Talking points on the groundless charges brought by the Prosecutor Generals office against Yulia Tymoshenko in case No.

49-3151

First: Yulia Tymoshenkos in her actions did not exceed her authority According to Article 365 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, exceeding authority or official powers is a willful commission of acts, by an official, who patently exceeds the rights and powers vested in him/her, and causes substantial damage to the legally protected rights and interests of individual citizens, or state and public interests, or interests of legal entities. The facts stated in the indictment and in the materials gathered in the criminal case do not obviously prove or justly show that Yula Tymoshenko exceeded her authority or official powers in her actions when signing the Directives dated 19 January, 2009. Throughout the entire trial, there was no precise mention of exactly which article Yulia Tymoshenko violated while negotiating with the Russian Prime Minister and signing, as a result of the negotiations, her Directives. Second: the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has no authority to issue Directives for signing contracts between two economic agents Throughout the entire trial, the prosecution tried to persuade everyone that Directives are issued only by a collegial body, i.e. such a document could be issued only by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. At the same time, the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (dated 16 May, 2008 and still effective in January 2009) says that the Cabinet of Ministers shall have no authority to approve directives for economic agents of Ukraine to negotiate and conclude agreements with economic agents of other states. According to Paragraph 3, Clause 4, Part 1 of Article 20 of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in the area of foreign policy, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall have the authority to ensure - according to the Law on International Agreements of Ukraine - decisions on issues related to concluding and executing international agreements of Ukraine. Thus, the issuing of Directives by Yulia Tymoshenko for NAK Naftogas of Ukraines delegation to negotiate with VAT Gazprom the conclusion of a saleand-purchase contract for natural gas in 2009-2019 and a contract on the volumes and terms of natural gas transit in 2009-2019, through the territory of Ukraine, cannot be considered as exceeding her authority or official powers in the form of individual actions (which can be committed only collegially) because the collegial body the Cabinet of Ministers has no such authorities.

2 Third: the Prime Minister of Ukraine has authority to issue directives. The PM issued directives for conducting negotiations and not for signing contracts. In the case files, there are a number of official letters from the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine signed by two different Ministers of Justice, a letter from the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, and findings of the Koretsky Institute of State and Law, according to which the Directives issued by the Prime Minister of Ukraine have nothing to do with directives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Moreover, according to Article 44 of the Law of Ukraine on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Prime Minister had the right to issue orders, official letters, including drafting them in the form of directives. The authority of the Prime Minister of Ukraine defined, in Article 114 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 44 of the Law of Ukraine on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, as well as procedures and forms of execution by the Prime Minister of his/her powers defined in Clause 2, Paragraph 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers, stipulated Yulia Tymoshenkos right to issue Orders of the Prime Minister, send official letters, as well as to exercise her powers in the form of oral orders to members of the Government and heads of central executive bodies. Orders of the Prime Minister that could be given by him/her according to Clause 2, Paragraph 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers in the version that was effective as of January, 2009, could have different forms and names: they could be in the form of instructions, directions, directives or orders. The same position was supported by the witnesses who are professional lawyers: Mr. Nahrebelnyi, Mr. Onishchuk, Mr. Kudriavtsev and Ms. Korniakova. Fourth: there was no intent in Yulia Tymoshenkos actions to exceed her authority The prosecution has provided no grounds and has not proved any evidence that Yulia Tymoshenko intended to exceed her authority or official powers. It also found no motive or purpose for any act that constituted a crime. The absurdity of charges is clearly seen from an extract from the indictment, verbatim: Prime Minister Tymoshenko, acting willfully, in her personal interests, understanding the groundless and unsound nature of the demands from the Russian side, wished to create a positive image of an effective head of state who is able to solve the gas crisis while conducting relations with the Russian Federation by her criminal actions, Yulia Tymoshenko tried to create an impression of alleged proper work undertaken by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine that she headed, and to pass off as her personal victory the negotiations concerning the issue, to improve her image in Ukraine and abroad. Firstly, the control over the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraines activity is the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Clause 13, Part 1, Article 85 of

3 the Constitution of Ukraine). The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is accountable to the President of Ukraine and is controlled and accountable to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine within limits stipulated by Articles 85 and 87 of the Constitution of Ukraine (Part 2, Article 133 of the Constitution of Ukraine). Only the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and not an investigator in his indictment can find proper or improper the work of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Secondly, the prosecution has provided no answer to the question of how anybody can create an impression of alleged proper work by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine by means of signing wittingly disadvantageous contracts. Thirdly, the prosecution has never proved that Yulia Tymoshenko had any personal interest while issuing her Directives for negotiations between NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine and VAT Gazprom. Fifth: there are no real losses The prosecution charged Yulia Tymoshenko with inflicting losses to the State in the person of NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine while purchasing and selling gas for technical and production consumption in the amount of UAH 1.5 billion. At the same time, there are numerous examples of evidence in the case files that prove quite the opposite. The 2009 price increase, according to the contract dated 19.01.09, was the lowest in the past 3 years. Execution of the contract dated 19.01.09 provided NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine with a profit in 2009 in the amount of UAH 3.2 billion in comparison to the year 2008. When compared with 2008, the transit rate did not change because the transit rate in the amount of USD 1.6 at the moment the contract was signed was fixed by our predecessors, by their agreements dated 2006. The rate was fixed till 2011. So, even if the contract dated 19.01.09 was not signed the transit fee for 2009 would be USD 1.6. Ukrainian legislation effective on 19.01.09 did not provide for the obligatory revision of the transit rate for transporting natural gas through the territory of Ukraine even in the event of an increase in the gas price. The purchase of gas for technical and production consumption was based on an internal agreement between the two economic agents of NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine and DK Uktransgaz. Neither the prime minister nor her directives had anything to do with concluding these agreements as they were concluded a long time before the directives of the Prime Minister were issued. Agreement 118-438 on buying and selling gas for production and technical consumption for 2009 was concluded between NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine and DK Uktransgaz on 17 December, 2008. So it took place before the agreement of 19 January, 2009 was signed and it was concluded for the volume which NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine had already owned and had bought at the price which was less than the price at which it was sold to DK Uktransgaz later.

4 In 2009, NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine costs for production and technical consumption were lower than the appropriate costs in 2008 as the gas price for production and technical consumption was lower than in 2008. The above mentioned is proved by the documents in the case files. In particular, it is proved by consolidated financial records of NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine for 2009, approved by Ernst & Young audit (adduced during the court investigation); by documents on gas received and transferred for production and technical consumption in 2005 which are in the case files; by the Revision Act of financial and economical activity PAT NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine in 01.01.08-01.03.10 of August 21, 2010 05-21/122 made by the Main control and revision office of Ukraine; by expert analysis by the Center of Court Expertise Alternatyva of September 30, 2010; by Analytical notes for a Report on the fulfillment of NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine financial plan for 2009, approved by a decree from Ukraines Cabinet of Ministers on December 29, 2010 1431, etc. Sixth: falsification of case files Some testimony by witnesses which was not made by them in the framework of this case, for example testimonies by Mr. Dubyna and Mr. Didenko, were included to the case files. Some resolutions and protocols by the investigator are registered on nonexistent dates, for example on 31 April. According to the protocol, 506 pages of documents were taken from NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, but there are two times less documents in the case files. The copy but not the original of the Directives of the Prime Minister of Ukraine of 19 January, 2009, which is the main evidence of the prosecution, was adduced to the case files. This copy does not bear the personal signature by Tymoshenko Y.V. but is in fact a facsimile of her signature. Very complex judicial and economic examinations were undertaken in a short period of time from the date when the experts received the documents. Examinations have been made on the basis of the documents that are absent in the case files. An examination was made into the violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without informing defendant Y.V.Tymoshenko, which lost her the defense the opportunity to formulate questions to ask experts. It was impossible to question Maslak because of deliberate actions by the prosecution. The court adduced the note from hospital on his hospitalization on 31 August, 2011, which is the day the court approved the defense petition to question him in court. Furthermore, this note was addressed to the prosecutors office, not to the courts address.

5 Seventh: Absence of corruption in the actions by Yulia Tymoshenko Despite publicized statements by authorities that the criminal case against the former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko was one of the cases that demonstrate the authorities fight against corruption in the country, in the case files there is no single point or document which even proves indirectly that the actions by Yulia Tymoshenko were corrupt. During the pre-trial investigation as well as during trial investigation, the prosecution failed to name the exact norm in Ukraines law which Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister violated when issuing the order of 19 January, 2009 in the form of directives, saying nothing of proving an intention to benefit personally, which is an integral part of a corruption action. There is no reference to there being present any signs of corruption in the actions of Yulia Tymoshenko in the indictment, so it is absurd to say that the criminal case against Tymoshenko is one of the cases that demonstrate fighting corruption in Ukraine.