah dan kota sebagai berikut: 1. Krawang dan Cikampek. 2. Sukabumi dan Cibadak. 3. Ceracas dan Cilimus. 4. Jatitujuh. 5. Majalengka. 6. Cikijing, Talaga dan sekitarnya. 7. Maja. 8. Rajagaluh. 9. Prapatan. 10. Indramayu. 11. Kuningan. 12. Ciawigebang dan daerah sekitarnya. 13. Kadipaten, Jatiwangi, Jamblang dan Arjawinangun. 14. Jalaksana. 15. Pekalongan. 16. Tegal. 17. Purwokerto. 18. Sukateja. 19. Wangon. 20. Purbalingga. 21. Bobotsari. 22. Cilacap. 23. Gombong. 24. Karanganyar. 25. Salatiga. 26. Lumajang. 27. Jember. 28. Ambulu, Keselir Kulon, Tanjong Rejo dan Wuluhan. 29. Manglis dan Panti. 30. Kencong, Dembulsari, Gumukmas, dan Puger. 31. Jangawah, Kemuning, Gajasan, Mengaran dan Jatiroto. 32. Mjang, Simpalan, Tempuran, dan Mumbusari. 33. Kalisat, Ledokombo, Sukowono, Sumberjambe. 34. Rambipuji, Nogosari, Rawatamtu, Picoro, Gugut, Kaliwining, Curamalang, dan Rambogudono. 35. Tanggul, Bangsalsarie, Petung, dan Sekar. 36. Wirolegi dan Aryoso. 37. Malang. 38. Kutobeda dan Buring. 39. Singosari. 40. Lawang. Pembakaran,penjarahan,pemerkosaan dan pembunuhan terus berlangsung di berbagai daerah di Jawa dan Sumatera hingga akhir 1949. Kejadian yang hebat terjadi di kawasan Jawa Timur, terutama sejak para tahanan penjara Kalisosok, Surabaya dilepaskan dan dipersenjatai serta direkrut ke dalam sejumlah satuan pasukan. Mereka ini dipersilahkan melakukan apa saja asal membantu pengosongan kota guna mendukung politik bumi hangus yang dipilih pihak Republik. Beberapa daerah di mana

mayoritas Tionghoa jadi korban aksi penjarahan dan pembunuhan ini antara lain adalah daerah Kertosono, Nganjuk, Caruban, Madiun, Blitar, Tulungagung, Kediri, Wlingi dan Malang. Kebanyakan pembunuhan dilakukan dengan cara menggiring semua orang Tionghoa keluar kota dengan mengatakan bahwa kota harus dikosongkan. Orang Tionghoa yang mengungsi biasa membawa semua anggota keluarga berikut harta bendanya. Begitu sampai di luar kota, rombongan dipisahkan antara laki-laki dengan perempuan dan anak-anak. Laki-laki dewasa dibagi dalam kelompok-kelompok lalu digiring ke hutanhutan dan pegunungan. Mereka lalu diminta membuat lubang yang kemudian ditumpuki kayu. Keesokan harinya orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut diminta berkumpul di dalam lubang tersebut untuk kemudian ditembaki. Harta mereka yang kebanyakan emas dan permata yang dijahit diujung baju diambili. Semua yang diperoleh lalu dikumpulkan dan dibagi di antara para pembunuh. Mayat-mayat yang berserakan kemudian ditimbun dengan tanah.[25][25] Demikianlah rangkaian penjarahan,pembakaran,penganiayaan,perkosaan dan pembunuhan yang dialami orang-orang Tionghoa sebagai ekses revolusi kemerdekaan tahun 1946-1949. Memang revolusi memerlukan pengorbanan, tetapi apa yang diderita etnis Tionghoa bukanlah pengorbanan tetapi kekonyolan yang sia-sia. Kalau kita perhatikan dengan seksama, tampak dengan jelas bahwa Belanda melakukan politik adu domba dengan mengorbankan orang-orang Tionghoa. Karena dalam setiap gerakan pasukan Belanda, apabila akan memasuki suatu daerah atau kota, sebelum tiba di sasaran mereka akan menghentikan gerakannya dan beristirahat terlebih dahulu, memberikan kesempatan kepada laskar-laskar dan gerombolan-gerombolan liar untuk menjarah dan membakar toko-toko dan rumah-rumah orang-orang Tionghoa, bahkan menyiksa dan membunuhnya. Malahan di Sukabumi pasukan Belanda melakukan pemberitahuan terlebih dahulu dengan menyebarkan pamflet. Tindakan penjarahan dan pembakaran ini bukan saja usaha Belanda untuk mengadu domba pribumi Indonesia dengan orang Tionghoa, tetapi lebih dari itu merupakan suatu grand strategi Belanda untuk menghancurkan reputasi Republik Indonesia di mata Internasional. Dengan segera Belanda menyiarkan seluruh kejadian yang menimpa orang Tionghoa dengan tujuan memojokkan Republik yang dianggap barbar dan belum layak untuk merdeka. Sungguh sangat disayangkan para pemimpin Republik kurang waspada dan secara naf memakan umpan yang disodorkan Belanda sehingga terjadi tindakan yang sangat merugikan reputasi Indonesia di mata dunia dan menyebabkan etnis Tionghoa harus menanggung semua penderitaannya. Sebenarnya sebelum kedatangan pasukan Belanda, orang Tionghoa yang berdiam di daerah Republik tidak mengalami gangguan, walaupun penangkapan terhadap orangorang yang dicurigai sebagai mata-mata berlangsung dari waktu ke waktu. Baru ketika menghadapi kedatangan pasukan Belanda, penjarahan dan pembakaran dilakukan oleh pasukan Indonesia. Hal ini sebagai ekses taktik bumi hangus yang dijalankan oleh TRI yang dipelopori Divisi Siliwangi. Seharusnya hanya bangunan- bangunan vital saja yang harus dihancurkan, namun dalam pelaksanaannya terjadi banyak ekses dan penyelewengan yang dilakukan oknum-oknum TRI yang diikuti laskar-laskar liar yang sukar dikendalikan. Justeru bangunan-bangunan pabrik, toko dan rumah milik orang Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa yang menjadi sasaran penjarahan dan pembakaran.

Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Demokrasi Parlementer (1950- 1959) dan Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965). Pada 17 Agustus 1950, saat memperingati hari ulang tahun Proklamasi Kemerdekaan, Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) sebagai hasil Konferensi Meja Bundar (KMB) yang berlangsung 23 Agustus-2 Nopember di Den Haag dibubarkan dan dideklarasikan berdirinya Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) dengan Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara (UUDS) yang selesai disusun pada 24 Juli. UUDS ini berlaku sampai dilaksanakannnya pemilihan umum yang akan menyusun UUD baru. UUDS 1950 disusun oleh Panitia Bersama yang terdiri dari 14 orang dan dibentuk oleh Badan Pekerja KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) dan Pimpinan DPR-RIS. Salah seorang anggotanya adalah Siauw Giok Tjhan. Ternyata UUDS ini berhasil mengakomodasi seluruh jiwa Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 yang sangat esensial. Antara lain Pancasila dimasukkan kembali ke dalam Mukadimah UUDS tersebut. Pasal 33 UUD-1945 yang dihapus oleh UUD-RIS, dihidupkan kembali dalam Pasal 38 UUDS. Hak-hak asasi manusia yang dalam UUD-1945 tidak dinyatakan secara jelas, dalam UUDS dicantumkan dengan mengambil oper seluruh Universal Declaration of Human Rights PBB yang telah disahkan oleh Sidang Umum PBB pada 10 Desember 1948. Bentuk negara adalah negara kesatuan menggantikan negara federal UUD-RIS. Juga dinyatakan dalam UUDS bahwa sistim pemerintahan (kabinet) adalah parlementer yang tidak bertanggung jawab kepada presiden melainkan kepada parlemen. Sehingga sebenarnya kekuasaan tidak berada di tangan Presiden Soekarno. Suatu hal yang sangat penting adalah dihapusnya Pasal 6 ayat 1 UUD-45 (pasal yang sangat rasialis) yang menyatakan presiden Indonesia adalah orang Indonesia asli. Ketentuan ini tidak disinggung sedikit pun dalam UUDS. Syukur dalam amandemen UUD-1945 ke-3 yang dilakukan MPR pada 21 Nopember 2001, pasal ini juga telah dirubah menjadi presiden dan wakil presiden adalah orang Indonesia sejak kelahirannya dan tidak pernah menerima kewarganegaraan lain atas kehendaknya sendiri. Selama berlakunya UUDS-1950 sampai dikeluarkannya Dekrit 5 Juli 1959 untuk kembali ke UUD-1945 oleh Presiden Soekarno, nyaris tidak terjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa yang berarti. Yang terjadi adalah aksi-aksi kekacauan yang dilakukan gerombolan DI/TII Kartosuwiryo di Jawa BaratJawa Tengah, Kahar Muzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan dan Daud Beureu'eh di Aceh. Disamping itu juga terjadi pemberontakan Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) di bawah pimpinan Dr. Soumoukil. Kartosuwiryo akhirnya berhasil tertangkap dalam sebuah operasi militer di hutan di Jawa Barat dan pada sidang Mahkamah Angkatan Darat Keadaan Perang untuk Jawa dan Madura (Mahadper) pada 16 Agustus 1962 dijatuhi hukuman mati. Demikian juga dengan Dr. Soumoukil yang berhasi ditangkap dan kemudian dijatuhi hukuman mati oleh Sidang Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Mahmilub). Sementara Kahar Muzakkar tertembak mati dalam sebuah operasi militer di hutan Sulawesi Selatan. Kekacauan lain adalah pemberontakan PRRI/PERMESTA yang dimulai pada 15 Pebruari 1958 dengan diprokamirkannya Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) oleh Kolonel Ahmad Husein. Sebelumnya pada 2 Maret 1957 Saleh Sahade membacakan piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (PERMESTA). Pada 17 Pebruari 1958 PERMESTA menggabungkan diri dengan PRRI. Pemberontakan tersebut hanya bertahan beberapa bulan. Pada pertengahan 1958 praktis pemberontakan tersebut berhasil dipatahkan walaupun seluruh kekuatan para pemberontak baru berhasil dihancurkan pada 1961.

Karena keterlibatan Taiwan dalam pemberontakan PRRI/PERMESTA, pada Agustus 1958, kegiatan Kuomintang dilarang di seluruh Indonesia. Seluruh pimpinannya ditangkap atau melarikan diri ke luar negeri. Semua sekolah Kuomintang di seluruh Indonesia ditutup dan gedungnya dijadikan sekolah negeri. Demikian juga seluruh perusahaan milik orang-orang Kuomintang diambil alih militer. Presiden Soekarno secara de fakto baru benar-benar memegang kekuasaan sejak 5 Juli 1959 dengan membentuk kabinet gotong royong dan menerapkan doktrin Demokrasi Terpimpin. Tanpa terduga sebelumnya, Presiden Soekarno pada November 1959 dengan tiba-tiba menandatangani Peraturan Pemerintah N0.10 atau yang lebih terkenal dengan sebutan PP-10.Peraturan ini berisi larangan bagi orang-orang asing (terutama ditujukan kepada orang-orang Tionghoa) untuk berdagang eceran di daerah-daerah pedalaman, yaitu di luar ibukota daerah swatantra tingkat I dan tingkat II yang berlaku sejak 1 Januari 1960. Sudah tentu peraturan yang rasialis ini sangat mengejutkan dan menggoncangkan sendisendi kehidupan orang Tionghoa di Indonesia, karena pada masa itu Undang-Undang Kewarganegaraan Tahun 1958 belum dilaksanakan, sehingga terjadi kesimpang siuran dalam menentukan yang mana asing dan mana WNI. Para penguasa militer di daerahdaerah dengan seenaknya mengusir bukan saja orang-orang Tionghoa asing tetapi juga orang-orang Tionghoa yang berdasarkan UU Kewarganegaraan tahun 1946 telah menjadi warga negara Indonesia. Sebenarnya PP-10 ini merupakan kelanjutan dari Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Kabinet Djuanda yang dijabat Rachmat Moeljomiseno, seorang tokoh NU yang pernah aktif di KENSI. Peraturan tersebut dikeluarkan pada Mei 1959, berisi larangan bagi orang asing untuk tinggal dan berdagang di daerah pedalaman. Ketika peraturan ini diterbitkan, Siauw Giok Tjhan segera menentangnya di DPR. Ia menyatakan bahwa peraturan semacam ini tidak bisa dikeluarkan oleh seorang menteri, melainkan harus merupakan sebuah undang-undang yang disahkan DPR. Siauw Giok Tjhan menyatakan bahwa orang-orang Tionghoa mempunyai usaha yang legal di daerah- daerah pedalaman yang otomatis mendapatkan perlindungan hukum internasional yang harus dipatuhi pemerintah Indonesia. Ia juga memperingatkan kalau sampai orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut diusir dari tempat kediaman dan usahanya di daerah pedalaman, akan menimbulkan kemunduran ekonomi Indonesia. Keahlian dan pengalaman yang dimiliki orang-orang Tionghoa yang telah beberapa generasi lamanya akan merusak dan melumpuhkan jaringan distribusi di daerah pedalaman. Rupanya peraturan ini sengaja dikeluarkan pada saat Presiden Soekarno sedang berada di luar negeri. Ketika kembali dari lawatannya ke luar negeri dan mengetahui adanya peraturan tersebut, Presiden Soekarno sangat marah kepada Rachmat Moeljomiseno, sehingga dalam kabinet yang dibentuk setelah 5 Juli 1959 ia tidak diikut-sertakan. Apa yang sesungguhnya menjadi alasan sehingga Presiden Soekarno akhirnya menandatangani peraturan tersebut tetap menjadi tanda tanya dan kontroversi. Ada yang berpendapat bahwa Presiden Soekarno mendapat tekanan dari militer dan partai-partai Islam. Pada umumnya perdagangan eceran di daerah pedalaman didominasi para pedagang Tionghoa yang telah mempunyai pengalaman dan jaringan beberapa generasi. Sudah tentu hal ini sangat merugikan para pedagang Islam yang baru bermunculan. Para

pedagang Islam yang pada umumnya berkiblat ke NU dan Masjumi merasa sulit bersaing dengan pedagang Tionghoa. Dengan dikeluarkannya peraturan tersebut mereka merasa diuntungkan. Orang Tionghoa dianggap semuanya berstatus dwikewarganegaraan atau asing, sehingga oleh pihak militer mereka dipaksa meninggalkan tempat kediamannya. Bukan hanya para pedagang tetapi yang tidak berdagang pun diusir. Tindakan paling buruk dilakukan pihak militer di Jawa Barat dibawah pimpinan Kolonel Kosasih. Berbagai insiden menyedihkan terjadi, seperti di Cimahi pada Juli 1960, seorang perempuan Tionghoa mati tertembak karena ia bersama keluarganya mencoba bertahan dan tidak mau meninggalkan tempat kediamannya. Pelaksanaan PP-10 ini menimbulkan ketegangan hubungan diplomatik RI- RRT. Melalui Duta Besar Huang Chen dan Radio Peking, pemerintah RRT menyampaikan protes-protesnya dan menyatakan kesediaannya menampung korban PP-10 dengan mengirimkan beberapa kapalnya dan mengangkut mereka untuk ditempatkan di berbagai tempat di Tiongkok. Pada saat itu timbul keguncangan dan demam repatriasi di kalangan masyarakat Tionghoa. Pada awalnya bukan hanya mereka yang menjadi korban PP-10, tetapi banyak juga pemuda dan pelajar Tionghoa yang menyambut dengan gembira dan dengan penuh semangat berbekal keranjang-keranjang rotan dan peti-peti besar berisi berbagai macam keperluan, berbondong- bondong berangkat ke tanah harapan. Ada juga orang-orang Tionghoa yang memilih pindah ke Singapore, Serawak, Eropa, Amerika, Brasil dan negara-negara lainnya untuk mencari kehidupan baru di sana. Pada masa itu lebih dari 136.000 orang Tionghoa yang meninggalkan Indonesia untuk bermukim kembali di Tiongkok. Tetapi kondisi dan sistim masyarakat di tempat baru serta kebiasaan di tempat lama di Indonesia, ditambah lagi dengan kendala bahasa ternyata menimbulkan banyak kesengsaraan. Merasa tidak betah, akhirnya mereka berusaha ke luar dari daratan Tiongkok untuk dapat bermukim di Hongkong, Macau dan negara lainnya. Berbagai cerita yang penuh penderitaan di daratan Tiongkok menyebabkan menurunnya minat orang-orang Tionghoa untuk kembali ke Tiongkok, sehingga pada akhir 1960-an, gelombang tersebut surut sama sekali. Satu-satunya aksi kekerasan anarkis yang terjadi dimasa Demokrasi Terpimpin adalah peristiwa rasialis 10 Mei 1963 di Jawa Barat. Peristiwa ini meminta korban harta benda orang Tionghoa yang cukup besar. Peristiwa ini diawali di Cirebon pada akhir Maret 1963. Terjadi perkelahian di Pengadilan Negeri Cirebon antara pemuda-pemuda Tionghoa dengan pemuda-pemuda pribumi. Hal ini terjadi karena Pengadilan menjatuhkan vonis bebas kepada putera Dr. Murad (seorang aktivis PSI) yang menjadi tertuduh dalam kecelakaan lalu lintas di jalan raya Gronggong, di pinggiran Cirebon. Dalam kecelakaan tersebut putera Dr. Murad menabrak seorang pemuda Tionghoa yang kemudian meninggal dunia. Rupanya vonis hakim yang membebaskan tertuduh tidak memuaskan keluarga korban dan teman-temannya, lalu terjadi terjadi perkelahian di halaman pengadilan antara pemuda-pemuda tersebut dengan sekelompok pemuda pribumi. Pada saat pulang dari pengadilan para pemuda pribumi mulai melakukan perusakan terhadap toko-toko milik Tionghoa dengan cara melemparinya dengan batu. Sebuah mobil di muka toko Medan,

di jalan Pasuketan dibakar massa menyebabkan terjadi kepanikan di kalangan masyarakat Tionghoa Cirebon. Namun kejadian tersebut dapat segera diatasi dan tidak berlanjut, hanya saja pada 5-6 Mei sempat menjalar ke Tegal. Tetapi anehnya baru pada 10 Mei 1963, aksi kerusuhan anti Tionghoa tersebut menjalar ke Bandung. Kerusuhan tersebut diawali dengan perkelahian di kampus ITB antara seorang mahasiswa Tionghoa dengan seorang mahasiswa pribumi karena terjadi senggolan sepeda motor. Kemudian dipelopori mahasiswa ITB dan mahasiswa Universitas Padjadjaran, dimulailah aksi perusakan toko-toko, rumah tinggal dan kendaraan milik orang Tionghoa di Bandung. Kerusuhan dimulai dari daerah Tegallega. Ratusan toko, rumah tinggal dan kendaraan milik Tionghoa menjadi korban perusakan para pemuda anarkis. Malahan kabarnya terdapat korban jiwa dalam aksi kerusuhan itu. Ironis sekali salah seorang yang menjadi korban adalah Drs. Yap Tjwan Bing, mantan anggota PPKI yang turut mengesahkan UUD 1945, anggota DPR-RI fraksi PNI, anggota Dewan Pimpinan Pusat PNI, anggota Dewan Kurator ITB dan anggota Panitia Ujian Fakultas Farmasi Universitas Padjadjaran. Sebuah mobil baru milik Yap Tjwan Bing habis dibakar massa pemuda, demikian juga bungalownya di Lembang di rusak. Kejadian inilah yang menyebabkan Yap Tjwan Bing dan keluarganya meninggalkan Indonesia untuk menetap di Belanda dan kemudian pindah ke Amerika Serikat, karena istrinya menjadi trauma dan kuatir apabila kejadian serupa terulang kembali, rumahnya yang terletak di jalan Cipaganti 32 akan menjadi sasaran. Padahal salah seorang anaknya menderita lumpuh akibat terkena penyakit polio.[26][26] Dari Bandung aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa menjalar ke kota-kota sekelilingnya antara lain Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Bogor, dan Sukabumi. Yang terparah disamping Bandung adalah Cianjur dan Sukabumi. Peristiwa di Tegal telah menimbulkan kerugian materiil sebesar 650 juta, sedangkan Peristiwa 10 Mei di Bandung telah mengakibatkan kerugian pada 500 buah toko, ratusan rumah tinggal, 63 mobil habis dibakar dan puluhan kendaraan lainnya dirusak. Di Sukabumi 98 kendaraan bermotor habis dibakar, terdiri dari 52 truk, 20 oplet, 12 sedan, 7 bus, 4 jeep, 1 pick-up dan 2 sepeda motor. Di samping itu 2 becak dibakar para pengemudinya. Kerusakan lainnya 4 pabrik di bakar (1 pabrik kertas, 1 pabrik tenun, 1 pabrik aci atau tapioka dan I pabrik teh). Selanjutnya 40 toko bersama isinya habis dijarah dan dibakar, 16 rumah tinggal hancur dilempari massa anarkis.Kerugian lainnya 120 ton aci habis dibakar. Di Cianjur 137 kendaraan bermotor habis dibakar, terdiri dari 28 truk, 57 oplet, 30 sedan, 3 bus, 4 mobil tangki minyak, 4 pick-up dan 11 sepeda motor. Kendaraan lainnya yang menjadi korban, 35 becak dan 167 sepeda hangus dibakar.Jumlah toko yang dirusak 316 sedangkan barang-barang isi toko tersebut habis dibakar. Disamping itu 114 rumah dan 2 gedung bioskop dirusak. Sebuah pabrik teh dibakar. Di luar kota Ciamis selain sebuah pabrik soun di Cisaga, 2 pabrik aci dibakar yaitu di kampung Cijambu, Banjar dan di kampung Panumbangan. [27][27] Peristiwa ini menimbulkan banyak reaksi. PKI dan kelompok kiri lainnya dengan segera mengeluarkan pernyataan bahwa peristiwa ini adalah peristiwa rasialis kontra revolusioner yang didalangi oleh sisa-sisa Masjumi dan PSI. Demikian juga Baperki mempunyai pandangan yang sama. Sebaliknya LPKB di bawah pimpinan Sindhunata mengeluarkan selebaran berisi pernyataan bahwa peristiwa ini disebabkan oleh prilaku orang Tionghoa yang ekslusif dan suka pamer kemewahan. Sudah tentu para pemimpin

Baperki memprotes para pimpinan LPKB yang dianggap secara provokatif mengipasi kemarahan massa. Aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di masa Orde Baru Selaras dengan aksi penumpasan G30S/PKI maka dimulailah kampanye anti "Cina" (Sinophobia) baik yang ditujukan kepada pemerintah RRT yang secara aktif melalui Radio Peking dan kantor berita Hsinhua menyerang rezim militer Soeharto-Nasution, maupun kepada orang-orang Tionghoa di Indonesia. Kampanyei anti Tionghoa ini disponsori oleh kekuatan asing terutama Inggris dan Amerika Serikat. Pada masa itu Perang Vietnam sebagai manifestasi perang dingin antara kubu negara-negara kapitalis Barat dibawah pimpinan Amerika Serikat dan Inggris dengan kubu negara- negara sosialis Eropa Timur dan Asia dibawah pimpinan Uni Soviet dan RRT sedang mencapai puncaknya. Terjadi tarik-menarik kedua kekuatan tersebut hampir di seluruh belahan dunia. Tidak ada satu pun negara di permukaan bumi yang terhindar dari pengaruh perang dingin. Jadi dapat disimpulkan bahwa kampanye dan kerusuhan-kerusuhan anti Tionghoa yang terjadi setelah G30S. ditimbulkan oleh faktor-faktor eksternal dan internal. Pemerintah Amerika dan terutama peemrintah Inggris merencanakan dan mensponsori kampanye dan aski-aksi antiTionghoa yang seolah-olah mendapatkan "dukungan" dari kegiatan Radio Peking dan kantor berita Hsinhua. Di dalam negeri sendiri agen- agen CIA dan MI-6 mendapatkan dukungan dari LPKB dan perwira-perwira AD dan pimpinan partai politik yang anti Tionghoa dengan memojokkan Baperki serta mengkondisikan terjadinya aksi-aksi anti Tionghoa. Setelah PKI dibubarkan dan Presiden Soekarno dikurangi kekuasaannya dengan membentuk kabinet baru, ternyata masalah kesulitan ekonomi, terutama masalah inflasi tidak dapat diperbaiki dengan segera. Namun untuk menampung aspirasi dan menjaga mobilitas para mahasiswa, pemuda dan pelajar yang tergabung dalam KAPPI/KAMI/Laskar Ampera ARH, harus dicari "kambing hitam". Dalam kalkulasi Soeharto, kekuatan para mahasiswa dan pemuda merupakan kekuatan yang ampuh dan masih dibutuhkan dalam menyelesaikan tahap akhir rencananya, merebut kursi presiden dari Soekarno. Maka hal yang paling mudah adalah dengan menimpakan segala kesalahan ini kepada orang-orang Tionghopa, baik WNI mau pun WNA yang dituduh menjadi pengacau dan parasit ekonomi. Orang-orang Tionghoa dituduh menjadi kolone kelima, tukang timbun dan sama sekali tidak pernah peduli dengan kepentingan rakyat.Orang-orang Tionghoa dituduh mempunyai loyalitas ganda dan selalu berusaha mentrasfer uangnya ke luar negeri. Pemilihan etnis Tionghoa untuk dijadikan kambing hitam dengan pertimbangan bahwa mereka adalah golongan yang secara politis sangat lemah, tanpa perlindungan dan mudah dipermainkan. Dalam melakukan operasi-operasi penangkapan dan pengejaran terhadap pimpinan, kader dan anggota PKI dan ormas-ormasnya yang dituduh terlibat G30S, pihak militer juga melakukan penangkapan terhadap orang-orang Tionghoa dengan tuduhan yang sama. Puluhan ribu orang Tionghoa di seluruh Indonesia baik yang menjadi pengurus atau anggota PKI, Pemuda Rakyat, CGMI, Baperki, PPI, IPPI, Perhimi, Chung Hua Tsung Hui, Chiao Chung maupun hanya simpatisan saja atau bukan, kalau dituduh berindikasi PKI langsung "diciduk" (ditangkap) pihak militer. Sebenarnya tujuan utamanya adalah untuk memeras uangnya. Namun bagi yang tidak mempunyai uang, banyak juga yang

ditahan sampai bertahun-tahun lamanya, malahan ada yang ikut dibuang ke pulau Buru bahkan ribuan orang Tionghoa ikut dibunuh.[30] [30] Seluruh sekolah-sekolah dan universitas-universitas Baperki ditutup dan disita.Demikian juga seluruh sekolah-sekolah Tionghoa dan gedung- gedung perkumpulan yayasan-yayasan Tionghoa diduduki pihak militer. [31][31] Dalam perkembangannya ternyata banyak di antaranya telah berubah menjadi ruko dan gedung perkantoran. Disamping itu setelah Peristiwa G30S intensitas kerusuhan anti Tionghoa makin menjadi-jadi. Penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran rumah-rumah, toko-toko, sekolahsekolah dan mobil-mobil milik orang Tionghoa terjadi di mana-mana. Kampanye dan berbagai aksi anti Tionghoa, ditambah tindakan represif penguasa militer inilah yang menimbulkan kekuatiran dan trauma berkepanjangan dan menjadi salah satu sebab mengapa orang-orang Tionghoa selama tiga puluh dua tahun mati-matian berusaha menghindari wilayah politik, dan memusatkan seluruh perhatian dan kegiatannya hanya di bidang bisnis. Aksi-aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa terjadi antara lain di Makassar pada 10 Nopember 1965. Pada awalnya terjadi demonstrasi yang dilakukan mahasiswa dan pemuda anggota HMI dan Ansor yang ditujukan ke konsulat RRT, tetapi aksi-aksi anarkis kemudian berlanjut ke pertokoan dan pemukiman orang Tionghoa. Massa demonstran mengamuk dan kemudian menjarah, merusak dan membakar berbagai toko, rumah dan mobil milik orang-orang Tionghoa. Menurut nota protes Kedubes RRT, lebih dari 2.000 toko dan rumah milik Tionghoa mengalami kerusakan dan hampir seribu keluarga bangkrut. Kerusuhan berikutnya terjadi di Medan pada 10 Desember 1965, Konsulat RRT dihujani batu, jendela-jendelanya hancur dan 3 orang stafnya mengalami luka-luka. Di tengah aksi tersebut pihak keamanan melepaskan tembakan ke arah massa demonstran. Hal ini menimbulkan kemarahan massa yang mengira pihak konsulat lah yang melakukan penembakan tersebut. Massa demonstran dipimpin gerombolan Pemuda Pancasila kemudian mengamuk ke seluruh kota Medan. Mereka menjarah toko-toko dan kios-kios milik orang-orang Tionghoa dan melukai atau membunuh siapa saja yang berani melawan. Di jalan-jalan raya orang- orang Tionghoa diseret turun dari becak, mobil dan sepeda motor, kemudian ditikam dengan pisau dan sangkur. Diperkirakan sebanyak 2.000 orang menjadi korban. Pada 8 Mei 1966, Pangdam Aceh, Brigjen Ishak Djuarsa mengumumkan agar seluruh orang Tionghoa WNA meninggalkan Aceh sebelum 17 Agustus 1966. Akibatnya lebih dari 15.000 pengungsi Tionghoa WNA menuju kota Medan dan sekitarnya. Mereka tinggal di gudang-gudang tembakau, klenteng dan bekas sekolah-sekolah Tionghoa. Di kota Medan sendiri tembok- tembok penuh coret-coret anti Tionghoa antara lain "Orang-orang Cina pulang " dan "Sekali Cina Tetap Cina". Pada Agustus 1966 KAPPI dan KAMI Sumatera Utara menuntut agar sebelum akhir tahun semua warga negara RRT diusir dari Sumatera Utara. Malahan KAPPI Sumatera Utara kemudian mengeluarkan pernyataan agar mengusir seluruh orang Tionghoa dari Indonesia atau KAPPI sendiri yang akan bertindak.

Dalam suatu rapat umum mahasiswa pada 15 Oktober 1966, Pangdam Sumatera Utara Brigjen Sobiran Mochtar menyatakan bahwa demonstrasi- demonstrasi anti Tionghoa tidak cukup untuk mematahkan dominasi orang Tionghoa dalam perekonomian setempat. Para mahasiswa harus memelopori menolak membeli atau menjual barang kepada orang Tionghoa dan secara aktif mengawasi toko-toko milik Tionghoa agar orang enggan belanja ke sana. Selanjutnya pada akhir Oktober dan Nopember 1967 dalam rangka penumpasan Pasukan Gerakan Rakyat Serawak (PGRS) dan Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU), terjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Kalimantan Barat. Orang-orang Tionghoa yang berdiam di pedalaman Kalimantan Barat atas hasil rekayasa pasukan RPKAD, diburu dan dibunuhi orang Dayak. Ratusan orang Tionghoa menjadi korban pembunuhan dan puluhan ribu lainnya terpaksa mengungsi, meninggalkan rumah dan harta bendanya di daerah pedalaman yang telah ratusan tahun turun-temurun dihuninya, menuju kota-kota pesisir Kalimantan Barat seperti Singkawang dan Pontianak. Setelah terjadi peristiwa aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa di Kalimantan Barat, selaras dengan kebijaksanaan pemerintah dalam menghadapi masalah Tionghoa dan bekunya hubungan diplomatik dengan RRT. Kegiatan anti Tionghoa relatif menurun. Namun pada Januari 1968, terjadi suatu insiden di Glodok, Jakarta. Seorang kopral RPKAD yang berusaha "memeras" seorang pedagang Tionghoa terlibat perkelahian dengan beberapa orang pemuda Tionghoa. Dalam perkelahian itu, kopral tersebut bersama temannya seorang anggota garnisun dipukuli sekelompok pemuda Tionghoa yang membela temannya sesama pedagang. Beberapa hari kemudian, pada 25 Januari, dua peleton anggota RPKAD menyerbu Glodok untuk melakukan pembalasan. Karena tidak dapat menemukan pemuda-pemuda yang terlibat dalam aksi pemukulan kepada teman mereka, maka dengan menggunakan rantai sepeda dan pisau komando, para anggota RPKAD tersebut dengan ngawur menyerang setiap orang Tionghoa yang mereka temui. Empat puluh orang Tionghoa menderita luka-luka dan beberapa toko dirusak ketika terjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa tersebut. Pada 21 Oktober 1968, di Surabaya terjadi kerusuhan anti Tionghoa sebagai ekses dari suatu demonstrasi KAPPI untuk memprotes digantungnya dua orang KKO di Singapura. Pada 17 Oktober 1968, kedua orang KKO tersebut menjalani hukum gantung di penjara Changi, karena tertangkap basah ketika melakukan aksi sabotase di Orchard Road - Singapura pada masa konfrontasi dengan Malaysia. Pemerintah Singapura dibawah pimpinan Perdana Menteri Lee Kuan Yew tidak menghiraukan permintaan Presiden Soeharto yang mengirim Brigjen Tjokropranolo untuk melakukan pendekatan, agar membatalkan hukuman gantung tersebut. Sungguh luar biasa, demonstrasi untuk memprotes hukum gantung dua orang KKO berubah menjadi aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa. Mobil, sepeda motor dan becak dihentikan kemudian dibalikkan dan dibakar. Demikian juga toko-toko dan rumah-rumah milik orang Tionghoa diserbu dan isinya dijarah. Seluruh perabot rumah tangga dilemparkan ke tengah jalan, kemudian dibakar. Di kawasan Pandaan yang merupakan lintasan jalan Surabaya-Malang, massa melakukan sweeping. Semua mobil yang dikendarai orang Tionghoa dihentikan. Pengemudinya diminta keluar dan dipukuli, kemudian mobilnya dicemplungkan ke sungai.

Aksi perusakan berjalan sehari penuh dan jam malam terpaksa diberlakukan. Korban akibat perusakan tersebut diperkirakan 98 mobil, 176 sepeda motor/scooter, 4 bemo dan 660 sepeda dirusak atau dibakar. Demikian juga 444 toko, 9 pabrik dan 71 rumah tinggal beserta isinya dirusak dan dijarah. Pada Minggu 5 Agustus 1973, masyarakat Tionghoa yang telah merasa tenang dengan meredanya aksi-aksi anti Tionghoa, tiba-tiba dikejutkan dengan terjadinya huru-hara anti Tionghoa di Bandung. Aksi penjarahan dan perusakan terhadap toko-toko dan rumah-rumah milik orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut dipicu oleh sebuah kecelakaan lalu lintas kecil dimana sebuah VW yang sedang lewat di jalan Astana Anyar, di muka bioskop Siliwangi disenggol gerobak yang dikendarai Asep bin Tosim. Tiga orang pemuda Tionghoa turun dari VW tersebut dan terjadi perkelahian yang mengakibatkan Asep terluka ringan dan dibawa ke rumah sakit. Melihat kejadian tersebut beberapa orang menjadi marah dan mengeroyok ketiga pemuda tersebut. Namun ketiganya berhasil menyelamatkan diri, hanya mobilnya hancur dirusak massa.Kemudian beredar isu bahwa Asep ditusuk dan meninggal dunia. Kebetulan hari itu sedang disiapkan demonstrasi para tukang becak untuk menentang diberlakukannya daerah bebas becak di kota Bandung. Massa tukang becak kemudian diprovokasi dan dialihkan melakukan aksi-aksi anarkis anti Tionghoa. Aksi penjarahan dan perusakan yang dimulai pukul 4 sore baru berakhir pukul 1 dini hari. Sebagai akibat aksi tersebut lebih dari 1.500 toko dan rumah milik etnis Tionghoa, terutama di pusat kota antara lain di Jalan Braga, Asia Afrika, Sudirman, A. Yani, Kopo dan lainnya habis dijarah dan dirusak para perusuh. Demikian juga ratusan kendaraan bermotor habis dibakar atau dirusak. Kerusuhan kembali terjadi pada waktu meletusnya Peristiwa Malari atau Lima Belas Januari 1974. Demonstrasi anti Jepang pada saat kedatangan Perdana Menteri Kakuei Tanaka berhasil diprovokasi sehingga berubah menjadi aksi penjarahan dan perusakan terhadap toko-toko dan kendaraan milik orang Tionghoa di daerah Glodok dan mencapai puncaknya dengan aksi penjarahan dan pembakaran pertokoan proyek Senen. Setelah Peristiwa Malari '74 yang meminta korban cukup banyak etnis Tionghoa yang tidak berdosa, beberapa orang mantan pimpinan LPKB merasa kuatir melihat perkembangan situasi di mana gap antara yang kaya dan miskin di Indonesia semakin dalam dan menjurus ke arah rasialisme. Dengan dukungan Gubernur DKI Jaya, Ali Sadikin pada Agustus 1974 mereka mendirikan Badan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (BPKB) yang kemudian pada 18 Oktober 1977 berubah menjadi Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Bakom-PKB). Badan yang Ketua Umumnya K. Sindhunata dengan dibantu oleh Junus Jahya dan Kwik Kian Gie mendapatkan pengakuan resmi dari Menteri Dalam Negeri yang menjadi pelindungnya pada 31 Desember 1977. Walaupun telah terbentuk Bakom-PKB,namun karena kebijaksanaan pemerintah Orde Baru terutama di bidang ekonomi yang diterapkan terhadap etnis Tionghoa dan KKN yang semakin subur berkembang, sentimen rasialisme dan benih-benih anti Tionghoa ternyata masih saja hidup di dalam hati sebagian rakyat Indonesia yang mudah diprovokasi menjadi aksi-aksi anarkis.

Hal ini terbukti dengan terjadinya peristiwa huru-hara anti Tionghoa di Solo, Boyolali, Salatiga, Semarang yang kemudian menjalar ke Kudus dan beberapa kota kecil lainnya. Malahan aksi-aksi perusakan toko- toko milik orang Tionghoa juga menjalar ke beberapa kota di Jawa Timur antara lain Ngawi, Madiun dan Jombang. Peristiwa penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran toko-toko dan kendaraan milik Tionghoa di Solo yang berlangsung pada 22-23 Nopember 1980, dipicu hanya oleh sebuah perkelahian antara 3 siswa Sekolah Guru Olahraga (SGO) dengan seorang pemuda Tionghoa. Ratusan pelajar dengan mengendarai sepeda motor bercampur-baur dengan menggunakan seragam sekolah secara terbalik sehingga identitasnya tidak bisa dikenali lagi. Mereka menyerang semua toko dan bangunan milik orang Tionghoa dengan cara melemparinya dengan bongkahan batu yang telah dipersiapkannya terlebih dahulu. Aksi anarkis yang berlangsung beberapa hari lamanya, dimulai dari daerah Coyudan kemudian menjalar ke daerah-daerah lainnya dan ditunggangi para "gali" (gang anak liar) yang menjarah toko-toko tersebut. Dengan cepat kerusuhan menjalar ke Boyolali, Salatiga, Ambarawa, Banyubiru, Candi dan Semarang. Di kota-kota ini para perusuh melempari semua rumah dan toko Tionghoa. Beberapa pemuda Tionghoa yang dijumpai diludahi dan dipukuli massa. Aksi penjarahan, perusakan dan pembakaran yang paling parah terjadi di Semarang mulai tanggal 25 Nopember 1980. Kerugian dari aksi kerusuhan ini puluhan milyar, antara lain 15 pabrik besar kecil dirusak atau dibakar. Kerugian terbesar diderita PT Arta Electronics yang konon berjumlah 1,2 milyar dan PT Standard Battery sebesar 600 juta. Krisis moneter yang berkembang menjadi krisis ekonomi membuktikan bahwa konsep pembangunan yang digembar-gemborkan rezim Orde Baru ternyata membawa kesengsaraan tidak terhingga kepada seluruh rakyat Indonesia. Hanya segelintir penguasa bersama kroninya, sekelompok konglomerat hitam yang menikmati kue pembangunan. Seluruh hasil pembangunan ternyata hanya fatamorgana yang dihasilkan melalui utang dan penjarahan kekayaan alam negara. Selama tiga puluh dua tahun pemerintahan rezim Orde Baru, negara telah dibuat bangkrut dengan meninggalkan utang yang luar biasa besarnya.[32][32] Beberapa tahun menjelang terjadinya krisis moneter yang menimpa Indonesia, muncul rasa ketidakpuasan di kalangan masyarakat luas terhadap kebijaksanaan ekonomi pemerintah yang dianggap hanya menguntungkan keluarga Presiden Soeharto dengan kroninya segelintir konglomerat Tionghoa. Situasi ini dengan mudah digunakan oleh para provokator untuk melakukan aksi-aksi anarkis anti Tionghoa. Pemicu aksi tersebut tidak masuk akal, antara lain insiden seorang pemuda Tionghoa yang tidak waras disuruh menyobek kitab suci Al-Qur'an (Pekalongan) atau seorang perempuan Tionghoa yang merasa terganggu dan marah-marah kepada sekelompok pemuda pemukul bedug untuk membangunkan umat Islam melakukan saur (Rengasdengklok), bahkan seorang santri yang mengalami penganiayaan oleh anggota kepolisian (Tasikmalaya) menyebabkan terjadinya aksi-aksi anarkis tersebut. Aksi- aksi tersebut kemudian berkembang bukan hanya ditujukan kepada etnis Tionghoa tetapi juga kepada gerejagereja Kristen dan Katolik. Malahan di beberapa tempat kelenteng-kelenteng dan vihara-vihara Buddha turut dijadikan sasaran perusakan. Aksi-aksi tersebut antara lain terjadi di Purwakarta (31 Oktober 2 Nopember 1995), Pekalongan (24 Nopember

1995), Situbondo ( 10 Oktober 1996), Tasikmalaya (26 Desember 1996), Sanggau Ledo (30 Desember 1995-2 Januari 1996), Tanah Abang (28 Januari 1997), Rengasdengklok (27 Januari-31 Januari 1997) dan Banjarmasin (23 Mei 1997). Pada 27 Juli 1996,kantor DPP PDI di jalan Diponegoro diserbu gerombolan yang mengaku pendukung PDI Kongres Medan dibawah pimpinan Buttu Hutapea cs. Aksi tersebut telah menyebabkan terjadinya kerusuhan yang mengakibatkan puluhan bangunan perkantoran, toko dan kendaraan bermotor sepanjang jalan Salemba dan Kramat Raya habis dirusak atau dibakar massa yang mengamuk. Sudah tentu kembali etnis Tionghoa yang menjadi korban. Setelah terjadinya krisis moneter berbagai kerusuhan dan aksi-aksi rasialis anti Tionghoa masih terjadi antara lain di Makassar (15 September 1997) dan setelah lengsernya Presiden Soeharto di Kebumen (7 September 1998). Puncak aksi-aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa seperti telah disampaikan di halaman pertama makalah ini adalah Peristiwa 13- 15 Mei 1998. Satu-satunya aksi anarkis yang meminta korban tokot-toko milik Tionghoa di era reformasi adalah pada saat Sidang Umum MPR hasil Pemilu 1999 (September 1999) memilih K.H. Abdurrachman Wahid menjadi Presiden. Pemilihan presiden baru untuk menggantikan Presiden B.J. Habibie mengalami berbagai rekayasa. Megawati sebagai calon presiden dari partai pemenang Pemilu mengalami hambatan dari partai-partai Islam, terutama dari koalisi Poros Tengah pimpinan Amien Rais dengan alasan gender, agama dan sebagainya. Para pengikut PDIP/ Megawati yang merasa dizalimi mengamuk dan melakukan aksi-aksi anarkis di Bali dan Solo. Ratusan toko milik orang Tionghoa hancur, malahan Pasar Besar Solo yang sangat terkenal dan menjadi salah satu icon kota Solo habis dibakar massa yang menjadi brutal dan sulit dikendalikan. Masalah Tionghoa adalah bagian dari masalah nasional Setelah dengan jujur mempelajari sejarah , maka dapat ditarik kesimpulan bahwa masalah Tionghoa adalah bagian dari masalah nasional yang diwarisi oleh penjajah Belanda. Kebijaksanaan politik segregasi penjajah Belanda, mengakibatkan bangsa Indonesia terkotak-kotak. Ingat apa yang dilakukan oleh Van Mook dan KMB yang menghasilkan negara federal ciptaan mereka yang ingin memecah-belah bangsa Indonesia yang baru saja memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya. Kebiasaan dan kebijaksanaan raja-raja Jawa yang diteruskan oleh pemerintah HindiaBelanda untuk memelihara segelintir orang Tionghoa yang dijadikan kroninya untuk memeras rakyat ternyata ditiru dan diterapkan oleh rezim Orde Baru yang juga memelihara segelintir oknum Tionghoa untuk dijadikan kaki-tangannya dalam menumpuk kekayaan. Hal ini dilakukan mulai dari pemegang puncak kekuasaan bersama keluarganya sampai ke tingkat paling bawah, lurah dan Rt/Rw. Sistim upeti yang menjadi tradisi raja-raja Jawa diterapkan, sehingga gaji pegawai negeri tidak pernah dicukupi dan mereka diberi kesempatan untuk melakukan korupsi asal memberikan upeti kepada atasannya. Berbagai kemudahan, HPH, Perbankan dsb.nya diberikan kepada segelintir konglomerat Tionghoa, malahan sampai detik terakhir kekuasaannya mereka diberikan kesempatan untuk merampok negara dengan mengucurkan ratusan trilyun dana BLBI.

Rangkaian aksi-aksi kekerasan anti Tionghoa yang dimulai dari zaman VOC/HindiaBelanda sampai mencapai puncaknya dengan terjadinya tragedi 13-15 Mei 1998 adalah warisan sejarah yang harus diselesaikan bukan saja oleh etnis Tionghoa, tetapi juga oleh seluruh komponen bangsa, termasuk seluruh kekuatan politik yang ada di Indonesia. Baik yang berada di eksekutif, legislatif maupun yudikatif dengan seluruh aparat dan birokrasinya dari pusat sampai ke tingkat Rt/Rw. Kita tidak bisa berilusi bahwa etnis Tionghoa bisa berjuang dan menyelesaikan masalah Tionghoa sendirian tanpa menceburkan diri ke dalam mainstream bangsa dan bersamasama komponen bangsa lainnya ikut menciptakan masyarakat baru Indonesia seperti yang kita cita-citakan. Untuk menjadi bangsa yang modern dan berperadaban tinggi kita harus membangun negara kita menjadi negara yang demokratis, egaliter, menjunjung tinggi hukum dan hak azasi manusia serta bersih dari segala bentuk KKN dan diskriminasi. Seluruh warga negara tanpa memandang asal-usul ras, etnis, agama, kepercayaan, gender, fisik dsb.nya mempunyai hak dan kewajiban yang sama. Untuk itu baik UUD maupun seluruh Undang-undang, Peraturan Pemerintah, Peraturan Daerah dsb.nya harus bersih dari unsur-unsur diskriminasi. Pertanyaannya sekarang adalah bagaimana kita harus bersikap? Apakah kita akan menerima saja keadaan yang penuh ketidak-pastian bagi hari depan anak cucu kita atau kita menginginkan perubahan? Jawabannya ada di dalam lubuk hati masing-masing. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1][1] Damar Harsono "May Riots Still Burns Into Victim's Minds" dalam The Jakarta Post, Mei 14,2002. [2][2] Major William Thorn, The Conquest Of Java, 1815, reprinted 1993 by Periplus Edition (HK) Ltd. Hal.242-244. [3][3] Adolf Heuken SJ."Tempat-tempat bersejarah di Jakarta",Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, Jakarta, 1997,Hal. 173-174. [4][4] G.William Skinner, "The Chinese of Java in Colloquium on Overseas Chinese", dalam Mely G.Tan (ed), Golongan Etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia, PT Gramedia, Jakarta 1979, Hal.1. [5][5] Menurut Scott Merilles, BATAVIA in Nineteenth Century Photographs, Archipelago Press, Singapore 2000, Hal.15, penduduk Batavia dan sekitarnya pada Desember 1866 berjumlah 530.018 orang terdiri dari Eropa 6.253 orang, Pribumi 472.301 orang, Tionghoa 50.583 orang dan lain-lain 881 orang. Sedangkan pada Desember 1895, penduduk Batavia dan sekitarnya berjumlah 1.268.043 orang terdiri dari Eropa 12.429 orang,Pribumi 1.169.678 orang,Tionghoa 82.510 orang dan lainnya 3.426 orang. Angka-angka ini diperoleh dari Regeering Almanak voor NederlandschIndie, Batavia Landdrukkerij 1868 dan 1900. [6][6] Sejak 1920 sampai 1930 jumlah imigran Tionghoa yang datang ke Hindia Belanda rata-rata lebih dari 40.000 orang setahun. Pada 1921 jumlahnya kurang lebih 43.000 orang dan pada 1928, kira-kira 41.000 orang.Jumlah rata-rata sejak 1900 sampai

1930 lebih dari 28.000 orang. Sedangkan pada 1932 berjumlah 12.000 orang, 1933 berjumlah 9.000 orang, 1934 berjumlah 12.000 orang, 1935 berjumlah 15.000 orang, 1936 berjumlah 19.000 orang, 1937 berjumlah 31.000 orang dan 1938 berjumlah 20.000 orang.Yang datang pada 1938 terdiri antara lain 3.000 orang anak laki-laki berusia di bawah 12 tahun, 8.000 orang berusia di atas 12 tahun, 2000 orang anak perempuan berusia di bawah 12 tahun dan 6.000 orang berusia di atas 12 tahun. Lihat : Victor Purcell, "The Chinese in Southeast Asia", Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1981, Hal.465. [7][7] Pada 1875 di Jawa terdapat 8.383 orang Arab dan 14.573 orang Timur Asing lainnya bukan Tionghoa.Lihat James R.Rush,"Opium to Java, Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860- 1910",Cornell University Press, 1990, catatan kaki hal.14. [8][8] Nio Joe Lan, "Riwajat 40 Taon T.H.H.K.Batavia", Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan Batavia, Batavia, 1940,Hal.10. [9][9] Menurut Dr. De Haan,kapiten Tionghoa peranakan Islam terakhir di Batavia bernama Muhammad Japar. Ia meninggal pada 1827 dan pada tahun berikutnya penguasa Belanda di Batavia telah mengakhiri bentukan masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Jakarta dengan menyatukannya dalam golongan masyarakat Tionghoa.Lihat Amen Budiman, "Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia". Tanjung Sari, Semarang,1979.Hal.34 [10][10] Onghokham,"Kapitalisme Cina di Hindia-Belanda" dalam Yoshihara Kunio," Konglomerat Oei Tiong Ham, Kerajaan Bisnis Pertama di Asia Tenggara", PT.Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta,1991, Hal. 84-85. [11][11] Benny G.Setiono "Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik ",ELKASA,Jakarta, 2003. Hal. 55-58. [12][12] Amen Budiman "Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia" Tanjung Sari, Semarang, 1979,Hal.32-35. [13][13] Menurut Amen Budiman, "Sangat menarik juga untuk dicatat ikhwal penggantungan bedug-bedug besar di serambi mesjid-mesjid di tanah Jawa, terutama sekali di daerah pesisir utara tanah Jawa, oleh karena bukan mustahil ikhwal ini pun merupakan pengaruh dari arsitektur Tiongkok, di mana kita bisa menjumpai adanya begug-bedug yang tergantung di serambi klenteng." Lihat Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia,Tanjung Sari, Semarang 1979,Hal. 40. Menurut catatran kaki, ini adalah informasi tertulis dari Ny.Michele Blusse.Lebih lanjut periksa: Welch, Holmes, The Buddhist Revival in China, 1968. Hal.249. [14][14] Lynn Pan, "The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas", Archipelago Press, Landmark Books,Singapore, 1998,Hal.51. [15][15] Ketika pemerintah Indonesia menginvasi Timor Portugis, pada 7 Desember 1975 pasukan Indonesia berusaha meduduki Dili dengan melakukan penembakan di di jalan-jalan raya secara mem**** buta kepada siapa saja yang ditemuinya sambil melakukan penjarahan toko- toko milik orang Tionghoa dan penduduk sipil lainnya.

Pasukan Indonesia yang menjarah dan membunuh orang-orang Tionghoa tersebut berdalih bahwa mereka adalah pelarian G30S/PKI dari Indonesia yang menyelamatkan diri dan mengkonsolidasikan diri di daerah jajahan Portugis itu. Pembunuhan tersebut berlanjut sampai satu minggu lamanya. Menurut laporan seorang pastor Katolok, diperkirakan 2.000 orang penduduk Dili tewas akibat pembunuhan yang dilakukan pasukan Indonesia tersebut, 700 orang di antaranya orang Tionghoa. Lihat : Adam Schwarz, "A Nation in Waiting, Indonesia in the 1990s", Allen & Unwin Pty.Ltd.,Australia,1994.Hal.204. [16][16] Harian "Suara Pembaruan", 24 April 2006.Hal.7 dan Harian "Kompas",25 April 2006.Hal.9 [17][17] Dr. Peter Carey, "Orang Jawa dan Masyarakat Cina 1755- 1825 ", Pustaka Azet, Jakarta 1986. [18][18] Benny G.Setiono Op cit.Hal. 171-177. [19][19] Pengantar pendirian SDI yang disampaikan Tirto Adhi Soerjo menyatakan antara lain, untuk mendapatkan perubahan kedudukan kaum pedagang kita bangsa Islam di Hindia wajib satu badan yang anggota- anggotanya adalah para saudagar supaya ilmu sarwat bisa dilakukan dengan sepertinya dan supaya lidi yang mudah dipatahkan itu tidak mudah dipatahkan, karena dipersatukan sehingga menjadi teguh. Lidi digabungkan jadi satu menjadi teguh karena tali pengikat, yaitu persarikatan saudagarsaudagar yang mempunyai badan hukum yang diakui dan dilindungi undang-undang negeri. Antara saudagar Islam satu dengan yang lain tentu sudah ada yang membikin kerukunan dalam suatu hal, tetapi kerukunan ini terbikin di bawah tangan,jadi tidak kekal dan mudah bubar. Lihat Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Sang Pemula", Hasta Mitra, Jakarta, 1985. Hal.120-121. [20][20] Twang Peck Yang,"The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence 1940-1950", Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1998. Hal.70-72. [21][21] Victor Purcell. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia", Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1981, Second Edition, Hal.474. [22][22] Aksi penjagalan,pemerkosaan dan pengusiran warga Tionghoa di kawasan Bandung Selatan,Tangerang, Mauk dan sekitarnya yang konon mencapai ribuan korban jiwa ini terjadi sepanjang Mei hingga Juli 1946. Untuk melihat detil pembantaian ini bisa dilihat Star Weekly No 23 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 9 Juni 1946; Star Weekly No 24 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 16 Juni 1946; Star Weekly No 25 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 23 Juni 1946 dan Star Weekly No 26 Tahon ke 1 Edisi 30 Juni 1946. [23][23] Lihat iklan seruan hari duka cita dalam Star Weekly No.23 Tahon k1, Edisi 9 Juni 1946. Hal.9. [24][24] Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Federation Of Chinese Associations) in Batavia, MEMORANDUM, Outlining Acts Of Violence And Inhumanity Perpetrated By Indonesia Bands On Innocent Chinese Before And After The Dutch Police Action Was Enforced On July 21,1947, Batavia, 15 September 1947, Hal.6.

[25][25] Kisah ini dikumpulkan berdasarkan hasil wawancara dengan sejumlah anak korban yang salah satu di antaranya dengan ilmu silat yang dikuasainya berhasil melompat dan melarikan diri ke hutan. Sumber Dokumen Stanley, Hasil Wawancara Dengan Sejumlah Keluarga dan Korban Pembunuhan Anti Tionghoa di Malang, Blitar dan Nganjuk pada Desember 1986 dan Agustus 1987. Di beberapa daerah dengan mudah bisa ditemukan kuburan massal para korban. Salah satunya adalah sebuah kuburan masaal yang berlokasi di pinggir hutan di Desa Donomulyo, Kecamatan Bagor, sekitar 9,5 Km sebelah barat Nganjuk. Di kuburan massal ini dikuburkan 1.250 orang korban. Proses penggalian dan pencarian jenasah para korban pembunuhan massal yang terjadi sepanjang 1946-akhir 1949 ini dilakukan oleh berbagai cabang Chung Hua Tsung Hui di sejumlah kota pada 1951. [26][26] Yap Tjwan Bing,"Meretas Jalan Kemerdekaan,Otobiografi seorang Pejuang Kemerdekaan", PT Gramedia, Jakarta 1988. Hal.79. [27][27] Harian "Warta Bhakti", 26 Mei 1963. [28][28] Siauw Giok Tjhan,"Lima Jaman,Perwujudan Integrasi Wajar", Yayasan Teratai, Jakarta, Jakarta-Amsterdam, 1981,Hal.324-325. [29][29] Budi Setiawanto,Andi Jauhari,Rahmad Nasution dan Unggul Tri Ratomo, "Menguak Tabir Perjuangan Suripto",Aksara Karunia, Jakarta, 2001,Hal.22. [30][30] Menurut majalah Life dan Far Eastern Economic Review beratus- ratus ribu orang Tionghoa telah dibunuh.Robert Shaplen menyebut angka kira-kira 20.000 orang mati.Sebaliknya kantor berita Hsinhua menyatakan beratus-ratus orang Tionghoa yang mati selama 6 bulan setelah G30S. Namun menurut Charles Coppel jumlah orang Tionghoa yang terbunuh hampir tidak mungkin melebihi dua ribu orang. Lihat ; Charles Coppel, "Tionghoa Indonesia Dalam Krisis", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta,1994 Hal.124-125. [31][31] Seluruh sekolah Tionghoa di Indonesia yang ditutup berjumlah 629 buah dengan jumlah murid 272.782 orang dan jumlah guru 6.478 orang. [32][32] Dalam suatu pengumuman yang dikeluarkan Menko Bidang Perekonomian pemerintahan Megawati Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti dinyatakan bahwa seluruh utang dalam negeri dan luar negeri pemerintah berjumlah lebih dari Rp 1.400 trilyun ataus setara dengan $ US 140 milyar. Site Sponsors