CASE: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

1602 Therefore, Miranda was not afforded his Fifth Amendment

right to compelled self-incrimination nor his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. The U.S. Supreme ourt reversed the Arizona
FACTS: On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at Supreme Court's decision.
his home and taken into custody at a Phoenix police station. HOLDING AT APPEAL FOR: Reversed.
While at the police station, he was identified by the
complaining witness. The police then took him to an
ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110;
interrogation room in the detective bureau where he was
20 FEB 1981]
questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at
Wednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers emerged
from the interrogation room with a written confession signed
Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave
by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed
coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr.
paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily,
Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000
without threats or promises of immunity and with "full
from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a
knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I
game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not
make may be used against me."
Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the
priest’s request to move it on another date. Sometime later
At the trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted
Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but
into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the
the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram
officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda
stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked
during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of
their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the
kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20 to 30 years'
case because the trial was already dragging the accused and
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate
concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court
attached to it in order for the court to recognize the
of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not
complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again
violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the
another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to
convictions. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized
revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the
heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request
priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
counsel. From that decision, the defendant appealed to the
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a
U.S. Supreme Court.
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
HOLDING AT TRIAL FOR: State of Arizona (and affirmed at the
State Appeal level).
Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case,
which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to
ISSUE: When one is arrested and otherwise taken into
appear at the trial, would place the accused in double
custody, is it required that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
jeopardy
rights, i.e. his right to remain silent against the giving of
incriminating evidence and his right to have an attorney
present, be explained to him before any questioning can
Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double
occur.
jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed
already without the consent of the accused which would have
RULE OF LAW: Upon "custodial interrogation", one is entitled
an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was
to the following measure as a rule of law: An admonishment
due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence due
that the arrestee has (1) the right to remain silent and that
to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself
anything he says may be used against him in a court of law,
which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the
and (2) the right to the presence of an attorney and if he
same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three
cannot afford counsel, one will be appointed for him prior to
requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid
questioning if he so desires.
complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a
court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has
RATIONALE/APPLICATION OF RULE TO FACTS: The court in its
been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
analysis held that from the testimony of the officers and by
information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were
the admission of respondent, it was clear that Miranda was
present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court
not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an
of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place
attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor
and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are
effectively protected in any other manner. Absent the
present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the
warnings to Miranda, his statements were inadmissible. The
dismissal or termination of the case without his express
court further held that the typed in clause stating that
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another
Miranda had full knowledge of his legal rights did not
prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was
approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to
evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a
relinquish his constitutional rights. The court further held that
speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
termination which would mean that respondents had no
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are not mutually
expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would
exclusive rights. They may overlap in some instances, and
make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by
protect the interests of an accused in an interrogation setting.
the competent court in order to protect the respondents as
well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to
With Miranda, the mere fact that his signed confession stated
acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further
he had full knowledge of his legal rights was insufficient. For
prosecution.
one to waive his
constitutional rights, he must do so intelligently, knowingly
and voluntarily. Without having been told he had a right to
remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him
PEOPLE VS. SALAS [143 SCRA 163; G.R. NO. L-66469;
in a court of law and that he had a right to an attorney and if
29 JUL 1986]
he could not afford one, the court would appoint a lawyer,
Miranda could not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights.
0 commentsSunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
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Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992,
a 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found
lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga;
she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of
March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and Richard Pangan who
were with her going home coming from the wake of one
Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard Pangan testified
that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard
Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way
and that was the last time Virginia was seen alive; just a few
minutes after reaching his house and while inside his house,
Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman, one Serafia
Gutierrez, testified that she likewise was awakened by a shout
at about 3:00 in the morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the
victim found hematoma on the head and chest, an abrasion
on the left chin and stabwound on the neck which stabwound,
the doctor claims, was the cause of death of the victim; Police
Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon
report, recovered at the scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch,
earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on
March 9, 1992 when he continued his investigation bloodstain
on the front door of the house of the accused which
bloodstain when submitted for examination was found to be of
human blood; one Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about
5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who
claims that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were
on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got
money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no
change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one
Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated the claim of
Resultay that Virginia had with her at that time money worth
P2,000.00 as in the morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her
mother for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he claims
his mother placed in her purse and claims further that at the
wake, he asked and was given P50.00 by his mother as he
also participated in the gambling thereat, however, the purse
of Virginia containing about P2,000.00 was no longer to be
found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the
accused gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled at
the wake; accused had been working for three days before
March 6 at Sta. Ana, Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but
the following day, he did not anymore report for work at Sta.
Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last seen
at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their
way home coming from the wake; the parents of [the]
accused were informed by Investigator Gonzales that their
son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender him, but
since March 6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga, he
returned only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga,
not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately
apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992
after chancing on a radio message by the police of Arayat to
their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred
at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the victim
and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat,
Pampanga where he used the name of Rommel Salas and not
Elmer Salas. The trial court rendered convicting Salas for
Robbery with Homicide
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a
conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.
(2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime homicide or robbery
with homicide.
Held: There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to
the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things
allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct
evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may
draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct
testimony would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the
circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other
persons, as the author of the crime. The facts and
circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and
inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to
surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00
a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house
in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since
childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his
co-worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to
appellant's house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00
a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a
painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of
the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He
was not seen again from said date. Police investigators found
human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on
his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was
killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the
principal suspect, a fact known to appellant's family and
neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the
authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six months
after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a
hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a
Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized, appellant used
the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas.
These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained,
has always been considered by the courts as indicative of
guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they
attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak
when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he
failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused
to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when
her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and
bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to
fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was
at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the
victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the
part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely
testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the
testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the
intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the
trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and intent
to give one's self up are absent where the accused went into
hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an
alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated
by the police authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against
property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the
main purpose of the criminal. In charging Robbery with
Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the
taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was
committed." Although there was no witness as to the actual
robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had
more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at
P750.00. These were never recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was
robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four
circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1)
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The
appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was
last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's purse
containing her money and earrings were missing from her
body when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is affirmed. Costs
against appellant. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29
JUN 1968]
0 commentsSunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape
before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the
charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said
motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused
in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy,
the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the
Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The
“doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico
applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense because his action
in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally
not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double
jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him
is revived by the fiscal.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444;
8 SEP 1920]
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Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of
adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not she
was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery
being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such
physical examination interposing the defense that such
examination was a violation of her constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a
violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-
incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The
rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition
is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.
CITIZENSHIP
MERCADO VS. MANZANO [307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO.
135083; 26 MAY 1999]
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent
Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-
Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private
respondent was the winner of the said election but the
proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto
Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent.
Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the
petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a
dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that
provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained
pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in
the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision
and declared private respondent qualified to run for the
position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This
petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC
and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold
office as Vice-Mayor.
Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen
because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San
Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those
born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand,
refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
BENGZON VS. HRET [357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7
May 2001]
1 commentsWednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985,
however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering
said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO.
87193; 23 JUN 1989]
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-
elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League
of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its
President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment
of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he
was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May
22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship
only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in
the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private
respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18,
1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor. They also argued that their petition in the
Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor,
his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio
because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent,
the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo
was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated
himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an
alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines.
His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of
Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also
joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because
what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the
annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He
agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground
that he was not a Filipino.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January
18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI,
Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at
all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the
Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective
office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987,
Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such
status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner
was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it
cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced
into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion
that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as

provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the

natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our
laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured
like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is
like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not
quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.

Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby

declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the
said province once this decision becomes final and executory.