NAACP v.

ALABAMA 1958 Ponente: Justice Harlan Facts: An Alabama statute requires a foreign corporation, except as exempted, to qualify before doing business by filing its corporate charter with the Secretary of State. The statute imposes a fine on a corporation transacting intrastate business before qualifying and provides criminal prosecution of officers of such a corporation. NAACP is a corporation organized under the laws of New York. It operated through chartered affiliates which are independent unincorporated association. In 1951, it opened a regional office in Alabama. Since then NAACP has never complied with the qualification statute, from which it considered itself exempted. Because of their noncompliance, the Atty Gen of Alabama, in 1956, brought an equity suit to enjoin NAACP from conducting further activities within, and oust the state. Before the hearing, the State moved for the production of a large number of the associations records and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama members and agents. NAACP refused to comply with a court order requiring in part the production of the membership lists for it violates the rights assured to the petitioner and its members under the constitution. ISSUE: W/N Alabama can compel NAACP to reveal to the States Atty Gen the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions and functions in the association. HELD/RATIO: NO. The US SC recognizes the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in ones association. Inviolability of privacy group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs. The production order entails a likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioners members of their right to freedom of association. The compelled disclosure of petitioners Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of NAACP and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs that they have the right to advocate. Furthermore, the petitioner asserts no right to absolute immunity from state investigation; it has urged the rights solely of its ordinary rank and file members who may be put in jeopardy because of their association.
SHELTON et al. v TUCKER et. al. 12 December 1960 Stewart, J. Nature: Facts: Act 10 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Arkansas General Assembly of 1958 requires all applicants to public school teaching posts to pass an affidavit enumerating all organizations that they have been involved in or have contributed to within the past five years. Appeal from the US District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

The case at bar is a consolidation of two suits assailing the statute, namely: No. 14, brought by B. T. Shelton, a teacher at Little Rock Special School District, who, after 25 years with the said school, was laid off due to his refusal to pass the required affidavit; and No. 83, brought by Professor Max Carr and teacher Ernest T. Gephardt, who were both terminated due to their issuance of documents listing membership in professional organizations, denying membership in subversive organizations, and manifesting willingness to answer inquiries instead of filing the required affidavit. Shelton appeals from the affirmation of the validity of the statute by the three-judge Federal District Court while Carr and Gephardt pray for certiorari of the same stand of the Arkansas Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Act 10 is a violation of the right of associational freedom YES Ratio:

A state has a right to investigate the fitness and competence of its teachers. Teachers exert great influence on the young minds of their students. Hence, it is in the interest of producing intelligent and well-rounded citizens that a state may impose administrative standards in selecting individuals who shall cater to that purpose. However, it must be understood that the classroom demeanor of a teacher is not the sole basis for determining his fitness. A broad range of factors must be considered in ascertaining the applicants competence. A statute compelling a teacher to disclose his every associational tie impairs his right of free association particularly when he serves at the absolute will of those whom the disclosure must be made. The right to free association assures that individuals may elect to be members of organizations of their choosing. It further assures that membership to organizations will not be a basis of discrimination, for as long as such organizations do not operate contrary to law. Even though such have no bearing upon the teachers occupational competence or fitness, the associational ties are apparently used by the state as bases for terminating the employment of teachers. This is tantamount to saying that the state may skip due process in the termination of teachers. Furthermore, there is no claim that the affidavits will remain confidential. Even though the governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The statute is both unlimited and indiscriminate in its sweep of affected fundamental personal rights and liberties. It is overbroad because it goes beyond the states justified exercise of legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers.

Judgment: Judgment in both cases reversed. Frankfurter, dissenting: The affidavits need not be opened to public inspection, for the permissible purpose of the statue is to enlighten the school board alone. A school board is entitled to inquire whether any of its teachers has placed himself, or is placing himself in a condition where his work may suffer. The Arkansas statute may serve the purpose of making known to school authorities persons who come in contact with the teacher in all of the phases of his activity in the community, and who can be questioned, if need be, concerning the teachers conduct in matters that may be pertinent to his professional fitness.

If the information gathered by the required affidavits is used to further a scheme of terminating the employment of teachers solely because of their membership in unpopular organizations, that use will run afoul the Fourteenth Amendment.

Harlan, dissenting: There is no showing that the statute has been discriminatorily administered since neither of the cases actually presents an issue of racial discrimination and the statute applies to all Arkansas teachers irrespective of race. When the action complained of pertains to the realm of investigation, our inquiry has a double aspect: first, whether the investigation relates to a legitimate governmental purpose; second, whether, judged in the light of that purpose, the questioned action has substantial relevance thereto. A state has the right to choose its teachers on the basis of fitness. It may inquire into associations so long as obtained information be in aid of this legitimate purpose. The information about associations is useful in determining the moral, professional and social qualifications of teachers. There is difficulty in drawing the line between permissible and overbroad inquiry. School authorities cannot be expected to fix in advance inquiry terms that will only yield relevant information.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union Benjamin Victoriano, plaintiff-appellee v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union and Elizalde Rope Factory Inc, defendants, Elizalde Rope Workers Union, defendant-appellant Date: 12, 1974 Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila Ponente: Zaldivar, J. Doctrine: Act exempting members of any religious sect to join labor organizations is constitutional Facts: Appellee Nejamin Victoriano , a member if the religious sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory Inc. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this agreement Sec 4(a), par 4, RA 875, prior to its amendment by RA 3350 The employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. RA 3350 introduced an amendment to the abovementioned provision x x x but such an agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union, twice, with no response from the latter. Subsequently, the Union wrote a letter to the Company asking for the Company to sever Victorianos employment.

Appeellee then filed an action for injuction in the CFI of Manila Issue: Whether an Act exempting members of any religious sect to join labor organizations is constitutional Held: RA 3350 is CONSTITUTIONAL. Appellant Union SC Appelants contention that RA 3360 1. The Act infringes on the fundamental prohibits and bans the members right to form lawful associations. appears nowhere in the wording of the Act. It deprives said members of their The term right can be construed in 2 constitutional right to form or join lawful ways: associations as guaranteed by the Bill 1. Liberty or Freedom the absence of Rights. of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law 2. Power whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association It is therefore the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association There was indeed an impairment of said union security clause because the Company was partly absolved by law from its contracyual obligation. However, the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. Purpose of RA 3350: To insure freedom of belief and religion, x x x to provide protection to members of religious sects against two aggregates of group strength (Collective labor and Collective Capital) Thus, the means adopted by the Act to achieve such purpose is reasonable. Moreover, the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. Under the Act, a religious objevtor is not required to do a positive act. He is exempted ipso jure.

3. The Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its CBA, the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment.

4. The Act discriminately favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions and leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations.

5. The Act violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the existence of a civil right.

The classification made by the Act is reasonable; based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and equally applies to each member of the class

6. The Act violates the equal protection of law clause of the Constitution 7. The Act violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. RA 3350 actually insures economic stability to the members of the religious sect. It promotes general welfare as it looks after the welfare of those who cannot join labor unions because of their religious belief.

Roberts vs. United States Jaycees Kathryn Roberts (acting commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Rights), appellant v. United States Jaycees, appellee Date: July 3, 1984 Ponente: Brennan, J. Nature: Appeal on the decision of CA Summary: Application of state law to compel Jaycees to accept women as regular members held not to infringe Jaycees freedom of association. Facts: In the by-laws of United States Jaycees (Jaycees), there are regular members and associate members. Regular members are limited to young men between ages 18 to 35. Associate membership is available for women and older men. Associate members dont get privileges like voting, holding local or national office, or participate in certain leadership and awards programs of the association. In 1975 and 1975, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of Jaycees began admitting women as regular members, which thereby violated the national organizations by-laws. Sanctions have been imposed on these two chapters, including denying their members eligibility for certain programs and refusing t count their votes during national conventions. When the national organization advised both chapters that a motion for the revocation of their charters would be considered, the two chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights for violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The said act declares that it is an unfair discrimatory practice to deny any person the full enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of public accommodation14 because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex.
Defined in the statute as a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.
14

The succession of court proceedings are as follows:

o Under the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, the examiner concluded that the Jaycees organization is 1.) a public organization and 2.) that it engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice by excluding women from the regular membership. o The Jaycees renewed their earlier dismissed complaint from the District Court, wherein they argued that requiring women to be accepted as regular members would violate the male members constitutional rights of free speech and association. The District court ruled and even certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court that Jaycees is a place of public accommodation. It is a.) a business in that it sells goods and extends privileges in exchange for membership dues b.) a public business in that it solicits and recruits diespaying members based on an unselective criteria and c.) a public business facility in that it conducts its activities at fixed and mobile sites. o The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court decision. It argued that because the advocacy of political and public causes is a substantial part of what the Jaycees does, the organizations right to select its members is protected by the freedom of association guaranteed by the first amendment. Also, they ruled that the application of the Minnesota statute compelling Jaycees to accept women as regular members would directly and substantially interfere with that freedom. Lastly, it ruled that the Minnesota statute is vague as construed and applied and is therefore unconstitutional for failing to provide any criteria that will distinguish a private organization from public accommodations covered by the statute. Issues: 1. Whether the features of Jaycees makes it worthy of the constitutional protection to freedom of association, thereby making state interference unjustified? 2. Whether there is a compelling state interest in the application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to the Jaycees? 3. Whether the Minnesota Act is vague and overbroad? Held/ Ratio: 1. No. The ones worthy of the constitutional protection against state interference in exercising their right to freedom of association are those organizations that are relatively small, have a high degree of selectivity in decisions to maintain the affiliation, and those that are secluded from others in critical aspects of the relationship. The family is the example given that fits this type of organization. Organizations lacking these qualities may be regulated by the state. The local chapters of Jaycees are neither small nor selective. Moreover, much of the organizations activities involve the participation of strangers to that relationship. 2. Yes. It may be conceded that by requiring the Jaycees to admit women as regular members, original members may be impaired with their ability to express views which they are willing to share only with those that that are not previously included. However, the right to associate for expressive purposes is not absolute. The states compelling reason for applying the statute to the Jaycess is to eradicate discrimination against females. That justifies the statutes impact on the male members associational freedoms. The state interest in assuring equal access is not limited to the provision of purely tangible goods and services because the state enjoys broad authority to create rights of public access on behalf of its citizens. The various commercial programs and benefits offered to Jaycees regular members could be considered as goods and privileges, which the women should have equal access to. There is no basis for

concluding that admission of women as regular members will impede the organizations ability to engage in their activities or to disseminate its preferred views. What the CA relied on in having that hypothesis are merely unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women. Given that, even if the enforcement of the act would cause some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees protected speech, that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the states legitimate purposes. 3. No. In deciding that the act reaches the Jaycees, the Minnesota Supreme Court used a number of specific and objective criteria, which was acknowledged by the CA as ascertainable. The state courts willingness to adopt limiting constructions/ standards that would exclude private groups from the statutes reach establishes that the act does not create an unacceptable risk of application to a substantial amount of protected conduct. Concurring Opinion (Justice OConnor)- concurring in part (he just dislikes some of the justifications used by the court) and concurring in the judgement He dislikes the first amendment analysis of the opinion (discussed in number 2 above). For him, the focus on the membership-message connection is objectionable. Even if the message of the group will be affected with the admission of women as regular members, the application of the statute is still justified because what the statute aims for is the elimination of discrimination. The focus on the membershipmessage connection may make justify certain commercial associations discrimination if they could just argue that the message of their organization will be affected if they will comply with the statute. Thus, the proper analysis of First Amendment claims of associational freedom is to distinguish expressive from non-expressive organizations. Expressive organizations enjoy the first amendment constitutional protection of not being interfered by the state with their activities. Jaycees is not an expressive organization. More so, it is even engaged in commercial activities with its recruitment and selling. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale Summary: James Dales adult membership to the Boy Scouts of America was revoked after the Boy Scouts found out that he was an avowed homosexual. Dale posited that the Boy Scouts violated the public accommodation statute which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The court held that the aim of the Boy Scouts to instill its system of values in its young members was a form of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. This being the case and because the Boy Scouts did not want to promote homosexuality as a legitimate form of conduct, the forced inclusion of Dale in the group would infringe the groups freedom of expressive association. Freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. FACTS: Petitioners are Boy Scouts of America and one of its divisions, Monmouth Council. It is a private, non-profit organization engaged in instilling its system of values in its young members. James Dale had entered in Boy Scouts at the age of 8 and after reaching 18, continued to be part of it by applying for adult membership and becoming an assistant scoutmaster. When he left for home to attend Rutgers University, he

acknowledged to himself and others that he was gay and he became a member and eventually copresident of the universitys lesbian-gay alliance. After a newspaper published an interview and a photograph of him identifying him as copresident of the said organization, he received a letter from the Boy Scouts revoking his membership. Dale filed a complaint alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated New Jerseys public accommodation statute and its common law by revoking his membership based solely on his sexual orientation. The said statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.

the general ISSUE: WON the application of said public accommodations law violated the First Amendment right of expressive association HELD: Yes it does. RATIO: Implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic etc. ends. This right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular ideas. Forcing a certain group to accept certain members, may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express. Thus freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the groups freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the groups ability to advocate private or public viewpoints. Digesters note: the subsequent issues are equally important and show the process with which the court came up with its decision Sub-ISSUE #1: Does the Boy Scouts engage in expressive association? (relevant because in order for a group to be protected under the First Amendment, it must be engaged in some form of expression) HELD/RATIO: Yes. The Boy Scouts is a private, nonprofit organization that aims to instill values in young people by having its adult leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing an engaging them in activities like camping, archery and fishing. It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity. Sub-ISSUE #2: Would the forced inclusion of Dale significantly affect the Boy Scouts ability to advocate public or private viewpoints? HELD/RATIO: Yes. The Boy Scouts asserts that it teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally straight. The presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts desire to not promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behaviour. As the court said that it must give deference to an associations assertions regarding the nature of its expression, they concluded that they must also give deference to an associations view of what would impair its expression. Dales presence would send to the youth members and the world that Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behaviour. Contrary to the New Jersey Supreme Courts view: First, an association need not associate for the purpose of disseminating a certain message in order to be protected, but must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired.

Second, even if Boy Scouts encourage leaders from disseminating views on sexual issues, its method of expression is protected. Third, the First Amendment does not require that every member of the group agree on every issue in order for the groups policy to constitute expressive activity; it is enough that the Boy Scouts take an official position with respect to homosexual conduct which it did. Justice Stevens, Dissenting Opinion The 1978 policy to exclude homosexuals was never publicly expressed. It was an internal memorandum, never circulated beyond the few members of the Boy Scouts Executive Committee. The Boy Scouts posture to the world and to the Scouts has remained what it had always been, one of tolerance, welcoming all class of boys and young me. The 1978 statement also simply says that homosexuality is inappropriate and makes no effort to connect that statement to a shared goal or expressive activity of the Boy Scouts. Furthermore, cases in the past show that it is not enough to simply engage in some kind of expressive activity, nor to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary membership policy, nor to articulate some connection between the groups expressive activities and its exclusionary policy. There is also no evidence that the BSA otherwise teaches or instructs Scouts on matters of homosexuality. It is simply silent on homosexuality and has no shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief about it at alllet alone one that is significantly burdened by admitting homosexuals. HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GLIB Date: June 19, 1995 Ponente: Souter Doctrine: A state law which requires private citizens, who organize a parade, to include among the marchers a group imparting a message, which the organizers do not wish to convey, violates the First Amendment Rights. First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Facts: Petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize & conduct the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the 1993 event to respondent GLIB, an organization formed for the purpose of marching in the parade in order to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, & bisexual individuals & to support the like men & women who sought to march in the New York St. Patrick's Day parade. GLIB filed a suit, alleging that the denial of their application to march violated a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. In finding such a violation & ordering the Council to include GLIB in the parade, the trial court, among other things, concluded that the parade had no common theme other than the involvement of the participants, & that, given the Council's lack of selectivity in choosing parade participants, the parade

lacked any expressive purpose, such that GLIB's inclusion therein would not violate the Council's First Amendment rights. Hence this appeal. Issue/Held: May Mass. require private citizens, who organize a parade, to include among the marchers a group imparting a message, which the organizers do not wish to convey? NO because it is a violation of the First Amendment Rights of the private parade organizers. Ratio: The Court has a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, w/o deference to the trial court, to assure that their judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. The selection of contingents to make a parade is entitled to First Amendment protection. Parades are a form of protected expression because they include marchers who are making some sort of collective point. Such protection is not limited to a parade's banners & songs, but extends to symbolic acts. Although the Council has been lenient in admitting participants to its parade, it does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate a specific message. Thus, petitioners are entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Mass. law has been applied in a way that it does not address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals. The petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, & no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march. It generally does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. However, since every participating parade unit affects the message conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts' peculiar application of the Mass. law essentially forced the Council to alter the parade's expressive content & thereby violated the fundamental First Amendment rule. A speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message & to decide what not to say. The Council selected the expressive units of the parade from potential participants & clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like. That is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another, free from state interference. No other legitimate interest has been identified in support of applying the Mass. law in the way done by the state courts to expressive activity like the parade.