A Letter from a Gentleman

David Hume This edition of "A Letter from a Gentleman" is reproduced directly from the 1745 Edinburgh edition. age numbers on reference lines are also from the 1745 edition. Title age !ume" LT#G Title age p 1 A LETTE# from a GE$TLE%A$ to !is &riend in Edinburgh" containing 'ome ()'E#*AT+($' on A 'pecimen of the rinciples concerning #EL+G+($ and %(#AL+T,said to be maintain.d in a )oo/ lately publish.dintituled- A Treatise of !uman $ature- 0c. E1+$)2#G!inted 3sic4 in the ,ear %.155.6L*. Te7t !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8 'ir+ !a9e read o9er the 'pecimen of the rinciples concerning #eligion and %orality- said to be maintain.d in a )oo/ lately published- intituled- A Treatise of !uman $ature: being an Attempt to introduce the E7perimental %ethod of #easoning into %oral 'ub;ects. + ha9e also read o9er <hat is called the 'um of the 5harge. =hich apers- as you inform me- ha9e been industriously spread about- and <ere put into your !ands some fe< 1ays ago. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8 + <as pers<aded that the 5lamour of 'cepticism- Atheism- 0c. had been so often employ.d by the <orst of %en against the best- that it had no< lost all its +nfluence: and should ne9er ha9e thought of ma/ing any #emar/s on these maim.d E7cerpts- if you had not laid your 5ommands on me- as a iece of common >ustice to the Author- and for undecei9ing some <ell?meaning eople- on <hom it seems the enormous 5harge has made +mpression. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 4 + shall insert the Accusation at full Length- and then go regularly through <hat is called the 'um of the 5harge: because it is intended- + suppose- to contain the 'ubstance of the <hole. + shall also ta/e notice of the 'pecimen as + go along. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 4 'pecimen of the rinciples concerning #eligion and %orality- 0c.

The Author puts on his Title?page @*ol. +. printed for >. $oon- 178A.B a assage of Tacitus to this urpose: "#are !appiness of our Times- that you may thin/ as you <illand spea/ as you thin/." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 4 !e e7presses his 1eference to the ublic/ in these =ords @Ad9ertisement- p. C.B "The Approbation of the ublic/ + consider as the greatest #e<ard of my Labours: but am determined to regard its >udgment- <hate9er it be- as my best +nstruction." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 4 !e gi9es us the summary *ie< of his hilosophy from p. 45D. to 47E. ?? "+ am confounded <ith that forlorn 'olitude- in <hich + am placed in my hilosophy. ?? + ha9e e7posed myself to the Enmity of all %etaphysicians- Logicians- %athematicians- and e9en Theologians. ?? + ha9e declared my 1isapprobations of their 'ystems. ?? =hen + turn my Eye in<ard- + find nothing but 1oubt and +gnorance. All the =orld conspires to oppose and contradict me: tho. such is my =ea/ness- that + feel all my (pinions loosen and fall of themsel9es- <hen unsupported by the Approbation of others. ?? 5an + be sure- that- in lea9ing all established (pinions- + am follo<ing TruthF and by <hat 5riterion shall + distinguish her- e9en if &ortune should at last guide me on her &ootstepsF After the most accurate and e7act of my #easonings- + can gi9e no #eason <hy + should assent to it: and feel nothing but a strong ropensity to consider (b;ects strongly in that *ie< under <hich they appear to me. ?? The %emory- 'enses- and 2nderstanding- are all of them founded on the +magination. ?? $o =onder a rinciple so inconstant and fallacious should lead us into Errors- <hen implicitely follo<ed @as it must beB in all its *ariations. ?? + ha9e already sho<n- that the 2nderstanding- <hen it acts alone- and according to its most general rinciples- entirely sub9erts itself- and lea9es not the lo<est 1egree of E9idence in any roposition either in hilosophy or common Life. ?? =e ha9e no 5hoice left- but bet<i7t a false #eason and none at all. ?? =here am +- or <hatF &rom <hat 5auses do + deri9e my E7istence- and to <hat 5ondition shall + returnF =hose &a9our shall + court- and <hose Anger must + dreadF =hat )eings surround meF (n <hom ha9e + any +nfluence- or <ho ha9e any +nfluence on meF + am confounded <ith all these Guestions- and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable 5ondition imaginable- in9ironed <ith the deepest 1ar/ness- and utterly depri9ed of the 2se of e9ery %ember and &aculty. ?? +f + must be a &ool- as all those <ho reason or belie9e any Thing certainly are- my &ollies shall at least be natural and agreeable. ?? +n all the +ncidents of Life- <e ought still to preser9e our 'cepticism" +f <e belie9e that &ire <arms- or =ater refreshes- .tis only because it costs us too much ains to thin/ other<ise: nay- if <e are hilosophers- it ought only to be upon sceptical rinciples. ?? + cannot forbear ha9ing a 5uriosity to be acHuainted <ith the rinciples of moral Good and E9il- 0c. + am concerned for the 5ondition of the learned =orld<hich lies under such a deplorable +gnorance in all these articulars. + feel an Ambition arise in me of contributing to the +nstruction of %an/ind- and of acHuiring a $ame by my +n9entions and 1isco9eries. ?? 'hould + endea9our to banish these 'entiments- + feel + should be a Loser in point of leasure: and this is the (rigin of my hilosophy." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 7 Agreeable to this summary *ie<- he tells us- p. 1C8. "Let us fi7 our Attention out of oursel9es as much as possible. ?? =e really ne9er ad9ance a 'tep beyond oursel9es: nor can concei9e any Iind of E7istence- but these erceptions <hich ha9e appeared in that narro< 5ompass" This is the 2ni9erse of the +magination- nor ha9e <e any +dea but <hat is there produced." ?? Accordingly- "An (pinion or )elief may be most accurately defined- A li9ely +dea related or associated <ith a present +mpression: and is more properly an Act of the sensiti9e than of the cogiti9e art of our $atures."

And- )elief in general consists in nothing but the *i9acity of an +dea. Again- the +dea of E7istence is the 9ery same <ith the +dea of <hat <e concei9e to be e7istent. ?? Any +dea <e please to form is the +dea of a )eing: and the +dea of a )eing is any +dea <e please to form. And as to the "$otion of an e7ternal E7istence- <hen ta/en for something specifically different from our erceptions- <e ha9e sho<n its Absurdity" And <hat <e call a %ind is nothing but a !eap or 5ollection of different erceptions united together by certain #elations- and supposed- tho. falsly- to be endo<ed <ith a perfect 'implicity." And- "The only E7istence- of <hich <e are certain- are erceptions. =hen + enter most intimately into <hat + call myself- + al<ays stumble on some particular erception or other. ?? + ne9er can catch myself at any Time <ithout a erception- and ne9er can obser9e any Thing but the erception. ?? +f any one thin/ he has a different $otion of himself- + must confess + can reason no longer <ith him. ?? + may 9enture to affirm of the rest of %an/ind- that they are nothing but a )undle of erceptions- <hich succeed each other <ith an inconcei9able #apidity- and are in a perpetual &lu7 and %o9ement." And lest the #eader should forget to apply all this to the 'upreme %indand the E7istence of the &irst 5ause- he has a long 1isHuisition concerning 5auses and Effects- the 'um of <hich amounts to this- That all our #easoning concerning 5auses and Effects are deri9ed from nothing but 5ustom" That- if any pretend to define a 5ause by saying it is something producti9e of another- .tis e9ident he <ould say nothing: for <hat does he mean by roductionF That <e may define a 5ause to be an (b;ect precedent and contiguous to another- and <here all the (b;ects resembling the former are placed in li/e #elations of recedency and 5ontiguity to these (b;ects that resemble the latter: or- a 5ause is an (b;ect precedent and contiguous to another- and so united <ith it- that the +dea of the one determines the %ind to form the +dea of the other- and the +mpression of the one to form a more li9ely +dea of the other." &rom these clear and plain 1efinitions he infers- "That all 5auses are of the same Iind: and there is no &oundation for the 1istinction bet<i7t efficient 5auses- and 5auses sine Hua non: or bet<i7t efficient 5auses- and formal and material- and e7emplary- and final 5auses" And that there is but one Iind of $ecessity- and the common 1istinction bet<i7t %oral and hysical is <ithout any &oundation in $ature" And that the 1istinction <e often ma/e bet<i7t o<er- and the E7ercise of it- is eHually <ithout &oundation" And that the $ecessity of a 5ause to e9ery )eginning of E7istence- is not founded on any Arguments demonstrati9e or intuiti9e" And in fine- That any Thing may produce any Thing: 5reation- Annihilation- %otion- #eason- *olition: all these may arise from one anotheror from any other (b;ect <e can imagine." This curious $ostrum he often repeats- p. 48E- 484. Again he tells us- "That <hen <e tal/ of any )eing- <hether of a 'uperior or +nferior $ature- as endo<ed <ith a o<er or &orce proportioned to any Effect- ?? =e ha9e really no distinct %eaning- and ma/e 2se only of common =ords- <ithout any clear and determinate +deas. And if <e ha9e really no +dea of o<er or Efficacy in any (b;ect- or of any real 5onnection bet<i7t 5auses and Effects- .t<ill be to little urpose to pro9e that an Efficacy is necessary in all (perations. =e do not understand our o<n %eaning in tal/ing so- but ignorantly confound +deas <hich are intirely distinct from each other." Again he says- "The Efficacy or Energy of 5auses is neither placed in the 5auses themsel9es- nor in the 1eity- nor in the 5oncurrence of these t<o rinciples- but belongs entirely to the 'oul @or the )undle of erceptionsB <hich considers the 2nion of t<o or more (b;ects in all past +nstances" .Tis here that the real o<er of 5auses is placed- along <ith their 5onnection and $ecessity. And in fine- <e may obser9e a 5on;unction or a #elation of 5ause and Effect bet<een different erceptions- but can ne9er obser9e it bet<een erceptions and (b;ects." .Tis impossible therefore- that- from the E7istence or any of the Gualities of the former- <e can e9er form any 5onclusion

concerning the E7istence of the latter- or e9er satisfy our #eason in this articular <ith regard to the E7istence of a 'upreme )eing. .Tis <ell /no<n that this rinciple=hate9er begins to e7ist must ha9e a 5ause of E7istence- is the first 'tep in the Argument for the )eing of a 'upreme 5ause: and that- <ithout it- .tis impossible to go one 'tep further in that Argument. $o< this %a7im he is at great ains from p. 141. to e7plode- and to sho<- "That it is neither intuiti9ely nor demonstrati9ely certain:" and he says- "#eason can ne9er satisfy us that the E7istence of any (b;ect oes e9er imply that of another. 'o that- <hen <e pass from the +mpression of one to the +dea and )elief of another- <e are not determined by #eason- but by 5ustom." +n a marginal $ote on the preceeding age he says- "+n that roposition- God is- or indeed any other <hich regards E7istence- the +dea of E7istence is no distinct +dea <hich <e unite <ith that of the (b;ect- and <hich is capable of forming a compound +dea by the 2nion." 5oncerning this rinciple- That the 1eity is the prime %o9er of the 2ni9erse- <ho first created %atter- and ga9e its original +mpulse- and li/e<ise supports its E7istence- and successi9ely besto<s on it its %otions: he says- "This (pinion is certainly 9ery curiousbut it <ill appear superfluous to e7amine it in this lace. ?? &or- if the 9ery +dea be deri9ed from an +mpression- the +dea of a 1eity proceeds from the same (rigin: and- if no +mpression implies any &orce or Efficacy- .tis eHually impossible to disco9er- or e9en imagine- any such acti9e rinciple in the 1eity. ?? 'ince hilosophers therefore ha9e concluded- that %atter cannot be endo<ed <ith any efficacious rinciple- because it is impossible to disco9er in it such a rinciple: the same 5ourse of #easoning should determine them to e7clude it from the 'upreme )eing" (r if they esteem that (pinion absurd and impious- as it really is- + shall tell them ho< they may a9oid it- and that isby concluding from the 9ery first- that they ha9e no adeHuate +dea of o<er or Efficacy in any (b;ect: since neither in )ody nor 'pirit- neither in 'uperior nor +nferior $aturesare they able to disco9er one single +nstance of it." And says he- "=e ha9e no +dea of a )eing endo<ed <ith any o<er- much less of one endo<ed <ith infinite o<er." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 18 5oncerning the +mmateriality of the 'oul @from <hich the Argument is ta/en for its natural +mmortality- or that it cannot perish by 1issolution as the )odyB he says- "=e certainly may conclude that %otion may be and actually is the 5ause of Thought and erception" And no <onder- for any Thing may be the 5ause or Effect of any Thing: <hich e9idently gi9es the Ad9antage to the %aterialists abo9e their Ad9ersaries." )ut yet more plainly- "+ assert- says he- that the 1octrine of the +mmateriality- 'implicityand +ndi9isibility of a thin/ing 'ubstance- is a true Atheism- and <ill ser9e to ;ustify all these 'entiments for <hich 'pinoJa is so uni9ersally infamous." This hideous !ypothesis is almost the same <ith that of the +mmateriality of the 'oul- <hich has become so popular. And again he endea9ours to pro9e- that all the Absurdities <hich ha9e been found in the 'ystems of 'pinoJa- may li/e<ise be disco9ered in that of the Theologians" And concludes- that "=e cannot ad9ance one 'tep to<ards the establishing the 'implicity and +mmateriality of the 'oul- <ithout preparing the =ay for a dangerous and irreco9erable Atheism." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 14 The Author.s 'entiments in %orality <e ha9e in *ol. 8. printed for T. Longman174E. !e there tells us- that "#eason has no +nfluence on our assions and Actions" Actions may be laudable or blameable- but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. That all )eings in the 2ni9erse- considered in themsel9es- appear entirely loose and independent of each other: .Tis only by E7perience <e learn their +nfluence and 5onnection- and this +nfluence <e ought ne9er to e7tend beyond E7perience." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 14

!e ta/es great ains to pro9e- from p. 87. That >ustice is not a natural- but an artificial *irtue: and gi9es one pretty odd #eason for it" "=e may conclude- that the La<s of >ustice- being uni9ersal and perfectly infle7ible- can ne9er be deri9ed from $ature. + suppose @says heB a erson to ha9e lent me a 'um of %oney- on 5ondition that it be restored in a fe< 1ays: and also suppose- that- after E7piration of the Term agreed on- he demands the 'um" + as/- =hat #eason or %oti9e ha9e + to restore the %oneyF ublic/ +nterest is not naturally attatch.d to the (bser9ation of the #ules of >ustice- but is only connected <ith it- after an artificial 5on9ention- for the Establishment of these #ules. 2nless <e <ill allo< that $ature has established a 'ophistry- and rendered it necessary and una9oidable: <e must allo< that the 'ense of >ustice and +n;ustice is not deri9ed from $ature- but arises artificially- tho. necessarily- from Education and human 5on9entions. !ere is a roposition <hich + thin/ may be regarded as certain- That it is only from the 'elfishness and confined Generosity of %en- along <ith the scanty ro9ision $ature has made for his =ants- that >ustice deri9es its (rigin. These +mpressions- <hich gi9e #ise to this 'ense of >ustice- are not natural to the %ind of %an- but arise from Artifice and human 5on9entions. =ithout such a 5on9ention- no one <ould e9er ha9e dreamed that there <as such a *irtue as >ustice- or ha9e been induced to conform his Actions to it. Ta/ing any single Act- my >ustice may be pernicious in e9ery #espect" And .tis only upon the 'upposition that others are to imitate my E7ample- that + can be induced to embrace that *irtue: since nothing but the 5ombination can render >ustice ad9antageous- or afford me any %oti9e to conform myself to its #ules. And in general it may be affirmed- that there is no such assion in human %inds- as the Lo9e of %an/ind merely as such- independent of personal Gualities- of 'er9ice or of #elation to ourself." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1K %r. !obbs- <ho <as at ains to sha/e loose all other natural (bligations- yet found it necessary to lea9e- or pretended to lea9e- the (bligation of romises or actions: but our Author stri/es a bolder 'tro/e" "That the #ule of %orality @says heB <hich en;oins the erformance of romises- is not natural- <ill sufficiently appear from these t<o ropositions- <hich + proceed to pro9e- 9iJ. That a romise <ould not be intelligible before human 5on9entions had established it: and that- e9en if it <ere intelligible- it <ould not be attended <ith any moral (bligation." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1K And he concludes- "That romises impose no natural (bligation." And- p. 115. "+ shall further obser9e- That since e9ery ne< romise imposes a ne< (bligation of %orality upon the erson <ho promises- and since this ne< (bligation arises from his =ill- it is one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible (perations that can possibly be imagined- and may e9en be compared to Transubstantiation or !oly (rders<here a certain &orm of =ords- along <ith a certain +ntention- changes entirely the $ature of an e7ternal (b;ect- and e9en of a human 5reature. +n fine @says heB as &orce is supposed to in9alidate all 5ontracts- such a rinciple is a roof that romises ha9e no natural (bligation- and are mere artificial 5ontri9ances- for the 5on9eniency and Ad9antage of 'ociety." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 17 'um of the 5harge. &rom the preceeding 'pecimen it <ill appear- that the Author maintains-

1. 2ni9ersal 'cepticism. 'ee his Assertions- p. 45D. ?? 47E. <here he doubts of e9ery Thing @his o<n E7istence e7ceptedB and maintains the &olly of pretending to belie9e any Thing <ith 5ertainty. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 17 C. rinciples leading to do<nright Atheism- by denying the 1octrine of 5auses and Effects- p. 8C1- 18D- CAD- 8EE- 8E1- 8E8- 48E- 484- CD4. <here he maintains- that the $ecessity of a 5ause to e9ery )eginning of E7istence is not founded on any Arguments demonstrati9e or intuiti9e. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 17 8. Errors concerning the 9ery )eing and E7istence of a God. &or +nstance%arginal $ote- p. 17C. as to that roposition- God is- he says @or indeed as to any other Thing <hich regards E7istenceB "The +dea of E7istence is no distinct +dea <hich <e unite <ith that of the (b;ect- and <hich is capable of forming a compound +dea by 2nion." !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1D 4. Errors concerning God.s being the first 5ause- and prime %o9er of the 2ni9erse" &or as to this rinciple- That the 1eity first created %atter- and ga9e it its original +mpulse- and li/e<ise supports its E7istence- he says- "This (pinion is certainly 9ery curious- but it <ill appear superfluous to e7amine it in this lace- 0c." p. CDE. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1D 5. !e is chargable <ith denying the +mmateriality of the 'oul- and the 5onseHuences flo<ing from this 1enial- p. 481- 4- 41D- 41A- 4C8. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1D K. =ith sapping the &oundations of %orality- by denying the natural and essential 1ifference bet<i7t #ight and =rong- Good and E9il- >ustice and +n;ustice: ma/ing the 1ifference only artificial- and to arise from human 5on9entions and 5ompacts- *ol. C. p. 5- 1A- 1CD- 41- 48- 4D- KA- 7E- 78- 4- 44. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1D ,ou see- 1ear 'ir- that + ha9e concealed no art of the Accusation- but ha9e inserted the 'pecimen and 5harge- as transmitted to me- <ithout the smallest *ariation. + shall no< go regularly thro. <hat is called the 'um of the 5harge- because it is intended- + suppose- to contain the 'ubstance of the <hole: and shall ta/e $otice of the 'pecimen as + go along. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 1A 1st- As to the 'ceptecism <ith <hich the Author is charged- + must obser9e- that the 1octrine of the yrrhonians or 'ceptic/s ha9e been regarded in all Ages as rinciples of mere 5uriosity- or a Iind of >eu7 d.esprit- <ithout any +nfluence on a %an.s steady rinciples or 5onduct in Life. +n #eality- a hilosopher <ho affects to doubt of the %a7ims of common #eason- and e9en of his 'enses- declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest- and that he intends not to ad9ance an (pinion <hich he <ould recommend as 'tandards of >udgment and Action. All he means by these 'cruples is to abate the ride of mere human #easoners- by sho<ing them- that e9en <ith regard to rinciples <hich seem the clearest- and <hich they are necessitated from the strongest +nstincts of $ature to embrace- they are not able to attain a full 5onsistence and absolute 5ertainty. %odesty then- and !umility- <ith regard to the (perations of our natural &aculties- is the #esult of 'cepticism: not an uni9ersal 1oubt- <hich it is impossible for any %an to support- and <hich the first and most tri9ial Accident in Life must immediately disconcert and destroy. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CE

!o< is such a &rame of %ind pre;udicial to ietyF And must not a %an be ridiculous to assert that our Author denies the rinciples of #eligion- <hen he loo/s upon them as eHually certain <ith the (b;ects of his 'ensesF +f + be as much assured of these rinciples- as that this Table at <hich + no< <rite is before me: 5an any Thing further be desired by the most rigorous AntagonistF .Tis e9ident- that so e7tra9agant a 1oubt as that <hich 'cepticism may seem to recommend- by destroying e9ery Thingreally affects nothing- and <as ne9er intended to be understood seriously- but <as meant as a mere hilosophical Amusement- or Trial of =it and 'ubtilty. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CE This is a 5onstruction suggested by the 9ery $ature of the 'ub;ect: but he has not been contented <ith that- but e7presly declared it. And all those rinciples- cited in the 'pecimen as roofs of his 'cepticism- are positi9ely renounced in a fe< ages after<ards- and called the Effects of hilosophical %elancholy and 1elusion. These are his 9ery =ords: and his Accuser.s o9erloo/ing them may be thought 9ery prudent- but is a 1egree of 2nfairness <hich appears to me altogether astonishing. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CE =ere Authorities proper to be employed in any hilosophical #easoning- + could cite you that of 'ocrates the <isest and most religious of the Gree/ hilosophers- as <ell as 5icero among the #omans- <ho both of them carried their hilosophical 1oubts to the highest 1egree of 'cepticism. All the antient &athers- as <ell as our first #eformers- are copious in representing the =ea/ness and 2ncertainty of mere human #eason. And %onsieur !uet the learned )ishop of A9aranches @so celebrated for his 1emonstration E9angeliHue <hich contains all the great roofs of the 5hristian #eligionB <rote also a )oo/ on this 9ery Topic/- <herein he endea9ours to re9i9e all the 1octrines of the antient 'ceptic/s or yrrhonians. !ume" LT#G Te7t p C1 +n #eality- <hence come all the 9arious Tribes of !eretic/s- the Arians'ocinians and 1eists- but from too great a 5onfidence in mere human #eason- <hich they regard as the 'tandard of e9ery Thing- and <hich they <ill not submit to the superior Light of #e9elationF And can one do a more essential 'er9ice to iety- than by sho<ing them that this boasted #eason of theirs- so far from accounting for the great %ysteries of the Trinity and +ncarnation- is not able fully to satisfy itself <ith regard to its o<n (perations- and must in some %easure fall into a Iind of implicite &aith- e9en in the most ob9ious and familiar rinciplesF !ume" LT#G Te7t p C1 ++. The Author is charged <ith (pinions leading to do<nright Atheism- chiefly by denying this rinciple- That <hate9er begins to e7ist must ha9e a 5ause of E7istence. To gi9e you a $otion of the E7tra9agance of this 5harge- + must enter into a little 1etail. +t is common for hilosophers to distinguish the Iinds of E9idence into intuiti9e- demonstrati9e- sensible- and moral: by <hich they intend only to mar/ a 1ifference bet<i7t them- not to denote a 'uperiority of one abo9e another. %oral 5ertainty may reach as high a 1egree of Assurance as %athematical: and our 'enses are surely to be comprised amongst the clearest and most con9incing of all E9idences. $o<- it being the Author.s urpose- in the ages cited in the 'pecimen- to e7amine the Grounds of that roposition: he used the &reedom of disputing the common (pinionthat it <as founded on demonstrati9e or intuiti9e 5ertainty: but asserts- that it is supported by moral E9idence- and is follo<ed by a 5on9iction of the same Iind <ith these Truths- That all %en must die- and that the 'un <ill rise To?morro<. +s this any Thing li/e denying the Truth of that roposition- <hich indeed a %an must ha9e lost all common 'ense to doubt ofF

!ume" LT#G Te7t p CC )ut- granting that he had denied it- ho< is this a rinciple that leads to AtheismF +t <ould be no difficult %atter to sho<- that the Arguments a posteriori from the (rder and 5ourse of $ature- these Arguments so sensible- so con9incing- and so ob9iousremain still in their full &orce: and that nothing is affected by it but the metaphysical Argument a priori- <hich many %en of Learning cannot comprehend- and <hich many %en both of iety and Learning sho< no great *alue for. )ishop Tillotson has used a 1egree of &reedom on this !ead- <hich + <ould not <illingly allo< myself: .tis in his e7cellent 'ermon concerning the =isdom of being religious- <here he says- That the )eing of a God is not capable of 1emonstration- but of moral E9idence. + hope none <ill pretend that that pious relate intended by these Assertions to <ea/en the E9idences for a 1i9ine E7istence- but only to distinguish accurately its 'pecies of E9idence. !ume" LT#G Te7t p C8 + say further- that e9en the metaphysical Arguments for a 1eity are not affected by a 1enial of the roposition abo9e?mentioned. +t is only 1r. 5lar/.s Argument <hich can be supposed to be any <ay concerned. %any other Arguments of the same Iind still remain: 1es 5artes.s for +nstance- <hich has al<ays been esteemed as solid and con9incing as the other. + shall add- that a great 1istinction ought al<ays to be made bet<i7t a %an.s positi9e and a9o<ed (pinions- and the +nferences <hich it may please others to dra< from them. !ad the Author really denied the Truth of the foregoing roposition- @<hich the most superficial #eader cannot thin/ e9er entred his !eadB still he could not properly be charged as designing to in9alidate any one Argument that any hilosopher has employed for a 1i9ine E7istence: that is only an +nference and 5onstruction of others- <hich he may refuse if he thin/s proper. !ume" LT#G Te7t p C4 Thus you may ;udge of the 5andor of the <hole 5harge- <hen you see the assigning of one Iind of E9idence for a roposition- instead of another- is called denying that roposition: that the in9alidating only one Iind of Argument for the 1i9ine E7istence is called positi9e Atheism: nay- that the <ea/ning only of one indi9idual Argument of that Iind is called re;ecting that <hole 'pecies of Argumentand the +nferences of others are ascribed to the Author as his real (pinion. !ume" LT#G Te7t p C4 .Tis impossible e9er to satisfy a captious Ad9ersary- but it <ould be easy for me to con9ince the se9erest >udge- that all the solid Arguments for $atural #eligion retain their full &orce upon the Author.s rinciples concerning 5auses and Effects- and that there is no $ecessity e9en for altering the common %ethods of e7pressing or concei9ing these Arguments. The Author has indeed asserted- That <e can ;udge only of (perations of 5auses by E7perience- and that- reasoning a priori- any thing might appear able to produce any thing. =e could not /no< that 'tones <ould descend- or &ire burn- had <e not E7perience of these Effects: and indeed- <ithout such E7perience<e could not certainly infer the E7istence of one Thing from that of another. This is no great arado7- but seems to ha9e been the (pinion of se9eral hilosophers- and seems the most ob9ious and familiar 'entiment on that 'ub;ect: but- tho. all +nferences concerning %atter of &act be thus resol9ed into E7perience- these +nferences are no<ay <ea/ned by such an Assertion- but on the contrary <ill be found to acHuire more &orceas long as %en are disposed to trust to their E7perience rather than to mere human #easoning. =here9er + see (rder- + infer from E7perience that there- there hath been 1esign and 5ontri9ance. And the same rinciple <hich leads me into this +nference<hen + contemplate a )uilding- regular and beautiful in its <hole &rame and 'tructure:

the same rinciple obliges me to infer an infinitely perfect Architect- from the infinite Art and 5ontri9ance <hich is display.d in the <hole &abric/ of the 2ni9erse. +s not this the Light in <hich this Argument hath been placed by all =riters concerning $atural #eligionF !ume" LT#G Te7t p CK +++. The ne7t roof of Atheism is so unaccountable- that + /no< not <hat to ma/e of it. (ur Author indeed asserts- after the present pious and learned )ishop of 5loyne- That <e ha9e no abstract or general +deas- properly so spea/ing: and that those +deas- <hich are called general- are nothing but particular +deas affi7ed to general Terms. Thus- <hen + thin/ of a !orse in general- + must al<ays concei9e that !orse as blac/ or <hite- fat or lean- 0c. and can form no $otion of a !orse that is not of some particular 5olour or 'iJe. +n rosecution of the same Topic/- the Author hath said- That <e ha9e no general +dea of E7istence- distinct from e9ery particular E7istence. )ut a %an must ha9e strange 'agacity- that could disco9er Atheism in so harmless a roposition. This- in my (pinion- might be ;ustified before the 2ni9ersity of 'alamanca- or a 'panish +nHuisition. + do indeed belie9e- that- <hen <e assert the E7istence of a 1eity- <e do not form a general abstract +dea of E7istence- <hich <e unite <ith the +dea of God- and <hich is capable of forming a compound +dea by 2nion: but this is the 5ase <ith regard to e9ery roposition concerning E7istence. 'o that- by this 5ourse of #easoning- <e must deny the E7istence of e9ery Thing- e9en of oursel9es- of <hich at least e9en the Accuser himself <ill admit our Author is pers<aded. !ume" LT#G Te7t p C7 +*. Ere ans<ering the fourth 5harge- + must use the &reedom to deli9er a short !istory of a particular (pinion in hilosophy. =hen %en considered the se9eral Effects and (perations of $ature- they <ere led to e7amine into the &orce or o<er by <hich they <ere performed: and they di9ided into se9eral (pinions upon this !ead- according as their other rinciples <ere more or less fa9ourable to #eligion. The &ollo<ers of Epicurus and 'trato asserted- That this &orce <as original and inherent in %atter- andoperating blindly- produced all the 9arious Effects <hich <e behold. The latonic/ and eripatetic/ 'chools- percei9ing the Absurdity of this roposition- ascribed the (rigin of all &orce to one primary efficient 5ause- <ho first besto<ed it on %atter- and successi9ely guided it in all its (perations. )ut all the antient hilosophers agreed- that there <as a real &orce in %atter- either original or deri9ed: and that it <as really &ire <hich burnt- and food that nourished- <hen <e obser9ed any of these Effects to follo< upon the (perations of these )odies" The 'choolmen supposed also a real o<er in %atter- to <hose (perations ho<e9er the continual 5oncurrence of the 1eity <as reHuisite- as <ell as to the 'upport of that E7istence <hich had been besto<ed on %atter- and <hich they considered as a perpetual 5reation. $o one- till 1es 5artes and %albranche- e9er entertained an (pinion that %atter had no &orce either primary or secondary- and independent or concurrent- and could not so much as properly be called an +nstrument in the !ands of the 1eity- to ser9e any of the urposes of ro9idence. These hilosophers last?mentioned substituted the $otion of occasional 5auses- by <hich it <as asserted that a )illiard )all did not mo9e another by its +mpulse- but <as only the (ccasion <hy the 1eity- in pursuance of general La<s- besto<ed %otion on the second )all. )ut- tho. this (pinion be 9ery innocent- it ne9er gained great 5reditespecially in England- <here it <as considered as too much contrary to recei9ed popular (pinions- and too little supported by hilosophical Arguments- e9er to be admitted as any Thing but a mere !ypothesis. 5ud<orth- Loc/ and 5lar/ ma/e little or no mention of it. 'ir +saac $e<ton @tho. some of his &ollo<ers ha9e ta/en a different Turn of

thin/ingB plainly re;ects it- by substituting the !ypothesis of an Ltheral &luid- not the immediate *olition of the 1eity- as the 5ause of Attraction. And- in short- this has been a 1ispute left entirely to the Arguments of hilosophers- and in <hich #eligion has ne9er been supposed to be in the least concerned. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CA $o< it is e9idently concerning this 5artesian 1octrine- of secondary 5auses- the Author is treating- <hen he says- @in the assage referred to in the 5hargeB That it <as a curious (pinion- but <hich it <ould appear superfluous to e7amine in that lace. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CA The Topic/ there handled is some<hat abstract" )ut + belie9e any #eader <ill easily percei9e the Truth of this Assertion- and that the Author is far from pretending to deny @as asserted in the 5hargeB God.s being the first 5ause and prime %o9er of the 2ni9erse. That the Author.s =ords could ha9e no such %eaning as they stand connected- is to me so e9ident- that + could pledge on this !ead- not only my small 5redit as a hilosopher- but e9en all my retensions to Trust or )elief in the common Affairs of Life. !ume" LT#G Te7t p CA *. As to the fifth Article: the Author has not any<here that + remember denied the +mmateriality of the 'oul in the common 'ense of the =ord. !e only says- That that Guestion did not admit of any distinct %eaning: because <e had no distinct +dea of 'ubstance. This (pinion may be found e9ery<here in %r. Loc/- as <ell as in )ishop )er/ley. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8E *+. + come no< to the last 5harge- <hich- according to the pre9alent (pinion of hilosophers in this Age- <ill certainly be regarded as the se9erest- 9iJ. the Author.s destroying all the &oundations of %orality. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8E !e hath indeed denied the eternal 1ifference of #ight and =rong in the 'ense in <hich 5lar/ and =oolaston maintained them- 9iJ. That the ropositions of %orality <ere of the same $ature <ith the Truths of %athematic/s and the abstract 'ciences- the (b;ects merely of #eason- not the &eelings of our internal Tastes and 'entiments. +n this (pinion he concurs <ith all the antient %oralists- as <ell as <ith %r. !utchison rofessor of %oral hilosophy in the 2ni9ersity of Glasgo<- <ho- <ith others- has re9i9ed the antient hilosophy in this articular. !o< poor the Artifice- to cite a bro/en assage of a hilosophical 1iscourse- in order to thro< an (dium on the AuthorM !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8E =hen the Author asserts that >ustice is an artificial not a natural *irtue- he seems sensible that he employed =ords that admit of an in9idious 5onstruction: and therefore ma/es use of all proper E7pedients- by 1efinitions and E7planations- to pre9ent it. )ut of these his Accuser ta/es no $otice. )y the natural *irtues he plainly understands 5ompassion and Generosity- and such as <e are immediately carried to by a natural +nstinct: and by the artificial *irtues he means >ustice- Loyalty- and such as reHuire- along <ith a natural +nstinct- a certain #eflection on the general +nterests of !uman 'ociety- and a combination <ith others. +n the same 'ense- 'uc/ing is an Action natural to %an- and 'peech is artificial. )ut <hat is there in this 1octrine that can be supposed in the least perniciousF !as he not e7presly asserted- That >ustice- in another 'ense of the =ord- is so natural to %an- that no 'ociety of %en- and e9en no indi9idual %ember of any 'ociety- <as e9er entirely de9oid of all 'ense of itF 'ome persons @tho. <ithout any #eason- in my (pinionB are displeased <ith %r. !utchison.s hilosophy- in founding all the *irtues so much on +nstinct- and admitting so little of #eason and

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#eflection. Those should be pleased to find that so considerable a )ranch of the %oral 1uties are founded on that rinciple. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 81 The Author has li/e<ise ta/en care in positi9e Terms to assert- That he does not maintain that %en ly under no (bligation to obser9e 5ontracts- independent of 'ociety: but only- that they ne9er <ould ha9e formed 5ontracts- and e9en <ould not ha9e understood the %eaning of them- independent of 'ociety. And <hereas it is obser9ed in the 'pecimen- That our Author offers further to pro9e- that- suppose a romise <as intelligible before !uman 5on9entions had established it- it <ould not be attended <ith any %oral (bligation. The most careless #eader must percei9e that he does not understand %oral in such an e7tended 'ense- as to deny the (bligation of romisesindependent of 'ociety: seeing he not only asserts <hat is abo9e?represented- but li/e<ise that the La<s of >ustice are uni9ersal- and perfectly infle7ible. +t is e9identthat suppose %an/ind- in some primiti9e unconnected 'tate- should by some %eans come to the Ino<ledge of the $ature of those Things <hich <e call 5ontracts and romises: that this Ino<ledge <ould ha9e laid them under no such actual (bligation- if not placed in such 5ircumstances as gi9e rise to these 5ontracts. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 8C + am sorry + should be obliged to cite from my %emory- and cannot mention age and 5hapter so accurately as the Accuser. + came hither by ost- and brought no )oo/s along <ith me- and cannot no< pro9ide myself in the 5ountry <ith the )oo/ referred to. !ume" LT#G Te7t p 88 This long Letter- <ith <hich + ha9e troubled you- <as composed in one %orning- that + might gratify your 1emand of an immediate Ans<er to the hea9y 5harge brought against your &riend: and this- + hope- <ill e7cuse any +naccuracies that may ha9e crept into it. + am indeed of (pinion- that the Author had better delayed the publishing of that )oo/: not on account of any dangerous rinciples contained in it- but because on more mature 5onsideration he might ha9e rendered it much less imperfect by further 5orrections and #e9isals. + must not at the same Time omit obser9ing- that nothing can be <rote so accurately or innocently- <hich may not be per9erted by such Arts as ha9e been imployed on this (ccasion. $o %an <ould underta/e so in9idious a Tas/ as that of our Author.s Accuser- <ho <as not actuated by particular +nterests: and you /no< ho< easy it is- by bro/en and partial 5itations- to per9ert any 1iscoursemuch more one of so abstract a $ature- <here it is difficult- or almost impossible- to ;ustify one.s self to the ublic/. The =ords <hich ha9e been carefully pic/t out from a large *olume <ill no doubt ha9e a dangerous Aspect to careless #eaders: and the Author- in my Apprehension- cannot fully defend himself <ithout a particular 1etail<hich it is impossible for a careless #eader to enter into. This Ad9antage of the Ground has been trusted to by his Accuser- and surely ne9er more abused than on the present (ccasion. )ut he has one Ad9antage- + trust- <hich is <orth a !undred of <hat his (pposers can boast of- 9iJ. that of +nnocence: and + hope he has also another Ad9antage- 9iJ. that of &a9our- if <e really li9e in a 5ountry of &reedom- <here +nformers and +nHuisitors are so deser9edly held in uni9ersal 1etestation- <here Liberty- at least of hilosophy- is so highly 9alu.d and esteem.d. + am'ir,our most obedient humble 'er9ant. %ay Dth 1745.

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