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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUN 2007 .,. .. .

28 April 1961
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OCI No. 1803/61 copy No.

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INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(Reference Title:

CAESAR XIII-61)

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTINQ THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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CURRENT INTELLIGEXCE STAFF STUDY
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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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T h i s is a workdng paper. I t traces c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y t h e development of a s p e c t s of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward c o l o n i a l areas and t h e c o u n t r i e s regarded by Moscow a s having achieved v a r i ous degrees of independence from rfimperialism.l? The Sino. S o v i e t S t u d i e s Group would welcome comment on t h i s paper, addressed t o Lyman Wilkison, who wrote t h e paper, or t o t h e a c t i n g c o o r d i n a t o r of t h e group, i n Room 2549 "Bb" Building

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SUMMARY
M & C o w f s prebccupati&n i n t h e period 1945-55 w i t h t h e task o,f r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e S o v i e t homeland, w i t h t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of E a s t e r n Europe i n t o t h e bloc, and w i t h developments i n Western Europe-the main focus of East-West f r i c tipnL-for it decade precluded a dynamic p o l i c y i n peripheral areas: non-Coknmunist A s i a , Africa, and L a t i n America. A l -

though on numerous p u b l i c o c c a s i o n s Lenin and S t a l i n h a d expressed great o p t i m i s m over t r e n d s i n c o l o n i a l areas, Communist a g i t a t i o n and S o v i e t a c t i o n i n t h e s e a r e a s - - u n t i l World W r I1 shattered t h e e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i n a large s e c t i o n s of A s i a and speeded up t h e tempo of p o l i t i cal, economic, and social change on a world-wide scale-' had been s i p g u l a r l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . The USSR's f a i l u r e i n l a t e 1945 t o adopt a bold program t o capture or g u i d e t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t movements which had matured d u r i n g t h e w a r reflected n o t o n l y t h e S o v i e t Union's desire n o t t o embitter r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West on secondary matters, b u t a l s o u n c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of noncommunist leaders and movements and t h e g e n e r a l lack of a S o v i e t "presence. '? S t a l i n a p p a r e n t l y e v a l u a t e d t h e new governments as t r a n s i t o r y , soon t o g i v e way before popular press u r e s i n a n i n e v i t a b l e e v o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power t o t h e l e f t . The worsening of S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West was accompanied by a s t i f f e n i n g of MOSCOW'S l i n e i n A s i a . With t h e founding of t h e Cominform i n September 1947, moderation toward non-Communists w a s r e p u d i a t e d conclusively--a decis i o n w h i c h was reflected i n 1948 i n t h e widespread outbreak of Communist-led s t r i k e v i o l e n c e , terrorism, and armed rebell i o n s n o t o n l y i n remaining c o l o n i a l areas b u t a l s o i n t h e newly independent s t a t e s of A s i a . T h e Kremlin a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e d t h a t n o t h i n g f u r t h e r could be g a i n e d by Communist r e s t r a i n t or c o n c i l i a t i o n , and t h i s view w a s abetted by Communist s u c c e s s e s i n China and by a c o n s i s t e n t o v e r e v a l u a t i o n of Communist p a r t y p r o s p e c t s elsewhere i n A s i a . Asian Communist parties, following MOSCOW~S lead, began f r e e l y t o prescribe a "Chinese way'' f o r t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t movement; i n e s s e n c e t h i s meant t h e encouragement of peasant and workers' armed r e v o l t s , : as w e l l a s i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e . The subsequent s u p p r e s s i o n of Communist-inspired r e v o l t s - w i t h t h e n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n of Indo-China--with heavy losses t o Communist assets w a s a s e r i o u s setback t o M O S C O W ? ~ g e n e r a l l i n e t h a t t h e t i m e was r i p e f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y upheavals i n A s i a .
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The world-wide crisis touched off in June 1950 by the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSR to mobil+ze world Communist and non-Communist *?peaceff forces in supnOrt of its Korean holicy. Moscow, however, was slow in rec,kignizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and %eutralism" could be turned against the West; even after the war turned into a military and political stalemate and t w Soviet Union's general attitude toward Asian non-Cornmunist goverhnlents moderated, Stalin continued to rebuff neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise.
At a September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics, offered to help promote the economic development of Asian countries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw materials. At the UN, the Soviet Union's consistent antiWesternism now was combined with limited overtures to nonWestern delegations, a change reflected also in Soviet world-wide diplomatic activity--suggesting that Moscow had upgraded the possibilities for expanding its influence through traditional government-to-government channels, The extensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference (sponsored by the World Peace Council) in April 1952 suggested that Stalin also looked to increased economic contacts as a promising avenue for breaking out of the USSR's semi-isolation. The year 1952 also featured a shift toward greater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs against Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists. Stalin's last major theoretical pronouncements pointed toward a greater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interest between the industrially developed Western powers and the weakly developed or undeveloped "capitalist dependencies," but his continued rejection of a settlement on Korea acted as a powerful brake on Soviet efforts to get a friendship campaign rolling

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Stalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discarded his methods and attempted to bring about a limited improvement in relations with the non-Communist world. The cumulative effect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders in the six months following StalinOs death made it apparent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward underdeveloped countries was in progress. For the first time the Soviet Union announced its willingness--although qualified-to contribute to the UNvs technical assistance program, and

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Soviet Premier Malenkov declared a "good neighbor" policy and "a new approacht1on economic aid to Asian countries.

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Thd' USSR s subsequeng economic overtures attempted to play oji local popular and governmental concern over export markets and desires for rapid economic development. Moscow's main attention in late 1953 and 1954 was to Asia, although interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempo of political; 'economic, and social change in the area. The Soviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to Latin America--a tacit admission that they were more or less effectively sealed off from its influence.

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A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way since 1950 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare and generate pressures against military or political cooperation with the West, was intensified in 1954. The USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West on territorial issues and other matters and stepped up its efforts to introduce detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asian and Arab countries. The Soviet Union's tactical support for nationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir was based on the expectation that their greater selfassurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting Western leadership.
The USSR's intention to seek a closer working agreement with Asian and Arab nationalist,regimes was made clear by its February 1955 agreement to help finance and construct a major steel plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and objectives of the neutralist-convened conference of Asian and African governments at Bandung in April 1955. MOSCOW'S attempts to accommodate its public posture to neutralist-nationalist sentiment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; having formerly attacked him for his anti-Communist and t*pro-imperialist" policies, Moscow now praised him for his "spiritual" and politibal leadership of Asia.

On the eve of the 1955 Geneva summit conference, the USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promise of an improvement in East-West relations and a general

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r e d u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , not j u s t i n Europe b u t throughout t h e world. Concurrent w i t h c o n c i l i a t o r y moves, however,, t h e S o v i e t Union ,set Pn motion a c h a i n of secret arm n g g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a ,group of Asian and Arab states des i g n e f f t o o f f s e t pro-Western a l l i a n c e s in t h e area, a t a c t i c s u r f a c e d w i t h t h e announcement t h a t September of C a i r o ' s arms
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The Bul$srnian-Khrushchev v i s i t t o Asia i n November and December 1955 w a s Moscow's first b i g chance t o b i d f o r support among Asian peoples. The t w o leaders dropped t h e i r Geneva smiles and attempted t o g i v e Asian n e u t r a l i s m a more anti-Western s l a n t by i d e n t i f y i n g t h e USSR w i t h Asian n e u t r a l ist aims and "peace" and t h e West w i t h "colonialism'' and int e r v e n t i o n , Agreements on i n c r e a s e d trade, technical and c u l t u r a l exchanges, and credits reached d u r i n g t h e t o u r l a i d t h e groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h e area. The Khrushchev-dominated 20th p a r t y congress i n February 1956 sought t o create t h e impression t h a t a new era w a s openi n g , b r i g h t w i t h prospects of Communist v i c t o r i e s . The new f o r m u l a t i o n s of t h e congress w e r e intended t o add c r e d i b i l i t y t o t h e S o v i e t Union's g e n e r a l l i n e of "peaceful coexistence" and t o f a c i l i t a t e long-term c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e USSR and non-Communist c o u n t r i e s . Khrushchev cdnfirmed t h a t a i d t o Asian, A f r i c a n , and L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s f o r t h e i r eco-

nomic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l development was an important plank i n S o v i e t foreign p o l i c y , designed t o p r o v i d e ''a maj o r stumbling block'' t o i m p e r i a l i s m . ,

In t h e series of crises touched off by t h e collapse i n J u l y 1956 of Cairo's n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r Western economic ass i s t a n c e t o b u i l d an Aswan h i g h dam and Nasir's s w i f t nat i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouraged Cairo t o resist Western demands. The S o v i e t Union's d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda footwork f o l l o w i n g t h e a t t a c k on Egypt was intended t o h a l t t h e f i g h t i n g and embarrass t h e a t t a c k ing c o u n t r i e s without committing t h e USSR t o a l l - o u t s u p p o r t of Nasir. A f t e r t h e cease-fire, Communist p r o p a g a n d i s t s feasted on t h i s "evidence" of i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r v e n t i o n and magnified t h e S o v i e t role as p r o t e c t o r of Arab i n t e r e s t s .
MOSCOW~S e f f o r t s i n e a r l y 1957 t o d i s t r a c t world attention from bloc internal t r o u b l e s c e n t e r e d on a campaign t o c o u n t e r P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower ' s "?diddle E a s t Proposals'*-i . e . , t o f r u s t r a t e t h e e x t e n s i o n of pro-Western d e f e n s e

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arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influence in some of the Arab countries, The Soviet Union's own growing foreign economic program could point to increased diplomatic @Id economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arab statesf,to dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries, and to a generally enhanced impression that ,the USSR,was a serious economic as well as political competitor wikh'the Wes$., Only a handful of countries, however, had agreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and military aid or of economic aid alone. Following the frustration in June 1957 of efforts by the "anti-party" group to break his control of the Soviet government and party;, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolder foreign moves. Behind a facade of Soviet security interest in Syrian developments and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures following Soviet tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile and claims of a new world balance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution. After two months of efforts to intensify and prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abrupt reversal reflected apparent disappointment that it w a s the Arab states--rather than the lest--which buckled under EastWest pressures. The USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations and subsequent meetings of world Communist parties in November 1957 reflected an effort to make direct political and propaganda capital out of changes wrought domestically and internationally in the years of Soviet rule. The'essence of the new formal policy pronouncements was a call for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence, with top priority to peace forces for a drive against the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons. The practical effect of the party discussions on Soviet policy was slight, with the USSR continuing to profess willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and to assist politically and economically in the development of countries seeking to break away from dependence on the West. Moscow began 1958 riding the wave of optimism engendered by World-wide reaction to its military and space achievements, and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over a period of years of the blocvs political, economic, and military aid program--combined with people-to-people contacts, intensive

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propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation--to make a growing number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependen,t on the .bloc and,,politicallytractable. However, Nasir's/precipitous move.toward a merger of Egypt and Syria point.e'd up the Soviet problem of maintaining good state relations with nationalist governments while supporting the spread of Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet Union ended by grudgingly accepting the formation of the UAR--with its disastrobd effects on the Syrian Communist party-and turned its attention to heading off any rapprochement between Nasir and the West, on the one hand by increasing its economic and military support to Cairo and on the other by continuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populace. The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on 14 July 1958 and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. As in the earlier Syrian r r r l s k , .Moscm attempted to intensify the air of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force an immediate big-power conference to bring about a detente. The Soviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations with the new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effective instrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs. Adtk-leftist coups in the fall of 1958 in Pakistan, Burma, .and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped countries a more resolute stand against reactionary influences, both domestic and international. ,
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At the 21st party congress in early 1959 Wrushchev personally spotlighted ideological and political differences which had arisen in MOSCOW*S political, economic, and military support of selected non-Communist countries--support ' based principally on parallel anti-Western interests rather than on compatible ideologies or common long-term goals. Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for more consistent support of Soviet foreign policy in exchange for Soviet favors. The congress' endorsement of a more active line in underdeveloped countries was reflected in signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs and of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and cultural contacts with Latin American countries. The general strategy outlined at the congress reflected the USSROs apparent belief

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that the.stalemate in East-West relations facilitated rather than hampered its policy of driving a wedge between the Western and neutralist camps;,,supportfor the latter was justified on!'the basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed' them .t'o be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward the bloc. 'In mid-1959, under the exigencies of its drive for detente with the West'and in reaction to unfavorable developments within key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarily s e t aside its activist line in favor of overtures for strengthening friendly government-to-government relations. Moscow apparently hoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United States would help build irresistible popular pressure for an early summit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly session in New York, which included the promise of vastly greater economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America from both the bloc and the West once the arms race was over, was a transparent bid for support for immediate talks on disarmament. In a different vein, MikoyanOs November 1959 visit to Mexico pointed up the new stage In Soviet efforts to exploit the economic difficulties of Latin American countries in the direction of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc; 90 Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1 6 reinforced this tactic; at the same time it called attention to MOSCOW'S appraisal that Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedented opportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. KhPushchevvsown highly publicized Asian trip in February and March 1960 probably was intended to halt the erosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had suffered particularly as a result of friction between Peiping and other Far Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Soviet positions and prestige. Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks'in May 1960 apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major outstanding international issues, prompted a major effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. The U-2 incident was used as a pretext for a campaign to frighten Americags allies into restricting the use,

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and p r e s s i n g f o r t h e e v a c u a t i o n , of American bases from t h e i r t e r r i t o r y under t h e t h r e a t of a S o v i e t s t r i k e i n t h e e v e n t of t h e i r us,e by a n y - f u t u r e i p v a d e r of S o v i e t a i r s p a c e . Released a t 1eas.k t e m p o r a r i l y f r o m - i n h i b i t i o n s d e r i v i n g from t h e des i r e .$or n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e US, t h e S o v i e t Government adopted a b o l d l i n e on Cuba w h i c h went w e l l beyondany.pm.Vious S o v i e t move i n L a t i n America, although Khrushchev's 9 J u l y S t h r e a t t o u s e rockets a g a i n s t t h e U i n t h e e v e n t of 'IPentagon'' i n t e r l e n t i o n a h Cuba w a s p a t e n t l y a b l u f f t o impress non-Cornmunist L a t i n America w i t h t h e might and d a r i n g of t h e S o v i e t Union. T h e S t r o n g e r l i n e w a s a l s o e v i d e n t . i n Moscow's t r e a t ment of t h e RB-47 i n c i d e n t and its breaking o f f disarmament
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Moscow seized on t h e crisis i n t h e Congo following its achievement of independence on 30 June as a w i n d f a l l t o d i s c r e d i t t h e West n o t o n l y i n t h e Congo b u t throughout A f r i c a and t o e s t a b l i s h a S o v i e t presence through heavy s u p p o r t t o Lumumba-controlled elements i n t h e L e o p o l d v i l l e government. Khrushchev's pledge of u n i l a t e r a l a i d w a s implemented dramati c a l l y i n a f a s h i o n t o undermine t h e UN program, which came under heavy S o v i e t a t t a c k f o r tlimproperlyll s u p p o r t i n g c o l o n i a l ist i n t e r e s t s . Mobutu's 15 September order e x p e l l i n g a l l bloc diplomats and t e c h n i c i a n s brought t h e USSR's Congo experiment t o an a b r u p t h a l t and f o r c e d t h e S o v i e t Union t o f a l l back on d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e c o n t i n u i n g p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y chaos.

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Khrushchev's performance a t t h e 1 5 t h General Assembly s e s s i o n i n New York i n September and October 1960, w h i c h managed t o keep t h e idea of a summit meeting a t t h e f o r e f r o n t of world p u b l i c o p i n i o n a t t h e same t i m e t h a t Moscow continued t o p l a y up s i t u a t i o n s making a n e a r l y meeting of S o v i e t and American leaders seem i m p e r a t i v e , w a s a n e f f o r t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e c d u n t r i e s of non-bloc A s i a , A f r i c a , and L a t i n America-s i n g l y and i n concert--to a heightened a s s a u l t on c o l o n i a l i s m , Khrushchev's o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l conduct, and S o v i e t maneuvers g e n e r a l l y , added up to a major e f f o r t t o impress on t h e leaders of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s t h a t i n t h e 15 y e a r s s i n c e a World Wr I1 t h e r e h a d been a fundamental change i n t h e world b a l a n c e of power--a f a c t w h i c h had n o t y e t been r e f l e c t e d p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y e i t h e r i n t h e p o l i c i e s of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l governments or i n t h e s t r u c t u r e and o p e r a t i o n s of t h e UN.

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In sum, the assumption underlying MOSCOW'S policy toward the underdeveloped countries--to which it has clung despite heavy pr,essures from both..insideand outside the bloc-is that tbk world is passing?through an interim period of uncertain but fairly short duration, perhaps a decade, during which political, economic, and ideological forces now in motion will bring about a basically new world situation: 'the predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian, A f rican, and L t i American countries will reflect the corre&!n lation of world forces, resulting in a gradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West. In this period, growing bloc economic and political support to underdeveloped countries will help their governments main- tain a neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc and increasingly opposed to Western-policies and interests.
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THE STALINIST LEGACY:

August 1945

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Mciscow's preoccupation i n t h e immediate postwar y e a r s with.$he massive t a s k of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e S o v i e t homeland, w i t h t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of E a s t e r n Europe i n t o t h e b l o c , and with c r u c i a l developments i n Western Europe--the p r i n c i p a l f o c u s of E a s t - W e s t differences--precluded a dynamic p o l i c y i n p e r i p h e r s l ' areas: non-Communist Asia, A f r i c a , and L a t i n America. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e extreme f l u i d i t y of t h e Asian p o l i t i c a l s c e n e aroused Moscow's r e v o l u t i o n a r y optimism and c a l l e d f o r an updating a n d c l a r i f i c a t i o n of its views on.Comrnunist world p r o s p e c t s . Although S t a l i n a t e v e r y p a r t y cong r e s s s i n c e t h e e a r l y 1920s--as Lenin had b e f o r e him--expressed o f f i c i a l optimism over developments i n " t h e c o l o n i a l areas," Communist a g i t a t i o n and S o v i e t meddling i n t h e a f f a i r s of nonCommunist Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America had i n f a c t been s i n g u l a r l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . World War 11, by s h a t t e r i n g t h e e x i s t i n g s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i n l a r g e areas of A s i a and speeding up t h e tempo of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l change througho u t most of t h e world, opened new v i s t a s f o r t h e expansion of Soviet influence.
Moscow's f a i l u r e a t t h e end of t h e w a r t o s t e p o u t immed i a t e l y w i t h a c l e a r - c u t s t r a t e g y t o guide or c a p t u r e a n t i c o l o n i a l , anti-Western movements, reflected t h e USSR's d e s i r e n o t t o e m b i t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West on matters which it considered secondary t o t h e o v e r r i d i n g n e c e s s i t y of a r r a n g i n g a s u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t i n Europe. I t t u r n e d a l s o on uncert a i n t y i n t o p S o v i e t circles whether /to c o o p e r a t e w i t h noncommunist leaders and movements--and on what terms--or t o encourage l o c a l Communists t o a t t e m p t t o seize power. The scarc i t y of s o l i d information, t h e l a c k of a S o v i e t "presence," and a record studded w i t h o v e r e n t h u s i a s t i c a p p r a i s a l s of a n t i c o l o n i a l developments a l l counseled c a u t i o n . Although L e n i n ' s vaunted t h e s i s t h a t t h e c a p i t a l i s t c h a i n could be broken a t its weakest line--the areas under " i m p e r i a l i s t oppressiontt-and S t a l i n ' s formula f o r overcoming imperialism by r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g its c o l o n i a l "rear" were considered s t i l l v a l i d , n e i t h e r s e r v e d as a p r a c t i c a l guide f o r S o v i e t p o l i c y in t h i s p e r i o d of widespread r e v o l u t i o n a r y change.

Whatever S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s concerning e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e c h a o t i c and near-chaot i c c o n d i t i o n s i n South and Southeast A s i a , Moscow was stymied by t h e fact t h a t r e l a t i o n s between local
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Communist and non-Communist independence movement s--seldom , if e v e r , good--had been embittered i n most areas o v e r t h e i s s u e 04 wartime,support f o r t h e A l l i e s . Moscow's 1935 adopt i o n a& subsequent c o n c e n t r a t i o n on Popular Front t a c t i c s i n Eu*ope--which viewed fascism as a more p r e s s i n g danger t h a n colonialism--had c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e estrangement of Com-. munists from i n c i p i e n t n a t i o n a l i s t movements by committing Moscow t o c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e Western c o l o n i a l powers. S t a l i n ' s p a d t ' w i t h H i t l e r removed these i n h i b i t i o n s , b u t f o l lowing Germany's a t t a c k on t h e S o v i e t Union i n June 1941, t h e v i r u l e n t a n t i c o l o n i a l campaign w a s suddenly moderated by t h e requirements of t h e w a r t i m e a l l i a n c e . With t h e Japanese def e a t , t h e two-front s t r u g g l e of Communists and n a t i o n a l i s t s a g a i n s t t h e c o l o n i a l powers--and each other--reached a new peak of i n t e n s i t y . '
'

Moscow, i n no p o s i t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e local developments
by e f f e c t i v e material o r p o l i t i c a l a i d , directed a s t e a d y stream of charges a g a i n s t B r i t i s h , French, and Dutch m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s undertaken i n an e f f o r t t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r c o l o n i a l

p o s i t i o n s , b u t its a t t i t u d e toward non-Communist movements coming t o power i n t h e new Asian s t a t e s v a c i l l a t e d . Moscow was p u b l i c l y cool toward t h e i r leaders, and S o v i e t spokesmen questioned t h e "genuineness" of t h e i r a n t i c o l o n i a l i s m , i n l i g h t of t h e compromises which had made e a r l y independence poss i b l e . Well i n t o t h e postwar period, Moscow continued t o d i s c u s s Asian developments i n t e r m s of e v e r - d e t e r i o r a t i n g p o l i t ital and economic c o n d i t i o n s and openly p r e d i c t e d t h a t e x i s t i n g governments and t h e i r programs would soon g i v e way b e f o r e t h e i n e v i t a b l e e v o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l . p o w e r t o t h e l e f t . S t a l i n n o t o n l y minimized t h e immediate prospects of Asian n a t i o n a l i s t movements, but he a p p a r e n t l y a l s o e n t e r t a i n e d hopes t h a t d i f f e r e n t views on c o l o n i a l i s m , combined w i t h a n t a g o n i s t i c economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t s , would lead t o a s e r i o u s r i f t between t h e United States and its Western c o l l e a g u e s . As a consequence of these views, S o v i e t propaganda downplayed t h e American r o l e i n a t t e m p t i n g t o s t a b i l i z e areas r e c e n t l y freed from Japanese occupation, c o n c e n t r a t i n g i t s attacks o n other Western powers a c t i v e i n Asia.
MOSCOW'S unsure d i p l o m a t i c hand was reflected i n disagreement i n t o p S o v i e t academic circles as t o t h e meaning of t h e changes brought about i n t h e c o l o n i a l world by w a r , Unanimous o n l y i n t h e i r a p p r a i s a l s t h a t "tremendous" and " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " developments had t a k e n and were t a k i n g p l a c e , S o v i e t scholars
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and p u b l i c i s t s , i n t h e absence of f i r m guidance from t h e t o p , a r r i v e d a t no consensus which would f i t t h e needs of S o v i e t pol icy7,' .'
, ) $
z

-Their c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s were u n d e r l i n e d by t h e c o n t r o v e r s y which s p r a n g up over t h e September 1946 p u b l i c a t i o n of Changes i n t h e Economy of C a p i t a l i s m R e s u l t i n g From tAe'Second q o r l d W a r b y Moscow s . l e a d i n g p o l it ico-economic t h e o r e t i c i a n , ' Academician Eugene S. Varga. Varga's monumental survey of t h e war's e f f e c t s on world c a p i t a l i s m , i n c l u d i n g an a t t e m p t t o assess t h e "far-reaching changes i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e c o l o n i e s and t h e mother c o u n t r i e s , " concluded t h a t on t h e basis of i n d u s t r i a l development and l e s s e n e d f i n a n c i a l dependence,, t h e war y e a r s i r r e v o c a b l y had reduced t h e economic dependence of t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e c o l o n i e s on t h e i r m e t r o p o l i s e s . Varga, i n company w i t h other S o v i e t a n a l y s t s , c i t e d t h e growth of an i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t i n a whole series of c o l o n i e s and t h e s u p p l y of arms t o c o l o n i a l peoples d u r i n g t h e war--a p a r t of which t h e y were able t o r e t a i n and u s e f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y armies--as f a c t o r s f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e development of Communist i n f l u e n c e . Although Varga's views found c o n s i d e r a b l e s u p p o r t , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s f a v o r a b l e a p p r a i s a l o f economic developments i n t h e c a p i t a l i s t world were i n c r e a s i n g l y unacceptable as cold war t e n s i o n s mounted. P u b l i c r e b u t t a l of Varga's views was considered necessary. Published d i s c u s s i o n s a t a j o i n t conference of Economics I n s t i t u t e and Moscow U n i v e r s i t y t h e o r e t i c i a n s i n May 1947 r e f l e c t e d S o v i e t h o s t i l i t y toward both t h e Western powers and t h e Asian. n a t i o n a l i s t movements. Varga's f i n d i n g s on t h e degree of economic independence a t t a i n e d by c e r t a i n c o l o n i e s and "semi-colonies" ( i m p e r i a l i s t "dependencies" s u c h as t h e L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s ) w e r e c h a l l e n g e d , and it was denied t h a t a basis had been l a i d i n some c o l o n i e s f o r independent economic development. Although t h e regime-sponsored c o u n t e r a t t a c k on Varga s e r v e d n o t i c e t h a t t h e area for i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of world e v e n t s had narrowed c o n s i d e r a b l y , both Varga s u p p o r t e r s and Varga detractors d i s p l a y e d u n c e r t a i n t y toward developments i n A s i a , f i n d i n g as much to condemn as t o p r a i s e i n t h e c u r r e n t scene. The founding of t h e Cominform i n September 1947 marked t h e c o n c l u s i v e r e p u d i a t i o n of moderation as a l i n e t o be f o l Zhdanov's keynote speech emphalowed toward non-Communists. s i z e d t h e e x t e n t t o which Moscow was t o commit i t s e l f t o t h e
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..

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d o c t r i n e ' o f t w o a n t a g o n i s t i c world systems, completely excludi n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a t h i r d , or n e u t r a l i s t , p o s i t i o n . Zhdanov;s speech'and t h e e a r l y Cominform propaganda had l i t t l e t o say,::tibout A s i a and served t o u n d e r l i n e t h e fact t h a t MOSCOW~S primapy concern remained w i t h s e c u r i n g a f a v o r a b l e s e t t l e m e n t of European i s s u e s , Asian Communist parties w i t h i n a s h o r t time,began t o r e f l e c t t h i s harsher l i n e and t o adopt a more vfgorous a s s a u l t on remaining Western c o l o n i a l i n t e r e s t s and on non-Communist Asian n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t i e s . The year 1948 w a s marked by a widespread o u t b r e a k of Communist-led s t r i k e v i o l e n c e , terrorism, and armed r e b e l l i o n s not o n l y in t h e remaining c o l o n i e s , b u t also i n t h e newly independent s t a t e s . Moscow's encouragement of such t a c t i c s a p p a r e n t l y stemmed from t h e belief t h a t n o t b i n g f u r t h e r could be gained by Communist r e s t r a i n t toward t h e West n o r f r o m a d d i t i o n a l attempts t o conc i l i a t e non-Communist Asian governments, a view abetted by Communist s u c c e s s e s i n China and by c o n s i s t e n t o v e r e v a l u a t i o n of Communist p a r t y prospects elsewhere i n Asia, A obvious e f f o r t was made t o e x p l o i t Chinese prestige n which ballooned i n A s i a on t h e heels of t h e 1948 m i l i t a r y v i c tories. Asian Communist p a r t i e s , f o l l o w i n g Moscow's l e a d , began f r e e l y t o prescribe a "Chinese way" as proper anticolon'ia l i s t s t r a t e g y f o r A s i a . The c o n t e n t of t h i s "Chinese way" w a s n o t s p e l l e d o u t , b u t in e s s e n c e it meant t h e encouragement of armed r e v o l t s by p e a s a n t s and workers, as w e l l a s i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e t o draw a d d i t i o n a l elements of t h e n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie i n t o the "anti-imperialist" s t r u g g l e . The foundering of t h i s policy--as evidenced by t h e general supp r e s s i o n of t h e Communist-inspired revolts w i t h heavy and i n some p l a c e s catastrophic losses t o local Communist assets, w i t h t h e n o t a b l e except i o n of Indochina--was a s e r i o u s setback t o Moscow's g e n e r a l l i n e t h a t t h e ' . t i m e w a s r i p e f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y upheavals i n A s i a .
Post m o r t e m s on f a i l u r e s of t h e resort t o open force--i,e., edj,t;or.ial-. i n t h e April 1949 i s s u e of Problems - -s of W i tory--attacked t h e d e g r e e of cooperat i o n "exposed" between a r e a governments and t h e " c o l o n i a l i s t s " and f r e e l y predicted a g e n e r a l d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e Asian p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n which would g i v e Communist p a r t i e s a n o t h e r chance under m o r e favorable circumstances. S o v i e t scholars w e r e charged w i t h coni c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r e f f o r t s on t h e s u p p o r t of S o v i e t and Commun i s t g o a l s i n Asia by greater a t t e n t i o n t o present-day developments and t o combatting t h e false theses of non-Communists.
the

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:,

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I n A p r i l 1949 a 'three-day meeting of P a c i f i c and O r i e n t a l Ins t i t u t e s p e c i a l i s t s w a s h e l d i n Moscow t o improve t h e c o n t e n t of S o v i e t propaganda on As,ian developmentsand i n June t h e r e was a j b i n t conference ofz-the P a c i f i c and Economics I n s t i t u t e s . The p r , i n c i p a l r e p o r t a t both meetings w a s d e l i v e r e d by t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e - P a c i f i c U s t i t U t e , Academician Eugene M. Zhukov, s i n c e 1943 a t o p spokesman on S o v i e t Asian p o l i c y ,
I .

i

The pro6e'edings of t h e two c o n f e r e n c e s p o i n t up t h e considerable d o c t r i n a l backing and f i l l i n g which was going on i n t h e Communist movement a t t h i s t i m e . Having j u s t s u f f e r e d de'feats a t t h e hands o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e i n many of t h e new Asian

s t a t e s , Moscow w a s i n no mood t o examine d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y curr e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o r p l a y i n g up e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e new states and t h e West, and i n s t e a d i n c r e a s e d its isolat i o n from Asian n a t i o n a l i s t movements by heaping abuse on t h e i r leaders and i d e o l o g i e s . Zhukov, however, made it clear t h a t Moscow even t h e n w a s less concerned w i t h t h e s o c i a l r o l e of v a r i o u s c a p i t a l i s t elements i n t h e new Asian s t a t e s t h a n w i t h t h e "main q u e s t ion" :
t h e p r o g r e s s i v e n e s s of one s o c i a l movement or a n o t h e r , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y n a t u r e OP r e a c t i o n a r y n a t u r e of one p a r t y o r a n o t h e r , i s . . . d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union, w i t h t h e camp of democracy and

socialism.

The c o n f e r e e s ' e x p o s i t i o n of an Asian s t r a t e g y w e l d i n g a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s , p e t i t - b o u r g e o i s , and middlebourgeois e l e m e n t s w i t h a m i l i t a n t ' p r o l e t a r i a t a r i d ' p e a s a n t r y l a r g e l y ignored r e c e n t defeats of Communist-led i n s u r r e c t i o n s and, because of "fundamental changes" caused by t h e war and t h e "new alignment of p o l i t i c a l forces'' i n Asia r e s u l t i n g from the Communist sweep of t h e Chinese mainland, c o n s i d e r e d Communist chances i n Asia b r i g h t enough f o r t h e continued advocacy of v i o l e n c e . The g e n e r a l l i n e continued t h a t a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y set by Zhdanov a t t h e founding of t h e Cominform i n September 1947--aggressive Communist leadership of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t c o a l i t i o n s and across-the-board attack on a l l evidence of Weste r n i n f l u e n c e . Area Communist p a r t i e s were slow i n coming around t o t h e Moscow-charted c o u r s e ; less caught up i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , t h e y p r e f e r r e d t o attack l o c a l class enemies. The Communist p a r t y of I n d i a , t h e most important i n non-Communist Asia f o l l o w i n g t h e s u i c i d a l u p r i s i n g of t h e Indonesian p a r t y in 1948, was s p l i t i n t o f a c t i o n s o v e r t h e q u e s t i o n whether
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-. .

t o c o n t i n u e peasant g u e r r i l l a warfare, which had f a i l e d i n Telengana, o r t o retreat t o more p e a c e f u l forms of p o l i t i cal a g i t , a t i o n i n a n attemp$ t o win over d i s s a t i s f i e d elements i n the,.Congress p a r t y . Cdminform e f f o r t s t o b r i n g Asian Commundst p a r t i e s i n t o l i n e were p o i n t e d up by an e d i t o r i a l i n its January 1950 j o u r n a l a t t a c k i n g those I n d i a n Commun i s t p a r t y leaders who continued to q u e s t i o n t h e direct app l d c i b i l i t y qf t h e "Chinese experience" t o t h e i r own s t r u g gle f o r power,'and t h e Japanese Communist p a r t y f o r advocati n g "peaceful r e v o l u t i o n " f o r 'Asia.

On t h e occasion of S t a l i n ' s 7 0 t h b i r t h d a y , P r o f e s s o r I . I . Potekhin, long a p r i n c i p a l spokesman on A f r i c a n a f f a i r s , summarized t h e S t a l A n i s t p o s i t i o n on "Colonial Revolution and t h e National-Liberation Movement :It
Comrade S t a l i n warned, and t h e l a s t q u a r t e r of a c e n t u r y f u l l y confirmed, t h a t t h e complete and f i n a l ' v i c t o r y of t h e c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n is poss i b l e o n l y under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t . P e t i t - b o u r g e o i s n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s and p a r t i e s have a l r e a d y proven t h e i r i n c a p a c i t y t o accomplish n a t i o n a l 1i b e r a t i o n . They 1i m i t thems e l v e s t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms and t h e achievement of formal, bourgeois democracy which do n o t and cannot e n s u r e a complete break I r o m t h e s y s t e m of i m p e r i a l i s m .

I n S t a l i n ' s name, Potekhin went on t o record "bourgeois bet r a y a l s " of t h e independence movement not o n l y by t h e Chinese b o u r g e o i s i e , but a l s o b y t h e b i g b o u r g e o i s i e of I n d i a , Indon e s i a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and Egypt. The Moscow-created crisis touched off by t h e i n v a s i o n of South Korea i n June 1950, which q u i c k l y became a p o l i t i c a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n of t h e major powers, provided a new f o c u s f o r S o v i e t Asian p o l i c y and pre-empted a t t e n t i o n from t h e other areas. S t a l i n ' s Korean gambit showed h i m a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y w i l l i n g t o u s e Communist armed forces, a t t h e very considerable r i s k of a g e n e r a l w a r , t o achieve h i s p o l i t i c a l object i v e s . The move obviously stemmed from a monumental rniscalc u l a t i o n of t h e Western mood. The war made academic f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h i n t h e Communist world o v e r h a r d o r s o f t t a c t i c s t o be followed i n t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e . What counted now was t h e s u c c e s s of
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...

l o c a l s u p p o r t e r s i n m o b i l i z i n g Communist and non-Communist "peace" f o r c e s i n s u p p o r t of o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s . The war a l s o marked the f i n a l s t e p i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of Communist propaganda t o w a r d . % i n g l i n g o u t t h e United States as t h e p r i n c i p a l "imp e r i a l i s t " enemy, n o t o n l y of Communist i n t e r e s t s b u t a l l e g e d l y of those of t h e independence movements as w e l l . Presuma b l y , t h e a t t a c k on South Korea was i n i t i a t e d as a r e s u l t of M O ~ C O W ' S estim,ate t h a t a m i l i t a r y shock b r i n g i n g down one of t h e 'weak Western-oriented s t a t e s i n Asia would t r i g g e r a c h a i n r e a c t i o n of r e v o l t s elsewhere. By'-the summer of 1951 it had become obvious t h a t t h e f i g h t i n g would continue deadlocked unless one s i d e o r t h e o t h e r was w i l l i n g t o take much g r e a t e r risks

I

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With t h e drawing t o a close o f t h e m i l i t a r y phase of t h e war, Moscow began t o back away from its previous l i n e . The clash of Korean p o l i c i e s had exposed c o n s i d e r a b l e Asian estrangement from t h e West. Statements by Indian and Arab leaders i n p a r t i c u l a r , and v o t i n g r e c o r d s i n t h e United Nations n o t h o s t i l e t o b l o c p o s i t i o n s , p o i n t e d up t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e estrangement which had developed between t h e "peace" p o l i c i e s of a number of Asian governments and those of t h e p r i n c i p a l Western powers. I n r e t r o s p e c t , Moscow, which had acted promptl y t o o r g a n i z e world-wide condemnation of t h e UN e f f o r t i n Korea, w a s s l o w i n r e c o g n i z i n g t h e e x t e n t t o which a n t i w a r s e n t i m e n t and " n e u t r a l i s t " f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of Asian non-Communist governments could be t u r n e d a g a i n s t t h e West, To t h e end, S t a l i n r e b u f f e d n e u t r a l i s t e f f o r t s t o b r i n g about a compromise on Korea, a problem i n ' w h i c h he was too p e r s o n a l l y a n d e m o t i o n a l l y involved t o permit &en t h e t a c i t admission of error. The t r a n s i t i o n t o a more p e a c e f u l s t a g e i n Communist and S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s with t h e former c o l o n i e s of Asia was gradual and uneven. The y e a r 1951 was marked by a c o n s i d e r a b l e t a i l i n g o f f of Communist-led g u e r r i l l a wars i n Asia--except f o r Indochina--and renewed emphasis on p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n by t h e l o c a l p a r t i e s , b u t t h e changeover i n t a c t i c s w a s n o t accompanied by unmistakable p u b l i c s i g n s such as t h o s e od: t h e i r adoption i n mid-1947. Bolshevik i n June 1951 commented favora b l y on t h e newly adopted program of t h e Indian Communist p a r t y furt which t u r n e d its back Q%lh e r encouragement of peasant rev o l t s and set t h e p a r t y ' s primary purpose a s t h e c r e a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y b l o c comprised n o t o n l y o f t h e working class and t h e p e a s a n t r y , but a l s o p r o g r e s s i v e elements of t h e
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i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and of t h e Indian b o u r g e o i s i e . I n d i a h a s cons i s t e n t l y been t r e a t e d as a s p e c i a l problem by S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n s . :If Moscow intendeqk its endorsement of t h e Indian Communist ,$arty's s h i f t as a t s i g n a l t o Asian Communist p a r t i e s g e n e r a i l y , t h e message was s l o w i n t a k i n g e f f e c t , f o r it was l a t e summer 1952 b e f o r e t h e l a s t p a r t i e s f e l l i n l i n e .
e. ' A t t h e September 1951 ECAFE meeting i n Singapore t h e Sov i e t delegates', i n an a b r u p t r e v e r s a l from t h e i r p r e v i o u s harrassment of p a r t i c i p a t i n g Asian governments, o f f e r e d t o promote t h e economic development of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s by t h e exchange of S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l machinery f o r l o c a l raw materials --a move which had a l l t h e earmarks of a propaganda gambit r a t h e r t h a n a p o l i c y s h i f t . B e t t e r evidence t h a t S t a l i n ' s inn e r c i r c l e of a d v i s e r s had concluded t h e r e w a s l i t t l e l i k e l i hood of an e a r l y Communist v i c t o r y i n g e n e r a l Asian r e v o l u t i o n , t h u s c a l l i n g f o r a major change i n s t r a t e g y , is p r e s e n t e d i n t h e r e p o r t s of d i s c u s s i o n s a t a 12-day conference i n November 1951 of S o v i e t Asian s p e c i a l i s t s of t h e I n s t i t u t e of O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s and of t h e p a r t y C e n t r a l Committee's Academy of Social Sciences.

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Zhukov a g a i n f u l f i l l e d t h e r o l e of regime spokesman. The burden of h i s argumentation w a s t h a t Asian p a r t i e s could n o t count on coming t o power everywhere t h r o u g h , " r e v o l u t i o n a r y armies," and t h a t t h e main s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e Chinese revolut i o n f o r other Asian c o u n t r i e s w a s its b l e n d i n g 6f anti-imperia l i s t and a n t i - f e u d a l elements i n t o a s i n g l e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t f r o n t s t r u g g l i n g toward independence. Resort t o arms as a p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c w a s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y disavowed, although i t was c o n s i d e r a b l y downgraded by t h e conference m a j o r i t y . With t h e pendulum now swinging i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of i n t e n s i f i e d p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n , t h e conferees s t r u g g l e d t o give more precise c o n t e n t t o t h e concept of a n o n c a p i t a l i s t p a t h of development f o r Asian c o u n t r i e s , reopening t h e d e b a t e s of t h e e a r l y 1920s over t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o r g a n i z ing a " s o c i a l i s t " o r d e r o u t of semi-feudal, s e m i - c a p i t a l i s t societies.
A desire t o open a new s t a g e i n S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h noncommunist A s i a w a s apparent i n Moscow's behavior i n t h e United Nations, where c o n s i s t e n t anti-Westernism w a s combined w i t h l i m i t e d o v e r t u r e s t o t h e small-country delegations--an apparent r e f l e c t i o n of a worldwide upgrading of p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r expanding Communist i n f l u e n c e by manipulating t r a d i t i o n a l methods of diplomacy, Greater S o v i e t a t t e n t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l and
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domestic developments having no immediate b e a r i n g on S o v i e t s e c u r i t y or on t h e main a r e n a s of East-West c o n f l i c t w a s ref l e c t e d ,.in t h e ap'pearance,*of a symposium prepared by t h e Ins t i t u t d ' o f Economics on The Peoples of L a t i n America i n t h e S t r u g g l e Against American Imperialism, t h e first s i g n i f i c a n t monograph devoted t o t h i s s u b j e c t i n t h e postwar period. No t o u r . d e force such as Varga's 1946 work, t h i s book i n d e f i n intg. t h e t a s k , q t hand as t h e ''unmasking of t h e economic, p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , and i d e o l o g i c a l expansion of American i m p e r i a l s i m " is t y p i c a l of S o v i e t s c h o l a r s h i p of t h e p e r i o d : t h e subs t i t u t i o n of q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e classics of Marx-Lenin-Stalin f o r o r i g i n a l a n a l y s i s and heavy dependence on second-hand accounts i n t h e l o c a l Communist press. The January 1952 Lenin a n n i v e r s a r y speech of p a r t y t h e o r e t i c i a n P e t r N. Pospelov, s u r v e y i n g t h e c u r a e n t "crisis of t h e e n t i r e c o l o n i a l system of imperial i s m " i n optLmist i c terms, claimed t o see "hundreds of m i l l i o n s of formerly backward and suppressed people" now beginning t o p l a y an a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l role, i n f u l f i l l m e n t of L e n i n ' s p r e d i c t i o n s .

t o drum up i n v i t e e s , i n d i v i d u a l businessmen who might s e r v e as f u t u r e trade c o n t a c t s or might s e r v e as f o c u s e s f o r local a g i t a t i o n a g a i n s t Western t r a d e c o n t r o l s . Moscow sought t o s t i m u l a t e i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d ' t r a d e 'with t h e S o v i e t Union by a few h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e t r a d e o f f e r s , o v e r t u r e s t o e s t a b l i s h comprehensive economic r e l a t i o n s , and l i m i t e d o f f e r s of techn i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . Although i n f r e q u e n t o f f e r s t o exchange Sov i e t i n d u s t r i a l equipment and c a p i t a l goods f o r r a w materials and f o o d s t u f f s produced i n t h e former c o l o n i a l areas had been made p r e v i o u s l y , t h e y had m e t w i t h g e n e r a l s k e p t i c i s m i n view of Moscow's g e n e r a l h o s t i l i t y t o non-Communist governments.

That S t a l i n looked t o i n c r e a s e d economic c o n t a c t s as one of t h e promising avenues f o r b r e a k i n g o u t of t h e semi-isolat i o n t h e USSR s u f f e r e d a s a r e s u l t of its r o l e i n Korea is suggested by t h e S o v i e t b u i l d u p f o r t h e A p r i l 1952 World Peace Council-, sponsored 'Moscow -Econorbic'Conference ;:Communilt- part i e s and peace c o u n c i l groups throughout t h e world a t t e m p t e d

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I n s e e k i n g t o expand trade and t e c h n i c a l c o n t a c t s , Moscow was a c t i n g from m a n i f e s t l y economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l object i v e s . The USSR's desire t o break t h e West's trade r e s t r i c t i o n s and open up Asia and A f r i c a , i f n o t L a t i n America a s w e l l , as s o u r c e s of materials v i t a l f o r S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e s and to f a c i l i t a t e its breakneck i n d u s t r i a l expansion w e r e undoubte d l y c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s . D e s p i t e heavy propaganda d t t e n t i o n
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c o n t r o l s , . a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union no l o n g e r had a need f o r imports b u t could compete w i t h t h e West on t h e basis of its own r e s g u r c e s . S t a l i n hejr-apparent Malenkov's r e p o r t t o t h e 1 9 t h p d ' t y congress which,'Lfollowed i n October 1952 cited t h e g e n e r a l p o v e r t y of t h e peoples of " c o l o n i a l and dependent" areas and f o r e c a s t a p e r i o d of continued d e c l i n e i n t h e economy of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s which, i n combination w i t h a g e n e r a l s h r i n k i n g of world markets f o r Western manufactured goods, wouldAWragdown t h e economy of t h e c a p i t a l i s t world l i k e a dead weight." S t a l i n ' s s h o r t concluding speech t o t h e con? gress w a s devoted e x c l u s i v e l y t o problems of t h e world Commun i s t movement, t o e x h o r t i n g more i n t e n s e e f f o r t , and f o r reass u r i n g t h e f a i t h f u l t h a t greater s u c c e s s e s were i n t h e offing. S t a l i n and Malenkov',s s t a t e m e n t s , i n combination w i t h MOSCOW~S stepped-up p o l i t i c a l and economic o v e r t u r e s t o t h e Asian and Arab states, suggested t h a t t h e p e r i o d of r e l a t i v e calm-and I ' neglect--had come t o an end. For obvious r e a s o n s , Moscow d i d not s p e l l o u t its r o l e i n t h e i n t e n s i f y i n g t r o u b l e s forecast f o r t h e c a p i t a l i s t world, b u t by i m p l i c a t i o n , Communists would s t e p up e f f o k t s t o e x p l o i t p o l i t i c a l and economic d i f f e r e n c e s whenever and wherever t h e y appeared. I n t h e November 1952 General Assembly s e s s i o n , Moscow moderated its p r e v i o u s s t a n d on s e v e r a l minor measures i n v o l v i n g a United Rations economic a s s i s t a n c e r o l e . S t a l i n , i n a C h r i s t m a s l?interview" w i t h James Reston, declared h i m s e l f i n f a v o r of i n c r e a s i n g economic and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h t h e smaller count r i e s . S t a l i n ' s continued r e j e c t i o n of I n d i a n e f f o r t s t o b r i n g about an East-West compromise on Korea, however, acted as a powerful brake t o S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o g e t its f r i e n d s h i p campaign r o l l i n g . With t h e January 1953 +discovery of t h e " d o c t o r s ' p l o t , " Moscow's f o r e i g n countenance, m i r r o r i n g its domestic one, a b r u p t l y became more h o s t i l e .
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P a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g h i s l a s t y e a r s , S t a l i n appeared t o e x e r c i s e a "dead hand" on S o v i e t p o l i c y w i t h h i s i n h e r e n t susp i c i o u s n e s s of a l l f o r c e s which were n o t under h i s c o n t r o l . Postwar changes i n Moscow's l i n e , as also post-Korea changes, were made i n t h e f a c e of r a d i c a l l y changed Asian circumstances --which took place w i t h l i t t l e o r no i n f l u e n c e from Moscow-which S t a l i n undertook w i t h r e l u c t a n c e .

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S d d l i n ' s sudden demide shook t h e whole of S o v i e t s o c i e t y . S i n c e * S t a l i n dominated a l l aspects of S o v i e t policy-making and implementation, and s i n c e he had t a k e n o n l y rudimentary steps t o p r e p a r e f o r an o r d e r l y s u c c e s s i o n , h i s abrupt d e p a r t u r e le'ft h i s s u c c e g s o r s as stunned a s was t h e ordidiiary 'Soviet c i t i z e n :and on the.*deferisive. , . The unsteady c o a l i t i o n which now assumed command t u r n e d first t o a r e d u c t i o n of tens i o n w i t h t h e West i n order t o p r o v i d e a breathing s p e l l for c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y as w e l l as t h e i r individual posit ions.
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F i r s t of a l l , t h e new leaders sought t o d i s p e l t h e black c l o u d s , domestic as w e l l a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l , g e n e r a t e d d u r i n g t h e d i c t a t o r ' s f i n a l two months of r u l e , and t o r e v i t a l i z e t h e moves made t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r toward a l i m i t e d improvement i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e non-Communist world. Molotov's f u n e r a l o r a t i o n attempted t o affirm t h e new regime's d e d i c a t i o n to c a r r y i n g o u t a " S t a l i n i s t peace-loving f o r e i g n p o l i c y , ?' which he i n t e r p r e t e d as a desire f o r t h e development of "cooperation" and "business ties" w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s . Malenkov's speech t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t on 1 5 l a r c h 1953--just t e n days a f t e r Stal i n ' s death--sought t o r e a s s u r e t h e S o v i e t people and emphasized h i s i n t e n t t o pursue peace. By t h e end of March, Moscow had i n i t i a t e d a series of minor moves and token steps intended t o clear t h e a i r of t h e h o s t i l i t y engendered e a r l i e r i n t h e year and t o s u p p o r t t h e genuineness o f , i t s p r o f e s s e d desire for improved r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e ' w e s t . A number of S o v i e t s t a t e ments culminating i n Bulganin's May Day speech emphasized t h e need f o r a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e r i s k of war and called on t h e West t o respond t o S o v i e t peace o v e r t u r e s by abandoning the arms race and d i s m a n t l i n g Western m i l i t a r y b a s e s close t o S o v i e t territory.
As t h e new l e a d e r s h i p became more c o n f i d e n t of its aut h o r i t y , t h e tempo of reform and i m p r o v i s a t i o n i n its f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s i n c r e a s e d . I n s u c c e s s i o n Moscow succeeded i n "norTerrimalizing" r e l a t i o n s w i t h Greece, Israel, and Canada t o r i a l claims a g a i n s t Turkey were abandoned, and new e f f o r t s were made t o i n c r e a s e diplomatic and trade c o n t a c t s , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h Asian and Arab states. The S o v i e t peace o f f e n s i v e brought diplomacy and propaganda t o bear i n a combination unknown i n S t a l i n ' s day. I n t h e i r h a n d l i n g of v a r i o u s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s ,

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t h e new leaders d i s p l a y e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e f l e x i b i l i t y and a marked i n c r e a s e i n s o p h i s t i c a t i o n as t h e y sought by t h e v e r y number ahd v a r i e t y of t h e g r moves, many of which were merely t h e redbrsal of S t a l i n ' s ' k r a t u i t o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of ill. w i l l , t o cruate t h e impression of a major s h i f t of S o v i e t poldcy i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of d e t e n t e . S o v i e t diplomats abroad undertook a widespread demonstration of good f e l l o w s h i p f o r t h e i r Westex% colleaguerj. The new l e a d e r s i n Moscow, who stopped short of openly r e j e c t i n g S t a l i n ' s methods i n r e a f f i r m i n g h i s g o a l s , dared p r i v a t e l y t o d e p l o r e "excesses" which had c r e p t i n t o S o v i e t f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s as a r e s u l t of S t a l i n ' s p e r s o n a l dir e c t i o n of day-to-day diplomacy. The new more c a n c i l i a t o r y f e a t u r e s of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y were i n t e r p r e t e d f o r t h e home audience as testimony of t h e S o v i e t Union's growing self-ass u r a n c e and s t r e n g t h . T h i s s y n t h e t i c o f f i c i a l optimism was n o t accompanied by any appreciable l e t - u p in domestic propaganda h o s t i l e t o t h e W e s t , however.

n a t i o n a l market." Stepped-up e f f o r t s through d i p l o m a t i c chann e l s showed t h a t Bioscow was l o o k i n g toward an expanding exchange of goods w i t h t h e major c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s as w e l l as w i t h t h e independent c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America. I n J u l y it became a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e new regime was prepared t o c a r r y its o v e r t u r e s t o t h e underdeveloped c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s w e l l beyond t h e l i m i t s implied i n earlier o v e r t u r e s . . A t t h e 15 J u l y meeting of t h e UN Economic and S o c i a l Council,
t h e first t i m e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e Uw's t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e program. While a t t a c k i n g t h e Western approach t o t e c h n i c a l

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e peace o f f e n s i v e , which occupied MOSCOW'S p r i m a r y a t t e n t i o n , t h e regime s t e p p e d o u t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of i n c r e a s e d economic c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e whole c a p i t a l i s t world. A t t h e Geneva meeting on East-West trade, S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s . toned down t h e i r propaganda role and showed a marked businessl i k e approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n s . A May-1953 Kommunist review of t h e major l i n e s of S o v i e t economic p o l i c y placed Moscow s q u a r e l y on t h e s i d e of "widening economic c o o p e r a t i o n and norm a l trade r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s " and f o r a n o v e r - a l l i n c r e a s e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. A t t h e same time, t h e a u t h o r , A. Nikonov, a l e a d i n g S o v i e t economist, reiterated t h e p r i n c i p a l l i n e s of Moscow's attack o n ' w e s t e r n trade policies, which he held t o be r e s p o n s i b l e for h o l d i n g doyn t h e volume of trade, and on Western strategic commodity c o n t r o l s , which he wanted dropped i n f a v o r of t h e "re-establishment of a s i n g l e i n t e r -

S o v i e t d e l e g a t e Arutyunyan announced Moscow's w i l l i n g n e s s f o r

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a s s i s t a n c e and r e p e a t i n g t h e s t a n d a r d S o v i e t p o s i t i o n t h a t e l i m i n a t i o n of Western trade r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed on t h e weaker c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s and t h e development of "normal t r a d e " . ; t i t h a l l countries"wou1d do more t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r economic development t h a n any l i k e l y UN program, Arutyunyan n e v e r t h e l e s s announced t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union had set a s i d e f o u r , m i l l i o n rubles--supplemented l a t e r by token amounts from tbe Ukraine aqd Belorussia--for t h e u " s t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e program.* The impact of Moscow's o f f e r w a s reduced by Arutyunyanss grudging endorsement--"it is better t o l e t them trade normally w i t h 6ther c o u n t r i e s and get t h e money t h e y need t h a t way t h a t t o r e n d e r them so-called aid"--and by t h e g r a d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e " c o n t r i b u t i o n " i n effect could be s p e n t o n l y w i t h i n t h e USSR or for sel'vices of S o v i e t speci a l i s t s abroad and d i d n o t conform t o : t h e requirements of t h e UN program. The i n i t i a l f o u r m i l l i o n r u b l e s , as a r e s u l t , went unused. The s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d on 25 J u l y 1953, on t h e occ a s i o n of t h e 50th Anniversary of Bolshevism, reflected t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e t o which t h e regime w a s w i l l i n g to l i n k belief i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l a s t i n g c o e x i s t e n c e w i t h t h e c a p i t a l i s t world to a d r i v e for i n c r e a s e d economic t i e s w i t h a l l countries The "good neighbor" p o l i c y which Malenkov advanced i n h i s 8 August 1953 speech t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t , The S o v i e t Union has no t e r r i t o r i a l claims a g a i n s t any s t a t e whatsoever.. Differences i n t h e s o c i a l and economic system cannot s e r v e as an obstacle t o t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of f r i e n d l y ' r e l a t i o n s . . . .

... .
e

was i n t e n d e d t o follow up Moscow's e a r l i e r overtures--such as its w e l l - p u b l i c i z e d s u r r e n d e r of nuisance c l a i m s a g a i n s t Turkey and Iran-and t o pave t h e way f o r a bolder across-the-board approach t o t h e newly independent states of Asia and A f r i c a . Malenkov's remarks w e r e keyed t o a r e a s s e r t i o n of S o v i e t s t r e n g t h , which w i t h i n two weeks were b u t t r e s s e d by p u b l i c claims t o poss e s s i o n of t h e hydrogen bomb, as p a r t of a n e f f o r t t o r e i n v i g o r ate t h e Communist movement, which had become somewhat l e t h a r g i c
and unchanging, Moscow l a t e r attempted t o cover up i t s y e a r s of o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s program by f a l s e l y d a t i n g t h e i n c e p t i o n of t h i s program as 911953-1954tt, i n s t e a d of 1950, and alleged t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e USSR, t h e Ukraine, and B e l o r u s s i a from t h e beginniqg,

*Always c o n s t r a i n e d t o show its p o l i c i e s as continuous

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i n t h e absence of s t r o n g one-man l e a d e r s h i p and under t h e d e b i l i t a t i n g i n f l u e n c e of t h e concerted e f f o r t t o p l a y down o u t s t a n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two world power b l o c s .
I

Tpe d r i v e by S t a x i n ' s s u c c e s s o r s f o r "reducing i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n " had helped reduce t h e diplomatic s e m i i s o l a t i o n Moscow had s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of t h e Korean vent y r e ' a n d had succeeded i n p a r t in reducing p r e s s u r e on Sov i e t p o s i t i o h s both. i n Europe and i n t h e F a r E a s t , b u t it had f a i l e d t o a t t r a c t Western concessions. Moreover, t h e peace o f f e n s i v e w a s n o t a s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e f o r h e l p i n g t o c r e a t e t h e impression of a USSR r a p i d l y growing i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e and authority--an impression which Communist leaders from t h e e a r l y days of t h e r e v o l u t i o n had recognized as v i t a l l y n e c e s s a r y b o t h t o Moscow and t o t h e world Commun i s t movement. The new f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o u r s e i n d i c a t e d by Malenkov represented n o t s o much a break w i t h S t a l i n i s t p o l i cies as it d i d a r e j e c t i o n of S t a l i n i s t t a c t i c s and t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t improved government-to-government r e l a t i o n s would place the USSR i n a better p o s i t i o n t o conduct a s t r o n g g l o b a l p o l i c y , The cumulative effect of t h e minor moves und e r t a k e n b y Moscow o v e r t h e p r e c e d i n g f i v e months inade it app a r e n t t h a t a fundamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n of S o v i e t t a c t i c s t o ward t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s had been decided on.
The August 1953 appearance of academician Eugene Varga's Basic Problems of t h e Economics and P o l i t i c s of I m p e r i a l i s m A f t e r t h e Second World W a r , which according t o t h e a u t h o r was prepared i n 1948-1951 and e l a b o r a t e d on i n 1952-1953 i n l i g h t of S t a l i n ' s Problems of Socialism a n d a t h e 1 9 t h p a r t y congress d i s c u s s i o n s , p r o v i d e f i n a u t h o r i t a t i v e summary of t h e world views i n h e r i t e d by t h e regime. Varga's a n a l y s i s harped on t h e coming d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of Western imperialism through f a i l u r e t o overcome i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " and ass i g n e d no g r e a t r o l e t o b u i l t - i n antagonism between newly i n dependent Asian-African s t a t e s and t h e West. I n s t e a d , h e dwelled on r i v a l r i e s among i m p e r i a l i s t powers f o r i n f l u e n c e and markets i n c o l o n i a l and formerly c o l o n i a l areas and all e g e d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l g o a l of American f o r e i g n p o l i c y w a s t h e economic and t e r r i t o r i a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o ' c o l o n i a l terf r i t o r i e s of t h e world t o its own advantage-a process he considered w e l l under way. Varga a l s o r e p e a t e d t h e s t a n d a r d c h a r g e t h a t " r o t t e n compromises" between local bourgeois part i e s and Western i m p e r i a l i s t staites had postponed t h e successf u l c o n c l u s i o n of t h e " n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n ' ' s t r u g g l e o v e r much

4)

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of A s i a , . V a r g a " s work d i d n o t reflect t h e e v o l u t i o n which had begun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's p o l i c i e s toward p r e v a i l i n g moods +n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s n o r provide a r a t i o Idle f o r t h e new tflick. It d i d , however, p r o v i d e a f o c u s f o r a l f m i t e d r e - e v a l u a t i o n of MOSCOW'S views on "colonial'' developments i n - t h e g u i s e of s c h o l a r l y criticism of Varga's book carried o u t o v e r t h e succeeding s i x months. Followingethe September 1953 plenum of t h e c e n t r a l committee, which confirmed Khrushchev as p a r t y first s e c r e t a r y and s e t o f f t h e o f f e n s i v e on t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l f r o n t , t h e d e c i s i o n t o s t e p up t h e f o r e i g n economic program w a s endorsed p u b l i c l y i n unmistakably o f f i c i a l t o n e s . Following up M o s c o w ' s g r a n t of one b i l l i o n r u b l e s f o r North Korean r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , Premier Malenkov on 19 September c a l l e d f o r "a new approach t o s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n s t r u c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e aid" t o Asian countries by "many states, " implying S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s t o assist t h e economic development of f r i e n d l y non-Communist Asian countries. Malenkov's c a u t i o u s s t e p w a s followed by d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s t o spark mutually r e i n f o r c i n g d r i v e s f o r i n c r e a s e d trade and f o r the "exchange" of t e c h n i c a l information and t r a i n ing. Although t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n f o r MOSCOW'S trade d r i v e probably w a s t h e need f o r greater imports of consumer goods e n t a i l e d i n bialenkov s "new course" promises t o raise consumpt i o n l e v e l s i n t h e USSR, Moscow made a major e f f o r t t o e x p l o i t its i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d t r a d e as proof of its good w i l l and as a demonstration of S o v i e t economic p r o g r e s s . Newly expressed desires t o import consumer gqods were used as a peg f o r f u r t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e r i d i c u l o u s n e s s of Western restrict i o n s on t r a d i n g w i t h t h e b l o c . Mikoyan's 17 October announcement of a new program on r e t a i l trade and p r o d u c t i o n of consumer goods u n d e r l i n e d Moscow's i n t e r e s t i n increased imports. A t t h e same t i m e , Mikoyan's s t a t e m e n t was e s p e c i a l l y noteworthy f o r t h e l e n g t h s t o which he went i n a t t e m p t i n g t o j u s t i f y t h e new program--as w e l l as t o b i d f o r added i n t e r n a t i o n a l prestige-by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e USSR's postwar strides i n economic recons t r u c t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l development, Moscow h a i l e d a growing list of new and r e v i s e d trade agreements as proof of t h e f r u i t s of its new program. Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a f i v e - y e a r trade agreement w i t h I n d i a p o i n t e d up t h e r a p i d rapprochement which had been developing between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , speeded by t h e
i

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of Asia, . V a r g a " s work d i d n o t reflect t h e e v o l u t i o n which had begun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's p o l i c i e s toward p r e v a i l i n g moods +n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s n o r provide tale f o r t h e new t+ck. It d i d , however, p r o v i d e a f o c u s a f o r a 3 mited r e - e v a l u a t i o n of MOSCOW'S views on " c o l o n i a l " developments i n - t h e g u i s e of s c h o l a r l y criticism of Varga's book carried o u t o v e r t h e succeeding s i x months. Followingethe September 1953 plenum of t h e c e n t r a l committee, which confirmed ghrushchev as p a r t y first s e c r e t a r y and s e t off t h e o f f e n s i v e on t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l f r o n t , t h e d e c i s i o n t o s t e p up t h e f o r e i g n economic program w a s endorsed p u b l i c l y i n unmistakably o f f i c i a l t o n e s . Following up Moscow's g r a n t of one b i l l i o n r u b l e s f o r North Korean r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , Premisr Malenkov on 19 September c a l l e d f o r "a new approach to s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n s t r u c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e a i d " t o Asian count r i e s by "many states, I' implying S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s t o a s s i s t t h e economic development of f r i e n d l y non-Communist Asian countries. Malenkov's c a u t i o u s s t e p w a s followed by d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s t o spark mutually r e i n f o r c i n g d r i v e s f o r i n c r e a s e d trade and f o r t h e "exchange" of t e c h n i c a l information and t r a i n ing. Although t h e p r i n c i p a l r e a s o n f o r Moscow's trade d r i v e probably w a s t h e need f o r greater imports of consumer goods e n t a i l e d i n Idalenkov's "new course" promises t o raise consumpt i o n l e v e l s i n t h e USSR, Moscow made a major e f f o r t t o e x p l o i t its i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d t r a d e as proof of i t s good w i l l and as a demonstration of S o v i e t economic p r o g r e s s . Newly expressed desires t o import consumer gqods were used a s a peg f o r f u r t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e r i d i c u l o u s n e s s of Western restrict i o n s on t r a d i n g w i t h t h e b l o c . Mikoyan's 17 October announcement of a new program on r e t a i l trade and p r o d u c t i o n of consume r goods u n d e r l i n e d Moscow's i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d imports. A t t h e same t i m e , Mikoyan's s t a t e m e n t was e s p e c i a l l y noteworthy f o r t h e l e n g t h s t o which he went i n a t t e m p t i n g t o j u s t i f y t h e new program--as w e l l as t o b i d f o r added i n t e r n a t i o n a l prestige-by r e f e r r i n g to t h e USSR's postwar strides i n economic recons t r u c t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l development. Moscow h a i l e d a growing list of new and r e v i s e d trade agreements as proof of t h e f r u i t s of its new program. Conclusion on 2 December 1953 of a f i v e - y e a r trade agreement w i t h I n d i a p o i n t e d up t h e r a p i d rapprochement which had been developing between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , speeded by t h e
'

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moderation of Moscow's Korean s t a n d f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h of S t a l i n . The agreement, l o o k i n g toward i n c r e a s e d exchange of a wide range of goods, c o n t a i n e d i n a d d i t i o n a vague c l a u s e concernding f u t u r e S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l aid. A t about t h i s t i m e , Moscow;.apparently made o v e r t u r e s t o extend t e c h n i c a l assistance to Egypt and pressed s i m i l a r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Afghanistan. A handful of S o v i e t t e c h n i c i a n s had been s e n t t o Kabul t h e . prpceding A p r i l i n connection w i t h p l a n n i n g f o r t h e construct i o n of g r a i n s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , r e v i v i n g a prewar t a c t i c which had l e d S t a l i n t o e n t e r i n t o c o n t r a c t s f o r t h e construct i o n of s e v e r a l i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s i n Turkey and I r a n and t o lllendlf t e c h n i c i a n s t o f r i e n d l y Afghanistan. The announcement on 2 1 December of t h e appointment of f i v e new deputy chairmen of t h e USSR Council of Ministers--Saburov, Pervukhin, Tevosyan, Malyshev, land Kosygin--foreshadowed a broad i n c r e a s e i n f o r e i g n as w e l l as domestic economic a c t i v i t i e s . Malenkov, i n r e p l y i n g on 31 December t o q u e s t i o n s submitted by Kingsbury Smith, renewed b i d s f o r expanded East-West trade as both a means 6f e x p r e s s i n g and of promoting peace and i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperat i o n . m Moscow's economic o v e r t u r e s attempted t o p l a y on l o c a l popular and governmental concern over e x p o r t markets and t h e problems of r a p i d economic development, accompanied by extens i v e propaganda efforts t o d i s c r e d i t Western economic and p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e and t o e x a c e r b a t e commercial as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l f r i c t i o n between t h e l i t t l e developed Asian, African, and L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s and t h e major Western powers. S o v i e t spokesmen continued to reject t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any compromise w i t h c a p i t a l i s t methqds of economic development and repeated stapdard a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e of bourgeois e f f o r t s to i n d u s t r i a l i z e t h e " E a s t The .first s e r i o u s p o s t - S t a l i n s t u d y of t h e problems of economic growth i n t h e former c o l o n i e s appeared i n t h e November 1953 Problems of Economics. The a u t h o r , L . F i t u n t a s p e c i a l i s t i n nonbloc economic developments, continued Moscow's attacks on Westerno r i e n t e d economic p o l i c i e s b u t veered away from past S o v i e t condemnation of f o r e i g n economic a s s i s t a n c e per se, conceding without e l a b o r a t i n g t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n of economic a i d under p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n s 'lpromotesl' i n t e r n a t i o n a l unders t a n d i n g . A December review of t h e p r o s p e c t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade i n t h e same j o u r n a l asserted t h e "great p o s s i b i l i t i e s " b l o c c o u n t r i e s now had of developing trade I t w i t h a l l c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s d e s i r i n g t o do so under mutually advantageous terms," and l i n k e d t h e S o v i e t t r a d e d r i v e w i t h Moscow's c o n t i n u i n g '*peace" o f f e n s i v e and w i t h moves t o "aid t h e economic development of backward c o u n t r i e s '*
,If
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I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e need f o r a thoroughgoing reassessment of S o v i e t views on developments i n t h e formerly c o l o n i a l areas and t o e x p l o r e t h e p r o c e s s e s of economic change abroad, a special,,bonferenc'e of ecoqomists and o r i e n t a l i s t s of t h e Academy of dbiences and of t h e - p a r t y c e n t r a l committee's Academy of S o c i a Y S c i e n c e s was h e l d i n February 1954, o s t e n s i b l y t o d i s c u s s t h e theses of Varga's Basic Problems.... The conference proceedings and l e n g t h y c r i w s of t h e book i n both Kommunist an3 Problems.o,f Economics were intended t o p r e s e n t an up-todate summary w[oscow's c u r r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such basic problems as t h e s h o r t - r u n p r o s p e c t s of world c a p i t a l i s m and of r e l a t i o n s between t h e Western powers and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic "dependencies I' Untenable, as undermining t h e v e r y bases of Communist e v a l u a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s t - w o r l d developments, were Varga's ,views ltminimizing'? t h e e x t e n t and t h e imminence of t h e +*crisis" n world capitalism. S o v i e t economists i seized on s i g n s of a g e n e r a l economic d e c l i n e i n 1953 as proof t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d t h e s i s was n o t overdrawn. R e l u c t a n t t o g i v e up a theme v i t a l t o t h e i r p r o s e l y t i n g e f f o r t , t h e y encouraged t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e t r o u b l e s of t h e big powers would lead t o economic disaster i n t h e underdeveloped areas.
A t t h e same t i m e , Varga w a s c r i t i c i z e d f o r underestimati n g the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e p o s i t i o n of "young capitalism" i n t h e former c o l o n i a l areas, which w a s looked on as a favorable development because i t i n c r e a s e d economic and p o l it i c a l antagonisms w i t h i n world capitalism. A concurrent review of world c a p i t a l i s t developments i n 1953 published i n Kommunist predicted t h a t t h e 1953 economic downturn would lead t h e West t o s t e p up its e f f o r t s t o balance its ,shaky economies by "int e n s i f y i n g t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of backward c o u n t r i e s and c o l o n i e s " --buying raw materials i n these c o u n t r i e s a t lower p r i c e s and s e l l i n g them i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t s a t m o r e e x h o r b i t a n t p r i c e s - and foresaw o n l y f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e s t a n d a r d s of l i v i n g o ' t h e peoples i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s most a f f e c t e d . f

P a r t y S e c r e t a r y and t h e o r e t i c i a n Pospelov's 21 January h i s remarks on t h e same o c c a s i o n t w o y e a r s e a r l i e r - - s i n g l e d o u t Asia as t h e %est v u l n e r a b l e p a r t of i m p e r i a l i s m " and j u s t i f i e d optimism among his l i s t e n e r s by c i t i n g t h e continued growth of t h e llpopular r e s i s t a n c e " movement throughout t h a t c o n t i n e n t . Although Moscowgs a t t e n t i o n s t o t h e Arab world had increased over t h e p a s t n i n e months, t h i s t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree w a s a measure of the i n c r e a s i n g tempo of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l change
1954 Lenin Anniversary speech--echoing

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there as t h e S o v i e t leaders continued t o be s u s p i c i o u s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y regime i n Egypt. Moscow h a i l e d Masir's s t r u g g l e f o r "immediate withdrawal" of E n g l i s h forces as a n e s s e n t i a l elemen$f'in a t t a i n i n g " t r u e independence, " b u t attacked t h e p o l i c i e s of Egypt's " r u l i n g circles" f o r t h e i r r e p r e s s i o n of Communists and o t h e r llprogressives,'' f o r u s i n g force and meager l a n d reform t o q u i e t p e a s a n t u n r e s t , and f o r t h e i r pro-German i g c l h a t i o n s . The s l i g h t a t t e n t i o n l a i d t o non-Arab Africa and L a t i n America was a t a c i t admission t h a t these areas, p a r t of t h e " c o l o n i a l reserve" of imperialism, were more o r less e f f e c t i v e l y sealed off from S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e .

The c o n c l u s i o n on 28 January 1954 of a $3,500,000 credit and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e agreement w i t h Afghanistan s e t off an unprecedented propaganda campaign t o convince underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s of t h e genuineness of S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s t o i n i t i a t e trade and broad economic r e l a t i o n s of a mutually advantageous, a p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e . A t t h e 1 0 t h ECAFE meeting i n Colombo, Sov i e t delegates a g a i n p r e s s e d Asian delegates f o r commercial t i e s , f o r i n i t i a t i o n of exchanges, and f o r acceptance of techn i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . MOSCOW~S numerous s p e c i f i c o f f e r s , p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , were intended t o whet l o c a l i n t e r e s t which governments would f i n d themselves unable t o resist. In March trade ' agreements were n e g o t i a t e d w i t h both- Egyptrrtt~@ Jsr-1. t - .

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The i n c r e a s e i n economic o v e r t u r e s w a s more t h a n equaled . by t h e i n c r e a s e i n p o l i t i c a l and propaganda a t t e n t i o n t o American e f f o r t s to form Asian c o u n t r i e s i n t o an a n t i - S o v i e t coalit i o n . The d e c i s i o n to b r i n g a rearmeg Germany i n t o t h e Weste r n a l l i a n c e and t o extend t h e anti-Communist d e f e n s e s t r u c t u r e throughout A s i a posed a direct c h a l l e n g e to Moscow's year-long e f f o r t f o r a d e t e n t e on its own terms. Moscowss p u b l i c rea c t i o n t o real o r rumored n e g o t i a t i o n s between Western governments and Asian s t a t e s on defense pacts and p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r y a i d reflected great s e n s i t i v i t y over these developments which raised t h e p r o s p e c t o f transforming areas close t o t h e USSR's s o u t h e r n border i n t o c e n t e r s of p r e s s u r e on t h a t extended f l a n k . The USSR's series of diplomatic demarches backed up by propaganda p y r o t e c h n i c s proved i n e f f e c t i v e in heading off t h e p r o j e c t e d a l l i a n c e s in t h e main, b u t it d i d succeed i n p o l a r i z i n g Asian and Arab government and popular sentiment around t h i s 3ssue and making it t h e c r u c i a l t e s t of Asian and Arab government r e l a t i o n s w i t h one a n o t h e r and w i t h both East and West.

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F i r s t of all, Soviet p o l it ical countermeasures f e a t u r e d e f f o r t s t o draw I n d i a i n t o a s t r o n g l y anti-Western, a n t i American p o s i t i o n . Moscow has a l w a y s accorded I n d i a great i n t e r e s t and p r e d i c t e d Iqdian developments would p l a y a v i t a l r o l e i d t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t "imperialism'r i n t h e E a s t , , The sheerrvolume of material devoted t o I n d i a i n S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s o v e r t h e 'years h a s been impressive. Both t h e first edition: of t h e l*Bolshaya'* encyclopedia, p u b l i s h e d i n 1937, and t h e second e d i t i o n , p u b l i s h e d i n 1953, gave almost 208 pages t o India,, much of it h i g h l y p r o p a g a n d i s t i c . If developments flowing o u t of t h e Korean war had awakened Moscow t o advantages o f a f r i e n d l y Indian n e u t r a l i t y , these views were r e i n f o r c e d by I n d i a n a t t i t u d e s toward Indochina and concern l e s t t h e c o n f l i c t there become an even more s e n s i t i v e f o c u s of E a s t West r i v a l r y and engulf g r e a t e r areas, p o s s i b l y a l l of South and Southeast A s i a , i n t h e h o t w a r . Moscow's concern w a s t o encourage I n d i a and Nehru i n t o an e v e r - s t r o n g e r s t a n d i n f a v o r of t h e bloc's "peacevcprogram. Kommunist i n F e b r u a r y 1954 could now h a i l
...the important role of modern I n d i a in t h e world a r e n a , t h e p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e Indian peop l e i n t h e matter of peaceful s e t t l e m e n t of controv e r s i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems, and I n d i a ' s attempts t o c o n v e r t t h e United Nations i n t o a genuine forum f o r a l l t h e p e o p l e s of t h e world.

The p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r working for Soviet-Indian rapprochement, however, was t h e deep-seated a n t i p a t h y between I n d i a and Pakis t a n which prompted New D e l h i ' s v i o l e n t l y a d v e r s e r e a c t i o n t o t h e g r a d u a l u n f o l d i n g of an impending American m i l i t a r y a i d program f o r P a k i s t a n . I n a s o l i d n o t e of approval f o r t h e c o u r s e of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y , Moscow welcomed t h e "vigil a n c e d i s p l a y e d by t h e Indian leaders i n connection w i t h attempts of f o r c e s of a g g r e s s i o n i n A s i a . "

The unmistakable build-up of East'-West t e n s i o n a s t h e res u l t of developments i n both Western Europe and A s i a prompted . a n i n t e n s e p o I i c y debate i n t o p S o v i e t circles r e v o l v i n g around how f a r Moscow c o u l d go i n a n t a g o n i z i n g t h e West. Malenkov's 1 2 March 1954 " e l e c t i o n speech" warning t h a t atomic war might mean t h e '*destruct i o n of world c i v i l i z a t ion"--rather t h a n j u s t c a p i t a l i s t society--marked t h e high p o i n t i n h i s e f f o r t s t o convince h i s c o l l e a g u e s of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r an accomodation w i t h t h e West. His retreat t h e f o l l o w i n g month t o t h e o l d

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f o r n u l a t i o n reflected h i s f a i l u r e t o c a r r y t h e m a j o r i t y of S o v i e t leaders along w i t h him on t h i s issue--and w i t h it t h e defeat of Walenkov's e f f o r t s t o dominate t h e r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n , * At the;$ame t i m e , S o v i e t propaganda reflected concern t h a t pub1 ic'"statements of Western i n t e n t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to i n t e n s i f i c d t i o n of t h e f i g h t i n g i n Indochina gave rise t o t h e poss i b i l i t y t h a t t h e USSR and t h e United States might be drawn c i q t o : a t o m i c war without e i t h e r s i d e r e a l l y i n t e n d i n g it.
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Speeches by both Malenkov and Khrushchev a t t h e A p r i l 1954 s e s s i o n of t h e Supreme S o v i e t t i e d b i d s f o r a r e d u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n and t l c o e x i s t e n c e " w i t h a s s e r t i o n s of growing s t r e n g t h , implying no weakening of S o v i e t o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e West nor any concession on its p a r t . Moscow's d i p l a m a t i c and propaganda s u p p o r t t o c o u n t r i e s involved i n d i s p u t e s w i t h t h e West i n t e n s i f i e d , A t t h e United Nations, Moscow heightened i t s s u p p o r t for S y r i a n complaints growing o.ut of border clashes w i t h Israel and over I s r a e l i p l a n s t o d i v e r t Jordan Biver water, making a p l a y f o r g e n e r a l Arab f a v o r by t a k e n a g a i n s t Israel. demanding t h a t "measures"--unspecified--be A t t h e Geneva Conference, Molotov's attempt t o champion "peop l e s s t r u g g l i n g f o r independence" was directed toward t y i n g I n a s s e r t i n g t h e " f u l l r i g h t of Asian Western hands i n A s i a . peoples to s e t t l e t h e i r a f f a i r s themselves" and a d o p t i n g t h e

p o l i c y which would p r o t e c t r e c e n t g a i n s i n Indochina. Moscow used t h e Chou-Nehru t a l k s t o f u r t h e r t h e p i c t u r e of c l o s e I n d i a n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e bJoc and e x t r a c t e d t h e "Five P r i n c i p l e s of Coexistence"--the '?Panch Shi1a"--expressed i n the preamble t o t h e Sino-Indian agreement on T i b e t s i g n e d 29 A p r i l as a charter f o r Asian-African n e u t r a l i s m , themes given heavy s u p p o r t a t t h e World Peace Council meeting i n B e r l i n i n May

*Because of t h e demoralizing effect of such a t h e s i s on Communists a t home and abroad, Moscow could n o t p u b l i c l y endorse t h i s l i n e even i f S o v i e t leaders themselves b e l i e v e d it. Thus MalenkovPs a b e r r a t i o n proved a handy c l u b i n t h e hands of h i s r i v a l s t o h e l p o u s t him, one year l a t e r , from the. premiership.

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The USSR's, r e a c t i o n t o t h e June 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan l e f t i s t ' p r e s i d e n t Jacobo Arbenz, which it alleged t o be t h e r e s u l t of " i n t e r v e n t i o n organized by US monopolies from Nicaraguan t e r r i t o r y , " w a s l o u d and b i t t e r and attempted t o world sentimhnt h o s t i l e t o o u t s i d e " i n t e r f e r e n c e . ' ' appeal:' t o S o v i e t propaganda, b e s i d e s r e f l e c t i n g Moscow's anger a t t h e t u r n of e v e n t s and its impotence t o r e v e r s e t h e m , sought t o cover t h e S o v i e t Union's own r o l e w i t h t h i s " l i v i n g proof" of its c h a r g e s cgncerning t h e n a t u r e of American imperialism. Appointment of an ambassador t o Indonesia i n J u l y culminated a period of i n t e n s e S o v i e t i n t e r e s t in developments in t h a t c o u n t r y a r i s i n g o u t of Djakarta's u n s t a b l e domestic p o l i t i c a l and economic s i t u a t i o n and, even more, Indonesia's complex int e r n a t i o n a l t r o u b l e s w i t h t h e Netherlands and t h e United States. Heavy propaganda s u p p o r t w a s afforded Indonesian anti-Western moves, and t h e first o r d e r 6f b u s i n e s s f o r t h e newly a r r i v e d S o v i e t s t a f f appeared t o be t o press Indonesia t o accept S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l equipment on easy-payment terms. Moscow's a t t i t u d e toward Burma also had become n o t i c e a b l y more f r i e n d l y . If e v e n t s i n Asia favored rapprochement w i t h I n d i a , Indonesia, and Burma, S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s for stepped-up economic c o n t a c t s , p o l i t i c a l demarches, and a s u c c e s s i o n of i n c r e a s i n g l y sharp propaganda warnings t o other Asian governments--notably Turkey, P a k i s t a n , and Thailand--concerning n e g o t i a t i o n s on area mutual d e f e n s e pacts proved t o l i t t l e a v a i l . Moscow pushed two l o g i c a l l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y b u t psychologic a l l y complementary courses. On t h e one hand, its high-powered ccpeace'' campaign was intended t o e x p l o i t t h e u n i v e r s a l fear of atomic warfare by g e n e r a t i n g p r e s s u r e s a g a i n s t m i l it a r y preparedness. It s e i z e d upon t h e Geneva conference r e s u l t s a s c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of its l i n e t h a t peace could be achieved o n l y through n e g o t i a t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s of "both sides." On t h e o t h e r hand, a Moscow-produced or Moscow-maintained climate of great East-West t e n s i o n w a s e s s e n t i a l t o its p o l i c i e s toward t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . Moscow aimed a t persuading people t h a t Western p o l i c i e s had brought t h e world--and kept it at--the b r i n k of d e v a s t a t i n g w a r , and played on apprehensions a r i s i n g o u t of t h e s e c u r i t y p a c t negot i a t i o n s which a l l e g e d l y p u t Asia-Africa on t h e " f r o n t l i n e " i n any f u t u r e c o n f l i c t . The i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of Moscow's e f forts t o t u r n its s p o r a d i c d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda support and a modest expansion of economic r e l a t i o n s t o direct p o l i t i cal advantage was p o i n t e d up i n October by Nasir's signature-d e s p i t e months of f e r v e n t S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o d i s s u a d e him--of

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an agreement w i t h B r i t a i n concerning t h e e v a c u a t i o n of t r o o p s from t h e Suez Canal zone on terms p e r m i t t i n g t h e i r r e t u r n i n t h e e v e n t of a " t h i r d power" attack on t h e Middle E a s t .
I

O k ' t h e economic fronh, Moscow s t e p p e d up its. e f f o r t s t o c a p i t a l i z e on l o c a l desire f o r r a p i d economic development t o

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i n t r o d u c e p i o n e e r i n g detachments of S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t s and t e c h n i c i a n s under UN a u s p i c e s and through direct b i l a t e r a l agreements. By o s t e n s i b l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n UP?-sponsored programs which enjoyed c o n s i d e r a b l e p o p u l a r i t y and esteem i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , Moscow sought to broaden t h e impact o f - its own a s y e t modest e f f o r t s and t o i n t r o d u c e S o v i e t techn i c i a n s and s c i e n t i s t s i n t o c o u n t r i e s and f i e l d s otherwise d o s e d t o it. F u r t h e r , t h i s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e S o v i e t e f f o r t t o p l a y up t h e growing s t a t u r e of t h e USSR as an advanced inQ u s t r i a l power and opened t h e way f o r u n d e r c u t t i n g Western-and e s p e c i a l l y US--economic a s s i s t a n c e programs on y e t a n o t h e r f r o n t . Moscow c i t e d t h e lack of p o l i t i c a l s t i p u l a t i o n s on UN a i d and t h e " w i l l i n g n e s s of dozens of c o u n t r i e s to go a l o n g w i t h t h e UM program," but a l l e g e d t h e United States a l o n e holds aloof f o r its own p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y motives. S o v i e t p u b l i c i s t s , still o b l i g e d t o p r e s e n t developments i n t h e capit a l i s t world i n terms of an imminent g e n e r a l economic crisis, stressed i n c r e a s i n g l y more u n f a v o r a b l e terms of trade f o r t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . Varga, w r i t i n g i n t h e first (August 1954) i s s u e of t h e new semi-scholarly monthly j o u r n a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e ) , p o i n t e d t o t w o years 09 depressed p r i c e s f o r raw materials and food e x p o r t s and t o r e p e r c u s s i o n s of impending American economic crisis a s compelli n g r e a s o n s why underdeveloped as w e l l as Western European c o u n t r i e s should t u r n t o expanded trade w i t h t h e bloc as a s o l u t i o n to p r e s s i n g economic problems.

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The long-awaited S o v i e t textbook P o l i t i c a l Economy, t h e product of a group of writers i n c l u d i n g l e a d i n g i d e o l o g i s t s Dmitry Shepilov and Pave1 Yudin, s i g n e d t o t h e p r e s s on 26 August 1954, followed S t a l i n ' s two-camp approach t o t h e int e r p r e t a t i o n of world developments. The a u t h o r s c r u d e l y ass a u l t e d economic r e l a t i o n s of t h e Western powers w i t h t h e former c o l o n i e s , a l l e g i n g t h a t f o r e i g n trade w a s "one of t h e s o u r c e s of economic enslavement of backward c o u n t r i e s by developed bourgeois c o u n t r i e s and ( t h a t it) widened t h e s p h e r e of c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s .I* P o l i t i c a l Economy claimed advances f o r t h e %at ional-1 i b e r a t i o n movements"ndonesia and India b u t spoke i n terms of g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l roles a l l e g e d l y being

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played by t h e " p r o l e t a r i a t 1 ' and Communist p a r t i e s , and t h e " n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie" continued t o be attacked as "weak and indecisive"--even i n t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t imperialism. The h o s t i1;Fy shown to n a t i o n a l i s t l t c o n c i l i a t o r y l lp o l i c i e s marked even ifidependent I n d i a as a bourgeois e n t i t y and t h u s a n enemy, I n t h i s and o t h e r f o r m u l a t i o n s , t h e a u t h o r s showed themselves hesitant t o amend fundamental Communist theses t o b r i n g them i n Line w i t h t a c t i c s Moscow c u r r e n t l y followed i n its r e l a t i o n s w i t h a number,of Asian governments. I n t h e f a l l , important works w e r e p u b l i s h e d on t h e two areas of t h e world which t o date had been g e n e r a l l y beyond t h e scope of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e and a t best on t h e p e r i p h e r y of Sov i e t i n t e r e s t * An imposing I n s t i t u t e of Ethnography symposium, The Peoples of Africa, under t h e j o i n t e d i t o r s h i p of p h i l o l o t D, A. Omerogge and e t h n o g r a p h e r - p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t I. I. Potekhin attempted a thorough a n a l y s i s of African c u l t u r a l achievements and p o l i t i c a l and economic developments area by area. T h e i r g e n e r a l t h e s i s , and t h a t of S o v i e t A f r i c a n i s t s g e n e r a l l y , w a s t h a t r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and economic e x p l o i t a t i o n are t h e twin bases of Western p o l i c y and views on Africa. To combat t h e West's views and t o champion African peoples, S o v i e t A f r i c a n i s t s advanced an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of African developments based on a "long and o r i g i n a l p a t h of h i s t o r i c develment," of a past golden age which w a s d e s t r o y e d by Western pol i t i c a l and economic i n t r u s i o n , and in g e n e r a l a t t r i b u t i n g t o Western i n f l u e n c e a l l negative f e a t u r e s of African l i f e . Potekhin's summary views on t h e p r o g r e s s of " n a t i o n a l liberat i o n " acknowledged t h e absence of Communist a c t i v i t y i n most of Africa, c i t e d trade unions as t h e g e n t e r s of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t a g i t a t i o n where there are no Communist p a r t i e s , and payed t r i b u t e t o growing African p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n world llpeacell and other f r o n t s . A less s u b s t a n t i a l s u r v e y o f t h e I n s t i t u t e of Economics by M. Grechev, The Imperialist Expansion of t h e US i n L a t i n America After Worn War 11, was devoted princ-lfi €5 a t t a c k i n g postwar US L atin-erican p o l i c i e s and t o r e i t e r a t i n g a s t r a t e g y f o r l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s based on att r a c t i n g a l l a n t i f o r e i g n elements around " t h e working class and its a l l y t h e p e a s a n t r y , " a u n i t e d f r o n t on Communist terms to p u t an end t o t h e yoke o f . f o r e i g n monopolies, t o , give land t o t h e peasants, t o facilitate i n d u s t r i a l development, t o improve l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s of a l l workers, and t o carry L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s on t h e broad road of progress and independence.

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By t h e close of 1954, t h e "good neighbor" p o l i c y which t h e Malenkov regime had followed--if a t times h a l f h e a r t e d l y - w a s no great s u c c e s s . The i n c r e a s e i n Moscow's i n f l u e n c e among extremist n a t i o n a l i p t elements had been i n direct prop o r t i o b t o t h e p r e v a l e n c e of v i r u l e n t anti-Western sentiment a r i s i h g o u t of unresolved t e r r i t o r i a l and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t e s w i t h t h e 'West and t o a lesser e x t e n t t o l o c a l f r u s t r a t i0n.s o v e r t h e f a i l u r e of p o l i t i c a l independence t o s o l v e pressiiig p o l i t i c a l , economic, and social problems o v e r n i g h t . Sov i e t a t t i t u d e s toward n a t i o n a l i s t movements and t h e i r l e a d e r s --for example, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir--reflected o n l y a s t e p i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of tactical c o o p e r a t i o n . Moscow's d i lemma was t h a t as n a t i o n a l i s t s these leaders had t o be praised t o t h e e x t e n t t h e y were " a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t " but as bourgeois t h e y had t o be attacked for t h e i r commitment t o c a p i t a l i s t methods and ideology and f o r t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n o r s u p p r e s s i o n of "progressive" elements. By:: t h e end of 1954 Moscow had come t o t h e p o i n t of s u p p o r t i n g n a t i o n a l i s t governments obv i o u s l y n o t i n t h e Western camp, i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e i r greater s e l f - a s s u r a n c e and s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n would have t h e n e t effect of r e d u c i n g Western i n f l u e n c e and, t o a degree, d i s c r e d i t i n g Western l e a d e r s h i p . Any f u r t h e r concessions would have l e d t o a d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e morale of l o c a l Communist
parties
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Moscow s c o r e d a n impressive propaganda breakthrough w i t h t h e s i g n i n g on 2 February 1955, a f t e r f i v e months of negotiat i o n s , of t h e agreement t o h e l p f i n a n c e and c o n s t r u c t a major s t e e l p l a n t a t B h i l a i , I n d i a . T h i s announcement foreshadowed a S o v i e t economic a s s i s t a n c e program of new dimensions and gave a measure of c o n c r e t e n e s s 'to t h e image of two world economic systems i n competition for i n f l u e n c e and f a v o r i n uncommitted areas.
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A NEW POLICY TAKES SHAPE:
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February 1955

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December 1956

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The demotion of Malenkov i n February 1955 prompted Moscow t o s t e p o u t ' w i t h a bolder p o l i c y both i n regard t o t h e Western powers and t h e p o l i t i c a l l y uncommitted, economically urfderdevelope4 c o u n t r i e s . T h i s w a s done i n p a r t to shore up domestic confidence, f o l l o w i n g t h e p e r s o n n e l shake-up, w i t h h a r s h e r a s s e r t i o n s of an i n c r e a s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y Molotov's speech on 8 February t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t appraised r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West wholly i n cold war terms and pres e n t e d an u n u s u a l l y clear r a t i o n a l e f o r S o v i e t c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h Asian and African governments. Acknowledging t h a t t h e newly independent governments of A s i a and Africa were s t i l l economically dependent on t h e West, t h e S o v i e t f o r e i g n minist e r nevertheless found a basis f o r o p t i m i s m i n t h e fact t h a t i n q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , " t h e y show concern f o r t h e maintenance of peace and t h e r e d u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n " and s o were worthy of S o v i e t s u p p o r t . A s had other S o v i e t leaders over t h e p a s t y e a r , Molotov s i n g l e d o u t f o r p a r t i c u l a r praise t h e " i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y " of I n d i a . The Supreme S o v i e t r e s o l u t i o n on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , which s e t f o r t h t h e p r i n c i p a l guide l i n e s of t h e subsequent BulganinKhrushchev p e r i o d , also called f o r t h e exchange of parliament a r y d e l e g a t i o n s , a t a c t i c Moscow had introduced t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r by h o s t i n g s e v e r a l semiofficial p a r l i a m e n t a r y groups. The a c c e l e r a t i o n of S o v i e t moves , i n Asia and t h e Middle E a s t r e f l e c t e d a recognition of'the increased i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s of Asian and A f r i c a n states and of t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e would c o n t i n u e t o i n c r e a s e i n importance. A t t h e same t i m e , it w a s i n t e n d e d as a p a r t i a l answer t o Western i n i t i a t i v e s b u i l d i n g up m i l i t a r y and anti-Commun i s t p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s a l o n g t h e USSR's s o u t h e r n borders. The regime's e f f o r t s t o underscore S o v i e t m i l i t a r y and econom i c might f u r t h e r e d t h e impression t h a t t h e new leaders were less d i s p o s e d t h a n Malenkov t o s e e k accommodation w i t h t h e West; i n any e v e n t , t h e West's f i r m n e s s in Europe h e l d o u t t h e p r o s p e c t t h a t any S o v i e t p r o b i n g there might lead t o a n u c l e a r war.
MOSCOW'S

w i t h Asian and Arab c o u n t r i e s was made clear i n its diplomatic and propaganda r e a c t i o n t o Middle E a s t developments and i n t h e f e r v o r of its e f f o r t s t o i d e n t i f y i t s e l f w i t h t h e views and

i n t e n t i o n t o seek a closer working agreement

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o b j e c t i v e s of t h e conference of 29 Asian and A f r i c a n count r i e s - l i h c l u d i n g 'Communist China b u t n o t t h e S o v i e t Union-a t Banaung, Indonesia. A- s t a t e m e n t by t h e S o v i e t Foreign M i n i s t r y on 1 6 A p r i l 1955 p r e s e n t e d detailed c h a r g e s of "cons i d e r a b l e d e t e r i o r a t i o n " of t h e Middle E a s t s i t u a t i o n , a l l e g e d t h a t t h i s was t h e direct r e s u l t of Western e f f o r t s t o f 6 r m anti-Communist m i l i t a r y blocs there, and offered, i n terms more s p e c i f i c t h a n e v e r before, o f f i c i a l S o v i e t support t o area governments opposing Western p o l i c i e s . A t t h e same t i m e , S o v i e t propaganda h a i l e d t h e p r o s p e c t s of AsianAfrican c o o p e r a t i o n , and Pravda t h r e w S o v i e t s u p p o r t b e h i n d any agreement which m i g h t b e r e a c h e d by t h e Bandung powers i n t h e d i r e c t i o n 0 f . a common e f f o r t a g a i n s t " p r e s s u r e and threat" from o u t s i d e powers o r i n implementing i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y t h e Chou-Nehru d e c l a r a t i o n on t h e I f f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of c o e x i s t e n c e . t' Moscow's c u r r e n t a p p r a i s a l a p p a r e n t l y stemmed from optimism t h a t "parallell" s h o r t - t e r m i n t e r e s t s of Asian-African s t a t e s and t h e USSR, i n combination w i t h t h e i n h e r e n t l y weak p o l i t i c a l and economic p o s i t i o n s of area count r i e s , opened t h e way f o r a r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . F u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t a fundamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n of t a c t i c s was involved w a s t h e i n i t i a t i o n 09 a wholesale shakeup of S o v i e t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of developments i n non-Soviet A s i a and Africa. I n l a t e A p r i l 1955 there appeared t h e first i s s u e of S o v i e t O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s , t h e f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t i e research and Marxist-Leninist i n t e r p r e t a of -were t i o n t o t h e immediate needs of Soviet,diplomacy and propaganda. Kommunist i n May kicked off a campaign to b r i n g i d e o l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s more i n l i n e w i t h t h e S o v i e t p o s t u r e of f r i e n d s h i p toward t h e non-Communist c o u n t r i e s r e p r e s e n t e d a t Bandung. Kommunist admitted t h a t e r r o n e o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s had c r e p t i n t o p a s t S o v i e t assessments of a n t i c o l o n i a l movements, and it c r i t i c i z e d S o v i e t scholars, and by i m p l i c a t i o n S t a l i n and those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Moscow's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h e e a r l y p o s t - S t a l i n period, f o r u n d e r e v a l u a t i n g t h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t Foreshadowed i n s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e n a t i o n a l ist movements these programatic s t a t e m e n t s were stepped-up e f f o r t s to interpret t h e p r e s e n t and even t h e f a i r l y remote past i n a n t i Western terms and t o d i s s o c i a t e t h e c u r r e n t S o v i e t regime i n t h e minds o f t h e peoples of t h e n e u t r a l i s t c o u n t r i e s f r o m t h o s e p a s t S o v i e t words o r deeds which impeded closer relat i o n s . Without p r o v i d i n g clear new g u i d e l i n e s , Kommunist n e v e r t h e l e s s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a more o p t i m i s t i c a p p r a i s a l ob Asian-African developments w a s i n o r d e r and t h a t p r o s a i c ,

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mechanical a p p l i c a t i o n s of Communist theorems w e r e t o g i v e way t o a f l e k i b i l i t y ' w h i c h owed more t o c o l d w a r requirements t h a n t o t h e i k o m u n i s t classics.
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MOSCOW'S new accommodation t o n e u t r a l i s t - n a t i o n a l i s t sent i m e n t was u n d e r l i n e d d r a m a t i c a l l y i n connection w i t h t h e June 1955 v i s i t t o , t h e USSR of I n d i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r Nehru. Nohru, who had been d e s c r i b e d by S t a l i n ' s Asian spokesman Zhukov as ''a cunning s e r v a n t of B r i t a i n and t h e United S t a t e s and a bloody s t r a n g l e r of p r o g r e s s i v e forces in I n d i a , " now w a s p r a i s ed on a l l c o u n t s f o r h i s s p i r i t u a l and p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p of Asia and f o r championing p r o g r e s s i v e views on such major i s s u e s as Korea, Indochina, m i l i t a r y b l o c s , and t h e banning of atomic weapons. A Russian t r a n s l a t i o n of Nehru's Discovery of I n d i p bl n on ection w e -despite --g e a was t h un g ils h e dt ai c k cn g nCommunisti t tha t h i c v i s int -India--and ct s i passa s sca i y at i l o n g "reviews" of t h e book i n KommuhPst and S o v i e t O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s used it as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e in s m f o r t h t he m i e t l i n e on Asian and A f r i c a n developments. Apparently encouraged by t h e p r o s p e c t s of t h i s i n i t i a l v e n t u r e i n t o t h e realm of "personal diplomacy"--Nehru 's v i s i t having been int e r p r e t e d p u b l i c l y as a " b r i l l i a n t m a n i f e s t a t i o n " of growing f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between t h e t w o countrdes--Moscow extended i n v i t a t i o n s t o t h e Shah of I r a n and t o Nasir. E f f o r t s w e r e i n i t i a t e d on an unprecedented scale t o f l a t t e r n e u t r a l i s t leaders, t h e c u l t u r e s of f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s , and Asian-African selfimportance. S y n t h e t i c S o v i e t commemorations of Asian and Afr i c a n n a t i o n a l h o l i d a y s became a prominent f e a t u r e of t h e new program. Pravda e d i t o r Shepilov--newly named a p a r t y s e c r e t a r y - was seat t o t in connection w i t h CaiFoos L i b e r a t i o n Day c e l e b r a t i o n s as a p e r s o n a l e m i s s a r y of MOSCOW'S t o p l e a d e r s h i p t o impress on N a s i r t h e p o t e n t i a l s of c l o s e r Soviet-Egyptian cooperat ion

Moscow's moves to e x p l o i t t h e "Bandung s p i r i t " as t h e inc e p t i o n of a c o o r d i n a t e d Asian-African o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e West was accompanied by a series of d i p l o m a t i c and economic s t e p s --with a p p r o p r i a t e propaganda o r c h e s t r a t i o n - - i n t e n d e d t o b u i l d up a "posture of peace" t o improve its p r o s p e c t s a t t h e upcomi n g summit conference. Moscow's a t t i t u d e appeared t o h d d o u t t h e promise of a major improvement i n East-lest r e l a t i o n s and a general r e d u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , n o t j u s t i n Europe b u t throughout t h e world. The S o v i e t people themselves were encouraged by t h e regime's propaganda t o e x p e c t a growi n g " b u s i n e s s l i k e atmosphere" i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s

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Bulganin's 4 August r e p o r t on t h e Geneva t a l k s t o a special. s e s s i o q ; o f t h e Supreme Soviet balanced ItGeneva s p i r i t " gains-a l e s s e n i n g of t e n s i o n , i n c r e a s e i n "mutual confidence, '' and the i n i t i a t i o n of p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t among t o p world leaders-w i t h a rundown of major s u b s t a n t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems o%tst anding.
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Concurrent w i t h Moscow's pre-Geneva c o n c i l i a t o r y p o s t u r e t o t h e West and B u l g a n i n ' s sober a p p r a i s a l of t h e r e s u l t s of t h e conference, t h e S o v i e t Union s e t i n motion a c h a i n of secret n e g o t i a t i o n s designed n o t t o f u r t h e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any mutual "hands off" p o l i c y i n Asia-Africa, b u t t o o f f s e t t h e c o n s o l i d a t i n g pro-Western c o a l i t i o n s w i t h a group of Arab s t a t e s under its i n f l u e n c e . Although Molotov's February 1955, f o r e i g n p o l i c y survey had been p e s s i m i s t i c on t h e Middle E a s t ,
' 0

W e cannot s a y t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n movement i n t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e Arab E a s t h a s a t t a i n e d t h e s t r e n g t h and momentum which t h i s movement achieved

i n a number of other Asian c o u n t r i e s , . . . i n t e n s i f i e d S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s t o S y r i a and Egypt i n t h e months f o l l o w i n g reflected a more hopeful viewe Reports of v a r i o u s c r e d i b i l i t y t h a t Moscow had made o f f e r s t o s e l l arms t o S y r i a , Egypt, Saudi Arabia, I n d i a , and Afghanistan were confirmed i n e s s e n c e by Nasir's 27 September announcement of h i s arms deal w i t h Czechoslovakia--obviously a dodge f o r a d i r e c t agreement between Moscow and Cairo.
1

The s u p p l y of arms t o a non-Communist government marked a s h a r p d e p a r t u r e i n S o v i e t p r a c t i c e and w a s a c h a l l e n g e to Western i n f l u e n c e of a more i n t e n s e and immediate n a t u r e t h a n S o v i e t economic o v e r t u r e s . Discussions w i t h N a s i r were w e l l advanced by t h e t i m e of t h e Geneva t a l k s , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Moscow e a r l y had hedged its bet t h a t a c o n c i l i a t o r y p o s t u r e and such r e a s o n a b l e n e s s as a g r e e i n g to t h e A u s t r i a n s t a t e t r e a t y would encourage s i g n i f i c a n t Western concessions. Moscow's immediate r e a c t i o n t o t h e s u r f a c i n g of Nasir's agreement t o purchase bloc arms w a s p r e d i c t a b l y d e f e n s i v e , a t t r i b u t i n g t h e Western uproar t o a false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of developments based on t h e West's own " e x b l o i t a t i v e practices." It went on, howe v e r , t o assert t h e " l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t " of a l l states t o buy weapons f o r t h e i r d e f e n s e without o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . Moscow9s p u b l i c and p r i v a t e follow-up was subdued, although t h e "Geneva s p i r i t " i n its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West had a l r e a d y

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l a r g e l y d i s s i p a t e d . Kaganovich's October Revolution speech, concurrent w i t h t h e v i s i t . o f Burmese Premier U N t o Moscow u and a & f i n i t e c o o l n e s s a t t h e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s ' meeting in Geneva', o m i t t e d any r e f e r e n c e t o a major s h i f t i n S o v i e t p o l i cy i m p l i c i t i n t h e o f f e r s and d e l i v e r i e s of t r a d e and techn i c a l , economic, and now m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to Asian and Arab , cobntries.

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Moscow continued t h e p r o c e s s of r e a p p r a i s i n g world develments i n terms j u s t i f y i n g t h e development of closer governmentto-government r e l a t i o n s w i t h Asian and Arab n e u t r a l i s t s . Komrnunist i n August had made a p i o n e e r i n g a t t e m p t t o c i t e f ? o m c t ' l v e o n s e q u e n c e s " of p o l i c i e s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of peace, red u c t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , and o p p o s i t i o n t o c o l o n i a l . i s m as a b a s i s f o r s i n g l i n g o u t a c a t e g o r y of p o l i t i c a l l y independent though economically dependent states which w e r e worthy of s u p p o r t . Xommunist a u t h o r Mikheyev's e f f o r t t o formalize p r o p o s i t i o n s raised by S o v i e t l e a d e r s e a r l y i n t h e y e a r d i d n o t f u l l y account f o r t h e scope and v a r i e t y of Moscow's t a c t i c s , as economic and p o l i t i c a l blandishments w e r e b e i n g offered n o t o n l y t o f r i e n d l y n e u t r a l s b u t a l s o t o c o u n t r i e s c l e a r l y non-neutral, such as Turkey. The new l i n e on A s i a and Africa w a s reflected i n t h e f a l l of 1955 w i t h t h e appearance of t h e second e d i t i o n of t h e t e x t b o o k P o l i t i c a l Economy, which contained d r a s t i c r e v i s i o n s of passages o f f e n s i v e t o I n d i a and o t h e r uncommitted c o u n t r i e s . By making a n e u t r a l f o r e i g n p o l i cy i n e f f e c t t h e s o l e c r i t e r i o n of S o v i e t s u p p o r t , Moscow indicated a s t r a t e g y f o r local Communist p a r t i e s which w a s res t r i c t i v e and t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e ' d e g r e e ' demoralizing. I n adopti n g s u c h a course Moscow t a c i t l y admitted t h e r e l a t i v d . permanence of t h e n a t i o n a l i s t governments, and i n o f f e r i n g these governments many-sided s u p p o r t without e x t r a c t i n g any commitment i n p r o t e c t i o n of local Communist e l e m e n t s , Moscow i n effect downgraded t h e l a t t e r and l e f t them t o s h i f t on t h e i r own meager r e s o u r c e s .
Moscow's first big chance t o b i d f o r Asian popular supp o r t was t h e Bulganin-Khrushchev " v i s i t of f r i e n d s h i p " t o I n d i a , Burma, and Afghanistan from mid-November t o mid-December 1955. The two S o v i e t leaders dropped t h e i r Geneva s m i l e s and attempted t o g i v e Asian n e u t r a l i s m a more anti-Western s l a n t by ident i f y i n g t h e USSR w i t h Asian n a t i o n a l i s t aims and 9tpeace,1T and t h e y attempted t o e q u a t e t h e West w i t h "colonialism" and "inUsing l o c a l s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e c o l o n i a l p a s t a s tervention." a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , t h e two--especially Khrushchev-launched
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b i t t e r a t t a c k s 04 t h e West and sought t o f o c u s Asian and world a t t e n t s o n on S o v i e t econ@ic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l i n i t i a ,* t i v e s ; Khrushchev and Bulganin, by a d o p t i n g brazen s t a n d s on t h e k i a n i n t r a m u r a l d i s p u t e s o v e r K a s h m i r and "Pushtoonistan, f 1 s e r v e d n o t i c e t h a t Moscow intended to s t e p up its d i p l o m a t i c aqd propaganda s u p p o r t for f r i e n d l y n e u t r a l s and t o i n c r e a s e p r e s s u r e on pro-Western area governments,

The t o u r i n g S o v i e t leaders dramatized t o m i l l i o n s of Asian n e u t r a l i s t s and t o t h e world i n g e n e r a l t h e USSR's a p p a r e n t r e a d i n e s s t o offer p o l i t i c a l and material s u p p o r t t o new s t a t e s a t t e m p t i n g t o e s t a b l i s h o r s e c u r e p o l i t i c a l and economic independence. Agreements reached on t h e t o u r for t h e e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , f o r i n c r e a s e d trade; and f o r greater t e c h n i c a l and c u l t u r a l exchanges l a i d t h e groundwork f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e subsequent expansion of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h e area. Khrushchev's announcement i n I n d i a t h a t
If you want h e l p , and you ask u s f o r it, we s h a l l g i v e it. If you want t o develop your technology and ask u s t o h e l p you, we s h a l l h e l p you. If you want t o t r a i n t e c h n i c i a n s , send t h e m t o us....

appeared t o raise Moscow's budding economic aid o f f e n s i v e to new heights--an Impression made more c o n c r e t e by t h e announcement i n Kabul of a $100,000,000 credit t o Afghanistan, The r e p o r t s of b o t h Bulgaqin and,Khrushchev t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t on 29 December as t o t h e r e s u l t s of t h e i r t r i p s e r v e d t o u n d e r l i n e Moscow's optimism over its new t h r u s t s f o r f a v o r i n A s i a . For t h e home audience, Khrushchev made t h e same i m passioned Bttack on Western economic a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s as h e had i n A s i a , and he implied t h a t one of t h e aims of t h e S o v i e t f o r e i g n economic program w a s t o Porce Western c o n c e s s i o n s t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , Riding t h e crest of optimism raised by t h e t o u r , Khrushchev i n t e r p r e t e d S o v i e t o f f e r s of economic and t e c h n i c a l h e l p as s i g n s of "OUT honorable i n t e n t i o n s , '' and, although he cited "mutual advantages" in t h e program, he n e v e r t h e l e s s w a s encouraged t o sound a u t o p i a n n o t e , "We c o n s i d e r it o u r d u t y t o share w i t h our f r i e n d s and t o h e l p them as b r o t h e r s . " E s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h i s South Asian t o u r , Khrushchev has t a k e n great p a i n s to be i d e n t i f i e d p u b l i c l y w i t h Moscow's f r i e n d s h i p o v e r t u r e s , w i t h t h e S o v i e t economic aid program, and w i t h t h e n e c e s s i t y t o i n c r e a s e ffperson-to-personf' c o n t a c t s , a v i t a l factor in each,

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Fur,$her s t e p s were t a k e n i n S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s i n l a t e 1955 t g , ' b r i n g S o v i e t v e r s i o n s of c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d MarxistLeninqst f o r m u l a t i o n s more i n harmony w i t h c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s . One such r e a p p r a i s a l , on t h e v i t a l and touchy q u e s t i o n of t h e role of t h e " n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie" i n t h e s t r u g g l e f o r independence, was undertaken s l o w l y and c a u t i o u s l y . A few pass a g e s i n S o v i e t O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s , which h a s s e r v e d p r i n c i p a l l y as a n bu'tlet- f o r offic2al views rather t h a n as a c l e a p i n g house f o r s c h o l a r l y papers, a l l o t t e d a greater role t o nonCommunists i n b r i n g i n g about t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l r e v o l u t i o n s i n Asia. I n view of t h e complexity and s e n s i t i v i t y of t h e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of postwar developments and t h e need t o s a t i s f p c o n f l i c t i n g demand&-to be convincing t o Asian-African leaders and i n t e l l e c t u a l s , t o l e a v e u n d i s t u r b e d t h e dynamic f e a t u r e s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist movement, and t o m a i n t a i n t h e f i c t i o n of t h e immutability of Communist d o c t r i n e , f o r exam;p l e - - i t remained f o r t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p t o undertake a "treat ive" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Leninism i n l i g h t of t h e new situation. The ghrushchev-dominated 2 0 t h p a r t y congress i n February 1956 marked a supreme e f f o r t by t h e regime to t u r n world Communist and non-Communist a t t e n t i o n away from the past--and away from any need t o account f o r o r e x p l a i n away elements of t h e S t a l i n i s t heritage which now were t o be discarded--and to create t h e impression t h a t w i t h t h e congress a new era, one b r i g h t w i t h p r o s p e c t s of new Communist v i c t o r i e s , was opening. A major part of t h e c o n g r e s s ' e f f o r t w a s devoted t o attempts t o shore up t h e t h e o r e t i c a l bases f o r t h e regime's c u r r e n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t o j u s t i f y c o e x i s t e n c e w i t h t h e West, and to g i v e v e r i s i m i l i t u d e t o S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s t o Asian-African countries. A l l who spoke a t t h e congress attempted t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e a u r a of optimism, of unprecedented a s s u r a n c e v i s - a - v i s t h e p h y s i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l challenges of t h e c a p i t a l i s t world, and of unanimity. Khrushchev r e s e r v e d t o himself t h e s t a r r i n g role, b u t Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kuusinen c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p u b l i c ~ e examination of S o v i e t a t t i t u d e s t o non-Communist governments. Khrushchev's 1 4 February keynote speech s p o t l i g h t e d a new global view characterized as t h e "breaking o u t r 9 of s o c i a l i s m from t h e bounds of a s i n g l e s t a t e i n t o a world system r i v a l i n g capitalism i n scope and power. H i s abandonment of t h e thesis of t h e l l f a t a l i s t i c l l i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war between capit a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t camps was a necessary, and t a r d y , s t e p

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t o add c r e d i b i l i t y t o its "peaceful coexistencer' l i n e and t o f a c i l i ate long-term c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e USSR and nonCommun st c o u n t r i e s . Khrushchev's admission, under p r e s s u r e t o improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h T i t o , t h a t there are many p o s s i b l e forms of t r a n s i t i o n from capitalism t o sociklism--that no sing3.e p a t t e r n would be a p p l i c a b l e "to Denmark i n t h e same w i y as t o B r a z i l ; t o . Sweden i n t h e same way as t o Malaya"-opened up t h e whole delicate and complex problem of i n t r a b l o c r e l a t i o n s . Moreover, by appearing to s u p p o r t social development according t o " c o n c r e t e circumstances" i n each c o u n t r p , Kbrushchev made an e x t r a o r d i n a r y concession t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s t governments, Khrushchev's t h i r d major "modificat i o n " a t t h e congress, t h a t t h e changeover from c a p i t a l i s m to '*socialism" need n o t be v i o l e n t b u t could be a t t a i n e d through " t h e winfiing of a s t a b l e p a r l i a m e n t a r y m a j o r i t y , ** had s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r n e u t r a l i s t c o u n t r i e s s u c h as I n d i a and Indon e s i a which had large Communist p a r t i e s .

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A t t h e congress, Mikoyan, as always c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h S o v i e t t r a d e policies, launched B~OSCOW*S s t r o n g e s t plea t o d a t e f o r t h e development of economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h nonCommunist c o u n t r i e s as a means f o r both reducing i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n and o b t a i n i n g economic advantages. Malenkov, who had i n i t i a t e d many of t h e l i n e s of Moscow's r e v i s e d p o l i c y toward t h e former c o l o n i e s , was now reduced t o a role of seconding c u r r e n t l y accepted f o r m u l a t i o n s . H e j u s t i f i e d t h e regime's p o l i c y toward Asia and t h e Middle E a s t as * * s u b s t a n t i a l l ynarrowing" Western p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r a t f a c k i n g t h e bloc. Molotov acknowledged t h a t i n S t a l i n ' s days t h e USSR had underestimated t h e importance of t h e c o l p n i a l s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e West and a c m i t t e d t h e c o r r e c t n e s s bf p a r t y c e n t r a l committee c r i t i c i s m 09 h i s Foreign M i n i s t r y sfor "underestimating t h e new possi-

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Ehrushchev's survey of Moscow's developing f o r e i g n economic o f f e n s i v e l e f t l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s program w a s to e n j o y a high p r i o r i t y . The January 1956 credit t o Belgrade of $110,00~,000--on t o p of t h e theatrical o f f e r of $100,000,000 t o Kabul in December 1955--had removed any doubts about t h e v i g o r w i t h which Moscow intended t o push t h i s p ~ o g r a m , Ehrushchev's r e v e l a t i o n t h a t t h e USSR had g r a n t e d long-term credits w i t h i n t h e bloc t o t a l i n g 2 1 b i l l i o n r u b l e s was i n tended t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e p r e s t i g e of t h e S o v i e t Union as a world economic power, and p o s s i b l y t o sidetrack bloc critac i s m of S o v i e t . o f f e r s t o nonbloc c o u n t r i e s . Promising aid

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i n t h e economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l development of nonCommunidt Asia, A f r i c a , apd L a t i n America, $2
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' i n order t o create an independent n a t i o n a l economy and a higher s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g f o r t h e i r p e o p l e , . . . w i t h o u t making it n e c e s s a r y f o r them t o bow down t o t h e i . r , former o v e r l o r d s ,

Khrushchev l e f t l i t t l e doubt as t o t h e p o l i t i c a l character of t h i s program, or t h a t h i s i n t e n t was t o impair t h e i r relathrns w i t h t h e l e s t , t o glace "8 major stumbling block" i n t h e way of c o l o n i a l p o l i c y .
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A month prior t o t h e congress, Bulganin i n a 16 January l f i n t e r v i e w " p u b l i s h e d in V i s i o n , a news magazine c i r c u l a t e d i n L a t i n America, f o r t h e m time extended t o L a t i n American governments t h e same t y p e of d i p l o m a t i c and trade overt u r e s t h a t Moscow had been making r e g u l a r l y t o f r i e n d l y and n o t so f r i e n d l y Asian c o u n t r i e s . I t w a s r e p o r t e d t h a t S o v i e t p a r t y leaders a t t h e c o n g r e s s sought o u t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e L a t i n American Communist p a r t i e s p r e s e n t i n an e f f o r t to improve t h e i r morale and t o s t i m u l a t e t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s especiall y in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a t t r a c t i n g broader segments of t h e population i n t o t h e f r o n t organizations. P a r t y organizational t a c t i c s o u t l i n e d a t t h e c o n g r e s s by Suslov and Kuusinen envisaged s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e d emphasis on u n i t e d a c t i o n w i t h nonCommunists, b u t t h e S t a l i n i s t debate touched off by Khrushchev's secret speech destroyed some of t h e idealized n o t i o n s about Communism and t h e USSR h e l d by ' p a r t y members and sympathizers abroad. For a number of months t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r de-Stalini z a t i o n n u l l i f i e d any g a i n s f o r t h e world Communist movement which Moscow may have expected from its moderate f o r m u l a t i o n s a t t h e 2 0 t h congress.

The congress provoked a f l o o d of p u b l i c a t i o n s t o reflect
t h e new views and to attempt t o apply them c u r r e n t l y and retr o s p e c t i v e l y in s u p p o r t of S o v i e t p o l i c y . Yikoyan at t h e congress had provided a s t r o n g goad f o r a thorough-going shakeup in t h e f i e l d of S o v i e t o r i e n t a l s t u d i e s , c h a r g i n g t h a t

while t h e whole E a s t h a s awakened i n o u r t i m e , t h e O r i e n t a l I n s t i t u t e h a p p i l y dozes away at a t i m e when o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e E a s t are growing in scope and s t r e n g t h , when, with t h e e x t e n s i o n of economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t e r n

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c o u n t r i e s , t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e S o v i e t p u b l i c has grpwn t o s u c h an e x t e n t , as has t h e need f o r people who know t h e languages, economy, and c u l t u r e of %he E a s t e r n c o u n t r i e s .

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o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and t h e o r e t i c a l shortcomings i n S o v i e t s t u d i e s of t h e non-Communist E a s t a n d - a t t e m p t e d t o t r a n s l a t e congress theses i n t o a program of a c t i o n f o r S o v i e t scholars and p u b l i c i s t s . P a s t e v a l u a t i o n s were a t t a c k e d f o r having f a i l e d t o g i v e p r o p e r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e new c o r r e l a t i o n L o f s o c i a l forces i n Asia and Africa, 'and S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n s were c r i t i c i z e d f o r approaching t h e i r problems from too r i g i d and dogmatic a viewp o i n t . A new v e r s i o n of t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between n a t i o n a l ist movements and t h e West admitted t h a t a t t h e p r e s e n t stage of t h e " a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t s t r u g g l e , " t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e nat i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e " b a s i c a l l y correspond w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e people." The r e v i s e d theorem w a s intended t o reduce i d e o l o g i c a l t e n s i o n between Moscow and nat i o n a l i s t elements, and was n o t accompanied by acknowledgement of t h e r o l e played by bourgeois leaders i n winning independence for t h e i r c o u n t r i e s .
O t h e r p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n of developments i n Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America f o l l o w i n g t h e congress reflected MOSCOW~S concession t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e economic development w a s p o s s i b l e --at least i n t h e n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s - - y i t h i n e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l , economic, -ab'& Bot?TEl frameworks. A Problems of Economics art i c l e by V. Kollontay, a s p e c i a l i s t i n free w z l d economic t r e n d s , a p p l i e d t h e c o n g r e s s ' views t o economic development of t h e former c o l o n i e s and showed Moscow w i l l i n g t o go t o cons i d e r a b l e l e n g t h s t o c o u r t f a v o r w i t h government p a r t i e s , i n -

An unsigned lead a r t i c l e of t h e j o u r n a l S o v i e t O r i e n t a l Studies w6ich appeared immediately f o l l o w i n g t h e congress admitted t o

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c l u d i n g s u p p o r t f o r e f f o r t s to p r o t e c t l o c a l c a p i t a l i s t s from t h e p r e s s u r e s of " f o r e i g n monopolistic" capital. Kollontay reiterated t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t economic development i1 p r i m a r i l y s1 a problem of mobil b a t i o n and c o r r e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n of domestic r e s o u r c e s , and 97 played up t o s t r o n g non-Communist sympathies i n t h e area f o r s t a t e p l a n n i n g and r e g u l a t i o n of a n a t i o n u s economic l i f e . " I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n " was p r e s e n t e d a s t h e o n l y s u r e p a t h t o economic independence, and t h e s e c u r i n g of p b l i t i cal freedom and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc were o f f e r e d a s t h e means f o r b r i n g i n g it about. P a s t r i d i c u l e of n a t i o n a l a t t e m p t s t o s o l v e p r e s s i n g economic problems and t o b r i n g about a r i s e i n l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s was shunted aside i n f a v o r of e f f o r t s

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w i t h h @ l f a dozeh s t a t e s - f r i e n d l y

t o s t i m u l a t e new and expanded p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s o r a t least t e m p o r a r i l y c o o l t o thd' West--ranging t e r s i t o r i a l l y f r o m Indonesia t o Egypt and economically from p r i m i t i v e Yemen t o I n d i a , where c a p i t a l i s t development adrhit t e d l y was ' * w e l l under way. I*
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Post-congress S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s were mainly in t h e direct i o n of f u r t h e r expansion of economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h Egypt, S y r i a , and I n d i a and i n a general increase i n t h e USSROs v o i c e in Middle E a s t a f f a i r s . Following a steady stream of arms d e l i v e r i e s t o Egypt and heavy d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda a t t e n t i o n t o area developments, Moscow i s s u e d on 17 A p r i l 1956 --coincident w i t h t h e a r r i v a l of Bulganin and Khrushchev i n Britain--a Foreign Minis*ry s t a t e m e n t which a t t e b p t e d t o p a s s off S o v i e t area polsicg as concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h p r o t e c t i n g S o v i e t a n d f r i e n d l y Arab i n t e r e s t s u n t i l a b a s i s could be found f o r t o p - l e v e l East-West t a l k s on Middle E a s t problems. In a@knowledging privaCely t h e l e g i t i m a c y of B r i t i s h concern over u n i n t e r r u p t e d o i l d e l i v e r i e s and p u b l i c l y e x p r e s s i n g w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a l k about h a l t i n g a r m s d e l i v e r i e s t o t h e area if d i s c u s s i o n s concerned a l l Middle E a s t c o u n t r i e s and n o t merely t h e Arab states, t h e t w o S o v i e t leaders attempted t o p l a y up theimoderation of t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n order t o f a c i l i t a t e negot i a t i o n s and t o g a i n a t l e a s t a t a c i t admission of "legitimate'* S o v i e t interedsts in BQiddle E a s t a f f a i r s . The 1 June replacement of Molotov as f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r - b y p a r t y s e c r e t a r y Shepilov, whose v i s i t t o Cairo t h e p r e v i o u s summer had paved t h e way f o r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e a r m s deal w i t h N a s i r , augured f o r an even more d a r i n g S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . S h e p i l o v ' s t r i p i n June t o Egypt, S y r i a , Lebanon, and Greece, however, w a s p r i n c i p a l l y 8 propaganda t o u r de force, w i t h Shepilov p u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l o i t Sov i e t " f r i e n d s h i p " and **sympathy" f o r local p o s i t i o n s - - t o b u i l d up hopes of e x t e n s i v e economic a i d a t t h e same t i m e as he dodged d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s and avoided a l l Arab a t t e m p t s t o firm up S o v i e t commitments on t h e q u e s t i o n s of Israel and Algeria. The USSR on 26 June v o t e d f o r S e c u r i t y Council c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e Algerian q u e s t i o n o v e r French obj e c t i o n s , b u t BBoscow's subdued propaganda tended t o confirm r e p o r t s t h a t Shepilov had urged a '*go slow" p o l i c y toward t h e Arabs. V i s i t s t o t h e USSR t h a t month by t h e Shah of I r a n and Yemeni Crown P r i n c e Badr p o i n t e d up t h e expanding t e r r i t o r i a l scope of S o v i e t i n l t i a t i v e s

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The series of crises touched off by the c o l l a p s e of C a i r o ' s l n e g o t i a t l i o n s for,.Western economic a s s i S t a n c e t o b u i l d an Aswan high dam and Nasir's angry n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e Suez.Cana1 Company on 26 J u l y 1956 w a s a major t e s t both of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s i n t h e Middle E a s t and of East-West relat i o n s . S h e p i l o v ' s second t r i p , t o t h e Middle E a s t in June had left t h e impression t h a t f r i e n d l y states could e x p e c t p r a c t i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d economic a i d from Moscow on generous t e r m s . Nasir a p p a r e n t l y had been a l l b u t a s s u r e d t h a t large-scale Sov i e t aid f o r h i s p e t project would be forthcoming immediately i f n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e West broke down. Moscow's s t r o n g propaganda s u p p o r t f o r Nasir's move w a s tempered by Khrushchev on 31 J u l y on h i s q e t u r n f r o m a two-week swing through t h e " v i r g i n land" areas, A t t h a t t i m e he minimized t h e "excitementt* and called on t h e West for moderation. S h e p i l o v ' s subsequent t a c t i c s involved an a t t e m p t t o keep n e g o t i a t i o n s going, as he w a s a p p a r e n t l y con37insed 6 0 a n event u a l s e t t l e m e n t l a r g e l y on Egypt's terms. Moscow's s t r o n g d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t f o r Nasir's p o s i t i o n - - r e i n f o r c e d by such t a n g i b l e s as t h e release of b l o c c a n a l p i l o t s f o r d u t y a t Suez-stopped s h o r t of any commitment of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t i n t h e event of an attack on Egypt. S o v i e t propaganda a t t e m p t e d to p r o t r a y t h e crisis as a v i v i d i l l u s t r a t i o n of l l i m p e r i a l i s t t l r e a c t i o n t o n a t i o n a l i s t e f f o r t s t o remove t h e v e s t i g e s of col o n i a l r u l e . Khrushchev's 23 August s t a t e m e n t a t t h e Rumanian Embassy r e c e p t i o n - t h a t bloc v o l u n t e e r s , i n c l u d i n g h i s own son, might be s e n t t o ' a i d ' E g y p t i n ' t h h - e v e n t bf ain attack--foreshadowed Moscow's propaganda footwork i n t h e November c r i s i s . Preoccupation w i t h Suez developments w a s n o t so complete, however, as to r u l e o u t e f f o r t s t o extend t h e S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c and economic o f f e n s i v e elsewhere a l o n g now well-established l i n e s . Moscow's year-long effort t o woo I n d o n e s i a ' s Sukarno led to a w e l l - e x p l o i t e d two-week v i s i t to t h e USSR i n AugustSeptember 1956 and w a s capped by t h e announcement i n Djakarta on 15 September t h a t agreement had been reached on a $100,000,0 0 0 . c r e d i t for i n d u s t r i a l development., In August t h e USSR s e t up t h e I n s t i t u t e of World Economics and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Rel a t i o n s , and in September Moscow announced t h a t t h e O r i e n t a l I n s t i t u t e , of t h e USSR Academy of Sciences, would be reorganized and expanded i n an e f f o r t t o b r i n g i t s product more i n l i n e w i t h t h e needs of S o v i e t p o l i c y . "Doctor of Historical Sciences" B. G. Gafurov, long-ttWe Tadzhik p a r t y s e c r e t a r y and a S o v i e t p a r t y c e n t r a l committee member who w a s a s s i g n e d i n

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May t o direct t h e shake-up said t h e p r i o r i t y t a s k s of t h e s t i t u t e ; ' i n c l u d e d ' t h e p o l 4 t i c a l and economic formation and yelopmgnt of t h e new states of t h e E a s t . and e s p e c i a l l y of dxperience and problems i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l crisis d i s i n t e g r a t i o n bf t h e c o l o n i a l system in Asia and Africa.

inde-

their and

' A landmark of t h e new s c h o o l i n o r i e n t a l s t u d i e s w a s the p u b l i c a t i o n i n two i s s u e s of t h e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s weekly New Times of a n a r t i c l e on ! Non-Capitalist Path f o r U n d e r d E P ' A o p e d C o u n t r i e s " by Modeste R u b i n s t e i n , chief of t h e US s e c t i o n of t h e I n s t i t u t e of World Economics and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , which wholeheartedly s u p p o r t e d s t a t e p l a n n i n g and t h e development of s t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e s i n I n d i a , Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and elsewhere as t h e o n l y way f o r underdeveloped countries t o i n d u s t r i a l i z e . Further, R u b i n s t e i n elic&ted t h e backi n g of local Communists and Communist-influenced elements f o r t h e s u c c e s s f u l f u l f i l l m e n t of these s t a t e p l a n s as l o n g as t h e b e n e f i t s "go t o promote t h e welfare of t h e people."

'

The second stage of S o v i e t diplomacy i n t h e Suez c r i s i s w a s touched off by t h e London Conference of t h e "Suez Canal Users' Association." The S o v i e t Foreign M i n i s t r y s t a t e m e n t of 15 September, i s s u e d on t h e e v e of t h e conference, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e l i n k e d t h e USSR's s e c u r i t y t o c u r p e n t Middle East developments and made a g e n e r a l c a l l f o r Vn a c t i o n , though it d i d n o t s p e c i f y what t h i s a c t i o n s h o u l d be. Moscow kepe up its s t r o n g d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda s u p p o r t of Cairo*s opposit i o n t o any form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c a n a l and encouraged N a s i r t o keep t a l k s ' g o i n g as a means t o f o r e s t a l l a c t i o n by t h e West. By mid-October, Moscow a p p a r e n t l y f e l t t h a t t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a Western m i l i t a r y response had l e s s e n e d and i n d i c a t e d i n f o r m a l l y its w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c k p a t e in int e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s t o seek a way o u t of t h e d i p l o m a t i c impasse. Moscow's immediate r e a c t i o n t o news of t h e attack was a government s t a t e m e n t condemning t h e a c t i o n and c a l l i n g f o r t h e S e c u r i t y Council t o "take immediate s t e p s " t o e h a l t the f i g h t i n g and t o force withdrawal of t h e a t t a c k i n g forces. Soviet e f f o r t s t o g e t , and t o keep; t h e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e S e c u r i t y Council were i n t e n d e d t o embarrass t h e a t t a c k i n g powers and g i v e Moscow a chance t o foment pro-Nasir s e n t i m e n t w h i l e it decided on a c o u n t e r s t r a t e g y . Over t h e p a s t months S o v i e t off i c i a l s i n f o r m a l l y had l e f t t h e impression of thorough supp o r t , amounting almost t o p r o t e c t i o n , f o r Cairo; t h e attack,

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however, exposed t h e ambiguity of t h e USSR's p o s i t i o n . Only a f t e r the S o v i e t $leadersBecame convinced of t h e s e r i o u s s p l i t between t h e a t t a c k i n g p o d e r s and t h e United States d i d Moscow take .the i n i t i a t i v e , first i n a l e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower proposing j o i n t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n under UN a u t h o r i t y a g a i n s t t h e and t h e n in b l i s t e r i n g notes to B r i t a i n , gave France, and .Israel--exaggerated in t h e Soviet press-which t h e impression t h a t t h e USSR would take u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n a g a a n s t these powers u n l e s s t h e y called off t h e i r a s s a u l t on
Egypt

Four days after t h e 6 November cease-fire, Moscow made a t h i n l y v e i l e d t h r g a t o f "Soviet c i t i z e n volunteers"--a threat which, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h ..*%moastrationsb e f o r e t h e B r i t i s h , French, and Israeli embassies i n Moscow and "angry protest meetings" throughout the USSR, w a s intended t o b u i l d up psychological p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e West. Before s e t t l i n g on t h i s gambit, however, Bulganin on 1 November s e n t l e t t e r s t o Nehru and Sukarno proposing t h a t t h e y convene a second conference of Asian-African c o u n t r i e s t o condemn t h e attack o n E g y p t and t o promote common a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e West. T h i s first major t e s t of t h e genuineness of S o v i e t pret e n s i o n s t o be t h e "protector" of t h e p e o p l e s of t h e E a s t was a q u a l i f i e d v i c t o r y f o r Moscow*s a c t i v i s t policies. Communist p r o p a g a n d i s t s feasted on t h e "evidence" t h a t i m p e r i a l i s m had n o t changed i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e armed force t o kebp or rec a p t u r e key c o l o n i a l p o s i t i o t l s , and Moscow~sr o l e i n b r i n g i n g about t h e m i l i t a r y cease-fire w a s magnified after t h e fact t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e image of t h e S o v i e t Union as having a major v o i c e i n Middle E a s t developments. A t t h e same time, Moscow w a s c o n s t r a i n e d to k W p a l i v e world fears t h a t continued tens i o n i n t h e area might lead t o f u r t h e r f i g h t i n g both to-*fores t a l l a d d i t i o n a l Western moves a g a i n s t pro-Soviet Arabs and t o draw world a t t e n t i o n away from t h e r e c e n t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Hungary and its aftermath. ?doscou's disappointment o v e r t h e f a i l u r e of Asian n e u t r a l s t o respond its c a l l for a s o l i d f r o n t a g a i n s t "imperialism" w a s reflected i n d i p l o m a t i c channels, Konununist i n December l e c t u r e d both p a r t y and nonparty elements f o r u n d e r e b t i n a t i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e obstacles remaining in t h e p a t h of t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e and t h e '*desperate energy" w i t h which i m p e r i a l i s t s , w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o . d e f e n d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , pred i c t ing

.
I

!
!#

\

I

a whole series of s h a r p c o n f l i c t s , a m u l t i t u d e of battles on a l l econoaic and p o l i t i c a l problems bktween t h e newly a r i s i n g states of t h e East and 'the imperialists.

...

..

geoisie i n t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e East" c i t e d I n d i a , Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt f o r f u l f i l l i n g "progressiverr f u n c t i o n s and attempted t o q u i e t d o u b t e r s of t h e 2 0 t h congress l i n e f o r " i g n o r i n g facts" and " f a i l i n g t o n o t i c e new phenomena." The d i s c u s s i o n s showed Moscow now w i l l i n g t o endorse n a t i o n a l capit a l i s m in whatever & o m as a " p r o g r e s s i v e h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon i n c o l o n i a l and underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s " and denying that its s u p p o r t w a s based on t e m p o r a r i l y parallel i n t e r e s t s . The papers as p u b l i s h e d showed a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s p a r l t f of y i e w s , b u t t h e y i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h o s e r e f l e c t i n g t h e ortlhodox s u s p i c i o n t o lasti n g commitments t o non-Communist governments now were o u t of favor

. A l a t e 1956 conference of S o v i e t Asian s p e c i a l i s t s on '*the econom&cland p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s of t h e n a t i o n a l bour-

.

Although p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s e n t a n g l e d w i t h Suez tempora r i l y s h i f t e d t h e s p o t l i g h t off Moscow's f o r e i g n economic program, by t h e end of 1956 Moscow c o u l d p o i n t t o i n c r e a s e d dipl o m a t i c and economic c o n t a c t s i n Asia and Africa, dozens of new trade agreements w i t h non-Communist countries--a great many of which either provided f o r or looked toward t h e exchange of t e c h n i c a l experience--and a g e n e r a l l y enhanced impression t h a t t h e USSR w a s an economic as wel1,as p o l i t i c a l competitor f o r i n f l u e n c e i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . Shepilov boasted a t t h e Ungted Nations on 22 November t h a t s i n c e t h e war t h e USSR had g r a n t e d more t h a n 25 B i l l i o n r u b l e s i n f o r e i g n c r e d i t s ; bP, f a i l e d t o mention t h a t these l o a n s were p r i n c i p a l l y i n t r a .bloc. However, t h e momentum of Moscow's campaign cowed more t o promises of a i d and p r o s p e c t i v e economic b e n e f i t s Zhan it d i d t o s o l i d performance. Furthermore, 'developments w i t h i n t h e b l o c in l a t e 1956, e s p e c i a l l y t h e Hungarian u p r i s i n g , and Us s h a r p rise in East-West t e n s i o n s f l o w i n g from both Middle E a s t and C e n t r a l European crises i n t e r r u p t e d t h e c o u r s e of Sov i e t p o l i c y , d o m e s t i c a l l y as w e l l as i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . The December 1956 S o v i e t p a r t y c e n t r a l committee plenum w a s followed by t h e most e x t e n s i v e r e s h u f f l i n g of t o p governmental p o s t s s i n c e S t a l i n ' s death, by e x t e n s i v e changes i n Moscows a t e l l i t e economic r e l a t i o n s , and by upward r e v i s i o n s of domestic housing and consumer goods goals. There is some evidence t h a t h i g h e r p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s of economic a i d t o t h e

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bloc--including @ina--and t o Yugoslavia prompted a slowdown i n new;,commitments f o r ai.d t o non-Communist c o u n t r i e s and encoura ed those i n t h e Soviet leadership opposed t o t h i s program.&o challenge Khrushchev on t h e issue.* A slowing up of t h e tempo of MOSCOW'S economic program was,suggested by long dFawn-out n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a over a new $126,000,000 credit. Completed i n November, t h e agreement, despite ImdiaOs c r i t i c a l need f o r immediate help, carried t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t it not be drawn upon u n t i l 1959.

'

*Our best evidence of t h i s s p l i t is Saburov's "statement" a t t h e 21st congress c h a r g d a t h a t t h e a n t i p a r t y group, blinded by t * u l t r a n a t i o n a l ist narrow-mindedness" had opposed both trade expansion and economic aid t o bloc c o u n t r i e s as w e l l as t o nonCommunist underdeveloped countries. The upsurge i n Soviet offers following t h e June 1957 dismissal of the a n t i p a r t y group tends t o conf irln t h i s .

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IV.
:'I

;.-;SYRIA AND

SPUTNIKS:

January

-

November 1957

'

,

.

and with f o r e s t a l l i n g f u r t h e r Western moves i n t h e Middle E a s t and elsewhere'while bloc u n i t y w a s being reSt6red and strengthened. The series of bloc government and p a r t y conferences indicated t h a t a high p r i o r i t y w a s being given t o working out a new program f o r intr abloc cooperation and t o r e s t o r i n g the p u b l i c image of Communist "solidarity." Domestically; t h e l e s s o n s of Hungary and Suez were exploited t o r e i n s t a t e a v i g i l a n c e campaign as a means f o r e n l i s t i n g g r e a t e r enthusiasm for o f f i c i a l programs and for d i v e r t i n g popular d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over t h e slowness of domestic economic g a i n s .
A cont inued high l e v e l of djlplomat i c a c t i v i t y , accompank84 by appropriately s t r i d e n t propaganda, attempted t o keep a l i v e t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t Hungary and Suez were merely t h e prelude t o concerted Western e f f o r t s designed t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e i r former world p o s i t i o n in a l l key areas, e s p e c i a l l y t h e Middle EBst. Prelfdent Eisenhower's 5 January W i d d l e E a s t proposals" were immediately made t h e center of Soviet a t t e m p t s t o s p l i t t h e Arab world i n t o pro-Western and anti-Western fact i o n s . TASS on 1 2 January undertook a point-by-point r e b u t t a l of t h e '*proposals**leading up t o t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t although t h e program was formulated in terms of opposing Soviet and Communist pretensions in t h e area,, its primary purpose was t o halt and reverse t h e course of t h e Arab movement toward indepegdence. The ominous, i f ambiguous, Sino-Soviet communique of 18 January pledged t h a t t h e bloc would "continue rendering t h e necessary support t o t h e peoples of t h e N e a r and Middle E a s t i n order t o prevent aggression and interference" by t h e Western powers in t h e affairs of area governments. .

6 . . -:?. . .. I A t t h e beginning of 1957, Moscow was concerned p r i n c i p a l l y with d i s t r a c t i n g world a t t e n t i o n from i n t r a b l o c t r o u b l e s

.>

.,.

'. 1

,

~

*

ing t o accept closer diplowtic and economic ties with t h e bloc, Acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of American economic a i d under t h e new Middle E a s t program was seized upon by Moscow as t h e 'chief c r i t e r i o n of genuine independence.

Moscow welcomed t h e 18-19 January discussions in Cairo by Egyptaan, Syrian, Jordanian, .and Saudi Arabian leaders as evidence of closer cooperation among t h e anti-Western Arab f a c t i o n and of strengthening t h e hand of pro-Nasis Arabs w i l l -

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42

-

. .
,~

.
'. 5

.

S o v i e t move: i n t h e Middle E a s t appeared motivated both by fear$ t h a t Western moves i n t h e area impinged on t h e USSR's secur$y and by concern that its newly won i n f l u e n c e in t h e Arab 'world would erode under combined Western diplomatic, m i l i t a r y , and economic p r e s s u r e s , A TASS s t a t e m e n t o n 23 January alJegfng t h a t t h e United States i n t e n d e d t o e s t a b l i s h atomic bases in Turkey and I r a n touched off direct propaganda charges t h a t t h e **Eisenhower=Dulles** Middle E a q t d o c t r i n e was intended t o prepare t h e way for a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union. Moscow's g e n e r a l l y h o s t i l e t o n e toward t h e West w a s backed up by v e i l e d boasts concerning new S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c - m i l i t a r y developments. S o v i e t Defense M i n i s t e r Marshal Zhukov, t o u r i n g India as part of t h e i n c r e a s i n g stream of t o p - l e v e l S o v i e t v i s i t o r s t o South and Southeast Asia, asserted a hard a n t i imperialist l i n e and focused Asian and world a t t e n t i o n on re= c e n t more o p t i m i s t i c S o v i e t p u b l i c a f f i r m a t i o n s of comparative m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h vi$-a-vis t h e West, c l a i m i n g a n i o b i l i t y t o s t r i k e a **crushingblow" a g a i n s t targets anywhere on earth. S o v i e t n o t e s t o t h e United States, B r i t a i n , and France op 1 Pebruary c a l l i n g for a m u l t i l a t e r a l big-power approach t o 1 Middle E a s t problems, over t h e heads of local governments, repr e s e n t e d a sharp d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e USSR's e f f o r t s t o b u i l d

up S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e in t h e area through offers and d e l i v e r i e s of both p o l i t i c a l and material s u p p o r t t o Arab anti-Western extremists. Although t h e n o t e s were framed a l o n g l i n e s long used t o c o u r t these Arabs--noninterference i n t h e i n t e r n a l aff a i r s of Middle E a s t c o u n t r i e s , r e j e c t i o n of m i l i t a r y blocs, withdrawal of f o r e i g n t r o o p s , and t h e encouragement of economic development-the d i r e c t i o n of t h e o v e r t u r e of p a r t i a l d e t e n t e t o t h e West, backed by t h e s u g g e s t i o n of a mutual ban on arm shipments t o t h e area, showed t h e S o v i e t Union a t t h i s t i m e w i l l i n g t o jeopardize Arab good w i l l in t h e interest of a t least a p a r t i a l s e t t l e m e n t w i t h t h e West. Subsequently, Moscow has not been able c o m p l e t e l y t o p u t t o rest Arab s u s p i c i o n t h a t o v e r r i d i n g cold war i n t e r e s t s may lead t h e S o v i e t Union t o agreements or a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h t h e W s which would be et d e t r i m g n t a l t o Arab i n t e r e s t s or a s p i r a t i o n s . Afoscow may have had i n mirid a big power conference on t h e Middle E a s t s i m i l a r to t h e 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Its immediate int e n t was t o s t a l l t h e implementation of t h e new US Midt€le'East progqana. Foreign M i n i s t e r S h e p i l o v ' s survey of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relat i o n s in a n address t e . - t h e Supreme S o v i e t on 12 February, on

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t h e eve;,of h i s r e t u r n t o t h e p a r t y secretariat and h i s replacement by,' f o r e i g n a f f a i r s " ~ r o f e s s i o n a l v Andrey Gromyko, went t o v consj.48rable l e n g t h s t o defend MOSCOW!~ p o l i c y of **coexistence1' w i t h t h e West as t h e "cornerstone" of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y rather t h a n a p o l i t i c a l maneuver o r t a c t i c of t h e moment. Shepilov promised t h a t t h e USSR would continue t o f o l l o w the

" g r e a t e e t s e l f - c o n t r o l , p a t i e n c e , and p e r s i s t e n c e n in s e e k i n g a s o l u t i o n w i t h t h e West through n e g o t i a t i o n s . Following a second round of n o t e s to t h e Western powers on 19 A p r i l , Khrushchev, in an i n t e r v i e w $ i t h New York Times e d i t o r Catledge on 10 May, p o i n t e d up t h e ana-yxt-neva s e t t l e m e n t on Indochina and said, "It would be w i s e i f t h e leaders of t h e great c o u n t r i e s met' more often." A t t h e same time Moscow sought t o l i m i t t h e n e g a t i v e effects of t h i s t a c k by a t t e m p t i n g t o r e a s s u r e t h e Arabs t h a t its 1 February and 19 A p r i l proposals 1 were designed t o s t r e n g t h e n Arab s e c u r i t y and promote t h e r a p i d economic development of the area.
t h e Arab world were p r e s e n t e d i n t w o monographs, released in l a t e A p r i l and early May, by scholars of t h e I n s t i t u t e s of Law

The general o u t l i n e s of Soviet views on developments i n

I. Levin and V. Mampyet of m t i t u t e of Law s u r v e g economic and s o c i a l forces a t wmk i n t h e area and offered a n e x p l a n a t i o n for Soviet support.

t h e Countries of t h e Arab East ,

and O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s r e s p e c t i v e l y .

In The S t a t e S t r u c t u r e of

--

m e

An even more impressive attempt t o i n t e r p r e t recent area h i s t o r y i n such a way as t o j u s t i f y c u r r e n t Soviet support f o r Arab anti-Western movements w a s a symposium, Arabs in t h e S t r u g g l e f o r Inde endence, prepared by t h e Y i ~ E ~ t ~ p e r t s of t h e I n a t T-%-TT- t a l S t u d i e s , under t h e e d i t o r s h i p of u e o r en Egyptian specialist L. N Vatdiria and Ye. A. Belyayev, The . two works devoted l i t t l e space t o Arab h i s t o r y or p o l i t i c a l claims, although E g y p t ' s J u l y 1952 r e v o l u t i o n w a s h a i l e d f o r

I

in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a n t i f e u d a l , democratic reforms. The Sov i e t a u t h o r s , c i t i n g t h e predominantly r u r a l character of a l l Arab states, h e l d o u t l i t t l e hope of r e a l economic development u n t i l t h e a g r a r i a n problem had been s o l v e d along 1 t p r o g ~ e s s I v e ' 9 l i n e s and large-scale i r r i g a t i o n , e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , improved t r a n s p o r t , and e x t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n had been carried o u t . The s u b j e c t of j o i n t development of t h e a r e a w a s avoided i n f a v o r of i n d i v i d u a l Arab agreements w i t h bloc c o u n t r i e s . Making no disavowal of area Communists, admitting t h a t in most Arab c o u n t r i e s weak Communist elements are f o r c e d t o work underground, t h e symposium stated t h a t MQSCOW'S a b is n o t t h e

its s u c c e s s f u l measures a g a i n s t impeFialism and f o r its s t a r t

- 44 ..
i

d i c t a t o p s h i p of t h e Arab proletariat, b u t t h e " s t r e n g t h e n i n g of n a t $,mal independence ,?$hrough democracy, l a n d reform, and t h e b q i l d i n g of socialism in l i n e w i t h t h e n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e Arab countries." Hardly a b l u e p r i n t of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s , t h e two works,' e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s p r e s e n t e d s o l i d t e s t i m o n y t o Moscow~se f f o r t s t o woo Arab leaders and i n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d ' t o accommodate its major propaganda l i n e s t o t h e i r interests.

The v i c t o r y of t h e Communist p a r t y i n g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n t h e Indian s t a t e of Kerala p o i n t e d up t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t in Moscowfs attempts to p r e s e r v e a p o l i c y of o f f i c i a l good w i l l and ekploit an o s t e n s i b l e community of i n t e r national i n t e r e s t s w i t h n e u t r a l i s t countries, while a t the same time remaining committed i d e o l o g i c a l l y t o a s s i s t i n g t h e i n e v i t a b l e and h i s t o r i c a l communization of t h e world. The ins t a l l a t i o n on 5 A p r i l of t h e Communist-led m i n i s t r y i n Kerala, t h e first c o n c r e t e proof of Khrushchev's 2 0 t h p a r t y formulat i o n on t h e p o s s f b i l i t y of t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y p a t h t o power by Communist p a r t i e s , was g r e e t e d a s testimony t o t h e p o p u l a r i t y of Communist ideas i n I n d i a , b u t , o u t of an obvious desire t o maintain good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e I n d i a n Government and w i t h Nehru, l i t t l e comment was devoted t o Kerala. Considering t h e magnitude of t h e v i c t o r y , t h e volume of s t r a i g h t p u b l i c i t y was small, although t o u r i s t accounts on Kerala subsequently became a f e a t u r e i n S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s . Commentators s c r u p u l o u s l y avoided t h e s u b j e c t of I n d i a n i n t e r n a l affairs, and u n t i l l a t e 1958 there was no i n d i c a t i o n of, B B o s c o ~ ~ si l l i n g n e s s t o chamw pion t h e Kerala m b i s t r y .
* I

In t h e c o n t i n u i n g search for a s t r o n g e r r a t i o n a l e f o r its p o l i c y toward Asian and African n e u t r a l i s t states, Soviet publ i c i s t s t u r n e d t o L e n i n ' s works t o c u l l o u t a p p l i c a b l e views, In t h i s i n s t a n c e t h e " r e t u r n t o Leninism" r e p r e s e n t e d an effort t o l e g i t imwe t h e new. c o u r s e and.. g i v e i t .t h e stamp of greater a u t h o r i t y as w e l l as t o i n j e c t some of t h e early r e v o l u t i o n a r y enthusiasm i n t o t h e new Communist theses. Lenin was cited p a r t i a u l a r l y t o j u s t i f y t h e temporary a l l i a n c e w i t h bourgeoisc o n t r o l l e d Asian n a t i o n a l movements; however, h i s s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t cooperation w i t h non-Communist groups w a s ' p o s s i b l e o n l y i f Communists were l e f t free t o o r g a n i z e and agitate w a s not cited, i n view of t h e domestic anti-Communist p o l i c i e s of some of t h e Asian and Arab governments which Moscow was now w i l l i n g t o overlook. Moscow's modernized v e r s i o n of Leninism played down ideological d i f f e r e n c e s i n f a v o r of b r i n g i n g about t h e

- 45 -

c

.. .

u n i t y of a l l n a t i o n a l elements i n a j o i n t s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l ir$ependence , which ;;Ln' turn', w a s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h an a n t i Western f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I
~

.r

s t u d e n t , and other Communist-front groups and by m u l t i p l y i n g direct c o n t a c t s of Asian and African peoples w i t h t h e bloc, S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n was given t o t h e trade union movement i n an attempt t o e x p l o i t $he h i s t o r i c a l l y close emotional r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e labor and n a t i o n a l i s t movements, Bdoscowqs greatest i n i t i a t i v e a l o n g t h i s l i n e w a s directed toward propag a t i n g a "Bandung s p i r i t , " which it i n t e r p r e t e d as g e n e r a l Asian-African n e u t r a l i s t endorsement of b l o c p o l i c i e s and attempted t o expand to i n c l u d e n o t only t h e Bandung Conference d i s c u s s i o n s and t h e i r aftermath but also t h e p a r a l l e l "AfroAsian S o l i d a r i t y " movement which had been developing along nongovernmental l i n e s s i n c e l a t e 1954, Moscow recognized t h e p o t e n t i a l of a movement based on popular enthusiasm for Asian and A f r i c a n cooperation as a f o u n t a i n of anti-Western propaganda as w e l l as a convenient mechanism f o r c o l l a b o r a t i n g with and i n f l u e n c i n g Asian-Af r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t = h e u t r a lists

The USSR's- i n i t i a l impact on Asian-African n e u t r a l i s m had come. about through direct c o n t a c t s with ' n a t i o n a l i s t leaders s6ch as Nehm, Sukarno, and Nasir. NOW, Moscow sought t o inurease its i n f l u e n c e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c through brighteni n g and broadening t h e appeal of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l labor, womenss,

.

The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Soviet o f f i c i a l s i n l e a d i n g organiz a t i o n a l roles both in cooperation w i t h and in competition w i t h Egyptian and Indian elements was' intended t o b r i n g t h e "Afro-Asian S o l i d a r i t y Movement" as close as p o s s i b l e t o t h e bloc's peace movement and t o f u r t h e r t h e image of t h e USSB a s an Asian n a t i o n , Overtures t o Asians and Africans, however, w e r e .but part of a g e n e r a l Soviet e f f o r t t o expand c o n t a c t s w l t h foreiglb groups and i n d i v i d u a l s , in l i n e w i t h t h e format i o n on 21 May of a State Committee for C u l t u r a l R e l a t i o n s With Foreign Countries, under t h e USSR Council of Ministers. T a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y in d e a l i n g with non-Communists, in perr$on-td-persorr ..cuntaits:;fiozXw $hanil ixi ;goVeriibene-to governwent rela%%ths, was t o be t h e order of t h e day.

The F i r s t All-Union Conference of O r i e n t a l i s t s , convened i n Tashkent from 4 to 1 June, brought t o g e t h e r s p e c i a l i s t s 1 from a l l o v e r t h e bloc in an effort t o back up c u r r e n t Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y l i n e s w i t h more s k i l l f u l and convincing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of area developments and t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e appeal

t o AsiapAfrican.intellectuals. B G. Gafurov, a Tadzhik who . s i n c e $he 2 0 t h p a r t y con@ess h a d - a u t h o r e d t h e p r i n c i p a l programmetic s t a t e m e n t s on t h e new l i n e f o r Asia-Africa, chaired t h e conference,and shared t h e s p o t l i g h t w i t h a n o t h e r Asian, N. A. Mukhitdinov, t h e n first s e c r e t a r y i n Uzbekistan and c p n d i d a t e member of t h e S o v i e t p a r t y presidium. The locus of 'the confererlce $tb,eihe&rt ::of: 'Sbvfet c e n t r a l Asia), t h e e o n t e n t of t h e major speeches, and t h e leading ole of S o v i e t Asians u n d e r l i n e d t h e s h i f t t o e f f o r t s t o u t i l i z e t o t h e maximum t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of S o v i e t r u l e i n t h e C e n t r a l Asian r e p u b l i c s as a p a t t e r n for t h e economic development of non-Soviet c o u n t r i e s . Gafurov cited t h e "marvelous experience" of t h e peoples of these r e p u b l i c s , .'
which w i t h t h e a c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e Russian people and of other p e o p l e s of t h e USSR, i n t h e shortest historical period, overcame t h e i r former backwardness and

created a h i g h l y developed i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e .
Mukhitdinov, now tabbed as a l e a d i n g regime spokesman on n a t i o n a l movements, likewise emphasized t h e p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l achievements of t h e peoples of t h e S o v i e t E a s t i n t h e y e a r s of Communist r u l e as a p r o d s i n g v e h i c l e for making more v i v i d and c o n c r e t e t h e Communist program f o r A s i a and'dfr i a a . I n t h e year f o l l o w i n g t h i s meeting, S o v i e t scholars expanded t h e i r o u t p u t of a n a l y s e s of t h e social and economic development of C e n t r a l Asia as t h e path f o r a n o n c a p i t a l i s t p a t h of development from feudaTism to,socialism, The state u n i v e r s i t i e s a t Tashkent and F'runze were developed as c e n t e r s of scholarly and c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t w i t h non-Soviet Asia.
The practical a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e vi&s to p r e s s i n g Midd l e E a s t problems showed Moscow engaged in a - c a r e f u l assessment of areas of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n which S o v i e t theoretical p r e j u d i c e s p l a y e d a l i m i t e d r o l e . Having s c o r e d i t s advanced In t h e Middle E a s t on t h e basis first of g i v i n g a l l - o u t sup-

p o r t f o r Arab governments a g a i n s t Israel and second of e n c o u ~ a g ing Arab estrangement from t h e West, Moscow r e v i s e d somewhat its earlier views on t h e shape of t h e dangers to'&'ts p o s i t i o n and t h a t of its Arab allies. Months a f t e r - t h e fact Moscow re-,.vised its v e r s i o n of t h e Suez crisis t o admit t h a t t h e attack on Egypt cane without p r i o r agreement w i t h t h e United States. A t t h e same t i m e , w h i l e t a c i t l y a d m i t t i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e Amepican s u c c e s s e s i n s h o r i n g up the economic and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of area c o u n t r i e s opposed t o t h e e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e ,
.

.... .. ,

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.

.

. .

...

Moscow qppeared Jess concerned t h a t major American intervenits p r i n c i p a l a t t e n t i o n t o firmt i o n Wgs imminent and tu*ed i n g t p e anti-Western s t a n d of Egypt and S y r i a and t o winning broader &ab popular support. In t h e face of t h e o u s t e r o f , t h e Nabulsi government of Jordan fn A p r i l and t h e s i g n a t u r e o$ 19audi-US agreements, Moscow blamed r e a c t i o n a r y leaders , r a t h e r t h a n ' t h e t w o k i n g s f o r these pro-Western moves, apgqre n t l y f e e l i n g t h a t i n time these governments would be forced by intrB-Arab p r e s s u r e s t o f o l l o w t h e lead of C a i r o and Damascus

.

.most a l l area c o u n t r i e s and speeded t h e re-equipping of
!

Moscow continued its o f f e r s of economic assistance t o althe

Egyptian Army t o replace its losses of material. Arms also flowed t o S y r i a a t c u t - r a t e p r i c e s i n exchange f o r Syrian exp o r t s of c o t t o n and wheat, necessiOating t h e d i v e r s i o n t o t h e bloc of a n importaha p a r t of S y r i a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l exports t o West European markets and r e s u l t i n g i n a dramatic i n c r e a s e i n t h e bloc's share of Syrian f o r e i g n t r a d e . Despite Moscow~s &lank& o f f e r s of i n c r e a s e d trade, of economic development loans, and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , by mid-1957 only a h a n d f u l of countries-notably India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, E g y p t , and Syria-had agreed t o e x t e n s i v e programs of economPc or -ec;onomic and m i l i t a r y a i d . Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, and Yemen had agreed t o terms w i t h Moscow,vbut African ( o t h e r t h a n Egypt) and L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s f a i l e d t o respond t o t e n t a t i v e Soviet o v e r t u r e s .
MOSCOW~S i n t e n t i o n s t o follow a n a c t i v i s t l i n e i n t h e urnderdeveloped countries--based on a more o b j e c t i v e understanding of c o n c r e t e developments on t h e one hand and i n t e n s i f i e d ideological-propaganda attacks on Western p o l i c i e s on t h e other-Were reflected i n important P u b l i c a t i o n moves a t mid-year. In early June, Hoscow i s s u e d i n 125,000 copies a r e f e r e n c e handbook of almost 1,000 pages e n t i t l e d Foreign Countries. Ths p u b l i c a t i o n , which gave a run-down o m developments a s i n c e World Wr I1 for a l l c o u n t r i e s except t h e USSR, presented s h o r t geographic a n d economic surveys, d e s c r i p t i o n s of OPgans of state power, l e a d i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e press, etc. An a i d to Soviet e d u c a t o r s and propagandists, it was n o t a b l e for its d i s s i m i l a r i t y t o an a g i t a t o r ' s notebook.

!

-

Of more l a s t i n g impact, Moscow brought t o l i f e after a decade Vargats j.ourna1, a new World Economics and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , t h e stated p u r p o m which was t o e x a m i n e eeonomic developments both in t h e developed and underdeveloped

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G

S o Khavinson,* l o n g ' h e a d of TlfSS and former chief of t h e f o r e i g n s e c t i o n of Pravda, as chief editor p o i n t e d up t h e unmistakable p o l i t i c a l -of the j o u r n a l . A second new j o u r n a l , The Coatemporar E a s t , introduced a t t h e same time w a s i n t e n d x t o s e r v e as popular v o i c e of t h e I n s t i t u t e of O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s both at home and abroad. To date it has n o t l i v e d up t o its i n i t i a l promise to appear "soon'* in t h e major languages of Asia and A f r i c a , but under Gafurov's e d i t o r s h i p it has been used t o d i s s e m i n a t e o f f i c i a l views bn p r e s s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems e s p e c i a l l y t o u c h i n g on t h e i n t e r e s t s of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America, t o p u b l i s h t h e parallel views of n e u t r a l i s t leaders, and t o p o i n t up t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of eult u r a l c o n t a c t s , exchanges, f r i e n d s h i p societies, and f r o n t o mgroups i n b r i n g i n g together non-Communist and avowed C m u . n i s t a c t i v i t i e s i n *hese areas.

c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s and r e l a t i a n s among and between them, The r e ~ o w n e deconomist w4h l i s t e d as a n e d i t o r and has been

a f r e q u e n t c o n t r i b u t o r , b u t %he s e l e c t i o n of Ya.

-

The step-by step d i s c l o s u r e i n early J u l y of the "antiparty'* group c o n s p i r a c y whichk had come to a head t h e p r e v i o u s month opened a new era i n S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e uncommittetiwprld, as Xbrushchev used t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h e groufi:? p o l i c i e s which were unpopular or had f a i l e d and to adsociate himself p e r s o n a l l y w i t h those i n i t i a t i v e s which had proved a s u c c e s s o r were now t o be undertaken. The dismissal of Shepilov, t h e S o v i e t leader most closely associated w i t h MQSCOW*S s t r o n g prg-Nasir s t a n d , obliged t h e regime t o e x p l a i n t o t h e Ar4bs t h a t no change i n S o v i e t Middle E a s t p o l i c y was i n prospect. The indictment of Molotov, p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t l y , f o r broad o p p o s i t i o n t o many of Khrushchev's f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves cleared t h e way for a p u r e l y Khrushchevian s t y l e i n fore i g n affairs. Accusing t h e whole a n t i p a r t y group w i t h having opposed such f e a t u r e s of c u r r e n t S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y as moves i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of peace and c o e x i s t e n c e w i t h t h e West and

*Khavinson, i n a n t h o r i n g important articles on i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n h i s own and such o t h e r S o v i e t publieat i o u s as I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs and L i f e Abroad, h a s used t h e l i t e r a r y pseudonym Y. Marinin.

-

SE+T

49

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llpersonal, diplomacy" were a p p a r e n t l y intended t o under1 i n e these f g ' a t u r e s ' s a n c t i t y &d t h e importance w i t h which Moscow coqitinued t o view r e a c h i n g a long-range accomodation w i t h t h e West. No mention was made a t t h i s t i m e of opposit i o n by a t least p a r t of t h e o u s t e d presidium members to Khrus'hchev's p o l i c i e s f o r i n t r a b l o c as w e l l as f o r e i g n a i d .
1

The first test of t h e regime's i n t e n t i o n s f o l l o w i n g t h e purge was provided almost immediately as a r e s u l t of t h e growi n g intimacy of Soviet-Syrian r e l a t i o n s and Moscow's g e n e r a l embroilment i n Middle E a s t developments. On 6 August a j o i n t Soviet-Syrian communique i s s u e d on t h e conclusion of a v i s i t t o Moscow of a high-ranking d e l e g a t i o n of S y r i a n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y - f i g u r e s pledged t h e USSR t o f u r t h e r e x t e n s i v e economic and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r S y r i a and sought to s t r e n g t h e n t h e anti-Western hand of t h e S y r i a n Government. Following t h e a l l e g e d d i s c o v e r y a week l a t e r of an American p l o t , t h e S y r i a n regime o u s t e d t h e l a s t d i s s e n t e r s t o its proS o v i e t p o l i c i e s and set off a n area-wide alarm o v e r t h e spread of o v e r t Communist a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e Middle E a s t and on t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of pro-Western i n t e r v e n t i o n i n S y r i a , S o v i e t propaganda s e i z e d on t h e S y r i a n c h a r g e s and subsequent Arab alarms n o t o n l y t o i n t e n s i f y t h e a i r of crisis i n order to increase p r e s s u r e s on pro-Western Arab governments, b u t also, as i n d i c a t e d by a t h i r d round of n o t e s t o B r i t h i n , France, and t h e United States on 3 September, t o b r i n g about p i g power n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e Middle E a s t on t h e same terms as proposed 1 i n its n o t e s of 1 February and ,19 Aprdl 1957. Behind a facade of exaggerated i n t e r e s t i n S o v i e t s e c u r i t y in t h e Middle E a s t , and i n t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e n s e p o l i t i c a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e s , Moscow set o u t t o test Western react i o n s and Western r e s o l u t i o n o v e r S y r i a n developments, TASSv 26 August announcement of t h e s u c c e s s f u l t e s t i n g of a n i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e touched off a campaign by Moscow t o e x p l o i t claims of a new b a l a n c e of power and t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h a s t r o n g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s e l f . T h i s campaign was made more e x p l i c i t by t h e p u b l i c a t i o n on 8 September in Pravda of a l o n g 'tinterview**w i t h head of t h e S o v i e t a i r f o r m r Marshal Vershinin, d e p i c t i n g overwhelming S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y vis-a-vis t h e West, The 18 Sepgember announcement by Moscow t h a t t w o warships from t h e B a l t l c F l e e t which were on a good-will v i s i t t o Albania and Yugoslavia would also make a ten-day v i s i t t o S y r i a dramatized t h e USSR's s e l f - a p p o i n t e d role as l l p r o t e c t o r * tof t h e Arabs a t t h e same

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t i m e as i$, was i n t e n d e d t o , s e r v e as a c o n c r e t e reminder of Sov i e t Middle E a s t i n t e r e s t & A p a r t y brochure p u b l i s h e d on 25 Septemtjer, he Soviet Union and- t h e - C o u n t r i e s of t h e Near and Middle East, y m . w o r y a n , l a i m e d t hat-

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, t e n s of m i l l i o n s of p e o p l e i n t h e Near and Middle E a s t s e e ' i n t h e face of t h e S o v i e t Union a t r u e

f r i e n d and s u p p o r t e r of t h e peace and independence of peoples.... I n e x p l a i n i n g t o wide domestic circles S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c supp o r t for S y r i a and Egypt, t h e brochure d i d n o t i n t i m a t e t h a t Moscow's backing would be other t h a n d i p l o m a t i c and economic. Khrushchev's a t t e m p t s t o b u i l d up t h e impression abroad of irresistible S o v i e t power were intended t o i n h i b i t Western moves i n t h e area and t o encourage Arab governments t o take a s t r o n g e r l i n e a g a i n s t t h e West, s e c u r e in t h e belief t h a t S o v i e t arms would p r o t e c t them from any Western m i l i t a r y rep r i s a l and t h a t b l o c economic t i e s would f o i l attempted economic r e t a l l i a t i o n . Moscow's h a n d l i n g of t h e second phase of t h e crisis was more c l e a r l y directed over Arab heads a t t h e West. MQSCOW'S 24 September announcement--without comment--that atomic and hydrogen weapons of v a r f o u s k i n d s had been exploded i n connection w i t h m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s w a s a p r e l u d e t o t h e r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of Sov5et m i l i t a r y , s c i e n t i f i c , and economic advances which followed t h e 4 October launching of Sputnik I. Moscow kept t h e s p o t l i g h t on m i l i t a r y technology w i t h t h e announcement on 7 October t h a t on t h e p r e c e d i n g day it had tested a "powerful hydrogen d e v i c e of new design." Then Khrushchev p e r s o n a l l y took t h e lead i n magnifying t h e war scare o v e r S y r i a w i t h h i s s t a t e m e n t t o New York Times correspondent James Reston t h a t Turkey would n0t-sw e day" in a Middle Eadjrt war. Again on t h e e v e n i n g of t h e 7 t h t h e premier h i t a t T u r k i s h and Western i n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g S y r i a , adding t h a t it would be too l a t e t o r e c o n s i d e r p o l i c i e s when "cannons begin t o s h o o t and rockets t o f l y . ) ' The subsequent t r a n s f e r of Marshal Rokossovsky t o command of t h e Transcaucasus M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t b o r d e r i n g on Turkey and I r a n , followed by a n unprecede n t e d p r e s s s t a t e m e n t t h a t m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s had been carried o u t there under s i m u l a t e d atomic warfare c o n d i t i o n s , was intended t o convince both t B e Arabs and t h e West--but p r i n c i p a l l y t h e Latter--that t e n s i o n s were so g r e a t as t o r e q u i r e an immediate s e t t l e m e n t .
I

Althpugh both p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s t a t e m e n t s of S o v i e t w i l l i n g d b s s t o undertake, .3.f n e c e s s a r y , m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n suppor,K'of S y r i a f e l l s h o r t of committing t h e USSR to uni-

l a t e r a l a c t i o n , t h e y s e r v e d t o c l o a k S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s and t o maintain f o r Moscow as wide a n area as p o s s i b l e f o r propaganda' e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d p o l i t i c a l maneuver. When even t h e Nasir-orienteli'Arab states moved i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of dbtehke, Khrushchev, a t a r e c e p t i o n on 29 October i n t h e Turkish Embassy, made a theatrical, s e l f - s t y l e d " g e s t u r e of peace" and attempted to resume t h e pose of peacemaker. Perbapa in reco g n i t i o n t h a t t h e v e r y crudeness of its tactics had boomeranged among some of t h e Arabs and had f a i l e d t o shake t h e West, Moscow later made a h a l f h e a r t e d a W a u p t t o blame t h e m i l i t a r y p r e e s u r e s t o t h e "adventurism1* of t h e n Defense M i n i s t e r Marshal Zhukov, Zhukov may have f a v o r e d such tactics and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e atmosphere of crisis by r e p e a t i n g t h e h a r s h e r t o n e s of t h e Moscow p r e s s .in his speeches i n Albania at t h e h e i g h t of t h e t e n s i o n , but i n B i e w of h i s three-week absence and Khrus h c h e v ' s earlier p e r s o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h thesyprobe, h e w a s an u n s u i t a b l e scapegoat.
Moscow's subsequent attempts t o depict its e f f o r t s t o int e n s i f y , prolong, and blanipulate t e n s i o n s between S y r i a and i t s neighbors as a n o t h e r major t r i a l of its r o l e as p r o t e c t o r of t h e Arabs have c e n t e r e d around t h e undisputed fact t h a t no i n t e r v e n t i o n took p l a c e . Although a t t h e t i m e t h e c e n t r a l press reflected disappointment t h a t t h e Arab s t a t e s proved irr e s o l u t e i n t h e face of East-Wes$ p r e s s u r e s , S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n s have p r e f e r e d t o skim o v e r t h e d i p l o m a t i c and p o l i t i c a l maneuv e r i n g which l e d t o t h e impasse, t o p r e s e n t a c a r i c a t u r e of t h e crisis based on t h e Western p l o t thesis, t o r e p e a t t h e "we saved Syria" a l l e g a t i o n without s p e c i f y i n g t h e S o v i e t psychol o g i c a l p r e s s u r e s employed. Although p a l e d by t h e r e c e n t Sov i e t support f o r S y r i a , t h e s i g n a t u r e on 28 October of a $170,000,000 long-term development a s s i s t a n c e c r e d i f emphasized t h e close c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e t w o governments a t t h e same t i m e as it u n d e r l i n e d t h e i n t e r p l a y of S o v i e t economic a i d w i t h both broad and immediate p o l i c y aims. Concurrent w i t h t h e S y r i a n developments, a major review of t h e p o l i t i c s of economic a i d t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s by Modeste R u b i n s t e i n emphas i z e d t h e i n d i r e c t "f inancial-economic and m i l i t a r y - p o l i t ical'' methods used by c o l o n i a l i s t s in e n f o r c i n g t h e i r w i l l on nomin a l l y independent states and asserted t h a t Moscow's u n s e l f i s h a i d " t r u l y t h r e a t e n s c o l o n i a l i s t p o l i c i e s " i n opening t h e way for t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s t o choose f r e e l y t h e c o u r s e and pace of t h e i r econDmic development.

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In 1957, f o r , t h e first t i m e , economic a i d w a s i n c l u d e d as one $f t h e Theses f o r qhe October Revolution Anniversary;
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I h i n g become a mighty i n d u s t r i a l power, t h e s o c i a l ist s t a t e n o t o n l y exrtends t o t h e c o u n t r i e s of Asia -and Africa moral and p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e f o r . a t t a i n i n g , p r e s e r v i n g , and s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r independence, b u t also h e l p s them i n t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e economic b a s i s of independence i n b u i l d i n g up ind u s t r y and i n developing a g r i c u l t u r e .

The 40th a n n i v e r s a r y provided a convenient peg f o r a f l o o d of S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s eo attempt t o i n f l u e n c e t h e peoples of the former colonies. The e f f o r t w a s keyed t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r e c e n t world h i s t o r y i n terms of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m in which a l l of these peoples had p a r t i c i pated i n one degree or a n o t h e r and w a s couched in localized terms i n order t o i n c r e a s e its p l a u s i b i l i t y , Symptomatic of Moscow's more o p t i m i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of p r o s p e c t s f o r still greater i n f l u e n c e ' i n Asia and Africa w a s t h e p u b l i c a t i o n i n :he j o u r n a l S o v i e t Oriehtal S t u d i e s of an a r t i c l e on t h e F i r s t Congress of t h e o p l e s of t h e E a s t , held i n September 1920 a t Baku; which o u t l i n e d a long discarded program of revolut i o n a r y s t r u g g l e of a l l p e a s a n t s and workers of t h e world. One of t h e f r a n k e s t e v a l u a t i o n s of East-West r i v a l r y f o r c o u n t r i e s was given by Eugene Varga o n , t h e eve o f the November c e l e b r a t ion. W r i t i n g i n " h i s " j o u r n a l World Economics and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s - - h e r e i n a f t e r c i m s WEIR t he x t e d S o v i e t economist s i n g l e d o u t " t h e three m i g h t y w l a r s " of c o l o n i a l r u l e : monopoly on t h e s u p p l y of i n d u s t r i a l equipment and machinery, monopoly on t h e s o u r c e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l credit, and monopoly on t h e s u p p l y of arms. Varga claimed a l l three were crumbling as a consequence of S o v i e t p o l i c i e s . He brag-@ t h a t t h e economic achievements of t h e USSR and t h e bloc permitted them t o f u r n i s h whole i n d u s t r i a l combines to underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and t h a t sound S o v i e t f i n a n c e s permitted t h e USSR t o m a k e l o a n s on more advantageous terms t h a n those o f f e r e d by either t h e United S t a t e s o r B r i t a i n . In one of Moscow's r a r e r e f e r e n c e s t o its nonbloc m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e programs, Varga cited t h e h i g h stage of b l o c i n d u s t r i a l development as making p o s s i b l e t h e sale of arms t o former c o l o n i e s and dependent c o u n t r i e s t h r e a t e n e d by i m p e r i a l i s t a g g r e s s i o n , t h u s e l i m i n a t i n g t h e West's t h i r d and l a s t "monopoly" s t a n d i n g
t h e t a c t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e of t h e underdeveloped and n e u t r a l i s t

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i n t h e yay of c o w l e t e p o 1 , i t i c a l and economic independence. The neap-term implicatioq\was t h a t Pdoscowt s c a l l f o r p e a c e f u l compet,f;,Xtionw i t h t h e West would f e a t u r e g r e a t l y expanded Sov i e t e f f o r t s a l o n g a l l t h r e e of t h e s e l i n e s . As f o r t h e p o l i cies Moscow was u r g i n g on therunderdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , t h e mopt:important was a pro-Soviet, or a t least n e u t r a l , f o r e i g n p o l i c y , p l u s domestic measures combining
l a n d reforms and t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of f e u d a l holdovers; t h e l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e economic p o s i t i o n s of imperia l i s m i n i n d u s t r y , f i n a n c e , and trade; t h e c r e a t i o n of a powerful state economy on t h e basis of an i n c r e a s e of t h e r e l a t i v e weight and d i r e c t i v e r o l e of t h e s t a t e s e c t o r i n t h e c o u n t r y ' s economy; t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of elements of s t a t e p l a n n i n g of t h e economy; t h e establishment of a d e f i n i t e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e a c t i v i t y of

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p r i v a t e c a p i t a l ; and t h e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of forg'ign (From t h e unsigned lead a r t i c l e i n S 8 v i e t property. O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s , No. 5, 1957, s i g n e d t o t h e press on 1 N o v e m The 40th a n n i v e r s a r y c e l e b r a t i o n i n Moscow, led and domin a t e d by Khrushchev, w a s keyed t o e f f o r t s t o make direct p o l i t i cal and propaganda c a p i t a l o u t of t h e changes wrought domestic a l l y d u r i n g t h e 40 y e a r s of Communist r u l e . KhrushchevPs j u bilee speech paraded a l i s t of r e c e n t domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l achievements--topped off by r e c e n t ICBM claims and world-wide acclaim of Sputnik I and, on the e v e of t h e holidar;,Sputnik 11--to g i v e t h e i m p r e s s i o q t h a t t h e s u c c e s s e s of t h e p a s t y e a r were b u t t h e p r e l u d e f o r f u r t h e r Communist advances, and he r e i t e r a t e d s t a n d a r d claims f o r t h e i d e o l o g i c a l and c u l t u r a l s u p e r i o r i t y of Communism as a world system. H i s remarks on t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of c o l o n i a l i s m were brief and n o t a b l e o n l y f o r t h e o p t i m i s t i c f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t t h e " t w i l i g h t of i m p e r i a l r u l e i n t h e East has a r r i v e d , " as d i s t i n c t from t h e u s u a l e q u i v o c a t i o n as t o timing. Khrushchev's speeeh d i d n o t even imply t h a t up u n t i l less t h a n two weeks p r e v i o u s l y t h e Middle E a s t , s p e c i f i c a l l y S y r i a , had been t h e l o c u s of a major E a s t West crisis. The f o l l o w i n g day, however, newly named M i n i s t e r of Defense Marshal Malinovsky liept a l i v e t h e S o v i e t charge t h a t Western "adventures" s u c h as S y r i a t h r e a t e n e d mankind w i t h t h e calamities of n u c l e a r w a r f a r e The meetings and d i s c u s s i o n s of Communist p a r t y leaders who were i n Moscow o s t e n s i b l y t o h e l p celebrate t h e a n n i v e r s a r y

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comprised a m a j o r . e f f o r t t o r e s o l v e i n t r a b l o c d i f f e r e n c e s and t o e s t a $ i i s h a greater s e , b l a n c e of d o c t r i n a l and organizat i o n a l ; . u n i t y t o t h e world Communist movement. The "Declarat i o n " I s s u e d a t , t h e 14-16 November conference of bloc parties --a document Yugoslavia r e f u s e d t o sign--apparently was intended,by its f o r m u l a t o r s as a s o r t of bloc charter, and was so treated by Soviet propaganda for about a year f o l l o w i n g t h e meeting. The "Declaration" reaffirmed t h e theses of t h e S o v i e t p a r t y 2 0 t h p a r t y congress and i n effect v a l i d a t e d S o v i e t Peade r s h i p of t h e world Communist movement in the i n t e r i m p e r i o d . A t t h e same t i m e , however, p r o v i s o s were added which justified harder l i n e s i n both t h e ideological and p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e class enemy ( c a p i t a l i s m ) and t h e bloc enemy ( t h e West) , . The meeting from 16 t o 19 November of 64 Communist p a r t i e s , c l a i m i n g more t h a n 33,000,000 members, w a s concerned w i t h broade n i n g and i n v i g o r a t i n g Communjst t a c t i c s and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , e n l i v e n i n g t h e l a n g u i s h i n g "peace" movement, The 64-party "Peace Manifesto" called for an i n t e n s i f i e d s t r u g g l e by a l l a n t i - i m p e t i a l i s t elements a g a i n s t Western i n f l u e n c e and p o l i cies and directed peace o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o m a k e a p a s s i o n a t e d r i v e a g a i n s t t h e manufacture, t e s t i n g , and u s e of n u c l e a r weapons.
The p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e s and t h e t w o p r o g r m a t i c documents were intended t o close t h e gap between t h e correct l i n e being followed by Moscow i n government-to-government relations-which accepted d i f f e r e n c e s i n socia1:and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s as secondary t o t h e c o u n t r y ' s s t a n q e vis-.a-vis t h e West--and t h e i d e o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t i e s i n local p a r t y programs. A s u r v e y , D i s i n t e g r a t i o n --e C o l o n i a l System by V. Ya. Avarin, which of t h appeared i n November 19S*/ under-uspices of t h e I n s t i t u t e of World Economy and I n t e r n a t i o n a l E e l a t i o n s , reflected Moscow's w i l l i n g n e s s t o advance a s t e p toward r e c l a i m i n g class s t r u g g l e and a g i t a t i o n as m o t i v a t i n g forces f o r p r o g r e s s i v e world developments, p o i n t s l e f t u n s e t t l e d by t h e concessionary 2 0 t h p a r t y congress formulations. Avarin c i t e d t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e worki n g class as " u s u a l l y t h e basis and p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e of t h e a n t i - imperial ist and ant i f e u d a l movement" and h a i l e d ' t h e role of labor u n r e s t and strife as a n " i n t e g r a l part" of t h e n a t i o n a1 l i b e r a t i o n movement. Subsequent t o t h e November meetings, S o v i e t commentators were more c a u t i o u s i n t h e i r a p p r a i s a l of n a t i o n a l i s t parties and governments t h a n t h e y had been t h e p r e A v i o u s year. The p r i n c i p a l impact of t h e p a r t y get-togethers, hawever, was n o t on S o v i e t p o l i c i e s , nor even on S o v i e t p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s , but on b r i n g i n g t h e t a c t i c s of l o c a l Communist parties i n t o l i n e : t.0 focus t h e resentment and hatred of a l l nat i o n a l elements on t h e c a p i t a l i s t and f o r e i g n enemy, p r i n c i p a l l y t h e United States.

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INTERIM BETWEErJ PARTY CONCLAVES:
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December 1957

{January 1959

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The p a r t y d i s c u s s i o n s had l i t t l e i f any immediate effect onAhe c o u r s e of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . MOSCOW~S p u b l i c att i t u d e continkdd t o be comprised of a p r o f e s s e d w i l l i n g n e s s t o e n t e r i n t o r e a s o n a b l e agreements w i t h t h e West and of a n e x t e n s i v e commitment t o assist those c o u n t r i e s wishing t o break free of dependence on t h e W e s t , p o l i t i c a l l y and economically. On 9 November 1957, after drawn-out n e g q t i a t i o n s , Moscow f i n a l l y s i g n e d a $125,000,000 credit t o a i d I n d i a i n developing a domestic heavy machine-building i n d u s t r y . Later i n t h e month, f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s i n Moscow w i t h Nasir*s t o p aide Marshal A i, t h e S o v i e t Union announced its w i l l i n g n e s s t o e x t e n d mr long-term credits t o Cairo for projects unddr EgyptOs economic development plan., Concurrently, efforts were made t o i n c r e a s e trade n o t o n l y w i t h t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , b u t w i t h t h e Western g r e a t powers a s well--to "promote t r u s t , " as Khrushchev t o l d v i s i t i n g American newspaper magnate Hearst on 22 November. One s i g n t h a t t h e Kremlin had n o t f o r g o t t e n t h e Pnt e r p l a y of Western d e f e n s e moves and Arab developments on Sov i e t s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Middle E a s t w a s Moscow's c o n t i n u a t i o n of its s e r i o u s warnings and g e n e r a l diplomatic p r e s s u r e on Turkey. In December, Moscow i s s u e d a first c a l l i n a new program f o r b r i n g i n g about a summit conference which could lead t o a g e n e r a l s e t t l e m e n t of o u t s t a n d i n g E a s t West i s s u e s and a l e s s e n i n g of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n .

Khrushchev p e r s o n a l l y t o o k t h e lead i n e x t e n d i n g MOSCOW~S economic a s s i s t a n c e and f r i e n d s h i p campaign t o L a t i n Americao s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y u n a f f e c t e d by p o s t - S t a l i n changes i n S o v i e t p o l i c y . I n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h two B r a z i l i a n j o u r n a l i s t s on 21 November 1957, published s u b s e q u e n t l y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs, Khrushchev began a new stage of S o v i e t e f b r t s t o break down t h e r e s i s t a n c e of L a t i n American government and b u s i n e s s circles t o i n c r e a s e d c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e bloc. C a l l i n g h i s v i s i t o r s "the first swallows h e r a l d i n g a new era i n S o v i e t - B r a z i l i a n r e l a t i o n s , I* Khrushchev aitched h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o t h e desira b i l i t y of re-establishing diplomatic r e l a t i o n s - - t h e absence of which a l l e g e d l y w a s d e p r i v i n g B r a z i l and other L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s of t h e advantages of economic and c u l t u r a l coo p e r a t i o n w i t h Moscow--and t o S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s t o expand commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s , extend i n d u s t r i a l a s s i s t a n c e , and i n c r e a s e c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t s . According t o local Communist press a c c o u n b ,

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S o v i e t lgspders had m e t s e p a r a t e l y w i t h L a t i n American delegates af;'the November meetings i n Moscosr,--17 of t h e 2 1 L a t i n Americ.@ Communist p a r t i e s , many i l l e g a l , had r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t t h e Moscow talks---and worked o u t w i t h them r e g i o n a l p o l i cies and tactics.

Two a r t i ' c z e s i n t h e December i s s u e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Aff a i r s a t t e m p t e d t o apply t o L a t i n American c o n d i t i o n s t h e s n s . o f t h e 2 0 t h p a r t y c o n g r e s s and t h e developments up to and i n c l u d i n g t h e November Moscow meetings. It w a s asserted t h a t t h e main purpose of t h e n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement i n L a t i n America w a s t h e a t t a i n m e n t of genuine economic independence and n a t i o n a l ecc5nomic development i n which t h e n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e would be "almost as i n t e r e s t e d i n economic p r o g r e s s and economic independence as t h e working class:' Moscowvs transparent intention i n seeking friendly contacts with Latin American businessmen and government figures was t o l a y t h e groundwork f o r long-term p o l i t i c a l g a i n s similar t o t h o s e scared earlier w i t h similar groups i n Asia and t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s by e x p l o i t i n g t h e i r c u r r e n t economic d i f f i c u l t i e s - - f o r e i g n exchange, e x p o r t market, and investment capital shortages--in . t h e d i r e c t i o n of reduced economic and t h u e p o l i t i c a l dependence on t h e United States and i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a l ' ; economic, and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc.,
Although Moscow o f t e n promoted i n c r e a s e d economic c o n t a c t s between t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and t h e bloc--and even between t h e major c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s ,and t h e bloc--as a means of r e d u c i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n and as an a n t i d o t e f o r war p s y c h o s i s , it p r e s s e d a program of undermining Western economic i n f l u e n c e i n Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America i n unmistakably cold-war terms. A t t h e same time as t h e S o v i e t economic assistance program was s t i l l r e s t r i c t e d p r i m a r i l y t o a half-dozen c o u n t r i e s of c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l and strategic importance in the East-West r i v a l r y , Moscow carried o u t a s y s t e m a t i c and widespread campaign t o c o u n t e r Western and p a r t i c u l a r l y American a i d programs. A s p e c i a l conference on "American gAssistance' t o Asian C o u n t r i e s , " b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r l e a d i n g S o v i e t economists and o r i e n t a l i s t s of t h e I n s t i t u t e s of World Econom i c s and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Chinese S t u d i e s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , and other e s t a b l i s h m e n t s , w a s h e l d i n December. The condensed t e x t s of t h e s t a t e m e n t s p r e s e n t e d , as p u b l i s h e d in t h e January 1958 i s s u e of WEIR, reflected M o s c o w p s evaluawere t3 formidable bart i o n t h a t Western economic ai-ograms rier t o t h e e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e throughout t h e under-

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developed world. A l s o reflected w a s t h e desire t o c e n t e r local a t t e n t i o n on p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y " s t r i n g s " a l l e g e d l y attached t o all2,Western a i d so as $0 undermine t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l and politica3, impact of a i d programs, w i t h t h e f u r t h e r effect of d i v e r t i n g p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n i n t h e underdeveloped areas f r o n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o n c r e t e economic measures t o p o l i t i c a l and propqganda s i d e i s s u e s which could be manipulated by MCDSCQW and local anti-Western elements t o d i s c r e d i t a l l r e l a t i o n s w i t h "imperialists," The core of t h e argument was n o t new: is Western v r a s s i s t a n c e f * i n fact p a r t of a complex scheme t o a s s u r e t h e continued political-economic domination of Western c o u n t r i e s over t h e former c o l o n i e s , The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h e conference w a s t h a t there would be an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of Sov i e t and Communist e f f o r t s n o t o n l y t o harrass Western economic programs i n these areas, b u t to s t e p up e f f o r t s to d i s r u p t a l l forms of i n t e r c o u r s e between t h e developed and underdeveloped p a r t s of t h e c a p i t a l i s t world.

The first impressive p u b l i c exercise of Communist s t r a t e g y toward t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and of tactics t b be used t o i n t e n s i f y area f r i @ t i Q n Sw i t h t h e West was t h e Afro-Asian S o l i d a r i t y Conference h e l d i n Cairo from 26 December 1967 t o 1 January 1958. Although b i l l e d as a s u c c e s s o r to t h e Bandung Conference, only t h e Chinese and S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n s , pPus a f e w Arab p a r t i c i p a n t s , were o f f i c i a l l y s a n c t i o n e d by t h e i r governments, and a number of t h e approximately 500 'rpeopleso re$r e s e n t a t i v e s " from 45 c o u n t r i e s were expatriates or exiles of t h e c o u n t r i e s r e p r e s e n t e d . Bdoscowvs impressive team was headed by Sh, R. Rashidov, "President" of, t h e Uqbek Itbepublice, and A. A. Armmanyan, director of t h e I n s t i t u t e of World Economy and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . A t t h e conference Arzumanyan made a bald a s s a u l t on Western economic p o s i t i o n s i n &he underdeyeloped world--an' a s s a u a t framed i n terms of a direct c h a l l e n g e t o established p o s i t i o n s as w e l l as to s h j l f t i n g economic relat i o n s h i p s . Simply expressed, ArzumanyanOs thesis w a s that in order t o s a f e g u a r d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l independence and to sec~tre economic independence as w e l l underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s must develop t h e i r own heavy as w e l l as l i g h t manufacturing industries. To get t h e c a p i t a l n e c e s s a r y f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n these c o u n t r i e s s b s u l d n a t i o n a l i z e t h e p r o p e r t y of * * f o r e i g n monopolies'' and t h u s g a i n c o n t r o l f o r n a t i o n a l purposes of t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s and of t h e p r o f i t s which Westerners had been s e n d i n g o u t of t h e country. UnderdeveiPoped c o u n t r i e s would t h e n f i n d it possible t o mobilize a l l i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s and p l a n t h e i r u t i l i z a t i o n . I n c r e a s e d commercial trade w i t h t h e

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bloc and bloc t e c h n i c a l and development a s s i s t a n c e extended on f a v o r a b l e terms could supplement domestic r e s o u r c e s w P t h no l i m i t i n g p o l i t i s a l c o n d i t i o n s . Although t h i s was n a t a new concept, t h e fact that;'Moseow chose a h y b r i d conference a t Cair6' t o s p o t l i g h t not '6nfy its w i l l i n g n e s s t o e x t e n d

credits t o f r i e n d l y governments bat a l s o i t a ideological antagonism t o one of t h e p i l l a r s of the areawseconomy, fore i g n investment, p o i n t e d up one of t h e purposes of Soviet p o r i t i c a l and.qconsmic s u p p o r t t o n a t i o n a l i s t governments-t h e encouragement of p o l i t i c a l and economic f o r a y s a g a i n s t Western p o s i t i o n s .
B e s i d e s t h e forum f o r attacks on t h e West, Mosceow valued t h e Cairo eonf e r e n c e and t h e * t s o l i d a r i t y * * movement behind it as a promising mechanism f o r m a i n t a i n i n g . l i a i s s n w i t h and inf l u e n c i n g n e u t r a l i s t and n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment i n monbloo Asia, t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s , and also Black Africa. Having o r i g i n a t e d

p r i n c i p a l l y i n I n d i a n and Egyptian n e u t r a l i s t circPes, the Afro-Asian sdlfdwndity movement, though S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e d , had a r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and home-grown f l a v o r Mossow could n o t eh&llgl i n A s i a and Africa %or its peace movement. Although Moscow v i e s w i t h Cariro--as on o c c a s i o n also w i t h New Delhi and Peiping-for o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e in t h i s movement, t h e r e s o l u t i o n s adopted a t Cairo reflectdd %he bond of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m in demanding immediate independence of c o l o n i a l territories, and g e n e r a l l y passsllPeled l i n e s of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The permanent a r g a n i a a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e which .emerged from t h e conference also provided Moscow wi%h a valuable new channel f o r direct c o n t a c t s w i t h A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t groups of many hues.
I

S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s i n A f r i c a n e v e n t s had n o t i c e a b l y quickened d u r i n g 1957 w i t h S o v i e t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t t h e independence c e l e b r a t i o n s of Ghana and T u n i s i a and a broadening and intensif i c a t i o n of attempts to i n f t Pate d i p l o m a t i c and trade relat i o n s w i t h t h e independent A f r i c a n states. S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s on Africa, still p r i m a r i l y t h e P e s p o n s i b i I P t y of the Inw t i t u t e of Ethnography, were p o i n t e d a t winning t h e confidence of p o l i t i c a l l y conscious A f r i c a n elements by a s s e r t i n g a f r i e n d l y i n t e r e s t in t h e i r coming of p o l i t i c a l age, and by discrediti n g on a l l counts t h e West*s past and p r e s e n t r o l e in Africa. In Moscowgs n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r t h e exchange of d i p l o m a t i c miss i o n s a n d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of remlar economic and eorPtura1 ties, long-time S o v i e t A f r i c a n i s t P ~ o f e s s o rI , I. P o t e k h i n played a p i o n e e r i n g role as scholar, semiofficial spokesman, and proto-diplomat.

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MOSCOW began 1958 still r i d i n g t h e wave of optimism engendered by world-wide r e a c t i o n t o its s p u t n i k launchings, although doubts concerning Moscow's e x t r a v a g a n t claims t o world s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l 1Fadership began t o be more p r e v a l e n t i n non-Communist circles and portended a rapid d e c l i n e i n t h e p o l i t i b l mileage Moscow could expect i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . polbl i c e x p r e s s i o n s of Soviet leaders and Moscow commentary gave t h e appearance t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union w a s c o n f i d e n t t h a t changes t a k f n g p l a c e -in non-Communist Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America, both in t h e f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and i n t h e i r domestic social and economic developments, were f a v o r a b l e t o t h e i n c r e a s e o Communist i n f l u e n c e and moreover were i r r e v e r s i b l e . f Moscow gave every i n d i c a t i o n t h a t it was counting on t h e cuml a t i v e e f f e c t o v e r a period of years of bloc political, economic, and, though more'restricted, m i l i t a r y a i d program-in comb i n a t i o n w i t h people-to-people c o n t a c t s , i n t e n s i v e propaganda, and growing local Communist a g i t a t i o n - - t o make a t least a considerable number of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s materially dependent and p o l i t i c a l l y tractable.

The l i n e s developed p u b l i c l y a t t h e November p a r t y conf e r e n c e s and of t h e Cairo Afro-Asian S o l i d a r i t y Conference were picked up and extended i n S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s over t h e first half of 1958. Pravda on 17 January published an a r t i c l e by Mexican C o m m u n i q t y leader Lombard0 Toledano, who e nj o y s c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s t i g e throughout left-wing circles i n L a t i n America, i n which Toledano i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l s t r a t e g y f o r L a t i n American Communists was t o discredit t h e United States and its lvcoloaialistf* policies. More $ t o l l e d statements of r e v i s e d local s t r a t e g y ,and o f - o r g a n i z t i o n a l and propaganda tactics w e r e carried i n local p a r t y organs f o l l o w i n g t h e r e t u r n of p a r t y leaders from Moscow--some V i s i t e d P e i p i n g as w e l l . The r e p o r t of t h e head of t h e Uruguayan Communist p a r t y , Rodney Arismendi, t o h i s p a r t y congress was r e p r i n t e d in Moscow's a g i t p r o p organ P a r t Affairs In Ilbrry-an i n d i c a t i o n that I t w a s considered bot exemplary and progrannnatic. The k e r n e l of t h e new s t r a t e g y as o u t l i n e d by Arismendi was to i n f i l t r a t e a l l p a r t i e s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s which favored p a r o c h i a l n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and a r e d u c t i o n of t i e s w i t h t h e West, and t o encourage t h e i n i t i a t i o n or i n c r e a s e of diplomatic, economic and cultural r e l a t i o n s w i t h b l o c c o u n t r i e s . I m p l i c i t i n t h e new program, local Communist p a r t i e s were to p l a y down class antagon i s m and a t t a c k s on c a p i t a l i s m p e r se i n f a v o r of propagandizi n g n a t i o n a l programs of **economicp r o g r e s s and economic independ8nC8. *'

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The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between t h e S o v i e t Union and Ghana on 1 4 January 1958 marked an import a n t e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t c o n t a c t s w i t h African n a t i o n a l movem e n t s a& was h a i l e d by Moscow as acceptance by t h e Black Africanfkommunity of S o v i e t s u p p o r t and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . MOSCOW'S .primary concern, however, continued t o be t h a t of d i s r u p t i n g Western t i e s w i t h A f r i c a n t e r r i t o r i e s and f r u s t r a t i n g Western p l a n s to f a s h i o n a new framework of p o l i t i c a l and economic mutual r e l a t i o n s . B e s i d e s s p o t l i g h t i n g and exaggerating racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n Africa and the United States as e v i d e n c e of i n n a t e Western h o s t i l i t y t o Africans, Moscow sought to f a n fears of c o l o n i a l i s t c o o p e r a t i o n under American leaders h i p t o e x t e n d t h e network of Western m i l i t a r y bases througho u t Africa and t o t i e African t e r r i t o r i e s permanently i n a dependent economic a n d , p o l i t i c a l role through a v a r i e t y of schemes and s l o g a n s ; e.g. , lvEurafrica.,r* In a monograph e n t i t l e d A f r i can Peoples, released under the a u s p i c e s of t h e I n s t i t u t e of m n o g r a p h y i n February, A. S Orlova attempted t o a p p l y t h e . , l e s s o n s of t h e Bandung and Cairo conferences t o Africa and claimed p r o g r e s s i v e forces and t h e i r post-Bandung slogan of "Independence i n t h i s generation!" as p a r t of the g l o b a l movement for peace and democracy. Moscowp$ s u p p o r t f o r t h e A f r i can s t r u g g l e f o r independence w a s more theoretical t h a n seal, however. The A p r i l conference of independent A f r i c a n states a t .Accra--attended by t h e UAB, Ethiopia, Liberia, L i b y a , Morocco, t h e Sudan, T u n i s i a , and Ghana p l u s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of s e v e r a l A f r i c a n r e s i s t a n c e groups--was s o l e l y a n A f r i c a n affairs, though Moscow s e n t messages of s u p p o r t and reported f a v o r a b l y on t h e r e s u l t s of t h e conference; conference documents were r e p r i n t e d in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs.

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Although S o v i e t and Egyptian delegates had worked c l o s e l y a t t h e Cairo Conference on a general a n t i L i m p e r i a l i s t l i n e f o r A s i a and Africa, Nasir s p r e c i p i t o u s response' t o S y r i a n overt u r e s for a f e d e r a t i o n of E g y p t and S y r i a posed a s e r i o u s chall e n g e to t h e bases of Moscow's s u p p o r t f o r non-Comimnist nationa l i s t governments. Moscow s u p p o r t e d t h e view-as long as t h e t a l k was still of " f e d e r a t i o n , " b u t when- t h e o u t l i n e s of N a s i r O s planned merger became clearer, ~MoscowOs praise'ceased. Not o n l y had Damascus proved a more p l i a n t a l l y , b u t diplomaUic, economic, and m i l i t a r y a i d which Wd b u i l t up e x c e l l e n t i n t e r governmental r e l a t i o n s had f o s t e r e d t h e rise of l e f t - w i n g Arab e l e m e n t s which t h r e a t e n e d t o be t h e first victims of t h e union. More t h a n p o i n t up t h e deficiencies of Moscowva simple framework of attemptring t o e v a l u a t e p o l i t i c a l , economic, and social

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changes in Arab and other underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s i n terms of pro- or a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m , t h e move toward merger underl i n e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in long-term aims between Cairo and Moscow add between Nasir-l-ed Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s and Middle East Communibh.
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Moscow's pro-forma a c c e p t a n c e of t h e accomplished fact
d i d n o t conceal its lack of enthusiasm, Its first c a u t i o u s apfkaisal of *the new Arab state, p r e s e n t e d by K. Ivanov in I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , r e p r e s e n t e d a grudging adjustment t o t h e new circumstances b u t d i d n o t r e f r a i n from r e s t r a i n e d criticism, c i t i n g problems and d i f f e r e n c e s in S y r i a "which cannot be surmounted a t once by decree o r government order." Subsequently Moscow was more openly c r i t i c a l of t h e a n t i p r o g r e s s i v e p r o s p e c t s 09 t h e e x t e n s i o n t o S y r i a of Nasir's res t r i c t i o n s on labor and p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Althowgh he conceded t h a t t h e merger played a n a n t i c o l o n i a l role i n

w r i t i n g $n domestic

s t r e n g t h e n i n g Nasir*s hand, Soefet commeptator I. Belyayev, E a s t , expressed r e s e r v a t i o n s as t o t h e

Moscow's 'dilemma in f a c i n g up to , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of Nasir's move without s u r r e n d e r i n g completely its Communist assets i n S y r i a t o t h e demands of continued good s t a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Nasir was p o i n t e d up by t h e f a t e of t h e S y r i a n Communist p a s t y . Khalid Bakdash, t o p S y r i a n Communist leader, r e f u s e d to d i s s o l v e t h e Syrian p a r t y , p u b l i c l y denounced Nasir's merger p o l i cies, and on 5 February f l e d w i t h h i s f a m i l y and other S y r i a n Communist leaders t o t h e bloc. F r o m a v a r i e t y of bloc forums, Bakdash kept a l i v e t h e t h r e a d of a n uncompromising Comnreanislt program for t h e e v e n t u a l communfzation'of t h e Middle E a s t , in markdd c o n t r a s t t o MOSCOW~S o f f i c i a l p o l i c y of good r e l a t i o n s w i t h anti-Western Arab governments.* Both lldoscow and Cairo s k i r t e d a showdown on ideological i s s u e s , b u t t h e undertones of t h e S o v i e t r e a c t i o n w a s t h a t of a retreat rather t h a n a surrender.

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Kaznacheyev, t h e SovAet diplomat in Rangoon whose d e f e c t i o n has thrown added l i g h t on Moscow's e f f o r t s simultaneously to promote good r e l a t i o n s with e x i s t i n g governments and t o undermine t h e i r p o p u l a r s u p p o r t , reported t h a t in Janua r y 1958 t h e head of t h e I n s t i t u t e of O r i e n t a l Studies, B @. . Gafurov, w h i l e on a v i s i t t o Barma as a member of t h e S o v i e t p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l e g a t i o n , m e t secretly w i t h t h e leader of the Communist underground, U Ba Nyein, and promised S o v i e t s u p p o r t , a d v i s i n g him n o t t o pay much a t t e n t i o n to MoscowQs''official p o li c y, *'
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Nasir's acceptance of a renewed i n v i t a t i o n t o v i s i t t h e Soviet Union-originally scheduled for August 1956 b u t postponed because of t h e crisis o v e r Suez--capped an unprecedented numbe? of highLlevel SqYiet-UAR exchanges, f e a t u r i n g t h e parade . t o Cairo of Soviet m i n i s t e r s t o n e g o t i a t e or implement econoniic, a g r i c u l t u r a l , and c u l t u r a l agreements. For reasons of t h e i r own, both Moscow and Cairo sought t o l i m i t t h e areas of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l disagreement so as not t o d i s t m b tactical cobperation, which had brought major g a i n s t o both parties a t t h e expense of t h e West, NasirOs a r r i v a l in MQscow on 29 A p r i l 1958 touched off a major Soviet propaganda effort t o p o r t r a y USSR-UAR p o l it i c a l views as i d e n t i c a l Nas ir 's speeches and h i s conduct d u r i n g an e x t e n s i v e t o u r of t h e USSR i n d i c a t e d t h a t d e s p i t e continued Soviet economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , he intended t o proceed w i t h h i s r e c e n t l y announced p o l i c y of seeki n g improved r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West. H e avoided seconding b¶oscowosanti-Western attacks a t t h e same t i m e as he accepted closer Soviet-UAR econ6m'ic t i e s --

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Moscow attempted t o i d e n t i f y itself i n t h e minds of t h e Arab peoples w i t h p u r e l y Arab goals, b u C , i t ' w o u l d n o t formally endorse Nasir as spokesman for a l l Arabs, nor was Nas'ir able t o g e t a s t r o n g e r Soviet s t a n d on t h e Arab's war of l i b e r a t i o n in Algeria. For t h e i r p m t , S o v i e t leaders seemed i n t e n t on heading off any rapprochement of N a s i r w i t h t h e West by inc r e a s i n g t h e i r economic and m i l i t a r y backing of Cakko and cont i n u i n g t o fan anti-Western s e n t i m e n t among t h e Arab people.
A t t h e same time, t h e Soviet economic a s s i s t a n c e p~ogram, a s an i n t e g r a l part of Moscow~ss e l a t i y n s w i t h a l l t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , w a s undergo'ing continued r e - e x d i n a t ion and in t u r n was being d i f f u s e d i n t o Soviet a n a l y s e s of t h e dynamics of social growth in t h e s e areas. A s p e c i a l confsrence on 24 February sponsored by t h e dournal I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affaiks, b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r p r o p a g a n d i s t s s u c h ' a s I l y i c h e v , t h e i t a r y s t r a t e g i s t - t h e o r e t i c i a n Talensky, and a handful of academicians, d i s c u s s e d t h e l a t e s t achievements of S o v i e t science and technology and t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r and i n f l n ence on i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations, The a b b r e v i a t e d v e r s i o n of t h e proceedings, as publAshed in t h e j o u r n a l , reflected Moscow's determination t o push forward an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n emphac sizing enhanced Soviet prestige, t o . ' w new v i g o r behind its p e r e n n i a l "wave of t h e f u t u r e " propaganda l i n e , b u t also t o claim g r e a t e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y as a r e s u l t of "import a n t changes In t h e balance of forces between socialism and
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capitalism," Propaganda t o the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , i n order t o keep a l i v e i n t e r e s t i n S o v i e t developments and t o . pave t h e way f o r c l o s e r government-to-government relations, f eaturedhk'he s p u t n i k s and other '*peaceful**embodiments of So>-, v i e t s c.- e n t i f i c advances i
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lldoscowos g e n e r a l economic aid o f f e n s i v e w a s p o i n t e d up e a r l y An March by Soviet Deputy Forefgn M i n i s t e r F i r g u b i n a t the'ECAFE conference in Kuala Lumpur. A t t h e same time, G. Ye. Skorov, one of t h e editors of WEIR, attempted a point-byp o i n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n of S o v i e t e c o n o m a s s i s t a n c e t o non-Communist governments w i t h i n t h e g e n e r a l framework o f , a n t i - i m p e r i alism. H e claimed f o r bloc trade a " s t a b i l i z i n g " and r*favorable i n f l u e n c e on t h e economy**of t h e u n d e r d q e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , w i t h t h e implication t h a t t h e y stood w i t h MOSCOWon important i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s and so should be strengthened. He a l s o reiterated c u r r e n t Soviet s u p p o r t for development of t h e "state - s e c t o r " but i n s t r o n g e r terms, asserting t h a t
under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , t h e s t a t e sector of t h e economy may become t h e m a t e r i a l - t e c h n i c a l basis of a p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t ion t o socialism. Skorov's most important c o n t r i b u t i o n , however, w a s an attempt t o shore up t h e ideological basis f o r MOSCOW~S economic offens i v e w i t h t h e admission t h a t although t h e m e d i a t e effect of S o v i e t aid o f t e n w a s t o a i d c a p i t a l i s t development, t h e s t a t e independence of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s lfinvolved them i n t h e world s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e West and on t h e l o n g t e r m opened t h e p r o s p e c t of social change. Then, i n more t r a d i t i o n a l terms, he asserted,
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Despite t h e fact t h a t t h e majority of the n a t i o n a l l y independent states remain a p a r t of t h e c a p i t a l i s t system, t h e dialectics of world social growth are such t h a t t h e i r movement forward a l o n g t h e path of independent p o l i t i c a l and economic development does' n o t s t r e n g t h e n , b u t , on t h e other hand, weakens world

c a p i t a l i s m , d e p r i v i n g it of its m s important r e s e r v e . ot

MXkogan's 1 March Yerevan "election" speech, which con1 tained a brief attack on "economist comrades* f o r t a k i n g an i n c o r r e c t p o s i t i o n on c e r t a i n f o r e i g n economic matters, l e f t vague the f o c u s of t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n . It cts n o t clear whether t h e e r r i n g "economist comradesrcwere opposed on i d e o l o g i c a l

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o r p o l i t , + c a l grounds, or whether t h e y differed on' economic i n t e r e s g and p r i o r i t y - - t h K p r o g r a m appeared v u l n e r a b l e on a number;of accounts. Whatever t h e case, Yikoyan's defense was d o n g p o l i t i c a l rather t h a n economic l i n e s :
2

:In t h i s connection, w e must n o t overlook such an importante factor i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e as t h e role of c o u n t r i e s t h a t are liberated from c o l o n i & l dependence and have earned p o l i t i c a l independence
and which are proceeding on t h e p a t h of establishi n g economic independence.

On t h e occasion' of his v i s i t t o Hungary i n Appil 1958, Khrushchev gave c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r s o n a l . a t t e n t - i o n t o j u s t i f y i n g t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t economic program, w i t h emphasis on longrange o b j e c t i v e s . A t Tatabanya on 8 A p r i l he emphasized t h e role of t h e working class in each country, t h e " i n s p i r a t i o n a l example" of economic developments w i t h i n t h e bloc, and asserted--without l i m i t i n g it t o t h e bloc--that t h e "only c o r r e c t r o u t e t o v i c t o r y is t h e growth of p r o d u c t i v e forces i n a l l p o s s i b l e ways." A t t h e Hungarian Academy of Sciences t h e foalowing day, Khrushchev reiterated t h e t h e s i s central t o t h e program, r e l y i n g on t h e example of S o v i e t economic advances: "We attack c a p i t a l i s m on its f l a n k s from economic p o s i t i o n s , f r o m p o s i t i o n s of t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of our systemen Expressing S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s s h o r t l y to o v e r t a k e and s u r p a s s t h e West, and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e United States, i n per c a p i t a production of s o c i a l l y necessary goods, Khpshche.v boasted:

Then the ideas of Communism w i l l be understood by many people, n o t o n l y by means of t h 6 s t u d y of'B5arxism-Leninism, b u t also by t h e force -of example.. People who today cannot u t t e r t h e word 'comunism' without i r o n y w i l l t h e n also be w i t h us. They w i l l take o u r road without t h e i r being aware of it.

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The f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e S o v i e t approach and Moscow's u i l l ingnsss t o adapt and modify its tactics t o appeal not o n l y t o p o l i t i c a l e x t r e m i s t s but also t o moderates ' i n - t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s w a s exemplified by a l i n e i n t r o a u c e d i n March which implied t h a t Moscow might be i n d u c e d - t o - compete alongs i d e t h e West for i n f l u e n c e in t h e economic development of t h e former c o l o n i e s rather t h a n t o kieep up a s t r u g g l e t o eaclude Western i n t e r e s t s , In an i n t e r v i e w w i t h a correspondent of L e Flgaro on 19 March, Wlrorshchev picked up a , - p r o p o s a l advanced
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by t h e m e n c h a t t h e Gemeva Summit Conference i n 1955--that a real a a s i n g of i n t e r n a t b n a l t e n s i o n gnd disarmament "would make a$' p o s s i b l e t o deduct s u f f i c i e p t sums t o ' r e n d e r real and t a n g i b l e a i d n t o *he hnderdeveloped couptries,. Tpen a 24 March i n t e r v i e w w i t h an I t a l i a n newsman,' Khrushchev agreed twrd w a s mrit 3n I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r P e l l a v e s u g g e s t i o n of a j o i n t Western Europe -,USSR fund to aid'Middle E a s t development, provided such a fund should be s e t up n o t by a %arrow grouping** of c o u n t r i e s , bgt by a l l European c o u n t r i e s , inq l u d i n g the s,Q9ll ites.

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Moscow's "six p r i n c i p l e s v e f o r Middle E a s t peace, set f o r t h in its February and 'April 1957 notes t o - t h e Western powers, had t i e d vague **promotionx'of area economic development t o an arms embargo but had n o t been followed up. Soviet w i l l i n g n e s s
t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n r e g i o n a l a i d now reappearisd i n t h e 5 May m 6 b randum setting f o r t h agenda items f o r t h e expected s m i conu mt

f erence,

a s s i s t a n c e i n c r e a t i n g t h e i r own n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s . , . without l a y i n g down any p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , or other c o n d i t i o n s incompat f b l e with t h e principles of t h e i r independence and sovereignty. Without committing itself in any way, sot-even t o c a l l i n g o f f or t o n i n g down its propaganda harassment of'Western exxw!lhic p o s i t i o n s i n t h e area, Moscow a p p a r e n t l y wanted t o p u t i t s e l f on t h e r i g h t side of a n i s s u e of much i n t e r e s t t o the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . +

The n e c e s s i t y arises of also c o n s i d e r i n g t h e quest i o n of economic dooperation w i t h t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e Near and Middle E a s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e s p e c t t o

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*Subsequently, in h i s t r a v e l s t o t h e United States in t h e summer of 1959 and t o France in lldarch 1960, Khrushchev t b d p r o s p e c t s of a mJor i n c r e a s e in economic assi-ce t o progresq ,on disarmament, implying, though c a r e f u l l y not s t a t i n g , that programs t o be paid for by funds iweleased by a reduction of military expenditures could be used for programs carried on j o i n t l y w i t h t h e West.
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Soy$et emphasis d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d , however, w a s overwhelmi n g l y o~ t h e side of undes-cutting Western economic a c t i v i t y G. Mgrtysheva, w r i t i n g i n t h e i n th9;imderdeveloped areas semipopular monthly Contemporar E a s t , echoed Arzumanyan's Cairo t h r u s t f o r t h e d t K o f Western-owned e n t e r p r j s e ' s i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s :

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The task of l i q u i d a t i n g ages-old backwardness cann o t be decided without s e i z i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s held by f o r e i g n c a p i t a l in t h e economy;...natioaalizat i o n is a n i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e ; its r e a l i z a t i o n w i l l s h r i n k t h e sphere of i m p e r i a l i s t e x p l o i t a t i o n in t h e underdeveloped cotmt r i e s and w i l l allow t h e governments of these count r i e s t o t u r n t h e p r o f i t s from n a t i o n a l i z e d enterp r i s e s t o t h e needs of economic c o n s t r u c t i o n , and above a l l t o i n d u s t r i a l k a t i o n

I

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N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , however, w a s o n l y t h e l o g i c a l conclusion of a simple a s s e r t i o n t h a t p r i v a t e c a p i t a l investment was exploit a t i o n rather t h a n a s s i s t a n c e t-rd economic development, and t h a t i n e f f e c t it is n o t t h e c o u n t r i e s e x p o r t i n g capital which f i n a n c e economic development, but underdeveloped countries which provide e x c e s s i v e p r o f i t s for Western concerns, a f r a c t i o n of which r e t u r n s t o the same or a n o t h e r underdeveloped country, where t h e same c h a i n of investment-exploitation ;takes place. T h e w t h o r also used an a r t i f i c e of a nbalance sheet" p u r p o r t i n g t o demonstrate t h a t p r d f i t s American concerns have r e c e i v e d from t h e i r postwar o p e r a t i o n s exceed by s e v e r a l t i m e s a l l American capital investments in t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s ; t h i s strategem w a s repeated w i t h ingenious v a r l a t i o n s by S o v i e t economists.

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The f a i l u r e of ghrushchev*s ideological concessions and continued p o l i t i c a l and economic o v e r t u r e s t o h a l t YugoslaviaOs Qlr#J$ away f r o m t h e bloc, l e a d i n g t o t h e second Soviet-YugoS l a v crisis, provoked a reassessment of S o v i e t views on development p r o c e s s e s and t h e r e l a t i o n s of bloc c o u n t r i e s t o nonCommunist c o u n t r i e s as w e l l as t o Comnunistlia r e v i s i o n i s t Yugos l a v i a . I n t h e lead a r t i c l e of Problems of Philosophy, G M. . Gak, l e a d i n g up t o a r e f u t f t i o n of Tito<s-national communism, ',' sought t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between Communist programs of r e v o l u t i o n a r y reform and t h e v a r i o u s stages of the bourgeois-democratic r e v o l u t i o n which Moscow f o r governmental reasons supported i n non-Communist Asia. He made it clear t h a t

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s u p p o r t ,$or t h e n a t i o n a l b p u r g e o i s i e i n its s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t imperiaA'ism should n o t l&d t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h e n a t i o n alists,:are capable or i n t d r e s t e d i n c a r r y i n g t h e s t r u g g l e forward t o Communism. C i t i n g t h e i n c r e a s i n g numbers and i n f l u ence of Communist parties i n I n d i a and Indonesia, t h e author revemphasized t h e importance of independent Communist organiz a t i o n and struggle:
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In these c o u n t r i e s t h e Communist p a r t i e s , support-i n g g e n e r a l democratic a c t i v i t y f o r which the nationa l b o u r g e o i s i e is capable, a t t h e same t i m e is carryi n g out a s t r u g g l e for t h e e x t e n s i o n of its i n f l u e n c e f o r t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e role of t h e working class and t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of its ties w i t h a l l popular masses i n o r d e r t o c a r r y t h e country along t h e path of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of s o c i a l i s m . , . .

A two-volume roundup of bloc and nonbloc Communist p a r t y leaders e n t i t l e d The Great October Revolution and t h e World Liberat ion M o v e m e n t z t a d r e v i s i o n i s t v e r s i o F o m - w m s a n d underlined t h e importance of t h e p a r t y t s role a t the p r e s e n t s t a g e . T h i s work, s i g n e d t o t h e p r e s s on 1 9 l a y for wide p u b l i c d i s t r i b u t i o n - a press run of 75,000-lipas attuned t o t h e 40th Anniversary c e l e b r a t i o n s . . -

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In t h e vehemence of t h e i r attacks on T i t o and i n t h e just i f icat i o n s given for c a n c e l l i n g Soviet-Yugoslav aid agreements, S o v i e t leaders revealed more t h a n w a s .politic about t h e i r exp e c t a t i o n s t h a t p o l i t i c a l gains should f o l l o w economic aid. ghrushchev's a s s e r t i o n on 3 June t o t h e Bulgarian p a r t y congress --"everyone knows t h a t t h e imperialists never g i v e money t o anyone f o r no purpose, j u s t for having b e a u t i f y 1 eyesn-7was directed a t both t h e Yugoslavs and t h e Asian-African n a t i o n s who showed an i n t e r e s t in a c c p p t i n g American aid. In t h e h a s t i l y improvised j u s t i f icat i o n s f o r u n i l a t e r a l l y c a n c e l l ing--"ipostponing*'--Soviet credits to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev r e v e a l e d a number.of p o i n t s about t h e Soviet a i d program which h i t h e r t o had been hidden o r denied but which probably had been t h e subject of d i s c u s s i o n and disagreement among t o p Communist leaders. On 12 J u l y , in 8 speech a t a Soviet-Czech f r i e n d s h i p meeting in Moscowo Khrushchev admitted t h a t
speaking i n g e n e r a l , f r o m t h e commercial viewpoint o u r economic and technical a i d t o t h e underdeveloped

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c o u n t r i e s is u n p r o f i t a b l e f o r u s ,

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that a i d t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s is a necessaTy matter from t h e ,$iewpoint of humanity and geneqal human s o l i d a r i t y e e e

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This b e l i e d past p r o t e s t a t i o n s by t h e S o v i e t s t h a t their econ o 9 i c : a i d program was based on mutual economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Khrushchev's fxbllow-up d e f i n i t i o n of t h e s p e c i a l "profitn t o Moscow waB straightforward:

by r e n d e r i n g economic, t e c h n i c a l , and other a i d , w e by these means create in these c o u n t r i e s c o n d i t i o n s so t h a t they, having been freed f r o m c o l o n i a l s l a v e r y , do n o t e n t e r i n t o any one-sided deal w i t h dolonizers, do n o t go begging t o t h e m , do n o t s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r economy t o them, and i n t h i s way we make it possible f o r them t o oppose a t t e m p t s t o b'in@,thela i n old colon i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , however changed in forb.

Moscow's vigorous r e a c t i o n t o t h e 1 4 J u l y r e v o l t in Iraq and t h e subsequent American and B r i t W h randings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern t h a t t h e s e moves were a p r e l u d e t o a g e n e r a l Western c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Soviet and UAR interests in t h e Middle E a s t . N a s i r ' s h u r r i e d f l i g h t t o Moscow suggested that t h e UAR leader shared these views and sought r e a s s u r a n c e s as t o t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t of Soviet s u p p o r t . S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n was confined p r i n c i p a l l y t o a v i r u l e n t propaganda campaign directed p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t t h e United States and s e c o n d a r i l y a g a i n s t B r i t a i n and gro-Western states of t h e e a s t e r n Mediterranean and t o immediate d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda s u p p o r t for t h e new I r a q i regime. Contending t h a t t h e United States and B r i t a i n had committed aggression, and t h a t a m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t w a s in p r o g r e s s which t h e West planned t o extend t o I r a q and possilily t h e UAR as w e l l , Moscow attempted t o a p p l y many of t h e same pspchological p r e s s u r e s which it had brought t o bear d u r i n g t h e crisis o v e r Syria t h e preceding summer and f a l l , i n c l u d i n g t h e announcement of m i l i t a r y m n e u v e r s i n areas a d j a c e n t t o t h e l i d d l e East. Soviet e f f o r t s t o u s e t h e crisis t o force an immediate conference of t h e major powers, p l u s I n d i a and the UN Secretary General, showed a c o n s i d e r a b l e p u b l i c concern f o r Arab s e n s i t i v i t i e s o v e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of East-West agreement on t h e Middle E a s t t o t h e detriment of Arab p r e s t i g e and i n t e r e s t s , but subsequent exchanges, i n which Khrushchev accepted a summit meeting under UN a u s p i c e s and then.backed away i n t h e face of p r e s s u r e s from Peiping, i n d i c a t e d t h e S o v i e t Union's ppprehensions had q u i c k l y

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faded. As in t h e earlier Suez and Syrian crises, a f t e r t h e peak of ,,*ension hdd passedj Moscow continued its concerted propagah'da and diplomatic e f f o r t t o claim that o n l y Soviet p r o t e c t i o n had prevented a damaging blow t o Arab i n t e r e s t s .

p e Soviet Union's r a p i d s t r i d e s in developing f r i e n d l y reI'at ions w i t h ,Qasim, t h e f loweking of pro-Communist forces
in I r a q f o l l o w i n g t h e coup, and Q a s h t s s t r e n u o u s and successf u l e f f o r t s t o k.belp from being drawn under Nasir's c o n t r o l g r e a t l y complicated t h e l i n e s of S o v i e t Xiddle E a s t p o l i c y . H i t h e r t o Moscow had relied on its economic and arms aid t o N l i s i r t o r e i n f o r c e t h e anti-Western, a n t i - Z i o n i s t emotional core of t h e pan-Arab,movement and speed t h e e r o s i o n of Weste r n i n f l u e n c e . A t an e a r l y date Moscow a p p a r e n t l y realized t h e advantages of a second, more radical, anti-Western Arab c e n t e r as a check on N a s i r and as a more e f f e c t i v e instrument f o r t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of its long-range goals of ensuring t h e anti-Western o r i e n t a t i o n of Arab governments and of transformi n g *he p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e area.

Corntemporary E a s t i n e a r l y J a y had p u b l i s h e d a lengkhy a r t i c l e - b y Ali l a K h e a d of t h e Communist p a r t y of Morocco-? which was one of t h e s t r o n g e s t e f f o r t s t o j u s t i f y , in terms of an ascending scale of u n i t i e s of i n t e r e s t s between Cornnun i s t and n a t i o n a l i s t forces, Communist support for strengghened bloc government-to-government r e l a t i o n s w i t h Cairo and Communist acquiscence in Nask.'s e f f o r t s t o be t h e sole leader of t h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t Arabs. In sharp c o n t r a s t , t h e first .issue of t h e new bloc yourhal.Pr6blems of Peace and the Socialism ( t h e E n g l i s h e d i t i o n of which a p p e a e !orL Marxist Review), released i n l a t e August, containLd ed a r e a s s e r t i o n by --Communist e x i l e ghalid Bakdash of the need for an independent role for t h e Cormfiunist p a r t y in the Arab s t r u g g l e f o r independence and u n i t y . .Bakdash's a r t i c l e was a summary of views he had expressed a t s e v e r a l b l o c meetings since his February f l i g h t from Damascus: c r i t i cism of Arab governments-willing t o carry on f r i e n d l y day-today r e l a t i o n s w i q p t h e West; s c o r n for t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o r a b i l i t y of t h e Arab n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e t o carry o u t prog r e s s i v e domestic rerorms; and f l a t r e j e c t i o n of IUasir's demand f o r t h e l i q u i d a t i o n of Arab Communist p a r t i e s .

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The v i s i t t o C b i n September of N Mukhitdinov, Soviet X i . p a r t y presidium and secretariat m e m b e r charged w i t h Middle East and Asian affairs, w a s a p p a r e n t l y intended by Moscow t o smooth

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o u t t h e whole range of p o l i t i c a l dif,arences which had become more acjte in t h e ' t w o mon,hs s i n c e t h e Khrushchev-Nasir discussions 6h Lebanon. Mukhit inov, whose government p o s t is c h a i r man o f ' t h e Foreign qffairs ConuniLtee of t h e USSR Soviet of

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N a t i o n a l i t i e s , a p a l e shadow of h i s p a r t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , repoEtedly made a s p i r i t e d defense of Moscow's support for Qasim an8 a g a i n s t S s p q i amalgamation w i t h t h e UAR, and in support of Middle E a s t Communists as t h e m s reliable anti-imperiot a l i s t force. A further p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n was t h e e x t e n t of Soviet s u p p o r t f o r t h e Algerian w a r . WUh Nasir's encouragement, an *Algerian Republic" was proclaimed i n Cairo on 1 9 September. Although Mukhitdinov's meeting w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e government-in-exile w a s p u b l i c i z e d i n t h e Moscow p r e s s and New Times h a i l e d t h e s t e p as Fa logical and n a t u r a l s e q u e l t o tKA-ans' l o n g years of l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e , " t h e Sov i e t Union avohded a s t r o n g e r l i n e .

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For tactical' reasons, Mbscow a p p a r e n t l y f e l t impelled t o attempt t o buy off Nasir's d i s p l e a s u r e over Soviet policy and o v e r Arab Communist o p p o s i t i o n t o h i s p r e t e n s i o n s t o all-Arab leadership. Having k e p t Nasir dangling for more t h a n three y e a r s after t h e withdrawal of Western pJedges of economic ass i s t a n c e f o r his pet project, t h e Aswan High D a q : Khrushchev on 23 October, a t a Kremlin banquet for Marshal A i, Xasir's mr top aide, pledged Soviet support and offered a Soviet credit of $100,000,000 toward t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n costs of t h e dam's first stage. Moscow p r e v i o u s l y had been r e l u c t a n t t o becone so deeply involved an R a s i r ' i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program w h i l e s keeping a l i v e Egyptian hopes fo+ more Soviet credits. A rundom of t h e USSR's economic a s s i s t a n c e t o Arab c o u n t r i e s in t h e J u l y rLssue of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs had concluded on a def ensdve note,
t h e p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s of Soviet-Arab r e l a t i o n s i n r e c s n t y e a r s and i n c r e a s i n g economic and techn i c a l cooperat ion, as w e l l as t h e e x i s t i n g c u l t u r a l exchanges between the USSR and t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s , . cannot a s y e t f i l l a l l t h e needs of s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e economic Independence of t h e Arab states.... (emphasis added).
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A r e p o r t e d disagree&& among Soviet leaders as t o i n t r a b l c and nonbloc economic programs and p r i o r i t i e s l e d t o t h e o u s t e r in August of M i n i s t e r of Foreign Trade Kabanov and h i s replacement by a .deputy f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , No Sa Patolichev. ApparentZy . .. .. ,
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a d e c i s i 9 n was made f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e increase i n Moscowvs econom4c investment i n support of long-term foreign .policy object,ives. Within a matter of,.days a f t e r Khrushchev's Aswan Dam commitment,,Moscow agreed t o extend a $100,000,000 credit t o Argentina f o r t h e development of its petroleum i n d u s t r y and cogc3;uded its first major economic agreement w i t h Iraq.
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Moscow's efforts t o g i v e a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r its policies and t o f i n d p a t e e r n s i n - t h e growing- complexity of its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , as w e l l as t o supp o r t c u r r e n t moves, w e r e reflected i n t h e growing volume of S o v i e t commentary on developments i n Asia, Africa, and LBtin America directed a t 'all l e v e l s of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and f o r dom e s t i c as w e l l as f o r e i g n audiences. A t mid-year a symposium, Africa South of t h e SaharaZ,prepared by t h e new g e n e r a t i o n of m t e d to update Soviet documentation on t h e d e c l i n e of Western i n f l u e n c e i n B r i t i s h , French, and Belgian Africa. Their mentor, I. I. Potekhin, admitted i n an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e work t h a t Soviet A f r i c a n i s t s were still i l l - e q u i p p e d t o e x p l a i n specific p e c u l i a r i t i e s of Western col o n i a l policies i n Africa o r t o i n t e r p r e t many of t h e phenomena of contemporary African l i f e . In a broad stfidy e n t i t l e d The Colonial S s t e m of I m p e r i a l i s m and Its Decay, S. T y u l p a n o v *ice r e c t k z i n g r a d U n i v e r a y 3 r m e d those who attempted t o e x p l a i n t h e rise of n a t i o n a l i s m and t h e s u c c e s s e s df t h e independence movements i n Asia and Africa i n terms of a worsening of economic c o n d i t i o n s there in t h e postwar p e r i o d ; he asserted i n s t e a d t h e importance of a "wide circle" of p o l i t ical q u e s t i o n s i n determining t h e speed and d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r development.

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In August a monograph Q p t b e H i s t a r i c a z - E x p e r i e n c e of Buildi n g Socialism i n Formerly B a w S d Countries, by M S &hnusov, . . head of t h e phmosophy department of t he Klrgiz State University, attempted on t h e basis of t h e experience of t h e Soudet C e n t r a l Asian Republics, China and Mongolia t o e x p h i n how f a r s o c i a l l a w s are u n i v e r s a l and t o what e x t e n t special h i s t o r i c a l , economic, and socio-pol it i c a l circumstances determined s t e p s i n t h e i r development-all t h i s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of o f f e r i n g guidance t o non-Communist former c o l o n i e s . Dzhunusov emphasized p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s which go on w i t h i n n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movements dver t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r course of f u t u r e development, and i n a d m i t t i n g t h a t s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n may take many forms, he also cited t h e basic L e n i n i s t formulation Zhat:V,here are n o t and there cannot be " p u r e l y v peaceful and p u r e l y v f o r c e f u l v
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I forms of ,social:'revolut ion"--a p o i n t considerably soft-pedaled by Biosco*'following t h e ZQgh p a r t y congress. 4)
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Th'e major task of i n t e r p r e t i n g developments i n t h e underdeveloped areas i n t h e face of changing diEcum8tances--'?Fenewed imperialist assaults'? and t h e i n s i d i o h s influence of V e v i sioW.sm"--was. e n t r u s t e d . t o Boris Ponomarev, a leading ideologist who.was head of t h e p a r t y cen$ral c'mmnittee s e c t i o n deali n g with nonbloc p a r t i e s . Ponomarev's long review of "The Int e r n a t i o n a l Movement a t a New Stage'. i n Kommunist, reheased on-the eve 0-f' axst' Ann-iversary,-.admiTted recent losses i n the Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand as a r e s u l t of "imperialist-backed plots." -omarev attempted to overbalance these r e v e r s e s w i t h general c l a h s of successes, hich h e s a i d included t h e Iraqi coup, t h e independence of Gha a and Guinea, and t h e general development of t h e progressive s t r u g g l e i n Africa and L a t i n America. POnomarevOs s t a t u s report a t least i m p l i c i t l y charted a more unyielding l i n e f o r local Communist parties. It alleged there w a s a changing ideological content of t h e national 1 iberat ion movement , a growing recognit ion by n a t i o n a l i s t leaders t h a t "it is impossible to stop hal% way...or.to ret r a v e l t h e t o r t u o u s path which capitalist c o u n t r i e s follow." Further, it contained an obvious s l a p a t Nehru, defending t h e Communist government of Kerala a g a i n s t the "desperate attempts of r e a c t i o n a r y forces**to d i s c r e d i t t h e "Communist experiment ," A follownap survey of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l movement by o l d Bolshevik Xuusinen i n Pravda for 22 Novebber, on t h e occasion of t h e first anniversw-the Moscow %.arter of Unity", was, like t h e Bonomsrev a r t i c l e directed a g a i n s t r e v i s i o n i s t inf luences, a g a i n s t going too f a r i n c o n c i l i a t i n g non-Communist elements i n t h e colpmoII s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e West. In t h e face of a growing estrangement between key Asfan-African leaders and Moscow, Kuusinen, as had @nomarev, recited a long list of Communist p a r t i e s which he-claimed had increased i n p o w e r and influence, and he Parged ?*ideological-polit ical unanimity" among Communists.
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page r e j o i n d e r t o a Hehru a r t i c l e c r i t i c i z i n g C o m n i s t encouragement of class c o n f l i c t and t h e use of violence a g a i n s t opposition elements. The critical?. t o n e of Yudin's a r t i c l e
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ganda backing for t h e Kerala m i n i s t r y s i n c e it took office i n April 1957--was followed up i n t h e December i s s u e of t h e new bloc j o u r n a l by Pave1 Yudin, a leading Soviet ildeolcbgist who a t t h a t time was ambassador t o China. Yudin presented a 13-

Ponomarev's attack on Nehru--Bbscowvs first s e r i o u s propa-

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was tempeyed o n l y by a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a l f l a t t e r y

Moscow 1,qng had l a v i s h e d oq' Nehru. S o v i e t leaders p r e v i o u s l y had made' no move t o take is-sue w i t h Nehru, d e s p i t e t h e I n d i a n : . leader's f r e q u e n t p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s a t v a r i a n c e w i t h Moscowps
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' P u b l i c and p r i v a t e r e b u f f s a t t h e hands of its p r i n c i p a l t h e Afro- Asian Economic Asian-African " n e u t r a l i s t " f riends-at Conference h e l d in Cairo i n December t h e head of t h e Indonesian d e l e g a t i o n challenged MoscowSs r i g h t t o be p r e s e n t o and Arab and Asian d e l e g a t i o n s combined t o l i m i t Moscow's a t t e m p t t o t u r n t h e conference i n t o a n anti-Western c i r c u s and kept t h e USSR off t h e o r g a n i z f n g committee-led S o v i e t spokesmen t o dev o t e greater a t t e n t i o n t o A f r i c a n and L a t i n American developments i n an e f f o r t t o m a i n t a i n a n a u r a . o f optimism around t h e n a t i o n a l i F i b e r a t i o n movement. I t both Africa and L a t i n America, however, S o v i e t investment i n terms of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l o v e r t u r e s had so far been i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n comp a r i s o n w i t h its s u p p o r t f o r such Asian n a t i o n a l i s t s as Nehru and Sukarno, or of Arab leaders N a s i r and Qasim,
Moscow's prompt p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l overt u r e s t o t h e new state of Guinea, f o l l o w i n g t h e r u p t u r e of t h a t state's p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h France, were an open encouragement t o o t h e r members of t h e French African community t o p r e s s f o r more r a p i d economic a n d . p o l i t i c a 1 development. The USSR also was q u i c k to r e c o g n i z e t h a t much of Africa was l o o k i n g $o-Accra rather t h a n t o Cairo for l e a d e r s h i p , and it a c c o r d i n g l y l a v i s h e d g r e a t a t t e n t i o n on t h e Nhrumah-sponsored All-African People*s Conference, h e l d i n Accra c o n c u r r e n t w i t h t h e Cairo Economic Conference. Moscow's a d v i c e t o t h e conaeaees a t Accra-where t h e S o v i e t had heavy "observer" and press r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t a n African conference for t h e first time-was repeated i n a New Times editorial which was s i m p l i c i t y i t s e l f , "Unity-unity w i m n x c o u n t r y f i g h t i n g t h e colo- . n i a l i s t s , and u n i t y of-n of a l l African Sov i e t propaganda sought t o depict t h i s conference as t h e - d i r e c t outcome of Bandung, Cairo, and t h e Accra Conference of Independent African States, i n t e n t i o n a l l y b l u r r i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s between governmental and nongovernmental conchives i n l i n e w i t h t h e USSR's e f f o r t s X o upgrade t h e f o r c e and v a l i d i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t and similar Communist-influenced or -sponsored p o p u l a r meetings.

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Mosqow also probably yalued Accra's t i e s wifh d i s s i d e n t and exized n a t i o n a l i s t leaders i n - t h e remaining c o l o n i e s , Red Star ~ q 7i December p r a i s e d t h e independence movements i n a number of t h e colonies--including Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, t h e Cameroons, Mauretania, and the- Belgian Congo-ackna'wledged t h e s t r u g g l e as having assumed a wide d i v e r s i t y of f o r m , and'atlmitted "varied" s u c c e s s t o date. For t h e moment, Moscow ignored t h e controversy which s u r f a c e d a t t h e conference o v e r t h e u s e or r e p u d i a t i o n of v i o l e n c e i n order t o a t t a i n nat i o n a l ist goals

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It remained for t h e upcoming Soviet p a r t y congress t o formul a t e more p r e c i s e l y 'the limits w i t h i n which Moscow's a t t i t u d e toward developments In t h e nonbloc t*East**would evolve. g u s t p r i o r t o t h e congress, however, a j o i n t conference o s t e n s \ + b l y of t h e ?*Editorial Boards" of t h e Soviet j o u r n a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs and its Chinese c o u n t e r p a r t on

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the main t e n d e n c i e s of t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e c o l o n i a l system of imperialism and on t h e s p e c i a l features and p e r s p e c t i v e s of t h e nationa l - l i b e r a t i o n movement of t h e peoples of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America
summarized p r e v a i l i n g views. Leading Soviet spokesmen--Academic i a n Eugene Zhukov and Professors A, A, Guber and V. Ya. Avarin-reflected Moscow's less o p t i m i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of t r e n d s i n nonbloc Asia and ATob s t a t e s and g n e a t e r empliasls on t h e clash of p r o g r e s s i v e and r e a c t i o n a r y social forces w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s r e q u i r i n g a more r e s o l u t e s t a n d - a g a i n s t imperialist i n f l u e n c e s , whatever f o r m they might take. As summarized subs e q u e n t l y in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs, any serious exchange of views a t t h e conference was subordinated t o a re-emphasis of common i n t e r e s t and a u n i t y of purpose flnd program,

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.VI:

THE 2 l s t PARTY CGNGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH:
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The 2 1 s t congress of t h e CPSU, convened i n l a t e J a n u a r y and , e a r l y February i n " i r r e g u l a r " o r special s e s s i o n t o d i s cuss a Seveg-,Year P l a n f o r t h e S o v i e t economy, provided a f o c u s f o r Moscow's efforts t o u s e t h e growing economic and m i l i t a r y - - b u t p r i m a r i l y economic--development of t h e USSR f o r a n across-the-board a s s a u l t on Western p o s i t i o n s througho u t t h e world. Second o n l y t o t h e Khrushchev-led s t r a t e g y of a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l o i t r e c e n t and p r o s p e c t i v e economic g a i n s f o r immediatg p o l i t i c a l advantage, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , S o v i e t leaders a t t h e congress cont i n u e d t h e process of p u b l i c re-examination and re-evaluat i o n of S o v i e t economic and p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t for neu t s a l i s C governments. The major p o l i t i c a l t h e s i s of t h e congress--that i n t h e competition of two world systems t h e r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e of t h e West would soon r e s u l t i n t h e s h i f t of economic s u p e r i o r i t y t o t h e bloc, proving n o t o n l y t h e greater e f f i c i e n c y of Communist s o c i e t y b u t a l s o g r e a t l y magnifying t h e Communist v o i c e i n world affairs--was u n d e r l i n e d by t h e simple technique of t r e a t i n g medium- and long-range g o a l s on a par w i t h a c t u a l achievements, The p o l i t i c a l aspect of t h e economic d o c t r i n e unfolded by Khrushchev a t t h e congress was t i e d t o two p r e d i c t i o n s : f i r s t , t h a t b y t h e end of t h e seven-year p e r i o d more t h a n one h a l f o f t h e w o r l d ' s i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t would come f r o m t h e bloc; and second, t h a t w i t h i n an addit i o n a l f i v e y e a r s t h e USSR would "occupy first p l a c e i n t h e world both i n o v e r - a l l and per capita" p r o d u c t i o n , Both Khrushchev and h i s p r i n c i p a l l i e u t e n a n t s t i e d t h e p r o j e c t e d economic development of t h e USSR w i t h an expansion of Moscow's f o r e i g n economic a c t i v i t i e s , Khrushchev r e i t e r a t e d t h e Sov i e t commitment to a i d t h e r a p i d economic development o f Asian, African, and L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s on " f a i r commercial p r i n c i p l e s , '* adding t h e defense "we are not engaged i n benevolence." O l d Bolshevik Kuusinen, however, r e l y i n g more h e a v i l y on t h e prospects of t h e Seven-Year P l a n , gave a more liberal f o r m u l a t i o n h a r k i n g back i n s p i r i t t o t h e u t o p i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m of t h e e a r l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d ;
It is t r u e t h a t in t h e h i s t o r y of socialism there was a t i m e when w i t h a l l good i n t e n t i o n s there
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simply w a s n o t h i n g t o d i v i d e . Now t h i s time is pa,st. Having become r i c h e r , w e have n o t become npsers.. e In seveg' y e a r s w 0 w i l l become even r i c h e r . T h i s means t h a t n o t o n l y we o u r s e l v e s ' - w i l l l i v e better, but o u r f r i e n d s too w i l l be better o f f .

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Khrushchev himself s p o t l i g h t e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t had a r i s e n i n Moscow * s p o l it ical , economic, and m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o selected n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s on t h e b a s i s of a p a r a l l e l i s m i n c e r t a i n s h o r t - r a n g e goals--anti-Westernism--rather than of long-range o b j e c t i v e s , by unprecedented p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m o f Nasir, i n whose government Moscow had made its greatest material and p s y c h a l o g i c a l investment. Taking i s s u e w i t h Nasir's r e c e n t j a i l i n g of Egyptian and S y r i a n Communists and w i t h t h e UAR leader's condemnation of Communist policies i n t h e Middle E a s t as a n t i - b a b , Khrushchev n o t o n l y r e f u s e d t o r e p u d i a t e Arab Communist a g i t a t i o n but avowed Moscow*s cont inued s u p p o r t f o r " p r o g r e s s i v e elements. '' The S o v i e t leader's open c h a l l e n g e t o Nasir w a s continued and developed by Mukhitdinov, now well e s t a b l i s h e d as Khrushchev's t o p aide on r e l a t i o n s w i t h Asian and Arab c o u n t r i e s , and by Arab Communist l e a d e r s Khalid Bakdash and Ali Yata, whose 21st congress views r e f l e c t e d MOSCOW~S t u r n away f r o m Nasir. C a l l i n g on Nasir n o t t o l e t d i f f e r e n c e s of " i d e o l o g i c a l views" i n t e r f e r e w i t h f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , Khrushchev r e a s s e r t e d t h e primacy of the "common s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t imperialism," p r a i s i n g Nasir's arch-foe Q a s i m i n t h e same breath as t h e UAB leader f o r t h e i r "triumphs ,over imperialism.t'

2

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The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t p r e m i e r ' s s t a n d w a s t h a t l o c a l Communists were t o be encouraged t o adopt more dynamic programs, in p a r t t o prod n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n t o adopti n g radical o r a t least b o l d e r reforms and s h a r p e n i n g p u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n t o Western economic, p o l i t i c a l , and c u l t u r a l inf l u e n c e . A t t h e congress, p a r t y s e c r e t a r y and t o p theoretic i a n Suslov s p e c i f i c a l l y admonished Communists on t h e need t o raise t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l e v e l of t h e n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e of t h e p e o p l e s of Asia, Africa, :aQd L a t i n America. On t h e o t h e r hand, n e i t h e r Ehrushchev nor any other S o v i e t leader showed any d i s p o s i t i o n t o c o n t i n u e t h e ' p o l e m i c s w i t h Nehru which were i n i t i a t e d t h e p r e c e d i n g fall, b u t on t h e c o n t r a r y resumed t h e i r s t u d i e d e f f o r t s t o win h i s t a c t i c a l s u p p o r t , g l o s s i n g o v e r or denying d i f f e r e n c e s of view. A t t h e same time, t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s p r e p a r e d t h e way f o r new

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a t t e m p t s t o a r o u s e world o p i n i o n a g a i n s t what Mukhitdinov l a b e l e d , *collecC+ve colonialism'' by a s s e r t i n g t h e might and u n i t y fik t h e s o c i a l i s t c@p on t h e side of peace and attempt$ig t o extend t h e p r o s p e c t of "zones of peace" t o Asian and P a c i f i c areas. I n t h e g e n e r a l l i n e s of S o v i e t s t r a t e g y o u t l i n e d a t the congress, ghrushchev and other S o v i e t leadep:showed Moscow v e r y much aware t h a t t h e stalensate of Sov i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Western powers f a c i l i t a t e d r a t h e r t h a n hampered its e f f o r t s to e x a c e r b a t e i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n between the n e u t r a l i s t and Western camps. S o v i e t e v a l u a t i o n s of the " h i s t o r i c importance" of t h e c o n g r e s s stressed t h e theme of S o v i e t economic development, which %peeds up th'e p r o c e s s of t h e decay of imperialism and f a c i l i t a t e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e peoples of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s on t h e p a t h of genuine progress" and of t h e c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e West for i n f l u e n c i n g t h e c o u r s e of economic development i n t h e former c o l o n i e s . A. Arzumanyan, head df t h e I n s t i t u t e of World Economics and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , w r i t i n g i n Kommunist , gave t h e i n t e r n a t iona1:-sfgn i f i c a n c e of t h e economic p l o p o s a l s d i s c u s s e d a t t h e congress: The achievement i n t h e USSR of such a volume of p r o d u c t i o n and of such a l e v e l of material w e l l b e i n g of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w i l l immeasurably i n c r e a s e t h e a t t r a c t i o n of t h e great ideas of MarxismLeninism. T h i s w i l l conquer m i l l i o n s of new followers f o r world socialism and w i l l have a great r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n f l u e n c e 04 t h e q i d e s t p o p u l a r masses i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l b u t e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s of t h e c a p i t a l i s t world.
A t t h e c o n g r e s s i t s e l f , Mukhitdinov, drawing on b o t h Lenin and p r o s p e c t i v e Seven-Year P l a n achievements, gave greater weight t o t h e real p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s t o move d i r e c t l y from f e u d a l i s m t o socialism--wifhout an int e r m e d i a t e p e r i o d of "bourgeois c a p i t a l i s t development"--on t h e model of t h e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e USSR's C e n t r a l Asian territories, a r g u i n g t h e thesis t h a t material a s s i s t a n c e from more economically developed areas made this possible and I t is noteworthy, however,'t€iat Khrushchev's practicable. concluding speech t o t h e congress made no such claim f o r Sov i e t p o l i c y and j u s t i f i e d Moscow's economic and p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t t o non-Communist Asian and African governments on t h e basis of t h e fact t h a t t h e i r conduct showed them " w e l l disposed'?
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toward t'he bloc and s u p p o r t e r s of peace. The c o n g r e s s r e s o l u t i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y endorsed i n c r e a s e d t r a d e and "contacts" w i t h t h e .undbrdevelopkd c o u n t p e s , b u t it w a s s i l e n t on f u t u r e p o l i t ical 09 economic investment i n n e u t r a l i s t governments.
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Developments in t h e Middle E a s t c o n c u r r e n t w i t h and imm e d i a t e l y subsequent t o t h e c o n g r e s s helped t o d i s p e l any ill u s i o n s world,Communist leaders might have had t h a t p o l i t i c a l g a i n s would f l o w a l l but a u t o m a t i c a l l y from t h e i r exaggerated claims of economic and s c i e n t i f i c accomplishment. V i r u l e n t Arab r e a c t i o n to Khrushchev's b l u n t criticism of Masir appare n t l y exceeded S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n s , and an e f f o r t was made to persuade Nasir t h a t t h e attack was flonlymp o l i t i c a l and n o t personal.
I

A sharper setback to Moscowvs Middle E a s t p r e t e n s i o n s came f r o m Tehran. Encouraged by s i g n s of a changed a t t i t u d e ..on t h e p a r t of t h e Shah, Moscow i n c r e a s e d its ecanomjlc and p o l i t i c a l o v e r t u r e s to h i m and i n l a t e January and early February a p p a r e n t l y had h i g h hopes of p r y i n g Iran a t l e a s t p a r t way o u t of t h e a n t i - S o v i e t c o a l i t i o n i n t h e Middle E a s t . The sudden c o l l a p s e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s in Tehran and t h e empty-handed r e t u r n home on 10 February of t h e USSR's s p e c i a l mission touched off pained and b i t t e r S o v i e t p u b l i c reaction,, A Pravda "Observer1* a r t i c l e on 14 February and Khsushchev i n a m r u a r y speech a t T u l a s l a s h e d a t t h e S h a h D ssudden reversal., Khrushchev's f u r t h e r attacks on t h e " f a i t h l e s s n e s s " of t h e Shah and t h e I r a n i a n Government i n a 24 February " e l e c t i o n e e r i n g " speech t o t h e voters of t h e XalPnin D i s t r i c t in Moscow carried t h e p o l e m i c s ' w i t h the Shah to extremes, making it obvious t h a t Moscow had g i v e n up any n e a r p r o s p e c t s of improving r e l a t i o n s w i t h Tehran.

The apparent lesson of t h i s e p i s o d e w a s t h a t MQSCOW'S p s y c h o l o g i c a l - p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s on pro-Western states could be switched o f f , given t h e p r o s p e c t of P tactical opening or i n t e n s i f i e d In f r u s t r a t i o n . I n t h e v i o l e n c e of its new a t t a c k s on t h e Shah, on his regime, and on t h e s o c i o - p o l i t i cal b a s e s of t h e I r a n i a n Government, Moscow p o i n t e d up t h e lshallowness and tenuousness of t h e ideological roots of its t;actical c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h non-Comunist governments. The c o n t e n t and t o n e of S o v i e t p u b l i c a t i o n s of t h e p e r i o d tend t o confirm r e p o r t s from a v a r i e t y of sources t h a t a t p r i v a t e meetings w i t h Asian, African, and L a t i n American p a r t y
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s S o v i e t leaders urged upon local Communist p a r t i e s a s h a r p e r l i n e toward n a t i o n a l i s t e l e m e n t s ' t h a n KhrushFhev bhose t o adopf p u b l i c l y a t t h e congress. Kommunist claimed t o see t h e c o u n t r i e s of A s i a and A f r i c K s enter'ing a new stage, i n which p r o g r e s s depended on t h e ''alignment of I n t e r n a l forces" and on t h e c h a r a c t e r and d i r e c t i o n of domestic programs. A summation of t h e c o n g r e s s ' v ' i e w s on Communist s t r a t e g y in t h e underdeveloped areas w a s p r e s e n t e d by p a r t y t h e o r i s t B o r i s Ponomarev on 6 March in Pravda. Ponomarev p r e s e n t e d e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i v i s t l i n e hewing c l o s e l y t o Communist orthodoxy, emphasizing t h a t it is i n c o r r e c t t o t h i n k t h a t s o c i a l changes are going t o occur autoraat i c a l l y i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s without a class s t r u g g l e a n d t s t r e s s i n g t h a t i n t h i s s t r u g g l e an evergreater r o l e is marked o u t f o r l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s . S t r e s s i n g t h e p o i n t advanced by t o p S o v i e t spokesman s i x months earlier--that t h e young governments of A s i a and Afr i c a were a t a h i s t o r i c ftcrossroad*r--Ponomarev v i s e d l o c a l ad p a r t i e s t h a t i n t h e c u r r e n t p r o c e s s e s of economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l change new p a r t y and class i n t e r e s t s had a r i s e n , and t h a t s h i f t s i n class and p a r t y s t r e n g t h s w i t h i n nationa l i s t movements were t a k i n g place which called for a l i g n i n g Communist s u p p o r t f o r t h o s e l o c a l elements a d o p t i n g progress i v e domestic and f o r e i g n programs, namely f u l l l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e remains of c o l o n i a l i s m , growth of n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y , e l i m i n a t i o n of feudalism, t h e c a r r y i n g o u t of wide-scale a g r a r i a n r e f o r m , t h e growth of democracy,, a peace-loving f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and an a c t i v e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s t blocs. None of t h e s e ideas is new, b u t t h e c u r r e n t emphasis on Communist s u p p o r t for p r o g r e s s i v e e l e m e n t s r a t h e r t h a n t h e broader " a n t i - imper i a l 1st f o r c e s r e p r e s e n t e d a f u r t h e r c o o l i n g of MOSCOW'S a t t i t u d e toward non-Communist movements and a marked d e p a r t u r e from t h e s y n t h e t i c f r i e n d l i n e s s of t h e 2 0 t h p a r t y congress. KhrushchevDs a i r i n g of h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Nasir a t t h e 2 1 s t p a r t y c o n g r e s s had r e s u l t e d in a n i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of p r e s s and r a d i o polemics, b u t it w a s t h e r e v o l t on 8 March o f ' a proNasir I r a q i Army Colonel a t Mosul which brought t o a head p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between Moscow and Cairo. Nasir took t h e lead in p u b l i c . s p e e c h e s on 11 and 15 March -

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denouncing Communists i n t h e Middle E a s t as a g e n t s of a f o r e i g n power and as enemies of &ab nationalism. T h i s w a s too direct a chaldenge f o r Moscow t 6 ignore. Khrushchev on 16 March, a t a r e o e p t i o n f o r a v i s i t i n g Iraqi economic d e l e g a t i o n , surveyed t h e whole f i e l d of S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e UAR and with I r a q a n d , t h e Cairo-Baghdad r i v a l r y , throwing h i s wholehearted support behind<gasim. Dbscow a p p a r e n t l y was confident t h a t its c o n s i d e r a b l e economic and m i l i t a r y a i d t o Nasir would work to keep t h e d i s p u t e from s e r i o u s l y harming s t a t e - t o - s t a t e relat i o n s ; it p r o b a b l y . r e f l e c t e d In a d d i t i o n an a p p r a i s a l t h a t over t h e p a s t year Nasir's p o s i t i o n i n t h e Arab world had deteriorated as t h e r e s u l t of t h e rise of Baghdad and Q a s i m as a r i v a l c e n t e r of b a b nationalism, of i n c r e a s i n g t r o u b l e s i n Syria, and of setbacks i n T u n i s i a and Sudan t o NasirPs eff o r t s t o dominate Arab affairs.

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On 19 a r c h a t a Moscow press conference, Khrushchev exp r e s s e d t h e belief that Moscow could continue t o have good r e l a t i o n s w i t h both t h e UAR and Iraq, p a t r o n i z i n g l y r e f e r r i n g t o Nasir as inexperienced and "hOt-headed'' and u r g i n g Nasir t o have p a t i e n c e and end UAR i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Iraqi affairs. Nasir s t r u c k back on 22 March i n Damascus w i t h , t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n t h e 1956 attack on Egypt, h i s country had fought a l o n e a g a i n s t Israel, B r i t a i n , and France without "any s i g n of a s s i s t a n c e from any f o r e i g n state, i n c l u d i n g t h e Soviet Union." Pravda '*Observern attempted to r e f u t e t h i s claim, and K h r u s m i n a l e t t e r t o Nasir i n April suggested t h a t both s i d e s should t o n e down t h e i r p u b l i c r e c r i m i n a t i o n s . The basic p o i n t s a t i s s u e were*left unresolved, however-i n c l u d i n g t h e v i t a l q u e s t i o n of Soviet and Communist agitation for faster "social progress" i n Iraq and t h e UAR. Moscow appeared c o n t e n t t o l e a v e any f u r t h e r move toward conc i l i a t i o n up t o Cairo, and Khruspchev on 7 Hay t o l d t h e publ i s h e r and e d i t o r of Indian l e f t i s t weekly B l i t z , who subt o des e q u e n t l y talked w i t h Nasir, t h a t "it is up-hem cide--we s h a l l l i v e through it somehow."
The endorsement a t t h e 2 1 s t congress of a more a c t i v e l i n e i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s was reflected also i n signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet a t t e n t i o n t o African a f f a i r s . The s i g n a t u r e on 13 February i n Conakry of a Soviet-Guinean trade and payments agreement p o i n t e d up the new s t a g e of broad government-to-government r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l indppendent African states, following t h e g e n e r a l p a t t e r n of Soviet o v e r t u r e s t o n e u t r a l i s t Asia i n t h e

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immediate post-Bandung era. The March i s s u e of t h e I n s t i t u t e 'of OriexyTal S t u d i e s ' semipopular j o u r n a l Contemporary E a s t w a s devhted almost e n t i r e l y t o A f r i c a n developments, WEE, c o v e r a g e , r u n n i n g t h e gamut from t h e c u l t u r a l accomplishments of AfrYcan p e o p l e s and t h e mutual advantages of g r e a t e r cont a c t s between A f r i c a n s and t h e b l o c t o an appraisal o f t h e A f r i c a n movements f o r immediate independence by top S o v i e t . A f r i c a n i s t I: 3 Potekhin. P o t e k h i n ' s survey brought t o a close t h e p e r i o d of S o v i e t p u b l i c ambiguity on t a c t i c s recommended f o r t h e African n a t i o n a l i s t s , a t t a c k i n g those' African leaders who would l i m i t t h e s t r u g g l e t o seeking g r a d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform w i t h i n t h e framework and on t h e b a s i s of t h e l a w s created by t h e colon i z e r s , t h e p a t h of n e g o t i a t i o n s , and agreements with t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s . and a s s e r t e d t h a t African e x p e r i e n c e had proved t h e n e c e s s i t y of t h e u s e of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t "ixuperialiStS." I n March there a l s o appeared i n important I n s t i t u t e of O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s monograph, A. Yu. S h p i r t ' s A f r i c a i n t h e Second World War, which. emphasized World War I1 as a c c ~ o ~ o ~ l E F h h o ~ f o r g i v i n g character and d r i v e t o the s t r u g g l e of the African peop l e s f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic independence. A g r e a t l y ex-panded coverage of African developments i n S o v i e t j o u r n a l s and t h e press r e f l e c t e d S o v i e t a i m s t o harass Western, economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Africa, t o deny the West m i l i t a r y b a s e s througho u t Africa and squeeze out those already e s t a b l i s h e d , and t o b u i l d up n e u t r a l i s t , pro-Soviet, and i n t e n s e l y anti-Weste r n s e n t i m e n t among t h e A f r i c a n peoples. S o v i e t views were n o t so sanguine on L a t i n American developments, which s i n c e t h e Soviet-Argent i n e economic agreemeniswere s i g n e d had f a i l e d t o develop. i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of i n c r e a s e d d i p l o m a t i c , economic, and c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e bloc. Despite heavy propaganda a t t e n t i o n t o t h e overthrow of Batista, which it i n t e r p r e t e d as popular repudiat i o n of US p o l i c y i n t h e a r e a , Moscow adopted a c a u t i o u s att i t u d e toward t h e Castro government, w h i l e h a i l i n g t h e revol u t i o r ? for f r e e i n g democratic forces making p o s s i b l e t h e rapjld t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y a l o n g p r o g r e s s i v e l i n e s . Following Castro's v i s i t t o t h e United States i n A p r i l , Moscow seemed r e a s s u r e d of t h e anti-US p o s i t i o n of t h e Cuban Government and t h e i n t e n s i t y of Castro's a n t i p a t h y to American economic and pol it i c a l i n t e r e s t s . A mid-year s u r v e y of l i b e r a t i o n

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f o r c e s i n L a t i n America c i t e d s u b s t a n t i a l achievements i n Venezue1,q and Chile as w e l l as i n Cuba and c o n s i d e r e d prosp e c t s , l*,ldespitea l l t h e bdrriers and d f f f i c u l t i e s , " ' favorable a.Jso in B r a z i l , Mexico, Argentina, and B o l i v i a . A l though t h e claim had been advanced before, theEe now appeared more s u b s t a n c e to.Moscow's a s s e r t i o n t h a t L a t i n America wag e n t e r i n g a new stage of its development as an important s e c t o r of the' world n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e ,

Moscow-led d i s c u s s i o n of Communist s t r a t e g y i n t h e underdeveloped world c o n t i n u e d w i t h t h e special conference, h e l d i n E a s t Germany i n May 1959, of b l o c t h e o r e t i c i a n s on t h e sub-iect of "the n a t i o n a l bourgeoisie and t h e l i b e r a t i o n As usual', a major p o r t i o n of t h e speakers' removemeni", marks, as p r e s e n t e d i n t h e bloc j o u r n a l , r e p r e s e n t e d a Concerted attempt t o stress t h e advantages of Bid t a l n a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s i e i n t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m and t h e disr u p t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and economic t i e s of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s w i t h t h e West. A t t h e same t i m e , emphasis on t h e i n s t a b i l i t y and i n d e c i s i v e n e s s of non-Communist leadership and on the d i v i s i o n s of aims and j n t e r e s t s of elements comp r i s i n g t h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t f r o n t suggested greater l o c a l Communist a t t e n t i o n to t h e l i m i t s of such t a c t i c a l cooperat i o n and t o independent p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y so as n o t t o lose i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e p o p u l a r masses and t o p r e s e r v e and improve t h e chances f o r its own PeadershPp of t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e .
A similar view on t h e p r o s p e c t s of Communism i n the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and of t h e role,of Communists in nat i o n a l i s t movements was reflected i n t h e long-awaited t e x t book H i s t o r y of t h e ComunPst P a r t y of t h e S o v i e t Union, which t p a r t of J u c P z p X d - c m y by appeared t h e E a group of t o p - l e v e l h i s t o r i a n s headed by Ponomarev, the new p a r t y h i s t o r y devoted c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e problems of Communist o r g a n i z a t i o n and a g i t a t i o n under c o n d i t i o n s of a c a p i t a l i s t society. The g e n e r a l t h e s i s d e d u c i b l e from t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e S o v i e t past and of L e n i n ' s classical f o r m u l a t i o n s was on c o n s t a n t s t r u g g l e which combines legal, semi-legal, and i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y and makes use of even t h e **most r e a c t i o n a r y " elements i n e x p l o i t i n g n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a tions f o r self-rule. I n summarizing t h e textbookvs import for t h e Communist world i n t h e bloc j o u r n a l , Ponomarev just i f i e d j o i n t a c t i o n w i t h non-Communists :

though t h e i r understanding of t h e ways and methods

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of s t r u g g l e d i f f e r s from t h a t of Communists...the overwhelming, m a j o r i t y s t a n d s o l i d l y for peace and so#al p r o g r e s s , . b
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Be "calied f o r greater v i g i l a n c e and stepped-up e f f o r t s because, as he p u t i t , never b e f o r e had t h e forces of r e a c t i o n waged s u c h :an i n t e n s e and varied s t r u g g l e against Marxism-Leninism ana a g a i n s t Communism.

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However, d e s p i t e t h e i n t i m a t i o n s o f t h e f a l l of 1958, of t h e 21st p a r t y c o n g r e s s and its follow-up, t h a t Communist movements i n Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America might w i t h d r a w
t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r "bourgeois n a t i o n a l i s t " movements and move I n t o a new stage-a d r i v e f o r Communist c o n t r o l a g a i n s t those n a t i o n a l i s t s who r e f u s e d Moscowgs lead 8s w e l l as a g a i n s t p r o - i m p e r i a l i s t and pro-feudal elements--Moscow i n mid-1959, under t h e e x i g e b c i e s 09 t h e d r i v e for d e t e n t e with t h e West and of u n f a v o r a b l e CPQSSCUPPBS~W w i t b i n the underdeveloped world, a g a i n sacrificed an a c t i v i s t l i n e i n f a v o r of maint a i n i n g f r i e n d l y government-%o-$ovesnment r e l a t i o n s , Events i n Iraq touched o f f by Communist-led r i o t s i n Kirkuk and other Iraqi c i t i e s i n connection w i t h t h e c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e f i r s t a n n i v e r s a r y of the I r a q i r e v o l u t i o n brought about s t e r n countermeasures by Qasim and r e s u l t e d i n a sharp decrease in Iraqi Communist i n f l u e n c e both i n t h e government and among 'the masses. Iraqi Communists, who had been engaged in a b i t t e r i n t r a p a r t y debate on how f a r t o press Qasim f o r a . s t r o n g Communist p r e s e n c e i n t h e c a b i n e t and i n f l u e n c e i n domestic and f o r e i g n affairs, fqund Mopow after t h e f a c t supp o r t i n g t h e i r p a r t y e s m i n o r i t y , which f a v o r e d continued coo p e r a t i o n w i t h Qasim, and t a k i n g t o t a s k t h e mililtabe wing of t h e p a r t y f o r " i P r e s p o n s i b i l i % y . "

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F r i c t i o n between t h e I n d i a n Government and t h e Communist government of t h e State of Kerala reached a peak in June and J u l y and posed a n o t h e r s e r i o u s test of Communist i n t e n t i o n s . Although t h e Communist p a r t y of I n d i a attempted t o - r a l l y supp o r t f o r t h e Kerala government a g a i n e t l % c t s of hooliganism and v i o l e n c e " . i n s p i r e d by-tihe Csngross p a r t y and t h r e a t e n e d t o naeet v i o l e n c e i n kind, Moscow kept i t s e l f a p a r t . When Nehru's c e n t r a l government on 31 J u l y d i s s o l v e d t h e Communist m i n i s t r y and l e g i s l a t u r e of Kerala on t h e grounds t h a t it had proven i t s e l f u n a b l e to maintain p u b l i c order, MQSCOW remained p a s s i v e . In backing ayay from any s t a n d in s u p p o r t of ithe Kerala Communist government, Moscow made it obvious t h a t

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i t valued t h e f r i e n d s h i p and good w i l l o f ' t h e Indian Government and, of Nehru, more t h a n it d i d t h e prospects of e i t h e r p t h e Ker@a government or %he Comun%s.& a r t y of India. Mascow s o r g h t t o minimize t h e d i s p i r i t i n g effect of such desert i o n on other Communist p a r t i e s ' t h r o a g h o u t t h e world by maint a i n i n g silence on t h e q u e s t i o n ,
Moscowps g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t i n p r e p a r i n g f o r high-level n e g o t i a t i o n s t o b r i n g about a r e l a x a t i o n of East-West t e n s i o n s reinforced t h e t r e n d toward downgradfng-party miZitancy,..and Soviet leaders moderated t h e t o n e s i f n o t the s u b s t a n c e of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l h o s t i l i t y t o t h e W e s t . In s i n g l i n g o u t B e r l i n , West German rearmament, disarmament, and d e t e n t e w i t h t h e United States as t h e p r e s s i n g problems of t h e day, MQSCOW d i d not i n t e n d i n any way to detract from its long-term program of undermining WestePn s t r e n g t h and inf l u e n c e i n Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America, b u t the inesshpable result was t o r e i n f o r c e t h e impression t h a t over t h e s h o r t r u n Moscow was w i l l i n g to l i m i t t h e scope of its ass a u l t on Western i n t e r e q t s i n t h e hope of g a i n s a t t h e conf e r e n c e table e A w w l d - ' w i d e s u m e .sf S o v i e t i n t e r n a t i o n a l ~~ r e l a t i o n s f o r t h e first h a l f of I959 prepared by s i x j u n i o r e d i t o r s of t h e j o u r n a l WEIR refleeted an unushal'ly r e a l i s t i c view of developments at same time as it ferried down t h e p o l i t i c a l arrogance and anti-Westernism of Mos@owps l i n e w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e r i n g a p o i n t , Tbis and ather p u b l f e commentary i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r "another, mre realistfc Geneva Conference," which Moscow hoped would come 0ut o f - t h e exchange of v i s i t s w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t , c e n t q r e d on, p u r p o f t e d .changes i n t h e c o r r e l a t i o n of world forces which had-brotight a b u t a need t o revfew o u t s t a n d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s i n consonance w i t h t h e new s i t u a t i o n . Assessing c u r r e n t t r e n d s from a reasonab1y"detached viewp o i n t , t h e a u t h o r s acknowledged setbacks i n MoSc%w* s relat i o n s w i t h Arab states and d i f f e r e n c e s withfii f h e ' h a b in"pol dependence movement. Continued Soviet -ecoj~orh3k-~'and it i c a l s u p p o r t f o r key Asian states was pledged-fn-.order to h e l p them maintain t h e i r f r i e n d l y p o l i t i c a l n e u t r a l i t y and t o s t i f f e n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o %he West O a n t i - S o v i e t , anti-Cons munist "penetration" i n South and S o u t h e a s t Asia. The att i t u d e reflected on Latin Anerica was that i n c r e a s e d trade and improved economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc offered t h e m s promising road t o t h e e r o s i o n of American influence Pn ot t h e area. On Africa, the impression was t h a t Moscow viewed
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sub-Saharan developments as s u b j e c t t o u n p r e d i c t a b l e v i c i s s i t u d e s , , b u t t h a t t h e g e n e r a l s t r u g g l e f o r p o l i t i c a l and econom#,e independehce woadd m u l t i p l y t h e more o r less permaneq5'trouble s p o t s f o r t h e West and bog down Western as- . sets and prestige. Inaplicit in t h i s e v a l u a t i o n was reliance on long-term p o l i t i c a l , economico and social p r o c e s s e s i l p t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s a t least as much as on an expanded bloe*economic, p o l i t i c a l , and i d e o l o g i c a l programs f o r determining t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e of t h e i s gbverximents and peoples. Its p i c t u r e is t h a t of a l o n g drawn-dut--competit i o n between t w o s o c i a l systems for predominance--a s i t u a t i o n i n which many complex and c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n f l u e n c e s would be a t p l a y , w,i t h no simple s o l u t i o n t o be expected. c u l t i v a t i o n of E t h i o p i a and its Emperor. The $100,000,000~ Soviet l o a n "for development of i n d u s t r y and a g r i c u l t u r e n announced a t t h e close of t h e Emperor's v i s i t i n J u l y was an investment i n S o v i e t r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and w a s accompanied by t h e u s u a l a s s e r t i o n s of d i s i n t e r e s t e d motives. MQSCOW~S i n t e n t i o n t o p r e s s on w i t h its economic a i d program was p o i n t e d up by i n c r e a s e d p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n 6f t h e scope and an articl'e i n " I n t e r n a t i o n a 1 i m p l i c a t i o n s of S o v i e t a i d ; e.g. Affafrs g i v i n g t h e first comprehensive l i s t i n g - - o ? major Sov i e t credits t o eight underdeveloped c ~ u n t r i e s - - t o t a l i n g o v e r 4.5 b i l l i o n r u b l e s . S o v i e t propaganda and dip1,omatie, prepmat ion for ghrus h c h e v s s t r i p t o t h e United States, epitomized fn h i s article in t h e American j o u r n a l Foreign Affairs, prepared for release c o i n c i d e n t w i t h h i s a r r i v a l , reffected an optimism and an i l l - c o n c e a l e d e x p e c t a t i o n of concessions from the West. The v i s i t took place amid s i g n s t h a t , in spi$& of S o v i e t r e a f f i r m a t i o n s of o p p o s i t i o n t o imperialism and c o l o n i a l i s m , some pro-Moscow n e u t r a l s w e r e concerned t h a t gbrushchev would e n t e r i n t o d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the US which might p r e j u d i c e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . Khrush@hevQs disarmament i n i t i a t i v e a t t h e General Assembly. was designed t o b u i l d fires under t h e alleged Western unwillingness t o n e g o t i a t e s e r i o u s l y on t h e S o v i e t proposals. The promise, however ill u s o r y , of t h e release of v a s t l y greater r e s o u r c e s by both t h e bloc and t h e West for economic a s s i s t a n c e t o Asia, Africa, and Latin America once t h e arms race is hb-lted was a t r a n s p a r e n t bid for t h e suppork b g ' t h e governments and peoples

MOSCOW~S c o n s i d e r a b l e t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l f t y and its a b i l i t y t o seize openings p r e s e n t e d was' reflected i n its

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of a l l underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s f o r immediate t a l k s and agreement on,$lisarmament. Although a t t h e p r e v i o u s s e s s i o n of t h e Genera&'r'Assembly--in t h e , % a l lof 1958--Moscow had had l i t t l e succesis w i t h its p r o p o s a l s for immediate c u t s of 10 t o 15 perc e n t of arms expenditures, w i t h p a r t of t h e s a v I n g s ' t o be used to step up a i d t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , Khrushchev a p p a r e n t l y counted on t h e p r e v a i l i n g - m o o d - f o r EastWest d e t e n t e ; 'personal emphasis, and t h e world s p o t l i g h t he commanded in New York t o g i v e great i m p a c t - t o ' h i s D e c l a r a t i o n of General and Complete Disarmament. T h e - p o i n t a s - t o whether Moscow envisaged p a r a l l e l or j o i n t aid.prograrm3 w a s purposely l e f t obscure i n a n effort to c u r r y s u p p o r t in t h e broadest possible circles. KQmmunist's follow-up of ghrushchev's N e w York proposal asserxed t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union *stood and s t a n d s f o r broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation i n t h e matter of renderi n g a i d t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s r t and h e l d ' t h e door open for cooperation, p a r t i c u l a r l y through t h e UN.
Khrushchev's i n t e r i m r e p o r t of 28 September t o t h e Sov i e t people on t h e r e s u l t s of h i s US t r i p was'liftle more t h a n a f o l k s y account and r e a s s u r a n c e as to its success. Following h i s t r i p t o P e i p i n g for Communist ChinaOs t e n t h anniv e r s a r y Celebrations, Khrushehev, in speeches a t - V l a d i v o s t o k and Novosibirsk on 6 and 10 October r e s p e c t i v e l y , emphasized his commitment t o s e c u r i n g a high-level s e t t l e m e n t w i t h t h e W e s t a t t h e same t i m e as he showed concern t h a t tactics used t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s might have a d e l e t e r i o u s effect on Communist eJ8n. A t Vliidivostok he attempted t o make clear t h a t he w a s s e a r c h i n g f o r ' a common ground w i t h Americ a n s o n l y on t h e q u e s t i o n of a f i r m and l a s t i d g peace, and t h a t as f a r as other q u e s t i o n s were concerned,'nWe do not f i n d comon language w l t h American b u ~ i n e s s m e n . ~A t Novosibirsk ~ h e a g a i n sought to emphasize t h a t he had hot gone s o f t on capit a1ism and, in terms reminiscent of Shepilov?s speech of 12 February 1957, d e f i n e d peaceful c o e x i s t e n c e - a s "economic, political, and ideological--but not m i l i t. r y - - s t r_u g g l e .'* a _
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Khrushchev's report on 31 October to t h e Supreme S o v i e t , In a d d i t i o n to being an a u t h o r i t a t i v e review 'of"-the' i n t e r n a t i o n a l s a t u a t ion, was inaended to j u s t ify the- var3.ous moves taken i n p r e p a r a t i o n for' and a n t i c i p a t i o n of a;ii- -East-West summ i t meeting and t o reassure comrades that-'hd-had i n mind no concessions t o t h e West on matters of p r i n c i p l e . In asserting t h e wisdom of t h e c o u r s e adopted, be emphasized t h a t both sides had t a k e n s t e p s toward a "radical improvement in r e l a t i o n s
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between t h e USSR and t h e U S r , Although he c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t overopti,nism and c i t e d t h e continued i n f l u e n c e of r e a c t i o n a r y elementp, he conceded thaq'tbe West had given proof of its c o n c i l + a t o r y 1nten.tions. 'His c e n t r a l t h e s i s was t h a t t*reali s m " demands a closer a t t e n t i o n fo changes which have been brought about not only by t h e growing might'and i n t e r n a t i o n a l in$!luence of t h e S o v i e t Union and of t h e b l o c , ' b u € also by t h e greater r o b now played by former c o l o n i e s ; by non-Communist governments everywhere which are v i t a l X y - c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of peace and t h e p r e v e n t i o n - o f war, and by peace-loving forces within the major capitalist c o u n t r i e s themselves who want t h e c o l d w a r l i q u i d a t e d and oppose measu r e s l e a d i n g up t o a new w a r .
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A t t h e same time, KhrushchevDsspeech refIected MOSCOW'S marked w i l l i n g n e s s t o moderate its t a c t i c s i n - t h e s*uggle w i t h t h e West f o r i n f l u e n c e in t h e underdeveloped world i n order t o promote great power s e t t l e m e n t . S o v i e t fiterest i n n o t h f f l i n g t h e s u r f a c e calm in East-West r e l a t i o n s - - t h e "new i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere" claimed as a r e s u l t of Khrushchev's American trip-was reflected in h i s d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a y i n g down t h e problem of Laos, which had attracted heavy and v i t r i o l i c S o v i e t comment s i n c e Communist-led elements in t h a t c o u n t r y had r e v e r t e d t o guerrilla warfare in'mid-July after a y e a r and a half of legal p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . Asserting that t h e f a u l t w a s SEATO'S and t h a t w i s e approach and observance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l !+greements" would lead t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n , he concluded t h a t more n o i s e had been raised i n t h e world about Laos t h a n t h e s i t u a t i o n 3 u s t i f ied

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Khrushchev's o v e r r i d i n g concern w i t h an early-East-West summit meeting was p o i n t e d up eyen more clearly in h i s mode r a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t l i n e on Algeria, Despite a p u b l i c commitment t o independence f o r Algeria, r e g u l a r and o c c a s i o n a l l y i n t e n s e propaganda s u p p o r t f o r t h e Aqgerian rebels, and tokbn material a i d f o r Algerian r e f u g e e s and c a s u a l t i e s - - n o t t o mention s p o r a d i c c l a n d e s t i n e shipments of arms by E a s t European countries--Moscow's Algerian p o l i c y l o n g had toughened or s o f t e n e d in l i n e w i t h p r o s p e c t s of closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h Paris. S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o exploit p u b l i c d i f f e r e n c e s between W e s i d e n t de G a u l l e and other Western leaders on NATO p o l i c y and on such other t o p i s s u e s as disarmament and t h e . d e s i r a b i l i t y of t o p - l e v e l t a l k s w i t h Moscow reflected a higher p r i o r i t y f o r direct East-West i s s u e s t h a n f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g

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t h e a n t i c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e . C i t i n g t h e "close h i s t o r i c t i e s between /France and Algeriaa**Khrushchev, drawing t h e French Communi& p a r t y along behind him, asserted t h a t de G a u l l e ' s propoakls of 16 September f o r a p l e b i s c i t e on t h e f u t u r e s t a t u s of Algeria, if followed up, offered t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of ending h o s t i l i t i e s t h e r e ,
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Kommun"i&t' i n a f e a t u r e a r t i c l e in November took up t h e matter of d e f i n i n g t h e l i m i t s of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e f o r Assert fng t h a t no matter how t h e benefft: ,of , w r l d parties ; v i t a l intergovernmental r e l a t i o n s . are, they do not exhaust t h e f i e l d , t h e a r t i c l e restricted compromise t o a narrow d i p l o m a t i c f i e l d . In defending the permanence and unchangea b i l i t y of Communis$ d o c t r i n e , Kommunist also reiterated t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t no middle ground exists or can e x i s t between bourgeois and p r o l e t a r i a n . w o r l d outlooks.

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The newly released textbook The FQundations of AtarxismLeninism, prepared by a group of p a r t y theorists headed by presidium member Kuusinen, w a s being d i s c u s s e d in t h e Soviet p r e s s and p a r t y s t u d y groups. I t too, reflected MOSCOW~S p e r s i s t e n t problem of h a r n e s s i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y enthusiasm t o t h e c u r r e n t requirements of Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Komm u n i s t ' s December review of t h i s new guidebook e m p h a s i z x t h e m p l e x i t y and v a r i a b i l i t y of contemporary circumstances l e a d i n g t o a necessary f l e x i b i l i t y i n Communist t a c t i c s and stated t h a t
t h e task of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y proletariat and its

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Moscow's efforts t o press forward w i t h a program of l a r g e scale economic a s s i s t a n c e t o selected c o u n t r i e s w a s pointed up by t h e announcement in J u l y of its w i l l i n g n e s s t o extend an a d d i t i o n a l credit of $375,000 000 t o India--tXmfWued in September--to h e l p f i n a n c e New D e l h i ' s Third Five-Year Plan. This commitment moved I n d i a - w e l l ahead of the-UAR as t h e p r i n c i p a l r e c i p i e n t o f . S o v i e t a i d and w a s intended t o p r o t e c t Moscow*s p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t and investment in a f r i e n d l y n e u t r a l i s t I n d i a , t o keep New Delhi from backslldi n g as a r e s u l t of its desperate reqwirenaent for l a r g e - s c a l e economic a s s i s t a n c e , and t o dissociate itself Prom Chinese

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attacks on t h e Indian Government. Moscow's o f f e r i n August of a $35,,,000,000 long-term, l o w - i n t e r e s t economic development credit $0 Guinea i n d i c a t e $ - t h e USSR's i n t e n t i o n t o f o l l o w up t h e flyod of economic and c u l t u r a l c o n t a c t s it had i n i t i a t e d w i t h Conakry f o l l o w i n g t h e l a t t e r ' s October 1958 independence w i t h economic aid out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n t o Guinea's size b u t i n , l i n e w i t h its new importance a s a f o c u s of extremist ant$t ,

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Western A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i m e n t . The l a v i s h r e c e p t i o n Moscow gave v i s i t i n g Guinean P r e s i d e n t Toure i n November und e r l i n e d t h e S o v i e t Onion's i n t e r e s t in.making Soviet-Guanean r e l a t i o n s a model for the newly arising African states.

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In a somewhat d i f f e r e n t v e i n , t h e v i s i t of F i r s t Deputy Premier Mikoyan t o Mexico C i t y i n November i n connection w i t h t h e opening of t h e S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l e x h i b i t i o n highlighted a new stage in S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o exploit L a t i n American economic d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e i n t e r e s t of expanding trade and other t i e s w i t h t h e bloc. Although l i k o y a n had long f i g u r e d as Moscow's t o p trade expert, h i s p u b l i c and p r i v a t e remarks in Mexico were directed as much a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l as economic a s p e c t s of tgcolonialisms*--US i n f l u e n c e i n L a t i n America. H i s a t t a c k s on t h e p o l i c i e s and acti3llties of t h e United States and of US f i r m s i n L a t i n America were combined w i t h t h e reite r a t i o n of S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n i n c r e a s e d trade and w i l l i n g n e s s t o extend--**without s t r i n g S - d e v e l o p m e n t credits t o Mexico and otber L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s .
Although Milcoyan's v i s i t had l i t t l e a p p a r e n t effect on Mexico's economic p o l i c i e s and 4 i s a t t p m p t s t o i n t e r e s t Hexican government and b u s i n e s s circles i n S o v i e t development credits were t u r n e d aside, he n e v e r t h e l e s s succeeded i n focusi n g L a t i n American a t t e n t i o n on i n c r e a s e d economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc as a way o u t of t h e L a t i n American economic impasse and as a l i c i t means o f r e d u c i n g t h e predominant r o l e of US economic i n t e r e s t s . A more p o s i t i v e - r e s p o n s e t o S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s w a s t h e v i s i t t o t h e USSR of a B r a z i l i a n trade m i s sion-for which Moscow had been a n g l i n g for t w o years-which r e s u l t e d i n t h e s i g n i n g on 9 December of a trade agreement, t h e first between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , c a l l i n g for g r e a t l y L ' , stepped-up exchanges of goods.
MOSCOW~S changing l i n e on L a t i n America was r e f l e p t e d i n an o u t b u r s t of p u b l i c a t i o n s a p p e a r i n g i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of 1959. The g e n e r a l l i n e p r e s e n t e d by V, Levin i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs was of a new stage a r i s i n g in L B t i n m i c a ' s

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l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e as t h e result of the overthrow of dictatorshi@+ Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela and of p r o l e t a r i a n l e d an-l;&feudaL and a n t i - w e r i a l i s t a g i t a t i o n in o t h e r countries.,.;'On 1 December a semipopular t r e a t m e n t of the Cuban . r e v o l u t i o n bp.K. M Obgden appeared-a press run of 35,000 copies i n d i c a t e d t h a t it w a s intended f o r a wide Soviet audfenge--which n o t o n l y claimed an important role for Cuban Communists i n t E e *overthrow of B a t i s t a but a l s o warmly supported t h e domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l program of Castro's government and h a i l e d his r e v o l t as t h e f i r s t in L a t i n America t o d r i v e t h e " c a p i t a l i s t classes, a l l i e d w i t h t h e United States," from power. S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n N N Bollchovitinov presented, under . . t h e pretext of a s c h o l a r l y study of t h e Monroe D o c t r i n e f o r t h e I n s t i t u t e of I n t b r n a t i o n a P R e l a t i o n s , an a t t a c k on US p o l i c i e s past and . p r e s e n t in t a t i n America.
The most impressive survey of L a t i r ! American p o l i t i c a l and economic developments i n t h e p o s t - S t a l h p e r i o d appeared i n e a r l y December i n t h e form of a symposium, The Problems of Contem o r a r y L a t i n America,, under t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e ]Ins The =?r-+w-r or ~ o o m i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Belations. Iu e o g i s t of t h e argument was t h a t t h e fnamediate goal of,t h e L a t i n American independence movement w a s t h e attafnment of economic independence from US domination--to be Bchieved through t h e development of n a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y , t h e n a t i o n a l h a t i o n of local holdings of US "monopolies,** l e g i s l a t i o n p r o t e c t i n g local i n d u s t r y from d e l e t e r i o u s practices of goreign c a p i t a l i s t t r a d i n g companies, t h e development of trade wfth t h e bloc, and radical and thorough-going &and reform t o e l i m i n a t e t h e l a s t v e s t i g e s of feudalism. A t t h e same time, L a t i n American e f f o r t s a t economic and p o l i t i c a l cooperation were derided.' Communist p a r t i e s were Parged to work for these goals through comon a c t i o n w i t h non-Communist groups and p a r t i c u l a r l y through labor a g i t a t i o n . Although it was admitted t h a t t h e independence s t r u g g l e i n L a t i n America was a t varying s t a g e s in t h e d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s and t h a t it w a s being c a r r i e d o u t in a v a r i e t y of form, t h e conclusion was drawn t h a t L a t i n America had e n t e r e d t h e E n f i n a lperiod- in its l o n g s t r u g g l e f o r f u l l and complete independence. . Mikoyan' s v i s ' i t t o Cuba in February 2960 :pdiki$ed.wp-*Mbscow ' s optimistic a p p r a i s a l of C a s t r o t s -anti-Bmerieanism ( g l l i e d w i t h hern t h e growing s t r e n g t h of l o c a l Communists) as a r i ; ) s f o r expanding S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e throughout L a t i n America. The $100,000,000 Soviet iEoan announced on 1 2 , February and t h e . a s s o c i a t 9 d . .. , .,- . . I. . .. . I . . . _.

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economic agreements have c a t a p u l t e d Moscow i n t o t h e role of a p r i n c i n a l t r a d i n g p a r t n e r and close cooperator in t h e economic d9velopment of Cuba :&er t h e bex& decade and more. A t t h e sage time t h e y showed t h e S o v i e t Union w i l l i n g t o r i s k a d e t e r i o r a t i o n ,of r e l a t i o n s w i t h the--United States in o r d e r t o take advantage of an o p p o r t u n i t y to..improve its r e l a t i o n s wi$h Cuba--only weeks before t h e scheduled summit meeting*
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1 On 1 February, j u s t after a conference i n Xoscow o f - t h e e i g h t Warsaw Pact powers had approved his stewardship of bloc i n t e r e s t s and endorsed i n advance his p o s i t i o n i n t h e expected summit conference w i t h Western leaders Khrushchev began a three-week t o u r of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. This v i s i t , on t h e heels of high S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s , s u g g e s t s ., t h a t he f e l t t h a t t h e weight of h i s own personal diplomacy was necessary, i n t h e " L e n i n i s t s t y l e in dfp&omaoy. .addressing himself to-broad popular masses i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , " in order t o o f f s e t t h e s h a r p d e c l i n e i n bloc and local Communist p o p u l a r i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e T i b e t a n t r o u b l e s , Sino-Indian border f r i c t i o n , PeipingOs a t t a c k s on measures taken by t h e Indonesian Government a g a i n s t r e s i d e n t Chinese, and t h e popal a r enthusiasm for t h e US made e v i d e n t on Predident Eisenhower's r e c e n t v i s i t t o I n d i a and Afghanistan. Xhrushchev's less Shan triumphal t o u r f e a t u r e d a heavy stress on b l o c economic competition w i t h t h e West in a i d i n g Asian n a t i o n s along t h e p a t h 66 economic independence. O f f e r i n g S o v i e t materfial and moral support, which he backed up by a rundown of Soitiet ass i s t a n c e a l r e a d y rendered Asian governments, he k e p t up a heavyhanded attack on Western mqtives gnd Western economic practices i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e peoples of t h e area. h a speech t o the::Indian Parliament on 1 February, Khrushchev 1 cited '*UN experts" a s having c a l c u l a t e d t h e annual investment needs of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s as $14 b i l l i o n and

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o v e r t u r e s t o Havana. me review of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations f o r t h e second h a l f of.1959, prepared by a group of editors of t h e j o u r n a l WEIR, omitted a s e c t i o n on L a t i n America--and tropical Africa-although both the preceding and subsequent semiannual roundups contained l e n g t h y sectionscarftcemni3gy c r i t i c a l of Western, apd e s p e c i a l l y US, p o l i c y in these areas.
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*Soviet concern lest it be i d e n t i f i e d p u b l i c l y w i t h Castro's b l a t a n t anti-Americanism may have slowed Moscow's

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asserted t h a t i f f u l l and g e n e r a l disarmament were achieved, it would be an easy matter f o r t h e great powers t o s e t aside
f i g t e e n and even twenty b i l l i o n d o l l a r s from t h e hGdred b i l l i o n d o l l a r s saved i n o r d e r t o s o l v e t h e u n i v e r s a l h i s t o r i c task of p r e s e r v i n g hundreds of m i l l i o n s o f p e o p l e from hunger and poverty.
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I n C a l c u t t a oh '15 February he reiterated S o v i e t r e l u c t a n c e t o p a r t i c i p a t e j o i n t l y w i t h t h e West i n economic a s s i s t a n c e programs, i n s i s t i n g t h a t "if a i d is t o be rendered, we w i l l r e n d e r it ourselves.'* No new.Soviet economic r i d w8sGUnnodncad'during t h e I n d i a n p o r t i o n of t h e t r i p , a l t h o u g h announcement was made of agreement s p e c i f y i n g t h e u s e s t o which I n d i a would p u t p a r t of t h e $375,000,000 credit f o r its T h i r d . Five-Year P l a n announced some months earlier.
The p r i n c i p a l economic h i g h l i g h t o f - t h e ghrushchev j u n k e t w a s I n d o n e s i a ' s a c c e p t a n c e of a $250,000;000 l o a n f o r development purposes which a p p a r e n t l y iaczuded p r o v i s i o n f o r addit i o n a l arms and equipment for t h e Indonesian armed forces, Khrushchev's heavy homage t o Sukarno followed a l o n g t h e l i n e s of S o v i e t commentary, which aot o n l y supported h i s anti-Western i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic measures b u t also o s t e n t a t i o u s l y s u p p o r t e d t h e Sukarno-proclaimed "guided demooracy Strong p u b l i c s u p p o r t for Djakarta's m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t rebel forces on Sumatra and Celebes and continued backing f o r Indoh*Waian claims t o West I r i a n more t h a n offset any losses MOBCOW may have s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of f n d o n e s i a ' s q u a r r e l w i t h Communist China o v e r r e s t r i c t i o n s D j a k & t a imposed on t h e Chinese b u s h e s 6 community in Indonesia. Khrushchev's 22 February announcement t h a t Moscow had decidkid to e s t a b l i s h a "Peoples' F r i e n d s h i p U n i v e r s i t y " was intendei? t o impress on h i a n s t h e importance w i t h which BlIoscow viewed c u l t u r a l and t e c h n i c a l exchanges, and- it foreshadowed g r e a t l y stepped-up efforts t o expand people-to-people c o n t a c t s . 'Khrushchev's repeated a s s e r t i o n t h a t China, I n d i a , and Xnilonesia should take p a r t in f u t u r e great power.conference8 r e p e a t e d a hoary S o v i e t t a c t i c which n e v e r t h e l e s s received a h e a v y ' f a v o r a b l e r e s p o n s e in Asia. H i s r e i t e r a t i o n a t gaXiirILoI Soviet supp o r t f o r Afghanistan's c l a i m s t o "Push~oonisfan;'t l i k e . h i s earlier backing of I n d o n e s i a ' s claims toWest' I r i a n , openly encouraged p a r o c h i a l Asian n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment.

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Ehrushchev's t r i p t o France f r o m 23 March t o ' 3 A p r i l took place i n a pre-summit atmosphere, w i t h t h e S o v i e t leader's remarks a t t u n e d t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n €hat cooperation between t h e S o v i e t Union and France w a s possible on terms which would r e s u l t i n a g r e a t l y enhanced French role in European affairs. Shrushchev's remarks at t h e D&plomatic Press Assoc i a t i o n luncheon on 25 March t h a t IBoscow s t o o d wholeheartedly behind de Gaul1,e's p r o p o s a l s f o r self-determination--an att i t u d e n o t overwhelmingly reflected i n t h e S o v i e t press o v e r t h e fpi?*eceding:: month&-typif ied h i s e f f o r t s t o allege a h a r k n y of Soviet and French i n t e r e s t s . A t a p r e s s confere n c e on 31 March, Khrushchev r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s t h e q u e s t i o n of Algeria. H e also w a s noncommittal concerning a n arms ban t o Africa and joint economic a i d t o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s known t o be f a v o r e d by de Gaulle. He-asserted S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s t o cooperate in r e n d e r i n g economic assistance, b u t he linked s u c h a p o s i b i l i t y t o '*agreement on disarmament" and rejected t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a l l s u c h ' a i d s h o u l d be under UN a u s p i c e s , a l l e g i n g t h a t "such a r e s t r i c t i o n would i n f l i c t great harm t o t h o s e c o u n t r i e s needing 'assistance.'* There was no mention of Soviet-French agreement on e v e n t s in

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ghrushchev's own 8ummary of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of h i s t r i p a g a i n c e n t e r e d on t h e growing importance of t h e new c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Bfrica, and L a t i n , l m e r i c a . Be emphasized t h a t it was i n tb'e Soyiet interest.kko h e l p these c o u n t r i e s become s t r o n g e r b o t h p o l i t i c a l l y and economically, n o t o n l y by t h e c o n t i n u e d and i n c r e a s e d e x t e n s i o n of credits t o f r i e n d l y governments b u t also b y l i m i t e d g r a n t s of material and t e c h n i c a l aid, &s announced on h i s v i s i t t o Burma and Afghanistan. Xhrushchev m a d e ' i t clear t h a t what h e had in mind was p o l i t i c a l and economic a s s i s t a n c e t o f r i e n d l y underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s so as t o s t i f f e n t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e t o Western p o l i c i e s - - t o Although Khrushchev again c o l o n i a l i s m 81howeverdisguised. lauded Nehru and Moscow's o f f i c i a l l i n e continued t o a v o i d criticism of n e u t r a l i s t leaders and governments, a p u b l i c l e c t u r e on 16 March in Moscow, a t t e n d e d by a Western o b s e r v e r , w a s more candid in g e n e r a l d i s a p p r o v a l of a l l bourgeois nat i o n a l i s t leaders w i t h t h e s i g n a l e x c e p t i o n of Guinea's Sekou Toure. Moscow's endorsement of Guinea's p o l i c i e s w a s made clear in t h e p u b l i c i t y it directed a t t h e Second Afro-Asian S o l i d a r i t y Conference held i n Conakry f r o m 1 to 17 A p r i l . 1 A Pravda e d i t o r i a l on 15 A p r i l cited Guinea as a ' * b r i l l & a n t exand a model f o r t h e peoples of Africa i n how t o a t t a i n and Q$e:.ChBir'r; fnddpendence

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t h e underdeveloped areas in t h e communique i s s u e d a t t h e c l o s e of t h e v i s i t , in Khrushchev's speech on h i s r e t u r n t o Moscow, or in the, 6 A p r i l J r a v d a e d i t o r i a l summing up t h e r e s u l t s of t h e '*hig.toric visi-n.$he other hand, p o i n t s of open disagreeqqnt were c a r e f u l l y s k i r t e d .

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Unlike Xhrushchev's. v i s i t t o France, Mikoyan's v i s i t toiIraq in A p r i l was .I;.~S keyed t o more modest lirnitg;-an,l assesament of' Q a s l m and of t h e prospects of MOSCOW~S heavy p o l i t i c a l and economic investment in t h e Iraqi regime. Mikoyan's 15 A p r i l press conference s t a t e m e n t t h a t MOSCOW*S f a i l u r e t o recognize t h e Algerian government-in-exile was done in t h e l a t t e r ' s i n t e r e s t p o i n t e d up t h e Soviet Union's predicament in a t t e m p t i n g t o maintain a moderate s t a n d tfsa - v i s P a r i s and a t t h e same t i m e a s s u r e t h e Arabs, and Asiansupport foe A f r i c a n s i n g e n e r a l , of t h e genuineness of %3%&2 t h e most a c t i v e of t h e c u r r e n t n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e s . The v i s i t also called a t t e n t i o n t o growing coolness between S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s and Qasim and Baghdad's increaspngly h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e toward Iraqi Communists. No communique was i s s u e d a t t h e conclusion of Mikoyan's ''unoff i c i a l * * ' v i s i t , and both c o u n t r y ' s p r e s s accounts were merely p o l i t e . S h o r t l y afterward, however, it w a s announced t h a t I r a q had accepted a new S o v i e t credit for modernization of t h e Basra-Baghdad r a i l road *

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The USSR's f u r t h e r investment in Iraq-in t h e face of signs of a l i m i t e d rapprochement of Qasim w i t h t h e West and of s t i f f e r measure8 by t h e Baghdad Government a g a i n s t local leftists-pointed up Moscow's a p p a r e n t , b e l i e f that close economic r e l a t i o n s with t h e new Asian and African n a t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y in t h e case of I r a q , t h e UAB, and a select f e w other a o u n t r i e s - i n combination w i t h its c o n s i d e r a b l e m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e program would prove d e c i s i v e over t h e l o n g term in determinwg t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r p o l i c i e s . The January announcenlent t h a t t h e UAB had accepted a long-term Soviet credit for completing t h e Aswan High Dam, for which c o n s t r u c t i o n had j u s t begun, can be viewed as a major propaganda triumph for Moscow. Despite a @ i l l i g g n e s s t o t o n e down its g e n e r a l h o s t i l i t y t o the West, as demonstrated on Khrushchev's American t o u r and i n Moscow's a s s e r t i o n of t h e importance o f ' t h e " s p i r i t of Camp David," t h e S o v i e t Union's version of "peaceful comp e t i t i v e coexistence" w i t h Western economic f n t e r e s t s i n t h e

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underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s r e v e a l e d a w i l l i n g n e s s t o employ h a r s h e r tactics on an o f f i c i a l . l e v e 1 . Mikoyan's speeches i n Mexic,g, Cuba, and I r a q e x e m p l i f i e d t h e t e n o r of MOSCOW~S attacks4'ion "foreign" c a p i h l i s t i n f l u e n c e s , as d i d h i s remmmendatJon t h a t L a t i n Americans-presented i n a n address t o Me% i c a n bus inessmen--expropr i a t e f o r e i g n h o l d i n g s without compensation as a means of r e c o v e r i n g some of t h e v a l u e looted from 'their economy b y - f o r e i g n ?*monopolies.'* In h i s speech t o t h e Supreme'Soviet. on 14 Januitry, Khrushchev a l s o asserted t h a t t h e West had an a b l i g a t i o n t o r e p a y t o t h e c o l o n i e s and former c o l o n i e s a p a r t of t h e riches &toled f r o m them; he r e p e a t e d t h i s l i n e i n h i s 25 January message.to t h e A l l - A f r i can P e o p l e ' s Conference a t Tunis, S i m i l a r l y , Mikoyan's Cuban and Iraqi speeches f e a t u r e d s h a r p attacks on Western trade and inues;tlhant p o l i c y i n t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . By t h i s time it had become a s t a n d a r d f e a t u r e for Moscow t o emphasize i n g e n e r a l terms t h e magnitude of S o v i e t f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e and its r o l e a s a prime motive force in i n t e r n a tional relations S o v i e t F i r s t Deputy Premier Kosygin, i n h i s 26 October r e p o r t t o t h e Supreme S o v i e t on t h e s t a t e development p l a n f o r 1960, had s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e coming y e a r Moscow would r e n d e r t e c h n i c a l assistance--and i n soae cases financing--in b u i l d i n g 288 i n d w s t r i a l p r o j e d t s i n b l o c countries and 95 i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . A widely c i r c u l a t e d s u r v e y of S o v i e t f o r e i g n economic o p e r a t i o n s and t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , The Competition of t h e Two'Systems and t h e Underdeveloped Cou*ies by A, S, Gdachenko, s i g n e d t o t = e r u a r y , emphasized t h e broad dimensions of Sov i e t a i d i n u n u s u a l l y c o n c r e t e terms, .The 1.5 b i l l i o n r u b l e credit t o I n d i a f o r f i n a n c i n g t h e T h i r d . F i v e Year P l a n w a s h i g h l i g h t e d as t h e largest credit ever extended by t h e Soviet Union t o a nonbloc country, and t h e i n f l u e n t i a l role of Sov i e t a s s i s t a n c e i n c e r t a i n of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s w a s p o i n t e d up by t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t S o v i e t f i n a n c i a l assista n c e . t o t h e DAR covered 50 p e r c e n t of t o t a l UAK e x p e n d i t u r e s for development projects and by t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t S o v i e t c r e d i t s to Afghanistan comprised 70 p e r c e n t of t h a t c o u n t r y e s t o t a l f o r e i g n developmental a s s i s t a n c e .

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KonmunistPs pre-summit s u r v e y s of developments in t h e non-5loviet " E bt,'' as w e l l as t h e fl6od of p u b l i c a t i o n s on Lenin as a prophet on o r i e n t a l developments i n connection w i t h Lenin 9 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y c e l e b r a t i o n s , gave heavy emphasis on t h e scope and i n t e n s i t y of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l ferment

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in Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America and t o &;diz?ection of S o v i e t p u b l i c i s t E Ivanov, em. t h e i r f u t u r e development phasizlne,,$he sigzag n a t u r e ,of e v e n t s in these areas and characteqdzlng t h e c u r r e n t ,bath of t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e as "an .c$ctremely complex and confused l a b e t i n t h , " eva3imted dd0eloplloentsLa$' eff e c t f v e l y a n t i c a p i t a l i s t , Chough adwit& &0d@n o t socialist Kommunist e d i t o r i n chief-'F. Konstantinov min$mieed t h e importance of t h e " w i l l and-'desires of t h e v a r i o u s peogleh'and governments".of t h e underdeveloped countries in determining t h e i r f u t u r e , a s s e r t i n g as more important a standard r e f e r e n c e to objective economic laws and "the course of t h e competition of t h e t w o world systems?--the i n t e r p l a y of S o e i e t and Western p o l i c i e s and prograws?"in t h e area. A c o l l e c t i o n o f articles on Lenin as t h e p r e c u r s o r of Moscow's c u r r e n t line--Leain ahd t h e E a s t , e d i t e d by Gafurov and released i n mid-.m e r h e i n t a u s p i c e s of t h e I n s t i t u t e s of O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s and of Sinologp-was a t t u n e d t o t h e s t r u g gle of Asian peoples t o amid t h e burdensome-path of c a p i t a l ist e v o l u t i o n and t o proceed more directly t o b u i l d i n g a; higher social order w i t h t h e advice and a s s i s t a n c e o f - t h e Soviet Union. The interim and t r a n s i t i o n a l n a t u r e Of t h e ' p r e s e n t p o l i t i c a l and social s t r u c t u r e s of t h e Asian., -'Bfrlcap, and L a t i n American states depicted in Soviet literature was not, however, reflected by any diminution i n Moscowls-'willingness t o commit itsel$ to s h o r t - and m e d i d - t e r m coopdrat2on w i t h existing non-Communist governments, given t h e c u r r e n t s t a g e in r e l a t i o n s between thb t w o camps.

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WgT-SUMMIT, PROSPECTS OF STIFFER ANTICOLONIAL LINE: _ . %y O c t o b e r 1960 .(

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Khrushchev's d i s r u p t i o n of t h e Paris t a l k s , a p p a r e n t l y in; &&act& I W E & L & & ? ~ I X ~ ~ :&ne i d e n t .::&dctth'e:'@kadaiw" i)'e~#rc$sp@a -.fxmtWdst4bn r*cadce&siwm :.on.agyc v f f tt;iremfu$$ariorit8tcllnld- ! k .n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , prompted a major e f f o r t by S o v i e t spokesmen t o a b s o l v e the USSR of any blame and t o convince t h e world p u b l i c t h a t t h e United States a l o n e w a s r e s p o n s i b l e . C l a i m i n g t h a t t h e t a l k s failed because a g g r e s s i v e m i l i t a r i s t s in t h e West feared t h e consequences of s e r i o u s East-West t a l k s , Moscow alleged t h a t W h i l e t h e S o v i e t Union had prepared f o r t h e conference by a d o p t i n g c o n c r e t e measures t o improve t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere and by working o u t "important proposals'' for p r e s e n t a t i o n a t Paris, t h e United States had t a k e n steps intended t o make pegotiations impossible. Moscow's v o c i f e r o u s attacks on t h e U-2 o v e r f l i g h t s as "outrageous" int e r n a t i o n a l behavior were designed i n p a r t t o minimize a d v e r s e world r e a c t i o n t o Khrushchev's t a c t i c s a t Paris and t o d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n from t h e c o l l a p s e of its pre-Paris l i n e , Despite t h e p u b l i c i z e d v i t u p e r a t i o n o v e r t h e U-2, S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s p u b l i a l y and p r i v a t e l y asserted t h a t i f t h e West d i d n o t engage in f u r t h e r "provocations, '* Moscow would do n o t h i n g t o d i s t u r b t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , Nevertheless, wi$h E a s t West t a l k s n o t expected soon, Moscow's i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s t u r e n o t i c e a b l y st i f f ened.
The USSR's i n i t i a l u t i l i z a t i o n of' t h e U-2 i n c i d e n t to p r e s s t h e US' a l l i e s t o remove American bases from t h e i r territories was u n s u b t l e and v i o l e n t , i n t h e apparent belief t h a t now as never before t h e a l l i e s were v u l n e r a b l e to popul a r n e u t r a l i s t s e n t i m e n t . Khrushchev warned t h a t "we s h a l l h i t a t those bases" from which any f u t u r e f l i g h t comes. This warning was repeated i n less p r e c i s e language i n t h e S o v i e t p r o t e s t n o t e s of 13 May t o Norway, P a k i s t a n , and Turkey t h r e a t e n i n g ''proper retaliatory measuresw i n t h e e v e n t of a f u t u r e i n t r u s i o n of Soellet a i r space. ~ Q S C O W ' S monthlong e f f o r t t o scare p e o p l e s i n t h e affected c o u n t r i e s t o demand t h a t t h e i r governments take measures t o p r e v e n t f u t u r e f l i g h t s and t h a t American t r o o p s be withdrawn reached a peak w i t h Marshal Malinovsky*s s t a t e m e n t on 30 May of h i s order t o t h e commander of S o v i e t r o c k e t f o r c e s t h a t i n t h e e v e n t of a f u t u r e v i o l a t i o n of bloc a i r space, he s h o u l d s h r i k e a t t h e base from which t h e i n t r u d e r came; f u r t h e r ghrushchev'

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a s s e r t e d , , i n a p r e p i conference on 3 June t h a t Malinovsky's In t h e absence warningiphould be understqod " l i t e r a l l y . of a n y i a p p a r e n t succesbl, t h i s campaign w a s allowed t o t a p e r off b u t was l a t e r r e v i v e d b r i e f l y . In a l e t t e r t o B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r BIacmillan in e a r l y August, Khrushchev reaffirmed t h e v a l i d i t y of Mal inovsky ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , b u t by t h i s t i m e t h e gambit had t a k e n on a p r o forma a s p e c t .
On 28 May, a t a labor conference i n Moscow Khrushchev reported on t h e summit breakdown. He a s s u r e d t h e assembled " l e a d i n g workers1*from a l l o v e r t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t Sov i e t policy, as before, would be d i r e c t e d toward r e a c h i n g an accommodation wieh.':the West. A t t h e same t i m e , however, he p r e d i c t e d t h a t ''more s u r p r i s e s were i n store for Americ a n i m p e r i a l i s t s " i n c o l o n i a l and formerly c o l o n i a l areas. The m i s s i o n of S o v i e t F i r s t Deputy Premier Kosygin t o Buenos . A i r e s in l a t e May i n connection w i t h t h e 150th a n n i v e r s a r y of A r g e n t i n a ' s '*Yay Revolution" attempted t o d u p l i c a t e Mikoyan's anti-US feats i n Mexico and Cuba. Kosygin app a r e n t l y had less s u c c e s s , as t h e F r o n d i z i government w a s . cool toward h i s d e l e g a t i o n . Nevertheless, a protocol broade n i n g t h e u s e s Argentina could make of t h e Soviet-Argentine economic agreement of October 1958-originally for petroleum equipment--was s i g n e d a t t h i s time

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ment. The j o u r n a l Modern and Contemporary H i s t o r y f e a t u r e d a r t i c l e s on these "progres=e f o r c e s " of 150 years ago, '*the direct a n t e c e d e n t s of t o d a y ' s p a t r i o t s , " gnd included a comprehensive bib1 iography of S o v i e t mohgraphs, pamphilets, and articles on L a t i n America p u b l i s h e d i n t h e S o v i e t Union s i n c e 1945-a s c a n t 70 items, i n c l u d i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s and e s s a y s p u b l i s h e d in S o v i e t p r o v i n c i a l j o u r n a l s o v e r t h e 15year period. While these developments implied o n l y a broader S o v i e t i n t e r e s t , Khrushchev's 28 May accUim of F i d e l Castro as.<a" f i e r y patrio..t*a w a s t h e p u b l i c s i g n a l of a newly i n i tiated phase of Soviet-Cuban r e l a t i o n s . S i n c e Yikogan's v i s i t t o Havana i n February 1960, t h e Castro government had shown itself w i l l i n g t o expand economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Hoscow and t h e b l o c as a whole and, i f anyt h i n g , appeared t o be f o r c i n g t h e pace of closer economic and p o l i t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n , With t h e breakdown of t h e P a r i s
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t a l k s , Moscow a p p a r e n t l y decided t h a t t h e advantages of a Moscow-o*iented Cuba i n i q t e n s i f y i n g t h e anti-US l i n e througho u t Ladh America were worth c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l and economkc r i s k s . Released, a t least for a s h o r t p e r i o d , f r o m i n h i b i t i o n s sterhming from i t s e f f o r t s t o p r e p a r e t h e way f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e US, Moscow adopted an ~ [ , u n p r e h ~ d 8 n t e d , ~ ~ ~ sla%tablt;l :i$tlial;.a.iwiWit r e s p e c t t o a L a t i n American country. In t a k i n g t h i s s t e p , M scow a p p a r e n t l y was encouraged b o t h by t h e " s t e a d y d r i f t t o t h e l e f t i n Castro's domestic and int e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s and by t h e i n c r e a s e in i n f l u e n c e and . r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of t h e Cuban Communist p a r t y . I n c r e a s i n g coo p e r a t i o n between t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s w a s reflected i n t h e announcement in Moscow on 17 June by Nunez Jimenes, director of t h e Cuban I n s t i t u t e of Agrarian R e f o r m , t h a t o i l - s u g a r exchanges were being stepped up "at t h e r e q u e s t of t h e Cuban Government" and t h a t W u s h c h e v had agreed t o an early exchange of v i s i t s w i t h Castro. Moscow's unannounced d e c i s i o n --apparently made i n l a t e May--to accede t o Havana's r e q u e s t t o purchase a r m s no l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e t o it from Western s o u r c e s sealed t h e rapprochement. Moscow and Havana tested US r e a c t i o n first w i t h a commercial t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a handful of h e l i c o p t e r s and then, i n a r a p i d series of s t e p s , concluded an agreement for and began t h e implementation of a major program of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d and t r a i n i n g .

' n a speech t o a teachers* conference i n Moscow on 9 I J u l y , Khrushchev t h r e a t e n e d t o u s e rockets a g a i n s t t h e US i f t h e ''Pentagon'' i n t e r v e n e d i n , C u b a . , T h i s was a c r u d e and s y n t h e t i c a t t e m p t t o create f o r himself t h e role of nprotector'' of t h e Cuban r e v o l u t i o n . It also went w e l l beyond t h e bounds of scow's s t a n d a r d tactical e x p l o i t a t i o n of ready-made o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o widen t h e breach between t h e US and governments of t h e Underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s and, as it was p a t e n t l y a b l u f f , reflected t h e USSR's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t there was l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of US i n t e r v e n t i o n . Uoscow*s d i p l o m a t i c and propaganda follow-up was in much less d i r e c t terms, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l purpose of t h e gambit was t o impress on t h e non-Communist L a t i n American p u b l i c t h e d a r i n g and might of t h e USSR without committing t h e Sov i e t Government t o any p a r t i c u l a r l i n e of a c t i o n i n defense of C a s t r o . KIitrrshchdle p r e s s conference s t a t e m e n t of 12 J u l y s u p p o r t i n g Havana reflected a r a p i d t r a n s i t i o n back t o gen-, eralized p o l i t i c a l and economic s u p p o r t and away f r o m h i s rocket t h r e a t , although he maintained h i s a c t i v i s t role w i t h

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a t h i n l y , y e i l e d s u g g e s t i o n ,that t h e Cuban people m o m e t i m e ' " w i l l mu$ter enough courage'* t o a s k r e t u r n of t h e Guantanamo base. .-;'
Ehrushchev's d e n i a l t h a t Communists c o n t r o l l e d t h e Ca&rd government or t h e Cuban r e v o l u t i o n and h i s a s s e r t i o n % h a t i f t h e y Brard, "the Cuban r e v o l u t i o n would have proceeded d i f f e r e n t l y " i n no way detracted from t h e p u b l i c image of close harmony between t h e t w o governments. Subsequent heavy S o v i e t a t t e n t i o n t o Cuba c e n t e r e d Qn a l l e g a t i o n s of US economic and p o l i t i c a l a g g r e s s i o n n o t o n l y a g a i n s t Cuba bbt Sthaoyghout L a t i n America. The j o i n t communique marking Raul Castro's v i s i t t o Moscow i n raid-July n o t o n l y p u b l i c l y affirmed but also gave an added solemn n o t e t o t h e new relat i o n s h i p of th.e t w o governments. Elements of a i S & x 6 n g 8 = i , i t d A B i?bv@l; p q 1 8 6 g d b e o a l s o I p r e s e n t i n East-West relations--Moscow's h a r s h l i n e i n breaki n g up t h e disarmament conference and its t r e a t m e n t of t h e RB-47 incident--and i n its e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e Congo s i t u a t i o n . The Kremlin's e a r l y e x p l o i t a k i o n of t h e Congo disorders p o i n t e d up t h e heavy propaganda a t t e n t i o n and more r e s t r a i n e d o f f i c i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n of a n t i c o l o n i a l i s m which had become s t a n d g r d Soviet practice. Moscow bad followed t h e progress of Belgian-Congolese independence t a l k s from t h e i r beginning and endorsed t h e upsurge of a g i t a t i o n and sentiment for freedom. Moscow's general views on t h e Congo as it approached independence were sumararized i n a monograph bv V. A. Martsnov, one of t h e younger g e n e r a t i o n of S o v i e t e k p e r t s on A f r i c a h "The Congo Under t h e Xoke of Imperialism;: N o v e m b n 5 9 , a a d i n a n authoris i g n e d t o t h e press on= t a t i v e essay by s e n i o r Soviet A f r i c a n i s t I. I. . ~ o t e k h i n , "Characteristic Features of t h e D i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e C o l o n i a l System of Imperialism in Africa," published i n Problems of O r i e n t a l S t u d i e s i n February 1960. The gist of t h e i r a n x y s e s was thaf -transition of t h e African peoples t o p o l i t i c a l independence would be f a i r l y rapid, though n o t u n i f o r n . F u r t h e r , v a r i e d t r a n s i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and social forms would appmar which, although d i f f e r i n g from those Moscow would propose i f its v o i c e were d e c i s i v e , would n e v e r t h e l e s s lead t o t h e r a p i d d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of Western p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e , and so s h o u l d - b e encouraged. A three-man S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n a r r i v e d in L e o p o l d v i l l e f o r t h e Congolese independence f e s t i v i t i e s on 30 June and n e g o t i a t e d agreements l e a d i n g t o t h e establishment of diplomatic and c u l t u r a l r e a t i o n s . Such promptness had long s i n c e become r o u t i n e .

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Moscow quickTy seized on t h e r i o t s and m u t i n i e s and t h e Belgian,;;reaction t h e y pregipitated a s a w i n d f a l l which could be expToited a g a i n s t t h e major Western powers n o t o n l y i n t h e Congo b u t throughout a l l Africa. Khrushchev's charge, in a press conference on 12 J u l y , t h a t - t h e W powers were A m us$ng t h e " p r e t e x t of -alleged disorder" t o reimpose t h e i r c o l o n i a l domknation--a charge seconded.by a s t r o n g l y worded government s t a t e m e n t on t h e next day--touched off a manys i d e d propaganda campaign t o harass Western i n t e r e s t s and i n t e n s i f y t e n s i o n s between A f r i c a n s and t h e West. On 15 J u l y Khrushchev pledged, i n response t o a message from Kasavubu and Lumumba, t o s u p p o r t t h e Congolese leaders and h i n t e d a t u n i l a t e r a l S o v i e t ai'd. H i s promise of " r e s o l u t e measures t o s u p p r e s s t h e aggression" w a s p u t i n t o a c t i o n w i t h i n a m a t t e r of days when a dramatic shipment of relief' s u p p l i e s and t e c h n i c i a n s w a s a i r l i f t e d t o t h e Congo. A t t h e same time, MOSCOW encouraged t h e Congo Government t o appeal t o t h e UN and v o t e d i n f a v o r of t h e r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r t h e with'drawal of Belgian t r o o p s and t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n of a UN force f o r t h e Congo. As t h e crisis worsened, Moscow's a t t i t u d e 'toward t h e UN s t i f f e n e d , and S o v i e t spokesmen moved from a r i t i c i s m of UN officers f o r not moving m o r e p r o p b t l y to enforce Belgian and Katangan compliance w i t h t h e S e c u r i t y Council r e s o l u t i o n of 14 J u l y t o open attacks on t h e UN f o r having kmproperly gone over t o s u p p o r t of t h e c o l o n i a l i s t s .
A t h i r d f e a t u r e of S o v i e t e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e crisis was its e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h i t s , o w n presence i n t h e Congo t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l and economic s u p p o r t of t h e Lumumba-cont r o l l e d elements i n t h e Congolese Government. Taking adv a n t a g e of t h e p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n and l a c k of f i n a n c e s and of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e chaos i n t h e L e o p o l d v i l l e government, S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s began a freewheeling e f f o r t t o b u i l d up pro-Moscow s e n t i m e n t i n government and p u b l i c circles by r u s h i n g i n relief s u p p l i e s , t e c h n i c i a n $ , and a d v i s e r s , and promising almost u n l i m i t e d economic aid. The u n r e s t r a i n e d e f f o r t s of t h e newly a r r i v e d S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c mission to discredit t h e U"s role i n t h e crisis and encourage t h e L e o p o l d v i l l e government t o open r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e U"s demands were t y p i c a l of Moscow's u n s u b t l e tactics. The i : : 2orCefQl: role of t h e S o v i e t ambassador, p i k h a i l Yakovlev, was donfirmed by documents released by the Congolese Government a f t e r t h e f a l l of Lumumba, T h i s phase of M O s c o w * s a t t e m p t t o implant its i n f l u e n c e came t o a n a b r u p t end on 15 September when Mobutu o r d e r e d a l l S o v i e t and bloc d i p l o mats and t e c h n i c i a n s o u t of t h e Congo.

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S o v j e t spokeqmen f a i l e d t o comment on t h e c o l l a p s e of t h e USSR's Congo gambit 06:t h e . heels of t h e d e c l i n e of Lumumb a t s i$.fluence. Moscow found thet it had i n s u f f i c i e n t res o u r c e s t o go it a l o n e , and a n t i h w e s t e r n A f r i c a n governments, r e s p e c t i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e n g t h and prestige of t h e UN, pr9ved not as r e s o l u t e i n f o l l o w i n g Moscow*s lead as t h e S o v i e t Unionlmight have wished. Among other t h i n g s , Moscow's, aborted experiment showed up its poor understanding and lack of s k i l l i n d e a l i n g w i t h A f r i c a n s e n s i b i l i t i e s .
Parallel t o t h e development of Moscow's a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m campaign i n Cuba and t h e Congo, greater a t t e n t i o q was dev o t e d after t h e breakup of t h e Paris s u m m i t meeting t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e correct Communist a t t i t u d e toward e f f o r t s by underdeveloped capitalist c o u n t r i e s t o s o l v e p o l i t i c a l and economic problems and of tactics and i d e o l o g i c a l l i n e s t o follow i n winning o v e r t h e i r governments and peoples t o c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e bloc. (Communist s t r a t e g y toward t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s h a s become a focus of HOScow-Peiping r i v a l r y , t h u s t a k i n g on a new urgency. As t h i s aspect d3-a ibcucr)$e'ai..Sn; de*a 132t n-;b~&rum 1EfilBUc:end!Q s : 3 ! ! U t stuc&g,the p r e s e n t paper makes no a t t e m p t t o relate S o v i e t policies and a t t i t u d e s and guidance to l o c a l Communist p a r t i e s t o t h e Sino-Soviet polemics.) Although Mosoow adopted a harsher l i n e a g a i n s t Western governments and a g a i n s t capitalism, it took p a i n s t o reassure Western powers t h a t t h e way t o n e g o t i a t i o n was s t i l l open on its former terms. Moreo v e r , Its guide l i n e s for Communist parties in t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America, insofar a s t h e y c a n be approximated, emphasized t h a t there s h o u l d be no r e l a x a t i o n of efforts t o cooperate l o c a l l y w l t h as many non-Communist elements as p o s s i b l e In a g e n e r a l e f f o r t t o reduce Western i n f l u e n c e and t o r e i n f o r c e t e n d e n c i e s toward parochial n a t i o n a l i s m .

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Moscow's post-summit a t t i t u d e was a p p r o p r i a t e l y summarbed i n a long article i n Sovetska a Bossi a on 30 June parties i n reviewing t h e expanding role o t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . The s u r v e y s p e c i f i c a l l y warned a g a i n s t "rushing ahead, p u t t i n g forward premature s l o g a n s of Socialist reforma where c o n d i t i o n s are n o t ripe." It emphasized t h e " i n s t r u c t i v e example" for parties of "the E a s t and L a t i n America" of t h e Iraqi p a r t y ' s s e r i o u s m i s c a l c u l a t i o n in mid-1959 when its demands for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Q a s i m government led t o a lp&&2. i t h Q a s i m ' s n a t i o n a l i s t w

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Arab forc,qs and t o , r e p r e s s i v e measures a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y by t h e goveghment. Moscow a p h r e n t l y was concerned over s i g n s of diss.$tisf c t i o n i n some p a r t i e s w i t h its s u b o r d i n a t i o n a of t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t class enemies t o t h e tactical dictates of c a r r y i n g out a w o r l d - w i d e a n t f - i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c y , and by t h e ' p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t under u r g i n g from P e i p i n g , some local parties wouEa'again resort t o t h e i r i n h e r e n t p r o p e n s i t y f o r h e a t i n g up t h e attack on class enemies, t h u s i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e delicate s k e i n of S o v i e t diplomacy. Even those Communists n o t drawn i n t o t h e i n t r a - and inter-pansy polemics could n o t ' i a i l t o be impressed by Moscow*s unequivocal r e i t e r a t i o n . o f its p o s i t i o n on 12 August, i n a Pravda a r t i c l e by p a r t y ideol o g i s t Boris Ponomareb, and on m u s t by t h e dean of So-

v i e t specialists on n a t i o n a l - l i b e r a t i o n movements, Academician Eugene Zhukov. Other S o v i e t programmatic s t a t e m e n t s l i k e w i s e s p o t l i g h t e d t h e cold w a r a s p e c t s of these movements. Sov i e t A f r i c a n dpecYali6t2 S D a t l i n , w r i t i n g i n Kommunist i n . August, hailed t h e s t r u g g l e between c o l o n i a l i s m and t h e nat i o n a l - l i b e r a t i a n movsment i n Africa as '*a great h i s t o r i c a l battle...which has f a r t r a n s c e n d e d t h e boundaries of t h e African c o n t i n e n t , w i t h now almost t h e e n t i r e world t a k i n g p a r t i n it e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y . " Moscow's "peacerr l i n e w a s eclipsed in May by t h e first phase of its s t r i d e n t attacks on t h e West f o r making t h e summ i t t a l k s Impossible and its a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t Western l'prov o c a t i o n s " undermined t h e very basis of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relat i o n s . With t h e new S o v i e t d i s a r a a m e n t # p r o p o s a l s of 2 June, Moscow began a new campaign t o e n l i s t s u p p o r t i n t h e under: developed c o u n t r i e s for LA@;: ~ ~ 6 ~ i d i o O r - c O d o e \ ~ S a n m ~ s nit~ ; ~ ~ ; l . . : - .

Again Moscow l i n k e d disarmament t o p r o s p e c t s of v a s t l y increased o u t s i d e aid f o r economic development i n Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America; i n t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e J o u r n a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs, A. Kodachenko p r e s e n t e d a " t e n t a t ive" f i g u r e of $-lion a year which,

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it can c o n f i d e n t l y be s a i d g e n e r a l and complete disarmament f i o u l d release? f o r f i n a n c i n g t h e economic progregs of t h e undzrdeveloped c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America.
The f i g u r e mentioned by Kodachenko does n o t bear up under-.ana l y s i s , b u t It I s i n t e r e s t i n g as a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e l e n g t h s t o which Moscow has gone t o b u i l d i l l u s o r y and u n r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s of r a p i d economic development, t o assert t h a t

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n o t econgpic but p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s s t a n d i n t h e wag of a five-fo$;d increase i n f o r d g n a s s i s t a n c e , and t o p o i n t t o source.g'of added capital--the e l i m i n a t i o n of m i l i t a r y exp e n d i t u r e s on t h e p a r t of underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , t h e use of c u r r e n t goreign m i l i t a r y a i d for peaceful c o n s t r u c t i v e puqposes, greater trade r e c e i p t s , and p r o f i t s of $15 b i l l i o n annually--whikh Kodachenko alleges flow o u t of t h e underdeveloped countries--in a d d i t i o n t o i n c r e a s e d f o r e i g n ass i s t a n c e made possible by disarmanent of t h e major powers. S o v i e t propagandists also used t h e l i n e t h a t "unequal exchange is a weapon of colonialism," c i t i n g s p u r i o u s f i g u r e s of S o v i e t economist.A. A. Santalov as evidence t h a t c o l o n i e s and former c o l o n i e s lose approximately $9 b i l l i o n a year from '?unequivalenttt exchange--unf avorable<terms of trade-w i t h Western powers.
Moscow d i d n b t r e l y on these s u s p i c i o u s s t a t i s t i c s alone. A j o i n t session of t h e e d i t o r s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Affairs and t h e " S c i e n t i f i c Counciltt of t h e p a r t y ' s Academy of Social Sciences which w a s devoted t o "The Two Socio-Economic Systems i n t h e World Arena" emphasized Soviet and bloc production achievements i n t h e race t o c p v e r t a k e t h e US economically as having t h e greatest s i g n i f i c a n c e for determining t h e course of world affairs. With h i s u s u a l f l a r e , Khrushchev asserted i n Bucharest bn 21 June t h a t bloc economic advances, "like a m u l t i s t a g e r o c k e t , w i l l c e r t a i n l y lead t h e people of t h e whole world i n t o t h e o r b i t of
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The eight-day l5Vth I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress of O r i e n t a l ists, held i n Moscow' i n August, brought together almost 2,000 delegates from 60 countries--with t h e conspicuous absence of a s i n g l e delegate from China, although t h e S o v i e t press some months earlier had p r e d i c t e d a Chinese d e l e g a t i o n i n t h e hundreds. T h i s meeting w a s a prime example o f ' S o v i e t rmanipulat i o n of a respected, scholarly, i n t e r n a t i o n a l organLzation t o s u p p o r t its c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s and t o discredit t h e West p o l i t i c a l l y , economically, and i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n t h e underdeveloped S o v i e t F i r s t Deputy Premier Mikoyan's o f f i c i a l greet**East i n g t o t h e congress, and t h e opening and c l o s i n g speeches of Moscow~st o p orient~list-administrator; B ~ f t f E Q ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ e ~ ed Moscow's dedicat $on t o 1 q u i d a t i n g "as soon as possible" i t h e remains of colonialism. Moscow~s" u n s e l f i s h " economic and moral support and t h e "pricelesstt S o v i e t exp-nce in developing its C e n t r a l Asian republics-some Asian and A f r i can participahts:wwre.:escorted through these areas a f t e r

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t h e congrRss--were,emphasized i n s u p p o r t of efforts t o impress visitors2;from t h e underdevaloped c o u n t r i e s w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y of Marx;lst-Leninist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c u r r e n t developments and w i t h t h e p r a c t i c a l aim of S o v i e t p o l i c y - t o h e l p backward peoples become p o l i t i c a l l y , economically, and i d e o l o g i c a l l y free $ram Westerninfluence. Although t h e congress r e v e a l e d ho$new tack i d S o v i e t p o l i c y i n Asia and Africa, it unders c o r e d bloscow's preoccupation w i t h i n c r e a s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l and psychological gap between t h e Wesatern powers and t h e i r c o l o n i e s and former c o l o n i e s , as w e l l as t h e scope of S o v i e t i n t e r e s t and t h e r e s o u r c e s behind Moscow's a n t i c o l o n i a l campaign.
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Khrushchev's performance a t t h e 1 5 t h General Assembly session i n New York, where he gained f o r himself an unprecedented audfence of w o r l d leaders and h e l d t h e world spotl i g h t for weeks, was t o a great e x t e n t p o i n t e d toward imp r e s s i n g on t h e world public--especialIky t h e peoples and gov,: ernments of t h e underdeveloped countries--the high p r i o r i t y of t h e task of p u t t i n g an end LQ colonialism. While Khrushchev managed t o keep t h e idea of a s u m m i t meeting a t t h e .Porefront of world p u b l i c opinion, and w h i l e Soviet p o l i c y continued t o create c o n d i t i o n s making an early meeting between Soviet and American leaders anaear: imperative, t h e weight of t h e Soviet p r e m i e r ' s o f f i c i a l and p e r s o n a l diplomacy $ss in t h e d i r e c t i o n of i n f l u e n c i n g t h e c o u n t r i e s of IlOn-blQh.:; Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America, s l n g l y and in c o n c e r t , t o a heightened a s s a u l t : , on cozonialism. Khrushchev's demands f o r an immediate end t o t h e remaining vesOiges of imperial r u l e o v e r a l i e n peoples dramatized a s t a n d long i n p l i c i t i n Moscow*s f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s and, of course, e x p l i c i t i n world Communist agitation. He managed t o g i v e t h e appeal t o popular opinion an unusual degree of v i v i d n e s s and of urgency, r e i n f o r c i n g it by k e s t u r e s of pereonal and p o l i t i c a l f r i e n d s h i p t o n e u t r a l i s t and n a $ i o n a l i s t leaders. Radiating from Khrushchev's o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l conduct and t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n ' s maneuvers a t t h e assembly w a s a fundamental e f f o r t t o impress on t h e leaders of t h e governments of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America t h l t in t h e 15 y e a r s s i n c e t h e end of t h e w a r there had been a major change i n t h e balance of world power which had n o t y e t been reflected p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i n either t h e policies of t h e s e governments themselves nor i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations-s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e UN. This involved both a r e s t a t e m e n t of

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M O S C O W ~ ~&ong-stancjard claim t o have r i s e n t o a p o s i t i o n of p a r i t y 2 w i t h t h e United g a t e s and t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e d i s $ h t e g r a t i o n 6f t h e c o l o n i a l system, which had res u l t e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n of dozens of new states, freed t h o s e states from having to submit t o p o l i t i c a l and economic dom$nation, either d o m e s t i c a l l y o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , and t h u s opened tlfe'way for t h e former c o l o n i e s t o p l a y a new and d e c i s i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l role. Khrushcbevf s bizarre publ i c behavior and characteristic mingling of f r i e n d l y and b e l l i g e r e n t p o s t u r e s may have stemmed in p a r t from a d e s i r e t o .&uphasize t h a t S o v i e t s t r e n g t h and confidence was such t h a t he could ignore Western norms and s e n s i t i v i t i e s .
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Khrushchev s i n i t i a t i v e i n seeking a fundamental reo r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e UN which would reflect h i s views on t h e c u r r e n t c c b r e l a t i o n tsg f o r c e s w a s intended t o s t i m u l a t e Asian and African demands f o r a greater v o i c e i n UN a f f a i r s , as w e l l as t o l a y t h e groundwork for f u t u r e major changes i n t h e UN s t r u c t u r e and s t a f f i n g which would a s s u r e MQSCOW 'that t h e could no l o n g e r be used e f f e c t i v e l y t o oppose Soiriet p o l i c y anywhere i n t h e world. H i s demand f o r t h e immediate a b o l i t i o n of a l l m i l i t a r y bases on f o r e i g n territory-a demand he l i n k e d w i t h t h e move for immediate l i b e r a t i o n of a l l areas s t i l l under c o l o n i a l rule--showad t h a t he recognized t h a t t h i s was a n o t h e r i s s u e capable of a r o u s i n g t h e masses and t h a t even a p a r t i a l v i c t o r y where Western bases were m o s t v u l n e r a b l e t o popular p r e s s u r e s wouldcbe a n important g a i n for Mqscow. Khrushchev's r e p o r t on 20 October t o t h e S o v i e t people on t h e r e s u l t s of h i s New York s t a y , which he dezended as not o n l y worthwhile b u t necessary, gave prime emphasis t o h i s p r o p o s a l s for r e o r g a n i z i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e uE3 t o reflect three major blocs, and ts a r e i t e r a t i o n of Moscow*s disarmament p o s i t i o n rather t h a n 60 its more a g g r e s s i v e a n t i c o l o n i a l l i n e . Khrushchev did, however, confirm MQScow's s t r o n g e r s t a n d on A l g e r i a when on 3 October in New York he embraced Algerian Deputy Premier K r i m Belkacem and s a i d a t a luncheon on 7 October t h a t r e c e n t Soviet-Algerian c o n t a c t s meant i n e f f e c t de f a c t o r e g o g n i t i o n of t h e prov i s i o n a l Algerian government. Khrushchev% :assb&Dion-oh.20 October t h a t "we have rendered and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o r e n d e r them a l l t h e a s s i s t a n c e w e can**--accompanied by an i n c r e a s e of material a i d t o Algerian r e f u g e e s by So4iet "public organizations'*--confirmed t h e view t h a t , a t least f o r t h e time

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being, ~ O S C O W had,given up hope of wooing France and French PresideRt de Gaulle away qkom close cooperation w i t h NATO, West G$rmany, and t h e United S t a t e s in p a r t i c u l a r .
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The assumption underlying Moscowt8 p o l i c y towsrd t h e un9erdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , an assumption t o which t h e Soviet Union has clung d e s p i t e heavy p r e s s u r e s from both i n d i d d and o u t s i d e t h e bloc, is t h a t t h e world is p a s s i n g through an i n t e r i m period--of u n c e r t a i n b u t s h o r t duration--during iidhich forces now i n motion w i l l b r i n g about a b a s i c a l l y new world s i t u a t i o n . Changes w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, and L a t i n America w i l l r e f l e c t a s h i f t i n t h e c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s of t h e twuworld power blocs. T h i s i n t a r n , centers on t h e s u c c e s s f u l completion of Moscow*s short- and medium-range economic glans, achievemengs which w i l l allege d l y convince everyone of Communist economic--and by extension also m i l i t a r y - - s u p e r i o r i t y over t h e West i n terms which w i l l make Moscow's i n t e r n a t i o n a l v o i c e d e c i s i v e . Within t h i s framework, S o v i e t leaders c o n t i n u e t o d i s p l a y an i n t e r e s t i n , keeping cmicial i s s u e s w i t h t h e West, such as B e r l i n and disarmament, from coming t o an e a r l y showdown, and t h e new forms and novel l i n e s followed i n t h e Soviet WnionOs broadened and I n t e n s i f i e d f o r e i g n a c t i v i t i e s , " t o answer f u l l y contemporary demands," have been directed toward making t h i s i n t e r i m period as short and as p o l i t i c a l l y profitable as possible.

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Moscow' s 'lmodernized b¶arxist-Lenipistv* approach has been designed t o b r i n g about a r a p i d t a a n s i t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic policies of t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s toward j o i n t or parallel o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e West--including v o t i n g w i t h t h e bloc in t h e UN, acceptance of close economic ties and c u l t u r a l relations w i t h Communist c o u n t r i e s , and, in t h e g u i s e of " s o l i d a r i t y 1 ' and common i n t e r e s t of t h e c o u n t r i e s of Asia, Africa, a n d . L a t i n America, closer alignment of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s behind t h e l e a d e r s h i p of anti-Western extremist leaders. More and more, Moscow has committed its p r e s t i g e t o a small but growing number of f o c u s e s of anti-Western s e n t i ment such as Indonesia, Guinea, Cuba. In a greater number of t h e new states, S o v i e t p o l i c y is based an t h e d i p l o m a t i c and economic encouragement of narrow n a t i o n a l i s t i c sentiment, i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t e n s i o n s between anti-Western extremists and pro-Western e l e m e n t s ' f o r leadership of these governments w i l l lead t o a g r a d u a l e l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i d e o l o g i c a l t i e s w i t h t h e West. In t h i s r e s p e c t ,

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. Moscow's,political and economic s u p p o r t for non-Communist n e u t r a l $ & and n a t i o n a l i s i c governments of Asia, Africa, and LaOPn America h a s n o t e e n a pure g a i n for local Communist&, whose major role, as t h e most dedicated anti-Western element, has been reduced t o propagandizing Moscow*s c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i n e . F l e x i b i l i t y of tacties, w i t h t r k d i t i o n a l big-power p o l i t i c s plalying a more s e r i o u s role t h a n classical bbrxian formulas, and a g e n e r a l l y pragmatic diplomacy s i n c e t h e advent of Khrushchev t o t o p S o v i e t leadership--spiced by an e l e m e n t of experimentation--probably w i l l l a s t as long as Khrushchev has t h e d e c i s i v e voice. The i n c r e a s i n g l y d a r i n g n o t e i n Moscow's p o s t - P a r i s p o l i c y toward "imperialismtf#a p p a r e n t l y ref l e d t s a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t world p u b l i c opinion, backed by t h e vaunted might of t h e **socialistcamp," can be manipulated t o deter e f f e c t i v e Western c o u n t e r a c t i o n .

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The Gorld-wide expansion of S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and economic a c t i v i t y , which has l e d t o a Soviet **presence'*i n t h e remotest areas of t h e world and made t h e Soviet Union a bargaining factor, either d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e a t 3 p, in every p o l i t i c a l and economic t r a n s a c t i o n of an underdeveloped country w i t h t h e o u t s i d e world, has yielded p o l i t i c a l and economic g a i n s of no mean order. ly(oscow's siazective use of its r e s o u r c e s t o achieve maximum effect on key countries-w i t h a consequent r e l a t i v e l y modest d r a i n on its own resources--does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t economic c r i t e r i a w i l l force any c u r t a i l m e n t of t h i s program,, even a l l o w i n g for a considerable i n t e n s i f i e d t i o n of domestic demands for a higher s t a n d a r d of l i v f n g and real o r a n t i c i p a t e d i n t r a b l o c r e q u i r e ments. Grah8dd t h e o v e r r i d i n g i n f l u e n c e of t h e t e n p e r a t n r e of East-West r e l a t i o n s on t h e tactics--though not t h e direction--of Soviet p o l i c y , t h e p r o s p e c t s are overwhelmingly on t h e side of an even greater S o v i e t e f f o r t t o inOiluence t h e course of developments i n t h e underdeveloped areas.

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