Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
quire about how to go about wriiing an ar- relevant and important. Remember that we
ticle for ARMOR. It is really fairly simple - exist to exchange ideas and pass informa-
just have a good idea and put pencil to tion to the Armor Force, not to compete for
paper. If you are not sure about your idea, literary awards.
check previous issues of ARMOR to see if
we have already published something on Try to say what you want to say in fewer
your subject. If we have, don't write about it. than 3,000 words (that's about 12 double-
(By way of a tip: We do not need anything spaced typed pages). The number is not
right now on recon-counterreconor NTC): If set in concrete, but it is a good target. Con-
you want to bounce your idea off us first, trary to the way we learned to write in
before you spend hours writing, just give us school, it is harder to write shorter than it is
a call. to write longer. Also, see the directory sec-
tion in this issue. There, you can find what
We are interested in articles that fall into word processing programs we can work
these broad categories: leadership, tactics, with. Just send us your disc, along with a
logistics, equipment design, military history hard copy. Include any art or photographs
(for lessons learned that can be applied to (black & white, or color) you might have.
Airland Battle), training, gunnery, Threat,
and U.S. and Soviet organization. We try to That's all there is to it. Just like the only
put together each issue with articles from bad question is the one that goes unasked,
across this spectrum. the only bad article we know of is the one
that goes unwritten.
If you are apprehensive about the "quality"
of your writing, do not be. We will polish - PJC
Official:
Editor-in-Chief FEATURES
MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY
6 Clarke of St. Vith Dies
Managing Editor 10 The Criticality of Time in Combat
JON T. CLEMENS by General James H. Polk, Ret.
Commandant 14 Soviet Tanks: An Israeli View
MG THOMAS H. TAlT by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Ret.)
19 The "Brave Rifles" at the NTC
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published by Major Steve Speakes
bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401 24 Battlefield Deception
Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. by Captain Randall M. Scheffler
Disclaimer: The information contained in
ARMOR represents the professional opinions of 30 Use of the Pressure Setting
the authors and does not necessarily reflect the In the Ml/MlAl Fire Control Computer
official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it by David H. Tofsted and SFC Wakeland Kuamoo
change or supersede any information
presented in other official Army pubiications. 32 Leadership Doctrine for the Airland Battle
Official distribution is limited to one copy for by Major Thomas G. Clark
each heavy brigade headquarters, armored
headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 35 The Bugle Call Has Faded...
quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Browne, Jr.
quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- 36 Subaltern Stakes
pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Colonel James M. Lyle and Major N. Wlnn Noyes
the United States Army. In addition, Army
libraries, Army and DOD schools. HQ DA and 38 Painless Training Schedules
MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for ar- by Captain Robert L Jones
mored. direct fire, ground combat systems. or-
ganizations, and the training of personnel for 40 The Battle of Booneville
such organizations may request two copies by by Captain 0. C. Burnette
sending a military letter to the editor-inchief.
45 Open Letter on TACAIR Support
Authorized content: ARMOR will print only
those materials for which the US. Army Armor
by General Robert D. Russ, USAF
Center has proponency. That proponency in-
cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry
DEPARTMENTS
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
2 Letters 46 Professional Thoughts
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;
2 Points of Contact 50 Recognition Quiz Answers
any miscellaneous items of equipment which 8 Commander's Hatch 51 Bustle Rack
armor and armored cavalry organizations use 9 Recognition Quiz 52 Books
exclusively: training for all SC 12A, 128, and
12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted
soldiers; and information concerniog the train-
ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armor
and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi-
ment level and below, to include Threat units at
Second-class official mail postage pald at Fort Knox. KY, and addHionai mailing offlces.
those levels.
Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, A m . ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox, KY
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except 40121.
where copyright is indicated. Disirlbution Restriction: Approved for public release; dislributlon is uniimRed.
USPS 467-970
May-June 1988, Vol XCVll No. 3
number of 94th Infantry Division men who they could rest easy In their graves. (They
The Final Word on Bannholz were in this action and they may have are also in the cemetery at Hamm along
Dear Sir: other opinions.) with those of the 704th TD Bn.)
The 4th Armored Divlsion was in Luxem-
Re: The Bannholz and Lessons for burg for an "extended period" of rest and
Today's Warriors. A rifleman isn't in combat for very long refit after their actions in the relief of Bas-
before he gets the feeling of things that togne. With the rest of their outfit still in
There were four battles for the Bannholz are fated to be. Today, it seems that it rear area billets, one wonders if the 704th
Woods (see Harry E. Traynor's letter in the was fated that the airborne Lieutenant was not 'Yurious" and "enraged" before
November-December 1987 ARMOR). 1 Newsome wrote his letter on tanks they ever left Luxemburg.
wrote about the third (September-October (January-February 1987 letters) which led
1987 letters). Traynor was in the second. to an exchange of letters, eventually in- One wonders if the sentiments did not
Today, Traynor can tell the rest of the cluding mine and Harry E. Traynor's preexist any action they later undertook
704th TD Bn, 4th AD, that in the third Ban- response in the following issue. It's almost with the 94th Infantry Division, a division
nholz battle, the 704th got even with the as if the ghosts of those riflemen lost by not even in the corps to which the 4th AD
94th, if indeed 10-to-1 is even. (This writer the 94th Infantry Division on the Bannholz belonged. However, Traynor states, "Our
can only speak for himself. There are a wanted this story told so that for once (TD) company commander was furious
city State ZP Signature (Master Card and VISA orders must be signed)
March 7, 1988
precious than time, lor it is tlie "Get there fustcst with power to create
price of eternity." the niostest," he never surprise, to produce
could fully explain his the unexpected
It is curious that so few thoughts tactical genius. move, reinforced by
or philosophical writings are an acute time-sense
devoted to tlie advantages that a Napoleon's so-called and by the capacity
step ahead in time gives to the at- "maxims" are olten ir- to develop the
tacker in modern ground warfare. relevant, or at Icast not highest possible de-
Examples abound, and Ilicre are a persuasive, in attempt- gree of mobility....
I'
Newsweek displayed
our civilian and military hierarchy. a table of comparative We must avoid battles of attrition
As an example, a recent issue of numbers of tanks, artil- - Caen, Anzio, Tet, Porkchop Hill,
Nclivsweek displayed a table of com- lery, fighter aircraft, Verdun, Passchcndaele - the
pariltivc numbers of tanks, artillery, and others, which names are endless, and the results
fighter aircraft, and others, which showed that the War- are meaningless and horrendous.
showed that the Warsaw Pact out- saw Pact outnum- We must seek the war of maneuver,
numbered NATO by a factor of bered NATO by a fac- we must break through, seek the
about 2-to-1, and the gloomy con- tor of about 2-to-1, and priceless time advantage so that we
clusion was, by implication at least, the gloomy conclusion are ahead of our adversary, he is
that NATO will be quickly defeated was, by implication at reacting to our last move, our time
in a conventional war. niis is piwe least, that NATO will advantage overcomes his numbers,
IlOIISeItSe.
be quickly defeated in we get one step ahcad, then two
a conventional war. stcps ahead, then we have him by
In fact, an attack by the Warsaw the throat, when boldness counts,
Pact is very scenario-dependcnt. If This is pure non- and numbers don't mattcr, and we
the Pact was able to mount a full- sense." know and he knows that it is almosl
scale attack on a Sunday morning over. We the Icaders, once this pre-
without prior detection, NATO cious time advantage is gained,
would have a dreadful time with or Overlord and beyond envisioned a must drive our attacking units to the
without atomic weapons. But such progressive widening of the Norman- limit of endurance and beyond, be-
an attack represents a dreadful risk dy bridgehead in successive "all- cause our adversaries are not only
by the Soviet leadership because of hold-hands" advances. Unfortunate- exhausted, but badly frightened and
the chance o f detection and of the ly, the planners did not foresee the they are ours to harvest. The
battle becoming a one-on-one at- painfully slow progress in the American soldier is not stupid, and
tack. On the other hand, if we had hedgerows. But worse than that, when he collectively smells victory,
five days warning and mobilized so they had no concept of the wild he is incredibly brave and ruthless,
that NATO divisions were in posi- breakouts and confusion that fol- and numbers don't count.
tion and ready, we w c ~ ~ lsurely
d lowed. Third Army advances lltis is victory!
achieve a standoff or stalemate and depended almost totally on
possibly a victory. Again, time is not availability of gasoline, whereas the
critical; it is priceless. German Army could do almost
nothing to delay our speed of ad- General James H. Polk
vance. Had we had the gasoline, was born In 1911 In the
Furthermore, with a time ad- Third Army could have breached Philippines, where his
vantage, numbers don't count. It is the Seigfried Line easily, because it father was an Army officer.
the mosl exciting, exhilarating ex- was almost unmanned. We had the He was commissioned in
perience a soldier may en,joy. It time advantage, but lost it because cavalry from West Point in
begets boldness and daring i d , as we had outrun our support. In a 1933. During WWII, he com-
stated earlier, increases t h e relative war of maneuver, fuel is critical, manded Third Army caval-
superiority as the events accelerate while in a battle ol' attrition, am- ry units and was decorated
and only ends when support is out- munition is the decisive Factor. We three times for gallantry.
distanced. My own 3rd Armored had the firepower but lacked the From 1955 to 1957 he was
Cavalry reached the Moselle River POL and thereby lost our "time" ad- chief of staff, then assistant
with one troop out ahead and ac- vantage. It certainly cost the Allies commander, of the 3rd Ar-
tually captured intact the bridge at six months of active warfare and un- mored Division and served
Thionville. The troop had to he conscionable casualties. We fell into two years with NATO's
recalled as no reinforccnients could a war of attrition in Octobcr of 1944 land forces in Central
join it, and the 7th Armorcd and never achieved any rcal success Europe. He was com-
Division was running out ol' gas, until the breakout in the spring of mander-in- chief USAREUR
tank by ti& bchind us. And sig- 1045, when we once again got and Seventh Army when he
nificantly enough, the planning for moving and had "time" on our side. retired in 1971.
Soviet Tanks:
An Israeli View
by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Retired)
Soon after the Six Day War, with During the War of Attrition (1968- perience served to modify the
hundreds of Soviet tanks captured 1970), the IDF used the Soviet vehicles within an extensive upgrad-
by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) tanks in several operations along ing program which was imple-
in Sinai and the Golan Heights, Is- the Suez Canal, the most audacious mentcd in the mid-1970's.
rael began to evaluate these being the large armored raid on the
vehicles. It was soon established coastal road of the Gulf of SUCZin During the Yom Kippur War, a
that the Soviet tanks had substantial September 1969. The raiding force, complete brigade of partially-
combat potential and compared which included several T-55 and upgradcd T-55 tanks served in
favorably with Western counterparts. BTR carriers painted in Egyptian Sinai, fighting alongside the IDF
army colors, was landed at night by Patton and Centurion tanks. The T-
LST. It roanicd the coastal r o d 55s were b y then upgunned with the
The IDF Ordnance Corps decided southward destroying Egyptian 105-mm gun, but still retained most
to bring these tanks into service. Al- military traffic and radar installa- of the original features of the Rus-
though the captured T-54/55 tanks tions. The operation lasted for al- sian model. During the fighting in
at lkst retained their original D-IOT most half a day, after which the Sinai, the IDF T-55s were badly
IOU-mm gun, modifications includcd force was rccovercd by amphibious mauled in combat during the Oc-
the replacement of the Russian craft and returned to base. tobcr 14 battles, when the brigade
radio set with the standard VRC stemmed an all-out Egyptian assault
type in service with the IDF, and This was the first time that Israeli almost unassisted. After the war,
the fitting of Browning machine crews opcrated Soviet tanks under the upgrading program was con-
guns. combat conditions. Their ex- tinued and included imoortant
modifications based on the bat- upgrading scheme fitted Blazer reac- live in cleaning and air volume supp-
tlefield experience gained in Sinai. tive add-on armor plates, enhancing ly (8OOm3/sec), and needs only com-
protection. pressed air for cleaning every 50
Austere Modifications hours.
Currently, the IDF Ordnance
The . guidelines dictated by the Corps main depot is upgrading the Reducing Vulnerability
Ministry of Defense were strict: the Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks to Is-
modifications were to be made with raeli standards. Designated Model The old fuel system, comhining ex-
utmost economy. However, the S, the T-55s is re-cngined with the ternal and internal fuel and oil
ordnance experts agreed unani- American General Motors 8V-73T tanks, was scrapped as both incffec-
mously that the basic T-55 was a diescl powerpack developing 600 rive and vulnerable in combat. It
good tank with excellent automotive hp, a considerable improvement was replaced by four fuel h n k s lo-
capabilities riding on one of the over the Russian 500-hp engine. cated in various places inside the
world’s best suspension and track The Soviet manual transmission was hull, some of which are dual-pur-
systcms, its heavy armor but low also rcplaced by a semiautomatic pose, combining diesel fuel and am-
weight adding survivability. The hydromechanical transmission fitted munition storage. Armament im-
tank had an extremely low sil- with a torque converter, which en- provements include a new Cadillac
houette, and was fast even over sures optimal output power in all <;age stabilizer replacing the electro-
rough terrain and sand. Its power- gears. This facilitates gear shifting, a hydraulic systcm used by the
pack was fairly reliable and simple very tiring and physically exhausting Soviets. The old system gave fine
to maintain. job on the original tank. The new vertical stabilization (hydraulic) but
combination made driving a lot the electrical horizontal stabilization
After evaluating the gun/turret easier, permitting acceleration lo 27 was poor. The new unit provides su-
structure, it was decided to leave mph in only 30 seconds, a marked perior performance in both axes.
the original Soviet D-IOT gun sys- improvement.
tems and assembly intact and The hazards of comhuslihle
replace only the barrel and sleeve. Further modifications in the hydraulic h i d , demonstrated by ex-
However, due to the higher barrel powerpack involved the final drive. ploding tanks during the latest wars,
pressure, muzzle velocity, and recoil The original design was a two-part have been reduced. The stabiliza-
forces of the L7A1, the gun assemb- planetary device, one permanently tion system’s more vulnerable parts,
ly had to be acijusted. Because the installed in the hull, the other the accumulator and powerpack
original systems were kept, no hinged to the engine. The new final have been located in the hull in a
modifications to the turret ring, drive is a custom-made single unit relatively safe place, feeding the sta-
trunnions, or turret layout became which can be removed with the en- bilizers through a special hydraulic
necessary and the tank was rcady gine and is, therefore, easily replace- line over thc hydro-electriccollector.
lor firing tests just a few months able. Engine change is now down to
after project launch. a 30-minute job in the field. All en- To enhance survivability, several
gine accessories have been systems are added. These include a
The post-Yom Kippur War rcplaced. Among these are the air standard IDF low-profile com-
retrofit program included installa- cleaners. The original device used a mander’s cupolo,replacing the
tion of metal stowage boxes on the particle filter and oil bath for air original Soviet bolted, lorward-open-
sides and rear of the turret, which cleaning. This proved totiilly unreli- ing hatchcover, which dangerously
added protection against HEAT able under desert dust conditions, blocked the commander’s forward
and shoped-charge hits. This also rcquiring major cleaning evcry 25 view. The original smoke screen gen-
changed the silhouette, facilitating hours. The new systcm, lociltcd in- erator, operatcd on a system under
recognition in battle. An additional side an armored box, is more elTec- which diesel fuel was injected into
I
16 ARMOR - May-June 1988 I
I
the left side of the 11s-mm gun. use them in combat as second-
This arrangement actually seats echelon reserves, a threat which
three of the crew in line, and if the should not be discounted.
tank is penetrated by a kinetic-ener-
gy shot on the left side, all three are Other Tanks
usually killed by one round. The
loader is seated on the right side of “...Although the T- There are three other main battle
the gun. Although he has most of 72 is an advanced tank models in the Soviet arsenal, of
the space in the turret, h e has to design incorporat- which one, the T-72, is in wide ser-
load the gun to the left, which, un- ing many technical vice with several Arab armies. The
less he is left-handcd, makes it a improvements, other two, the T-64 variants and the
very trying occupation, soon reduc- especially in the new T-80, are at present in service
ing the firing sequence. later models, it still only with the Sovict armored corps.
retains some of the
Although the U-STS(2A20) 115- old Soviet tank The T-72 has been in production
mm smoothbore gun, at first, seems maladies. Driving since the early 1970s, a parallel
a very efficient tank gun, its combat the T-72 seems as developmcnt of the T-Ci4A which
effectiveness leaves much to be tiring as driving ear- was already introduced into active
desired. The firing sequence lier Soviet tanks...” service with the Soviet Army in
presents most of the drawbacks. 1967. The T-72 has a combat weight
The gun’s exhaust fumes are over- of 41 tons and is crewed by three
whelming and the fighting compart- men, in contrast to four crew mem-
ment soon fills with carbon bers in most Eastern and Western
monoxide, despite the bore kilogram round into the rapidly clos- tanks. Its silhoucttc is even lower
evacuator dcsigned to remove ing horizontal breech. As the gun is than the T-62 and with the
fumes. Poor ventilation causes com- elevated during the loading process, automatic loader, which takes up
bat fatigue, and crews have been all power is cut off to prevent ac- about half of the fighting compart-
known to abandon their mounts to- cidentd firing of the gun until the ment, makes life in the T-72 turret
tally exhausted, choking from the loader has chambered the round even more cramped than in pre-
poisonous fumes. and depressed the safety button to vious designs.
lire.
An automatic ejection device is Although the T-72 is an advanced
provided, under which the spent This arrangement reduces the rate design incorporating many technical
shell is propelled outside the turret of fire considerably helow Westcrn improvements, especially in the
through a porthole in the rear. But standards. In spite of these draw- later models, it still retains some of
this arrangement frequently gets backs, the 115-mm gun is very effec- the old Soviet tank maladies. Driv-
knocked out of line by jouncing tive in killing tanks at ranges below ing the T-72 seems as tiring as driv-
over rough country or by non- 1,500 meters, where most tank ing the earlier Soviet tanks, and al-
penetrating hits. The result is dead- engagerncnts occur. though the stccring mcchanism is
ly. The empty brass containers hydraulically assisted, it still retains
(poorly aimed by the damaged sys- The Sovict T-55 and T-62 still the old clutch and braking system,
tem) rebound off the turret wall and make up major parts of Middle with the two steering levers as
ricochct at high speed around the Eastern arsenals. In spite of their More. This seems somewhat odd,
cramped fighting compartment, deficiencies, their excellent sil- as Western tanks have long since
where the loader is the most vul- houette design and turret shape adopted the automatic transmission
nerable. make them difficult to pinpoint and system, which permits driving a tank
hit, and they frequently deflect almost like driving a sports car.
Another defect is the loading se- rounds coming in at wide angles.
quence. This requires vigorous The Soviets keep many thousands The automatic loader is extremely
force to shove the heavy 25- of these tanks in storage and could controversial. The T-72, like the ear-
functioned as the regimental com- capable of managing the regiment's preciably higher thim expected. On
mander's eyes and ears, screening requirements. The regimental staff several occasions the enemy simply
forward and to the flanks of the regi- felt the impact 01 this organization. could not close within the stand-off
ment. It provided invaluable infor- The work of the support squadron envelope of the MIA1 to destroy
mation which enabled key adjust- enabled the regimcntal S1 and S4 to 3ACR formalions. Consequently, he
ments prior to actual contact with locate in the TOC and serve as logis- quickly shifted his tactics to try and
the enemy. Critical decisions regard- tic planners rather than managers. deny the MIA1 that stand-off
ing FASCAM employment, prioriti- They had not felt the full impact of capability. The Iluidity with which
zation of fires, and employment of this shift in job responsibilities until the OPFOR changed its operational
the regimental reserve could all be this field exercise. Consequently, concepts is a testament to their
made, for the most part, after the the flow of events and information legendary training level.
enemy had shown his hand, hut from the line squadrons, and from
before the OPFOR could seize con- the support squadron to the We cannot lightly dismiss the im-
trol of the battlc. Accordingly, the regimental staff required redcfini- pact of this discovery concerning
commander retained the initiative, lion to manage the service support the MIA 1's reach. The three-km kill-
working within the enemy's decision system. ing umbrella of the MLA I proved es-
cycle to employ limited combat mul- sential to scout survivability. All too
tipliers at the critical place and time From an organizational stand- often, when the regiment mistakenly
to shape the battlefield. point, I must address one piece of decoupled tanks and scouts, the
equipment. This exercise marked scouts died swiftly. As the
The additional attack helicopter the debut of the MlAl at the NTC. armodcavalry community continues
troops provided in the new It proved to be a devastating to debate the role of tanks in
squadron organimtion also proved weapon systcm ideally suited for divisional cavalry, it should not for-
their worth. Using the two troops cavalry operations. Its speed and get this discovery. 3ACIR scouts pcr-
from the 278 ACR as the regimen- flexibility enahlcd commanders on forming recon and security func-
tal reserve, the 3ACR was able to several occasions to operate within tions had limited survivability unless
reinforce the key area on the bat- the OPFOR's decision cycle. Even they operated with their associated
tlelield with mobile, effective when a mistake was made in their tanks. The difficulty of maintaining
firepower. Although the limited initial employment, leaders could this formation on the battlefield ar-
ability of NTC instrumentation frequently recover and reposition gues against the flippant response
makes a complete assessment of the the tanks before it was too late. that tanks can be task organized
effectiveness of the two troops im- into a cavalry structure when
possible, their presence at the criti- The other factor that had a sig- needcd. Despite great effort, it was
cal time subjectively changed the nificant impart on all tactical out- a continuous challenge to maintain
flow of the battle in the 3ACR's conies was the lethality and range of effective tank/scout coordination.
favor several times. the 120-mm gun. Its simulated ef-
fect through the MILES system Doctrine
The support squadron also proved proved to be a dominant factor on
its worth. Through its efforts, the the battlefield. The effectiveness of The first important question was
regiment's 4,000 men and its equip- the 120-mm gun was also obvious how the regiment dealt with the
ment were fed, fueled and supplied. during the live-fire portion of the ex- "recon/counter-rec(~n"challenge. As
The still growing material manage- ercise. Rounds-per-kill were lower the regimental task organization list-
ment center (MMC) proved and percentage of hits was ap- ing- shows, the regiment deploycd
fire support assets - the howitzer First, mobility operations are com- preciation for the encmy's prohable
batteries - were only effective bined arms in nature and not simply location and capability. Finally, they
when massed in accordance with engineer opcrations. The regiment's showed limited capability in effec-
the squadron commander's intent. ability to synchronize all assets to tivcly employing their principal kill-
support mobility operations is both ing systems - the TOW and
The internal structure of the regi- a training and doctrinal issue. The Dragon. The TOW system was scl-
ment is the final doctrinal issue I critical doctrinal issue is the inade- dom used, and Dragons were not
will address here. The first concern quacy of engineer assets currently al- volley-fired to optimize their efec-
is air-defense. In conjunction with located to the regiment. Given the tiveness.
the 11th ADA Brigade, the regi- extreme frontages associated with
ment enjoyed a significantly en- cavalry missions, the one organic en- The second major training lesson
hanced air-defense protection con- gineer company is grossly inade- was the inefficiency of our fire-sup-
cept. A hatlery composed of two quate. For this rotation, an addition- port systems. Obviously, major sys-
Virlcait platoons and a Cltuparral al combat cnginecr companysup- tcms train-ups were required to
platoon augmented the organic ported the regiment. Its contribu- familiarize the regiment with its DS
Stingers. Wherever possible, Stingers tion to the 3ACR proved two artillery battalion, a unit never pre-
were under armor in either FIST or points. First, that an engineer com- viously associated with the regi-
Ll'rtlcair tracks. The Chaparral pany pcr squadron is essential. ment. We soon overcame these
platoon operated far forward in Second. that a habitual association obstacles. What remained a prob-
mobile mode - liequently right be- with supporting engineer assets lem was an inability to integrate ar-
hind the tank company. A Hawk must be maintained. The critical in- tillery with maneuver, a problem
fire unit with 2 FAARS augnented tegration of engineer operations that seemed to stem from failure to
this. In combination, all of these as- with maneuver is not a last-minute integrate the lire-support system
sets made a formidable packet. coordination to be effected just with maneuver element training. A
EiIch system synergistically cn- prior to employment. training program based only upon
hanced the regiment's ADA umbrel- battery ARTEPs is totally unsatisfac-
la. Armoring the Stiitgm is essential Training tory. Battery ARTEPs are "stand-
to their survivability. However, the alone" excreises, which stress a tech-
intcrim Ti of placing them with the This NTC rotation revealcd that nical capability not necessarily in-
Pillcarts proved unsatisfactory - the 3ACR had a major deficiency in tegrated with a tactical unit and
the Army needs a better answer. scouting. Far and away our most ef- scheme o l maneuver. They have
The Chaparral platoon proved fcctive scouts were the aviators. Oh- great value as a first step because
devastating when employed forward viously, they enjoy significant ad- they develop and measure the
to counter the Hind threat. The vantages when compared to their ability to put steel on target.
Hawk system reinforced everything ground countcrparts. However, the
with its long-range identification entire dissimilarity in their el'l'cctive- The next stcp must be combined
and dclivery capability. This cvolv- ness cannot be solely attributed to artillery-maneuver operations. The
ing ADA system employment holds this dilference. Our scouts seemed final goal is obvious - accurate tar-
great promise to enhance the sur- to be deficicnt in critical skills such get effect, in accordance with a com-
vivability of an ACR in a mid- to as land navigation, terrain associa- mander's intent, in spite of the com-
high-threat environment. lion, and enemy idcntification. Next, plications inherent in combined
our scouts got killed because their arms operations. As the regiment
From the perspective of niovemcnt techniques got them in works to overcome the deficiency, a
niobiIity/countermobility, the regi- trouble. Too many died in kill major focus will be on the troop
ment relearned some old lessons. zones, which indicatcd a lack of ap- FISTS and squadron fire-support of-
Battlefield Deception
by Captain Randall M. Scheffler
An anitor brigade is iiiidegoiitg an tacks the Iiiill-douii tanks. As the gest some ways in which maneuver
A R TEP evahiatioit. nie mercise colt- OPFOR attacks, jlaitk fires from well- battalions and companies can use
sists of hvo battalions coiidiictiiig an cariioiijlaged M I tanks arid aiitiar- deception and deceptive devices to
attack against the other battalioris. A mor missiles destrojl it. enhance tactical success.
parl of one battalion 3 dcfeiirtsirv coil-
figriratiori is a two-tank sectioii iit a Both of these stories are good ex- History
stream bed aboiit 1,200 rireters from amples of what we all want to do in
the point at wlticli opposing forces training exercises at home and at Deception has played an impor-
can first take it under ohsenatiori the NTC. Both are examples of tant part in military tactics since
arid direct fire. niis position covers leaders conducting good terrain man first fought. In the days of the
the cipected key roiite of the oppos- analysis, and exploiting the correct Roman Empire, when armies were
ing force. advantages. However, the real essentially equal in size and weapon-
similarity of both of these true ry, the operational art of an army’s
Wlieii tlie opposing force discowrs stories is that the opposing force commander usually made the dif-
the tank section, it realizes that the deployed its forces against decoy ference in success or Failure. The
section o).viis the k q piece of terrain targets! successful use of deception was
alorig this a.ris. nie OPFOR stops often decisive, and was considered a
aiid deplo),s a platooii to destrov the Although history has many ex- sign of a competent leader.
tank section. Wliile the opposing amples of the military use of decep-
force is stopped, the defending bat- tion, the U.S.Army lacks both the With the advent of knighthood,
taliori deplojs agaiitst it arid destrow doctrine and equipment to practice war took on a diflerent flavor. Most
it. it. military leadcrs considered decep-
tion to be an unfair tactic, a form of
llte OPFOR is coiidiictiiig art at- This article will briefly discuss the “cheating.” During the American
tack. A s part of its recoii, it discovers historical aspects of military decep- Revolution, the American Army
the dcfeiisirv positioiis OJ the visiting tion, highlight the Army’s ex- used deception skillfully to deal
battalion. At dawi, the OPFOR at- perience with deception, and sug- with a superior foe. General
t
Deceptions can cause the enemy to to waste time by deploying and at- tion, and exposed in the lake posi-
waste artillery ammunition and to tacking it position, prepare him for tion.
misusc rcconnaissance assets. Onc unnecccssary offensive action, and
of the covering force’s objectives is render his force vulnerable to
usually to deceive the enemy on the counterattack. As in offensive opera- Vehicle tracks are of particular
location of the main defensive sec- tions, it is essential that the operi- concern. From reconnaissance ac-
tor. The covering force seeks to mis- Lion avoid the use of patterns. tivities to the arrival of troops, con-
direct the enemy’s attack, to cause Defensive patterns that we tradition- sideration should be given to the
him to deploy his forces preniature- ally execute are: troops arrive in an tracks created by personnel and
ly and to delay the execution o l his area, dig in, clear fields of lire, and vehicles. Where tracks are un-
plans. Small elements may use thcn camouflage their positions. Pat- avoidable, they should continue past
dummy positions, decoys, and no- terns such as these must be con- the true destination to a logical but
tional activities to cause the cnemy cealed in the true dclcnsive posi- unused tcrmination area.
I
PLNSlOPS SECTION COMMS SIG TEAM PHYS SIG TEAM ELEC SIG TEAM
Sec Chief (SWO) 971A Team Chief 97630 Team Chief 19D30 Team Chief 98530
SeC NCOIC 31640 ** Comms Spec 97620 ** CmbtEng 12830 **ElecSpec 97620
** Elm Spec 97630 *** Cornms Spec 97610 ** Cmbt Arms 13630 *** Elm Spec 97610
**IndSpec 96830 ** Cmbt Arms 1lC30/19K30
** Vis Spec 96030 ** VisSpec MD20
** Cmbt Anns 1lB30/19K30
Figure 1
Transitional operations pose a sig- retrograde unit to divert the place. As a minimum, they stress
nificant challenge for the mancuvcr enemy's attention. secrecy and surprise.
unit. These operations should not When one unit replaces another,
be without the use of deception. security and deccption play key In developing a deception plan, ac-
roles in the success of the tive and passive measures can
During retrograde operations, maneuver. The most common relief present a significant element of the
deception is necessary to reduce the operations are the reliel' in place deception story.
inherent vulnerability or the unit and passage of lines. During a relief
moving to the rear. Whcn a unit in place, the deception story could Examples of some active measures
withdraws, deception can help main- portray the outgoing unit as remain- are:
tain secrecy of movement and aid in ing in place. 0 Relocation of troop units, real
achieving surprise in unit disposi- or simulated, to indicate strength,
tion. To do this, thc incoming unit will weakness, or - with specific types
have to assume the normal pattcrns o l units such as CSS - a spccific
Some deception measures include: and signatures of the outgoing unit type of operation.
to provide continuity. Employ
Requiring radio silcnce for dis- decoys and dummies for any equip- 0 Increased or decreased move-
placing units and maintaining a nor- ment that is moved to the rear and ment.
mal radio pattern along the old not replaced in kind.
FLOT. 0 Increased air activity.
Conducting limited objective at- Deception events in a passage of 0 A supply buildup, real or simu-
tacks in areas away from the lines are very similar to the relief in latcd, including combat trains,
4
bridge parks, fortification materials, pcrsonncl replacement in a manner deception. The most believeable
POL supplies, and transport. to prcclude evidence of an impend- deception is one in which the target
ing attack; control of reconnais- sees things that he knows are consis-
0 Increased road and bridge sance and such other activities that tent with our doctrine and
maintenance. normally provide evidence of an im- capabilities. For this reason, much
0 Simulation of damage to roads pending attack; and camouflage of of the doctrine that outlines how to
and bridges. equipment and installiitions. establish deceptive positions and in-
0 Simulation of the light patterns To assist divisional units in plan- tents already exists in our manuals.
of bivouacs, convoys and assembly ning and executing deception, the
areas. division has a 19-man battlefield
dcception element under a combat
0 Simulation of vehicle move- arms captain. A mix of military intcl- CAPTAIN RANDALL M.
ment, artillcry fire, and other bat- ligence and combat arms MOSS SCHEFFLER was commis-
tlcfield noises. comprises the unit. (Figure 1). sioned in the Military Police
Corps from Marquette
Planned, dclihcrate security This element works under the staM University In 1979 with a BA
violations to afford the enemy suffi- supervision of the G3 and not only in Law Enforcement. Follow-
cient opportunity to identify the dis- plans deception operations for the ing assignments as a
play- division, but also assists brigade and military police officer in
battalion staffs in their own dcccp- Colorado and Korea, he re-
0 Marking vehicles, equipment, tion operations. Assistance can quested a branch transfer
and personnel to be identical to range from training the starf in the to Armor In 1981. He has
those of the simulated unit. techniques of deception planning to since served in CONUS in
assisting companies and platoons to numerous positions, cul-
0 Displaying evidcnce of the learn the best ways to employ their minating in command of
peculiarities of the unit simulated. decoys and other deceptive devices. both Company A, 4-64
Armor, and HHC, 5-32
Certain measures that are essen- Additionally, the three signature Armor, 24th Infantry
tially passive, such as restrictions on sections of the dcception clement Division, Fort Stewart, Geor-
road movement and radio traffic, will have unique equipment to sup- gia. While at Fort Stewart,
may actually he active deceptions port deception operations, although he participated in six NTC
because they are executed with the the materiel is still under develop- rotations, including two as
intention that the enemy will detect ment. The equipment will be able to a tank company com-
the decrease in activity. replicate the communications, mander, and one as an
electronic, and physical signatures HHC commander. He is a
An intensification of security may of TOCs, logistical sites, and other graduate of MPOBC,
characterize passive measures. The critical nodes with an authentic and JOMC, the Ordnance Of-
tactical force supported by the plausible signatures. As in any ficer Advanced Course, and
deception plan primarily imple- operation, the commander will have AOAC, and is currently as-
ments them. Typical passive to weigh the cost of the operation signed to the Army's Bat-
measures are blackout; movement with the potential payofl. Deception tlefield Deception Office at
at night; movement by small units or operations often have dispropor- Fort Huachuca, AZ. He is
segments using indirect routes; tionatcly high payofl's. designated to become the
restriction of personnel to specific first OIC of the 3d Armored
areas; removal of identifying mark- Any article, book, or manual that Division's Battlefield Decep-
ings on vehicles, equipment, and purports to be a complete "how-to" tion Element, and departs
personnel; control of supply and oC deception misscs the point of for Germany in June 1988.
Introduction
There is a void between leadership battle area. Furthermore, we now trast, a corps commander's
doctrine and battle doctrine. expect leaders to perform in con- audience consists of senior officers
AirLand Battle doctrine calls for flicts of varying degrees of intensity, with a large degree of motivation
tenets of leadership that many from small-scale guerrilla actions to and broad experience. Thus, ideally,
Army leaders cast aside during the operations on a nuclear battlefield. the corps commander devotes little
Vietnam era. During the decades of time to supervision of people; his
the 1960s and 1970s, we witnessed a While we have adopted AirLand primary effort is devoted to focus-
trend to exercise control at the Battle doctrine into Army training ing the efforts of subordinates on
highest level possible. Leaders at all and organizations, we have not long-term objectives.
levels suffered from this tendency. retooled leadership doctrine. The
Virtually every activity from combat principles of leadership in FM 22- As leaders move to more senior
operations in Vietnam to subjects 100, MilitaqJ Leadership, are still positions, they must make a con-
for unit training schedules were vic- valid; but, they do not apply equally scious effort to adapt their leader-
tims of centralized control. to all levels of operations and they ship style to their audience and to
are not clearly defined for applica- their operation. Also, they must cul-
Then, during the late 1970s, senior tion to battlefield doctrine. The pur- tivate their ability to apply the
Army leaders began to reconsider pose of this article is to discuss the leadership tenets of depth,
discarded leadership styles. General tenets of our new operations synchronization, and initiative to dif-
Donn Starry, in his videotape, "Ser- doctrine as tenets of leadership ferent audiences and operations.
geant's Business," recalled the role doctrine. They must hove the agility to make
of noncommissioned officers in their leadership style fit the situa-
leadership and in training. Leaders tion.
everywhere joined the move to get
troop unit leaders more involved in Agility applies equally to leaders Depth
training decisions. There developed at every level, from squad leaders to
a consensus among leaders that army commanders. A leader must In leadership doctrine, depth is a
many decisions being made at have the agility to meet changing variable that has greater application
division level or higher should be situations, to make his leadership at senior levels. Depth is the vision
delegated to battalion and company. style fit his environment. a leader has; it is the leader's "mark
Concurrent with these initiatives, on the wall" to which he seeks to
senior Army leaders adopted The audience and type of opera- raise his unit; it is his picture of
AirLand Battle doctrine. This tion determine the leadership style. what the unit will resemble in the fu-
doctrine ushered in new roles for For example, a battalion com- ture. Depth transcends goals and ob-
leaders at all levels. Under this new mander's audience is relatively inex- jectives commonly used by junior
doctrine, we envision small units perienced. To be effective with leaders to guide training and opera-
sometimes operating in isolation these young officers and noncom- tions. Depth is a grand vision that
with only mission-type orders, and missioned officers, the battalion looks both to history and the future
senior leaders fighting battles with commander dedicates his effort to for definition.
enemy units two or three days direct supervision of people to meet Senior leaders use depth as a
before those units reach the close immediate rcquirements. In con- means to give
- organizations
- direc-
lion. The first direction is toward a The final direction is toward long- First, he refines the "vision" of his
philosophy for Icadership. For ex- term performance standards. higher headquarters to lit his own
ample, as the Vietnam era ended, Several years ago, the TRADOC unit. Second, he makes all required
senior leaders faced the perplexing commander initiated performance tasks provide an opportunity to im-
task of overcoming the penchant of standards for tactical opcrations in prove his unit's mission capability.
leaders at every level to centralize the Army Training and Evaluation Finally, he molds the needs of his
activities and decisions for training. Program (ARTEP). He developed unit and needs of individuals into
Many general officers recalled the observable standards for tasks pursuit of a common goal.
time when sergeants conducted Army leaders previously considered
training, while officers focused their to he immeasurable. As the various Each leader approaches synchron-
efforts on evaluating and managing proponents refined performance ization differently; the synchroniza-
training. One result of this historical standards for each tactical opera- tion process is personality-depend-
perspective was the Battalion Train- tion, training management im- ent. When senior leaders adopted a
ing Management Systcm (BTMS), proved, the quality of training im- new training philosophy in the late
an effort to decentralize training proved, and Army readiness im- 197Os, many division Commanders
and to get sergeants back to "ser- proved. He had a vision of where he saw a need to synchronize unit train-
geants' business." These senior of- wanted the Army to be in readiness; ing and installation support require-
ficers aligned a leadership philo- he developed and executed a plan ments. To do this, they raskcd their
sophy for decentralized operations to bring Army units to his level of staffs and subordinate commanders
with the management, evaluation, excellence. Thus, in each of these to identify mission-related training
and conduct of unit training. three areas, senior leaders showed activities and support requirements
depth in making their vision, as well that detracted from mission train-
The second direction is to tactical as in executing the plan to make ing. Their synchronization process
doctrine. In the late 1070s, senior their vision reality. called for canceling most of the sup-
leaders began to carefully analyze port activities units performed that
the conflict spectrum. They saw hat- Synchronization did not support their mission train-
tlefields of varying intensity where ing needs. These division com-
young leaders would fight, usually Synchronization is the process manders thus synchronized a leader-
outnumbered, without access to whcreby leaders bring incongruent ship philosophy with incongruent ac-
their higher command structure. elements together to establish a t ivitics.
unified effort. Synchronization is the
These senior leaders' vision of most difficult tenet to accomplish
doctrine to meet these contingen- because it encompasses decision- Each leader must conscioiisly
cies included refinements of making. The difficult dccisions in- make the synchronization process
doctrine for light operations in low- clude establishing priorities whcn support what he wants his unit to ac-
intensity or unconventional battles, every task simultaneously requires complish. Synchronization in Army
and AirLand Battle doctrine for immediate attention, how to resolve units makes the unit and its soldiers
fighting in depth to defeat forces the paradoxes of command, and more efficient. The synchronization
with greater numbers on convention- how to make contending activities process will be an outgrowth of
al or nuclear battlefields. These support command objcctives. As Icadcrship philosophy; each leader
leaders aligned battle doctrine with with agility, synchronization applies must make his process support the
their vision o f what they wantcd equally to junior and senior leadcrs. synchronization efforts of other
units to look like before, during, In the synchronization process, the units within his environmental super-
and after future battles. leadcr accomplishes thrce things. - structure.
ARMOR - May-June 1988 33
'...In matters of initiative,
senior leaders allow,
without prejudice, honest
mistakes falling within their
bounds of intent and ac-
ceptable risk.... 'I
Initiative clear on how their commander sees capture our Army's senior leaders'
the completed operation. Second, "vision" of battle. This "vision" shows
Initiative transcends battle junior leaders must know where us units operating in actions across
doctrine and leadership doctrine. In- they are in relation to acceptable the conflict spectrum, and we see
itiative is the trait lcaders employ to risk parameters. Those limits are in- senior leaders giving missions and
"fill out" orders; they use it to create herent to the senior commander's in- intent, with limits of risk, to subor-
unexpected turning points for the tent, crossing those limits may dinates. We see junior leaders fullill-
enemy, to make the enemy reactive negate the desired result. Third, ing this intent, many times on the
to our operations. Initiative is the junior leaders must never allow the basis of their own decisions.
ability to quickly generate action to freedom of initiative to erode unit
meet the intent of orders. or personal discipline. In fact, units To execute this doctrine, leaders
and individuals will require a higher must possess the ability to adapt
Scnior and junior lcadcrs have dcgrce of disciplinc to exccute thcir stylcs to meet thc situation;
critical roles in the realm of initia- doctrine that calls for initiative. they must have dcpth to see beyond
tive. The junior partners exercise in- Finally, junior leaders also exercise, the present; they must synchronize
itiative to fulfill their missions. The to a considerable degree, control divergent demands into an irresis-
senior lcadcrs of the Army, corps over an atmosphere supporting in- tible force; and, finally, they must
commanders and above, must build itiative. They must exercise initiative have the initiative to use their own
an environment in which all junior to build successful units. The for- ingenuity to meet situations not
partners can exercise initiative. mula for AirLand Battle is covered in their orders. The build-
knowledge plus good judgerncnt ing imperatives of AirLand Battle
Senior leaders have a threefold plus initiative equals success. There leadership doctrine are agility,
role in building an environment sup- is no substitute for success; victory depth, synchronization, and initia-
portive or initiative. First, whether is inherent in success. tive.
in garrison or in the field, senior
commanders communicate thcir in- Conclusion
tent or vision, their risk parameters, Major Thomas G.
and their concept for any operation. AirLand Battle doctrine places Clark is a Texas Tech
Second, in matters of initiative, many demands on leadership. In University graduate.
senior leaders allow, without mid- to high-intensity conflict, lead- He received his
prejudice, honest mistakes falling ers must fight rear, close, and deep master's degree from
within their bounds of intent and ac- battles simultaneously. They must Campbell University
ceptable risk. Finally, senior leaders also be ready to conduct low-inten- and is an alumnus of
exercise "life and death control sity conflict. These divcrgcnt re- the C&GSC. He served
over initiative. quiremcnts call for new leadership with the 197th Infantry
doctrine. Brigade; the U.S. Army
If they do not make a concerted ef- Field Station, Okinawa;
fort to build an atmosphere support- FM 22-300 gives us an outline of the 5th ID; and the
ing initiative, junior leaders will be- morality; that is good, but it is insuf- Combined Field Army
come automatons constantly looking ficient for today's leaders. Just as (ROWUS). He is
for guidance from above. Likewise, weapons systems must be com- presently the S3 in the
junior leaders have responsibilities plementary, so must battle doctrine 4th Training Brigade at
in exercising initiative. First and and lcadcrship doctrine. AirLand Fort Knox, KY.
foremost, they must be perfectly Battle-era leadership doctrine must
One of the most important respon- tion. First, he reports to the colors,
sililities of any military leader is then to the squadron commander,
that of training his lieutenants. We where he must repeat the regimen-
take that responsibility very serious- tal motto spoken by General Win-
ly in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regi- field Scott at the battle of Chapul-
ment. If you receive an officer in tcpec, Mexico, in 1847 "Brave
your unit who earncd his spurs Rilles! Veterans! You have been
here, you can rest assured that he baptized in fire and blood and have
has completed a rigorous growing come out steel!" The new officer
process and knows the business of must visit the regimental museum
lighting. and have an initial briefing with the
regimental commander. His sponsor
Our junior officer training ensures that he meets and receives
program is called "Subaltern a briefing from each staff section so
Stakes," after the old British system that he is familiar with the organiza-
in which a young subaltern had to tion and functions of each part of
prove himself before being recog- his squadron and regiment. During
nized as a lieutenant. The Stakes this period, he receives two special
are three-phased, and Phase I items, his battle map case and his
begins when a young lieutenant is Subaltern Stakes Job Book.
first notified of his assignment to
the Regiment of Mounted Phase 111, his certification, takes
Riflemen. He receives an already- our budding cavalryman betwecn six
certified officer as a sponsor and months and a year to complete. His
receives his initial welcome packet. troop commander becomes his men-
This packet is specially tailored to tor with the specific responsibility to
let him know he is joining an elite ensure he is soldicnied, ~fj'iccnied
unit with proud traditions and that and baptiied in the spirit of blood
more will be expected of him than and steel. He soon learns that his plete a proper 2402 on all organic
most other second lieutenants in the branch basic course was only the equipment (vehicles, commo,
Army. He will have greater challen- beginning of his warrior education. weapons, etc.), and obtain an
ges, hut also more opportunities to operator's license for all assigned
excel; he will have his chance to So1dicn:irrg means our lieutenant vehicles. Using FM 21-2, the
earn the spurs of a cavalryman. demonstrates his proficiency in the lieutenant will certify 61 of 68 Skill
hasic skills required of every Level 1 tasks in the areas of see,
Phase I1 begins with his arrival at trooper in the regiment. He will communicate, navigate, M72A2
Fort Bliss. The squadron ad,jutant qualify with his assigned weapon LAW, hand grenades, land mines,
and the sponsor pick up the new and pass his PT test with a mini- survival techniques, protect against
"subaltern" and guide him through mum score of 210, using the stand- NBC attack, first aid, and customs
the formal reporting procedure, ards of the 19-year old soldiers he and laws of war. Using FM 21-3, he
which is based on 140 years of commands. He must demonstrate will demonstrate proficiency in 31
American mounted warrior tradi- his ability to perform PMCS, com- of the 34 Skill Level 2 and 3 tasks in
the areas of communication, naviga- demonstrate familiarity with the officer development program in the
tion, survival techniques, and protec- 3ACR War Plan, 3ACR world.
tion against NBC attack. Finally, he TACSDOP, 3ACR Maneuver
must pass a squadron-conducted Pamphlet, and his squadron and So, if you are ever at a parade, for-
CTT. troop battle books. He must then mal luncheon, or other such gather-
construct a platoon battle book of ing where cavalrymen might be, and
Uficeizing ensures our lieutenant his own. He must show that in every you see a young officer with a 3d
becomes proficicnt in those basic way he understands and follows the ACR patch on his shoulder, and
abilities required of all mounted warrior ethic. He must demonstrate, spurs on his heels, he's not just
comhined arms officers. During this under pressure, his technical and another cocky cavalryman, he's a
process, he will demonstrate his tactical proficiency. warrior from the Regiment of
ability to inspect soldiers and super- Mounted Riflemen.
vise maintenance of equipment. He Throughout his time in the regi-
will properly conduct guard mount. ment, each officer will attend many
He will prepare for and successfully officer professional development Colonel James M. Lyle com-
pass a comprehensive Pre-Combat seminars. Fifty per cent will be on mands 3d Armored Cavalry
Inspection (PCI) prior to departing fighting skills, 25 pcr cent will deal Regiment at Ft. Bliss, TX. He
for any major training exercise. He with administrative matters, and 25 is a graduate of the College
will validate proficiency in ad- per cent will be on the special con- of William and Mary and
ministrative tasks such as, counsel- cerns of each commander. served as a platoon leader
ing statements, OERs, EERs, main- and troop commander with
tenance forms and records, and Of special benefit to him are the the 1st Squadron, 3d ACR in
reports of survey. He will guest speakers. Many of our W W I I Germany. He sewed as ad-
demonstrate his ability to inspect combat leaders, such as General visor to the 2/1Oth Viet-
facilities for safety, cleanliness, James K. Polk, our honorary namese Cavalry Squadron
physical security, and orderliness. colonel and W W I I regimental com- and as commander, 2d
He will complete the Brave Rifles mander, and Lieutenant Colonel Ut- Squadron, 2d Armored Caval-
Reading List, and, above all, will terback, a WWI Squadron com- ry Regiment, Germany. More
demonstrate his ability to plan, mander, are in the local area and recently, he served as direc-
resource, and conduct training. very willing to share thcir expcrien- tor, Command and Staff
ces. All visiting active duty officers Department, U.S. Armor
Baptizing irr rltc Spirit of Blood arid whose expertise would be of benefit School, Ft. Knox, KY.
S/ecl is when the lieutenant learns are also captured for this program.
the art of war. He will be tested Major N. Winn Noyes is the
under such stress and realism as regimental S3, 3ACR. He was
peacetime constraints allow. He When the young lieutenant has commissioned in 1973 and
must qualify on his organic crcw- completed the formal portions of served as a divisional cavalry
served weapons system (tank, Subaltern Stakes, there is a special platoon leader, as XO of the
helicopter, M113, elc.) and awards ceremony. He receives his l/lOth Cavalry, and as an air
demonstrate his ability to control spurs and is now recognized as a cavalry platoon commander
the live Gres of his platoon. He proven cavalry officer. With the and regimental cavalry troop
must demonstrate a thorough grasp award comes the normal bragging commander with 2d ACR. He
of combat lcadership principles and rights, but more important, comes has also served as aviation
procedures by successfully complet- the confidence and inner strength advisor to the Reserve Com-
ing a platoon ARTEP or adequately from knowing he has successfully ponent, as a tactics instructor
performing as a part of a troop completed what we consider to be at Ft. Knox, KY, and as
ARTEP. He must read and the most rigorous mounted combat squadron S3 for the 2/3 ACR.
"Oh, no! I jiist got back from springs when he writes everything in be any discrete blocks of training
REFORGER, I have a coriiritartd the schedule without performing time that the command normally
arid staff nreeting in tltiq riiirtutes, BTMS because of the imminent uses. A recommended height be-
arid tlie trairtirrg schedule is diie deadline. When this occurs, the tween hour lines is three index
tomorrow rironting! I jiist don't have commander is performing the cards. The wall should look some-
ertotigli time!" platoon leader's job, and no one is thing like Figure 1.
performing the commander's quality
Time is the commander's most control function. Step Two
valuable resource. Between the
meetings, the inspections, and the The commandcr can place himself Direct each platoon leader, the
myriad of other "ankle biters," the back in the driver's seat without XO, and the training NCO to create
training schedule becomes just pain. All that he requires is a blank training request cards. The training
another haby alligator in a very wall, masking tape, 3x5 index cards, request cards should be an index
large swamp. The shortage of time and a little time for a short training card with the locally-required train-
frequently means that the com- meeting. ing information. Normally, the card
mander cannot effectively manage should contain the name or task
his own training program. lnstead Step One number of the task, the location of
of performing training management, training, the instructor's name, the
the commander must oftcn hurried- Use the blank wall and the mask- estimated time required for the
ly draft a stopgap copy of the train- ing tape to create a large scale training, and any remarks. The date
ing schcdule in order to meet the weekly training schedule. Across and time of training should not be
S3's submission deadline. This the top of the schedule place the included because the date and time
rough draft usually ends up as the days of the week. Each day should are not ye1 determined. Each
final copy with platoons discovering have sufficient space to place five platoon should be easily identified
their scheduled training only when index cards side by side. Down the on its training card. The card could
the final printed copy reaches them side of the training schedule place be marked with subunit designation,
through distribution. the hours of the normal working but may also be identified by using
day. This can be either each hour either colored index cards or
The company commander is from the beginning of the day to the speciFying a particular color ink for
responsible for the quality of his end of the normal duty day or it can each platoon. (Many TACSOPs as-
company's training. Quality training
begins with quality planning. For
the commander to effectively
manage his training resources, he
must develop a quality training plan
and reflect the plan on the training
schedule. After sctting the training
goals, the commander should allow
the platoons to develop their por-
tion of the training schedule (as out-
lined in the Battalion Training
Management System, (BTMS). The
commander should then evaluate
the platoon training plan to ensure (Add sufficient additional lines for the rest of the day.)
that it clearly reflccts the training
priorities that he has set. The trap Figure 1
that awaits the unwary commandcr
v
I
2, at right. LOCATION: Motor Pool
-1
~~
mass to avoid confusion. So, drop TANK! Announces OK! Puts gun on FIRE Moves on order of
battlesight altogether. This business when he sees target. and says UP! contlnves to move
“Excuse me there, captain. Ya but, son, you ’re doiri’ eritirelv too “Yeah! You’re right about that! Ya
gotta minute or two? iiiaiiy tliiiigs in yoiir troop. might just work yourself outta a job.
But I ain’t never seed that happen.
“I know you’re busy...and it is “Whoa there, son! Just hear me ’Cog as troopers and units get bet-
late... and I know ya been workin’ out first. I know all those things ter, they try to do more and better,
since 05OU this morning. But 1 just need doin’, hut my point is.. iiof bjt which keeps the leaders always
gotta talk to ya. Ya see, 1 been you. When’s the last time you spent thinkin’ and plannin’.
watchin’ ya fur quite some time an hour just tliiiikiit’ ’bout your
now. 1 know bein’ a commander is a troop and its problems? Ya aiii’t, “Now, Ict me ask ya a question:
time-consumin’, never-endin’ job. have ya? You’re too busy pushin’ When’s the last time ya read a book
But ifn ya lissen real good, 1 just pdpers, stompin’ out fires, writin’ about leaders and leadership?
might be able to hep ya. Ya see, I bad check replies, redoin’ your
got a little experience in this here lieutenant’s work, teachin’ privates ”I thoirglii so! You’re too busy
military stuff an’ I want ta pass it on to be soldicrs, arguin’ with the durin’ the day and just plum tuck-
whilst I can. After all, even I ain’t motor officer, writin’ trainin’ ered out when ya get back to the lit-
gettin’ any younger. schedules, answerin’ the staffs ques- tle missus. Well, think about it!
tions, countin’ sheets, figurin’ head Have you got all the answers to
“Who am I? Well, let’s just say I’m count, ensurin’ your pothead gets to your problems? Ifn you think your
an 01’ trooper who’s been around, his counselin’, and a hundred other professional development begins
an’ is gettin’ mighty concerned ’bout daily little details. Well, on a daily with your basic course and is con-
some of thc leadership 1 been seein’! basis, them’s other peoples respon- tinued by your commander and the
sibilities. Them’s sergeants’ and other Army courses, you’re ridin’
“Now, cool 08sori! I ain’t here to lieutenants’jobs. with a loose cinch and headin’ for a
attack your ability or your stand- fall. Il‘n you expect to train, chal-
ards. 1 can see you’re workin’ your “Yeah, you’re right, son! Some a lenge, and earn thc respect of your
tail to a frazzle. 1 just kinda thought them sergeants rvoii’t do it, and licutenants and senior sergeants, ya
it might help iTn I talked to some- some a them lieutenants can’t do it. gotta do a lot o f readin’! lfn you
one ’bout what I seed. But, that’s even more reason why ain’t read some a these here books,
you shouldn’t do any a their work. son, you’re niissin’ some great
“Whatcha mean, why me? ’Coz you Ya gotta train ’em to high stnnd- stories, some super examples and a
got potential, that’s why! You’re ards. Ya gotta spend time getting lot of priceless info.”
smart, physically fit, can talk to sol- inta their minds so they unnerstand
diers, show common sense, an ya how to do whiitcha want. ’Course, Ilte Dcfeitce of Diifler’s Drip, Swin-
got desire and high standards. Plus, that takes time to think, plan, check, ton; Small Unit Leadership, Malone;
you’re at the key level of leadership evaluate, measure, and readjust Meit Against Fire, Marshall; lltis
where all the fightin’ takes place. your plan. Ya need time to sit and Xirid Of War, Fehrenbach; Attocks,
An, if you captains ain’t trainin’ think. Ya can’t run a troop like Rommel; Oiice AI^ Eagle, Myrer;
your units to fight, this here U.S. them flyboys drive a plane - by the Tiger Jack, Baldwin; Coriiiiioii Seiue
Army is in big trouble, son! seat a your pants. It takes a lot of Tkaiiiing, Collins; llie Challeiige Of
figurin’ and what-iflen. Coiiiiiiaiid, Nye; A Distaiir Tnuiipet,
”Let’s sit down here under this Horgan; Conipaiiv Coninraider,
here tree. Yeah! I know it’s the first And if you do everythin’ now, are MacDonald; Platooii Leader, Mc
sergeant’s grass, but he’s gone you gonna be able to do ’em in war- Donough; nie Foqotteii Soldicr,
home, an’ I’m gettin’ too old to time? 1 gar-an-tee ya can’t! Ya gotta Sajer; Tlie Killer Aiigels, Sahadra; h i -
stand around an’ jaw. Bsides, I push your men to do all of their job, faittnt Iii Battle, U.S. Infantry
kinda like the looksa this place. not just part of it. An’ when they School, and Aniior Iii Battle, U.S.
Kinda reminds me of a place callcd fail, ya just might consider part o f Armor School.
Fiddlcr’s Green. the fault to be your’n. Maybe you “Now, 1 ain’t no great shakes as a
“Now, I don’t wantcha to get all didn’t explain, train, or prepare ’em readin’ man, myself, but every
hct up over what I’m ‘bout to say, as well as ya needed ta. professional needs to have a readin’
The Rise and Fall of the Great Civilian as well as military pollcymakers powers relative to Japan, the People's
Powers: Economic Change and will find the final chapter of special inter- Republic of China, and the European
Military Conflict from 1500 to est. Kennedy speculates on the near fu- Economic Community, provided the
2000, by Paul Kennedy. Random House, ture, using his findings on what causes na- Europeans can ever agree on common
NY, 1987.677 pages. $24.95 tions to rise and fall. As the messenger policies and goals. How fast and to what
bearing bad news, Professor Kennedy degree these changes will occur depends
Paul Kennedy, a professor of history at may want to don a flak jacket. His work upon the relative skill and experience of
Yale who studied strategy and military his- contradicts those who wish to believe that the pollcymakers involved.
tory under Liddell-Hart at Oxford, has writ- the United States will remain forever the
ten a blockbuster of a book on the interac- most powerful economic and military na- Kennedy's study is not a dissection of
tion between economics and military tion on earth. the military tactics and operations of the
strategy. His work has substantial value great powers, but instead a superbly satis-
as a military history of the rise and Kennedy correctly observes from history fying investigation of their national grand
demise of the world's great powers since that the balance of power between lead- strategies since 1500, and a thought-
1500, particularly because it fills in the ing nations never stays constant because provoking picture of the future. It should
details which other authors often neglect. of uneven rates of economic growth and be required reading for the enlightened
The book is in three major sections: the technological advance. If a nation ex- professional soldier who wishes to under-
preindustrial world to 1815; the industrial pands its military commitments beyond stand the dynamics that cause a nation to
era to 1942; and the strategy and the economic base required to support gain or lose power
economics of today and tomorrow into them, or lacks the will to extract the neces-
the 21st Century. Approximately 1,400 sary support from its economy and
sources listed in the bibliography and 82 citizens, that nation is in trouble. Accord- MARK F. GlLLESPlE
pages of end notes indicate just how rich ing to Kennedy's thinking, both the United CPT, Armor
a work of history it is. States and the USSR will be declining Department of History, USMA
American HeavyTanks:
An Encyclopedic Reference
On Wartime Behemoths
That Arrived Too Late
For Wwll A T-28 heavy tank under test. Only a few
were built, too late for WWII.
FIREPOWER: A History of the though the US. Ordnance Department sued the same style of presentation with a
American Heavy Tank, by R.P. Hun- did work with a few models shipped from multitude of clear photographs and equal-
nicutt. Presidio Press, Novato, CA., 1988. Britain. The end of WWI put the heavy ly clear line drawings. Not much at all is
224 pages. $40.00. tank program in the United States on the left to the reader's imagination.
back burner for two decades, until the
The appearance of the German Panther Panther and Tiger showed up. The author's truly in-depth research, his
and Tiger tanks in the European and data sheets, references and selected bibli-
African theaters of WWll restimulated the Then the program was unearthed and ography provide the reader with an al-
development of heavy tanks in the United development rushed ahead. Again, the most limitless source of further reading.
States. Although never fully developed end of the war halted the program, but
before the war ended, this program led to this time several innovative concepts were The price is heavy, but then, so is the
some interesting and unusual experimen- incorporated in American tanks. subject. This book. along with Hunnicutt's
tal heavy tank models and passed on previous works, should really become a
many innovations that appeared in the Hunnicutt, author of: PATTON: A Historv must purchase for the truly professional
M60 series of tanks. of the American Main Battle Tank. and armor officer.
PERSHING: A Historv of the Medium Tank
Development of the heavy tank during T20 Series, and Sherman, all acknow-
WWI was primarily a British project, al- ledged treatises on their subjects, has pur- ARMOR Staff
Lineage
Constituted 3 Dec 41 in the Army of the US as the 628th Tank
Destroyer Bn. Activated 15 Dec 41 at lndiantown Gap Military Reserva-
tion, Pa. Allotted 7 Mar 42 to the PAARNG. Inactivated 14 Nov 45 at
Camp Myles Standish, MA. Redesignated 24 May 46 as the 628th Tank
Bn. Organized and Federally recognized 2 May 49 as the 628th Heavy
Tank Bn at Johnstown and assigned to the 28th Inf. Div. Ordered into ac-
tive Federal service 5 Sep 50 at Johnstown. Redesignated 20 Sep 50 as
628th Tank Bn at Camp Atterbury, IN. (628th Tank Bn (NGUS) organized
and Federally recognized 1 Sep 53 at Johnstown). Released 1 Jun 59
with elements of the 110th Inf and the 108th and 166 Field Artillery Bn to
Y
/ form the 103d Armor, a parent regiment under the Combat Arms
Regimental System, to consist of the 1st Recon Sqdn and the 2d
Medium Tank Bn, elements of the 28th Inf Div. Reorganized 1 May 62 to
consist of the 1st Recon Sqdn and the 2d Medium Tank Bn, elements of
the 28th Inf Div, and the 2d Medium Tank Bn, a nondivisional unit. Reor-
ganized 1 Apr 63 to consist of the 1st and 2d Medium Tank Bn, ele-
ments of the 28th Inf Div, and the 3d Medium Tank Bn, a nondivisional
unit. Reorganized 24 Mar 64 to consist of the 1st and 2d Bns, elements
of the 28th Inf Div, and the 3d En, a nondivisional unit. Reorganized 17
Feb 68 to consist of the 1st Bn, an element of the 28th Inf Div, and the
3d Bn, a nondivisional unit. Reorganized 1 Jan 76 to consist of the 1st
Bn, an element of the 28th Inf Div.
Motto
Expedite (with dispatch), em- Decorations
phasizes the speed of operation,
while the idea of power and destruc-
French Croix de Guerre with Silver Star, World War 11, Streamer
tion is shown in the shield.
embroidered WALLENDORF. Headquarters Co 1st Bn (Johnstown) addi-
tionally entitled to: Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer
Symbolism embroidered HURTGEN FOREST.
The armored shell of a voracious Co A 1st Bn (Ligonier) additionally entitled to:
man-eater cracking the scales of the Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered EUROPEAN
fish is an allegorical allusion to the THEATER and Luxemburg Croix de Guerre, Streamer embroidered
destructive power of the organiza- LUXEMBURG.
tion and its skill in snaring the wary Co C 1st En (Somerset) additionally entitled to: Luxemburg Croix de
enemy. The motto emphasizes the Guerre, Streamer embroidered LUXEMBURG.
speed of operation.
Distinctive Insignia
The distinctive insignia is the shield
and motto of the coat of arms.
PIN: 063513-000
U.S. Government Printing Office 1988 748-050/88-3