1

Fifth Symposium on “U.S.-China Relations in a Global Context”

Cosponsored by: George Washington University China Policy Program, and
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
June 1-3, 2011, Beijing, China
Africa: U.S. Interests/Policy and Potential Collaboration/Competition with China
David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, GW
Long-term Themes in United States Policy towards Africa

There are four long-term themes in U.S. policy towards Africa that have been consistent
for most of the period since the end of World War II.

 First, when compared to other major regions of the world Sub-Saharan Africa has had the
lowest foreign policy priority for each administration. Although North Africa is part of
Africa, for U.S. policy purposes it is treated as part of the Middle East.
 Second, U.S. policy towards Africa does not change significantly from one
administration to another. It makes little difference if the administration changes from
Republican control to Democratic control or vice versa.
 Third, from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, the
containment of communism dominated U.S. policy in Africa. Although there were other
concerns, none was as dominant or consistent as the effort to minimize communist
influence in Africa. This policy ended as the Cold War concluded.
 Fourth, the United States has consistently been the first country to provide the most
emergency assistance, especially food aid, to African countries in times of need.

Current U.S. Interests in Africa

Based on a hard-headed calculus as to what constitutes a U.S. interest, the United States
has only five interests in Africa.

 First, the United States obtains about 20 percent of its imported oil from Africa and wants
to maintain or expand its access to African energy.
 Second, it seeks political support from as many as possible of Africa’s fifty-three
countries, which constitute more than one-quarter of the members of the United Nations.
 Third, it wants to maintain access for U.S. military aircraft to overfly/land in African
countries and for U.S. Navy ships to refuel and resupply in African ports.
 2

 Fourth, it seeks African support in the global fight against terrorism, drug smuggling,
money laundering and international crime so that these problems do not spread to the
United States.
 Fifth, it wants to increase exports to Africa.

Some analysts would include as U.S. interests in Africa the expansion of democracy,
improvement of human rights, economic development of African countries, support for free
markets, etc. In my view, these are more appropriately described as goals or objectives of U.S.
policy. They are not “hard” interests.

Current U.S. Policy towards Africa

After more than two years in office, the Obama administration has articulated its policy
towards Africa. In its broadest outline, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie
Carson, explained earlier this year that there are five essential components to the policy.

 First, strengthening democracies, good governance and human rights;

 Second, promoting sustainable economic growth;
 Third, mitigating and resolving conflicts;
 Fourth, improving public health, especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; and
 Fifth, working with Africa as partners on global issues, concerns and challenges such as
climate change, narco-trafficking, proliferation of small arms, global terrorism, etc.

Carson made the point that President Obama has refused to see African leaders who do not
have democratic credentials. His support for economic development is evidenced by renewal of
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)-related initiatives, support for extension of
AGOA beyond 2012 and continuation of the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge
Corporation. The Obama administration remains committed to the President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)-related initiatives and announced a new Global Health Initiative that
promotes the strengthening of health systems, improves maternal child health, addresses
neglected tropical diseases and fosters research and development. The administration supports
agriculture in Africa through the new Feed the Future initiative. Support for conflict mitigation
is evidenced by the administration’s strong engagement in implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Sudan and collaboration with the Economic Community of West African
States for regional resolution of disputes. The administration has also increased assistance for
countering global climate change.

While the policy of the Obama administration towards Africa is not significantly different
than that of the Bush administration, there has been some reordering of priorities. The Obama
administration attaches more importance to both the rhetoric and reality of long-standing U.S.
policy to encourage democratization and human rights in Africa. Financial resources for this
purpose remain, however, modest and there are occasional compromises on principle when
 3

African countries with questionable records on these issues also export critical resources such as
oil or they support U.S. regional and international polices. The Obama administration has
refocused the U.S. approach towards counterterrorism in Africa and shown less enthusiasm, for
example, for actions that result in military attacks. While it continues strong support for the fight
against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, it has begun a new initiative to improve African
agriculture and food security. There is a question, however, whether the tight budget
environment facing the U.S. government will allow sufficient funds to make significant progress
in the improvement of agriculture. There has been increased rhetorical support for dealing with
climate change and improving the environment in Africa, although it is not clear that significant
financial resources will be made available to support these objectives. Finally, the Obama
administration has expanded somewhat high level personal contact with African counterparts.

Areas for U.S.-China Collaboration in Africa

The following areas for U.S.-China collaboration try to take into account American and
Chinese interests while, at the same time, provide benefits to Africa.

Development Assistance Cooperation:

 The United States and China have particular strengths in the health sector that can
collaboratively improve the situation in Africa. China and the United States give a high
priority to antimalarial programs. China is constructing thirty malaria treatment centers
and providing antimalarial drugs such as artemisinin. China built a factory in Tanzania
for the production of artemisinin. It is a highly effective medicine for preventing malaria
when used in combination with other drugs and as part of a holistic program that includes
insecticide-treated bed nets. USAID supports such a holistic program. In addition, the
President’s Malaria Initiative has a goal of reducing mortality by half in target countries.
Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete during a visit to Washington in 2008 lavished praise
on the multidonor anti-malarial program in his country. When asked if China is part of
the multidonor coordination, Kikwete replied in the negative but said he would welcome
participation by China in the collective effort. A cooperative program for countering
malaria is not likely to lead to political conditionality on the U.S. side and might also
include involvement by organizations like the Clinton Foundation and Gates Foundation.
 Neglected tropical diseases, particularly hookworm infection and schistosomiasis that
each afflict 200 million Africans, are another area for U.S.-China collaboration. USAID
and the Gates Foundation are working to reduce both diseases in Africa, and China has
experience in combating them. China is also among the largest producers of
praziquantel, the principal drug for treating schistosomiasis. Merck is another major
producer. Although praziquantel costs only eight cents a pill, it is still too expensive for
many African countries. At a minimum, a multidonor program that includes China and
the United States should step up efforts to counter neglected tropical diseases such as
hookworm and schistosomiasis.
 4

 Other areas in the health sector for possible collaboration include improvement of
nutrition and pandemic preparedness. China and the United States have experience in
these areas that could prove valuable to African countries.
 The other principal area for potential collaboration is agriculture. Some 60 percent of the
African labor force works in agriculture and is still not able to grow enough food to feed
its people. By contrast, 2 percent of the U.S. labor force produces enough food to feed
the U.S. population, sell large quantities on world markets and supply food aid to many
African countries. China feeds 20 percent of the world’s population on only about 8
percent of the world’s arable land and grows about 95 percent of what it consumes. The
United States and China have significant experience in aiding African agriculture. While
the focus over the years in helping African countries has been different, this is an obvious
area for combining the strengths of China and the United States.

Improving African Trade, Business and the Environment:

 The United States and China should work to build greater export capacity in Africa,
which African leaders have identified as a priority. The United States and China have the
experience and institutions to help African states improve their competitiveness in global
markets, especially for products other than raw materials. The United States has been
doing this with some success through the African Growth and Opportunity Act. China
has a similar but more modest program for admitting certain products into China duty
free from Africa’s poorest countries. China also has a loan fund that encourages Chinese
businesses to establish manufacturing operations in Africa. The United States and China
can provide personnel and technical assistance to increase African export capacity.
 At the policy level, China, the United States and other major trading nations should be
more supportive of African goals in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The Doha Round began in 2001 as an initiative to ensure that developing countries are
better integrated into the multilateral trading system. Results have been disappointing so
far as the 153 WTO member countries try to finish negotiations this year.
 As part of a broader dialogue on global energy, the United States and China can include
developing oil derivatives and renewable energy, encouraging efficient energy
consumption, developing energy technology and increasing the safety, efficiency and
environmental protection of oil extraction in Africa.
 A dialogue between China and the United States that includes Africa has already begun
in the area of corporate social responsibility. This is a topic that seems to be of growing
concern in China; it is not surprising the Chinese are willing to expand the dialogue to
Africa. While still at an early stage, it is an area where the United States has a great deal
of experience and may be able to help improve Chinese business interaction in Africa.
 The United States and China have demonstrated their concern over the negative impact of
climate change and environmental degradation. China is increasingly receptive to taking
steps to end environmentally damaging practices. Growing recognition that climate
 5

change will have some of its most negative impacts on Africa could open the door for
constructive cooperation by both countries and other donors with the Africans.

Security Cooperation:

 China assigns about 1,600 soldiers, mostly engineering, transportation and medical
personnel, to the six UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The United States provides
the single largest amount of funding for UN and African Union peacekeeping operations.
The United States welcomes Chinese involvement in African peacekeeping and has even
collaborated with China in the building of barracks for peacekeepers in Liberia. This is
an area where the interests of both countries are often similar; there could be additional
peacekeeping cooperation.
 The United States and China should work together to help African coastal states reduce
piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and threats to offshore oil facilities.
Chinese and American shipping interests have been attacked by Somali pirates. There
has already been significant cooperation in the anti-piracy operation off Somalia.
Although Chinese frigates operate independently of the three established naval task
forces in the region, the United States has spoken favorably about the Chinese
contribution to the anti-piracy effort. The U.S. Coast Guard has been particularly
successful in cooperating with its Chinese counterpart organizations. China has provided
patrol boats and training to several countries in West Africa. The time may be
appropriate to extend the U.S. Coast Guard’s interaction with its Chinese counterparts to
include discussion of possible cooperation along the African coastline.
 The United States should encourage U.S.-China discussions that include the Africans and
Europeans on drug trafficking that passes through Africa. This has become a growing
problem for several African countries as heroin moves from South Asia across Africa to
North America and Europe. Cocaine originating in Latin America reaches West Africa
before going to Europe. It brings with it international crime syndicates and increasing
cases of money laundering. A number of African drug smugglers have been arrested in
China. Eventually, this will become a greater threat to China.
 The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart has expressed a willingness to
engage its Chinese counterparts in dialogue and even to consider joint projects in
connection with UN peacekeeping operations and maritime security. While this is a
sensitive topic that must include Africans in the discussion, it has the potential to improve
stability where it is threatened in Africa to the advantage of all three parties.

Challenges Hindering U.S.-China Cooperation in Africa

 Information sharing is a significant problem. While there can always be improvement on

the American side, this has traditionally been a greater problem on the Chinese side.
Even details about China’s foreign assistance, a seemingly innocuous topic, are treated as
a state secret. It will be difficult to cooperate in virtually any area until China is more
 6

willing to share information. For example, the United States has encouraged China to
subscribe to the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
which aims to strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in
the extractive sector. China has made clear that it has no interest in supporting EITI.
 The United States often imposes conditions concerning good governance, human rights
and economic policy reform on its foreign assistance. This practice is anathema to China
and will almost certainly eliminate the possibility of collaboration on development
assistance projects in countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan with a probable exception
for the new government in South Sudan. On the other hand, there are a number of
African countries where U.S. conditionality does not come into play and others where
unconditional U.S. assistance is possible for certain kinds of projects. This is not an
insurmountable obstacle, but one that must be dealt with delicately.
 Whenever possible in its assistance programs, the United States works through
nongovernmental and civil society organizations. China interacts almost exclusively with
African governments or ruling political parties. There will be occasions where these two
operating principles come into conflict. Again, however, there are many cases where
American aid passes exclusively through African governments, and the Chinese are
slowly becoming more comfortable working with nongovernmental organizations.
 The United States is almost always an active member of donor coordination groups in
African capitals. These informal groups have traditionally included all western donor
nations, although they are open to non-western countries. China has not shown any
interest in joining these groups just as it has avoided participation in the OECD, another
western dominated organization. While it is perhaps understandable that China prefers to
confine its international donor coordination to UN and African organizations, where there
is less western control, it is less clear why China eschews participation in donor
coordination groups in African capitals. These are essentially information sharing
sessions to improve donor coordination and sort out problems with host governments.
 China’s policy on selling small arms and light weapons to African countries is opaque
and does not always result in strict procedures to ensure that these arms are not
transferred to undesirable third parties. Chinese weapons and those from other countries
including the United States have appeared, for example, in conflict zones such as Darfur
and the eastern Congo. Nevertheless, most western countries that supply arms make a
greater effort to keep these weapons out of the hands of undesirable third parties.