xii

Prehce

edsement also goes to Linda Singer, whose persistent radicalism.has [.3"'i""ifr"n; S;Jr;B;rtky f6r her work and hcr timely words of Nicholion for her editorial and critical advice' ;;il;;;;;;;ii;i"

Anierson for her acute political intuitions. I also thank shaped and ,f,. 6ii"*r"g-i.ai"ia""it, friends, and. colleagues.who Peter Caws' Azar' ;;;;;J m"v thinking' Eloise Moore Agger, In6s

;;tii;;"

Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire
(

iJff;F.

Kathy'|'Jaranson, Lois Natanson, Maurice Natanson, sir.ibi"r, l"ri,-ilrliii., Margaret soltan, Robert V. Srone, Richard Votaw. i th""i Sandra Schmidt for her fine work in V^"1, ""d'fszti this manuscript, and Meg Gilbert for her assisrance. hfii;il pi.p"r. and I also thank Maureen MacGrogan for eniouraging this, proiect guldance' others with her humor, patience' and fine editorial "'il!J;;", I thank \fuendy Owen for her relentless imagination,

C"it,

)n

c is

" t o"'ll, x;:]l';' :]; T:'" l,'l'j;'

,o,,",";, ill!'J,1,'Jll:;:

l';ec<'; nr

es

..e'

Strictly speaking. "worrerr" cannot lre saicl to exist.

",...
trris nori<,n

'r'he deploynrent .,,

,"--,';i'.'. l'lt;lj;l,rn.o
Foucaulr

.f

sex.

'l'he category

k";;;i;-t*,

and for the provocation of her work'

.f

scx

-Michel is the p.litical caregut;li;nr"rdr

society as h*crosexual.

i. "'Wotnen"

as the Subject of Feminism

u"*ft1it?:,.r"..K;;

i[:t!:: i#rinism

and rlte subversiort

of ictentitv.

For dte most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some cxisting idcrrtity. rrndcrsfood througlr thc c:rtcgory of women, who not orrly initiatcs fcnrinist interests and goals witlrin discourse, but constitutcs the subject for whom political represenration is pursued. r\ut politics and reprcsentation are controveisial terms. on the one h'and, representa,tiort scrves as the operative term within a political i process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy ro *.r-en / ", political subjects; on the other hand, represeniation ii the normativei function of a lirnguage which is said either to reveal or to distort what is irssumccl to bc trr-rc about the category of women. For feminist tlrc.ry, the dcvcloprrnc't of a la'guirge that fully or adequately represcnts wonrcn has sccnred necessirry to fostcr thc political visibility .f wor'cn. This has seenrcd obvio.sly import:rni considering thc pcrvasive cultural condition in which wonrcn's livcs were eithcinrisrcprescntecl or not representeci at all. Rcccntly, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist tlreory and politrcs has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The vcry subject of women is no longer understood inl st:rblc or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only qucstions the viability of "rhe subject" as the ultimate candidate for rcprcsentation or, indecd, liberation, but there is very little agreemcnt after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought ti, .onstitute, the catcgory of women. The d'mains of political and linguistic "representatiorr" sct out in aclvancc the criterion by whiclr subjects themselvcs arc forrnccl, with the rcsult th:rt rcprescntation is extcnded only to what can bc ackrrowlcclgcd as a sulrject. In otlrcr worcls, tlrc qualihca-

2/

Subiects of Scx/(iendcr/l)csirc

Subjects of Sex/Gencler/Desire

tions for being a subject must firsr lre met beforc reprcscntation can

points out that iuriclical systcllls of powcr prodtrce thc ,ut i"." ilr"y ,ubr"qucnrly comc to rcprcscnt.r Juridical lrotio.s of n"*.i "no.ar t' rcgulatc political lifc iir purcly tcgativc tc.rnrs-thnt is. thr,luei.t thc lir'itati,rr, pr.hi6ition. rcgulrrtitn, control irlrd cvctt ;;o-i".ii?rn" of individuais'related to that political structurc through tli" .,inti"g.nr ancl rerragable opcration of choicc. But thc subjccts rl"ul.r"a liv ,u.l', structurcs ".", lry virtue .f bcing subiccted t. t6cnr, frr?mc.l, .lcfilrc.l, ancl rcprodtrccd in acctlrtlrtncc witlr tlrc rcquircntcttts nf rtr"." srrucrures. lf tliis anelysis is right, thcl tlrc itrridical fprntatiotr ;il;i;;;;;. and politics that'represe-nts womcn as "the subiect" .f i.t"irii!. is itself a discursive foimation ancl cffect of a given version politics. And the femi.ist subjcct.turns out to bc "i..e".r."rational y consrit;recl by the very political system that is s'pp.scd Jir.Jrri".f to facilitatc irs cnrarrcipaiion. l his bc.nnt.t politically p.ro[rlctn:rtic ii if-,^, iyr"m can bc'shown to producc gc'clcrcd,s.ubiccts, along a differential axis of domination or to produce subiects who are nr.ru,t.d to be masculine. In such casei, an uncritical appeal to i".ir-" ryr,"nr for thc clrr:rncipatiorr of "w<lnrcn" will bc clcrrrly sclf-

be extcnded. - -lnr."ult

contract.

wcll as the i.vocatio' of a tcmporal "before,,' is co.stituted by the law as the fictivc fbtrnclation 6f its own crairn ro r",{iiin;u. rh" prcv.r ilirrg assrr rrr rrrirrrc f r Irc orr rologicar integrity .,i t1.,.'lubi..ii.ror. tlrc raw mrght bc undcrstood as thc contenrp()rary tracc of thc statc of naturc hypothcsis, rhat f,undationalist iable conitiru,iu.-Lr ,n" juriclical stru*ures of classical liberalism. The p.rf"ri;;il; i;".."tion of a nonhisrorical "before" becomes tn" ror"a"iion"iir","ir. that guarantccs a prcsocial ontology of persons who frcely tonscnt to bc governcd and. thcrcby, constiture trre regitimacy of ihe sociar

_t

crucialfor.politics, and for,fenrinist politics'in parricular, because iuridical subiects-are irtvariab]r. Rto"show" iir."J ,nr,-g6 .e.tain exclusionary p.racticcs that do not In other j"riiical structure of politici has. been established. ,fr. "".. thc political consrrucrion of thc subiect pr<rceeds with. certain ...ai, lceitirnating and exclusionary aims, and thcsc p<llitical operations arc .f%.,i".f f !onccalc.l and naruralizedby a political analysis that.takes iuridical srructurcs as rheir foundation. iuridical powcr .inevitably i oruau..r" whar it clairns mcrcly to reprcsc't; ltcttce, p,litics rnust #'.;;;;;;"a *itn this dual funciion of'p.wcr: thc juridical and thc o.uJu.tiu.. ln cffect, thc law produccs arrtl thcn cottceals thc notion ii-;" ,"Ul.c bcfore the law'"' in order to irtvokc that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently i;;i;i;", rhar law's own regulatory hegemony.- lt.is not enough to in?rlr. into how women -[1tt beiome more fully rcpresented in i;;;;;;"'t"d politics. l'cminisi critique ought also to urtdcrstattd.how /ff.r;;;;y Jf :;*u*"n," the subjcct of leminism' is produced and l;;;;i;;i by the vcry srructures of powcr through which enrancipaltion is sought. fcminism raiscs the subiec't of '" r"i".J, ,ie questionnraywomen as subicct wlr.ofstands "bcf.rc" the thc not bc a rfr-"i t1r"r. p,"ril-iiuy t6e subiect' as rcprescntaiion in or by thc law. l'erhaps i"*,

defeating. --ffr.

qi.r,ion of "rhe subie6"

is

t .

idcntity. Rather than a^stable signifier that commands the assent of those whonr it.purports to dcsciibe and rcpresent) wontez, cven in \ thc plural, lrrrs bccorne a troublesome term, a sitc of contcst, a cause for anxiety. As Dcnise l{iley's titre suggests, Am I T'hat No*,r{i"i', q.uestiorr produced by. the u"ty po*illrity of the n"n.,"'s*uitipt" significatiorrs.t If onc "is" i'r *or',n.,, that is surcly nor rli on"-ir; tt . term fails to bc exhaustive, not because a pregeudered .,rrerson,, tra nsccn ds tlrc speci 6c pa raphcrna i a of its g"ni"rjuu. u..^uri g"na.. is not always constituted coirerentry or.onrTrt.nrry i, airi.r"rih-iitori^.ri"i., cal cortexrs, and because gender intersects *itrr sexual, and regional modalidcs of discursiv.ty .onrtltur.Jialrrlti.r. "rliri,^.i"rr, As.a rcs-ult, it becomcs impossibrc to scparate out "gen<Jer" from the political and cultural i.teisecriors in which it iti"r?ri"biy prom..a
r

encounters in the assumption that the term

. Apa.rt frorn thc foundationalist fictions that supporr the notion of 'r"]'''inirthc subject, howevcr, there is the poriticar p.obi;;;t

", *o*nndcnotes,

.o--on

ancl maintaincd.

"*"iting

- llrg politicrrl assurnprio' that there must be a universal basis for fcminism' one which musr be found in an identlry;rr;;;iil'.*irt cross-culturally, ofte' accompanies the notion tt,"t th" nppr*"rsion of wolrcn lras sorne singular fornr discernibre irr the u'iversar or hegcmonic srructure of pJrriarchy or mascurin" d"-in"t;;. ih; ,rtion of a .universal patriarchy has been widery ..rtior.a in';;;;;';."., for lts tallure to accornt for trre workings of gcndcr oppression in the concrere cultural contexrs in which it*existi. wher"'th"s"-uriiou, contcxts have becn consulted within such theories, it has o""n io nna 'examplcs" or "illustrations" of a universal p.in.ipi" tir"i" ,rri*.a from the start. That form of feminist theorizing nr, .o*" -rrra"i criticism for its efforts to c,lonize and appropriatJnon-!7"rt".n .ultures to supporr. highly Wcsrern notioni of opprcssion, bur tr"."ur. rtrcy tcnd as wcll to constnrct ir "Tlrird World" or even an ..Orient,' in wlrich .gendcr opprcssion is. subtry exprained ,r rffitoJ"ti. or an cssenfial, non-western barbarism. The urgen.y r"nrinirrr, ,o
"r

4i

Sublects of Scx/(lendcr/Desirc
Suby'ects

of Sex/Gender/Desire

"women," the corollary to that framework, has bccn mucir morc difficult to clisplacc. ccrtainly, rhcrc Iravc [rec' plc'ty of c]cbatcs: Is therc some commonality amoug "womcn" that preexists thcir oppression_, or do "womcn" have a bond by virtuc of thcir opprcssiorr alone? Is there a spccificity to w<)men's cultures tl-rat is incicpendent of their subordination by hcgemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of women's culrural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the tcrnr.s <lf sontc morc clonrinant cultural formarion? If rhcre is a regio'of the "spccifically feminine," onc that is both differe'tiated from thc masculin" r,, su.h and recognizable in its clifference by an unmarked and, hcnce, prcsumed universality of "women" ? T'he masculine/fe minine binary constitutes not only thc cxclusive framcwork in wlrich that spccificity cirn bc recognizcd, but in cvery other w:ry the "specificity" olthc fcmininc is once again fully deconrexrualizcd and separated off an:rlytically l- and politrcally from the constitution of class, race, chnicity, and other (N rxcs of prwer rclati<lns that both constitutc "itlcrrtity" alrd lrrrkc thc singular notion of identity a misnomer.o My suggcstion is that the prcsumed universality and unity of the subjcct of fcr-ninism is effcctively underminccl by thc co'srraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the prcmature insistence on a stable subject of fcminisnr, unclcrstood as a seamless category of womcn, inevitably gcneriltes multiple rcfusals to accept the category. T'hese domains of cxclusio' revbal thc coercive and regulatory conseque nces of that constructiorl, cven when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposcs. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminisnr and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from "women" whom feminisrn claims to represenr suggest the necessary limits of iclentity politics. 'The suggestion thirt feminism can seek wider reprcscntation for a subject that it itself constructs has tlre ironic coltsequcncc that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take accounr of the constitutive powers of their own represcntational claims. This problcm.is not amcliorated through iln appeal to thc catcgory of womcn for nrcrcly "stratcgic" purposcs, for strirtcgics alwitys lravc nreanings that cxceecl the purposcs for which thcy are intcndcd. In

establish a universal status for patriarclry in orclcr to strengthcn tlrc appcarancc of fernirrism's owl-l claims to bc rcprcscntativc has occasionally motivatecl tlre shortcut to a catcgorial or fictivc univcrs:rlity of the structure of domination, hcld to proclucc wr)men's common su b juga tctJ expcriencc. Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longe r en joys the kind of credibility.it once did, the norion of a gencrally shared coriception of

frame a critique of the. categories of rdentity that contem_ porary juridical srru*ures engender, ;;;;;;;;i'iir,"lflir.. Pcrhaps thcre is arr opporrunity at this jun*ure a pcriod rhar somc *,ru[d ."tt ..["rir"_i;;;;:;";; "f;i;;;;i;olitics, ;;n.* illi,j wirhin a fcminist perspcctive on tlre i;,;.ri;r, to corlsrruct a subject of fcrrrinisrn. within fcrninist porirrcar p.".r;.., ."di."l'.Jr;iik,ng ,,f t'c .nr.logicar consrru*ions " order ro f'rmurarc a reprcscntatiorrar poririti "ill.;;;; "ppears ro hc nccessary in i;;; ,i*rr,'ri"i"" r"-i rrisrn on other gr.rrnds.'o_rr ,t.'" .rit i.rin"cr, it may bc tinrc ro crrtcrtain a raclical cririquc rhar sccks," rr."",. i.rlnirt trr"n'ry i.,,-ilr" n"."rriry of to .rnrt.,,.t a single ,, conresrcd bv thosc idcntity ^aving "blJ;;; grou.nd whi.t i, in"r.irUly fositions o, p.riii"", it inva ria bly cxcludes. Do.rri"' ;i;-r;;;r; "-nii-id.nriry groundthat ipracriccs rhat fcm rrist thcory in a norion of "womcn" nr rui'"., paracroxicary undercut fcnrinjsr goals to extend its claims a ;ilpr.r"nrarion,,?, , Pcr.'rps the-pro.trenr is evcn -,r." r".ious. Is the construction of the carcgory of women as a cohcren."na ,,rul. ,rul"._i"" ,ir*irrirg rcgulation and rcification of ;;";;r;;i"rions? Ancl is nor such a reification prcciselv cottrary tJ feminist aims? T'o wlrat cxtent thc cetcgory of wrmerr ,;;;;i;;; and coherence onry incloes trrc ".(i"u" conrcxr of rhc hererosexuar nratrixi; ir I r,rr'r.;;;;;;i;;tni". no longcr provcs to bc.the f;";;;;i;""i' pcrhaps a ncw sort of f"n'in;sif"rliii' i.",',ir" of fcnrinisi politics, i#'.";;';;";l;;"'.1"#rlrr rr,. vcry reificationg giselder and ii.ntiry, on" that w'rtake the variabre ';,,d"no.ir"riu" consrructi,rr of idenriry as botrr m.ihodor"gi.;r prerecluisite, if nor a political goal." T, rracc rhc ooliric'a.t op"."?rtrtr that produce alrd conccar what quali6.cs as rhc.iuridi.;lr;L;;;';i'i..,n;Jis precisery thc task of a fe;ninist geneatogy of the :ir.s9;i;i';;;"". rn the course of rhis ctf.rr to q.csrion "wonrcn" riiu;".:, of feminism, thc unproblcrrrrrtic irrvocrrtion of th:rt .","g,riyir"r"p-r" "r"rr'r" tt) prc(lu.lcrhc possibil_ ity.f fcrrririsrr as e ."1',."r",rr"iiurt"r pi,tlriir. wn'"r'*,,r" i"iJiil,r"r." to cxrcnd reprcsenrarion to subjed ;i;;'are constructed through

casc, excrrsion itse.rf nrigrrt quarify as suc. a' unintended yct collse(lucntial nreaning. Bv conf( ."pr"*",,r,,ii.,,,,,r p.,ritil;';ri;, ii,,;;:l;'T;l:r,':l_",,':liil,T':;ilil: ferninism r'us .ncrrs itsclf to ;h;.;;; obviouslv',rr"'p"ruii"i ;";i ;';?,L "i g.*r'",;r."prlr.nr"rio". ."fur.. tics-as if we cou[d. T'c iuridical ,i*rur", rcprcscnrarionar pori.,f trlrg;rg";;; ;;iffi; consrirrrre the contcmporary 6eld fo't"".; hencc, ri_,"rii, no posrrron I/ outsitl-his Ecrd, hur orrrv ..iti."i!*".r.,gy "f oii,;;;,; i;;itimating I " As such, the i.ritical p"i;; ;f'd;J*;" t)r:rcriccs. t;;/ri*'iir,orirrt presetrt, as Marx put it. And tlc task is ro formulare witrrin this crnstitutcd

t.is

5/

Subjects of Sex/Gcndcr/Desirc

Subiects of Sex/GcndcrlDesire

I7

the exclusion <lf those who fail to conform to unspoken norrnativc requircmcnts of the subject? What relations of domirration and exclusion are inaclvertently sustained when reprcsentation becomes the solc focus of politics? Thc identity of the fenrinist subject ouglrt not to be the foundation of fcminist politics, if thc fonnation of the subjcct takes placc within a lield of power regularly buried through thc assertion of that foundation. Pcrhaps, parad<lxically, "reprcsentnrtion" will be shown to makc sensc for feminism only when the sulrject of "w<lmcrr" is l-towhcre prcsumcd.

ii. The Compulsory Order of Sex/Gender/Desire

Although the unproblcmatic unity of "womcn" is oftcn invoked to construct a solidarity of identity, a split is introduccd in the feminist subject by tlre distinction bctwecn sex and gcndcr. Originally intcndcd to disputc thc biology-is-destiny formulation, the distinction bctwccn sex and gender serves the argumcnt that whatevcr biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructcd: _lrgpg_e, gcndcr is ncither the causal result of sex nor as sccmingly fixed as sex. 'l"lre unity of thc subjcct is tlrus already potcntially contested by thc distinction that permits of gendcr as a multiplc interpretation of sex.' ," If gender is tlrc cultural mcanings that thc sexed body assumes, the n or]e way. l'akcn .r* *- a gcndcr cannol hc said to follow frorn a scx in arry a radical disconto its logical limit, the sex/gendcr distinction suggcsts

tinuity between sexcd bodies and culturally coustructed genders. Assuming for the moment thc stability of binary scx, it does not follow that thc construction of "men" will accruc exclusivcly to the bodies of males or that "women" will intcrpret orrly fernale bodies. Furthe r, cven if the scxes appear to be unproblematically binary in thcir morphology and constitution (which will become a question), thcre is no rcason to assume that genders ought also to rcmain as two.* Thc presumptiorr of a binary gender system implicitly retains the bclief in a mimetic rclation of gcnder to sex whereby gcnder mirrors scx or is otherwise rcstricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is tlrcorized as raclically independent of sex, gende r itself becomes a frcefloating artifice, with the consequence th.at man and masculine might just as casily signify a female body as a male one, and ruoman and
feminine a tnale body as casily as a fcmalc orrc. 'l-his radical splitting of the gendered sutrjcct poses yet anothcr set of problcms. Can we refer to a "givcn" sex or a "given" gender without 6rst inquiring into how sex andlor genclcr is givcn, through what means? And what is "sex" anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or I'rormonal, and how is a fe minist critic to assess the

scicrrtific cliscourscs which purport to cstablish such "facts" for us?' Docs scx have a history?"'Does each sex have a different history, or histories? Is therc a history of how the duality of sex was established, a gcncalogy that might cxpose the binary options as a variable constructi'n ? Arc the ostensibly narural facts of scx discursively produced by various scicntific discourses in the servicc of other political and social inte rcsts ? If thc immutable charactcr of sex is contcitcd, perhaps this construct callcd "sex" is as culturally constructcd as gender; inclccd, prerhaps it was llways already gen.ic., with thc .o,rr".-qu",r.. that tlrc clistinctiou bctwcc. sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.rr It would make no sense, then, to define gender as the cultural intcrprctation of scx, if sex itself is a gendcred cltcgory. Gender ought not to be conceivecl mgrely as rhe cultural inscripiion of mcaning on a. prcgivcn scx (a juridical conception); gender must also designate thc very appararus of production where6y the scxes tlrcmselves are cstablished. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gerrder is also the discursive/cultural means by which "scxed nature" or "a natural sex" is produccd and establishcd as ,.prediscursivc,', prirrr to culturc, a politic:rlly neutral surfacc on whiih culture acts. This construction of "sex" as the radically unconstructed will concern us again in thc clisctrssion of Ldvi-Strauss and structuralisrn in chapter 2. At this juncure it is already clear that one way the internal stabiliry and binary frame for sex is effectivcly secured is by casting the dualiry of scx in a precliscursivc clomain. This production of sex a"s the prediscursive- ought to be understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultrrral construction designated by gender. How, then, jtes gendcr need to bc reformulated to encompais the power relatio's thit produce the.effect of a prediscursive six and so conceal that vcry operation of discursive production?

iii. Gender: The Circular Ruins of Contemporary Debate

Is tlrere "a" gender whiclr persons are said to baue, or is it an essential attribute rhat a person is said to be, as implied in the question

"What gendcr are you?"? When feminist theorisis claim that gendcr is the cultural interpretation of sex or that gender is culturally constructed, what is thc manner or mechanismof this construction? If gender is constructed, cor:ld it be constructed differently, or does its constructedness imply some form of social determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agc'cy and transformation? Does "constructionn suggest fhat certain laws generate gcnder differences along universal axes of scxual differcnce? How and where does the conslruction of

ti /

Subjccts of Scx/Gcrrdcr/l)csirc

Subjects of Scx/(icnclcr/l)csirc

gendcr takc place? lWl'rat scnse can wc makc of a constructiou that cannot assume a hunrarr c()nstructor prior to tlrat constnrction? On somc accor.rnts, thc notion that gcndcr is constructcd suggcsts :r ccrtiliu clctcnninisrn of gcndcr meanings inscribccl olr anirtolrlicaIly diffcrcntiated [roclics, whcrc tlrosc bodics are utrclerstoocl as passivc rccipiclrts of an inexorable cultural law. Whcn thc rclcvarrt "culture " tlrat "constrlrcts" gcncler is unclcrstoocl in terrns of such a lirw or sct of laws, tlrcn it scclns that gcrrdcr is irs clctcrnrincd :rnd fixccl as it w;rs urtclcr thc biology-is-clcstirry fornrulation. ln suclr 1r crlsc, rrot biology, but ctrlttrrc. hcc<lrrrcs rlcstirry. On the <rther hand, Sinrorrc clc Bcauvoir suggcsts i:rt'['lte Sccond Sex tlrat "orrc is not born a w()man, but, rathcr, bccomcs <)nc."'' For llcauvoir, gcnclcr is "constructcd," but impliccl in hcr fornrLrlatiorr is an agcnt, a cogit<t, who sonrchow takcs on or appropriatcs th:rt gcndcr

{ rfi

and coulcl, in prrinciple, tirke on somc otl.rcr gcrrdcr. Is gcnclcr rrs variablc arrcl v<>litionirl as lle:ruv<lir's account secnrs to suggest? Oart "constructiolr" irr such a casc bc rcduccd to a fornr of ch<licc? lle auvoir is clear that onc "becorres" a woman, but always urrdcr a cultural compulsior.r to bcconrc onc. Arrcl clearly, thc conrpulsion docs trot conrc fr<lrn "scx." I'hcrc is rrotlring irr lrcr llcc()urrt thlrt gttlrratrtccs that tlrc "olrc" who bccolncs A w()nrrllr is rrcccssarily fcnralc. If "thc body is:r situation,"" as shc clainrs, tlrcrc is n() rcc()rlrsc to a lrody th;rt has not always alrcacly bcclr intcrprctccl by crrltural nrcanings; hcncc, scx coulcl not qualify as a prccliscursive auatontical facticity. lndeed, scx, hy defirrition, will bc shown t<> lrave bccrr gcrrdcr all along.'t 'fl.rc controvcrsy over thc mcaning of constructiort appcars to founclcr on tlre convcntional philosophical polarity bctwccn frcc will and dctcrnrinisnr. As il consequcnce, ()ne nright rcasonably suspcct that sonrc conlllr()r't lirrgrristic rcstriction on thought b<lth fornrs and lirnits thc tcrrns of thc dclratc. Within tlrosc tcrn.rs, "thc body" appcars as a pilssivc mcdiunr on whiclr cultural mcanings arc iuscribcd or irs thc instrtrnrcnt through which an appr<lpriativc and intcrprctivc will dcternrincs a cultural rneaning for itsclf. In citlrcr casc, thc body is figurccl as a rncrc instruntent or medium for wlrich a sct of culturirl nrcalrings arc orrly cxtcrnally rclatcd. But "tlre bocly" it itsclf a constructi()n, as arc thc rnyriatl "bodics" tlrirt constitutc thc dorn:rin of
gcndcrccl subjccts. IJoclics carulot bc saicl to lrirvc a sigrrifiablc cxistcttcc prior to the nrark of thcir gcndcr; thc rlucstiorr thcrt cnrcrges: 'lir what cxtent docs rlrc I'totly come into lrcing in ancl tlrrough tlrc nrark(s) of gcnclcr? How clo wc reconceivc the body no longcr :rs i.t passive

Wlrcther gcrrclcr or scx is fixed or frcc is a function of a discourse which, it will bc suggcstccl, seeks ro sct ccrtain limits to analysis or to safcgtrard ccrtairr tcncts of humanisrn as presuppositional to any rrrralysis of gcndcr. l'hc locus of intractability, whcthcr in "sex" or "gcnclcr" or in thc vcry mcarring of "c<lnstructi{1n," providcs a clue to wlrat cultural possibilitics can ancl cannot bcconre nrobilized tlrrouglr any furt[.rcr analysis.'fhc linrits of the cliscursive analysis of gcnclcr prcsupposc arrcl prccurpt the possibiliries of irrraginable and rcalizablc gcnclcr coufigurati<lns within culrurc. l-his is llot to say that arry and all gcnclcrccl possibilitics arc open, lrut tlrat tlrc boundirrics of lnalysis suggest the linrits of a discursively conclitioncd expericncc. "I'lrcsc lirnits irre always set within the tcrms of a hcgemonic cultural cliscoursc prcclicatcd on binary structures that appc:rr as thc language of univcrsal rationirlity. Constraint is thus built into what that language constitutcs rrs thc irnirginablc dornain of gencler. Although social scientists rcfer to gender as a "factor" or a "dimension" of an analysis, it is also applied to enrbocliecl pcr5en5 1t "" nrark" of biological, lirrguistic, irud/or cultural cliffcrcnce. In thcse laftcr cirscs, gcndcr can bc undcrstood as a signification that an (al-

fication cxists only in relati<ttt to anothcr, opposing significatiorr. fcminist thcorists cl:rinr that gcnder is "a rclation," indeed, a sct of rclations, and not an individual attribute. Othcrs, following Bcauvoir, would argue that only the femininc gender is markcd, th:rt
Sorr.re

rcady) scxtrally differcntiated body assunres, but evcn thcn that signi-

nrcdium or instruruent awaiting thc cnlivcnirrg capircity of a clistinctly

inrmatcrial will?''

thc universal person ancl the masculine gender are conflated, thereby de{ining wonrcn in tcrnrs of their sex and extolling rncn lls the bcarers of a body-transccrrdcnt univcrsal personhood. hr a rnove that complicatcs the discussion further, Luce Irigaray argues tlrirt women constitute a paradox, if not a contracliction, within thc drscourse of idcntity itself. Women are the "sex" which is not "ol'Ie." Within a language pervasivcly masculinist, a phallogocentric larrguagc, women constitute tlte unrepresentable. In <lther words, women reprcscnt tlre sex that cannot be thought, a lirrguistic absencc irncl opacity. Within a language thirt rests on univocal signification, thc fcrnalc sex constitutcs the unconstrainable and undcsignatable. In this scnsc, women are thc sex which is not "one," lrut nrultiple.'o In opp<lsition to Beauvoir, for whom womcn are dcsignated as the Other, Irigaray argucs that both the subjcct and thc Othcr arc masculine mainstays of a closed phallogocentric signifying economy rhat achicvcs its totalizing goal through thc cxclusion of the feminine altogctlrcr. For Bcauvoir, women are the ncgativc of mcn, thc lack

10

Subiects of Sex/Gender/Dcsire

Subjects of Scx/Gender/Desire

1l

aeainsr which masculine identity diffcrcntiatcs itsclf; for lrigaray, i-ti"t olrti.ular dialcctic constitut;s a systcm tlrat cxcluclcs an cntircly J;il;i;;;a',,trotny of signification. \Womeir are not only rcprescntcd i"ir"iy ,riitrin the Sartrftn frame of signifying-su6jcct ancl significtlothcr, but the falsity of thc signification points Out thc clltirc structtlrc

.rf ,.pr.r"nration as inaclcqiate. Thc sex which is not onc' thcn' or.rvi'dcs a point of dcpartuic for a criticisrlt,lf lrcgcrrtttnic Wcslcrrl i"p."*tir"rilrn .,.rd ,rf thc n.tctaphysics of stthstrtttcc tlrrrt strtrcttrrcs tlrc vcry notiotr of thc subicct' What i, tfic rtrct:rpliysics of substrttrcc,:rrrtl lrow cl6cs it itlf11rtl thinking about the categorics of sex? ln thc first instancc, ltunranist

is not a relevant notion here. Even in their variety, discourses constitutc so many modalities of plrallogocentric languagc. The fcmale sex is thus also the subiect that is not one. Thc rclation bctween masculine and femininc cannot be represented in a signifying economy in which thc masculine constitutcs the closed circle of signifier and significd. Paradoxically enough, Beauvoir prefigured this impossibility in The Second Sex when shc argued that men could not settle the question of women because they would then be acting as both judge and party
t<l thc crlsc.t*

.""."pfi."r of the subielt tend ro assunle a sr,rbstantivc

fenrinist pgsitiol might undcrstand gcndcr as

pcrson who is

the bcare r <tf various essential and nonesscntial rrttributcs. A humanist

art attribute of a pcrson is cliaracterizeiessentially as a pregeldcrcd substarlce or "cOrc''' who

r"lf"J ,h" p"rrnn, denoting a uniu'etsal -capacity .for rcas<ln, nloral c{eliberation, o, languag". The universal conceptioll of thc. pcrson' h;;;"., is displaced ai a point of depart're for a social theory of j""a"r f,y thosJ historical and anthropological positiorts thart utrdcrrt^n.l g.;l.1.r as a relati<trt anr()rrg soci:rlly cotrstittltctl sr-rbiccts irr

J c

spccifiablc colttcxts. 'I'his rclationai or colltcxttlal- point of vicw sttgg"sts th"t what tlrc person "is,'and, indccd, wh:rt gcndcr "is," is ;l.ry;;;l";i". i" th.'."nstruced relations in which it ii detcrrnincd. '' As a .shifting and contextual phenomclloll' gcndcr does not denotc a ,.,Urto"ti"""t eing, but a relative poi't of convcrgencc among cr:lttrrally and historically specific sets of relations' iric.arav w,uld mairrtain, lrowevcr, that t5c fcmirrinc "scx" is a p.,i,riof iirrguistic absence, thc impossibility of a grammatically clenot..l ,ubst"nncc, and, hcnce, the point of vicw that exposes. that subsrance as an'abiding and foundadonal illusion of a tnasculinist ;;;;". This irbscnce'is nor marked as suclr within the m:rsculine sisni fvtne cconomy-a contcntion that rcvcrses Bcauvoir's argulncllt is nralc t"'i,a lviitig's) thai rhc fcmalc scx is nrarkcd. whilc thc -scx lrigaray, the female sex is not a "lack" or an "Othcr" that ir",. f'",. i-.an"ntly'ani negariucly defines thc subiect in its masculinity. On thc contr"ry, the feliale sex eludcs the ve ry rcquircmcnts of reprcscn-

The distinctions among the above positions are far frorn discrete; each of them can be understood to problematize the locality and meaning of both the "subject" and "gender" within the context of socially instituted gender asymmetry. The interpretivc possibilities of gendcr are in no scnsc exhausted by the alternatives suggested above. Thc problematic circularity of a feminist inquiry into gender is underscorcd by the prescnce of positions which, on the one hand, presume that gender is a secondary characteristic of persons and those which, on the other hand, argue that the very notion of the person, positioned within languagc as a "subject," is a rnasculinist construction and prcrogativc which cffcctivcly cxcludcs thc structural and semantic possibility of a fenrininc gencler. The consequence of such sharp disagreements about the meaning of gender (indeed, whcther gender is the term to be argued about at all, or whether the discursive construction of sex is, indeed, more fundamental, or perhaps ruomen or wonwn andlor men and man) establishes the need for a radical rethinking of the catcgorics of identity within the context of relations of radical gender asymmetry. For Beauvoir, the "subjcct" within the existential analytic of misogyny is always already masculine, conflated with the universal, differentiating itself frorn a fcminine "Other" outside the universalizing
norms of personhood, hopelessly "particular," emLrodicd, condemned to immanencc. Although Bcauvoir is often understoocl to be calling for tlre right of women, in effect, to become existential subjects and, hence, for inclusion within the terms of an abstract universality, her position also irnplies a fundamental critique of the very disenrbodint of the abstract masculine epistemological sub jcct.'u Tlrar sub ject is abstract to the extent that it disavows its socially rnarked emboclime

tation, f.r. ri.t" is lcither "Other" nor the "lack," tho,se categ.orics i.n-'ri.ing relative t. the Sartrian subiect,immanent to that phallogocentric ,Jh..". Hence, for lrigaray, the feminine could nevcr be the ,rriri of a subiect, as lieauvoii would suggst' Further, the feminine could not lre theniir"d in terms of a detcrirri:narc relatiotr bctwcen the ,r.,"r..rlin" and the feminine within any givcn discourse, for discourse

ment and, further, projects that disavowed and disparaged embodiment on to the feminine sphere, effectively renaming the body as female. This association of the body with the female works along magical relations of reciprocity whereby the fcmale scx becomes rcstricted to its body, and the male body, fully disavowcd, becomcs,

12

Subyccts of Scx/Gcnder/l)csire

Subjects

of Sex/Gender/Desire

13

paradoxically, the incorpclreal instrument of an ostensibly radical freedom. Bcauvoir's analysis implicitly poscs thc qucstion: 'I'hrough what act of ncgaticln and disavowal does the urasculine posc as a discmbodicd universality and thc fcnrininc gct colrstructcd rrs a cJisavowed corporeality? The dialectic of master-slirve, hcre fully rcforrnulated within thc nonrcciprocal tcrrns of gender asymmetry, prefigures what Irigaray will late r describe as the masculinc signifying cconomy that includes both the cxistcntial sulrject and its Othcr. Ilcauvoir pr()poscs that thc fcrnalc lrocly ought to bc thc situation arrd irrst rurncntality oI worrrcrr's frccdonr, rrot ir clcfirring arrd lirrritirrg cssencc.'" Tlrc thcory of cmbodimcnt inforrrrirtg Bcrtuvoir's analysis is clearly limited by the uncritical reproduction of the Cartcsian distinction betwecn frccdonr and thc body. Despite my own prcvious cfforts to argue the contrary, it appears that Beauvoir maintains the nrind/ body dualism, even as shc proposcs a synthcsis of those tcrms.'' 'fhe preservation of that very distinction can bc rcad as symptonratic of tlre very phallogocentrism that Bcauvoir ur.rclcrestimates. In the philosophical tradition that begins with Plato and continucs through Descartes, Husserl, and Sartre, the ontological distirrction betwccn soul (consci<)usncss, nrilrcl) rnd body irrvlrriably supports rclrrtiotts of political and psychic subordination and hicrarchy. Tlrc rnir-rcl not only (* subjugatcs tlre body, but occasionally entertains thc fantasy of flccing J its ernbodimcnt altogether. The cultural associations of mincl with masculinity and body with femininity are well documented within thc field of philosophy and feminism.2' As a result, any uncritical reproduction of the rnind/body distinction ought to bc rethought for the implicit gender hierarchy that the distinction has convcntionally produccd, maintained, and rationalized. 'fhe discursive construction of "the body" and its scparation from "freeciom" irr Beauvoir fails to mark al<lng thc axis of gcnder the very mind-body distinction that is supposed to illun-rinate the persistence of gender asymmetry. Officially, Reauvoir contcnds thirt thc femalc body is markcd within masculinist discoursc, whercby thc masculine body, in its conflation with thc universal, rcmains unmarked. Irigaray clcarly suggcsts that both marker and marked arc maintained within a masculinist mode of signification in which the fenrale body is "marked off," as it were, from the domain of the signifiable. In post-Hegelian terms, she is "cancelledr" but not preserved. On lrigaray's reading, Beauvoir's claim that woman "is sex" is reversed to mean that shc is not the sex she is designated to be, but, rather, the masculine sex encore (ancl en corps) parading in the mode of otherness. For Irigaray, that phallogoccntric mode of signifying thc fcmalc scx pcrpctually

self-limiting linguistic gesture that granis alteiiry or difference to women, phallogocentrism offers a name to eclipse the feminine and take its place. iv. Theorizing the Binary, the Unitary, and Beyond
Beauvoir and Irigaray clearly differ over the fundamental structures

reproduces phantasms of its own self-amplifying desire. Instead of a

by which gender asymmetry is reproduced; Beauvoir turns to the failed reciprocity of an asymmetrical dialectic, while kigaray suggests that the dialectic itself is the monologic elaboration of a masculinist signifying economy. Although kigaray clearly broadens the scope of feminist critique by exposing the epistemological, ontological, and logical structures of a masculinist signifying economy, the power of
her analysis is undercut precisely by its globalizing reach. Is it possible to identify a monolithic as well as a monologic masculinist economy that traverses the array of cultural and historical contexts in which sexual difference takes place? Is the failure to acknowledgc the specific cultural operations of gender oppression itself a kind of epistemologic:rl irrrpcrialisrn, onc which is not ameliorated by the sirnple elaboration of cultural diff'erences as "examples" of the selfsame phallogocen-

trism? The effort

to

include "Other" cultures as

variegate.d

amplifications of a global phallogocentrism constitutes an appropriative act that risks a repetition of the self-aggrandizing gesrure of phallogocentrism, colonizing under the sign of the same those differences that might otherwise call that totalizing concepr into question." Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respec ro rhe totalizing gesnrres of feminism. The effort to identify rhe enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different ser of terms. That the tactic can operate in feminist and antifeminist contexts alike suggests that the colonizing gesture is not primarily or irreducibly masculinist. lt can operate to effect other relations of racial, class, and heterosexist subordination, to name but a few. And clearly, listing the varieties of oppression, as I began to do, assumes their discrete, sequential coexistencc along a horizontal axis that does not describe their convergcnces within the social field. A vertical model is similarly insufficient; oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of "originality" and "derivativeness. "'o Indced, the field of power structured in part by the imperializing gesrure of dialectical appropriation exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual difference,

i4 /

Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire

Sublects of Sex/Gender/Desire

15

{:
=4

do not assume in advance what the content of "women" will be. They propose instead a set of dialogic encounrers by which variously positioned women articulate separate identities within the framework of an emergent coalition. Clearly, the value of coalitional politics is not to be underestimated, but the very form of coalition, of an emerging and unprcdictable assemblage of positions, cannor be figured in advance. Despite thc clearly democratizing impulse that mbtivates coalition building, thc coalitional theorist can inadvertently reinscrr herself as sovcreign of the process by trying to asscrt an ideal form for coalitional structures in aduance, one that will effectively guarantee unity as the outcome. Related efforts to determine what is and is not the true shape of a dialogue, what constitutes a subject-position, and, most importantly, when "unity" has been reached, can impede the shelf-shaping and self-limiting dynamics of coalition. The insistence in advance on coalitional "unity" as a goal assumes that solidarity, whatever its price, is a prerequisitc for political acrion. But what sort of politics demands that kind of advance purchase on unity? Perhaps a coalition needs to acknowledge its contradictions and take action with those contradictions intact. Perl'raps also part of what dialogic undcrstanding entails is thc acceptancc of divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of the often tortuous

offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized either within tl-re terms of phallogocentrism or any other candidate for the position of "primary condition of opprcssion. " Rather than an exclusivc tactic of masculirrist signifying cconomics, dialectical appropriation and suppression of the Other is one tactic among many, deployed centrally but not exclusively in the service of expanding and rationalizing the masculinist domain. The contemporary feminist debates over essentialism raise the question of the universality of female identity and m:rsculinisr oppression in other ways. Universalistic claims are based on a common or shared epistemological standpoint, understood as the articulated consciousness or shared structures of oppression or in the ostensibly transcultural structures of fernininity, maternity, sexuality, and/or ticriture feminine. The opening discussion in this chapter argued that this globalizing gesture has spawned a number of criticisms from women who claim that the category of "women" is normative and exclusionary and is invoked with the unmarkcd dimensions of class and racial privilege intact. In other words, the insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of women has effectively refused the multipliciry of cultural, social, and political interscctior-rs in wlrich rhe concrctc array of "women" are constructed. Some efforts have been made to formulate coalitional politics which

process of democratization. The very notion of "dialogue" is culturally specific and historically bound, and while one speaker may feel secure that a convcrsation is happening, another may bc sure it is not. -l'hc powcr rclatious that condition and limit dialogic possibilities need first to be interrogated. Otherwise, the model of diilogue risks rclapsing into a liberal model that assumes that speaking agents occupy equal positions of powcr and speak with the same presuppositions about what constitutes "agreement" and "unity" and, indeed, that those are thc goals to be sought. It would be wrorrg to assume in advance that thcre is a category of "women" that simply needs to bc filled in with various components of race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexuality in order to become complete. The assumption of its essential incompleteness permits that category to serve as a permanently available site of contested meanings. The definitional incompleteness of thc category might then serve as a normative idcal relicved of cocrcive

force.

Is "unity" nccessary for effectivc political action? Is thc premature insistence on the goal of unity precisely the cause of an ever more bitter

fragmentation among the ranks? Certain forms of acknowledged frirgrncntation might faciliate coalitional action precisely bccause ihe "unity" of the category of women is neither presupposed nor desired. Does "unity" set up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identiry that rules out the possibiliry of a ser of actions which disrupt the very borders of identiry concepts, or which seek ro accompliih precisely that disruption as an explicit political aim? Withoui the presupposition or goal of "unity," which is, in either case, always instituted at a conceptual level, provisional unities might emerge in the contcxt of concrete actions that have purposes other than the articulation of identity. Without the compulsory expectation thar feminist actions must be instituted from some stable, unified, and agreed upon identity, those actions might well get a quicker start and seem more congenial to a number of "women" for whom the meaning of the category is permanently moot. This antifoundationalist approach to coalitional politics assumes neither that "identity" is a premise nor that the shape or meaning of a coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its achievement. Because the articulation of an identity within available culrural rerms instates a definition that forecloses in advance the emergence of new identity concepts in and through politically engaged acions, the foundationalist tactic cannot take the transformation or expansion of existing identity concepts as a normative goal. Moreover, when agreed-upon identities or agreed-upon dialogic strucrures, through which already established identities are communicated, no longer

16

Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire

Subjects of Sex/GendcrlI)esire

77

constitute the the me or subicct of politics, then idcntities can come inttl being and dissolve cleperrding on thc concrctc prircticcs thirt corrstitutc

blc notions of idcntity? In other words, the "coherence" and ,.continuity" of "thc pcrson" arc not logical or analytic featurcs of personhood,

thcni. Ccrtain political practiccs instittrtc iclcrttities o11 a contingcnt basis in order to accornplish wh:rtevcr aillrs :lrc irl vicw. Coalitional politics requires neither an exparrdecl catcgory of "wotnen" nor an internally multiplicitous self that offcrs its complexity at oncc. Gender is a cornplexity whose totality is perrnancntly deferrccl, never fully wfiat it is at any given juncture in time. An opcn coalitiotr, rhen, wiit affirm identiiii' rl.rat are alte rnrtcly instituted ancl rellnquished accgrcling to tlrc purposcs ar lr:rnd; it will bc au gpen assemblage that permits of multiple convergetlces and .divergences without ,rb.di"n.. to a normative telos of definition:rl closure'
v. Identity, Sex, and the Metaphysics of Substance

by "idcntity," then, and what grounds thc presumprion that identities are self-idcntical, pcrsisting through timc as the samc, unificd and internally coherent? More irnportantly, how do thcsc assuntpriol]s inform the discotrrscs on "gender idcntity."? It would bc wrgng t<-r thiltk that thc discussittrt of "iclcntity" trught ttl pnrcccd prior to a discussion of gender identity for thc simplc rcason
ihut "p.itons" only become intelllgible tl-rrough becoming-gendered in conformity with rccognizablc srandards of gender intelligibility. Sociological discussions haue .onu.ntionally sought to undcrstarrd
the noti-on of the person in tcrms of an agency that claims ontological

\What can bc meant

pnority to the u"ii,rur roles and functions through which it assutlcs iocial visibility arrd rneaning. within philosophical discoursc itsclf, '"thc pcrson" has rcccived analytic claboratiorr ol1 the thc notion of assumption that whatcver social context thc pcrsol.t is "in", rctrteit.ts somch<rw cxternally rclated to thc dcfinitional structurc of pcrsonhood, be that conici<)usncss) the capircity ftlr lattguage' or moral deliberation. Although that literature is not exatnined lterc, ortc prcmise of such inquiries is the focus of critical exploration and inversion. Whereas the question of what constitutes "personal idcntity" within philosophical accounts almost always ccnters on the questio.n of what int.rn"l' feature of the person establishcs the continuity or self-idcntity of the person through timc, thc quesrion hcre will be: T"o what extent do regulatory practices of gender formatign and division constitute
iclentiiy, the iniernal cohcrence of the subicct, indced, thc self-idcntical status of tlre person? To what extent is "identity" a normativ.e ideal rathcr th:rn a descriptivc fcature of cxprericnce ? Ancl h<lw do tbe regulatory practiccs fl.rat govcrn gcndcr also govcrn culturally intclligi-

but, ratlrcr, socially irrstitutcd arrcl mirintaincd norms of intelligibility. I'asrnuclr irs "idcntity" is assured through the stabilizing coniepts of sex, gencler, and scxuality, the very notion of "the person,'is ialled into qucstion by the cultural emergencc of those "incoherent" or "discontinuous" gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to thc gendered nornrs of cultural intelligibiliry by which pcrsons arc defined. "lntclligible" genders are those which in some sensc institute and maintain rclations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual.practicc, and desire. In other words, the spectres bf discontinuity and incohercnce, rhemselves thinkable only in relation to existing norms of continuity and coherence, arc constantly prohibited and produccd by thc very laws thar seek to establish causil or expressive lincs of connection among biological sex, culturally constituied genders, :rnd the "expression" or "effect" of both in the manifestaiion of sexual desire through sexual practice. Thc notion that thcre might be a "truth" of sex, as F'oucault ironicillly tcmrs it, is prroduccd prcciscly tl'rrough the rcgulatory practices that generate _cohcrenr identities through the matrii of coheient gender norms. The heterosexualization of desire requires and institirtes the procluction of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between "feminine" and "masculiner" where these are und-erstood as expressive attributes of "male" and "female." Thc cultural matrix through which gender ide'tity has become intelligible requires that cerraln kinds of "identities" cannot ((s1i51"-1[at is, thos-e in which gender does not follow from sex and those i' which the practices of"desire do not "follow" from either sex or gendcr. "Follow" in this context is a political rclation of entailment instituted by the cultural laws that establish and regulate the shape and meaning of sexuality. Indeed, preciscly because ccrtain kinds of "gender identities" fail to conform to those norms of cultural intelligibility, rhey appear only as developmental failures or logical impossibilities from within ihat domain. Their persistence and proliferation, however, provide critical opportunities to expose the limits and regulatory aims of that domjin of intelligibility and, hence, ro open up within the very terms of that matrix of intelligibility rival and subversive marrices of gender disorder. Before such disordering practices are considered, however, it seems crucial to unclerstand the "marrix of intclligibility." Is it singular? Of what is it composed? What is the peculiar illiance p."s.rm"l ro cxisr

18

Subjects of Sex/Ciender/Desire

Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire

19

between a system of compulsory heterosexuality and the discursive categories that establish the identity concepts of scx? If "identity" is

an effect

of discursive practices, to what extent is gender identity,

construed as a relationship among sex, gcnder, sexual practice, and desire, the effcct of a regulatory practice that can be idcntified as compulsory heterosexuality? Would that explanation return us to yet another totalizing frame in which compulsory hctcrosexuality mercly takes the place of phallogocentrism as the monolithic cause of gender

tVithin the spectrum of French feminist ancl poststructur:rlist tl.reory, very different regimes of power are understood to produce the identity concepts of sex. Consider the divcrgencc between tlrosc positions, such as lrigaray's, that claim there is only one sex, the masculine, that elaborates itself in and through the production of thc "Other," and those positions, Foucault's, for instancc, that assume tlrat thc category of sex, whether masculine or feminine, is a procluction of a diffuse regulatory economy of sexuality. Consider also Wittig's argument that the category of sex is, under the conditions of compulsory heterosexuality, always feminine (the masculine remaining unmarked and, hcncc, synonomous with the "univcrsal"). Wittig con-

oppression

curs, however paradoxically, with Foucault

in claiming that the

category of sex would itself disappear and, indeed, dissipate through the disruption and displacement of heterosexual hegemony. The various explanatory models offered here suggest thc very different ways in which the category of sex is understood depending on how the field of power is articulated. Is it possible to maintain the complexity of these fields of power and think through thcir productive

capacities together? On thc one hand, Irigaray's theory

of sexual

difference suggests that women can never be understood on thc rnodel of a "subject" within the conventional reprcsentational systems of Western culture precisely because they constitute the fetish of representation and, hence, the unreprescntable as such.'Sfomen can never "be," according to this ontology of substances, precisely because they

are the relation of difference, the excluded, by which that domain

marks itself off. Sfomen are also a "difference" that cannot be understood as the simple negation or "Other" of the always-already-masculine subject. As discussed earlier, they are ncither the subject nor its Other, but a drfference from the economy of binary opposition, itself a ruse for a monologic elaboration of the masculine. Central to each of these views, however, is the notion that sex appears within hegemonic languirge as a substance, as, metaphysically speaking, a self-identical bcing. 'fhis appearancc is achieved through

term of that binary. The "tr "t?ifi.i"l binary regulation of sexuality suppresses m'liipricity of a ;:,T'J;;y ;h* air."p,r'i,t"#51"*u"t, reproducrive, and mcdicojuridical heg#onies. For witrig, the binary restriction 5n ,.* serves . thc reproductive aims of a svsrem of compulso.y h.t..or"*;;;y;".i"riJrirry, ,rr" claims that ihe overrh row tr .o#putrorf ii.r.rorJ*""iii]"r,i,rfr""grrate a true humanism of "rhe person" fi..d f.o- th",rr'r.l[, ,r In other.conrexts, she.,,,gg"rr, thar the profuri"";;JJ;,;iio' r"-. of nonphallocenrric eroric " g.""i5no-y will diiper ,i",il;;i;;';il;;, identity. At yer other iextual ,iorn.nts ir seems rhar ,.rhe 1.!,1",9 t:1t^t_1: " llerges as a third gender that promis., ,o ,rrnr..nd ,h" Dlnary restnctlon on sex imposed by tlre syitem of compulso., h"r".o_ sexuality. In her defense of ihe ,,cogniti#;;;;;;,;."wiri,*""Jo"r* ," have no meta phvsica r q ua rrer *i trr"[&;;".r J ,,'"a* ri., ar: j:ryesentation ; indecd' r he su "i'3isiln".r bjectfwi th its attri brr" oil.iili.r"rmrnatron' appcars ro be the rehabilitation of the of choice under the name of the lesbian: lirh" ""irtl"u"t o.ru.rrt"g"rr, iiirJ*iJrli ,rujects demands first destroying.rh. cnregories of sex. . . . the lesbian is the onlv concepr r know of rihich is bEvond ,h;.;;;;;.r"oi"r""*.,,," she does nor criticize "rhe subje*" as in'variabry ;r;.t;;;"i..o.ai"g to the rules of an inevitably patriarc.t,"l Sy-Uoii., frri f;;;.Ii" ir, pl5,. tltg equivalent oJ a lestian ,"Ul..i'", l"ngu"g._Jrer:;"'" The identification of women wirh "1.",;fo. g?""?"ii rrr !'ittig, is a conflation of the caregory of *o."n ", *ith the .;;.;;,bl; ,l*r"lir"a features of their bodies ; ;;frr;i ;';;;;?;;i#:lft tonomy ro women as it "i.I,'h"rr.", is.purporredly enjoyed"by ,"". ft;,;;;; "r_ ;i;;;; ::::l::"*1::"j.qn., of sex woutd u. tr,. synecdoche,.orrl. ,')ilrr", sex' rnat has. throush a misogynistgestureof to t"k. the place of rhe o"iron, ,fr"LffaJr"r,.'llning.rogito.ln other words, only men "p.rro,,r,; ar.l ,lr.;ir;; ;;rra., Uu, the fenrinine: "."
the subversive

of sex impo-ses b,;;t".;r"rion between the.sexes' as welr as "n "timiiJr internal .oh"r"n.'. *i*in.".t,

gr"..", .f ;;;;;;;;i,-iJ'"rru.n", tirrl"tln. ,nJi.Linin", f :l "r1-p1.. of a binary that effectively -;rk" ;h; ,"j"oi"f ,na hcgelnonrc disc'ursc of mascurine, phalrogocentrir*, rii"n.i"g "the. the feminine as a site of subue.sive-;;ffplt;;&. F;;;;;.;;lt, the substanrive grammar
Irigaray's view, the substa'tive
men and women as weil as their a"ttributes.of

it li::11"ly ,b.:"ur,. supports the subsrantial model of gender as a Drnary reratron between two positive and representabre"termr.rt-rn

a performative twist of language and/or discourse that conceals the fact that "being" a sex or u g"ia"r is fundamentaily impossible. rriga.ray, grammar ."r, ,,.uJ, b. , tru.lnJ;;';f;;;ff..t"rion,For

i"rt^l;;;

20

Subjects of SexiGender/Desire

Subjects of Sex/GendcrlDesire

21

Gender is the linguistic index of the political opposition between the sexes. Gendcr is used herc in the singtrlar bec:rusc indecd there are not two gcnders. There is only one: the fcrninine, the "masculine " not being a gencler. For thc nr:rsculinc is not the masculinc,

but the general." Hence, Wittig calls for the destruction of "sex" so that womcn can assume thc status of a universal subject. On thc way toward that dcstruction, "w()mcn" rnust assumc lroth a particular arrcl a univcrsal

point <-rf vicw." As a sutrjcct who can rcalizc concrctc univcrsality through frecdom, Wittig's lesbian con6rms rathcr tlran contcsts the normative promise of humanist ideals prcmiscd on the metaphysics of substance . In this respect, Wittig is distinguished from Irigaray, not only in terms of the now familiar oppositions bctween essentialism and materialism,"'but in terms of the adherence to a mctaphysics of substance that confirms the normativc model of hunranism as the framework for ferninism. Where it seems that Wittig has subscribed
to a radical project of lesbian emancipation and enforced a distinction between "lesbian" and "woman," she does this through the defense of thc prcgcndcrcd "pcrson," characte rized as frecdonr. J'his move not only confirms thc presocial status of human frce clom, but subscribes to that metaphysics of substancc that is responsible for thc production and naturalization of the category of sex itsclf. The metaphysics of suhstance is a phrasc tl'rat is associatcd with

thou gh ts. Thc su b jcct, ihe sel f, ir. ln ai"iiurt, r.. J urr*rir"i_, *r;[. conccpts, since they tra.sforrn into substances rr!rr!rvuJ urrrtrt fictitious ,.i"u;;, having rt thc stirrt only a li'guir,i.- ,",Jiiy.lti''vv

ries.. lt was gramnrai (the structur. or,rui..i;;J';;;j:;;)';f;;, inspired Descartcs' certainry that "I" ir irr. r,ru;"i;;qili.," wlrcreas it is rather the thoughts th"t *.n. to .,me,,: at bottom, faith in grammar simply.o,rrly, tti. *illio b" in" ;."urli;;;#,

illusion g.es back basicary ro a srpersririon that .nly common sense l.rut nls' pl.,il.,r.ilr.rr_namcly, deccives nor thc belief in la nguagc a nd, more prcciscly,'in rfr. r'."ifr""f g."r"ri,rri..f?rl'_,

which binary gendcr is urriversalir.d. nltt.,"ugh-i;;;; ;;:;';;#i. lo sorts of nouns other than persons, Wittlg argues "lt ,fi", fr..-rnriyri, h", consequences for Englisrr as well. At tie ortret of .. r-he na".r. or Gendcr" (1984), she wrircs:
The rnark of gencier, according to gramnrarians, concerns substarrtives..They talk about it in teimslrf fu,r.iion. if *.y q..l.'ii." rhcy mry iokc:r['orrr ir, calling gcnder , .,n.'ri"-. ,"*.:i'. .'. 111inS, as rar as thc catcgones of the pcrson are concenled, horh I English and Frerrch] 6""..r, of gendcr ,o rt. .,",r.," extent. Both indeed "r. give way..to a primitive oniological .on."p, that enforces in lan_ guage a division of beings inro sexes. . . . As an ontorogical c""..o, thar deals with the narrire of Belng, along with a *hJi;;"hil5i other primirive conceprs belongin"g ;" ,f," same.line .f ,n"reti, gender seems ro belong primaril"y ,? pliinroplrv.,.

witrig providcs an artc'rarivc critique by, showirrg that persons wirhi' languagc *iti'rurt thc nrark"of senier. she providcs a potirical analysis 6r t"n. s.;;;;;;; ;;;i;rt;'ir"n.n. iF, g"ni., not nnly?.rignr,", pcrs( )ns, .,qua ti fi cs,, 1::.d]:q-t: Y'-,,
cannor bc signified

rocm, as

lt wcrc, but constitutcs a conccptual cpistcn," by

it

Nietzsche within the contemporary criticism of philosophical discourse. In a commentary on Nietzschc, Michel Haar argues that a number of philosophical ontologies have becn trapped within certain illusions of "Being" and "Substance " that are fostered by the belief that thc grammatical formulation of subject and predicate reflects the prior ontological reality of substance and attribute. These constructs, argucs Haar, constitute the artificial philosophical means by which simplicity, order, and identity are effectively instituted. In no sense, however, do they reveal or represent some true order of things. For our purposes, this Nietzschean criticism becomes instructive when it is applied to the psychological categories that govern much popular and theorctical thinking about gender identity. According to Haar, the critique of the metaphysics of substance implies a critique of the very notion of the psychological person as a substantive thing:
The destruction of logic by means of its genealogy brings with it as well the ruin of thc psychological categories founded upon this logic. All psychological categories (the ego, the individual, the person) derive from the illusion of substantial identity. But this

on gender rdenrrrv trrar rrncritically emproys rhe inflcctiorrar aiiribu_ tion of "being" to genders r"J;;"';;;;a"rrrics.,' Trre unprobrcmatic claim to "be" a woman and .,bc'. h"t.ror.*u"l *"ul;i;;i."p?_"ri. of th.at meraphysics of gender tubr;r;;;; ln th" case of borh ,.men,, and "women," this clai"m tends ," ,uU"iainate the notion of eender under rhat.of identiry arrd ro lcad to;h;.;;,ai;r;; ;;;;;;rln ,, gender and rs one in virrue or h,s cr. tr"r " r.*, pry.hi. r"rr. Sir.rrl'r"a

For gender to ..belong ro philosophy,, is, for Wittig, to belong to "that bodv of self-cvi.rei, .nn..pir'*lir.,"u, which irrr";l"Lp'r-'.^ u" -ioiii"lieve they cannor develop n lin. Jii""r"""rng ana *t.,ict go yithgut rl,{l1gr. fg. jhcy'exist prio. ; ;;y rhought, any social orcter, 11T'ljl''," wittig's vicw is corrohorarci uv ,rr'"i p"fi,r"l Jr.i,r^"

22

Subiccts of Sex/Gcncler/Dcsirc

Subjccts of Sex/GcndcrlDcsire

23 is

various expressions of that psychic self, thc most salicnt bcing that of scxual dcsirc. In such a prefcminist contcxt, gcnrler, naivcly_ (rathcr tlran critically) confuscd with scx, scrvcs rs a unifying principlc of tlrc cmbodied sc[f and lnairrtairrs that unity ovcr ancl agerirlst atr "o1'rpositc Scx" whgsc structurc is prcsumcd to nr:rintain a parnrllcl but opptlsi'I'hc :rrticulational irrtcrttal colrcrcnce alnong scx, gcndcr, llrcl clcsirc. tion.,l fccl likc a woman" by a fcmalc <lr "l fccl likc ir man" by a ntirle prcsupposcs that itr neithcr casc is thc clairrt rncirtringlcssly

is diffcrcntiatcd from a fcminine term, and this differentiation

ul,

rccltrndant. Aiih,x,gh it rnight appcxr tutprotrlcnrrrtic t<t bc :r. givctl anaronry (althougli wc sllill later cgnsiclcr thc way in-which.that pr'jcct is also fraught with dif6culty), tlrc cxpcricnce of a.gendcrcd pry.hi. dispositigrr-or cultural idcntity is considcrcd an aclricvcmcnt. i'lius, "l fecl likc a wonlan" is true to thc cxtent that Arcthir Frattklin's invo.latiotr of the dcfining Other is assumcd: "You nrake mc fccl like to fhii achicvcmerrt rcquircs a cliffcrcntiatiotr f rom a natural woman." thc oppositc gcnclcr. Hcnce, otrc is onc's- gcndcr to thc cxtcllt thirt onc i, nui ih. otlicr gcndcr, a f,rmulation that prcsupposes and cnforces thc rcstriction of gcndcr within that binary pair' Gcnclcr can denirte a ttnity of cxpcricnce' of scx, getlcler, and dcsirc, <lnly wlrcrr scx cltlt l',c trrlclcrst,xltl irr stlrrrc scllsc t() rlcccssitatc gc-ndcr*lr"r" gcrrclcr is a psyclric ancl/or cultural clcsig,nation_of tlrc -sclf-and clcsircjwhc.c dcsi.c is lrctcroscxual ancl thcrcfore diffcrcntiatcs itself through an opp11siti<lnal relatiort to that othcr gcrrdcr it dcsire's.'fhe intcrlal cohcic,rcc 9r r.rnity of eithcr gendcr, man Or woman, thercby 'I'hat institurequircs both a stable and gppositionirl hetcrosexuality. tignal heteroscxuality both'icquircs ancl produccs thc univocity of each of thc genclercd tcrms tlrat constitute the limit of gcndered possibilities *ithin an oppositignal, binary gclclcrsystcm. l'his conccption of gcnclcr prcsuplroses uot <lnly-a c:rusal rclation among sex' gcndcr, arrJ clcsirc, but suggcsts as well that dcsirc rcflccts or cxpresses ["n.lc.'altd that gcndcr ."i]".t. or. cxprc-sscs clcsirc. 1'hc rnctaphysical iinity 9f thc thre-c is assumcd to lrc truly knowtr antl cxprcsscd.in a clifferentiating dcsirc for an oppositional gendcr-that is, in a form of oppositirrti"l h"t".urcxuality. Whethcr as a natLrralistic paradigm whicli cstablishes a causal continuity among sex, gendcr, and desire, or as an authcntic-cxprcssivc paradigrn in which somc truc sclf is said to bc rcvcalcd sirnuitaneo,ttiy or sttcccssivcly in scx, gcndcr, and desire , lre rc "tlre old drearn of symmetry," as Irigaray has called it, is prcsupposcd, rcified, and rationalized. ' This'rough skctch of gendcr givcs us a clue to undcrstanding the political ..ir,r,,, for the iubstantializirrg view of gcncler. l'hc. instituii.rn (rf a compulsory and naturalizccl hetcroscxu:rlity rcquircs and rcgulatcs g",]d.. as a binary rclation in which thc masculinc tcrm

tiorr. lrr tlrc closing ch:rpter of thc first volunre of T'lte History of Sexuality arrd in his bricf but significant introductiorr to Herculine lJarbin, Being the Recently l)iscouered Journals of a NineteenthCcntury Hermaphrctdite,'s ltrucault suggests tlrat tlrc category of scx, prior t<l any ciltcgorization of scxual differencc, is itsclf constructed througlr a historically spccific mocle of sexuality.l'hc tactical procluction of thc cliscrctc and binary categorization of scx conceals thc stratcgic airns of tlrrrt very apparatus of production by prostulating "sex" as "a c:lusc" of scxuirl cxpericnce, behavior, and desire. Foucault's gcncalogical in<1uiry cxposcs this ostcnsiblc "c:luse " as "all cffcct," tlrc 1'rroductiou of rt givcn regirrrc of sextrality thrrt sccks to regulatc scxu:rl expcricncc by instating thc discretc catcgories of scx as foundational and crusirl functions within any discursive account of sexuality. Foucault's introcluction to the journals of thc herrnaphrodite, Hcrculinc Barbin, suggests that thc gcnealogical critiquc of these reified categorics of sex is the inadvertent consequence of scxual practices that cannot be accountcd for within the medicolegal discoursc of a naturirlizecl hctcroscxui.rlity. Herculinc is not an "idcntity," but the sexnal inrpossibility of an identity. Although malc and fenrale anatomical clcurcnts arc jointly distributcd in and on tlris body, that is not the true sourcc of scmnclal. 'fhc linguistic conventions that produce intclligiblc gcndcrcd selves find thcir limit in Hcrcr.rline prccisely because shc/lrc occasiorts a convergcncc and disorganization of the rules that govcrn scx/gcndcr/dcsirc. Herculinc deploys and rcdistributcs thc terms of a binary system, but that very redistribution disrupts and prolifcrates those tcrms outsidc the binary itsclf. Accorcling to Foucault, Hcrculine is not categorizable within the gendcr binary as it stands; tlrc disconccrting convergcnce of heterosexuality and homosexuality in hcr/his pcrson arc only occasioncd, but ncvcr caused, by his/her anatomical discontinuity. Foucault's appropriation of Hcrculine is suspcct,r' but his anirlysis implics thc intcrcsting bclicf that sexual hctcrogcucity (paradoxically forccloscd by a uatur:rlizcd "hetero"-scxuality) implics a criticluc of thc metaphysics of substance

accornplishcd tlrrough thc practices of hetcrosexual clesirc. Thc act of diffcrcntiating thc two o1'r1'rositional nrorncnts of thc binary rcsults in a consolidation of cach tcrm, the rcspcctivc internal cohcrcnce of sex, gerrclcr, arrcl dcsirc. The stratcgic clisplaccrrrcnt of that binary rclation and thc mctaphysics of substancc on which it rclics prcsuppose that thc catcgorics of fcmalc and rnale, wonlilll rrnd man, are sin-rilarly produccd within thc birrary fr:trnc. Foucault inrplicitly subscribes to suclr an explana-

24

Subjccts of Sex/Gendcr/Desire

Subjects of Sex/Gcnde rlDesire

25

Ji :.N

as it informs the identitarian categorics of sex. Foucault imagines Herculinc's expcriencc as "a world of plcasurcs in which grins hang about witlrout the cet."' Smilcs, happirrcsscs, plcasrrres, and dcsires arc figurcd herc as c;ualitics without an irbiding sulrstancc to which thcy are said to adhcrc. As free-floating attributcs, they suggcst the possibility of a genclcrcd cxpcricnce that c:lrur()t bc graspcd through thc substatrtializing and hierarcl-rizing grammar of nour.rs (res extensa) and adjectives (attributes, esscntial and accidcntal). Through his cursory rcading of Hcrculine, Foucault proposcs an ontology of accidcntal attrilrutes that exposes the postulation of idcntity as a cultur:rlly restricted principle of ordcr and hierarchy, a rcgulatory fiction. If it is possible to spcak of a "man" with a masculine attributc and to understand that attribute as a happy but accidental fcature of that man, then it is also possible to speak of a "ntan" with a feminine attribute, whatever tlrat is, but still to maintain the integrity of the gendcr. But oncc wc dispense with tlre priority of "min" and "woman" as abiding substances, then it is no longcr possiblc to subordinate dissonant gendcred features as so many secondary and acciclcntal charactcristics of a gender ontology that is fundamcntally intact. If thc noti<ln of :rn abiciing subst:rncc is a fictivc c()nstruction produced through the compulsory ordering of attributes into cohcrent gender sequcnces, thcn it seems that gender as substance, the viability of man and woman as nouns, is called into question lry the dissonant play of attributes that fail to conform to scquential or causal models

to prccxist rhc dccd. 'r'hc crrailcnsc f; ,l'tr-';"r.i"f g;;;;;':;r"gorics oursidc of the rncra.prrysics of *rbriarrce wiil hauc [?n,ira". ,rr" ."r"_ vancc of Nietzsche's ciaim in on the Genearogy i;;;;i;;;"t ..th.." is no'being' behind doing, effecting,-be.o.i"ng;',th". "/ do"rll, mercly a fiction addcd to the deei-th" d"Jd i, eu..ything.,,rr lr, an applica_ tion that Nictzschc himsclf wourd not have anticipatccl or condoned, we rnight statc as a.corolrary: There is no gencrer identity bchind the cxprcssions of gcndcr;. that idcntity ir pcrf?.mair""ry ."'"rrii,,t.a uy thc vcry "cxprcssions;. that ,rid ,o"bc its rcsults.

der is alwaysa doing.,]:.lrgh rrot a tloing by

:jjl:rs'Tfl-"l.hy:!* of substance, gcndcr provcs to bc performsliys_ rnar constrtutrng^thc rdcntity it is purported

a

to bc. In this sense, genstrbjcct wlro nrisht bcsaid

"..

vi. Language, Power, and the Strategies of Displacement

of intelligibility.
Thc appearance of an abiding substance or gendercd self, what the psychiatrist l{obcrt Stoller refers to as a "gcrrdcr core,"" is thus produced by the regulation of attributes along culturally established lines of c<lhcrencc. As a rcsult, thc cxposure of this fictive production is conditioned by thc dcregulated play of attributes that resist assimilation into thc ready made framework of primary nouns and subordinatc adjectivcs. It is of coursc always possible to argue that dissonant adjectives work retroactive ly to rede6ne the substantivc identities they are said to modify and, hence, to expand the substantive categories of gender to include possibilities that they previously excluded. But if thesc substances are nothing other than the coherences contingcntly creatcd through the regulation of attributes, it would seem that the ontology of substances itself is not only an artificial e ffect, but essentially superfluous. In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a sct of freefloating attributes, for we have seen that the substantive effect of gendcr is pcrformativcly procluccd and compellcd by the rcgulatory practiccs of gendcr cohcrencc. Hcnce, within thc inhcrited discourse

radical fcr'i'ist thcory :rr amblguous position witrrin the 'ccupics conrinuum of theories on tlie quesrion hand, Witrrg appears to dispurclh." n-,.r"plryri;r;f "F,t"-rlrrl"i*.'olr^irr, """ J;;;r;.",'br, on the other hand. shc retains th. hu-rn'rrt,i".t, ,fr."iJi"ii""l, ,, the metaphysical locus. of $hii. Wirrig,, nun-,",ri,,rr-.f"rrly "g.n.y. n:'l!i:::: that thcre is a doer behind the deedlhcr. ilri"l, ".*rrr,._ less derlneates the perfo'native construction of g.na","''*"i*in ,t,. materal practices of culturc, disputing the temporality ,ri nations that would confuse ".aur"""*ith ..."rult.i'--iri'" tt-,"r| "*pr^pi."* ,rr", suggests rhc inrcrtcxruar space that rinks wittig *iri, e"Il="ii q"na reveals rhc traces of trre Marxist notio,i or ."in.?ri",lln irlrr]li ,rr.i. theories), shc writes: A matcrialist femi.ist approach shows thar what we takc f.r the :f:::_:l::isin.of opprcssion is in fact onty the mork;;;";;;'i;, ..rnyth

A great deal of feminist $..o.ry and riterature has ncvcrrheress assumed thaillrere is a "docr" behind tr,. a""i. vtr#;;;;!nt, it i, argucd, therc can be.no agency and hencc no potentiar ro initiate a transformafion of reration-s uf a"nrin"ri.rn *iit in'r.,.i"ri.'wir,ig,,

construction, an "imaginary formation."a,

a pnysrcar ancr drrect perception is onry a sophisticated and ,,nyit".

the oppressor; rhe of woman," plus its material .fi".i, .."a manifestatiors in the appropriated'.#r.iourn.* 'fhus, this womcn. "ra-ii"ai"r' "i marli docs not preexist oppr..ri,r,'l . . . "r; is taken as an "immcdiate given," a'*sensihle ji".",;";pl,yri."f f-"lyr9s,': belonging to a nat*ural order. But what we bclicvc ro bc

Bccause this nroduction of "rature" ()r)cratcs irr acc'rcr with thc dictatcs of cornpulsory tt","ior"*;;iuy. il.i" of horrroscxuar

",n"rg"ncc

26 /

Subjects of Scx/(icndcr/Dcsirc

Subjccts of Sex/Cicndcr/Dcsire

27

desire, in hcr vicw, tr:rnsccncls thc catcgorics of sex:

libcratc itself,

it would

"lf desirc could havc nothing to do witlr thc prclinrinary

U1

r.

rnarking by scxes."o' Wittig rcfcrs to "scx" as a tlark tlrat is s<lnrcltow applictl lly an institutionalizcd hctcroscxuality, a m:rrk that carr bc crascd or olrfuscatcd through pr:rctices tlrat cffcctivcly contcst that institution. Hcr vicw, of course, diffcrs radically from lrigaray's. 'l'hc lattcr would understand thc "mark" of gcnder to be part of thc hcgemonic signifying ccononry of thc masculinc tlrat opcrirtcs tlrrough the sclf-claborating mechanislns of spccularization that havc virtually dctcrrlincd the field of ontology within thc Wcstern philosophical tradition. For Wittig, lauguagc is an instrumcllt or tool that is in tro way ntisogynist in its structurci, br,t only in its applications.o' For Irigar:ry, thc possibility of another languagc or signifying cconomy is thc only chance at cscaping thc "nlark" of gcndcr which, for tlrc fcmirrirte, is nothing but thc plrirllogoccntric erasure <lf tlrc fcnr:rlc scx. Wl.rcrcas Irigaray secks to exposc thc ostcnsiblc "binary" rclation bctwcclr thc scxcs as a masculinist ruse that excludcs thc femininc altogethcr, Wittig argues that positions like Irigaray's reconsolidatc thc binary between masculinc arrd funilrinc and rccirculatc a mythic notion of thc fcrlittinc. Clcarly drawing on Beauvoir's critiquc of thc myth of thc feminine in 'fhe Second Sei, Wittig asserts, "thcre is no 'femininc writing.' "t' Wittig is clcarly attuned to thc power of languagc to subordinate and excludc womcn. As a "rnaterialist," howevcr, she considers language to be "another ordcr of materiality,"aa an institution that can be radically transformed. Langu:rge ranks among the concrcte and contirrgent practiccs and institutions maintained by thc choiccs of rndividuals ancl, hcncc, wcakened try thc collcctivc actions of choosing -l-hc intlividuals. linguistic fiction of "scx," shc argucs, is a catcgory produccd and circulatcd by thc systcm of conrpulsory hetcroscxuality in an cffort to restrict thc pnlduction of idcntitics along thc axis of lrctcroscxu:rl dcsirc. In some of hcr work, both nralc ancl fcmale homoscxuality, as well as othcr positions indepcndcnt of thc hetcrosexual contract, provide the occasion either for thc overthrow or thc proliferation of thc catcgory of sex. ln The Lesbian Body and clsewhere, howcvcr, Wittig appcars to take issue with genitally organized scxuality per se and to call for an alternativc cconomy of plc:rsurcs which would botl'r contcst thc construction of fcnrale subjcctivity markcd by womcn's supposedly distinctivc rcproductive function.ot Herc thc proliferation of plcasurcs outside the reproductive cc()nomy suggcsts both a spccifically fcmininc form of crotic diffusion, unclcrstoocl as a c()untcrstrirtc[iy to thc rcproductive c()nstruction of gcnitality. ln a scnsc, 'I'he Lesbidn llody can bc unclcrstood,

as_ an "invertccl" rcading of F'reucl's Three lissays on the Thcory of scxuality, in which hc argucs for rhc developmental superi<lrity of gcnital scxuality ovcr and agairrst tlrc lcss rcstrictcd ancl nrorc cliffusc infrrrrtilc scxuality. only the "invcrt," thc mcdical classificirti'n i'voked by Freud for "rhe homosexial,,' fails to "achic.ve" genital norm. In waging a political critique against _the genitality, {it1ig appcars to deploy "inversion" as a critical ,"-"ding practice, valorising prcciscly those featurcs of an undcvcloped scxuall ity_designrrtcd by Freud and cffectively inaugurating a .,post-genital politics."o" Indccd, thc-notion of developnr""nt ."n'b" ,."d Jnly as normalization within rhe hetcroscxual dratrix. And yct, is this'the only rcading of Frcud possible? And to whar exrcnr is wittig's practice of "inversion" committed to the very model of normalizati6n ihat she seeks to dismantlc? In other words, if the model of a morc diffusc and antigenital sexuality scrves as thc singular, oppositional alternative to.the hcgcmonic struc'turc of sexuality, t'whii cxtcnt is tlrat binary relation fatcd to rcproduce itsclf endlessly? what possibility exists fu the disruption of tl're oppositional binary itself? Wittig's oppositional relationship to psychoarralysis produccs thc u-trcxpectcd conscqucncc rhat hcr rlrcory prcsurncs prcciicly that psychoanalytic thcory of developrnent, now fully .'invertcd,;' that'she seeks to overcorne. Polymorphous perversiry, assumed to exist prior to the marking by sex, is valorised as the teios of human sexuality.ot One possiblc feminist psychoanalytic response to \Wittig rnight argue *meaiing that shc b'th underthcorizes and undeiestimates thc i'nd function of the language in which "the mark of gender" o..uri. Sh" understands that marking practice as contingent, radically variable, a-nd cvcn dispensable. Thc srarus of a primary prohibition in Lacanian th_eory operates more forccfully and less contingently than thc notion of a regulatory pr.tctice in F.ucault or a maieriaiist account of a system of hcterosexist opprcssion in Wittig. In Lacan, as in lrigariry's post-Lacanian rcformulation of Frcud, sexual diffcrcnce is not a simple binary that retains the mctaphysics of substance as its foundation. The masculine "subject" is a fictive construction produced by the law that prohibits incest and forces an infinite displacement of a heterosexualizing dcsire. l'he fcminine is never a mark of the subject; the femininc could not bc an "attrib.ute.I oj a gender. Itather, thc feminine is the significatio' of lack, signified by the symbolic, a set of differentiaring linguistic rures that cffcctively create sexual difference. The maiculiric linguistic position undcrgocs inclividuation and hetcrosexu:rlization re{uired by thc for.rncling prohibirions of the Symbolic law, the law of the F'atl-rcr. The incest tabo' tlr:rt bars thc son from thc mother and

for Wittig,

28

Subiects of Scx/Gcntler/l)csire

Subjccts of Scx/Gendcr/Desire

29

thercby instates thc kinship rclation bctwecn tlrcm is a law cnactcd "in the namc of tl.rc Fatlrcr." Sirrrilarly, tlrc law that rcftrscs tlrc girl's desirc for both hcr motlrer ancl fathcr reqttircs that shc take up the cmtrlcnr of rnatcrnity and pcrpctuatc tlrc rulcs of kinship. lloth rnasculine irnd fcmirrinc positions arc tl-rus institutcd througl-r prohibitivc laws that proclucc culturally intelligiblc gcnclers, [rut only throtrgh thc protluctiorr of :rn rrrrcorrscious sexuality tltat rce ttre rgcs in tlrc tlomirin of thc imaginary.o' 'l'hc fcrninist approprrirtiotr of scxu:rl cliffcrcrrcc, wlrctlrcr writterr in oppositiotr to thc plrallogocclrtrism of l-acarr (lrigaray) or its il criticirl rcelaboration of l,acan, attcmpts to thcorize thc femittinc, not as an
cxprcssiolr of thc mctaphysics of substancc, but as tl.rc unrcprescntable abscncc cffectcd by (masculine) dcnial that grounds thc signifying cconomy through cxclusion. The fcminine:rs the rcpudiatcd/excluded within that systcm constitutcs thc possibility of a critiqr.rc and clisruptiorr of that lrcgem<)nic conccptu:rl schcmc. 'I'hc works of Jacclucline l{osco' and Jarrc Gallopt" undcrscore in diffcrcnt ways thc constructed status of sexual differcnce, the inhercnt instability of that construc-

construction's tcnuous ground. Although rJ(ittig and othcr materialist fcminists within thc Frcnch context would argue that sexual diffcrcnce is an unthinking rcplication of a reificd sct of sexed polaritics, these criticisms neglcct the critical dimension of thc unconscious which, as

tion, and the dual consequcntiality of a prohibition that at once institutcs a scxual iclcntity irrrcl proviclcs for thc cxpostlrc of that

a sitc of repressed sexuality, reemergcs within the discourse of the subjcct as thc vcry impossibility of its cohcrcncc. As l{osc points out very clearly, the construction of a cohercnt scxual idcntity along the disjunctivc axis of the fcminine/masculinc is bound to fail;'' the disruptions of this cohcrcncc through thc iuadvcrtent reemergcnce of the rcprcssecl rcveal n()t only that "idcntity" is constructed, but that the prohibitiorr that constructs identity is incfficacious (thc paternal law ought to bc unclcrstood not as a detcrministic divine will, but as a perpctual bumbler, prcparing the ground for the insurrections against him). The diffcrences between the materialist and Lacanian (and post[,acanian) positions emerge in a normative quarrel over whether there is a rctrievablc sexuality eithcr "before" or "outsidc" the law in the modc of the unconscious or "after" thc law as a postgcnital scxuality. Paradoxically, the nornrative trope of polyrnorphous perversity is undcrstood to charactcrize both views of alternative sexuality. There is no agrecment, howcver, on the manncr of dclimiting that "law" or sct of "laws."'l'hc psychoalralytic criticluc succccds in giving an account of the construction of "thc sutriccl"-and pcrhaps also the

tlrat "tlrc bcforc" .f thc iaw and "rire aftcr" otc dis.ir,riu"iu "u, performativcly instiruted modes of remporarity that "r.,a i*ok"J within the tcrms of a normativc framework whicli asserts "r" tharsubversion, dcstabilization, or displacement requires a scxuality thai somehow.cscapcs thc hc6;cmonic prohibitions on sex. F'or lioucault, thosc prohibiti.ns arc irrvariaLrly and inadvertently productiv" in ih" ,"nr" that "thc subjec" who issupposed ro be foJnded a'd produced in thro'gh rhose prohibitioris does nor have access tJ"-r.*urlity 1nd ls rn that some scnse "outsidcrt, ,,before,,'or ,,after', power itself. Power, ratlrcr than thc law, encompasses both the iuricrital (prohibitivc a.d regulat'ry) and the productive (i.advcricnrry gcrieiative) tunctrons of diffcrcrrtial rclatiolrs. Hence, thc sexuality-th-at cmergcs within thc rnirrrix of powcr relations is not a simple'rcpti."iion o. copy of the law itsclf, a uniform reperition of a nraiculiniri..o'o-y of iclentity. The producions swerve from their pu;p"ro "rigin"i inadvertcntly mobilize possibilities of "subjects" ihr, ,lt nli .n.r"ly "r,a cxceed tlrc bounds of cultural intelligibirity, but --] -'the lroundaries of what is, in fac, cuTt.,raliy intciligiblc. "rr..ilu"iy-"*prni The fcmrnisr norm of a postgcniral sexuaiity becirnc rhe object of significant criticism from femirrist theorists of sexuality, ,"-" or *"h9- hav_e sought a spcci6cally fcminist and/or lesbian of Foucault. This utopiar norion of a sexuarity freecl fr;;r,'h;i;;;r.* "piio*lrtion ual constructs, a scxuality bcyond "sex," failed to acknowledge the ways in which power relations continue to construct sexualiiv for women cvcn within the tcrms of a "liberared" heterosexualiiy or lesbianism.'" The same criticism is waged il.r" ,rii.r-.r specifically fcnrinirrc scxual ple.sure thlt is"g"inrt " iadically aiir".."iirt.a from phaIIic scx.uality. Irigar:iy's <rccasionalefforts r" i"iir" femrnlne scxuality from a spccific female anatomy havc bccn "lp..i6c the focus

thcpostrrlation of a subvcrsive or e mancipatory sexualiiy which could bc free of thc law. wc c'an prcss thc argumenr further r,i p"inting

tlrc Pc.rs"., t. havc a prrcsocial and prcgcn.icrc.r irtcg.ity. on thc hancl, tfi" monologic ."thc patcrnal Law" in Lacan-, as well 'tl.rer mastery of phallogoccnrrism in Irigaray, bear thc mark of a monotf,e", istic singularity tl'rat is pcrhaps leis unitary and culrurally universal than thc guiding.structuralist'assumptions of the p."ru-".ij "..ouni But thc qu:rrrcl sce r's also to turn bn the articuration of a temporal trope of a s'bvcrsivc scxuality that flourish cs prior to tlre inrpoiition of a law, aftcr its overthrow, or during its reign as .onrt"nt.fiallenge " to its. auth.rity. Here it scems wise to rci-nvoke Foucault *ho, in clarmirrg thrrt scxuality and power are coextcnsivc, implicitly rcfutes

tior.rs. Irr hcr existcrrtial-matcrialist mode,

illusi.rr of substancc-within thc matrix of normirtivc gcnder rela-

wittig pr"r,lrr","r the subject,

30

Subjects of Sex/Gender/Dcsire Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire

3l

6.

of anti-essentialist arguments for some time.t'-fhe return to biology as the ground of a specific fcminine sexuality or rneaning sccnls to dcfeat the feminist premise that biology is not dcstiny. llut whether fenrinine scxuality is articulated herc through a discoursc of biology for purely strategic reasons,t't or whcthcr it is, in fact, a fcnrinist re turn to biological essentialism, the characterization of female scxuality as radically distinct from a phallic organization of sexuality remains problematic. Women who fail either to recognize that scxuality as tlrcir own or understancl thcir scxuirlity as partiirlly constnrctecl within thc terrns of thc phallic cconomy arc potcnti:rlly writtcn off witlrin the tcrms of that theory as "male-idcntificd" or "unenlightcned." Indeed, it is often unclear within lrigaray's text whethcr sexuality is culturally constructed, or whethcr it is only culturally constructed within the terms of the phallus. In other words, is specifically feminine pleasure "outside" of culture as its prehistory or as its utopian futrrre? If so, of what use is such a notion for negotiating the contemporary struggles of sexuality within the terms of its construction? The pro-sexuality movement within ferninist thcory and practice has effectively argued that sexuality is always constructed within the terms of discoursc and powcr, wl.rcre p()wer is parti:rlly urrdcrstoocl in tcrms of hctcrclscxual and phallic cultural conventions. fhc crncrgencc of a scxuality constructed (not determined) in thesc tcrms within lesbian, bisexual, and hctcrosexual contexts is, therefore,not asign of a Inasculine identification in some reductive sensc. It is not the failed project of criticizing phallogocentrism or heterosexual hegcmony, as if a political critique could effe ctively undo thc cultural construction of the feminist critic's sexuality. lf sexuality is culturally constructcd witlrin existing power relations, thcn thc postulation of a normative sexuality that is "before," "outside," or "bcyond" power is a cultural impossibility and a politically impracticable dream, one that postponcs the concrete and contemporary task of rcthinking subversive possibilities for sexualiry and identity within thc terms of power itself. This critical task presumes, of course, that to operate within the matrix of power is not rhe same as to rcplicate uncritically relations of domination. It offers the possibility of a repetition of tlre Iaw which is not its consolidation, but its displacemcnt. In the place of a "malc-iclcntified" sexuality in which "malc" serves as the causc and irreduciblc meaning of that sexuality, we might develop a notion of sexuality corrstructcd in terms of phallic rclations of powcr that replay and redistribute the possibilities of that phallicism prcciscly through the subversive operation of "idcntifications" that arc, withirr tlre powe r 6elcl of scxu:rlity, incvitablc. If "identificati<lns," followingJacqucline l{ose, can bc exposcd as phantasmatic, then it must be possible to enact an idcntification that displays its phan-

,., ".r.nn*r"ag. J""r'lixl' o r ;i'il'i.i ; J'f';::1":''*H* :.''"'ffi "p?h e n cc, c, n s' i.r, il i t i, ;i;;' i,h ;;:.. i T l'; ii?i; jiiH,,li:;ll "" il, l i j: rifi catior " rh a t otrgrr "r " lr" .ri!.".a"} what prssihirirics irf g",r,i.. .r"ig,,-ri"rrs "'i";i;i:;;,,:: bu rary) ? exisr rm()rg rhe various ""'u"'g?"t '''"t'i"' orcurturiir inieligib'',T:':::::,X?.:,ff:ili:l::Jivirr isr sex rrn r thcory, wit h irr trrt' te rrrs ,f rcnr it is crc:r r t hrr t t he prcserrce of power dy,arnicswithi; ;;;,;1,;:; _ ,,",r;;;;;;;"j#ffi]e simple colrs.lid:rtirn or ir.grnerrtrrri.r oi a heterosexist or Prrail,gocelrtric power rcgirnc' Trrc, ';prescnce" of ,.r-."1r..i hctcrrscxuar crfventions within ..,,,r"*,. ,,, ;;ii;;;;r" prrlifcrati,n ,f spccifically gay disc.urses r[ scxuar Jirr.r.,,i". '.rroscxu,rI ..butch..
-1a,'r.rat
r

structecl scxuaritv,

tasmatic strrcrurc. rf trrcrc is .o racricar repucri:rti'n of rs reft isirr. i,,91ri"" ,rf rr,rw

a cLrrtLrralry corr_

Fllti-;t"'r* r""

"fenrrrre" as rrisroric.rr

of gendcrc:rreg,ries.

chimcrical .,f o.igln"liy t..,"t..nrcxual itlcntitics. nclthcr can they he.rrndcrsto,,tL AntJ rr'ilr" ei.rnici6us ipsistcncc .f hetcr._ sexrst c()nstrrrcts witrrirr g:ry sex.nriry heterosexual ..rnrt.ult, i;iirri"^r."r,ir ,rir.r i.rc'tity. Trrc *o",ir-1,',]i l'rl.ri., ,,li,J,."igrr, may well be rrre ineviralrr. rir.'.rf thlii""r,,r"uzarion
a-ni rnobiiization rtr.."f ii...,i;""i,lir"r.r,,sex.arconsrru*s in non-

and "r,,,r th. crse.f iJ."ni;.r r'lr.*"ir,rryr., ca.ror hc exprainc<.r as rcprcscnrrti.,,r,

iril ;;;

and amrng, heterosexuar.

of g"y*: to straight not.as copy .-ip1, i. ,., ..,py. The parodic rcpetition of "the origirrrl." triscrrssctr ", irr tirc i,,,,iJ",-ri;", reverls thc <,rigin,rl t,., 1," ,,.,ti,iug;;;i;;;;;;" "r.i,,,pi",. .,'"'iil'ji, ,"*,, a parody of rltc itlaa <tf rhe natura l a nd rrrc <'ricira r. "' u""""ii i.'.r"r"r""ir, constructs ci rcu the avair':rhre sircs rii p,'*.ft;;;l';r: as r.;i" whic^.r,,.do gc,r.ic. ratcar, the quesrion remainsi whr; at possibiliries .[ drinq gcntler;;;i;rrrir"i "l reci rcuration cxist? which ,";";;';;; i'irplr." r^r.ugh hyperbole, r;; ;'' p JJr ii.,.",i.,,r th e u.-rv ll,'n,,.u.,, f ;; ::'l,X"tf " "..r Consider nor onlv that the arnbiguitics a-nd irrcoherenccs
the so-calletl hetcrosc_rrr"i".;il;,. is to origirr:rl, hut. rerhcr,.

heteroscxrar frrrrrrcs r'rritrg*'i,rio

."i;.i

il"r,

rir'" ,,rr"rry c.nstrut tcd strtus

;lm

iir"'.",r,".r f rarnew'rk ,f iuncive ancl asvnrnr::.:::li il;;; .,i,""irrri,relferninine, thc dis_ but that thes-e crrltrrrrl r'tirrfigrrr;rtions. of gercr.,. .ro,rfur;.,,1 ()pcratc :rs sitcs for rntervenri.rr, cXDosrrrc., an.l Jispfi.-en'""ii,irr.,.r"."i.;.;;;,;r. words' thc "'rnitv" gcndcr r;;i-';;ii;; or a regur:rtorv i",irrlr.. pra*ice that secks t,r rcrrtlcr 'f e";,1". i.i",,riiy',_ifo'r,,r,.hr,r;;i;',;..;r;;irr' Ireterosex u a i r y. Ttr e H,.." r iir, ;;:;; ;;1,, r, r", ji",,..;: i. ;i;;"., apparatus oI prodrrctir,,r, " t,, ,."rtrii.,ilr" ..1"ri"" mearrirrgs ,f ..hctero_
I ;

suppressed rrrrd redescribc.r wirrrin

rron-,,;;";i"i,'"",r

hisexrrer pre*ices arc

within

32

Subjects of Sex/Ciender/Desire

Subjects of Sex/Ciender/Desire

/ 33

,,homosexuality," and "bisexuality" as wgll as the subversexuality," sive sites'of their convergence and resignification. That thc powcr regirrres of Sete r.sexism aid phallogocentrism scek to augment them,.iu., throrrgh a constant repetition of t6eir logic, thcir metaphysic, an.l thcir naiuralizecl ontologies does not inrply that rcpetition itself ought to be stopped-as if it iould be. If rcpetition is bound to. persist ?t* rnechanism of the cultural reproduction of identitics, thetr the "r crucial question emerges: what kind of subversive repetition might call into qr.restion thet-rcgulatory pradicc of iclentity itsclf?.. If there is no recourr"i,, "personr" a "scxr" or a "sextlality" that " escapes the matrix of powe r and_discursivc rclations that effectiv-ely pi"aL*" and rcgulate the intellig_ibility of those concepts ftrr us, what "possibility of efTectivc inversio1t, subversion, or disiunrtitut", the pi"..*."t*ithin the terms of a constructed identity? Whart possibiliby uirtue of tlte constructed character of sex ar-rd gende.r? li.r ""ir, Foucault is arnbiguous about the precise _character of the srh...n, ,,regulatory practiccs" thaiproduce- the category of sex, and 'Wittig ,;;?;r to'iriuest the full responsibility of the construction to sexual compuls.ry hcter,sexuality, yct J.' ,Jprodu.tion ancl its instrument, { gtirer discourses converge to produce this categorial fiction for reasons not ,l*ryt clcar or .uniirt.nt with one another' The power relations ih"t inf*" the biological sciences are not casily reduce-d, and the "emerging in nineteenth-ccntury -Ilurope has ,""Ji."t.grl alliance fictionst-thai could not be anticipated in advance. rp"*n.d".^tegorial t'h. u.ry coniplexity of the discursive map.that constructs gender appears to huid ori the promise of an i'a6vertcnt and gcncrative .li-ru.rg.r,.e of these discursive and regulatory structures. If the reguto,o.y fr.tion, of sex and gender a.e th"ms"lves multiply contested ri* lrf n.reaning, then the vEry rnultiplicity of thcir construction holds our rhe possibJity of a disruption of their univocal posturing. -f."tfy this project does ntt propose to lay. out.within traditional phil.rtop'tti."l t"r-, an ontology of g.nd"r whereby the meaning of being a'w<.,rnan or a man is eluiidated within the ternrs of phenomenolcrty. The presumption here is that the "being" of gender is an obie.t of a genealogical investigation that.maps, out the ,ifrrT ^n politilal p"rr-"t"r, of-its construcrion in the mode of ontology. To tl"ittt th"t gender is constructed is not to assert its illusoriness or ,.iifi.lrliry,"wh"re rhose terms are understood to reside within a binary thai counterposes the "real" -and the "authentic" as oppositi"""i. As a genealugy "f gender ontol.gy, this inquiry setks to understancl the dlscursiu-c'pro"duction of th-e plausibility of that binary ;.1"r,"; and to ,ugg.ri that certain culturil configurations of gender

take the place of "the real" and consolidate and augment their hegemony through that felicitous self-naturalization. II tlrerc is srlrnething riglrt in Beauvoir's claim that one is not born, but rathcr bcconrcs a wornan, it follows tl'tat woman itself is a term in proccss, a becomirrg, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification. L,ven when gendcr seems to congeal into the most reified forms, the "congealing" is itself an insistent and insiclious practice, sustirined and regulated by various social means. It is, for Beauvoir, never possible finally to become a woman, as if tlrcre were lr telos that governs the process of acculturation and construction. Gender is the repeated stylization of tlre body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid rcgulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy of gender ontologies, if it is successful, willdeconstruct the substantive appearance of gender into its consfitutive acts and locate and account for those acts witlrin the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of gender. To cxpose the contingent acts that crcate tlre appearance of a naturalistic necessity, a move which has been a part of cultural critique at least since Marx, is a task that now takes on the added burden of showing how the very notion of thc subject, intelligible only through its appearance as gendered, admits of possibilities that have been forcibly foreclosed by the various reifications of gender that have constituted its contingent ontologies. The following chapter investigates some aspects of the psychoanalytic structuralist account of sexual difference and the construction of scxuality with respect to its power to contcst thc regulatory regimes outlined here as wcll as its role in uncritically reproducing those regimes. The univocity of sex, the internal coherence of gender, and the binary framework for both sex and gender are considered throughout as regulatory fictions that consolidate and naturalize the convergent power regimes of masculine and heterosexist oppression. The final chapter considers the very notion of "the body," not as a ready surface awaiting signification, but as a set of boundaries, individual and social, politically signified and maintained. No longer believable as an interior "truth" of dispositions and identity, sex will be shown to be a performatively enacted signification (and lrence not "to be"), one that, released from its naturalized interiority and surface, can occasion the parodic proliferation and subversive play of gendered meanings. This text continues, then, as an effort to think through the possibility of subverting and displacing those naturalized and reified

34

Subiects of ScxiGerrdcr/Dcsirc

notions of gencler that support masculine hege mony and heterosexist power, tu -rk. gcnde r tioublc, not rhrough the strategics that figure I u,,rpirn b"y,r,id, but tlrroupih t6e molrilization, subvcrsivc cgnfusion, and pr,,liferati.rn of preiisely those constitutivc catcgor.ies that seek ro keep gcnder in iti place by posturing as the foundational illusions of idcntity.

2
Prohibition, Psychoanalysis, and the Production of the Heterosexual Matrix
'rhe straight nlind continucs to:rf6rm that incest, and not homosexuality represents its major interdiction. 'I'hus, when tl.rought by the straight mind, homosexr"lity i, nothing bur
heterosex ua I ity.

Wittig, "-l he Straight Minil" -lVorrique

on occasion fcminist theory has becn drawn to rhc thought of an origin, a time before whar some would cail "patriarchy" thlt would provide an imeginary perspectivc fronr which'ro cstablislr th. .ontingency of thc hist.ry of wonren's oppression. Debates have emerged over whcther prcparriarchal cultures'have cxistcd, whether th.t ;"";; matriarchal or matrilineal in structure, whcrher patriarchy could be shown to have a bcginning and, hcnce, bc subjec, ,o end. The ^.i critical impetus behind thesc kinds of inquiry sought undersiandably to show thar rhe antifeminist argumenr in favor of"the in."ii"uirit/o'r patriarchy constitured a rcification and naturalization of a bistorical and contingent phenomenon. Although the turn to a prepatriarchal state of culture was intended to expose the self-reificarion of patriarchy, that preparriarchal scheme has proven to be a differe nt sort of reification. More recently, some feminists have offered a reflcxive cririquc of some ,.in.Jlonrrrucs within feminism itself- The very notion of "patriarchy;' t tl,r""te.r..l to become a universalizing concept thut ouer.ides or ,.du* distinct "r articulations of gender in different cultural conte*ts. As tcn,nrsm.has.sought to "rym-etiy become integraily related to struggles against racial and colonialist opprcssion, it"has bccomc incrcasinlly irn"portant to resist the colonizing cpistemological srraregy rh"t *Jutd ,ubordinate different co'figuritions of doirination u"n.l", the rubric of a transcultural notion of patriarchy. The articulation of the law of patriarchy as a repressive and reg,rl'atory structure also requires reconsideration from this critical peripective. Thc femino, ,..iou.r. ,o imaginary.past "n to be cautious nor to promore a poliricaily -needs problematic reification of women's experience in the .or.r. of debunking the self-reifying clairns of masculinist pow"..