TECHNOLOGY FOCUS

Well Control
It has been stated many times that all the easy wells have been drilled. It would stand to reason then that only problem wells remain. Even though this last statement is not entirely correct, our industry is facing increasingly costly incidences of pressure-related nonproductive time. Problems include narrow pore-/ fracture-pressure windows, wellbore stability, depleted formations, formation damage, and excessive casing strings, among others. The industry has responded by developing managed-pressure-drilling (MPD) technologies. The goal of MPD is precise management of the pressure in the entire annulus. In most instances, a rotating control head is used, diverting the mud returns through an adjustable choke. This closed system allows precise imposition of surface backpressure on the annulus and enables precise measurement of the mud-return rate. The use a rotating control device and choke in this way is very similar to a constantbottomhole-pressure method of well control. In September 2009, the SPE Drilling & Completions Applied Technology Workshop on Well Control was held in Rio de Janeiro, during which several companies involved in MPD made presentations on how their MPD technologies have enhanced well control. The closed system, which precisely measures surface pressures and mud-return rates, enables the detection of kicks (sometimes with less than 1 bbl of influx). Then, the mud-return rate is slowed to the prekick rate long enough to stop the influx and the well is killed, all without shutting in the well. In some cases, when a very small influx is detected, it is not even necessary to stop drilling. The papers selected to be highlighted in this issue all detail unconventional wellcontrol methods that have been used recently. On the basis of these papers and presentations at the Applied Technology Workshop, it appears that well control JPT with MPD will quickly become conventional.
Well Control additional reading available at OnePetro: www.onepetro.org IPTC 11970 Killing a Gas Well: Successful Implementation of Innovative Approaches in a Middle-Eastern Carbonate FieldA Field Case by S. Salehi, University of Calgary, et al. SPE 121045 Prevention of Vertical Gas Flow in a Collapsed Well Using Silicate/Polymer/Urea Method by Istvan Lakatos, SPE, Reseach Institute of Applied Earth Sciences, University of Miskolc, and Geoengineering Research Group, Hungarian Academy of Science, Miskolc, Hungary, et al.

Jerome Schubert, SPE, is an Assistant Professor in the Harold Vance Department of Petroleum Engineering at Texas A&M University. He has more than 30 years in the petroleum industry with Pennzoil, Enron Oil and Gas, the University of HoustonVictoria Petroleum Training Institute, and Texas A&M University. Schuberts main research areas include deepwater drilling, managed-pressure drilling, and well control. He earned BS, ME, and PhD degrees in petroleum engineering from Texas A&M University. Schubert is a coauthor of Managed Pressure Drilling and an author of more than 35 technical papers. He has served on several SPE committees and as a technical editor for SPEDC and serves on the JPT Editorial Committee. Schubert serves as Faculty Advisor for Pi Epsilon Tau. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in Texas.

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Managed-Pressure Drilling: Kick Detection and Well Control

In times when the oil industry is looking for drilling technologies to optimize field development, managed-pressure drilling (MPD) has become an attractive technology, offering considerable benefits. MPD is an optimized drilling process used to control the annular pressure profile more precisely throughout the wellbore. The annular pressure profile is controlled from surface so that the bottomhole circulating pressure (BHCP) is balanced with the pore pressure at all times.

RCD Pressurizable returns Annular preventer

Introduction Controlled-pressure-drilling (CPD) technology has enabled the commercial development of numerous oil and gas reservoirs worldwide that otherwise would not have been exploited because of technical and/or economic limitations. CPD has become possible only as a result of the integration of many developing technologies that facilitate directional control of the well trajectory, control of the BHCP, and the safe handling of drilling fluids and drill cuttings at surface. MPD is a drilling technology that uses a pressurizable fluid system and specialized equipment to control the wellbore pressure profile more precisely. Application of this technology optimizes the drilling process by decreasing nonThis article, written by Assistant Technology Editor Karen Bybee, contains highlights of paper SPE 124664, Roles of ManagedPressure-Drilling Technique in Kick Detection and WellcontrolThe Beginning of the New Conventional Drilling Way, by Paco Vieira, SPE, Maurizio Arnone, SPE, and Fabian Torres, Weatherford International, and Fernando Barragan, AGR Group, originally prepared for the 2009 SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology Conference and Exhibition, Manama, Bahrain, 2628 October. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

BOP stack Drillstring

Fig. 1RCD.

productive time and mitigating drilling hazards associated with pressure fluctuations that occur when conventional drilling techniques are used. Many drilling and wellbore-stabilityrelated issues stem from the significant fluctuations in bottomhole pressure (BHP) that are inherent to conventional drilling practices. These fluctuations stem from the stopping and starting of circulation during drillstring connections in jointed-pipe operations; specifically, they result from a change in equivalent circulating density (ECD) that occurs when the pumps are turned on and off. MPD technology, and more specifically, constant BHP (CBHP) as a variation of MPD, is applicable to avoid changes in ECD by applying appropriate levels of surface backpressure, a technique that maintains a CBHP during the complete drilling operation. Additionally, CBHP enables safe application of conventional well-control procedures when unexpected high-pore-

pressure formations are encountered. This requires that MPD systems play roles in kick detection and well control. Kick Detection While Drilling A kick is defined as an influx of formation fluid into the borehole. If left uncontrolled, a kick can develop into a blowout. The result of failing to control a kick can be the loss of the well, and quite possibly, the loss of the rig and lives of the crew. Detecting a kick early and limiting its volume make the difference between a manageable situation and one that can lead to loss of control. It is important to have the appropriate and most-accurate kick-detection equipment available to alert the crew to the kick. The most reliable kick indicators in conventional drilling operations are related to volume and flow-rate monitoring. MPD The objectives of MPD are to ascertain the downhole-pressure-environ-

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Fig. 2MPD choke manifold.

ment limits and to manage the annular hydraulic-pressure profile accordingly. It means that the annular-pressure profile is controlled in such a way that the well is balanced at all times. In conventional well operations, the fluid density is designed to provide an overbalanced status above the pore pressure and below the fracture pressure of the formations to be drilled. This works well in areas where the difference between pore pressure and fracture pressure is sufficiently large to allow some variation in BHP. In the current drilling environments, many operators are drilling more-complex wells and often through depleted reservoirs. Very often in these wells, the pore and fracture pressure in a single hole section are very close. This can result in losses and kicks being taken, resulting in longer well times and additional costs. MPD allows more accurate BHP control, resulting in fewer pressure fluctuations, and it allows better control of the well. Several MPD variations have been defined, and their application will depend on the formation and projectspecific requirements. Variations for MPD are pressurized-mud-cap drilling (PMCD), dual gradient, and CBHP. The full-length paper focuses on the CBHP technique because of its exponential growth during recent years and wider range of applicability. The CBHP method enables staying within the bounds of a narrow window between the pore-pressure and fracture-pressure gradient while drilling a formation where severe losses are expected. The objective is to drill, using a combination of mud weight and special procedures so that the BHP is maintained constant under both dynamic and static conditions. In addition, changing the equivalent mud weight is instantaneous by the simple action of

adjusting the circulation pump rate or the backpressure on the MPD choke to keep control of the pressure profile in the wellbore. MPD control equipment does not replace the rig well-control equipment as the secondary protection barrier. Additional equipment is added to enhance the control of the first barrier, which is the fluid. The two main components of the MPD surface-control equipment are the rotating control device (RCD) and the MPD choke system. Different MPD choke systems are offered by service companies. Systems can range from manual to semiautomatic to fully automated systems. Main Components of MPD Operations RCD. The main function of the RCD (Fig. 1) is to divert the upstream flow from the wellbore to the choke manifold while maintaining an effective seal between the drillstring and the well. The RCD provides the rotating seal between the annulus and atmosphere during MPD operations. The technology is based on applying an advanced compound sealing rubber against the drillstring or Kelly surface, which provides an effective seal while allowing vertical movement of the pipe. The sealing sleeve is located within a secondary housing that allows unrestricted rotation of the drillpipe while still maintaining the seal. MPD Choke Manifold. The MPD choke manifold (Fig. 2) is a critical component of the MPD equipment. It creates the variable flow restriction that controls the wellhead pressure, which in turn maintains a relatively constant BHP in both static and dynamic conditions. The choke in MPD operations is used to control well pressure. Unlike conventional-drilling choke manifolds, MPD chokes are not used as secondary well-control equipment. MPD is intended to avoid continuous influx of formation fluids to the surface. Any influx incidental to the operation will be contained safely by use of an appropriate process. This means that a choke in MPD operations is used for pressure control and less for flow control. As per American Petroleum Institute RP53, the choke manifold must have the same pressure ratings as the preventer stack. In most MPD operations, the choke manifold is connected to the

RCD and therefore a 5K choke system is sufficient because the RCD is rated only to 5K. The choke system for MPD operations is part of the drilling equipment and should not be considered as a part of the well-control equipment; the RCD is a diverter and not a blowout preventer (BOP). The MPD choke manifold can be operated manually or automatically. In automatic MPD choke systems, after an influx is detected, no change in flow rate is required. The choke automatically closes to increase the backpressure at the surface until the influx is controlled. After the influx is controlled, the annular surface pressure is controlled to circulate the influx out of the well. MPD Kick Detection Several types of flowmeters can be used in MPD operations. However, Coriolistype flowmeters are used by most of the MPD service providers for return-flow monitoring. It is installed downstream of the choke manifold. The key characteristic of the tool is its early kick detection and accurate of measurement of the flow rate coming from the annular side. Field experience has shown that ultrasonic flowmeters are unreliable because of the high level of background noise. Because of its high accuracy and immunity from external forces and the ease of installation, the Coriolis-type meter is a reliable tool to take the flow measurements. The Coriolis measuring principle operates independently of the fluid physical properties, such as viscosity and density. Extremely accurate measurement of liquids and gases with temperatures up to 350C and pressures as high as 5,000 psi is achieved, depending on the model. The measuring principle is based on the controlled generation of Coriolis forces. These forces are always present when both translational and rotational movements are superimposed. The amplitude of the Coriolis force depends on the moving mass and its velocity in the system, and thus on the mass flow. Instead of a constant angular velocity, the sensor uses oscillation. A kick can be detected quickly by continuously monitoring and comparing when flow out deviates from flow in. Trends are monitored through a data-acquisition system. Alarms can be set, and, depending on the system being used, the kick can be JPT controlled automatically.

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A Well-Specific Approach to the Quantification of Well Control

Drilling wells in which there is a small pressure margin often is challenging with respect to well-control issues. A kick, which occurs if the wellbore pressure drops below the pore pressure, is one of the major risks being dealt with in the planning phase of the well. A kick can occur as a result of several factors. Because the ultimate consequence of a kick may be a blowout, it is essential to be able to assess and reduce the probability of a kick occurring.

Uncertainty Propagation

Model inputs User (uncertain) input: BHP model Events Geology User (fixed) input: Rig and system specific quantities

Variables of interest System model Stochastic BHP model Kick model output: Kick probability Underbalance probability distribution

Introduction The oil and gas industry is taking on increasingly challenging drilling operations; drilling in severely depleted mature reservoirs, high-pressure/hightemperature drilling, deepwater drilling, and ultradeep wells are some examples. In any drilling operation, proper well control is essential. Loss of well control may lead to a blowout, which represents one of the most severe threats associated with exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources, involving the risk of human lives and environmental and economic consequences. The more challenging the operation, the more effort should be spent in the planning phase on assessing the risks related to loss of well control. When analyzing new and unproven drilling technology, or drilling in challenging environments, statistical data or experience rarely are available. Thus, to
This article, written by Assistant Technology Editor Karen Bybee, contains highlights of paper SPE 124024, KickRiskA WellSpecific Approach to the Quantification of Well-Control Risks, by . Arild, SPE, E.P. Ford, SPE, T. Lberg, SPE, and J.W.T. Baringbing, SPE, IRIS, originally prepared for the 2009 SPE Asia Pacific Oil and Gas Conference and Exhibition, Jakarta, 46 August. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

Sensitivity Analysis/Importance Ranking

Fig. 1REM kick model.

assess risks related to such operations, a well-specific approach often is the only option. A well-specific approach can be undertaken by using a probabilistic risk-assessment (PRA) approach, which provides a body of practical techniques that can help engineers and risk managers predict and manage risks. The kick risk-evaluation model (REM) uses this approach. Proper well control typically is ensured by using two independent barriers. The primary barrier is the mud or fluid column, and the secondary barrier is the blowout preventer (BOP). The REM addresses the potential loss of both these barriers; however, the full-length paper addresses only the loss of the primary barrier (i.e., a kick occurring). Avoiding the occurrence of kicks is important because blowout probability is proportional to the kick probability; efforts made to reduce kick probability directly reduce blowout probability. The objectives of the full-length paper are to provide the reader with an appreciation of probabilistic risk analysis, insight into the REM, and an

understanding of the practical application of the REM tool. Conceptual Framework A quantitative risk model that consists of a formal mathematical and/or simulation model of the system of interest is often the main engine for assessing the risks of interest. The three elements of a quantitative risk model that provides a system representation are 1. The model inputs are all the parameters that are relevant to the system under consideration. This includes both external variables that may influence the system and internal variables. For hydrocarbon-well drilling, examples are the pore pressure (external) and mudpump reliability (internal). Both of these have uncertainty attached to them at the drilling planning stage. 2. The system model may be viewed conceptually as a numerical function linking inputs to outputs. This often is a combination of mathematical and physical models describing the system behavior. A simple example of such a model is the calculation of the

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well-pressure decrease following mud losses in a fracturing situation. A more advanced example is the REM bottomhole-pressure (BHP) model. 3. The output variables of interest should be all variables that will support decision making on how to use the system, including both design and operational decisions. The output quantities can be of both deterministic and probabilistic nature. For the REM, the main variable of interest is the probability of a kick occurring. In terms of the dynamics of the model, input uncertainties are propagated through the system model to generate output uncertainties. This is achieved using Monte Carlo simulation. Further, because an understanding of what input variables have the greatest effect on the output variables (commonly called sensitivity analysis or importance ranking), there is a need for backward propagation in the model. A variety of methods are available for achieving this. In the REM, correlation analysis is used for sensitivity analysis. A risk analysis generally provides decision support for the following type of decisions. Choosing between various alternative solutions and activities while in the planning phase of the system. Choosing between alternative designs of a solution or a measure. What measures can be implemented to make the system less vulnerable in the sense that it can tolerate loads and stresses better? Drawing conclusions on whether various solutions and measures meet the stated requirements (i.e., if the risk level is acceptable or not on different levels). Model Kick avoidance is a matter of wellborepressure control. The pressure margin during drilling can be defined as the difference between the minimum fracturing pressure and the maximum pore pressure in an openhole section. If the wellbore pressure, BHP, is kept within these limits, neither kick nor fracturing will occur. In the well-planning phase, neither the pore pressure nor the fracturing pressure is known. The (desired) BHP usually is decided by the planning team; however, the BHP will be varying during the operation because of temperature effects, hole-shape irregularities, and other factors. In other words,

the pore pressure, fracturing pressure, and the BHP are all uncertain before the drilling operation. Calculation of kick probability (or the fracturing probability) is a mathematical exercise that can be performed by, for example, Monte Carlo simulation. However, establishing the probability distributions for the pore pressure, fracturing pressure, and BHP is not straightforward. The challenge is, therefore, to be able to establish probability distributions that represent the uncertainty related to these pressures for a specific well. For this, a model is needed, which is the REM kick model. The elements of the REM kick model are illustrated in Fig. 1, and it should be considered a specific example of the system-specific, quantitative risk model. BHP Model The uncertainty in the BHP requires a model, while geology is regarded as model input. The uncertainty of the pore and fracturing pressure is quantified directly in dialogue with the project geologists and drilling engineers, while the BHP uncertainty is seen as being composed of a variety of factors whose interaction can be captured in a model. Detailed modeling of the pore and fracturing pressure could have been conducted; however, these are set by nature and cannot be changed operationally. BHP depends on several factors that potentially can be dealt with through operations and well design and is thus a suitable candidate for detailed modeling. A drilling operation can be seen as consisting of different operational phases or suboperations. Each of these suboperations has features that are special to it and thus require a dedicated BHP model. There are five different suboperations: 1. Drilling ahead 2. Tripping operations 3. Static conditions 4. Casing operations 5. Cementing operations For each of these phases, the BHP is decomposed as consisting of various pressure contributors. Depending on the operational phase, the BHP can in terms of physics be decomposed into the following three pressure contributors: Hydrostatic pressure Frictional pressure loss Surge and swab effects The goal of the BHP modeling is to capture the potential variations in

the BHP. Despite the efforts made by the drilling planning team to keep the BHP as constant as possible during the operation, the BHP will naturally fluctuate around the desired BHP. These variations can be regarded as normal fluctuations and may be caused by imperfections in mud preparation during circulation, fluctuations in the running speed during tripping or casing operations, and temperature effects during phases of no circulation. The aggregated effect of these normal fluctuations is captured in the model by requiring (well-specific) input in the form of probabilities and probability distributions. In addition to the normal fluctuations, the BHP model for any given suboperation takes into account abnormal fluctuations, which are caused by the occurrence of undesirable events. Undesirable events may be caused by unexpected geological and reservoir conditions, equipment failures, and human errors. For each suboperation, different undesirable events apply. The REM tool contains a comprehensive library of possible undesirable events for each suboperation, some of which are listed below: Wrong mud-density measurement resulting from (human) communication error Pressure peak when breaking gel at circulation start Increased swab effect caused by clay swelling Pressure drop as a result of washpipe leakage Pressure drop caused by water separation during cementing Pressure reduction caused by casing float-valve leakage Finally, the BHP model contains a submodel describing the operational steering or control of the BHP. The steering process can be regarded as a control loop and takes into account the quality of well pressure measurements and the philosophy related to mudweight adjustment. After collecting the required input for each of the BHP components, the calculation of kick probabilities for the suboperations and the whole drilling operation can be performed. The BHP model combines the input for both normal and abnormal fluctuations, and the uncertainties are propagated through the BHP model to the output using Monte Carlo simulation. JPT

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WELL CONTROL

Kicks in Offshore UK Wells

The first well on the UK continental shelf (UKCS) was spudded 44 years ago, and the area long has been considered a mature province. Despite this, kicks are still a frequent occurrence. Kicks occur in high-pressure/high-temperature (HP/ HT) condensate exploration wells and in production wells in depleted subnormally pressured oil reservoirs. They occur during drilling operations and during workover operations. Analysis of data on well incidents has identified where, geographically, kicks occur most frequently.

Exploration on the UKCS began in the mid-1960s, with the first major discovery in December 1965. In a mature oil and gas province such as the North Sea, it might be assumed that the frequency of kicks during drilling or workover operations would be decreasing. This study indicates otherwise. Approach The study is based on a review of all kicks and blowouts reported for the area in the 10 years since 1999. The intent in reviewing the data is to consider which areas of the UKCS, and which type of operation, carry the greatest risk of kicks. A second, more detailed, review was carried out for incidents in the 3-year period 2006 to 2008, which examined each reported incident in more detail, reviewing the circumstances under which the kick occurred and, where possible, identifying the underlying cause. Areas of the UKCS Over the last 44 years, wells have been drilled in each of a variety of discrete geographical and geological areas off the coast of the UK (Fig. 1). Although wells have been drilled in all the basins shown, the vast majority of the drilling activity on the UKCS has been limited to six discrete geological areas southern North Sea, central North Sea, Moray Firth, northern North Sea, West of Shetland, and Irish Sea. It is in these areas that the reported incidents considered in this study have occurred. Data Analysis Basin. The total numbers of kicks over the last 10 years have been spread evenly between the southern North Sea (93), northern North Sea (115), central North Sea, and Moray Firth (106). However, when the data are corrected for the level of rig activity in these

Introduction The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the regulator for oil and gas drilling on land in UK and on the UKCS. UK health and safety regulations specify which well incidents must be reported by well operators. These reportable incidents are kicks, blowouts both underground and at surface, the unanticipated presence of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), unplanned intersections and near misses, and serious failure of a safety-critical element including the primary pressure-containment envelope of the well. The purpose of the regulation is not merely to inform HSE of the incident, but also to allow the regulator to spot trends in the industry that may not be noticeable to individual well operators and drilling contractors. The fulllength paper focuses on kicks and their consequences, rather than on other incidents, but with the intention of sharing the overview more widely.
This article, written by Assistant Technology Editor Karen Bybee, contains highlights of paper SPE 119942, Kicks in Offshore UK WellsWhere Are They Happening and Why?, by J.D. Dobson, SPE, Health and Safety Executive, originally prepared for the 2009 SPE/IADC Drilling Conference and Exhibition, Amsterdam, 1719 March. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

Fig. 1UKCS basins. See full-length paper for details.

areas, it is evident that kick frequency is highest in the south and that it is higher in the northern basin than in the central and Moray Firth basins. There have been few kicks West of Shetland (13) or in the Irish Sea (4). Rig Type. When kicks are analyzed by rig type, it is apparent that they occur most frequently with platform rigs (140), followed by jackups (125). They are least frequent in wells drilled from semisubmersibles (68). Wells. For development wells, the frequency of kicks is highest in the northern North Sea (74), followed by the southern North Sea (67), then central North Sea (34), and Moray Firth (25) areas. Kicks during workover of development wells (60), however, occur mostly in the northern North Sea (40), with only a handful in other geological basins.

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The trend of kicks in exploration and appraisal wells is markedly different from the trend for development wells. For these wells, kicks occur mainly in the central (31) and southern North Sea (22) areas. They are a comparative rarity in the other sectors. Southern North Sea The southern North Sea is exclusively a gas province. The gas tends to occur in block-faulted anticlines beneath the Upper Permian Zechstein salt. The reservoirs are usually Lower Permian dune sands and occasionally Upper Carboniferous sands; underlying Carboniferous coalbeds provide the source of the gas. In a small number of fields, the reservoir is Triassic (Bunter) sand. Over the 10-year period, there have been 87 kicks in wells in the southern North Sea, of which 56 were from a Zechstein formation; of these, 50 were brine, three gas, and two mud, with one not recorded. H2S was recorded as being present in the brine in one. Of the remaining incidents, the majority (17) were gas kicks from the reservoir sands of the Lower Permian, specifically the Silverpit, Rotliegendes, or Westphalian, but there were also kicks in the Upper Cretaceous chalk and Bunter sandstone of the Triassic, which overlie the Zechstein formations. The kicks from the younger formations were predominantly of brine, but gas was occasionally encountered. Kicks in the Zechstein formation were all a result of dolomite rafting. In two recent incidents, flow from the Zechstein occurred through the lap of a recently cemented liner. This appears to be a measure of the challenges in successfully cementing casing in halite formations. Kicks in other formations appear to have been caused either by having the incorrect density of drilling fluid or were a result of mud losses to other formations. The high level of kicks from Zechstein formations is caused by difficulty in predicting the overpressured rafts. Most of the kicks were low-risk, small accumulations of brine that were quickly depleted. In the last 3 years, half of the kicks recorded were caused by dolomite rafting. Other recurring significant causes were poor liner cement, unexpected overpressure in the reservoir, losses to higher formations, and insufficient mud weight. The high percentage of kicks from jackup rigs is consistent with the level

of incidents in the southern North Sea. Almost all wells in the southern sector are drilled using jackups. Water depths are too shallow for semisubmersibles, and the small wellhead platforms rarely have integrated drilling rigs. Northern North Sea Typically, reservoirs in the northern North Sea are Jurassic sandstone. Faulting is common, often with discrete fault blocks with little or no communication between them. In many fields, faulting is part of the trap mechanism. The sands also are deltaic, and reservoir sands are frequently interbedded with shales, again with little or no communication between them. This is a major factor for kicks in development wells. A significant number of kicks come from drilling into fault blocks where the pressure is higher than expected, often a result of water injection. A number of kicks during workover are a result of loss of kill fluid to adjacent depleted sands, with the loss of head allowing a less-depleted sand to flow. The identified causes of kicks in the northern North Sea are varied. In the last 3 years, the most frequent were water injection and swabbing. Other causes were barite sag, reduced mud weight, unexpected overpressure, communication with a deeper sand, and mud losses to a higher formation. A high proportion of kicks involve the complex reservoirs found in this sector, often compounded by significant depletion, which offers an explanation for the comparatively high incidence of well incidents involving platform rigs when compared with semisubmersible rigs. The depletion of some sands, but not others, creates a situation in development wells, mainly platform wells, where there is a narrow window between losses and gains. Central North Sea and Moray Firth The frequency of well incidents in the basins of the Moray Firth and central North Sea is noticeably lower than in the areas to the north and south. This is despite the fact that the vast majority of HP/HT wells have been drilled in this area, which account for approximately one-third (26) of the kicks in the central sector (72). In the central North Sea, of the kicks recorded since 2006, many were a result of encountering higher-than-

expected formation pressures or a result of swabbingmostly in HP/HT wells. Other incidents had a variety of causeswater injection, gas-cut mud, reduced mud weight, supercharged formation, cuttings injection, mud losses to an adjacent formation, an unweighted cement wash, reduced equivalent circulating density on connection, and, during a workover, an accumulation of gas below a plug. None of the recent kicks in Moray Firth wells were HP/HT related. They too had a wide variety of causeshigher-thanexpected overpressuring, water injection, insufficient brine weight, gas-cut mud, a shallow-gas accumulation, and gas trapped below the tubing hanger. It is worth noting that, apart from HP/HT wells, there is no discernable underlying geological cause to kicks in the central North Sea or Moray Firth sectors. Conclusions Most kicks experienced on the UKCS are linked directly to geological conditions at the well location and, for the most part, involve conditions that are difficult to detect before the well is drilled. Specifically, these are the existence of dolomite rafts in the Zechstein sequence of the southern sector, compartmentalized reservoirs in the northern sectors, and difficulty in identifying the top of the transition zone in HP/HT Jurassic plays on the Central Graben. Other incidents are related to difficulties caused by the geological conditions, such as the challenges in cementing casing in halite formations or in keeping mud weight sufficient to prevent the well from flowing. The latter challenge is not limited to HP/HT wells but also is encountered in the complex reservoirs of the northern North Sea and in the Lower Permian sands in the southern North Sea. There are two areas of concern to HSE as the safety regulator for the UKCS. The most pressing issue is that human error continues to be a factor in well incidents. If recent high drillingactivity levels continue, then appropriate well-control training of personnel engaged both in rigsite operations and in operational planning, needs to be accorded the highest priority. This is already the case for high-risk operations involving HP/HT wells, but it should also be considered for other JPT complex wells.

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