Andrea Cassani

Ph.D. Political Studies GSSPS

The origin and functioning of electoral authoritarianism:
a rational choice perspective

Abstract
%he paper is organized as Iollows. AIter the topic will be presented in the introduction, two
sections, each one subdivided in two paragraphs, will develop it. In the Iirst two paragraphs, a
review oI the debate on hybrid regimes provides the base Ior the subsequent section, which covers
two more speciIic issues: the origin and institutionalization oI hybrid regimes and the their
Iunctioning and consolidation.

Introduction
%he purpose oI this paper is to address some oI the issues risen by one oI the most recent branches
oI the debate on democratization and its international diIIusion: the emergence, during the so called
third wave oI democratization, oI a new, hybrid, category oI political regimes. %he third wave oI
democratization is without any doubts one oI the most important phenomena that characterized the
international system during the last twenty-Iive years oI the 20
th
century. Hundreds, maybe
thousands oI studies have already been published on the topic. HopeIully, this work will not be the
nth repetition oI something already stated, argued, discussed and reviewed. Indeed, the very
existence oI such an amount oI publications allows to skip here much oI the work concerning the
introduction to the topic, and to Iocus directly on the issues at stake.
More than a decade aIter the end oI the so called third wave oI democratization, with the beneIit oI
a now enough distance Irom those dramatic events, it is Iinally possible to make a Iinal assessment
oI the changes that the third wave has brought about. %he changes I am interested in are not only
those concerning the political map oI the international system and in particular the relative
distribution oI democracy and autocracy all around the globe. Special attention will be also paid to
the new Iorms oI political regime that have emerged in the meanwhile as a sort oI side-eIIect oI the
third wave.
AIter an initial period oI reluctance, in part due to the blindness produced by the still luminescent
image oI the end oI the history and in part consequence oI the teleologically biased perspective
derived Irom more than a decade oI dominance by the so called transition paradigm`, the literature
has Iinally recognized the Iormation and proliIeration oI some political hybrids. %hese regimes
seem to combine new elements oI democratic governance with elements oI their past authoritarian
rule. %he Iirst and second paragraphs oI this paper will be devoted to brieIly reconstruct the recent
developments oI this speciIic strand oI the debate. %he task will be carried out both by proving
some evidence oI the emergence oI this new category oI political regime and by giving account oI
how that category has been deIined and speciIied.
In the third and Iourth paragraphs, I will try to Iocus on a more circumscribed aspect oI the debate
on hybrid regimes, namely iI and how the literature has addressed so Iar two Iundamental issues
concerning them. %he Iirst is the dynamic oI political evolution that led an authoritarian regime to
become an hybrid. %he second is the actual Iunctioning oI political liIe inside these regimes and
thus the way they managed to consolidate. As both issues involve primarily the interactions
between the most relevant actors or group oI actors in the polity, the Iocus will be on how the
literature has employed rational choice theory to explain those dynamics. %his decision is largely
consistent with the very most part oI the studies on democratization published during the 90s. As
rational choice proved to be such a powerIul tool in order to scan the Iunctioning oI a transition
Irom autocracy to democracy and the selI-reproducing mechanisms that make a democracy
consolidate, it will be interesting to see iI and how it has been used in order to explain hybrid
regimes.

hat are hybrid regimes?

1.1 1he emergence of the :gray zone'
%he Iirst halI oI the 90s evidently under the inIluence oI the symbolic signiIicance oI the end oI
the Cold War was literally blinded by the luminous image oI a global, apparently unstoppable,
democratic trend; an image nourished by the eIIective and rapid success oI many processes oI
democratization in Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe and supported by catchy
slogans such as the end oI the history`, the victory oI liberalism`, democracy as a universal value`
and so on.

Such an enthusiasm was, in eIIect, justiIiable. Even a glance at the mean value oI the Freedom
House index a measure oI democracy as criticized as used (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002) shows
the dramatic trend Iollowed during the 1974-1994 period. A trend also conIirmed by the steepness
oI the line representing the increase in percentage oI Iree countries in the world in the same period.

During the second halI oI the decade, however, something changed. Several new democracies were
Iacing many, much more than expected, diIIiculties in going through their political transition. Some
scholars started wondering about the imminence oI a third ebb (Diamond, 1996; Kaplan, 1997), but
their conclusions were still moderately optimistic. In 1996, Ior instance, Diamond remarked the
increasing shallowness oI democratization`; still, he was reluctant to claim the end oI the third
wave and preIerred to deIined that situation a period oI stasis during which the overall number oI
democracies in the world neither increases nor decreases signiIicantly. Generally speaking, early
eIIorts to assess the actual progress oI the third wave had been rejected as premature. 'Democracy
is not built in a day was the usual leitmotiv. Rather than a sort oI involution, those ambiguous
regimes should be considered as going through a slower transitional phase oI political development.
3
.
6
3
.
8
4
4
.
2
4
.
4
F
H
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
1=Full Democracy 7=Full Autocracy
FH ndex of Democracy 1974-1994
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
F
H
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Year
% of Free Countries 1974-1994
I course, they couldn`t be considered as Iully democratic, but, Ior sure, they would have become
it.


%hat view was clearly inIluenced by a sort oI democrati:ation fallacy: every authoritarian country
which is undergoing a political crisis and a phase oI political change is a democratizing country.
Such a biased perspective derived Irom the so-called transition paradigm` (Carothers, 2002) and
can be considered as the legacy oI %ransition Irom Authoritarian Rule`, the seminal work oI
`Donnell and Schmitter, generally considered as the milestone oI the debate on the diIIusion oI
democracy, published in 1986 when the third wave was approaching is zenith.
%hat teleological assumption implied some misleading theoretical consequences. %he transitional
nature oI those institutional settings reduced the necessity oI devoting academic energies to their
classiIication. Rather than studying them as a new phenomenon, and thus working on the
development oI a new analytical Iramework, scholars coined some diminished types oI democracy.
As those regimes were incomplete Iorms oI democracy, they needed to be diIIerentiated, both Irom
democracy and Irom each other, by a proper label capturing the speciIic nature oI their democratic
deIicits. %hat practice soon resulted in a proliIeration oI adjectives (Collier & Levitsky, 1997)
illiberal, delegative, oligarchical, limited, controlled, restrictive, partial, semi, quasi and many many
others and consequently in a certain degree oI chaos and oI Sartori`s conceptual stretching`. n
the other hand, as it has been clear in the Iollowing years, such a teleological assumption lacked
empirical Ioundations. %he Iollowing table may help to seize the actual trend oI the second phase oI
the third wave and oI the last decade.
%he diIIerence between a Iirst and a second phase oI the third wave is quite evident. Despite oI the
Iact that, apparently, the diIIusion oI democracy continued without interruption until the halI oI 90s
twenty-eight new electoral democracies between 1991 and 1995 and a total oI 117 the
assessment would change just iI we shiIted the attention to the Free and Partly Free columns. Quite
surprisingly, we soon realize that in 1995 the number oI Free states is exactly the same as in 1991.
Despite the steady growth in the number oI electoral democracies, the number oI liberal
democracies (which according to Freedom House correspond to the Free countries and are to be
considered as a subgroup oI electoral democracies) has stagnated and their proportion in the overall
electoral democracy category has signiIicantly decreased Irom 85 to 64.
%o be honest, such results are not innovative at all. As we have seen, in the second halI oI the
decades, several scholars had already been wondering about the end oI the third wave. At that
moment, the hypothesis oI a mere stalemate was perIectly admissible; today, IiIteen years later, less
and less. Let`s pay attention to the second part oI the table and, in particular, to the1995-2002 and to
the 2003-2009 lapses oI time. Concerning the Iormer, two points should be stressed. n the one
hand, the Free-country group recorded an increase (Irom 76 to 88 countries), thus producing a
similar rise in the proportion oI electoral democracies which qualiIied as liberal (Irom 64 to 75).
n the other hand, the number oI electoral democracies Iluctuated steadily but not signiIicantly, the
proportion oI democracies on the total number oI countries being roughly constant. As Ior the seven
years between 2003 and 2009, in turn, we can easily notice that no major event has occurred: same
number oI electoral democracies, same number oI Iree, partly Iree and not Iree countries, same
percentage oI liberal and oI only electoral democracies on the overall set oI democracies.
All this does not really look like a temporary slowing down in the global diIIusion oI democracy.
What, then? %he above remarks suggest at least to considerations. First, the 1995-2002 period might
reasonably represent a sort oI settling-down phase, in which the overall number oI democracies
stagnated and a Iew countries oI the only-electoral subset has Iinally gone through its political
transition; either successIully becoming a liberal democracy, or giving up to their internal
authoritarian pressures. %hereIore, the messy` whole oI electoral democracy progressively acquired
a more tidy internal organization: a numerically neater distinction between a large group oI liberal
and a small group oI only electoral` democracies. Second, in the last years this distribution oI
political regimes has somehow consolidated (or is consolidating). %he group oI liberal democracies
appears temporarily close and the same can be stated Ior Partly Free and Not Free countries.

YEAR
TOT N
STATES
ELECTORAL
DEMOCRCIES
FREE STATES PARTLY FREE STATES
NOT FREE
STATES
N.
%
TOT
N. % TOT
% EL
D
N. % TOT
% EL
D
N. % TOT
1974 152 41 27% 41 27% 100% 48 32% 0% 63 41%
1989 167 69 41% 61 37% 88% 44 26% 12% 62 37%
1990 165 76 46% 65 40% 85% 50 30% 15% 50 30%
1991 183 89 49% 76 42% 85% 65 35% 15% 42 23%
1992 186 99 53% 75 40% 75% 73 39% 25% 38 21%
1993 190 108 57% 72 38% 63% 63 33% 37% 55 29%
1994 191 113 59% 76 40% 67% 61 32% 33% 54 28%
1995 191 117 60% 76 40% 64% 62 32% 36% 53 28%
1996 191 118 62% 79 41% 67% 59 31% 33% 53 28%
1997 191 117 61% 81 42% 69% 57 30% 31% 53 28%
1998 191 117 61% 88 46% 75% 53 28% 75% 50 26%
1999 192 120 63% 85 44% 70% 60 31% 30% 47 25%
2000 192 120 63% 86 45% 71% 58 30% 29% 48 25%
2001 192 121 63% 85 44% 70% 59 31% 30% 48 25%
2002 192 121 63% 89 46% 73% 55 29% 27% 48 25%
2003 192 117 61% 88 46% 75% 55 29% 25% 49 25%
2004 192 119 62% 89 46% 74% 54 28% 26% 49 26%
2005 192 123 64% 89 46% 72% 58 30% 28% 45 24%
2006 193 123 64% 90 47% 73% 58 30% 27% 45 23%
2007 193 121 63% 90 47% 75% 60 31% 25% 43 22%
2008 193 119 62% 89 46% 74% 62 32% 26% 42 22%
2009 194 116 60% 89 46% 76% 58 29% 24% 47 24%
* 1he percenLages are approxlmaLed Lo Lhe closesL lnLeger number
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All this also suggests that during the last IiIteen years a ray :one between democracy and
autocracy (Carothers, 2002) has progressively emerged and is rapidly consolidating both in terms oI
number oI countries Ialling within and in terms oI persistence in this category. %his is to be thought
oI as a side-eIIect oI the third wave, the most oI these regimes having somehow undergone a
process oI political transIormation during that period. A process, however, that apparently was
leading those regimes towards democracy, but that ultimately coined a brand new category oI
hybrid regimes.

1.2 Defining an hybrid regime
During the 2000s, scholars has progressively recognized that the idea oI a twenty-Iive years global
democratic trend was an excessive simpliIication, even an obstacle to a Iuller understanding oI the
present conIiguration oI the international system. Rather, the third wave should be better interpreted
as a phase during which the complexity and heterogeneity oI the international system has increased.
Most oI those ambiguous regimes, that in the second part oI the 90s seemed to be stuck in the
middle oI a troublesome but still evident path to democracy, proved to be able to Iorm stable links
to their economic and societal environment and are seen by considerable parts oI the local elites as
an adequate institutional solution to the speciIic problems oI governing eIIectively` (Merkel, 2010).
Under certain conditions, in other words, hybrids regimes can reach a sort oI equilibrium and
consolidate.
But, then, once the new category oI hybrid regimes has been identiIied, how to deal with it? How to
deIine hybrid regimes? In its most simplistic Iormulation, by hybrid regime scholars usually mean a
set oI institutions which corresponds neither to a Iull-Iledged democracy nor to an outright
autocracy. %his deIinition does not tell much about such regimes, but may represent a starting point
in that it pinpoints the Iact that usually hybrid regimes Iall in the middle oI the analytical Iramework
as an intermediate category. In a continuous measure oI democraticness, such as the Freedom in the
World Index or the Polity IV, Ior example, hybrid regimes use to locate somewhere between the
opposite poles oI Iull democracy and Iull autocracy. Measurement issues notwithstanding, a proper
deIinition oI hybrid regime requires the identiIication oI their speciIic Ieatures, which in turn,
requires an understanding oI what actually happened in these regimes during their process oI
political transition Irom authoritarian rule. As an in-depth implementation oI this task would
deserve more space, resources and energies, let`s see how hybrid regimes have been deIined by the
literature and iI this deIinition Iits the empirical evidence that can be drawn by the available macro
data.
As Ior the debate on how to deIine hybrid regimes, a series oI articles by Diamond, Schedler,
Levitsky and Way published in 2002 in a special issue oI the Journal oI Democracy, still represent
the milestone and probably the most relevant contribution. %he underlying assumption oI the
theoretical Iramework proposed is that, when dealing with hybrid regimes, the emphasis on their
democratic share` might be misleading and that, most oI them should be better understood as new
Iorms oI authoritarianism.
Diamond provides an overall new classiIicatory Iramework by distinguishing between liberal
democracies, only electoral democracies, ambiguous regimes and three diIIerent types oI
authoritarianism. %hese are politically closed authoritarianism, a category corresponding to the
traditional Iorms oI authoritarianism, such as one-party regimes, one-man dictatorships, sultanistic
regimes, hegemonic electoral authoritarianism` and competitive authoritarianism`. %he two latter
should be thought oI as two sub-categories oI the concept oI electoral authoritarianism, coined by
Schedler, and the diIIerence between them is basically in the degree oI repression actually applied.
Accordingly, let`s Iocus on the concept oI electoral authoritarianism.
Its very denomination might sound as the perIect hybrid`. n the one hand, the emphasis on
authoritarianism distinguishes it Irom the notion oI electoral democracy; on the other, the emphasis
on elections sets it apart Irom the notion oI traditional autocracy. %he qualiIying Ieatures oI this
hybrid Iorm oI political regime are twoIold and, to a certain extent, contradictory. First, the
institutionalized presence oI multiparty and Irequent elections Ior the chieI executive and the
national legislative assembly. %hese elections are usually broadly inclusive, in that they are held
under universal suIIrage; minimally pluralistic, in that opposition parties are allowed to run;
minimally competitive, in that opposition parties are allowed to win votes and seats; and minimally
open, in that opposition parties are not constantly subject to massive repression. Second, the
presence oI manipulations oI electoral contest by the incumbents. Manipulation oI Iormal
competition in these regimes is so severe, proIound, widespread and systematic 'as to render
elections an instrument oI authoritarian rule rather than instruments oI democracy (Schedler,
2002). Manipulation may come under many guises, all serving the purpose oI containing the
uncertainty oI electoral outcomes: introduction oI discriminatory electoral rules; electoral Irauds;
restriction to opposition candidates` access to mass media and campaign Iinances; violation oI their
political rights and civil liberties; use oI coercion as an instrument oI dissuasion. An electoral
authoritarian regime makes use oI an institutional Iaade oI democracy in order to conceal the
reality oI an authoritarian governance. At the same time, note that in such institutional setting,
elections are more than a mere adornments. Elections, on the contrary, do matter as they are the
concrete instrument to reproduce the system itselI, one oI its Ioundational pillars. %he importance oI
this last point is conIirmed also by the deIinition oI competitive authoritarianism given by Levitsky
and Way (2002): a regime in which competition is real but unIair. Such a regime is competitive in
that democratic institutions are widely seen as the primary means oI gaining power and are not
merely a window dressing`: elections occur periodically and exhibit a meaningIul level oI
competition; oppositions legally exist, their activity takes place above ground and, in theory, they
can win. It is nondemocratic in that such victories are very unlikely because electoral Iraud is so
systematic, the harassment oI opposition candidates and their supporters (arrests, coercion, violation
oI civil liberties, etc.) is so extensive and the access to public resources and media coverage is so
skewed that the playing Iield is highly uneven.
As anticipated, the two deIinitions oI electoral authoritarianism and oI competitive authoritarianism
tend to overlap and they seem to Iocus on the same object, so that the two terms can be considered
as synonyms without risks oI conIusion. Both, in Iact, identiIy the core Ieature oI these new hybrid
Iorms oI authoritarianism in a sort oI perversion oI some oI the procedures and institutions listed by
Dahl as the core oI democracy itselI (1971) and largely acknowledged by the literature as the
standard minimum (Schmitter and Karl, 1991): elections, inclusion, competition, executive power
Iormally vested in elected oIIicials. %heir perversion consists in the persistence oI the Iormal
procedure in spite oI its systematic violation. %he eIIect oI manipulation can be imagined as the
enlargement oI the gap between the ideal and the practice oI democracy. A gap, that once
consolidated can hardly be Iilled, so that the practice has no longer nothing to do with the ideal.
In order to assess whether what Schedler, Levitsky and Way describe reIlects the actual Ieatures oI
hybrid regimes, a Iine-grained classiIication and an in-depth study oI their Iunctioning would be
needed. Alternatively, as a rough approximation, it is possible to veriIy iI, at a macro level, a similar
gap has progressively emerged and enlarged over time, i.e. when, during the second part oI the third
wave, electoral authoritarianisms have emerged and consolidated around the world. %he Polity IV
Project disaggregated panel data may serve the purpose.

XRPEN and XCNS% are two oI the Iour variables composing the Polity IV index oI democracy.
XRPEN measures the openness oI executive recruitment, i.e. extent to which all the politically
active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position in the executive through a
regularized process (Marshall et al., 2010). XCNS% measures the level oI executive constraints,
i.e. the extent oI institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers oI chieI executives. A
democracy is a country with an open system oI executive recruitment (XRPEN score4) by
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
XROPEN XCONST
No. of countries with formally open executive recruitment
vs
No. of countries with effective parity/subordination of the executive
XROPEN VS XCONST
means oI competitive elections and where accountability groups (legislature and an independent
judiciary) have an eIIective authority (XCNS% score 6 or 7). At the same time, XRPEN
measures the Iormal openness oI the system, whereas XCNS% Iocuses the eIIective constraints on
executive decision-making power. %hereIore, according to the previous deIinition, an electoral
authoritarian regime could score 4 in XRPEN but it is unlikely that it would score 7 in XCNS%.
Comparing the growth over time in the number oI countries scoring 4 in XRPEN and in the
number oI countries scoring 7 in XCNS%, thus, might tell us iI, during the third wave, the number
oI countries with a Iormally open executive recruitment which can be either democracies or
electoral authoritarianisms has increased more than the number oI countries with a substantially
limited executive power democracies only.
%he Iigure above apparently conIirms the hypothesis and the appropriateness oI the deIinition oI
electoral authoritarianism as a description oI hybrid regimes. %he emergence and consolidation oI
these new Iorms oI authoritarianism corresponded to a larger gap between the number oI countries
displaying some Iormal democratic procedures and the number oI countries actually implementing
them in practice.


2 Studying electoral authoritarianisms

2.1 1he transition to an electoral authoritarian regime
Now the attention should be Iocused on a more speciIic question: how does a polity become an
electoral authoritarianism? So Iar, the literature on regime change has Iocused on the transition
Irom authoritarian rule to democracy and the case oI a change Irom a type oI authoritarianism to
another has remained largely neglected. %he reason, again, is the legacy oI transitology, emerged at
the end oI the `80s under the inIluence oI the early successIul democratizations in Southern Europe
and Latin America and characterized by a teleologically biased perspective according to which
democracy is the natural end point oI any process oI political development. nce the possibility that
a traditional autocracy a one-party regime, a military junta, a one-man dictatorship or something
else undergoes a political transition to a diIIerent new type oI autocracy has been acknowledged,
it is also important to build a theoretical Iramework able to explain why and how a process oI
political change may take that direction.
%he aim oI this paragraph is to look into part oI the existing literature on regime change Ior
explanation oI that phenomenon. As my Ieeling is that there are not many speciIic studies on the
topic, the review will start Irom the literature on the transition to democracy in order to see iI those
analyses at least take into account the possibility oI a diIIerent outcome.
In very general terms, studies on regime change tend to Iall into two types. Some are macro-
oriented, tend to emphasize objective conditions and see political transIormation as determined.
%hese studies, strongly inIluenced by modernization theory, typically demonstrate that democracy
is a consequence oI economic development, transIormation oI class structure, increased education
and the like. Some others are micro-oriented, tend to concentrate on political actors and Iormulate
problems in terms oI possibilities and choices. %hese studies typically emphasize the strategic
behavior oI political actors involved in the process oI change.
In practical terms, the question is whether there is ground to expect that regime transIormations are
determined by some socioeconomic conditions or not. II it is the case, that is iI a Iull speciIication
oI such Iactors would uniquely account Ior regime transIormations, then the proper research
strategy would be to conduct comparative statistical studies oI patterns oI historical co-variations
and the only possible political strategy would be to wait Ior such objective conditions to mature.
%his was the dominating approach since the publication oI Lipset`s seminal article Some social
requisites oI democracy` in 1959. %his was in Iact also the case, as the 60s and early 70s roughly
correspond to what Huntington deIined the second roll-back` (1991), when many democratic
experiments in developing countries were miserably Iailing. However, the dramatic events occurred
in southern Europe and Latin America gave rise to a new openness to deemphasize the role oI
structural constraints and to highlight the possibility oI choice. %he idea that democracy and the
people who live under oppressive political regimes must somehow wait Ior the conditions to
produce it was no longer acceptable.
%he idea that the importance oI structural conditions should be rebalanced in Iavor oI people`s
agency, choices, preIerences and interests was Iirst advanced by Rustow in an article published in
1970. Rustow began his discussion in '%ransitions to Democracy with the very simple and acute
observation that much oI the literature on the causes and requisites oI democracy conIlated the two.
His point was that the Iactors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into
existence, then the two phenomena should be studied separately. In particular, concerning the latter
within which he identiIied a preparatory, a decision and a habituation phase he stressed the role
played by the relevant actors oI a polity, such as elite members, opposition leaders or new groups,
and the explicit deliberateness oI their actions and interactions, whether they take the Iorm oI
struggle or oI bargaining.
Rustow`s actor-oriented approach met a great Iavor in the subsequent years. In particular, it
represented the analytical Iramework oI `Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead`s %ransition Irom
Authoritarian Rule project, a research agenda devoted to the collapse oI authoritarianism in
Southern Europe and Latin America. From these studies emerged a series oI conclusions` about
democratization that would have structured the debate on regime change in the Iollowing decade
and would have Iormed the core oI transitology. %ransitology Iundamental assumptions can be
summarized as Iollows (Carothers, 2002). First, any country moving away Irom dictatorial rule can
be considered a country in transition toward democracy. Second, democratization tends to unIold in
a set sequence oI stages: opening when divisions appear in the ruling elite, along the cleavage
between hard-liners and soIt-liners breakthrough when the old regime collapse and new
institutions are installed consolidation when both elite and society get used to the new rules oI
the game. %hird, the underlying conditions in transitional countries their economic level, political
history, institutional legacies, ethnic composition, cultural traditions, etc. will not be major Iactors
in either the onset or the outcome oI the transition process. Fourth, the primary causal variable
during transitions is elite bargaining, i.e. the strategic interaction between leaders oI the Iormer
regime and representatives oI the opposition. FiIth, Iounding elections per se represents a key
generator over time oI Iurther democratic reIorms. Sixth, third wave democratic transitions are
being built on coherent, Iunctioning states.
It is not clear to what extent the passage Irom the speciIic a relatively small number oI cases
within a relatively homogeneous cultural area: Southern Europe and Latin America to the general
transition to democracy at large, or even democratization was originally in the authors`
intentions. Even a rapid reading oI their tentative conclusions`, however, would demonstrate the
level oI approximation oI the above guidelines with respect to `Donnell and Schmitter`s
reIlection. Largely dismissed, in particular, appear their remarks about the extraordinary state oI
indeterminacy that characterize a process oI transition Irom a certain authoritarian regime toward
an uncertain something else`; or about the Iact that those Iactor which were necessary and
suIIicient Ior provoking the collapse or selI-transIormation oI an authoritarian regime may be
neither necessary nor suIIicient to ensure the instauration oI democracy`; or, again, about the sharp
distinction existing between the processes oI liberalization and democratization and the diIIerent
outcomes when a process occurs without the other, such as dictablandas` and
democraduras`(`Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). As already mentioned, this biased perspective
proves quite unIruitIul when dealing with hybrid regimes.
Przeworski`s Democracy and the Market` (1991), probably Ior the direct participation oI the author
to that project oI research, represents a partial exception within transitology literature. In that
volume, the author developed a transition Irom authoritarian rule game which is now considered a
classic in democratization literature. %he model proceeds as Iollows. As a consequence oI some sort
oI pressure (economic decline, military deIeat, something happened in a neighborhood country,
etc.) the ruling elite oI the authoritarian regime splits into a group oI soIt-liners, who see the
introduction oI some liberalizing reIorms as a means to broaden the social base oI the regime and to
get out oI the crisis, and a group oI hard-liners, who oppose any opening reIorm. Given the ongoing
weakness oI the regime, soIt-liners have come to prominence and are now in the position oI
deciding what to do, whether to stick with the status quo or to implement their controlled opening
plan. %heir decision, however, will depend on their expectations about the intentions oI the
opposition groups, i.e. how civil society will respond to a partial opening oI the political system.
%he goal oI the partial liberalization proposed by soIt-liners, in Iact, is to co-opt some opposition
groups into a broadened dictatorship, but this outcome will be possible only iI civil society agrees to
enter. II, on the contrary, civil society decides to take advantage oI the circumstances the crisis,
the elite`s internal divisions and the new space oI action conceded and to mobilize against the
dictatorship, soIt-liners` plans will Iail. II it is the case, soIt-liners` position is strongly undermined
and, whatever it will happen, they will pay Ior their Iailure; the only thing they can do now is to
attempt to avoid the worst, a civil war. %wo choices are available. %he Iirst option is to repress
popular mobilization and to restore a narrower dictatorship led by the hard-liners. %he risk, in this
case, is that repression won`t be successIul and that an insurgency will make the state collapse. %he
second option is to accept opposition`s demands and ultimately promote the transition to
democracy.

Przeworski`s model oI transition has many merits. First, it highlights the strategic interaction
between members oI the Iormer regime and members oI the opposition groups, giving account oI
the dynamism intrinsic in these processes. Second, in line with `Donnell and Schmitter`s advices,
it includes the notion oI uncertainty, at least on the soIt-liners` side. %hird, it maintains that
liberalization and democratization are not synonyms and the Iormer can exist without the latter.
Fourth, and most important as in contrast with the spirit oI the time, the introduction oI uncertainty
makes a transition to democracy a very unlikely outcome oI a regime crisis, the result oI quite
narrow circumstances.
When soIt-liners have to decide whether to maintain the status quo or to promote liberalization
reIorms, they don`t know the real strength oI the opposition groups. %heir strength, in turn, is going
to inIluence both the likelihood oI success oI repression and ultimately the soIt-liners` initial choice.
%his will be clear in a moment, aIter having listed actor`s structures oI preIerences:
SoIt-liners Broadened Dict. ~ Status Quo Dict. ~ Narrow Dict. ~ %ransition ~ Insurgency
pposition %ransition ~ Broadened Dict. ~ Status Quo Dict. ~ Insurgency ~ Narrow Dict.
Now let`s consider the two cases oI strong and weak opposition separately and resolve the above
game by backward induction. II soIt-liners Iace a strong opposition, they will opt Ior maintaining
the status quo, given the high risk oI an insurgency in case oI repression and the opposition`s
preIerence Ior democracy instead oI a broadened dictatorship. II opposition is weak, on the
contrary, soIt-liners can obtain their most preIerred outcome: given that a deIeat in case oI
repression is very likely, opposition will accept to enter in a partially liberalized autocracy, rather
than risking to Iall in a narrower regime. In Iact, however, soIt-liners cannot be completely aware oI
the strength oI the opposition and this imperIect inIormation happens to be the key Ior making a
transition to democracy possible. %he quite unrealistic case in which soIt-liners are in Iact proto-
democratizers which mislead hard-liners notwithstanding, a transition to democracy might start only
iI soIt-liners misinterpret the situation and think they are Iacing a weak opposition whereas the
latter is actually able to organize.
Przeworski`s model, oI course, is perIectible and there are some attempts to correct his Ilaws. Gates
and Humes (1997) detect a Ilawed management oI uncertainty. %hey transIorm the model in one
with incomplete inIormation introducing nature also at the beginning, but they also introduce three
possible kind oI liberalizers (proto-democratizers; less committed; least committed), each one with
slightly diIIerent structures oI preIerences; the result is perhaps Iormally correct, but is deIinitely
more messy. Swaminathan (1999) builds a simpler game where opposition moves Iirst, but his
interest is to explain variation between peaceIul (negotiated) and conIlictual regime change, rather
than the initiation oI a transition.
All in all, Przeworski`s game, twenty years aIter its publication, is still widely accepted by the
literature and it is hard to think about an alternative model as general as that one. At the same time,
but this is a more general problem oI Iormal models oI regime transition, especially iI compared
with recent experiences with democratization and, broadly speaking, regime change, it oIten Iails.
%hat is why Barbara Geddes` contribution is, in my opinion so worthwhile.
|.| diIIerent kinds oI authoritarianism diIIer Irom each other as much as they diIIer Irom
democracy`, she argues, these diIIerences cause authoritarian regimes to break down in
systematically diIIerent ways, and they aIIect transition outcomes` (1999a). AIter having identiIied
three diIIerent types oI authoritarian regimes personalist; military; single party (plus a Iourth
hybrid mixture oI pure types) Geddes proposes and tests (Geddes, 1999b) the Iollowing
hypothesis: diIIerent types oI authoritarian government have diIIerent eIIects on the incentives
conIronting regime supporters when Iaced with challenges to the status quo. She Iinds that military
regimes, when challenged, tend to split easily and are more prone to negotiate peaceIully a
transition to competitive political systems; personalist regimes, on the contrary, tend to react
diIIiculties by circlin the waon, are more likely to end in violence and also to be Iollowed by
some other Iorm oI authoritarianism; single-party regimes, Iinally, show a high ability oI survival as
they tend to co-opt their challengers, alternatively they use to negotiate a peaceIul transition.
But the point is: do Przeworski`s model oI transition, along with Geddes`speciIications, account Ior
the instauration oI an hybrid regime and, in particular, oI an electoral authoritarianism? Yes and no.
Yes, because it envisages the possibility oI a broadened dictatorship, something quite similar to an
hybrid regime. No, because the concept oI electoral authoritarianism is something more than a
broadened dictatorship and the diIIerence between the two happens to be qualitatively Iundamental.
According to the model, a broadened dictatorship is the result oI soIt-liners` explicit will oI
stabilizing the regime and oI their rightIul perception oI the situation. %his is consistent with the
instauration oI an electoral authoritarianism, which, as we have seen, is not an accident along the
path toward democracy, but an institutional arrangement in order to guarantee regime survival by
adapting to the spirit oI the time. %hey both respond to the same imperative: Something must
change iI things are going to remain the same`, in Lampedusa`s words. But they do it diIIerently.
Authoritarian rulers promote liberalization without altering the structure oI authority, that is without
becoming accountable to the citizenry and thus become dictablandas. Electoral authoritarianisms,
similar in the substance, are characterized by a more Iine-grained surIace. %he introduction oI
political reIorms is not a limited concession in exchange oI support. ReIorms, which are even more
radical in their Iorm, become an instrument to disguise reality.
Geddes` insights, on their hand, suggest an interesting hypothesis to be tested: when military and
single-party regimes crack, they tend to give the way to a peaceIul transition to democracy;
personalist regimes, when in crisis, tend to become electoral authoritarianisms.
%o conclude, the instauration oI an electoral authoritarianism is the consequence oI an explicit will,
but it is more like the result oI a Iraud, rather than oI opposition`s ultimate agreement to enter. And
Iraud, we will see, is also at the basis oI its Iunctioning.

2.2 1he game of Rigged Elections
How do electoral authoritarian regimes Iunction? What mechanisms is their institutional
conIiguration able to trigger in order to guarantee their own survival and consolidation?
In the previous paragraphs it has already been pointed out that the main Ieature distinguishing
electoral authoritarianism Irom other traditional Iorms oI autocracy is the presence oI Iormally
inclusive and competitive elections. At the same time, the main Ieature distinguishing electoral
authoritarianism Irom democracy is the systematic manipulation oI these elections. Electoral
manipulation emerges, then, as the phenomenon whose understanding may help to explain the
capability oI electoral authoritarianism to survive and reproduce itselI.
As political regimes move Irom authoritarianism to democracy, Iounding elections are supposed to
mark the institutional break with the authoritarian past. %his is approximately what happened with
the early third wave transitions in southern Europe and Latin America. In later transitions, however,
rather than quit the political scene and negotiate extra-electoral guarantees, authoritarian rulers
opted Ior entering the electoral arena. Given that their goal was staying in power, as candidates they
try to distort and control the electoral process in order to minimize the risk oI deIeat. In doing so
they have developed several diIIerent practices. Studying these phenomena, Schedler was able to
compile a menu oI manipulation` (2002). %his ranges Irom the electoral Iraud i.e. the
introduction oI distortions in any oI the multiple steps oI the voting process, Irom the registration oI
voters to the counting oI the votes to political repression; Irom manipulating the political arena by
excluding competitors and Iragmenting the opposition Iront to altering the rules oI representation;
Irom manipulating the issue space by means oI manuIactured cleavages (international war,
terrorism, etc.) to the simple` control over the media or, again, the harassment, intimidation,
destruction oI the public reputation oI the adversaries.
Despite oI the broad array and the apparent rudeness oI the instruments at their disposal, however,
the mechanism is more Iragile and complex than it might be expected. %he Iact is that, again, an
electoral authoritarianism is not merely a liberalized autocracy. Inclusive and competitive elections
at the national level are periodically held; and elections invariably change the playing Iield. %he
convocation oI multiparty elections, however rigged, necessarily implies the opening oI a breach oI
uncertainty (Przeworski, 1991). %he strategies oI manipulation aim at containing this uncertainty,
but they can hardly eliminate it. %hen, neither incumbents nor, oI course, opponents will perceive
manipulated elections as an equilibrium solution. Almost by deIinition, manipulated elections
cannot be institutionalized as they are. n the contrary, they can be imagined in the middle oI a
gray area oI institutional ambivalence that lies between the poles oI Iull authoritarian control and
Iull democratic uncertainty` (Schedler, 2002b). %he ambivalent nature oI rigged elections suggests
Schedler to describe that phenomenon as a two-level game oI democratization by elections`. %he
name might be misleading, but it is simply due to the Iact that, in the case oI electoral
authoritarianisms, the transition Irom (traditional) authoritarian rule usually began as an apparently
genuine transition to democracy, still characterized by an almost opposite path with respect to old
democracies and early third wave democracies as well. In the latter cases elite competition over the
new rules oI the game and bargaining preceded inclusion and the call oI Iounding elections (Dahl,
1971); in the Iormer case elections have been the very Iirst step.
Let`s now Iocus the attention on the two-level nature oI Schedler`s game. %o describe it the author
makes use oI %sebelis`s notion oI nested ame: manipulated elections unIold as a nested game
where the game in the principal arena is nested inside a bigger game where the rules oI the game
themselves are variable. %he struggle between incumbents and opponents in the electoral arena is, at
the same time, a struggle over the basic rules shaping the electoral arena itselI. %he game oI
electoral competition within prevalent institutional rules is somehow nested inside a larger and
more Iundamental meta-game oI electoral reIorm, the latter unIolding simultaneously and
interacting with the Iormer.
As in all strategic games, at each stage the two actors the authoritarian government and the
opposition conIront with diIIerent choices. %he starting-point is a government calling an election
the opposition denounces as Ilawed. In continuation, (1) the incumbent decides whether to respond
to the criticism voiced by its adversaries by either attending to or neglecting their complaints; (2)
the opposition evaluates the response it gets Irom the government and decides whether to participate
or boycott the election; (3) the incumbent chooses whether to run a relatively clean election or to
commit Iraud on election day; (4) iI the ruling party is declared victorious, the opposition decides
whether to accept or protest the result; and (5) incumbents decide to repress eventual opposition
protests or respond by opening up to reIorm.



As we can see, the model admits only one possibility Ior maintaining the status quo oI a rigged
electoral system, that is opposition`s acquiescence oI electoral results. Formally, however,
opposition will hardly accept Ilawed elections as an endpoint, then such an outcome is unlikely. %he
most likely outcome, according to Schedler, is either a Iurther step toward democracy or, in worst
case, a step back toward a narrow autocracy. Electoral authoritarianism, again, is not an
equilibrium. Still, in practice, rigged elections tend to trigger cycles oI conIlict around electoral
reIorms, that may hide several traps`.
Note, Iirst oI all, the asymmetry oI the resources available to each player and the interdependency
oI the game. Government and opposition control diIIerent types oI resources, namely electoral rules
and electoral legitimacy, and this is reIlected in the model, incumbent`s choices lying at the meta-
game level, whereas opposition`s choices lying at the game level. %hat asymmetry has important
consequences, especially iI we consider the strategic interdependency characterizing the game. n
the one hand, authoritarian rulers care about at least a semblance oI legitimacy and thus need
opposition cooperation. n the other hand, opposition care about the conditions oI electoral
competition. Each side controls resources valuable to the other, and has to induce the adversary to
cooperate. %hereIore, the incumbent tries to get what he wants at the game level (opposition
participation to elections) by deploying the resources he commands at the meta-game level
(manipulation oI electoral conditions). ppositions, in turn, try to get what they want at the meta-
level (electoral reIorm) by using the leverage they have at the game level (participating/reIusing to
participate to the electoral game).
Given their conIlicting imperatives and the interdependence characterizing the game, actors
conIront with severe strategic dilemmas. n the one hand, an incumbent Iaces the trade-oII between
bringing opposition into the game (Ior legitimization) and keeping it under control. Manipulating
elections thus turns into a diIIicult balancing act: distort the electoral process not as much as
possible but only as much as necessary. n the other hand, opposition parties Iace an opposite
dilemma. %hey know that elections will be partially rigged but also that there will be a certain
degree oI openness. %hey wish to exploit this space in order to extract democratic concessions, but
this implies participating to a Ilawed election, and thus legitimating it.
%hese strategic action-dilemmas are also heightened by the uncertainties associated with actors`
correlation oI strength and thus political competition. Apparently, in Iact, any level oI
competitiveness may constitute a plausible reason Ior any kind oI strategic response |.|; it may
motivate reIorm as well as closure on behalI oI incumbents and protest as well as acquiescence on
behalI oI opposition parties` (Schedler, 2002). From the perspective oI authoritarian rulers, the
emergence oI a strong opposition may either incentivize the adoption oI manipulative strategies or
the concession oI some democratic Ireedoms in order to deIuse political protests. In case oI a weak
opposition, by contrast, incumbents may either use Iraud indiscriminately or introduce openings
without risk. From the perspective oI opposition parties, in turn, weakness may be an incentive both
to boycott and to participate, as they have little to lose. Similarly, iI they are strong, participation
might award as well as punish them (in case oI Iraud).
How to get out oI such a deadlock? %he only way an actor may deal with the traps oI the game oI
democratization by elections is by devising mixed strategies. pportunities Ior combining strategies
are available Ior both the incumbent and the opposition. n the one hand, a government may take
advantage oI its variegate menu oI manipulation. By picking the right combination oI items, an
incumbent may be able to Iine-tune elections as much as it is necessary to build credibility (and thus
to obtain legitimacy) while putting in place a Iew subtle precautions in order to contain democratic
uncertainty. n the other hand, an opposition party may solve its strategic dilemma by accepting to
stand Ior elections, while retaining the right to protest against results iI elections didn`t satisIy
minimal requisites oI Iairness.
In an electoral authoritarian regime rulers and democratic opposition gave liIe to a complex
electoral game. %he hybrid nature oI such an institutional arrangement the paradox oI
undemocratic elections is reIlected in the non-equilibrium position assigned to the status quo. At
the same time, that hybrid nature is the reason why the path toward a progressive democratization,
so close at hand in theory, is less practicable than expected. %he convocation oI rigged elections
triggers a nested game in which the competition Ior votes and the struggle Ior electoral reIorm go
hand in hand` (Schedler, 2002b). %his has consequences.
Formally, the outcome more democracy` might be achieved in three ways, either iI the government
initially decides to attend opposition`s complains, or iI it subsequently opts Ior running relatively
clean elections, or iI it ultimately concedes electoral reIorms. Given that the possibilities that the
government in the last decision point may opt Ior tightening the screw are Iew (still not null), the
non-equilibrium status quo is maintained in just two cases; either iI the opposition boycotts
elections thus missing the opportunity Ior gaining strength, or iI it accepts the rigged results. %wo
quite unlikely options, I would say. %hereIore, the inner logic oI the game seems to pull it away
Irom authoritarianism.
In practice, however, things are not as straightIorward as they might appear in the model at a Iirst
glance. %he strategic interdependence oI the two actors involved in the game, its consequences in
terms oI choices oI action, the trade-oIIs and dilemmas actors Iace given their respective conIlicting
imperatives, the uncertainty associated with power correlations and, in particular, the non-linear
eIIects oI opposition strength/weakness; all this increases the complexity oI the game. In Iact, all
this almost subverts the likelihood oI each outcome, reduces the chance oI getting the democratic
outcome and raises that oI remaining stuck in the non-equilibrium oI electoral authoritarianism.
Combining strategies, we have seen, is one technique Ior reducing the complexity oI the game.
Government, in eIIect, may well succeed in retaining power while cultivating some resemblance oI
legitimacy by mixing with ability complementary strategies oI electoral control. pposition, in turn,
can participate and subsequently protest without legitimizing the elections. But shiIting Irom the
Iiction oI the game back to reality, unIortunately, casts doubts on the eIIicaciousness oI such a
strategy. Entering the manipulated electoral game too oIten implies its legitimization and thus its
perpetuation. A posteriori protests, when (manipulated) results are public, are oIten less eIIective
than a priori battles over the rules oI the game. Honestly, how many cases oI successIul post-
electoral protests can we remember in recent years? Just as anecdotal evidence, let`s think about the
diIIerent timing oI the recent government-opposition struggles in Ukraine and Iran and the diIIerent
outcome oI these struggles. %he advantage enjoyed by authoritarian rulers is quite evident and
ranges Irom discrediting criticisms by attributing oppositions grievances to their unpopularity and
undemocratic spirit, to the use oI violence.


onclusion

%he aim oI this paper was, basically, to lay the Ioundations Ior approaching the study oI hybrid
regimes with method. First, I reconstructed the more recent trends oI political change triggered by
the third wave oI democratization. In doing so, rather than a mere literature review, I tried to
provide some evidence oI what I was saying by means oI simple descriptive statistics oI easily
available data. Even iI incomplete, raw, and largely superIicial, the tables and graphs provided
supported my arguments. Second, I addressed what in my opinion are the basic issues Ior a Iull
understanding oI electoral authoritarianism, iI ever it will be possible. n the one hand, the dynamic
oI institutional change that turned several traditional authoritarian regimes into such a particular
hybrid. n the other hand, the dynamic that makes the survival and even consolidation oI these
regimes possible.
I gave priority to studies based on rational choice theory as this was one oI the most common
approaches in regime transition literature during the 90s, when much oI the existing studies on
transition to democracy have been published. As Ior the Iormer issue, the identiIication oI electoral
authoritarianism as a by-product oI the third wave and as an almost brand new type being only
recent, many oI them were not explicitly aimed to describe the deviant` trajectory I was interested
in. However, I thought it would have been interesting to see whether those studies were able to
admit at least the possibility oI a similar deviation. As Ior the latter issue, on the contrary, rational
choice proves particularly eIIicacious in giving account oI the complex internal dynamics that
prevent a Iurther development in democratic directions oI those regimes.
%he review proposed is Iar Irom complete, but hopeIully it might represent a starting point, as this
is one oI the tasks I shall carry out in the next months.

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