Royal Holloway University of London

Department of Politics and International Relations

MSc in International Relations

Module Code: PR5807

Supervisor: Professor John Mattausch

Pakistan’s Hidden War: Post-Colonial Baluchistan?

by Ahmad Marri
 ABSTRACT

The regions of South Asia are still confronting hassles which recount to democratic,
governance, territorial problems and social factors. Political and economic process had led to
the mobilisation and formation of new social groups possessing values different from those
who came to power in the early post-independence period, giving birth to serious aspects of
genuine ship and governance. This essay examines related factors such as, causes and
aftermath of Post-colonialism in the South Asian region of Pakistan, in the light of political
and economical factors. A synthesis is conducted on post-colonialism theory. A survey is
done in-order to examine the post colonial era that still dominates various regions of South
Asia like Pakistan followed by the insurgency in Pakistan’s largest, richest and most gifted
region, Baluchistan, followed by the post-colonial structure that still exists in the post-
independent period. After the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, the people of
Baluchistan are struggling for complete independence but were soon taken over by history
and the Pakistani leadership. The argument of this dissertation is the most recent insurgency
and violence in Baluchistan, between the central establishment and nationalist forces of
Baluchistan, due to its strategic importance in South Asia. Pakistan, which is a keen ally of
the U.S. in the war against terrorism, enables this crisis worthy of attention by the super-
power state, the U.S.

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor John Mattausch for his good advice and support during
the writing of this dissertation. In addition, I thank my family for their support and for placing their
trust in me.

I dedicate this dissertation to my grand father, Late Nawab Akbar khan Bugti, the Baluch victims who
lost their lives and the one’s who have been abducted, and to the Baluch youth of Baluchistan.

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………..6

CHAPTER ONE: BALUCHISTAN’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND…………………………….9

Legacy of British Rule in Baluchistan……………………………………………………….…..........10

Pakistan’s Partition and Annexation of Baluchistan…………………………………………………..11

Baluch Nationalism……………………………………………………………………………………13

Post-Colonialism: Theoretical Excursion……………………………………………………………...15

CHAPTER TW0: CRISES IN BALUCHISTAN: (CAUSES)...............................................................20

Ethnicity, Politics and Power…………………………………………………………………………..20

Developing Baluchistan: Myth and Reality……………………………………………………………22

Strategic Importance of Baluchistan…………………………………………………………………...24

Human Rights Violation………………………………………………………………………….........26

CHAPTER THREE: CURRENT SITUATION IN BALUCHISTAN (RECOMMENDATIONS)…..27

Construct A Productive Roadmap……………………………………………………………………..27

Human Capital Investment…………………………………………………………………………….28

Issue of Identity and Autonomy………………………………………………………………………..29

Worthy of U.S. Attention………………………………………………………………………………30

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………………...31

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………...37

APPENDIX 1: Map of Pakistan………………………………………………………………………..5

APPENDIX 2: Baluchistan Map………………………………………………………………………34

APPENDIX 3: New Map of Middle East and Pakistan…………………………………………….....35

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MAP OF PAKISTAN

(Map Credit: amazon.com)

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INTRODUCTION

After the end of colonial rule, many states in South Asia are still engaged in confronting obstacles -
kindered to democratic governance and development. Formulation of a political and economical
process, within the post-independent era, has lead to the mobilization of new social groups, with
values different from those, who came to power in the early post-independence period. The distorted
and authoritarian state of Pakistan, where the democratic pillars are fragile due to it being over thrown
by the military institution again and again in the name of ‘the people’, suffers in terms of both,
political and economical aspects. Nevertheless, the take over by military executives from civilian
power, led to one of the most highlighted consequence in Pakistan’s history - succession of East
Bengal (Bangladesh). The on-going weakness of political ‘civilian’ parties and governments proved
itself to be one of the worst ‘inequalities’ of social welfare that was to be found in the world. Pakistan,
is suffering from immense obstacles: difficulties created by the military coup - accompanied by the
state’s civil-bureaucracy. Director for Asian program at the center of the International Policy, Dr Selig
Harrison stated, while addressing the members of faculty for the Research Foundation, “Current
situation in Pakistan will grow instable for a longer period to come and democratization is not on the
cards of Pakistan”.1 When asked to comment on the current situation in Pakistan, Notable political
activist, Noam Chomsky stated, “I’m afraid to say Pakistan is the paradigm example of a failed state
and has been for a long time. It has had military rule, violence and oppression”. 2 The largest province
in Pakistan, Baluchistan will remain the vital general perception through out this dissertation.
Baluchistan has been under-going a massive insurgency since 2005. Pakistan’s central government’s
argument portrays that the Nationalist movement in Baluchistan is being lead by a band of miscreants
and greedy tribal elders, whose main motive is to keep Baluchistan and its indigenous population
backward, so that they can remain in power and maintain their control over the vast rich “virgin”
resource of Baluchistan. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate, whether the current violence
in Baluchistan is simply a tool and pathway for the tribal leaders in Baluchistan to gain more wealth
and power, or is it truly a product of historical events of violence, lack of autonomy and interest to the
people and especially the youth of this vast-rich province, by the mainstream parties and ‘elite-varied
ethnic’ and ‘status quo’ population of Pakistan, which has been dominating the entire region, since the
post-independent era. To fully understand this dissertation, I intend to use literature compiled from
different sources of journals, books and relevant articles – enabling the reader to better understand the

1
Observer Research Foundation, Pakistan will remain instable, Selig Harrison,[online] (06 February 2008)
2
Noam Chomsky, Pakistan a ‘paradigm example of a Failed Sate, in Express India, February 3, 2008,

6
nature of the Baluch3 population and their history in Baluchistan. Also, the thepretical literature on
post-colonialism and Nationalism would be reviewed within a number of contexts, books and articles
focusing mainly on the perspective of Baluch Nationalism.

Since the Partition of India and Pakistan on 14th August, 1947, one of the sharpen states in South Asia,
Pakistan continued to comply the ‘imperial’ mechanism of divide and rule within its own domain and
succeeded in making Baluchistan an inalienable part of Pakistan. Baluchistan is the largest province of
Pakistan, which is named after the Baloch, settled in the South-West of Pakistan. It borders with Iran
to the West, Afghanistan to the North and Sind and Punjab to the East - Quetta being the capital of
Baluchistan. The province of Baluchistan is not only the largest province, but is also the richest in
mineral resources, making it the major supplier of natural gas to the country. However, despite being
rich in gas and mineral deposits, the presence of industrialization is relatively less and receives a small
share of the revenue that it is generating throughout the country, making it inevitably the poorest and
the least developed province in the country: provoking the nationalists and the indigenous population
of Baluchistan to seek an arm struggle to win their autonomy and ethnic rights over their land and
resources. In 1973, when the central government of Pakistan was still coping with the embarrassing
defeat, which resulted in the break-up of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971. The ethnic Baluch
population saw an opportunity to gain independence and started an insurgency that lasted for four
bloody years, threatening to destabilize Pakistan, followed by the entire South-West region in Asia.
This was the ‘war of Independence’ launched by the Baloch nationalists immediately after the
liberation of Bangladesh, and was ruthlessly crushed by the then President of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto4. Taking advantage of the lack of unity among the various tribes, the Pakistani Army and Air
Force managed to crush the post-1971 uprising after killing hundreds of Baloch youth through air
strikes.

At the dawn of the 21st century, once again under military rule, Pakistan stands at a crossroad, the
outcome of the struggle between supporters of the centralized autocrats and proponents of federal,
democratic functioning lead to the perpetuations of authoritarian control. The province of Baluchistan
has once again been thrown into disorder, and a series of violence, threatening to deteriorate into a
bloody civil war since January 2005. The argument being sparked from the central establishment is
being put forward, labeling the Baloch nationalists and their insurgency to seek an independent
Baluchistan as a band of ‘miscreants’ - undermining the development process in Baluchistan and
intend to keep the vast tribal province “backward” so that the feudal tribal leaders in the region

3
The form “Baluch” is used to describe the ethnic group. The word “Baluchi” refers to the language spoken by the Baluch
population.
4
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a Pakistani politician who served as the President of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973 and as the Prime
Minister from 1973 to 1977.

7
maintain their control and power upon their people. One of the most prominent tribal leaders in
Baluchistan Late Nawab Akbar Bugti (an Oxford University fellow) argues that, the current
insurgency in Baluchistan, which took root its hold once again in 2005, is the aftermath of decades of
exploitation of the Baloch region, conducted by the central government of Pakistan. Despite the
presence of rich resources, the Baluch people have been denied proper royalty and employments in
their own domain, reducing them to become “slaves and third grade citizens”5.

Chapter one of this dissertation, discusses the background of Baluchistan and is segmented into four
sections: section one analysis the legacy of the British colonial rule in Baluchistan, followed by
section two, illustrating the annexation of Baluchistan in-order for it to become a part of Pakistan to
form an ‘Islamic Republic’ in South Asia. Section three will examine the history and background of
the Balochnationalism and insurgencies since Pakistan has gained its independence in 1947, promising
provincial autonomy to the people of Baluchistan, but instead did the exact opposite by displacing the
Baloch population within their own homeland and exploiting their rightful means of education,
employment and development, placing the massive Baloch movement in a state of grievances. Section
four of this chapter will analyze the theoretical aspect of ‘post-colonialism’.

The dissertation then moves on to the second chapter which will examine the ‘causes’ of insurgency
and political violence in Baluchistan and the amount of resentment that the Baluch people possess
within their hearts. In-order to understand and analyze this factor, it is essential to understand the
political state of Pakistan itself. Section one examine the state of ethncity, politics and power in the
region. Section two will examine the development progress in Balcuhistan since its 61 years of
existance in Pakistan, followed by section three which will discuss the most keen aspect of
Baluchistan, its strategic importance, not only in Pakistan but throughout Central Asia. The section
section of this chapter will inspect the amount of atrocoties and human rights violation conducted
upon the population of Baluchistan.

Chapter three of the dissertation discusses the current socio-political state in Baluchistan, and its
recommendations - divided in four sections. Section one will avail a achieveble roadmap for the
Baluchistan, followed by recommendation regarding ‘constructive’ investment in human capital in
section two. Section three will assert the issue of identity and autonomy towards the indeginous
population of Baluchistan. Finally section four will analyse the role of the super-power, the U.S.,
whom attention is required to dissolve the up-rising civil-war in South Asia’s keensest state, Pakistan,
whom is a important ally for the U.S., in the war agaisnt terrorism.

5
Nawab Akhbar Khan Bugti., 1 August 2003.

8
CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BALUCHISTAN

A number of International crises, since the past one decade have lead to the practice of sketching
colonial boundaries with no concern for linguistic and ethnic realities. For instance, newly created
post-independent government’s had to go through a series of bloody wars and conflicts, in-order to
tackle tentacles of separatism and other various similar movements just to prevent their country from
disintegrating. The civil war in Nigeria, gory clashes in the Ogaden Desert, being fought between
Somalia and Ethiopia and with regards to Pakistan, the loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971. 6
These are some of the main conflicts that have made headlines all around the world, but at the same
time, there have been other bloody war’s of atrocities that have virtually gone unnoticed by the
Western countries – most probably because the economic and human resources within the domain of
7
these states have been incalculable. One disregarded conflict, that has seemingly passed onto to
remain unnoticed, which could lead to both regional and global consequences, is the conflict of the
Baluch tribes, living in the South-West borderlands of Pakistan. This conflict – if not resolved soon
could lead, or according to my personal critical evaluation has already formed its foundation to work
towards its unification of being an ‘independent state’, following the disintegration of Pakistan.
Visiting Pakistan on a trouble shooting mission for President Kennedy in 1962, Henry Kissinger
impatiently brushed aside a local journalist who asked him to comment on the insurgency then
beginning to surface in the restless province of Baluchistan. “I wouldn’t recognize the Baluchistan
problem, if it hit me in the face”.8

Baluchistan is the largest province in Pakistan comprising 44 percent of the land mass, and a coastline
which stretches 770 km, straddling along side Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.9 Baluchistan is sparsely
populated: the amount of Baluch population living in the province has been calculated to be a total of
54.7 percent, whereas, the remaining amount compiles the non-indigenous population, settled from
other various parts of the country. Economically, the land of Baluchistan is rich in mineral resources,
range of lands and gas deposits. However, despite possessing so much, it still remains to be the most
backward province in Pakistan. Being relatively less industrialized and underdeveloped – it receives a
very minor share from the vast revenue it generates.

6
Selig S. Harrison, Nightmare In Baluchistan, Foreign Policy, No. 32, autumn 1978.
7
Ibid, p. 136
8
Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974, pp, 63-64.
9
Frederic Grare, The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, South Asia Project, Pakistan Paper, Number 65, January 2006.

9
LEGACY OF BRITISH RULE IN BALUCHISTAN

The chief administrator for British India, Lord William Bentick, in 1833, pushed the influence of the
British monarchy, into the Sind and Punjab frontier – in-order to overcome their fears, that Russia
would turn the local tribal population in these regions against the British rule. Lord William Bentick
stated, “the expansion of the British rule would prosper a ‘new era of civilization’, that would bring
them blessing and happiness and would secure the position of the British Rule in the Western
domain.”10 Apart from these closely analysed strategies by the British Raj – confrontation was
inevitable, and the British administration working on the Western frontier, had to face immense acts of
rebellions by the local tribesmen between 1849 and 1947.11

The British century prolonged domination over the South Asian region - imposing a number of
administration techniques, in-order to maintain control over the restless tribes situated in the Western
borderlands. Methods such as, “Frontier of Separatism”: compiling methods for direct control and
negotiations with alliances: “Forward Policy,” whose motive was to establish and maintain control
through ‘peaceful penetration’ and the third and the last method was the “Closed Border System,” and
its purpose was to exert direct control over the tribal population. Amidst all three techniques:
“Forward Policy,” was the most fruitful method of all – Why? – It strengthens the capability, power
and autonomy of the Western Baluch tribesmen, in-order to conduct a direct conflict with the Pakistani
central authority.12 The same imperial techniques introduced by the British, were then adopted by the
central authority of Pakistan to provide some amount of influence in the region and to maintain peace.
As Pakistan gained its Independence in 14 August, 1947 – tactics that were implemented to maintain
peace and negotiations were soon dropped out – central authority of Pakistan moved towards
oppressive strategies, to exert its control and domination over Baluchistan. This newly knitted strategy
lead to four armed insurgencies between Pakistan and the tribal nationalist movement in Baluchistan
for nearly three decades between 1947 and 1977. The most recent insurgency that took its roots was in
December 2005. A number of Baluch tribesmen attacked the natural gas pipelines, located near the
Baluch towns in Sui.13 In return, the government and the military entourage launched an operation to
eliminate the ‘miscreants’ from the province, with massive force. Though despite the immense

10
Ainslee T. Embree, Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1979, pp, 29.
11
James W. Spain, Political Problems of a Borderland in Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, ed, Ainslee T. Embree, Karachi:
Royal Book Company, 1979, pp, 4.
12
Rasheed Rahman, The Crises in Balushistan, South Asian Journal on 26, January 2006.
13
Sui is a sub-district of Dera Bugti District in Baluchistan, Pakistan; the Sui gas fields are located in the premises of Sui
town, which generates more then half of the state’s gas.

10
involvement of the military and central power governments – the violence, instead of being
marginalized, erupted even more and continues till this very day. This tremendous grand example of
violence and atrocities in the largest province has given birth to a number of ‘nationalist’ movements
and force’s who have plunged themselves and the vast rich province into a bloody civil war, that dates
back it roots, since 1948: holding dire consequences for Baluchistan as a region, and Pakistan as a
state.

PAKISTAN’S PARTITION AND ANNEXATION OF BALUCHISTAN

The process of building a nation in Pakistan was apparently extremely difficult due to a number of
factors: Pakistan, relevant to other similar post-colonial states – was forced to compress its state
formation – granted by the British in a rapid but peaceful way. Unlike other many Western states who
were able to create their stable nation-states after suffering through conflict and nationalist revolution.
According to a few scholars – the process of state formation in Pakistan eventually ended up becoming
a massive obstacle, due to the inability of the dominating ‘Punjabi central government’ to supply a
legitimate ambition and hope to the minority groups within Pakistan’s domain.14 The creation of
Pakistan in 1947 – due to its ideological, political and theoretical foundation, and the existence of a
Muslim nation was a very distinct form to the various inhabitants in the country. This political act was
coined by the rulers of British India, to divide the sub-continent, and to possess a strong hold in the
newly established country of South Asia, in-order to prevent the influence of the rising communist
Soviet regime in the region.

The Baluch culture possess a concrete sense of distinctiveness, which dates back to late tenth century
– its literature devotes itself to the glory of its homeland and most importantly the victorious battles it
fought against the Tartars, Persians, Arabs and other variations of invaders.15 Pre-colonial Baluchistan
was an extremely fragmented society – unified and established an army comprising 25,000 Baluch
men – with an organized military and administrative system. Kalat 16 was the largest princely state in
Baluchistan. During the British rule, half of Baluchistan was renamed ‘British Baluchistan,’ which
was being administered by British India.17 Inayatullah Baluch, a well reputed author in Baluchistan
writes in his book, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, “the British ignored evidence of certain areas
coming under the jurisdiction of the Khan of Kalat, and had them gifted to Iran and Afghanistan – in-

14
Jetly. R, Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism, (1971-1891): Asian Ethnicity 5, Feb 2004.
15
Selig S. Harrison, Nightmare in Baluchistan, Foreign Policy, Vol, 32. 1978, p. 140
16
Kalat is an historical town located in the center of Baluchistan, Pakistan and was the capital of kalat khanate. Kalat was a
princely state, which became part of Pakistan when the British withdrew. The last Khan of Kalat was formally removed from
power in 1955.
17
Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Sovient Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment
for international Peace, 1981, p. 16

11
order to placate rulers in these two countries and befriend them in apprehension of any attack from the
Russian side, this was the ‘Great Game’ of those times and the Baluch had to pay dearly for the
motives led by the colonial rulers.18

On August 15, 1947, a day after Pakistan was formally established, the Khan 19 Declared Kalat’s
independence on 12 August 1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan in the
spheres of defense, foreign affairs and Communications. The ruler of Baluchistan (Khan Of Kalat)
affirmed his intention to develop Baluchistan and prosper the soveriegn land of the Baluch, so that
they could retain their tradition, customs and most essentially their identity. Leaders of Pakistan
rejected this declaration and bagan to pressurize the newly established independent state of Kalat, and
the process of negotiations prolonged - touching off a 9-month diplomatic tug of war that climaxed in
the forcible annexation of Kalat. As a result of meetings held between a delegation from Kalat and
officials of the Pakistan states department, and a series of meetings between the Crown
Representatives, the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah (founder of Pakistan), two vital factors came out
(1) The government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state; in treaty relations
with British government, with a status different from that of Indian states, (2) Legal opinion will be
sought as to whether or not agreements of leases made between the British colonial government and
Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistani government. The great turn of event occurred when on April 1,
1948 - the Pakistan Army invaded Kalat. The Khan surrendered and accepted the merger into Pakistan
by signing the instrument of accession and ended the 225 days of independence of Kalat confederacy
formed by Khan of Kalat’s ancestors almost 300 years ago – wiping of the semi-independent state of
Baluchistan from the global map. This gave birth to the first ‘Nationalist’ insurgency in Baluchistan,
led by Prince Karim, brother of Khan of Kalat in 1948. 20 He went on towards launching a revolt
against the central government of Pakistan, with the intention to establish an independent Baluchistan.
The Khan, who was under going a series of threats by the military and government of Pakistan, forced
him to pursue his brother, Karim to surrender, by which he (Prince Karim) and his men will be granted
amnesty under the umberellah of Pakistan’s centralized government. Prince Karim was soon arrested
among hundreds of his followers, but despite granting him amnesty as promised – it proved otherwise.
Karim and his men were imprisoned by the Pakistani forces – resultung in a widespread belief that the
Baluch nationalists have been betrayed – resulting in a serious of ‘incidents’ and ‘false treaties’ by
Pakistan, creating distrust between nationalists of Baluchistan and establishment of Pakistan.21

18
Inayatullah Baluch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, University of Heidelberg, p. 8-13
19
The term ‘Khan’ was used for the ruler of Kalat state.
20
Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm , New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 133
21
Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Sovient Temptations, 1981, p. 21

12
BALUCH NATIONALISM

The biggest question that remains unanswered is – what is Baluch Nationalism? In-order to understand
this concept, Stephen Cohen states in his book, The Idea of Pakistan, “the notion, that India’s Muslims
required a homeland not only for their protection but to fulfil their “cultural and civilizational
identity.”22 This notion ultimately became the root foundation for the movement led by the founder of
Pakistan, (Quaid-e-Azam) Muhamamd Ali Jinnah, towards the establishment of an independent
Muslim state in South Asia. An Independent and sovereign state, where millions of Muslims could
live within a free society – far away from the Hindu Indian majority - soon to be realized by Jinnah
and his counterparts that the ‘state’ that he has visioned for Pakistan was far more difficult to create,
then that of a ‘nation’. One must need to understand the differentiation between a ‘state’ and a
‘nation’. According to one definition, “a state is the principle political unit in the international
political institutions.”23 In contrast, “a nation is a group of people who view the other members of their
group as their fully extended family, and possess a common destiny normally associated with claims
on a particular territory.”24 Nationalism compiles a variation of goals, and stretches, even more rather
then remaining limited to ‘ethnic politics’ or simple ‘patriotism’. The term of nation-state is also
extremely essential to understand the concept of Baluch nationalism, and the term prevails a
suggestion that a nation - state, is the existence of a nation, plus political sovereignty.25 National
identity in most developed countries existed prior to the structure solidification of political authority –
resulting in the formulation of a nation-state. Now the vital aspect of this argument is that in many
newly created and underdeveloped states, including Pakistan, the formulation of a nation-state was
vice-versa. The case among states in Asia and Africa, unlike those in Europe, has been that “authority
and sovereignty have run ahead of self conscious national identity and cultural integration.” 26 This
process prevailed, not to the emergence of a formulated ‘nation-state,’ but a ‘state-nation’ – which
does not mean at all that a ‘state-nation’ is confined only to the ‘Third-World.’ For instance, long
before the state of France became the Raison d’Etre27, it was a monarchical state. Lowell W.
Barrington defines nationalism with a combination of two features, “the pursuit through argument or

22
Stephen Cohen, the idea of Pakistan, Washington D.C.: Brookings institution Press, 2004, p. 2
23
Lowell W. Barrington, Nation and ‘Nationalism’: The misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science, Political Science and
Politic, 30, 4 (Dec, 1997), p. 71
24
Walker Connor, Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethno-National Bond in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony
D. Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 71
25
Cynthia H. Enloe and Mostafa Rejai, Nation-States and States-Nations, International Studies Quarterly, June, 1969, p. 143
26
Ibid, p. 140
27
Raison d’Etre is a phrase borrowed from French where it means simply "reason for being"; in English, it comes to suggest
a degree of rationalization, as "The claimed reason for the existence of something or someone".

13
other activity, of a set of rights for the self-defined members of the nations, including, at a minimum,
28
territorial autonomy or sovereignty.” For the Baluch “nationalists” territorial sovereignty and
autonomy has been the main objective, not only since the advent of Pakistan’s independence – but
since centuries, and in the emergence of British withdrawal from South Asia – the sense of
nationalism has been ignited again and continues to burn rapidly till this very day.

In the year 1970 – nationwide election were held under the supervision of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (then
Prime Minister of Pakistan) to bring out the nationalist leaders in Baluchistan to participate and merge
onto the political arena, and to uphold the faith of basic democracy and marginalize the nationalist
separatist movement in Baluchistan. Yet again a series of conflict came into existence between Baluch
nationalists and the central government of Pakistan – headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto - gradually a
powerful armed struggle broke out against the Bhutto regimes, which lead, once again, a bloody
Baluch insurgency - that would shower the province for nearly four years.

Commencing after the breakdown of the provincial government in Baluchistan, and the imprisonment
of primary Baluch nationalists leaders – Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and his establishment in Islamabad
assumed that the nationalists in Baluchistan had active terms with Soviet Union – main objective was
to disintegrate Pakistan.29 However, what Bhutto, failed to foresee at that time by turning against the
nationalist movement and its legitimate leaders – an outburst of rebellions that took place, which
according to some estimation, mounted upto 55,000 Baluch fighters, who were willing to put their life
on the line, for the right and the sovereignty of the nation.30 A number of Baluch students participated
actively in the war declared against Pakistan’s government – conducting various attacks on Pakistani
and Western oil companies, which eventually halted each and every progress that was undergoing. An
estimate deployment of 80,000 troops, gunship helicopters and a financial aid of $200 million were
provided by the ‘Shah of Iran’, Reza Pehlawi to breakdown the insurgency, in which 5,000 Baluch
fighters and 3,300 men belonging to the military lost their lives.31 The crackdown of the Baluch
insurgency was lead by a General, performing service in the army, known as, General Tikka Khan,
who was nick named “Butcher of Baluchistan” by the Baluch population32, for his role in
marginalizing the Baluch resistance movement. His tactic included of being rendered with a number of
thirty U.S. Huey Cobra choppers from its neighbour, Iran33.

28
Barrington, p. 71
29
Titus, Paula and Nina Swindler, Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial
Balochistan, in The International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32, (2000), p. 47-69
30
Indian author analyzes the insurgency in Baluchistan, To Die Out in a While, New Delhi Hindustan Times. 15 Jan 2006.
31
Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, 1981, P. 36
32
Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p. 33
33
Ibid, p. 37

14
Despite, Baluchistan serving the country to generate reserves in natural gas, minerals and virgin
fisheries from their coastline – per capita income in Pakistan’s largest province, estimated in 1973 was
the lowest compared to all other provinces of the state34. Leading to a judgement that many of the
causes that had lead to the revolt in 1973 were based on socio-economic factors. The elections held in
1973 had elected the first genuine Baluch provincial government, who had high hopes in terms of
development and economic factors for the impoverished province, but sooner the Baluch realized that
once again they have been betrayed by the Bhutto’s regime. The nationalist movement considered
these actions of Bhutto, and the central government’s to be a deliberate act, which had to be responded
military35.Their main motive behind the long revolt in Baluchistan was to restore the nationalist
government that was overthrown ‘undemocratically’ by Bhutto’s regime, seek greater provincial
autonomy: affective local government and a vast share of the resources that it is generating. Leaving
behind, aspects of currency, communication, defence and foreign affairs, liable to the central
government, while everything else should fall in the hands of the local provincial authority33.

The Baluch resistance continued but was clearly weakened. The army had claimed to kill an amount of
125 patriots and capturing 990 insurgents. Additionally at least 50,000 sheep and 550 camels were
captured and sold off to non-Baluch individuals. 36 In 1977, when General Zia ul Haq, took over as the
new ruler of Pakistan, followed by the imprisonment of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, following to his death. An
opportunity prevailed for the Baluch resistance and nationalist movement to bring down the violence
in the province, that’s been evolving since 1973. Yet once again, apart from freeing 6,000 prisoners
held in Pakistani prisons – freedom fighters being granted amnesty, the regime of Zia still refused to
grant substantial concessions that were related to the Baluch autonomy.37 While, the Baluch
insurgency came to a halt, the Baluch still endured hatred, feeling of bitterness and widespread of
hunger for a chance to vindicate themselves and their martial honour.38

POST-COLONIALISM: THEORETICAL EXCURSION

The term post-colonialism is relatively enclosed in confusion. Indeed, writing about post-
colonial studies is nearly, writing about colonialism itself. Studying colonialism and its
aftermath have become fashionable within universities around the world, maybe because the
post-9/11 era has provoked ‘human kind’ to evaluate politics on a entirely new global scale.
An essay by Russell Jacoby states that ‘post-colonialism’ has the academic mind dazzling
34
35

33
Selig S Harrison, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, in John Hutchinson and Anthony d. Smith, Ethnicity, (Oxford: Oxford
university Press 1996), p. 298
36
Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. 38.
37
Ibid., 40
38
Harrison, Ethnicity, 300.

15
through out the world in various universities39 - perception presented my Jacoby almost a
decade ago. In the last half century, since the establishment of participatory political and
economic processes, has led to the conscription of new social groups, hailing dissimilar
customs and norms from those who held power in the early post-independence period, raising
vital descendent of legitimacy and governance in South Asian states such as, Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan. States such as the one’s mentioned; exhibit an immense amount of
diversion, which dates back from the time of their independence. The ‘instinct’ of these states
entity as a whole has been defined by relationships between various existing branches of the
‘third-world’ states. The civil with the military, the central with the region and the executive
with the legislative - various aspects of the society joined to define the cohesion of the states
entity as a whole. The interaction between religious classes, political parties and social classes
is increasing tremendously, diverting the ideology of state and re-engineering the surrounding
of the political environment. Consequential numerical groups - active in a form of
government lay intense confrontation towards the pre-dominant and post-colonial activists to
achieve their interests. Social classes who are not willing to accept the ideology of the
dominant class are being restructured on massive basis. The term ‘modernization’ filled the
bill after the colonial conquest - congregating the ‘elite’ and ‘status-quo’ class of the military,
bureaucracy, including a marginal number of developments towards the elected legislative
and representative’s establishment in states like India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan - refurbishing
the political and economic structure of the state.

Induction of “colonialism, imperialism and post-colonialism” ought to be a straight-forward

matter of most intellectual definitions and theoretical illuminations, and in terms of the
vaguely historical sequence already implied in this triad. According to Neal Larsen,
“Colonialism, imperialism, post-colonialism” would, from this point of view, be the
appropriate sequence40. However, “post-colonialism” by anyone’s reckoning is a term whose
implications are virtually restricted to the metropolitan academy and its satellites.

Colonialism can be explained as the, conquest and dominance of others region and goods.
Under Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the ‘Mongols’ had gained control in the
Middle East as well as China. The ‘Aztec Empire’ was created when: from the fourteenth
century to the sixteenth century, one of the various communal groups had colonized the valley
39
Russell Jacoby, 1995. p. 30
40
N. Larsen. (2000), Imperialism, Colonialism and Post-colonialism, edited by Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta
Ray, ed., Postcolonial Studies, (Oxford), Blackwell, pp. 23-29.

16
of Mexico, whilst, subjugating the other. ‘Aztecs’ winkled out tributes and tax in services and
goods from the conquested regions, as did the ‘Inca Empire,’ which was the largest pre-
industrial state in the Americas41. Other various kingdoms in Southern India in the fifteenth
century came under the domination of the ‘Vijaynagara Empire’ followed by the ‘Ottoman
Empire’, which originated as a minor Islamic prinicipality in what is now Western Tukey,
elongating itself from most of Asia Minor and the Balkans. It went on extending from the
Mediterranean to the Indian ocean in the advent of the eighteenth century, and the ‘Chinese
Empire’ which was larger then anything the Europoeans had seen. The expoit of the Mongol
rulers and the fictitious wealth of the ‘Mughal’ were imagined as fuel for the European
journeys to various parts of the world, giving birth to new and different kind of colonial
practices, altering in the whole globle in a way that other colonial power did not.

It terms of causes, regarding to these differences, it should be noticed that Europeans

established empires far away from their shores. Were they better organised or were a far
superior race, are explications, which have been infact offered to account for the global power
and drastic effects of European colonialisms. A crucial difference between the two was
subjected by Marxist, stating a crucial disparity: earlier colonialisms were pre-capitalist,
modern and contemporary colonialism was formulated, alongside capitalism in Western
Europe42. The contempoprary colonialisms conducted a lot more then just extracting tribute,
affluence and commodities from the regions it vanquised. It re-engineered the frugality and
economies of the latter - assembling them into a intricate relationship, amidst their kind -
developing an influx of native and human resources, in the midst of colonised and colonial
regions. Labour, slaves as well as raw material were carried out to fabricate merchandise in
the metropolis.

When it comes to the distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist colonislaism, it is most
often referred to the latter as ‘imperislism’. Like colonialism, imperialism dates back to a pre-
capitalist past. Some arguers comment upon imperialism as prior to colonialism 43. Like
‘colonialism’, the notion of ‘imperialism’ too is apprehended by not attempting to pin it down
to a unpaired semantic meaning, instead, relating its shifting meanings to historical processes.
In the early 20th century, Lenin and Kautsky provided unfledged meaning to the word

41
Ibid, p. 29
42
T. Bottomore, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Oxford, Blackwell Reference, 1983, pp. 81-85.
43
E. Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial literature: Migrant Metaphors, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 3-
17.

17
‘imperialism’ by linking it to a elemental stage of the development of capitalism, commenting
that the growth of ‘finance capitalism’ and industry in the Western regions, had formulated an
enormous superabundance of capital. This money could not be beneficially invested at home
where labour was bounded. The colonies lacked capital, but were sufficient in labour and
human resource. Therefore, it required to move out and subordinate non-industrialised
countires to sustain its own growth.

The difference between ‘imperialism and ‘colonialism’ are defined differently depending on
their historical mutations. One useful way of distinguishing between them might be to
separate them in saptial terms and to think of ‘imperialism’ or ‘neo-imperialism’, as the
phenomenon that originates in the metropolis, the process which lead to domination and
control. What happens as a result in the colonies as consequence of imperial domination is
colonialism. Thus, the imperial region is the ‘metropole’ from where power is being scooted
in, and the colony and neo-colony is the place which penetrates. In the spot light, Imperialism
can function without formal colonies but colonialism cannot.

The flunctuatuon described in the early paragraph do place a complex meanings to the term
‘post-colonialism’, a term which is a subject of an on-going debate athwart the world. Just
because the age of colonialism has diminished, and the descendents of once colonised
population subsist, live and breathe everywhere, the whole world is said to be post-colonial,
and yet the term has been fiercely contested on many accounts. Such as the prefix ‘post’
which complicates the matter by implying an ‘aftermath’ in two senses - temporal, as in
coming after. Secondly: inequities and injustice of colonial rule have not been expunged; it is
perhaps pre-mature to proclaim the demise of colonialism. According to Ania Loomba in her
book titled, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, “A country may be both postcolonial (being
formally independent) and neo-colonial (remaining economically and culturally dependent).”
44
Now, if what Ania Loomba states is true, the the new global order does not depend upon
direct rule. However, it wont be erroneous to argue that it does allow the economic, cultural
and political acumen and intelligence of some states by others, which make it debatable that,
whether once-colonised regions can be seen as properly ‘post-colonial’.

Many of the puzzle’s can be determined, if post-colonialism is defined as coming after

colonialism and imperialism, in their original meaning of direct-rule domination, but still
44
Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, Routledge, 2005, pp. 12.

18
located within imperialism in its later sense of the global system of hegemonic economic
power45. It is very apparent in the context of post-colonialism to be an contentional concept -
marking the extensive historical facts of decolonization and the decisive achievements of
sovereignty of nations and people, looming into a new imperialistic context of economic and
political domination. Specifying, a modified historical situation, and the cultural formations
that have originated in response to a commuted political condition in the erstwhile colonial
power.

45
R. J. C. Young, Postcolonialism an historical Introduction, Oxford, 2001, Blackwell, pp. 13-25.

19
CHAPTER 2: CRISES IN BALUCHISTAN (CAUSES)

Since the departure of the British from the South Asian region, mainstream parties especially in
Pakistan have carried on adopting practices and various forms of mechanism of colonialism, to sustain
the centralised control over the multi-ethnic state. Delivering, a federal state system which included
highly centralised features and minimum autonomy for the federating units.46 Coercive mechanisms
and centralised rule and control concluded in enhancing the demands by excluding ethno-regional
actors for a transmission of power and introduction of representative rule. In 1948, Bengali students
confronted the Centre’s intention to adopt ‘Urdu’ as the national language. The Bengali student
movement was apparently suppressed by the central government, which contributed to Bengali
perceptions of alienation and support for federalism and representative government. The miliitary’s
success in jeopordizing the democratic process and the failure of the political leadership to create and
sustain a viable order has its roots in Pakistan’s history. Since Pakistan’s establishment as an
independent state, authoritarian leaders have repeatedly intervened and captured the power of the state.
The regimes have centralised mechanisms of control which is opposed by the country’s multi-ethnic
population. However, the willingness of political leaders to accept constraints and their functioning in
return for a transfer of power; and when in power, their failure to respect democratic norms and
democratic institutions make them vulnerable once again towards authoritarian manipulation and
intervention.

ETHNICITY, POLITICS AND POWER

A vital question remains, whether the current conflict is ethnic in Baluchistan. An ethnic conflict is
one which involves a government, and “one or more politically mobilized ethnic groups, who
challenge the sanctity of existing political structures in their bid for autonomy or succession,”47 argues
Rajshree Jetly. The presence of discontent that lays in the core of the Baluch nationalists, is with
regards to the Punjabi dominated central government, and the central objective of the Baluchi
population, has always been their right on autonomy. It is not necessary for the Baluch nationalists to
gain independence as much it is to gain autonomy – desire to gain autonomy has been the long desire
and passion of the Baluch people. According to Walker Conner, “men don’t allow themselves to be
killed for their interest; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions.”48 The Baluch’s passion
towards their honour and dignity has driven them to violence and bloodshed, for their rightful
autonomy and primordial aspects.

46
Shastri, 2001: p. 43
47
Rajshree Jetly, Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism: An Assessment, Asian Ethnicity, Feb 2004, p. 8
48
Walker Conner, Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond, in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D.
Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 75

20
According to the theory advocated by Clifford Geertz, “congruities of blood, custom and spec are seen
to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness” which binds one to his kinsmen not
merely by “personal affection, practical necessity, common interest and obligation, but at least in great
part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself.”49 Primordial ties,
particularly in modernizing societies, are seen as the preferred bases of demarcation of autonomous
political units, from which ‘ancient hatreds’ play out in violent clashes between ethnic groups.50 As
mentioned in the previous paragraph. Prominent nationalist leader and Ex-Governor of Baluchistan,
Late Nawab Akbar Bugti states regarding the ongoing conflict in Baluchistan, “the Baluch will remain
subservient to the will of others, and ‘slaves and third citizens; in their own home land, unless solid
and productive efforts are conducted to safeguard the ‘rights’ of the Baluch people”.51

According to Roger D. Peterson, in his work on Understanding Ethnic Violence, has placed an
emotion based approach highlighting ‘ethnic conflict’ which are dependent on four main
‘mechanisms’ that serve to trigger actions: fear, resentment hatred and rage.52 Undoubtedly all of these
mechanisms mentioned lead to conflicts between various groups of different norms and customs, but
in the case of the Baluch conflict, their emotions most definitely exhibit an emotion of resentment. It is
historically proven that the central government of Pakistan has been dominated by the ethnic Punjabis,
ever since the state was formulated. A number of them have held high civil and dominating posts in
the province of Baluchistan. The dismissal of the elected government in Baluchistan similar to the one,
that took place in 1971, accompanied by the non-participation of the Baluch in various services such
as, army, civil and federal government have collectively fled the resentment aspect of the Baluch and
subordinated a powerful sense of equalizing the gap between these two ethnic groups, the Baluch and
the Punjabis. Not to mention, the sense of economics and the control of their resources is most
importantly vital to the on-going conflict.

The variant of the depriving loss in Baluchistan is also due to internal colonialism. Ethnic identity is
explained in terms of the marginalization of peripheral groups in relation to a ‘core’ group within a
complex society.53 The Baluch sentiment can be easily understood by the help of this theory where it
identifies the ethnic ‘core’ group ‘Punjabis’, dominating the central/federal establishment, imposing a
practice of ‘internal colonial rule’ by which the matter and concerns of Baluch political circle is
abruptly inferior to those of the state. However, statements that are fled up by the central establishment
49
Clifford Greetz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in Old Societies
and States, New York Times: Free Press, 1963, p. 109
50
Ibid, p.108
51
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti., interview, 1 August, 2003.

52
Roger D. Peterson, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 19
53
Rajshree Jetly, Baluch Ethnicity and Nationalism: An Assessment, Asian Ethnicity, Feb 2004, p. 8

21
of Pakistan, contends this theory and instead puts forth, that the tribal prominent nationalist leader’s
are the destructive contagious bacterial disease, who stand behind the violence occurring in
Baluchistan – responsible for exploiting the ethnic population, in-order to sustain their control and
authority over the Baluch community. Now, this theory is a direct mechanism of an instrumental
theory. Theory of instrumentalists deal ethnicity as a “social and political construction in a specific
context in which the ‘elites’ maneuver cultural symbols of their ethnic groups to derive an economic
and political advantage in the quest of power and authority.” 54 The establishment of Pakistan sustains
its stance that the current violence in Baluchistan is apparently being advocated by the tribal elders,
who do intend to keep their people backward by protesting against development and intend to
empower themselves under the feudal tribal system. The matter remains that these acts of violence in
Baluchistan are not being conducted by the tribal chiefs, but by the ‘mediocre’ population which
compiles, youth, doctors, engineers and mostly students, which is why I feel that the instrumentalists
have failed to reason why the vast number of people have taken up arms against the central authority
and remain loyal to their tribal elders. Michael E. Brown considers a very realistic reason towards
understanding the concept of “why do followers follow?” He states that such a situation arises due to
antagonistic group histories and mounting political problems.55 The current violence in Baluchistan
that has fled up for the fourth time since 60 years of post-Pakistan independence: product of both past
historical injustices, inequality and political memories. These products are all tools of depression that
stands as a bitter reality – reality, which has been imposed on the Baluch soil by the central
government of Pakistan, bureaucracy and its military. As result of ‘active opposition’ and ‘venomous’
historical background, assurances that are being flaunted by the Pakistan’s government of launching
the advent of what is portrayed as development, and prosperities are met with great mistrust. The
current crises in Baluchistan is due to a problem of ‘credible commitment’ in which the central
government is unable to reassure the Baluch people that it will not renege on its promises of economic
and political developments.56

DEVELOPING BALUCHISTAN: MYTH AND REALITY

Africa is a paradox, which illustrates and highlights neo-colonialism. Her earth is rich, yet the
products that came from above and below the soil continue to enrich, not Africans predominately, but
groups and individuals who operate to Africa’s impoverishment.57

54
Ibid, p. 8
55
Michael E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications, in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 2002, p. 222
56
Justin S. Dunne, Crises in Baluchistan: A Historical Analysis of the Baluch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan, 2006, p. 53
57
Naseer Dashti, In a Baluch Perspective, Asaap Publications, 2007, p. 129

22
One of the main aspects that has lead the Baluch masses (youth mostly) towards agitation in the recent
times is the mega-development projects that have been undergoing in the province of Baluchistan. The
indigenous population of the province Baluchistan, considers these developmental projects to be
nothing more then a tool to enrich the already wealthy ‘elite’ and ‘status quo’ outsiders and non-
Baluch personals. The port of Gawadar,58 when completed could prevail to be a vital importance for
the development in Baluchistan, and towards its social and economic upliftment. Gawadar's coastal
highway which links the city with Karachi (industrial base of Pakistan) will increase the transport
system, providing a boost to tourism, while the port of Gawadar could possibly turn into a vital port
serving as an outlet to china, Afghanistan and Central Asia.59 Now the statement being raised from the
state’s central authority - the Baluch population and rebels who are targeting these developmental
projects do not have the welfare of the province and its leaders prefer keeping the province backward,
just so to maintain their control over the indigenous population. However, the legitimate leaders of the
Baluch nationalist movements complain that population, which is being used as manpower for various
projects, is being governed by the federal establishment, which is being drawn from the non-
indigenous population, living outside the province.

It is constantly being imposed on the Baluch that the developmental projects that are being undertaken
will provide a variation of opportunities in terms of, business, trade and employment. According to a
prior Chief Secretary of Baluchistan, Abdul Hakeem Baluch, “the basic issue is not the construction of
these mega projects, but their ownership. Of all the mega-projects, nothing agitates the Baluch
population more then the port of Gawadar, which is the largest infrastructural project being undertaken
in Pakistan.60 The mega corruption in the land of the Gawadar, and the coastal highway, which both
belong to the province has been seized by the corrupt government officials and legislators 61,
succeeding till now to deprive the government of Baluchistan from a massive income mounting up to
trillion rupees. The state’s governments had noting to say regarding this matter except that , Islamabad
has been taking all decisions with respect to the development and the port, and all unjust transactions
have been usurped by the state’s coast guard and Para-military forces62. Another leading factor
towards the Baluch population, being deprived from Gawadar’s development is that, the federal
establishment managed to construct a coastal highway which connects the city of Gawadar to Karachi
(a non-Baluch city) but the capital city of Baluchistan, Quetta has still not been connected to Gawadar,
which has only made the people more restive, and find themselves to be landlocked, apart from having
58
Gawadar is situated on the South western coast of Pakistan. The port is strategically located between three increasingly
important regions, the oil rich Middle East, South Asia and the economically emerging and resource region of Central Asia.
The Gawadar port is expected to generate billions of dollars in revenues and create at least 2 million jobs.
59
Terrorism in Baluchistan, Editorial, The Dawn, Karachi, December 18, 2004.
60
Baluchis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History, Foreign Policy, London, Nov, 2006, p. 54
61
Although the government has banned the transfer of land, the Land mafia has shown backdated transactions to transfer the
land to the outsiders in collaboration with corrupt officials.
62
International Crises group, Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Baluchistan, Asia Report No 119, September 14, 2006, p.
14-15

23
the largest coastline. On the contrary, the Baluch national movement, till now, have only felt that these
tremendous mega-projects, being developed on a large scale, will only allow the inflow of outsiders in
their province, which will enable them to dominate the province’s population to a large extent - giving
birth to a number of fears, that foreign intrusion and investment will escalate too much foreign
influence, threatening the social and culture norms of the indigenous population63.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BALUCHISTAN

The most substantial aspect, for which the current violence in Baluchistan has fled up immensely, is
the strategic location of Baluchistan, not only in Pakistan, but in Central Asia, which is why the central
state authority has exerted its iron fist even more on the province, due to its regional dynamics and
potential. Its rich energy resources, gas deposits and mineral resources such as, coal, iron, copper, and
more recently the port of Gawadar, has been increasingly important to the state of Pakistan. An
estimate of eighty percent of the gas is being provided to the country by the province: cumulative
royalty from gases from Baluchistan amounts to US $114billion every year64. This is why the presence
of military and Para-military troops has increased tremendously, followed by the influx of non-
indigenous workers. This act has ignited the nationalist movement even more. The Baluch argues that
it has not even benefited itself from the long 770 mile coastline (Gawadar) and that they have not been
given their fair share in terms of their philanthropy to the national treasury65. The political leadership
of the Baloch nationalist has consistently raised the issue of genuine distribution of resources between
the provinces and Pakistan’s central government66. The Baluch population are being exposed to the
bitter truth of their rights being exploited, and foresee every one in Pakistan benefiting from these
developmental process except for the Baluch themselves, collaborating towards the sense of
‘colonialization.’

Today, in South-West of Pakistan, the struggle to impose security and calm is considered to be the top
issue, when it comes to ‘foreign policy agenda.’ Among all top nation’s, Pakistan is considered to be
amidst these nation, which intends to ensure its energy dilemma, and making efforts to exploit the
country’s own energy resource, construct a new deep sea port in Gawadar and enabling it to dominate
a keen place, in-order to arise as a concrete distributor in Asia 67. The economy of Pakistan is highly
dependent on its gas deposits: Estimation of gas in 2006 exposed the presence of gas to be 28 trillion
63
Confrontation No Solution to Baluchistan Imbroglio, Editorial, The International News, January 16, 2005.
64
Baluchis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History, Foreign Policy, London, Nov, 2006, p. 49

65
Massoda Bano, Dialogue is the only Solution, The News, Lahore, January 21, 2005.
66
Paul Titus In his Introduction to Sylvia Matheson’s book, The Tigers of Baluchistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi,
1998, p. 19
67
Robert G. Wirsing, Baluch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in
Pakistan, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008, p. 4

24
cubic feet – as much as 19 trillion cubic feet (68%were located in Baluchistan) – producing upto 45
percent of Pakistan’s natural gas, from which it only consumes an estimate of 17 percent.68 However,
Douglas Lovelace, Jr, Director Strategic Studies Institute states, “Pakistan’s quest for energy security
has run up against a tribal separatist movement which is spreading in the South western province of
Baluchistan.”69 In short, if the state of Pakistan wants to illuminate the future of its energy resources, it
will be extremely essential for the central authority to put forward a resolution for the Baluchi people.
Pakistan energy resources and gas resources, present in Baluchistan, have been all tangled in the
Baluch insurgency, placing the energy and gas infrastructure at high risk. Another extremely important
developmental project which involves countries like Iran and India has been seen as a great threat by
the Baluch nationalists. This pipeline would carry natural gas from Iran to Pakistan and then carry it
all the way to India.

To deeply understand the prevention of exploitation of gas mineral resource in Baluchistan by the
Baluch movement is the present ‘grand’ example of gas field in Sui, 70 which was established in 1952.
After being established as a gas plant, it served an estimate of 38 percent of its gas to Pakistan both,
domestically and on commercial basis, whereas, it left Baluchistan with a mere 6 to 7 percent gas
connection only. As a matter of fact, the only reason why gas was brought into the capital of
Baluchistan (Quetta) was due to the setup of army cantonments and headquarters in 1982 after 30
years of gas discovery beneath the land of Sui (Baluchistan). Out of 28 districts in Baluchistan, only
four receive gas connection, whereas, 83 percent of the gas has been diverted towards Punjab to
sustain their industrial and household usage of gas, plus gas is being supplied to every single village in
Punjab.71 With such intentions towards the people of Baluchistan, the Baluch nationalists do posses
weight and convincing arguments with regards to ethnic inequality motives. It is very much evident
that the prior projects and the current developments undergoing in Baluchistan is to only exploit
resources out of its roots and then to further distribute it unfairly and unequally by the central
government authority dominated by Punjabis of the Punjab province, and dispense it wherever they
want too. The percentage of gas royalty that the province of Baluchistan receives by the government is
a mere 12.5 percent, a rate that is the lowest in gas royalties in the world. 72 Most of the coal mines are
all been operated and possessed by the non-Baluchi population, which is then transferred to Punjab,
leaving behind nothing but piles of wood for the Baluch to make fire off. Whereas, marble is
transported to the port of Karachi and the priceless gas of Baluchistan is conveyed in pipes to Punjab,
from where it comes back in cylinders to Baluchistan, placing the Baluch in a state where it has to pay
for its own rightful product.
68
Statistics of Pakistan Energy resources, Country Analysis Brief: Pakistan, December, 2006.
69
Ibid, p. 4-5
70
Sui is a sub-District of District Dera Bugti in Baluchistan, Pakistan. The Sui Gas field and plant id located in Sui Town,
serving gas most of its gas and mineral resources such as, coal, iron copper throughout Pakistan.
71
Baluchis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History, Foreign Policy, London, Nov, 2006, p. 46
72
Emma Duncan, Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan, Penguin Books, London, p. 139

25
HUMAN RIGHT VIOLATIONS

The Human Right Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has urged the government and the military regime
of the state to put a halt to the atrocities, massive operations and the killing of innocent population in
various locations of Baluchistan. A ceasefire must be ordered to prevent the loss of more human lives
and both parties i.e. the nationalist movement of Baluchistan and the central authority of Pakistan,
including its military ally, should reconcile the turbulent situation and should address the issue on
political basis, in-order for a mutual consensus to prevail. The military operation in Baluchistan was
against both, national and international norms, and has expressed it deep concern regarding the people
who have disappeared from various areas both, rural and urban, condemning the role of the military
and civil intelligence.73 HRCP has accused the ex-President of Pakistan, General (Retd) Pervez
Musharaf, and his military led government, to be culprits of massive human rights violation, which
has led to a war like situation, exhibiting its bitter reality.

Ben Hayes from the Transnational Institute states in his article titled, Never Mind the Baluch, claims
that in the past year an estimate of six army brigades and 25,000 forces have been deployed in various
parts of Baluchistan. An amount of 450 Baluchi activists and politicians have been missing form the
surface of the earth and almost 4,000 Baluchis are placed in detentions centres without any valid
charge, nor a fair trial. UNICEF has called for immediate attention, to supply food and medical aid to
84,000 displaced Baluchis, which includes 33,000 children, which the federal establishment has
constantly blocked and prevented admission to any of the international bodies to operate in
Baluchistan to prevent evidence of human rights violations in the province.74 According to (NGO)
Asia Human Rights Commission (AHRC), 600 people have disappeared after being taken into police
custody, and 1,000 Baluchis have been killed from Baluchistan since military operation in 2001.75
Selig Harrison has referred to these acts of human rights violation, to be attracting international
attention. He has called these violation “slow motion genocide”, which unlike the crises of
humanitarianism in regions like Chechnya and Darfur, have not affected the conscience of the globe
yet. Harrison further argues that, “as Baluch casualty figures mount, it will be extremely hard to ignore
the human costs of the Baluch independence struggle and its political repercussions in other restive
minority regions of multi-ethnic Pakistan.”76

73
Daily times website, January 4, 2005.
74
Ben Hayes, Never Mind the Baluch, Transnational Institute, Militarism and Security, June 2007.
75
US State Department Report on Pakistan, Released by the bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, March 6,
2007.
76
Selig s. Harrison, Pakistan’s Baluch Insurgency”, Le Monde, October 5, 2006.

26
CHAPTER 3: CURRENT SITUATION IN BALUCHISTAN (RECOMMENDATIONS)

Since Oct 1999, with the takeover of the military regime from the civilian government, there has been
dismay and violence occurring literally in every part of Baluchistan. Yes! One can’t deny the fact that
many of the warlords in Baluchistan have been preying on mediocre Baluch population, and have not
taken many initiatives to build schools and hospitals for their people. At the same time, it is irrelevant
to state; the Baluchis have been given their fair share of the resource that it generates from its soil.
History reminds us again and again - the government of Pakistan (dominated by an ethnic elite class)
has helped themselves, since the past decades, to mineral and natural resources - refusing any foreign
help and developmental funds to the people of Baluchistan, which has led to separatist movement to
take its toll. It is extremely hard to believe the words, uttered from the ex-President of Pakistan, when
he spoke of maintaining the ‘writ of law,’ which is essential to formulate the country as a stable
nation. How can that be a possibility, when the ex-President had indulged himself in extreme
corruption, leaving behind the non-aristocrat society in a state of dismay! Even the U.S. (Bush
administration) is left wondering why Pakistan’s army is not able to win the war against Al-Qaeda,
within Pakistan’s domain. Figures and facts illuminates the reasons - the ex-military dictator of
Pakistan, Pervez Musharaf, had been diverting the nation’s armed forces to subjugate the insurgency
in the gas-rich province of Baluchistan.77 It can be said without any reluctance that, violent conflict
tends to breed further violence.78 The uprising of violence in Baluchistan requires to be stopped on
permanent basis. Measures, which are vitally important, require to be addressed in an ‘assertive’ way,
on both accounts i.e. ‘the nationalist forces’ in Baluchistan and the ‘central government of Pakistan’.
Below are the following recommendations that have been offered. If the Central Establishment is to
bring peace and harmony in Baluchistan, then it is essential for it to consider these pluralist steps,
which can lead to some light in the tunnel.

CONSTRUCT A PRODUCTIVE ROADMAP

Since Pakistan’s creation, the federal establishment has always kept one motive in mind – to
marginalize the nationalist movement in Baluchistan, through influx of military means – additionally,
putting an end to the violence temporally but not permanently. Sustainable termination of a civil war
requires to be dealt with a step by step process of disarmament and security, confidence building and a
forum in which the economic, political and social terms of the post-war can be defined.79 The only
good aspect of the war like situation in Baluchistan (till now) is that, it still hasn’t reached to the point

77
New York Times, Mr. Musharaf’s Other War, Editorial, February 23, 2006.
78
Virginia Page Fortna, Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars, in
International Studies Review, 2003, p. 102.
79
Sisk, p, 259.

27
of where a civil war would be seen into existence, but can be foreseen, and to avoid for such a critical
situation to arise, the government of Pakistan will have to take serious steps to prevent from such
happening, for e.g., an end to military intervention and seriously addressing the issue of social
discontent, with respect to mega-project developments.

Additionally, the process of building confidence and taking the Baluch under consideration should be
dealt with immediately. The central government must prove to the leaders of the nationalist movement
in Baluchistan and its masses that the projects that are under-going will mostly include the local
population from the province, followed by productive training and assurances. Revenue’s that are
being generated from the soil of the province will include a larger sum - passed onto the local
authorities of Baluchistan, and the rights of the Baluch indigenous population will not be deliberately
abrogated under any circumstances, whatsoever. Although, the process of building trust and reliance
with the Baluch people will surely not be a walk in the park, especially while dealing with the basis of
historical events of bitterness, atrocities and hostility. However, it will prove to be the only sensible
thing that has been left untouched since post-independence. Interaction and dialogue, amidst the
Baluch and the central government will surely demonstrate to be an imperative step towards a peaceful
process to the ongoing crises.

HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT

One of the most imperative steps to end the on-going conflict in Baluchistan is based on major
developmental and economical factors, which have so far been incapable of exhibiting tangible
outcomes for the Baluch populace. Reasons, which has lead to this result, is primarily because the
central government has paid more attention on ‘things’ rather then paying keen attention towards the
welfare of the people. Factors such as , dams, port, etc has always remained vital concern, which from
the Baluch perspective have been perceived as nothing more then mechanisms of exploitation. A
massive drastic approach requires to be implemented in Baluchistan in terms of human capital, in-
order to educate and train them, so that, they are capable enough to merge in and be a part of the
massive developmental schemes, which requires great potential. In terms of decision making, the local
and regional population should be taken into account, so to avoid any possible discrepancies and
mismanagement, because a local member of any region possesses far better understanding then any
outsider.

Introduction of ‘micro-developments’ should be given special attention as well, whilst, in the process
of mega-projects and schemes – fulfilling the basic needs and requirements of the Baluch, such as,
education, health, electricity and water. Policies like, ‘peaceful penetration’ is of vital importance to

28
formulate jobs and employment, which will ultimately decrease the massive military presence on its
own, resulting in the diminishment of the Baluch discontent, and marginalize the birth of more
militant elements from the national movement. The regime of dictator, Pervez Musharaf, claims credit
for a number of productive measures in Baluchistan, such as, education, transport and developments in
various sectors, the fact is that indeed he should be entitled credible for the on-going schemes. The
only problem remains, that sectors of development that have taken place under his umbrella, are only
meant to ‘enrich’ the already wealthy (mostly non-Baluchi’s) and aristocrats. Most of the Baluch
population have been side lined from these schemes, worth billions. In short, from all the steps that
have taken place by Mushsraf’s regime, there still remains room, for plenty more to be done.

ISSUE OF IDENTITY AND AUTONOMY

Bringing an end to the current violence in Baluchistan, will utmost be the most challenging job, which
the central government will have to confront – the longer the conflict languishes, it will become more
incurable. The on-going violence in Baluchistan is of direct essence to the Baluch ‘identity’, and when
the issue of the Baluch ‘identity’ will be brought out-front, composition of mutual consensus will be
extremely tough to deal with. The issue of ‘autonomy’ has always been a fearful factor, with regards
to the central government, However, now the time has come to address the issue of granting a sum of
greater autonomy to the locality of the province and its government. If not, then ultimately it could and
might lead to the disintegration of Pakistan. As it appears to be in the new map, of what has been titled
as the ‘Greater Middle East’ – gaining many international and intellectual comments – Pakistan has
been seen to lose most of it boundaries and land, including what is seen as ‘Greater Baluchistan’. (See
Map) Maybe this could be another primary lead reason, why the establishment wants to crush the
nationalist movement through military means. Unfortunately, the only outcome has been an increase
of more immense violence and conflict by the ethnic population.

The concept of ‘civic-nationalism’ should be imposed, if the government wants to marginalize the
perspective of ‘ethnic-nationalism’ and nationalism itself. This link can only be brought about, with
appropriate and adequate process of modernization, and till now the benefits of modernization have
not touched the population of Baluchistan. It is only this process which will help the central
government, to help the nationalist to adopt the perception of civic-nationalism, not only in
Baluchistan, but it any other part of Pakistan. The issue of autonomy and ethnic-nationalism requires
to be spoken of, by formulating direct ties and links – washout of this process will only prolong the
obstacles and hassles that Pakistan encounters today, and create more grievances and problems within
both parties.

29
WORTHY OF U.S. ATTENTION

The on-going conflict in Baluchistan is worthy of keen attention by the United states, due to its pile up
on the stability and sustainability of Pakistan. The interest of the United States lies in Pakistan, only if
it proves itself to be a stable nation, with respect to its cooperation on the issue of ‘Global War on
Terrorism.’ The stability of Pakistan will prove to the U.S. that Pakistan is competent to deal with its
problems, both, regional and international, especially in terms of the standoff between India and
Pakistan – ending the threat of a ‘nuclear war.’ Whilst, the matter of Baluchistan remains to be an
internal concept, its significance to the forceful dynamics in the region of South Asia, places a
responsibility on the U.S., foreign policy administration to encourage the establishment of Pakistan to
deal with the matter of Baluchistan in a constructive way – ignoring all tactics and mechanism of
violence. Peace and harmony will eventually be unattainable, if the principle issues are not addressed.

More concrete steps should be encouraged by the U.S., to Pakistan, in its approach towards
Baluchistan in terms of, employment, autonomy, rights etc. Most importantly, the issue of democracy
and sovereignty must be reformed and guaranteed, to assure the participation of provincial institution
and last but not least, legitimize the genuine efforts of bringing peace and success in Baluchistan, not
in the eyes of the U.S. itself, but in the eyes of the Baluch populace. For it is in the best interest of both
Pakistan and United States to reconcile the growing crises in Baluchistan, which will only weaken the
state structure, making the Baluch nationalist and militants more entrenched, if not resolved soon –
opening more windows for an even more dangerous problem to occur, such as the opportunity of
foreign fighters and maybe ‘foreign jihadi’s’ to come in-between.

30
 CONCLUSION

History truly repeats itself, and throughout history, the Baluch has always resisted ‘colonial rule’
aggressively, and continue to do so, till this very day, is not much of a surprise. The purpose of this
dissertation has been nothing more, but to uphold the crucial and critical factors, that have lead to the
crises and insurgency, throughout its volatile historical background. Arguments that have been laid out
in this thesis, have been supported by ‘pre-existing’ commodities – the legacy of British and
Pakistan’s method and policy; the Baluch people and their independent nature; and finally historical
complaint and grievances that have enabled the tribal Baluch elders to mobilize support of the Baluch
population, to seek an armed struggle against their greatest enemy, the central establishment of
Pakistan.

The explosive and dangerous civil war, which has been brewing in Baluchistan since the last decade –
if not dealt with properly, could inevitable lead to a civil war between the army and the Baluch
nationalists. Since 1947, the Baluch have been engaged in demanding their rightful share of autonomy,
political rights and natural resources. Since partition, the voice of the Baluchi’s has been silenced and
suppressed by the army – followed by an insurgency, which was and has been brutally crushed by the
army again and again. However, this new insurgency being flared by both sides – if not addressed
properly could most possibly create a new Bangladesh – after all, it was the civil war in 1971, which
established to be a primary tool – dividing East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and West Pakistan. The
insurgency in post-colonial Baluchistan is not being given much attention, in terms of Pakistani media.
There is a suspicion in Pakistan that one gets to know about through Pakistani sources, that even if the
Balochi resistance is a fact of life, the army of Pakistan is deliberately forcing the Baluchis to prepare
the case for a full scale attack to quell the nationalist’s forces. Introduction of sophisticated defence
equipment for tackling the insurgency in Baluchistan, espcially with the assurance of American
sympathy at its command, the army will never allow the nationalist movements to gain their right of
autonomy and representation.

the extreme level of Baluch poverty – which is generally responsible for fueling immense resentment,
claimed by the Baluchi’s, is the direct influence of the depriviation of their fair share of royalty. The
discovery of gas in 1952 has done very little to improve the life of the poor Baluch population. All the
revenue being generated, goes directly to federal ‘exchequer’ out of which 12% ends up being donated
to the local government… but that’s not all – from the 12%, the federal government owns billions of
Rs to the local government, which the nationalist leaders claim, that now the time has come to take
every penny into account, due to it being the rightful property of Baluchistan. The level of poverty is
so immense in Baluchistan, that personally, I consider the vast population of Baluchistan to be lucky!
In the sense that they are not aware, where the world has reached in the 21st Centuty – at times they

31
assume, regards to losing all hope - whatever is happening in their region is their faith and its what
they are destined for.

The relationship between the central government and the Baluch people have been exacerbated, by
imposing different mechanisms and techniques, used by the dominant authority of Pakistan,
throughout history, such as, direct domination, cooperation and reconciliation. Policies like the one
introduced by the ‘British Raj’ called ‘forward Policy’ resulted in a peaceful relation between the two,
however, even policies as the one mentioned eventually failed in-order to address the Baluch
discontent. The geo-strategic implication of Baluchistan drove the central authority to conduct
immense drastic and volatile steps, so to gain direct domination, which proved to be a prime example
of what was seen in the past aswell – undermining the grievance and fostering of more violent tactics.
The time has come when the on-going conflict in Baluchistan cannot be resolved or dealt with, until
and unless the policy of imposing ‘suppression’ are reversed to policy of ‘mutual consensus’ and
‘negotiations’. Indeed, the military and the Para-military troops in Baluchistan just can’t withdraw and
never will abandon various locations of deployment due to it’s core strategic significance – for the
government of Pakistan and the future governments to be, will remain far too dependent on the
economic and developmental schemes, that are taking place within the domain of the Baluch province.
Leaving the central government of Pakistan with not much of a choice, but to address the Baluch and
their grievances – placing the indigenous population of Baluchistan far more superior then any one
else in the state.

Another primary factor that I consider to be extremely important within the perspective of Baluchistan
is whether the key word ‘Independence’ is viable in Baluchistan. It is most definitely not my intention
to marginalize the appraisal of nationalist thinking in Baluchistan or by the nationalist movement, who
seek an independent Baluchistan. However, to evaluate this view from a practical and realistic sense –
compared to the independent movement in Bangladesh, one should pin point major factors that
distinguish the Bengali separatist movement amidst the Baluchi’s movement of Independence. Ever
since Bangladesh achieved its independence in 1971 - prediction remains that the separation of
Baluchistan from Pakistan is inevitable. The climate of aggressiveness of alienation from the capital
(Islamabad) is very much apparent in the hearts of Baluchi’s, which is very much commemorative
with the upsurge of the Bengali’s in the late 1960’s.80 Yes! The Baluch have indeed gained much
awareness, thanks to the most current insuregency which was fled up in 2005. Though, in the 1970’s,
it seemed from a personal evaluation, the Baluch nationalism did not acquire much momentum,
compared to the Bengali’s. Low level of literacy rate, non-massive movement and non-developed
literature etc, were among many of the reasons of low scale momentum. However compared to the

80
Selig S. Harrison, East Pakistanis Resent Army Takeover, Washington Post, 30 March, 1969.

32
Bengali’s revolution, under the rule of their nationalist leaders, a well cultural life, literacy rate and
wide sense of nationalism was seen in the formation.

The current government has somewhat tried to deal with the crises in Baluchistan- promoting
employments, induction of some Baluch race in the military and introducing efforts to incline the
education status. However, far more needs to be done to diminish the historical conflicts, bitterness
and the unfair treatment of the Baluchi’s compared to other provinces. The population of Baluchistan
are the people without power, without entitlement to their resources. It has undergone far too many
operations, dismissal of their genuine government – which is not only the problem of Baluchistan, but
remains to be the core problem of Pakistan. The right to be governed by their representatives is the
right recognized under the UN charter, UN Human Rights charter and under UN universal declaration.
Lack of education, awareness and development by the federal establishment, towards Baluchstan –
exhibits an intention with only to suppress the awareness and knowledge, in-order to assert the
Baluchi’s from their rights. Until and unless these issues are not addressed sufficiantely, aspects of
stability and harmony in Baluchistan, and Pakistan will remain to be not more then a dream. A
glimpse of the Pentagons new map appears into one's mind, where it has declared Pakistan to be
among the biggest losers, due to losing most of the state's land. Pakistan and its establishment will
have to take serious actions in terms of compiling mutual consensus and negotiations to stabilize the
volcanic situation within Pakistan’s domain. The situation in Baluchistan requires to be dealt with, and
as I had mentioned earlier, the term ‘assertiveness' will have to be given keen attention. Most
important of all - Pakistan’s central government and its military will have to stop gambling with
Pakistan’s pride and integrity. For if they don't, the Pakistani nation, apart from the ‘elite' and the
‘status-quo' population will have to pay a heavy price. A price that will leave an even deeper bruise,
then the one encountered in 1971, with the separation of East Pakistan.81

MAP OF BALUCHISTAN

81
Ahmad Marri, Parliamentarians: what Happened to Baluchistan, in the, The Baluch.com, July 2008.

33
 (Map Credit: Amazon.com)

PENTAGONS NEW MAP

34
 (Map Credit: Amazon.com)

PRE-PARTITION MAP OF BALUCHISTAN

35
(Map Credit: TheBaluch.com)

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ARTICLES

40
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43