Politics Internal Link Turn

Berkeley 2009 <Author Name>
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POLITICS INTERNAL LINK TURN
ILDemocracyquality discourse
Gridlock forces statesmen to fight for their beliefs resulting in quality discourse. This is necessary in any democracy Newsweek 2009: Levin, Yuval. "Partisanship Is Good." Vol. 153, No. 8. 23 Feb: 30. SIRS Researcher. Web. 16 Dec
2010. Our deepest disagreements coalesce into two broad views of human nature that define the public life of every free society. In a crude and general way our political parties give expression to these views, and allow the roughly like-minded to pool their voices and their votes in order to turn beliefs into action. To ridicule these disagreements and assert as our new president also did in his inaugural that "the time has come to set aside childish things" is to demean as insignificant the great debates that have formed our republic over more than two centuries. These argumentsabout the proper relationship between the state and the citizen, about America's place in the world, about the regard and protection we owe to one another, about how we might best reconcile economic prosperity and cultural vitality, national security and moral authority, freedom and virtueare divisive questions of enormous consequence, and for all the partisanship they have engendered they are neither petty nor childish. They are the substance of the political life of a healthy and thriving democracy, and Barack Obama, whether he likes it or not, has just thrown himself into the middle of them all. We can all join him in the pursuit of the public good. But in a democracy that pursuit includes arguing over just what the public good might be.
ILDemocracyIncr. participation
Gridlock key to more informed voters and has been responsible for increasing political participation in recent elections Farrell (professor of political science at George Washington University) 2009 The Prospect
http://web.ebscohost.com/pov/pdf?hid=13&sid=c25e4eef-e132-4d0e-bb0c-9fb57b486b9a%40sessionmgr111&vid=2 None of the civic-decline academics, whether they focused on voter participation, social capital, or the quality of deliberation, saw much use for political parties or partisanship. Putnam, in seeking to define American politics broadly, systematically underplayed the importance of partisan competition as a mobilizing force. While he surely acknowledged the significance of party-focused participation, he depicted it as merelyone form of civic participation among many. In his view, joining a local Democratic organization was no different from joining local civic groups like the Jaycees, and both seemed decidedly retro. Fishkin and his colleagues actively depicted partisanship as part of the problem. Fishkin suggested that deliberative democracy went hand-in-hand with a Madisonian vision of politics that had been partly subverted by the rise of political parties. Together with Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman, he claimed that the current political system encouraged parties to mobilize partisan extremists at the expense of the moderate center and tried to design deliberative exchanges to minimize the role of partisanship. The rebirth of civic participation this year is not a product of experiments in deliberative democracy or a new interest in league bowling. Rather, it is based on party politics, coupled with and accelerated by new opportunities provided by the Internet. Skocpols claim that conflict and competition have always been the mothers milk of American democracy tells part of the story. Just as social-movement theorists might have predicted, the major innovations came from outsiders, like members of MoveOn.org, who wanted to challenge the system. At the time when it led opposition to the Iraq War, MoveOn represented a point of view that had little support among political elites, which meant it wouldnt have been able to use conventional tools of interest-group pol itics even if it had wanted to. Instead, it turned to the Internet and created a new model of mass mobilization.technology and partisanship arent only increasing participation. Theyre also leading to a burgeoning of public debate, albeit not the kind that Fishkin and other academics imagined. Political blogs dont fit well with deliberation theory. They are rough, raucous, and vigorously partisan. Yet they have been far more successful than any deliberative experiment in encouraging wide-scale political participation and involving large numbers of people in real and lively democratic debate. Successful deliberative experiments have typically been small-scale, leading to real doubts about whether they can be scaled up to even the level of a state. The distributed conversation of the blogs, in contrast, involves millions of people, arguing vehemently about politics and other issues in interconnected forums of debate This may be a headache for the new administration. It isnt necessarily a bad thing in itself. Political conflict between parties with clearly diverging political platforms has its own pathologies, just as does the bipartisan-consensus politics it is replacing. However, it has the decided advantage of giving voters real choices. It should not be surprising that people are more inclined to participate in politics when they strongly identify with one political party and believe that it is important for that party to win elections, even if it cuts against a persistent anti-partisan bias in American political thought. For generations now, public intellectuals have been asking for more participation in American politics. Like it or not, theyre getting their wish
ILDemocracyfounding fathers and dire times

The founding fathers built America on a basis of partisanship which is responsible for the nations success. Americans have will set aside differences during gridlock to find common ground in order to solve dire problems such as sparking nuclear war. Goodwin, Chuck ,Counterpoint: Political Bipartisanship Is a Concession of America's Values. By: Points of View: Bipartisanship, 2010
During the founding of the United States, the Continental Congress reflected a diverse range of thought and views, mirroring the variety of defined values among the populace of the original thirteen colonies. These defining values not only differed geographically, representing both urban and rural areas, as well as those citizens of the South, the Mid-Atlantic states, and New England, but socioeconomically as well, as they represented both wealthy landowners and small farmers. All were similar in the fact that they were English colonists, but each possessed their own respective defined views and values. The convening founding fathers had to identify the core values that they believed represented this early American society, and which would become the basis of American law and government. New Englanders had their own distinctive views of what government and its rule of law should reflect, as did Southerners. While the basic values of each element were rooted in English society and law, and thus reflected broad agreement, as the founding fathers began to thoroughly examine and determine the distribution of limited resources, the broad interpretation of these similar values became defined by the more narrowly identified regional interpretations of them. Yet, in the face of overwhelming risk and threat, these early Americans set aside the more defined differences in order to find the common threads of agreement to forge a nation. Significant compromises were decided upon to create a nation and a new democratic government. These thirteen colonies set aside their differences and, in pursuit of creating a new nation, retained the most important general principles and values, at the broadest level. Inevitably, a democracy will be defined by a characteristic divergence of ideologies concerning both the distribution of limited resources, and how to achieve commonly held values. If the democracy is to operate effectively, there needs to be a consensus in order to foster progress and usher policymaking forward. Yet, building a consensus does not necessarily mean that the basic principles and values are to be sacrificed in obligatory concessions. In the consensus-building approach, all parties must identify the shared goals and focus on the commonality of purpose.
ILDemocracySolid party positions

Gridlock is key to solid party positions and increasing political participation. This preserves democracy Doh Chull (Doh Chull Shin is professor of political science at the University of Missouri at Columbia and Since 1988 he has directed the Korean Democracy Barometer program) 2007 Partisanship and Democratization
http://web.ebscohost.com/pov/pdf?hid=13&sid=f7af8853-d3c6-4a58-bdbf-2610a307363f%40sessionmgr112&vid=5
Political parties perform a variety of functions for achieving, maintaining, and improving the quality of democracy. How effectively parties can perform such democratic functions, however, depends largely on whether they form an institutionalized party system that has taken root deeply in society. One indicator of such a viable party system concerns the extent to which voters identify with a party or have a party preference. Without widespread citizen attachment to political parties, the electoral process becomes highly volatile and the legislative process becomes highly unpredictable in its formulation of major policies. Such partisan attachment, known as partisanship, is, therefore, essential to the institutional process of democratization. The democratization effects of mass partisanship go well beyond the institutional dimension of democratization. As a political predisposition often called a prime mover, partisan attachment powerfully shapes many other political attitudes and beliefs. As discussed in earlier articles, it motivates ordinary citizens to engage in electoral and other political activities. Furthermore, as a long-term affective orientation, it motivates them to perceive
and react positively to the political world in which they live. By promoting favorable attitudes toward the democratic system in which citizens live, partisanship can contribute to the process of legitimizing democratic rule in the minds
of the masses.
ILDemocracyclear party positions

Gridlock discourse clarifies a political factions position. Key to a functioning democracy Yglesias, Matthew. 2008; Atlantic Monthly The Case for Partisanship (10727825), Apr, Vol. 301 Issue 3, p15-16,
2p<http://web.ebscohost.com/pov/detail?hid=13&sid=f7af8853-d3c6-4a58-bdbf2610a307363f%40sessionmgr112&vid=6&bdata=JnNpdGU9cG92LWxpdmU%3d#db=pwh&AN=31229675> In short, the political scientists of the time wanted polarization. They got it, of course, and the result, in the general view, has been unseemly and unwelcome. Polarized politics takes the form of a bitter, endless feud; cross-party alliances, once the mainstay of Washington life, are now rare. Yet as today's presidential candidates call for a less divisive kind of polities, it's worth recalling the 1950s. While polarization has its drawbacks, the alternative is often worse. For veteran Washington hands-wheelers and dealers in the lobbying game or at the major interest groups-the new system is worse than dull. It's emasculating. This is why political elites find polarization so distasteful. In a polarized world, elections and procedural rules largely determine policy outcomes; there's little room for self-styled players to construct coalitions on the fly, and enhance their own power in the process. The growth in the lobbying industry might seem to belie the point, but consider Tom DeLay's post-1994 "K Street Project"--which pressured lobbying firms who wanted access on the Hill to hire more Republicans--or the swing of the pendulum back after the Democratic takeover in 2006. Power in Congress is firmly in the hands of the party leadership; lobbyists become less powerful, not more, in a polarized system. But for voters, the boring new ways can be looked at in another way--they're straightforward. Elections have a predictable and easy-to-understand relationship to government action. Electing a Democrat means, on the margin, more spending on the federal safety net and more government regulation, while electing a Republican produces policies more favorable to business interests. You don't necessarily get everything you want (ask any liberal disappointed by the continued flow of funds for the Iraq War), but at least on domestic measures, things move predictably. Under the looser system, it was hard to know where the parties really stood, or what effect elections might have. In 1956, for example, the voters of Idaho turned out their incumbent conservative Republican senator, Herman Welker, in favor of the Democrat Frank Church, whose liberal views included strong support for civil rights. Church's election helped preserve the Democratic Party's slender majority in the Senate, despite pickups by several Republicans. But as a result, the Judiciary Committee--with its jurisdiction over civil-rights issues--came under the gavel of Mississippi's James Eastland, a die-hard segregationist.
ILFiscal DX Govt intervention/spending

Gridlock key to fiscal discipline and less government intervention in the economy Tanner, Michael (senior fellow at the CATO institute); 11/11/10 More Gridlock Please CATO Institute
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12544 But history should have taught us that often, the best way government can help solve our problems is to stop doing things. Voters clearly thought so: On election night, 56% told exit pollsters that the government is doing too many things better left to business and individuals.
In many ways, gridlock is the political equivalent of the Hippocratic oath first, do no harm. Just look at the past few years. If we had had a bit more gridlock, we might have been spared both TARP and the stimulus bill, as well as a job-killing, budget-busting health plan. Our federal debt would be far lower than it is today, and government regulations would be less burdensome. What little gridlock we did have saved us from a ruinous carbon tax. For the next two years, gridlock means that government will spend a lot less of our money. We know from history that during periods of divided government, which tends to lead to gridlock, government spending increases by an average of less than 2% annually. In contrast, under unified government with cooperation rather than gridlock, spending grows by an average of more than 5%.
Gridlock might also give businesses confidence that there won't be a repeat of the new taxes and regulation of the past two years, encouraging them to invest, expand and hire.
ILFiscal DX further stimulus

Newsweek 2009: Levin, Yuval. "Partisanship Is Good." Vol. 153, No. 8. 23 Feb: 30. SIRS Researcher. Web. 16 Dec
2010. Like most presidents, Barack Obama came to The White House hoping his unique gifts might overcome party divisions in Washington. And as with most presidents, it has not taken him long to discover otherwise. His second week in office saw the most distinctly party-line vote on a major piece of legislation in the House of Representatives in many years, as
exactly zero Republicans voted for the stimulus bill, while all but 11 Democrats backed it. The bulk of the fault surely lay with the bill itself. Hardly a model of post-partisan pragmatism, it was a kind of greatest-hits collection gathered up from two decades of Democratic pet projects. Assorted union giveaways, boosts to favored federal programs, regulatory fixes, grants to constituent lobbies and other sundry odds and ends were all shoved together into a mess of a bill, designed more to satisfy the longstanding demands of Democratic interest groups than to address the particulars of the economic crisis. Republicans felt no guilt in opposing it. Even some Democrats who voted for it were uncomfortable. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's spokesman, Brendan Daly, explained the 11 Democratic defections by saying: "Many of the
districts are more conservative, and they campaigned on fiscal responsibility, and we understand that"suggesting, it seems, that the bill his boss sponsored was fiscally irresponsible.
ILFiscal DEvades Extinction

Gridlock preserves fiscal discipline which evades human extinction after Americas bankruptcy The Washington Times Doug Mainwaring, 6/3/2010 The power of positive partisanship SPECIAL TO THE
WASHINGTON TIME (DC), 06/03/2010, p3-3, 1 http://web.ebscohost.com/pov/detail?hid=13&sid=9cbceed4-07fb-4ddeb4e6082afa078f18%40sessionmgr12&vid=1&bdata=JnNpdGU9cG92LWxpdmU%3d#db=pwh&AN=4KB520100603041925000 025 Partisanship is now a four-letter word. Daily we hear the doleful claims that partisanship is gridlocking our legislative bodies and hindering responsible governance. Just as often, we hear shouts that partisanship will destroy our country. Partisanship is used interchangeably with "obstructionism"- meant to convey the presence of a dark force at work within the halls of power in Washington - which is useful because it inherently casts blame on the minority party. But perhaps the turn toward partisanship we have taken is not a wrong turn, but a very necessary adaptation. Partisanship may well be the lamented dominant political phenomenon of our time, but it might just also be a stopgap mechanism that is our salvation. Throughout the decades since the New Deal, our country has been sliding down a slope toward economic unsustainability and, perhaps far more troubling, cultural divisiveness. That slope is getting steeper. Our great cultural melting pot is being traded for the "salad bowl"- a nation of unrelated lowest common factors instead of the sublime synergistic equation we once were. An entitlement mentality first quietly snared the hearts of American citizens and the ids of politicians during Franklin D. Roosevelt's reign. In the intervening decades, a dangerous alliance has been forged between the huge blocs of voters receiving entitlements and the politicians receiving their votes, purchased through the redistribution of other people's money. The list of entitlements has grown over the years to the point where America faces inevitable bankruptcy. What if partisanship is not an objective evil, but rather, the strong medicine the times require in order to save our nation from the fate of Greece and the other social democracies of Europe, which now stand on a precipice? Closer to home, what if partisanship is the device saving us from the fate of our own California, where social programs and unreasonable promises to the legions of unionized government workers are dragging its economy off a picturesque Big Sur cliff? With both houses of Congress and the White House controlled by men and women who embrace not centrist, but far-left ideologies, partisanship is the harness holding the entire nation back from falling into the Grand Canyon, never to recover. Partisanship, for now, keeps us tethered to sanity and safety. The problem is that there is no longer a shared, common belief about what America is or should be. Ideologies have diverged so far to the right and to the left that there is a gaping crater in the center of the political arena. What is both saddening and frightening is that much of what is labeled as conservative partisanship was, until a generation ago, solid, ordinary, mainstream Americana. Until America can re-form that center, the best we can do is to restrain and fend off current and future debilitating legislation. The ultimate, restorative answer involves an enormous, near-superhuman undertaking to once again establish and embrace our American heritage, our distinct American identity and our envied American dream. We are Americans. We can and will do it. Perhaps now more than ever, as massive legislative efforts based on extreme ideologies ideologies that are foreign to the reason and sensibilities of most Americans - are being enacted, partisanship is saving the day. It is a stopgap measure, however, not the end. The Tea Party movement is beholden to neither major political party, though members of the movement are extremely grateful for the current partisan tactics of the Republican Party. The Tea Party movement stands in that gaping crater, appealing to the reason of all legislators and those who now seek to be legislators to exercise fiscal responsibility and constitutionally limited government.
ILFiscal DX Radical policies and X spending

The Washington Times 10/7/10 James T. Hackett (Official that served under the Reagan Administration) Gridlock is good http://web.ebscohost.com/src/detail?hid=13&sid=ab96af3b-8ae5-4d57-8dc70e9345a55096%40sessionmgr4&vid=1&bdata=JnNpdGU9c3JjLWxpdmU%3d#db=nfh&AN=4KB52010100704112771002 6
Some observers are warning that if Republicans win one or both houses of Congress, the result will be gridlock. They just don't get it. Gridlock can be good. It canhold down spending and keep bad bills from being passed. The Constitution provides a balance of powers, and the country often has lived with divided government. A recent example was from 1995 to 2001, when Bill Clinton sat in the White House and had to deal with a Republican majority in Congress. The resulting checks and balances forced President Clinton to move toward the center and led to a balanced budget and welfare reform. Two-party rule prevented excessive government spending and kept the most radical ideas from becoming law. Over the past two years, we have seen what happens when one party wins all the levers of power. Nothing is vetoed, and the pressure groups that helped win power are paid off. The Obama administration passed bills with little or no Republican support that cost trillions of dollars. The $800 billion stimulus bill was supposed to be for"shovel-ready"projects that would immediately put thousands to work. Instead, it was a huge Christmas tree of spending bills. Cobbled together in one big chunk of money, it paid off Democratic constituents and government labor unions. The administration's target of 8 percent unemployment was never reached, and unemployment is still holding now, 20 months later, at 9.6 percent. Consider that more than $58 billion went to state and local governments to help balance their budgets. The administration praised this spending as"saving the jobs"of thousands of police, schoolteachers and other government employees. But that is what governors and state legislators are elected to do. In states such as California and New York, they grossly overspent their budgets and then turned to Washington for bailouts. In fact, they were not about to fire schoolteachers or firefighters - that is always what they say when they want to raise taxes. The stimulus ended up subsidizing insolvent, often Democrat-led states at the expense of taxpayers in other states that were fiscally prudent. Then there was $48 billion more earmarked for education, which for many years was a local responsibility. Much of that, of course, was a payoff to one of the Democrats' biggest constituencies, the teachers unions. Deep within the 1,073-page bill are such little goodies as $8 billion for high-speed rail, never mind that no one needs it. After all, airlines fly you anywhere at generally reasonable cost - at least where there is competition - and do so a lot faster than high-speed trains. Don't forget the energy section of the stimulus, which set aside $41 billion, much designated for"green"projects. Many of these are pie-in-the-sky ideas that will burn money while not producing lasting results or putting people to work. President Obama signed this legislative monstrosity less than a month after taking office, but it was just the beginning. With majorities in both houses of Congress, the Democrats, led by liberals House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, rammed through one spending bill after another. If the result of gridlock is just to stop more spending, it will be worth it for that reason alone. Last week, House Republican leader John A. Boehner told an audience at the American Enterprise Institute that he wants to fix the"dysfunctional"House so it can better serve the American people. He would break up big spending bills into more manageable parts and make it easier to make cuts. He also has put in place a moratorium on earmarks for Republican congressmen. This is a beginning. In a weekend interview with the Wall Street Journal, Rep. Eric Cantor, Virginia Republican, Mr. Boehner's deputy, went further. Step 1 after the election, he said, is to extend the George W. Bush tax cuts, and Step 2 is to"cut spending as much as we can."He also promised"real earmark reform,"but that means an internal fight with Republicans wedded to earmarks. The Republican Party is at a crossroads. Most Republicans support the Tea Party goals of smaller government, less spending and a balanced budget. But many Republican members of Congress have spent their careers supporting government spending so they could"bring home the bacon." If Republicans take control of one or both houses of Congress, the first thing they should do is remove all members of the appropriations committees and appoint new, fiscally responsible members, with terms limits for those offices. Next would be to enforce an outright ban on all earmarks, begin defunding the more outrageous things the Democrats passed, and implement the changes proposed by Mr. Boehner and Mr. Cantor.
10
***IMPACTS***
11
ImpactDemocracy (Human Rights)

Democracy Provides Rights, And Weve Seen It Been Empirically Proven Langlois, Lecturer at International Relations at Flinders University, Australia. 03 (Anothny J., Human
Rights Without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis, Human Rights Quarterly, 2003) Project Muse. The generation of the Bandung Conference saw a swath of Western colonialist nations become independent sovereign states, and many of these have had a checkered history with democratic forms of government. 5 Regardless of the various successes and failures that could be cited here, it is nonetheless the case that for many of the international fora in which these states participate, democracyof some formis the benchmark for good governance. An example which shows both the reality and the ambiguity of this situation is the manner in which Zimbabwe conducts its "democracy," and the way in which this was assessed and judged by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Australia, during 2002. 6 The good and the bad of the incremental spread of democracy as the international form of governance is also marked by the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and its influence throughout what was known as the "Eastern bloc." While many states are now formal democraciesmost notably Russiamany would argue that the real extent of democratization is very superficial. 7 Nonetheless, the acceptance of the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government, and the considerable freedoms that do exist compared to previously, cannot be dismissed. In Asia a slightly rosier picture can be painted, particularly with recent [End Page 991] developments in Indonesia and with the creation of the sovereign and democratic state of East Timor. Indonesia itself, however, remains a highly ambiguous case. 8 It is no longer a dictatorship, as it was under Suharto. Nonetheless, its move toward democracy is highly ambivalent. As in the former Eastern bloc, there are many power structures and lines of command that exist as layers above and beneath the formal and material constructs of a democratic nation state. Its formal commitment to democracy raises nothing but questions when put in the light of its relationship to its new neighbor East Timor, whose recognition as a sovereign and democratic republic emerged out of a cold blooded massacre by the Indonesian army. 9 While East Timor may be clearly committed to the creation of democratic political culture, Indonesia's response to its complicity in the series of massacres that marked East Timor's independence (in the way of show trials for human rights abuses and the like) show the ambiguity of its claims to democracy. 10 Such cases could be multiplied. What they illustrate is on the one hand, the internationalization of democratic governance, and on the other, the ambiguities of this process. 11 A similar story is often told about the spread of human rights. Here, however, the emphasis on ambiguity and the tentative nature of affirmation is often lacking. 12 The success of human rights in the second half of the twentieth century, and now into the new millennium, is genuine. 13 However, the dimensions of this success are often inflated by the rhetoric of the human rights discourse and by the nature of the intellectual constructs that are used in the justification of the idea of human rights. Here I refer to the ideas of universality and of natural law, which so often undergirdin an only superficially satisfactory manner the human rights discourse. 14 The institutional nature of the human rights discourse also provides a framework inclined to inflate the success of human rights. 15 At the broadest level, we [End Page 992] can look to the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its concomitant human rights machinery, and the grand institution of international human rights law in search of its real "success."
12
Democracy GoodPrevents extinction

Democracy prevents multiple scenarios for extinction Diamond, 95
[Larry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives." A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie Corporation of http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm Downloaded 7-15-09] New York. December 1995.
The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
13
Democracy Good Diamond

Global democratic consolidation prevents many scenarios for war and extinction Diamond 95 Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of
their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
14
Democracy Good War

Democratization decreases warthe best models prove Ward and Gleditsch 98 Michael D. Ward, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, graduate research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review
As Figure 1 details, democratization-whether
in mild or strong degrees-is accompanied by reduction, not increase, in the risk of war. Though we do not present graphs of the converse, changes toward autocracy and reversals of democratization are accompanied by increased risks of war involvement. These risks are proportionally greater than the decline or benefits of further democratization. Thus, there is strong evidence that democratization has a
monadic effect: It reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a war. Although the probability of war involvement does not decrease linearly, it does decrease monotonically, so that over the entire range of democracy minus autocracy values, there is a reduction of about
50%. During the democratic transition, at every point along the way as well as at the end points, there is an attendant reduction in the probability of a polity being at war. We also find that reversals toward greater levels of autocracy (not shown)
not only increase the probability of war involvement. Apparently, it is more dangerous to be at a given level of democracy if that represents an increase in the level of authoritarianism than it is to be at the same level of democracy if that represents a decrease in the authoritarian character of the regime. Stated differently, reversals are riskier than progress .ll It has been argued that institutional constraints are theoretically important in translating the effect of democracy into foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Siverson 1995). If the idea of democracy is separated into its major components, then the degree of executive constraints empirically dominates the democracy and autocracy scales (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Accordingly, we demonstrate that moving toward stronger executive constraints also yields a visible reduction in the risk of war.
It continues
CONCLUSION Our
results show that the process of democratization is accompanied by a decrease in the probability of a country being involved in a war, either as a target or as an initiator. These results were obtained with a more current (and corrected) database than was used in earlier work, and our analyses also focus more clearly on the process of transition. In comparison to studies that look only at the existence of change in authority characteristics, we examine the direction, magnitude, and smoothness of the transition process.
Democratization decreases the chance of war Ward and Gleditsch 98 Michael D. Ward, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, graduate research trainee in the Globalization and Democratization Program, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review
The argument that democratization can bring about war is a powerful critique suggesting limits to the linkage between democracy and peace. This research examines this claim. Our
findings demonstrate that democratizing polities are substantially less war prone than previously argued. By focusing on the characteristics of the transition process, we show that as contemporary polities become more democratic they reduce their overall chances of being involved in war by approximately half. We also
find that rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals are associated with a countervailing effect; namely, they increase the risk of being involved in warfare. Both in the long term and while societies undergo democratic change, the risks of war are
reduced by democratization and exacerbated by reversals in the democratization process. To reach these conclusions, we developed and applied a logit model linking authority characteristics and war involvement using Polity III and Correlates of War databases.
15
Democracy Good War

Democracy solves great power war more likely to negotiate, and when they do fight they choose easy targets Tarzi 7 Shah, Professor of Economic Affairs @ Bradley, Democratic Peace, Illiberal Democracy and Conflict Behavior, International Journal on World Peace, vol 24
Bueno de Mequita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith are among the few who have sought to overcome the conceptual dilemmas noted above. Specifically they have provided insights on the link between institutions and foreign policy choices with reference to international disputes and conflicts. They find that democratic leaders, when faced with a choice, are more likely to shift greater resources to war efforts than leaders of the autocratic governments because political survival of the elected democratic regime demands successful policy performance, especially as the winning coalition grows. Thus, democratic regimes tend to have a military edge over autocratic regimes in war because of the extra efforts required. Also, "democratic leaders only choose to fight when they are confident of victory. Otherwise they prefer to
negotiate." (22) Bueno de Mequita and his colleagues conclude, Democrats make relatively unattractive targets because domestic reselection pressures cause leaders to mobilize resources for the war effort. This makes it harder for other states to target them for aggression. In addition to trying harder than autocrats, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typically leads to domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war when they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often termed the democratic peace. Autocrats need a slight expected advantage over other autocratic adversaries in devoting additional resources to the war effort. In order to initiate war, democrats need overwhelming odds of victory, but that does not mean they are passive. Because democrats use their resources for the war effort rather
than reserve them to reward backers, they are generally able, given their selection criteria for fighting, to overwhelm autocracies, which results in
find it hard to overwhelm other democracies because they also try hard. In general, democracies make unattractive targets, particularly for other democracies. Hence, democratic states rarely attack one another. (23)
short and relatively less costly wars. Yet, democracies
16
Democracy Good Environment

Democracy solves environment accountability, information flow and markets. Li, Prof of poli sci at Penn State, and Reuveny, prof of public and environmental affairs @ Indiana U 07 (Quan and Rafael, The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219)
Environment
Moving to the view that democracy reduces the level of environmental degradation, one set of considerations focuses on the institutional qualities of democracy. The responsiveness argument is that democracies are more responsive to the environmental needs of the 1995). It is also argued that democracies
public than are autocracies due to their very nature of taking public interests into account (Kotov and Nikitina, comply with environmental agreements well, since they respect, and respond to, the rule of law (Weiss and Jacobsen, 1999). The freedom of information channel is offered by Schultz and Crockett (1990) and Payne (1995). They theorize that political rights and greater freedom for information ows help2 to promote the cause of environmental groups, raise public awareness of problems and potential solutions, and encourage environmental legislation to curtail environmental degradation. Democracies also tend to have market economies, which further promotes the ow of information as economic efciency and prots requires full information. Hence, unlike the above
argument, this channel expects that prot-maximizing markets will promote environmental quality (Berger, 1994).
Democracy solves environment less war, famines and more repsonsiblity. Li, Prof of poli sci at Penn State, and Reuveny, prof of public and environmental affairs @ Indiana U 07 (Quan and Rafael, The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial Environment http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219) A second set of considerations on the positive role of democracy on environmental quality focuses on the effects of democracy on human life and crisis situations. The famines argument (Sen, 1994) observes that famines tend to
promote environmental degradation because they divert attention away from longer-term environmental concerns. Since famines typically do not occur in democracies, argues Sen, environmental quality is
expected to be higher in democracies than in autocracies. The human life argument (Gleditsch & Sverdlop, 2003) suggests that since democracies respect human life more than autocracies, they are more responsive to lifethreatening environmental degradation. A related argument, the war channel, reasons that to the extent that democracies engage in fewer wars, they should also have a higher level of environmental quality (Gleditsch & Sverdlop, 2003), since war often destroys the environment of the warring parties (Lietzmann & Vest, 1999).
17
Democracy Good Trade

Democracies increase trade confidence with rule of law. Li, Prof of poli sci at Penn State, and Reuveny, prof of public and environmental affairs @ Indiana U 07 (Quan and Rafael, The Effects of Liberalism on the Terrestrial http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/24/3/219)
Environment
If trade can be used as a tool of power, who will trade with whom? Grieco (1988), Gowa (1994), and Gowa and Manseld (1993), among others, expect that states will avoid trade with states they consider to be their actual or potential adversaries. In such situations, the concern for relative gainswho gains more from trademay reduce trade ows to trickles, as the side that gains less will worry that the side that gains more may translate the gain to military power. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. regulated its trade with the Soviet bloc based on this logic. Since democracies are expected not to engage in wars against each other, they feel more secure in
their bilateral trade and may be content with trade regardless of who gains more. Democracy, then, should promote trade (e.g., Russett & Oneal, 2001; Morrow, 1997; Snidal, 1991). Moreover, since democracy is associated with the rule of law and respect for property rights, agents will feel more secure to trade as the level of democracy rises, as it is more likely they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their investments (e.g., Olson, 1993; Clauge et al., 1996).
Democracy leads to free trade Milner 2 Helen Milner, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Summer 2002, International Organization
We have argued that the regime type of states can strongly affect their propensity to cooperate on economic issues.
Leaders in democracies have a greater incentive to pursue international cooperation in trade than do their nondemocratic counterparts. We
developed this argument using a formal model of trade policymaking emphasizing the electoral constraints faced by political leaders. Although there are many reasons why countries choose to cooperate, our analysis emphasizes how a countrys regime type creates domestic
political incentives for leaders that influence this choice. Our model assumes that both democratic and autocratic leaders would like to maximize the rents stemming from trade barriers, but that both may lose office if their rent seeking becomes excessive. The problem faced by voters and leaders, however, is that voters have incomplete information about their leaders. behavior: they do not know exactly what trade policy their leaders have chosen at any point in time. And domestic executives cannot credibly commit to accurately divulge this information. Hence, when
because the executive was too extractive, but rather because
exogenous shocks adversely influence the economy, an incumbent executive may be voted out of office not voters mistakenly assume that the executive was engaged in protectionist predation. The prospect of losing elections due to factors beyond the incumbent executives control provides a strong incentive to find ways of reassuring voters that the government is not being too extractive. Trade agreements are one such means. Commercial agreements can mitigate the executives informational problem. The monitors of these
agreements.either countries that are party to them or the international trade institutions themselves.can credibly signal to voters whether their leader is cheating or abiding by the agreement. Accusations of cheating against one.s government by foreign countries or an international institution are newsworthy events that can alert (at least some) voters to the governments behavior. Because of this signal, executives can improve their chances of re-election. In democracies, however, voters have a greater impact on the tenure of leaders than in autocracies, since the democratic electorate can more easily turn incumbents out of office. Since autocratic leaders face fewer worries about re-election, they have fewer incentives to relinquish policy autonomy and sign trade agreements, making them less likely than more democratic leaders to
seek commercial cooperation. The greater accountability of leaders to voters in democracies makes a difference. Surprisingly, this result is obtained even though democratic executives discount the future more heavily than their autocratic counterparts. In our model, international agreements serve a domestic purpose. They allow executives to commit themselves credibly to actions that voters would otherwise find incredible. Unilateral trade barrier reductions are less credible to voters and more easily repealed than are mutually agreed-upon international reductions. Others have argued that international institutions promote cooperation by providing information, but they have been less specific about how this mechanism actually induces leaders to choose cooperation.60 Here, we identify one mechanism by which cooperative agreements can convey information to voters about the behavior of their leaders, thus allowing voters to better judge their leaders. Other mechanisms might serve this purpose as well, but our claim is that trade agreements do so especially well. The information provided by trade agreements benefits all of the players in our analysis voters and governments alike. Existing studies rarely acknowledge that international institutions can serve this function. The tendency for such institutions to be created with monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms suggests their importance in disseminating information domestically as well as internationally. International cooperation can thus generate domestic political benefits for leaders,
empirical findings strongly support the two central hypotheses World War II, more democratic countries have displayed a greater likelihood of concluding trade agreement than other countries, even when holding constant various political and economic
making them more likely to seek cooperative agreements in the first place. Our
stemming from the formal model. Since
influences. Equally, pairs of democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as are pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy and roughly four times as likely to form such cooperative agreements as are autocratic pairs. In sum, holding constant Cold War influences, economic variables, and various other factors, we find considerable evidence that democracy promotes commercial cooperation. Clearly, democracy is not alone in promoting such agreements, but our findings indicate that it is a potent impetus to cooperation.
18
Democracy Good Peace Theory

Democratization solves fragmentation, global security and do not go to war with each other. Halperin, former Director or Policy Planning, Siegel, writer for foreign affairs, and Weinstein, director of programs at the Robin Hood Foundation 05 (Morton, Joseph, Michael, The Democracy Advantage, pg 12-13)
19
Democracy Good Famine and Civil war

Democracy solves econ, famine and civil wars. Halperin, former Director or Policy Planning, Siegel, writer for foreign affairs, director of programs at the Robin Hood Foundation 05 (Morton, Joseph, Michael, The Democracy Advantage, pg 17-18)
and Weinstein,
20
Democracy Good Famine

Democracy prevents famine Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winner, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge and Lamont University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, 2001, The Global Divergence of Democracies, p. 7-8
I have discussed elsewhere the remarkable fact that, in the terrible history of famines in the world, no
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia, Somalia, or other dictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union
in the 1930s; Chinas 195861 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlier still, the famines in Ireland or India under alien rule.
China, although it was in many ways doing much better economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed the largest recorded famine in world history: Nearly 30 million people died in the famine of 195861, while faulty governmental policies remained uncorrected for three full years. The policies went uncriticized because there were no opposition parties in parliament, no free press, and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of challenge that allowed the deeply defective policies to continue even though they were killing millions each year. The same can be said about the worlds two contemporary famines, which are occurring in North Korea and Sudan. Famines are often associated with what look like natural disasters, and commentators often settle for the simplicity of explaining famines by pointing to
these events: the floods in China during the failed Great Leap Forward, the droughts in Ethiopia, or crop failures in North Korea. Nevertheless, many countries with similar natural problems, or even worse ones, manage perfectly well, because a responsive government intervenes to help alleviate hunger. Since the primary victims of a famine are the indigent, deaths can be prevented by recreating incomes (for example, through employment programs), which makes food accessible to potential famine victims.
Even the poorest democratic countries
that have faced terrible droughts or floods or other natural disasters (such as India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in been able to feed their people without experiencing a famine. Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India continued to have famines under British
the early 1 980s) have rule right up to independence (the last famine, which I witnessed as a child, was in 1943, four years before independence), they disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press.
Famine leads to war Marc J. Cohen, Special Assistant to the Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute and Per Pinstrup-Andersen is Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Spring 1999, Social Research, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_1_66/ai_54668884/pg_10
Hunger and conflict usually have roots in colonial legacies and contemporary policies of racial or religious exclusion and political-economic discrimination (Heggenhoughen, 1995); and in struggles over control of strategic resources, such as land, water, trade routes, and petroleum. Sources of discontent include skewed land distribution and discriminatory economic policies that preclude decent standards of living. Unequal access to education and nutrition services and unequal treatment before the law inflame perceptions of unfairness. Human rights abuse based on race, religion, ethnicity, geographic location, political ideology, or occupation rouse animosities. In Central America, civil wars followed protracted food crises and human rights abuses, with demands for land, social justice, and democracy key to the conflicts (MacDonald, 1988; Barraclough, 1989). Tensions ripen into violent conflict especially where economic conditions deteriorate and people face subsistence
Hunger causes conflict when people feel they have nothing more to lose and so are willing to fight for resources, political power, and cultural respect. A recent econometric study found that slow growth of food production per capita is a source of violent conflict and refugee flows (Nafziger and Auvinen, 1997). In Ethiopia, Rwanda,
crises.
and Sudan, governments were finally toppled when they inadequately responded to famine situations they had helped create. Unfortunately, none of these wars immediately improved subsistence conditions; instead, all magnified suffering and food shortages. Hunger spurs conflict in both rural and urban areas. Wolf (1969), Scott (1976), and others have shown the key role of subsistence crises in "peasant wars of the twentieth century" in such places as Mexico, Cuba, Vietnam, and Central America.
21
Democracy Good Refugees

Autocracy leads to refugee crises Halperin 5 Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 97-98
Autocracies are also the main culprit in the worlds refugee crises. Of the 40 countries that have generated refugees over the past 20 years, 36 were autocracies engaged in conflict.2 Of the top 10 refugee populations at the end of 2003, all were fleeing conflicts that originated in autocracies (see Table 4.1). Similarly, of the 50 largest
instances of annual refugee flows from 1980 to 2003, all originated in autocracies. The most sizable nonautocratic refugee experience was in Sierra Leone in 1999. Yet this event, though it generated 487,000 refugees, was only the 88th worst refugee crisis of the past two decades. These figures buttress a key observation made in Chapter 2humanitarian and economic disasters nearly always take place under autocracies.
Refugee crises are a key contributor to contemporary conflict Lischher 5 Sarah Lischher, Assistant Professor of Government at Sweet Briar College, 2005, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 4
Since the early 1990s, refugee crises in Central Africa, the Balkans, West Africa, and the Middle East have led to the international spread of internal conflict. In 2001, a United States government analysis reckoned, the recent military interventions in Fiji and Cote dIvoire; ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, eastern Indonesia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the Arab-Israeli dispute have resulted in part from large-scale migration and refugee flows. That analysis also predicted that migration to less-developed countries
would continue to upset ethnic balances and contribute to conflict or violent regime change.
22
Democracy Good Social Services

Democracy is key to effective social service spending Halperin 5 Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 45-46
historical patterns of democratic development imply that even low-income democracies are better able to marshal the resources at their disposal into services that contribute to improved standards of living. That is, contrary to the conventional hypothesis, democracies are capable of creating administrative structures that are both efficient and effective. They typically generate higher levels of social welfare and (possibly) economic growth for a greater share of their populations than autocracies do. Considering the importance of human capital to improved
economic productivity, the tendency of low-income democracies to more effectively build the health and education capacities of their societies suggests that democratic policies also indirectly contribute to long-term economic development. In summary, the
23
Democracy Good Ethnic Conflict

Democracy solves ethnic conflict Halperin 5 Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 96-97
Democracies capacity to avoid conflict appears to be particularly important in ethnically diverse societies. Democratic governments generally manage social conflicts by channeling them into conventional politics. When divisive ethnic issues surface in democracies, they usually are expressed in protest rather than rebellion and often culminate in
reformist policies.7 Similarly, whereas ethnic diversity reduces growth by up to three percentage points in dictatorships, it has no adverse effects on economic growth in democracies.8 Evidently, democracies are better able to incorporate the competing interests of
diverse societies than are autocracies. The latter, by relying on a narrow political, economic, and military base of power, tend to direct a disproportionate share of benefits to a single or limited number of ethnic groups.
Indeed, this is a central mechanism by which they ensure the loyalty and discipline needed to maintain their hold on power. However, the exclusivity and disenfranchisement of this system stirs resentment and violent opposition.
Ethnic conflicts risk nuclear war Brown 93 Michael Brown, Director of the Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace, 1993, Ethnic Conflict and International Security, p. 18
Ethnic Wars and Weapons of Mass Destruction The
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has added a new dimension to ethnic conflicts: the possibility, however remote, that these weapons could be used in interstate or intrastate ethnic wars. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities, and
tensions between the two have risen to high levels on more than one occasion in recent years. One of the main sources of tension between the two is Indias claim that Pakistan is supporting Kashmiri separatists and Pakistans claim that India is supporting Sindh insurgents. India and Pakistan are also involved in a prolonged, bitter battle over the Siachen Glacier and their northern border. Russia and Ukraine both have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory, although the latter does note yet have operational control of the weapons on its soil. Although military hostilities between the two are unlikely at present, they cannot be rules out for the future. Another possibility is that central authorities could use weapons of mass destruction against would-be secessionists in desperate attempts to maintain integrity of their states. China has both nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities, ad the current regime in Beijing would
presumably use every means at its disposal to prevent Tiber, Xinxiang, or inner Mongolia from seceding, which many in these nominally autonomous regions would like to do. Iran has chemical weapon capabilities and is trying to develop or acquire nuclear weapon capabilities. One suspects that Tehran would not rule out using harsh measures to keep Azeris in northwestern Iran from seceding, should they become inclined to push this course of action. It is not inconceivable that Russian, Indian, and Pakistani leaders could be persuaded to take similar steps in the face of national collapse. Use of nuclear or chemical weapons in any of these situations would undermine international taboos about the use of weapons of mass destruction and, thus, would be detrimental to international nonproliferation efforts, as well as international security in general. Although the possibility that a state would use weapons of mass destruction against its citizens might appear remote, it cannot be dismissed altogether: The Iraqi government used chemical weapons in attacks on Kurdish civilians in the 1980s.
24
Democracy Good State Failure

Democracy prevents state failure Halperin 5 Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 97
Democratic government is also a bulwark against state failurethe collapse of a central states ability to maintain political order outside the capital city.19 State failure usually results in violent civil conflict and is typified by the experiences of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Afghanistan in the 1 990s. A comprehensive analysis of 75 potential predictors of state failure from 1955 to 1996 found that lack of democracy was one of the three most important.20 (The two others were material well being as measured by infant mortality rates and the level of trade.) In other words, the stronger a countrys democratic institutions, the lower the likelihood that it will become a failed state.
Democracy solves refugee flows Diamond 95 Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
As for immigration, it is true that people everywhere are drawn to prosperous, open, dynamic societies like those of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. But the
sources of large (and rapid) immigration flows to the West increasingly tend to be countries in the grip of civil war, political turmoil, economic disarray, and poor governance: Vietnam, Cuba, Haiti, Central America, Algeria. And in Mexico, authoritarianism, corruption, and social injustice have held back human development in ways that have spawned the largest sustained flow of immigrants to any Western country--a flow that threatens to
become a floodtide if the Zedillo government cannot rebuild Mexico's economy and societal consensus around authentic democatic reform. In other cases--Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Afghanistan--immigration to the West has been modest only because of the greater logistical and political difficulties. However, in impoverished areas of Africa and Asia more remote from the West, disarray is felt in the
flows of refugees across borders, hardly a benign development for world order. Of course, population growth also heavily drives these pressures. But a common factor underlying all of these crisis-ridden emigration points is the absence of democracy. And, strikingly, populations grow faster in authoritarian than democratic regimes.
25
Democracy Good Human Rights

Democratization is essential to the advance of human rights Sharansky 4 Nathan Sharansky, Israels Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs and former Soviet dissident, 2004, The Case for Democracy, p. 205
In the post 9/11 world, many democratic governments now have a better appreciation of how difficult it can be to find the appropriate balance between providing maximum security to your citizens and protecting human rights. In debating issues like the Patriot Act or the rights granted to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Americans are confronting a dilemma that Israel has faced since the day it was established.
Human rights violations can and do take place in democratic societies. But one of the things that sets democracies apart
from fear societies is the way they respond to those violations. A fear society does not openly debate human rights issues. Its people do not protest. Its regime does not investigate. Its press does not expose. Its courts do not protect. In contrast, democratic societies are always engaged in selfexamination. For example, look at how the United States dealt with the abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison. Even before the abuse became publicly known, the army had suspended those involved and was conducting a full investigation. And as soon as the disturbing pictures of the abuse were published, Americas democracy was shocked into action. The Congress, determined to find the culprits, immediately convened public hearings, and demanded a full account of what led to the abuse. Politicians and opinion makers insisted that the people responsible for the abuse be held accountable, including those at the very top of the chain of command. The media mulled over the details, pursuing every allegation, tracking down every lead. The American people openly discussed what the abuse said about their own countrys values, its image in the world, and how that image would affect the broader War on Terror. The U.S. president, for his part, apologized to the families of the victims and said that those responsible would be punished. But lets not forget that the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib under Saddam was far worse than anything America was accused of. Yet were pictures distributed of Saddams soldiers murdering, raping, and torturing Iraqis? If they had been distributed, would Iraqs parliament have conducted public hearings? Would the Iraqi media have reported it? Would anyone have publicly called for the resignation of Saddams defense minister, let alone Saddam himself? Would Saddam have denounced the
human rights abuses that sometimes occur in democracies often help illustrate the tremendous moral divide that separates free and fear societies. While I have not always agreed with the decisions made by my government on issues related to human rights, my experience has
made me confident that these issues
brutality and apologized to the victims and their families? Far from showing that all societies are the same, the
are thoroughly discussed and debated and that the need to protect human rights
is never ignored. I suspect that in most other free societies the situation is much the same. Every democratic state will choose its own balance between protecting security and protecting human rights, but concern for human rights will always be part of the decisionmaking process. The free world is not perfect, but the way it responds to its imperfections is only further proof that human rights can only be protected in democratic societies.
26
Democracy Good Economy

Democracy helps the economy Koch and Zeddy 09 (Andrew M. Koch is a professor of government and justice studies at Appalachian State University, Amanda Gail Zeddy is working on a PhD at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Democracy and Domination Technologies of Integration and the Rise of Collective Power, Lexington Books, page 191, first publication in March 28, 2009) In this regard, the push toward globalization produced a democratic response as both cause and effect.
As the regimes created more democratic forms of rule, the demands for greater economic performance were manifest on the national level. In turn, the democratic form of domination enhanced the stability of domestic institutions and provided a safer investment climate, which brought greater growth rates and greater integration into the global economy.
Democracy is necessary for a sustainable global economy Koch and Zeddy 09 (Andrew M. Koch is a professor of government and justice studies at Appalachian State University, Amanda Gail Zeddy is working on a PhD at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Democracy and Domination Technologies of Integration and the Rise of Collective Power, Lexington Books, pages 193-194, first publication in March 28, 2009)
Much of the criticism of the current circumstance centers on the lack of democracy in the new structures. There is no democratically organized political structure that makes the institutional decisions legitimate beyond the interests of the major players. Lacking those legitimating structures, the rewards of the current arrangement go disproportionately to those with the power to design the system. As is demonstrated by the complex political discussion surrounding the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Mercosur, economic integration reaches a structural limit without the furthering of political integration.
27

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