Competition in cognitive radio

networks: spectrum leasing and

innovation
CCNC 2011
Las Vegas, 11 January

Luis Guijarro
Agenda
„ Objective
„ Model
„ Method
„ Results and analysis
„ Further work

2
Objective
„ Spectrum leasing in a W-b b PO

cognitive radio network

„ To analyze equilibrium
p
under competition pp
between
SO
‹ Primary (PO)
/incumbent
ps
‹ and secondary (SO)
/entrant operators
TU

3
Model
„ Spectrum leasing W-b b PO
‹ PO leases b kHz to SO

‹ p and b are set outside

the model p
„ Competition pp
‹ à la Bertrand
SO
Ø Strategies are pp and
ps
Ø One-shot game ps
‹ Quality of service
Ø Spectrum W-b and b
Ø Spectral efficiency k(p)
and k(s) TU

4
Model
„ Competition
‹ Income
Ø n users
Ø Flat-rate
‹ Costs
Ø Operating costs
‹ Profits
Π p = p p n p + p·b − C p
Π s = p s n s − p·b − C s

5
 Model
„ Subscription W-b b PO

‹ Utility

p
⎛ ( p) W − b ⎞
U p ≡ log⎜ k ⎟ − p p = U p ( p p ,α ) pp
⎜ n p ⎟⎠
⎝ SO
⎛ (s) b ⎞
U s ≡ log⎜⎜ k ⎟ − p s = U s ( p s ,1 − α )
⎝ ns ⎟⎠ ps

np
α≡
n
TU

6
Method
„ Game theory
‹ Multi-leader-follower game
Ø The 2 operators fix their prices pi in order to
maximize profits
Ø Each user subscribes to the operator which
offers higher utility Ui
‹ Solved by backward induction
Ø First,solve subscription game
Ø Then, solve competition game anticipating
the reaction by users.

7
Method
„ Game theory
‹ Multi-leader-follower game
Ø Subscription game
• Wardrop equilibrium
– Assume n is high enough
– Equilibrium is reached when there is no
incentive to change subscription decision
• Assume that every user subscribe to service

U p ( p p , α ) = U s ( p s ,1 − α )

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Method
„ Game theory
‹ Multi-leader-follower game
Ø Competition game
• Nash equilibrium
– The operator does not know the strategy
chosen by the competitor, but space of
available strategies are common knowledge

p *p = arg max Π p ( p p , p s* )
pp

p s* = arg max Π s ( p *p , p s )
ps
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Results and analysis
„ Constant parameters
‹ # of users, n
‹ Total spectrum W
‹ Leasing price p
„ Variable parameters
‹ Leased spectrum b
‹ Spectral efficiency k(s)

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Results and analysis
„ Results
‹ Market share α
‹ Prices pp, ps
‹ User utilities Up=Us
‹ Profits Πp, Πs
‹ Price of Anarchy PoA
Ø Social welfare
• the sum of the utilities of all agents in the system (npUp+nsUs+Πp+Πs)
Ø PoA
• the quotient between the maximum value of the social welfare and the
social welfare obtained at the Nash equilibrium
– i.e., PoA >=1

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Results and analysis
„ Impact of leased
spectrum
‹ Objective
Ø Optimum amount of
leased spectrum
‹ Experiment
Ø b/W varies from 10%
to 90%

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Results and analysis
„ Impact of leased spectrum
‹ Results

Ø Maximum user utility

b/W≈0.45
Ø Minimum PoA reached
b/W≈0.35
Ø Maximum profits
would drive b/W
towards 1
‹ Conclusion
Ø Maximum b should be
fixed by regulatory
authority

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Results and analysis
„ Impact of technology
innovation
‹ Objective
Ø Impact of increasing
k(s)
‹ Experiment
Ø k(s)/k(p) varies from 1
to 5

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Results and analysis
„ Impact of technology
innovation
‹ Results
Ø User utility
increases
Ø PoA tends to the
unity
‹ Conclusion
Ø Users are better off
when entrant
innovates

15
Further work
„ To model bargaining over the leasing price
p and the leased spectrum b
„ To model the user willingness to pay so that
some users may decide to subscribe to
neither PO nor SO

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