How can collective action create better designed international institutions ?

The definition of Collective action is the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more than one person1. It is a term which has formulations and theories in many areas of the social sciences1. Explaining the evolution of cooperative tendencies is one of the central puzzles of the social sciences 2. Understanding how institutional structures can best promote collective action is a central object of political science2. Though these projects usefully inform each other, such an exchange is limited by differing assumptions about human nature2. One side views cooperation as a ubiquitous feature of human life and seeks to explain why this is so given the apparent fitness maximizing advantages of selfishness .Those interested in the design of political institutions generally assume that humans are selfish, and view institutions as the coercive means to provide incentives for cooperation Hobbes and Madison ,for example, both base their institutional prescriptions for government on a central assumption that people are self-interested rather than cooperative2. This may explain why there is, especially given the importance of the issue, relatively little research investigating any causal link between differing institutional environments and the evolution of cooperative predispositions 2. In this paper we examine we seek to add to this sparse literature by doing exactly that. Following Hobbes (and many who followed), we assume a selfish state of nature.2 Into this selfish state of nature we introduce varying institutional arrangements and observe how different institutional regimes channel the evolution of initially self-interested predispositions2. We design a series of computer simulations where a key rule of strategic interaction among individual agents is determined by either a single agent (an authoritarian system), a collectively determined measure of central tendency (a representative system), or by each individual agent (an individualistic state). Agents are endowed with individual traits (selfinterest, group orientation) that determine their interactions with other

agents2. These traits are heritable, with successful agents passing on their traits to the next generation.2 . The success of many economic endeavours depends on peoples ability to refrain from individually profitable actions for the sake of the common good. Such collective action problems have the key characteristic that, because individual actions have externalities on others, private and social optima do not coincide3. Key examples are the use of common property resources where the actions of individuals impose negative externalities on others, and the provision of public goods where the actions of individuals impose positive externalities on others.3 In this paper we review the existing evidence and provide some new results on two aspects of collective action problems.3 First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behavior and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate?3Most of our discussion will focus on collective action problems in developing countries. Institutional design has particular relevance in these countries both because formal institutions that regulate the use of common resources and the provision of public goods are generally absent, and because many of the worlds poorest individuals depend on these resources for their livelihood.3 The management of forest resources, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems provide important examples of collective actions problems faced by the worlds poorest. 3Around one third of the worlds population relies on firewood for energy (Edmonds 2002) and agriculture is the main source of income for the majority of the worlds poor. In addition, forests, pastures and irrigation systems are typically locally managed. In all these cases, the collective action problem has two prongs3. Extraction by one user creates a negative externality by reducing the amount available to others, while investment into maintenance generates positive externalities for theentire community3. Political theorists have long proposed a particular actor as a source of punishment to solve the cooperation problem: Government4. Indeed, the legitimate application of coercive power to counter self-interested behavior is the central justification for government in Hobbesian political theories4. What keeps people from ducking costly obligations in social, economic and political interaction is that standing behind covenants among individuals is

the sword of the state4. It is generally recognized that governments coercive powers play a central role in making collective action possible, and most political thinkers interested in the design of political institutions assume a highly self-interested human nature4 .There is a long running debate over just how strong a centralized power is required successfully create and maintain collective action in a polity4. James Madison,for example, accepted that men are no angels, but sought to fragment rather than centralize political power5. He argued that social collectives (factions), not just individuals, acted self-interestedly5. To preserve individual liberty and the greater collective good, it is thus best to institutionalize fragmentation of power to prevent any single faction from exercising if for their self-interests over the interests of others.5 The intellectual descendents of Adam Smith have also argued against institutions that overly centralize authority5. Friedman, for example, argues that individuals acting in their own self-interests can produce a collective good without recourse to a Leviathan.5 Ostrom at all empirically demonstrate that it is possible to make covenants without a sword,.Such covenants without the sword, however, probably do require some underlying institutional structure, even if it comes in as shared social norms as opposed to formally imposed rules from the state5. The importance of social structure or norms in supporting cooperation and collective action has been demonstrated through computer simulations, laboratory experiments, and from broader observations of the social, political and economic world.5

1 http://dictionary.babylon.com/collective action/ 2 Kevin B. Smith,Douglas Oxley- Collective Action Creates Cooperative People:Political Institutions and the Evolution of Cooperation,pp 3 Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay ,Imran Rasul-Cooperation in Collective Action,April 2005 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations 5 idem 2

Bibliography: Bandiera,O,Iwan Barankay,Rasul,I-Cooperation in collective action Elinor Ostrom-How do institutions for collective action evolve CERNY, Philip G. Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, International Organizations, Vol. 49 OLSON, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1965