Nuclear Weapons: outline The development of nuclear strategy mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategic effects of MAD nuclear

lear proliferation Nuclear strategy:1 WW2 and conventional bombing escalation over time conventional bombing was done to knock out enemys war industries. It was a total war in which heavily industrialized societies were fighting each other. knock out enemy more out. It was a euphemism for killing a lot of enemies and civilians. You can now hurt your opponent even more. By dropping bombs in the air, war can be painful for your opponent to continue to fight. Atomic bomb was regarded as the same thing, only bigger and more efficient Nuclear strategy:2 The early nuclear era: Massive Retaliation (You hit your enemy first extremely hard with nuclear weapons) - Americans strategy against Soviets In the event of war, immediately launch a massive atomic attack. First problem: Soviet conventional advantage Second problem: first strike advantages - bomb your enemy, wipe out the enemys war making capabilities extremely quickly. Escalation in the 1950s: Size of weapons - bombs got bigger. Hydrogen bomb > bomb in Hiroshima, Nagasaki Number of weapons Delivery system - intercontinental bombers. Soviets and Americans were both vulnerable to nuclear attacks. The most remote places could be hit in both countries. Were all MAD here: Mutual Assured Destruction Speed and scale of destruction - quickly and massive scale Survivable second-strike capability - The ability of a country that has been just attacked to strike back and its survivable because your nuclear weapon can survive the initial attack and be used to wipe out your opponent even if you were hit hard in the first place. This was a HUGE change for massive retaliation. In massive retaliation, it was thought that there was an advantage to the first country to use nuclear weapons to the opponent, wipe them out and not really suffer any consequences. But this is not the case now. You can lose a war but you can still launch a nuclear weapon and destroy your opponent. Methods Redundance - How many do you really need to wipe out an adversary? Not that many. The idea was the more you build, the more would survive the first strike. There is a vicious circle that the more they build , the more of your bombs that they can take out.

Missiles with rapid launch - Missiles can be launched a lot faster than the bombers can. Submarines - it can survive the land attack and launch their own missiles from sea. The Americans and Soviets developed survivable second-strike capabilities by the early mid-1960s. This meant that in the event of war, both sides could be wiped out. Strategic Effects of MAD: 1 Mutual deterrence - Neither side could start a war because they would be wiped out as well. MAD may have kept the peace You do not need to win to destroy From winning war to avoiding war - The Americans and Soviets shifted their goals: how can we make sure that the other side doesnt start a war with us? How can we essentially avoid a war? Criticism1: a winnable nuclear war? There can be a meaningful concept of victory that destruction can be better or worse. How much more powerful at the end of the war can you be than your adversary? If Americans were a little bit less than the Soviets, than they wouldve won. If, at the end of the war, there were two Americans and one Russian, we win. Criticism 2: this is, in fact, mad. The risks of accident - having these nuclear weapons around is a risk. The problems of control The need for cooperative practices - Americans and Soviets learned about the danger. You have to learn what the implications and risks are. Nuclear weapons enforce cooperation on us. Strategic Effects of MAD: 2 Can you credibly threaten to use nukes? If youve got a survivable second-strike capability that you know if you ever use your nuclear weapons against your adversary, they are going to destroy you. So this makes nuclear threats not credible. Along these lines, it would mean that you could not deter a major conventional war against your opponent just with the threat of nuclear weapons because the first side to use them would be wiped out by the other side. The stability-instability paradox: There could be stability at the level of nuclear bombs launched against cities, those arent really ever going to be used. But you can have instability at other levels less than nuclear weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons would not deter a whole bunch of actions that are incredibly dangerous up to nuclear weapons. limited conventional wars - nuclear armed states have fought conventional wars. In 1969, Soviet Union and China fought series of wars. India and Pakistan fought a five-week war over Kashmir. The idea that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) keeps the peace between states might not be true. Limited nuclear wars - the small nuclear weapons that could be used in battles to punch a hole in enemys conventional defenses. The belief was you wouldnt escalate from that point to the destruction of cities. So any threat that you make that if you used tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield will destroy was therefore not credible. This never occurred. Extended deterrence - One country says Dont attack my ally or Ill attack you

back. This was a huge dynamic in the Cold War. The way in which Americans and Soviets approached their allies were crucial. Under stability-instability paradox, the question is this: Would the Americans be willing to sacrifice Chicago and LA for Berlin? Would the Soviets be willing to sacrifice Moscow for Warsaw? MAD may not be such a huge effect. Answers: Threat that leaves something to chance - We cant totally predict whats going to happen under crises. Threat wasnt so much well destroy you as if you launch an attack, we could get in to a crisis situation that would wind up destroying the world. Being sensible, not rational - If you are rational, then you are in full control of your decisions and no rational actor would launch a nuclear attack knowing that hed be destroyed. The point is to be sensible; to be aware of human frailties and to not put human-beings in a position where something could go wrong.

Strategic Effects of MAD: 3 The problem of defense The paradox: defence may now be more dangerous - There can be repercussions. Various attempts at missile defense ABM treaty, 1972 - American and Soviets could only protect two sites in their countries with anti-ballistic missiles that can shoot down incoming missiles. - Two countries have agreed to make themselves more vulnerable to each other. This was a treaty to agree to make it easier for your opponent to destroy you. Strategic Defence Initiative (StarWars) - 1980s : At the time, US got criticisms for undermining the AMB treaty and making the world a more dangerous place by trying to make themselves less vulnerable. The Soviets didnt follow them in this. Gorbachev thought none of these system wouldnt work. George W. Bush and Missile Defence - Bush pulled the US out of the ABM treaty in order to launch a new program National Missile Defence. The belief is by building a missile defence system that can protect the new NATO allies in Eastern Europe, the Americans were making the world a bit more dangerous. They were increasing the reasons for Russians to be suspicious of the American nuclear capabilities. Nuclear Proliferation: 2 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968 Limits nuclear weapons to the five current nuclear states (US, Soviet Union, Britain, France, China). This means that any country without nuclear weapon that signs on to the NPT agrees not to develop them and also not to let other countries transit nuclear weapons across territories. Commitment to disarmament - It was a bargain that if none of you develop nuclear weapons, we will steadily roll back. Right ti civilian nuclear power - nuclear electricity. The problem was a lot of the technologies that were used to make civilian electricity by nuclear power were also useful for building nuclear weapons. Through power plant, you can enrich uranium to a high degree like a weapon degree and plutonium is made as by-products when civilian electricity is made. The concern is you have a civilian nuclear power program, you could be hiding a nuclear weapons program. The treaty stipulated that IAEA would monitor the countries that signed on to the NPT to make sure that their civilian nuclear power

program wasnt being used for a bomb. *Current controversy over Iran A lot of the concern is, where the Iranians get enriched uranium. If they enriched themselves, they can make a bomb in the end by enriching it to a weapons degree. What are they going to do with the span nuclear fuel, which could be turned into a bomb? Two days ago (Oct. 25, 2010) Iran first loaded the nuclear fuel rods into its power plant, enriching to a point where the U.S. and Israel are concerned. Russians agreed to supply uranium and agreed to take plutonium spent fuel back to Russia in order to keep lid on things but we dont know how it will work out. Most states eventually signed...who didnt? Israel developed nuke in 1970s India and Pakistan in 1998 North Korea initially signed but pulled out in 2003 and conducted test in 2006 1964 - USA, Russia, UK, France, China 197x - Israel 1998 - India, Pakistan 2006 - North Korea Nuclear Proliferation: 3 More may be better - The more countries that have nuclear weapons, the more countries would be involved in stable deterrence relationships . According to this logic, having nuclear weapons forces you to be responsible, because if you ever used them, youll be wiped out. More may be worse more sources of error - more countries that can go terribly wrong Command and control - rogue generals can use nuclear weapons. The concern with nuclear proliferation is that the countries that are developing nuclear weapons may not have command and control, the stability to reign in officers. They wouldnt have predictability. It is unclear who would be making decisions about bombs. Security over facilities might not be great so nuclear material can fall on to wrong hands. Mistrust - Regarding MAD, it required cooperative practices to show up over time. The more countries that have the bomb, the more countries with the bomb who did not actually have these cooperative practices just yet. Aggression, irrationality Spread to terrorists What can be done to stop the spread? strike first - However, an unsuccessful strike might increase the motivation that a country has to build nuclear weapons on the first place. offer guarantees and monitor