CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A.

VILLAROSA)
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 169202 : March 5, 2010 MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review1cacalw of the 27 May 2005 Decision2cacalw and 2 August 2005 Resolution3cacalw of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioners request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport. The Facts Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioners request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request. On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating thus: This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is applying for renewal of her passport using her maiden name. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these conditions.4cacalw (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000.5cacalw On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal6cacalw and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239. chanroblesvirtua| awlibary On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.7cacalw Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.8cacalw Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 August 2005. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals Ruling The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code9cacalw and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.10cacalw The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her husbands surname in her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement passport.

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The Issue The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. The Ruling of the Court The petition lacks merit. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs.cra|aw" We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court.11cacalw In Yasin,12cacalw petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained that: When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husbands name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husbands full name or by adding her husbands surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as use of her former husbands is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.13cacalw She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent.14cacalw In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, petitioners marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of ones marriage. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states: Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following requirements: x x x (d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied) The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport." These instances are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides: The passport can be amended only in the following cases: a) Amendment of womans name due to marriage; b) Amendment of womans name due to death of spouse, annulment of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of his parents. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not

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resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.15cacalw This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname.16cacalw In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.17cacalw However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law,18cacalw thus: I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.19cacalw Moreover, petitioners theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective.20cacalw For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.21cacalw This petitioner failed to establish. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands surname before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents,22cacalw cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it23cacalw as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be surrendered to any person or entity other than the government or its representative.24cacalw As the OSG correctly pointed out: T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondents competence to regulate any amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant case.25cacalw WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice Associate Justice

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

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structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from SECOND DIVISION Jennifer to Jeff. The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff G.R. No. 166676 Petitioner, of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf. cralawPresent: To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. CRALAWQUISUMBING Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the - versus CRALAWCARPIO MORALES Philippines Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical CRALAWTINGA, certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He VELASCO, JR., and explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body cralawBRION, JJ. secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, cralawPromulgated: very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of Respondent. female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified cralawSeptember 12, 2008 respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of that gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. DECISION The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 QUISUMBING, J.: which reads: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth was medically proven that petitioners body produces male Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following hormones, and first his body as well as his action and changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male. is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and The facts are as follows. identified as a male. On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following Siniloan, Laguna. corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees: registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, a) By changing the name from Jennifer she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons b) By changing the gender from female to thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further MALE. alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

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records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data. SO ORDERED.[3] Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling. The issues raised by petitioner are: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT: cralawI. THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND, cralawII. CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4] Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for noncompliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7] On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11] Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide: Rule 103 CHANGE OF NAME cralawSECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court]. cralawSEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) cralawThat the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) cralawThe cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) cralawThe name asked for. cralawSEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. cralawSEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic. cralawSEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

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cralawSEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY cralawSECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. cralawSEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. cralawSEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. cralawSEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. cralawSEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. cralawSEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. cralawSEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for noncompliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need

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for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18] Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19] The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20] Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth certificate entry is in order. Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male. In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male. WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice ATTESTATION cralawI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION cralawPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

Manila FIRST DIVISION ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES cralawcralawG.R. No. 174689 SILVERIO, Petitioner,Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairpers on, the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man Malakas (Strong) and the woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) cralawWhen is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? cralawOn November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. cralawPetitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male. cralawHe further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent

cralawcralawcralawSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, -v e r s u s-cralawcralawCORONA, cralawAZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. cralawPromulgated:

October 22, 2007 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA, J.: When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!, the voices said. She pecked

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. cralawFrom then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. cralawAn order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. cralawOn the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. cralawDuring trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. cralawOn June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for. The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from Rommel Jacinto to MELY and petitioners gender from Male to FEMALE. cralaw On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The petition lacks merit. controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

A PERSONS FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGN MENT cralawPetitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied) cralaw Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or The change will avoid confusion. does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. NOLA W ALLO WS THE CHAN GE OF ENTR Y IN THE BIRTH CERTI FICAT E AS TO SEX ON THE GROU ND OF SEX REASS IGNM ENT

(2)

(3)

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or typographical error is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: xxxxxxxxx (3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and(16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied) SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. cralawIn such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. xxx xxxxxx (emphasis supplied) A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words sex, male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

or the distinction between male and female. Female is the sex that produces ova or bears young and male is the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova. Thus, the words male and female in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary. Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term sex as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category female. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. cralaw In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY cralawThe trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. cralawThe changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams. No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. cralaw WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. cralawCosts against petitioner. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice WEcralawCONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate JusticeAssociate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

EDWARD V. LACSON,G.R. No. 150644 Petitioner, Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, cralaw- versus -cralawSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,cralaw CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON andMAONAADABANPromulgated: LACSON, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006 Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

DECISION GARCIA, J.:
cralawPetitioner

Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban Lacson, has come to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal andsetting aside of the Decision dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution of October 18, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
cralawFrom

would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward's mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually tookup nursing at St. Paul's College in IloiloCity. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Courtof Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
cralawIn

the petition and its annexes, the respondents' reply thereto, and other pleadings, the Court gathers the following facts:
cralawThe sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are

legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.For a month, they stayed with Lea's mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Lea's ) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea's mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.

that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward's failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.
cralawIn

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea's efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea

his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint. As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the court's corresponding order of May 13, 1996.
cralawFollowing cralawTherefrom,

Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 60203.
cralawEventually,

trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial court's decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001, dismissed Edward's appeal, disposing as follows;
cralawWHEREFORE,

premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.
cralawDouble

1)

Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the amount of TWO MILLIONFOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite;
cralawOrdering

costs against the defendant 'appellant [Edward Lacson].

cralawSO

ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

cralawIn

time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.
cralawHence,

Edward's present hissubmissionthattheCA erred I.

recourse

on

XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY RESPONDENTS' UNCLE NOEL DABAN. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO ' RESPONDENTS.

2)

defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)PESOS as attorney's fees; and Pay costs.

II.

3)

III.

SO ORDERED.

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONER'S OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE ' RESPONDENTS. lacks merit.
demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because itcame by way of a request or a plea.As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision, thus:
cralawFrom

cralaw cralawThe petition cralaw cralawPetitioner

admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:
cralawArticle

1976, [respondents' ] mother now and then went to their [paternal] grandmother's house by their father and asked for support; this notwithstanding their father's commitment for this purpose which the latter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two (2) years. xxxxxxxxx December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children, the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs' mother asked extrajudicially for her children's support since 1976, when she went to her mother's house. '.(Words in bracket and underscoring added.) cralawThe appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in the following wise:
cralawWe cralawLast

203 ' The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
cralawTo

petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.
cralawPetitioner's above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it

conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of

could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioner's ] posture of tryingto evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

mother did not make a 'formal demand therefor from him. [Petitioner's ] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will 'sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa] also statedas requested by their mother thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by [respondents' ] mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that [petitioner's ] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from 1976. (Words in bracket added).
cralawThe

compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.
cralawPetitioner's

Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this rule onconclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioner's plea for a review of the CA's findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Courtis not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, except when, as earlier indicated,

second specification of error touches on the CA's affirmatory holding that respondents' uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioner's lament on the matter isa veritable call for review of factual determinations of the two courts below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban.Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education, or, in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is not amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Dabanwho, owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to support her children. cralawPursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
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the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

cralawMention

may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. cralawAs for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawPetitioner

a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property. But, as the CA aptly observed, 'there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact '[respondents' ] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective shares on said property.
cralawSecondly,

the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioner's suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous and self-serving.
cralawPetitioner,

closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy ' thus release him from complying with- the underlying judgment for support,assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support in arrears.
cralawPetitioner's

unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioner's daughters.
cralawWHEREFORE,

the appealed AFFIRMED.

cralawCosts cralawSO

the instant petition is DENIED and CA decision and resolution are

against petitioner.

ORDERED.cralaw CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it assumes as

cralawWE

CONCUR:

CIVIL LAW (ELY LOYD A. VILLAROSA)

Chief Justice REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVALGUTIERREZ Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice ATESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN