Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
October 2A04
Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION.... 4
4
1.2 Authority ................... 4
1.3 Study Sponsorship .............. 4
1.4 Project Location 4
1.5 Previous Studies. .4
2.0 STUDY AREA CHARACTERISTICS .6
2.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics ........ .6
2.2 Basin Conditions .................... 6
2.2.1 Climatology and Hydrology .......... 6
2.2.2Basin 6
2.3 Current Dam..... 7
2.4 Existing Condition ............... 7
2.5 Review of Existing Dam Safety Monitoring Program. 8
2.5.7 Piezometers. 8
252Flow Measurements from Drains . 8
2.5.3 Survey Points I
2.5.4 Reservoir Level. 8
2.5.5 Visual Observations............ 9
2. 5 .6 D ata Evaluation/Management 9
3.0 PLAN FORMULATION......... 10
3.1 Problems and Opportunities........... 10
3.2 Planning Objectives ... 10
3.3 Evaluation of Conditions before Project Improvements 10
3.3. 1 Overtopping Scenario .. 10
3.3.2 Piping Failure Scenario.... 11
3.3.3 Seepage Failure Scenario... 11
3.4 Seepage Failure Scenario before Project Improvements t2
3.4. I Overview............ 12
3.4.2 Property Damagos.............. 13
Estimate of Residential Content Damages . t3
Estimate of Non-Residential Content Damages 13
3.5 Alternative Analysis....... t4
3.5.1 Flood Warning System... 14
3.5.2 Flood'Warning System Costs 15
3.6 Potential Reduction to Property Damages with Flood Warning Time... 15
3.7 Comparison of Benefits to Costs l6
4.0 RECOMMENDED PLAN....... t7
4.1 Overview............. t7
4.2Detection System t7
4.2. I Reservoir Monitoring t7
2
4.2.2 Upgrading Piezometers t7
4.2.3 W eir Box Instrumentation .. t7
4.2.4 Monitoring Station....... t7
4.2.5 Reservoir Gauge 18
4.2.6 Measurement Control Units......... 18
4.2.7 Additional Detection System Detai1s............. ................... I 8
4.3 Notifrcation System..... ................... 19
4.3. I Alternative Notification Options ...................19
4.3.2 Recommended Notification System 22
4.3.3 Specific Notification System Components . 22
4.4 Evacuation Plan ...... 23
4.4. 1 Recommended Evacuation Zones. 23
4 .4 .2 Ev acuations of Special Facilities/Structure s 23
4.4.3 Coordination of Emergency Response ........ .24
4.4.3.1 Police ........ .24
4.4.3.2 Cify .24
4.4.3.3 Fire............ .24
4 .4.3 .4 Interagency Coordination ........... .25
4.5 Environmental Impacts.... .25
4.6 Cultural Resources ................... .25
4.7 Geotechnical 25
4.9 Cost Estimate ..... 26
5.0 COMPLIANCE AND COORDINATION .27
5.1 Regulatory Compliance and Environmental Statutes... .27
5.2 Public and Agency Coordination .27
6.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND SCHEDULE.. ..28
6. 1 Finalizing Remaining Implementation Details ..28
6.2 Tasks and Responsibilities .... 28
6.3 Acceptance Criteria Plan 29
6.4 Schedule..... .29
7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION .............. 30
7.1 Conclusion .......... 30
7.2 Recommendation 30
J
l.O INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
Potential flood problems associated with the Silver Creek Dam, and opportunities to minimize the
consequences with the implementation of a flood warning system are explored in this Detailed
Project Report (DPR). This study is a feasibility level decision document, prepared using the
current guidance contained in Engineering Regulation (ER) I105-2-100, Planning Guidance
Notebook and current cost sharing requirements cited in the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986, as amended.
The specific purpose of this study is to identifr a project that will reduce the risk of loss of life
and flood damage in the City of Silverton while minimizing or avoiding environmental and
cultural impacts.
1.2 Authority
This report was prepared under authority of Section 205 of the Flood Control Act of 1948, as
amended. The Northwestern Division, Corps of Engineers granted specific authority to conduct
this analysis through correspondence dated 8 August 2003.
4
Insert Figure I
5
2.0 STUDY AREA CHARACTERISTICS
The Oregon Employment Department's"2}l2 Regional Economic Profile" shows 2000 Census
data for population: Marion County had a population just under 285,000; Salem, the largest city
in Marion County, had a population just under 137,000; and, Silverton had a population of 7,414.
Thereportalsoshowed a7999 percapitaincomefigureof $23,828forMarionCounty. The
principal industries in Marion County are government, agriculture, food processing, wood
products, retail trade, education and tourism.
2.2.2B,asir'
Silver Creek is located in the mid-Willamette Valley. It runs generally SE to NW, draining off
the lower western slope of the Cascade Mountains. It is a tributary to the Pudding River about 3
miles downstream of Silverton, Oregon. Drainage area at the Silver Creek Dam is about 45.6
square miles. Silver Creek has a drainage basin made up of forested foothills of the Cascade
6
Mountains, which has maximum elevations of about 4000 feet in the basin. Silver Creek has cut
a relatively deep channel through most of the community of Silver Creek. The basin is fairly
naffow with channel slopes upstream of Silver Lake Dame in excess of 100 feet per mile.
The upper drainage basin is forested and includes portions of Silver Lake State Park and Santiam
State Forest. Some logging still occurs. Debris in the form of logs and felled timber enters the
lake during large winter storms and some partial blockage of the spillway has occured. These
are typically a single large tree and have not caused major problems in the past. Based on
historical operation and maintenance records, debris has not and will not likely become a
significant emergency problem at the project.
The dam is a zoned earth and rockfill embankment with a maximum height above the original
ground surface of 65 feet. Embankment slopes are 2H:lV downstream and 3H:1V upstream.
Crest width is 20 feet, and crest length 680 feet, including the spillway. The spillway is located
on the right abutment and consists of a converging concrete chute with an entrance width of 120
feet. The dam stores approximately 1300 acre-feet of water and is approximately 2 miles
upstream from the Silverton downtown area.
Following a 1993 earthquake, preliminary inquiries were initiated concerning the seismic stabilþ
of the dam, and the potential for loss of life and property in the event of a failure of the 65-foot
structure. The City of Silverton contracted with Cornforth Consultants to prepare a Seismic
Stability Analysis for the Silver Creek Dam. The 1999 report concluded that it is unlikely that an
earthquake would result in failure of the dam.
Then, in 2000, the City of Silverton contracted with Philip Williams & Associates (PWA) to
perform a Dam Break Analysis, based on two dam failure scenarios: piping and overtopping.
The study indicates that if a failure due to piping or overtopping were to occur, the failure would
be catastrophic to the City of Silverton. The report notes, "Piping failure occurs if water migrates
through the dam material and develops a passage. This could be due to inadequate compaction
during construction of the dam, or to changes to dam integrity caused by seismic activity, slope
failure or vegetation. As water flows (pipes) through the dam material, it continues to carry away
more material and the passage grows in size. Eventually the size of the passage compromises the
structural integrity of the dam and causes collapse of the structure itself." An overtopping failure
is also described generically in the PIWA report. "Over-topping failure occurs when sustained
7
reservoir inflow is greater than the combined spillway discharge and reseryoir storage capacity
Eventually the water surface elevation in the reservoir rises above the dam crest, causing flow
down the face. Flow over the downstream face of the dam causes erosion. Eventually, the
erosion compromises the structural integrity and a breach develops." An overtopping failure
scenario was not used as justification for commencement of this study
2.5.1 Piezometers
The water levels in piezometers are read on an annual basis. Typically, readings are made during
the month of June after the reservoir has refilled and held full for several months which allows for
seepage and ground water conditions to equilibrate with full pool condition. Generally, this is
when highest ground water condition occurs. Water level readings are obtained by manually
sounding the standpipe using an electronic probe. The probe is lowered into the standpipe until an
audible signal indicates that the probe has been submerged in water. The depth to the water from
the top of the standpipe is then recorded. The elevation of the water level is calculated by
subtracting the depth to water from the elevation of the top of the standpipe.
I
2.5.5 Visual Observations
Visual observations are made of the general condition of the dam during the inspections. A visual
inspection checkoff list is used to maintain consistency over time. The list includes observations
of erosion on both the upstream and downstream side of the embankment, the presence of woody
vegetation, burrowing animals and wet areas that may indicate seepage, and the flow at weirs and
presences of turbidity in the flow.
Specific observations have also been documented regarding seepage that is occurring along the
downstream contact of the left abutment. These observations have included estimates of the flow
rate, the extent of the seepage area, and the clarity of the flow.
9
3.0 PLAN FORMULATION
Providing a flood warning system would increase the amount of time residents have to evacuate,
thereby reducing the risk of loss of life and reducing some portion of damage to property and
vehicles.
While reducing the risk of life is not a NED planning objective it is an important component. The
City of Silverton is situated along Silver Creek two miles downstream of the dam. The results of
dam failure would be catastrophic for the City of Silvefion. In the event the dam failed
significant portions of the valley would be inundated putting thousands of people in harms way.
3.3. I
Overtopping Scenario
The "silver Creek Dam Break Analysis" prepared by Philip Williams & Associates in 2000
defined the overtopping scenario. "Over-topping failure occurs when sustained reservoir inflow
is greater than the combined spillway discharge and reservoir storage capacity. Eventually the
water surface elevation in the reservoir rises above the dam crest, causing flow down the face.
Flow over the downstream face of the dam causes erosion. Eventually, the erosion compromises
the structural integrity and a breach develops."
The report indicates that the water surface elevation (WSE) in the reservoir associated with the
overtopping scenario is taken just below the crest of the dam (at 439.3 ft). In order for the WSE
to reach this elevation it assumed there is a debris blockage of the spillway.
Conceptual flaws in the logic of the debris blockage scenario became apparent with further
evaluation. The capacity of the spillway is about 22,400 cubic feet per second (cfs). At one-foot
below the top of the dam the capacþ of the spillway is on the order of 18,500 cfs. This is a
capacity of 2-ll2 times the 0.2 percent annual probability peak discharge so even very infrequent
flood flows would safely pass through the dam spillway. Dam failure due to overtopping would
require a blockage of 60 to 75 percent of the spillway capacity. Based on historical operation and
10
maintenance records, debris has not and will not likely become a problem at this project.
Therefore, improvements to the existing structure are not required based on the capacity to pass a
large flood event.
The dam was designed and constructed in the early 1970s in accordance with the state of the
industry atthattime. The structure failed to perform in an acceptable manner due to seepage
problems affecting the right side of the dam and the right abutment. Mitigative actions were
implemented which appear to have successfully corrected the problem. The structure has
performed in a satisfactory manner since, and has been deemed to be safe for continued operation
with no restrictions.
In the case of Silver Creek Dam, the right abutment is composed of landslide material. The
formation is relatively porous in nature, and probably prone to seepage problems, based upon
observation made in the two borings made during foundation investigations. In an attempt to
prevent excessive abutment seepage an upstream impervious blanket was placed on the abutment
from the dam for some distance upstream. The purpose of the blanket was to increase the length
ofthe seepage path so that seepage pressures would be reduced to an acceptable level.
Conditions in the abutment were not as assumed or the upstream blanket was compromised in
11
some manner resulting in excessive seepage during the f,rst filling of the dam. The seepage was
believed to be coming through the abutment and into the downstream shell of the dam,
threatening the stability of the structure. The pool was drawn down, horizontal drains were
installed into the abutment, and additional material was added to the downstream slope of the
dam at the abutment. These actions appear to have been successful in controlling the seepage at
the present time. However, some potential for unsatisfactory performance in the future remains.
Determination of Rate of Failure: The time required for failure of the structure is that amount of
time from initiation of piping to the loss of pool. The value was determined using the procedure
presented by Fell, Wan, Cyganiewicz, and Foster (April 2003) "Time for Development of Internal
Erosion and Piping in Embankment Dams" Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental
Engineering,Yol. 729,Issue 4. As with the above process to estimate probability of
unsatisfactory performance this procedure generates a rate offailure based upon the historical
performance of similar structures. Based upon this procedure it is probable that the time between
initiation of a piping failure and actual failure will be between 12 and 24 hours.
3.4.1 Overview
Although all three failure scenarios were found to be highly unlikely, the seepage failure scenario
was determined to be the most likely and therefore carried forward in this analysis. The Silver
Creek Dam Break Analysis report (PWA 2000) indicates that a flood wave would travel down the
Silver Creek channel reaching the downtown area within 15 minutes of the failure with flood
wave heights in excess of 10 feet in some areas.
If failure were to occur, there is a potential for both significant loss of life and property damage.
The potential for loss of life is high because of the proximity of the Silver Creek Dam to the
population in the city of Silverton. While loss of life is not considered part of the economic
justification for a flood warning system, it is a key issue. The Silver Creek Dam sets just 2 miles
upstream of a highly populated area in the city. The Dam Break Analysis indicates that in the
existing condition, water could travel to the downtown area within 15 minutes and that the
floodwave would progress through the study area in approximately I hour. The average wave
speed through the 4.12-mile study area is approximately 6 feet per second (fps). The depth of
water would vary, but would range between 6.0 feet and 15.8 feet within the area impacted by the
1 percent annual flood event. With the depth, velocity, and short timeframe, several lives could
be lost.
t2
3.4.2Property Damages
A significant number of properties lie within the flood inundation boundary. Therefore, there is a
corresponding potential for significant property losses ifthe dam failure event occurs. Structural
damages to residential and commercial properties cannot be prevented by a flood warning system.
However, some portion of damages to contents and vehicles can be prevented. Consequently,
only those categories are evaluated.
Based on the seepage evaluation, an event has a frequency of I in3l2 years. It is estimated such
an event would result in over $37 million dollars in residential content damages, and equates to
$173,900 in average annual damages.
Based on the seepage evaluation, an event has a frequency of I in3l2 years. It is estimated such
an event would result in $6 million dollars in non-residential content damages, and equates to
$27,600 in average annual damages.
13
Vehicles: It is assumed there are L5 vehicles per residence. The Institute for Water Resources
(IWR) funded a post flood survey in Salem, Oregon following the 1996 flood, with over 800
residences in the sample, and it showed that there were 1.5 vehicles per home in the flooded area
(IWR 1997). With over 800 residences in the inundation footprint, it is assumed there are 1200
vehicles in the footprint. While more vehicles may happen to be at non-residential properties
during an event, they were not accounted for so as to avoid double-counting. Also, some
residents may be gone to work outside the footprint during an event. To be conservative, it will
be assumed that 80 percent of the vehicles will be in the footprint during an event in the night and
evening hours, while 50 percent will be in the footprint during work hours. Weighting the two
equally, a conservative approach, results in about 65 percent ofthe 1200 vehicles having a
probability of being in the footprint during an event. Sixty-five percent of 1200 vehicles is 780
vehicles. With an average water depth of l0 feet, assume the loss of the vehicles. Assume an
average value of$7,500 per vehicle, for 780 vehicles, or $5,850,000.
Based on the seepage evaluation, an event has a frequency of I in3I2 years. It is estimated such
an event would result in almost $6 million dollars in vehicle damages, and equates to $26,900 in
average annual damages.
One non-structural alternative to be considered is a flood warning system. Given the short
warning time the only feasible approach is to establish a flood warning system that will: 1. Detect
a developing condition and2. Provide time to initiate the notification/evacuation of people based
on a "failure is imminent" condition.
The proposed early warning system consists of the detection system and the notification
system/evacuation plan. The detection system is to identif, a developing condition of concern in
advance of failure. The notification system is used to communicate to all inhabitants in the
inundation area of Silverton. The evacuation plan outlines how people are to exit the inundation
zone.
The detection component includes improvements to the current monitoring equipment and
installation of new equipment. Design components include reservoir level monitoring
instruments, piezometers with vibrating wire pressure transducers to detect changes in seepage
performance, weir box instruments to collect and measure seepage, and installing an onsite
monitoring station.
t4
component. In addition, certain procedures and policies such as notification flow charts, on-
going testing, maintenance and public education will be required.
6 13.5 s27,200
t8 26 $52,400
6 80 $21,s00
18 90 s24,200
The following table is a summary of benefits due to the implementation of a Flood Warning
System depending on the additional time to evacuate the inundation zone.
15
of Benefits Due to Added Flood
6
l8
4.0 RECOMMENDED PLAN
4.1 Overview
The early warning system itself consists of two subsystems that have individual performance
objectives but are fully integrated into the overall system. These include the detection system and
the notification system. A third and critical component of a flood-warning program is the
evacuation plan. The evacuation plan identifres specific evacuation zones within the inundation
area andthe routes for the movement of the evacuees out of the inundation areas.
The primary objective of the detection system is to identifu a developing condition of concern tn
advance of failure to allow time for making a decision regarding evacuation. The detection
system has a secondary purpose of providing information to assist in the decision making process
during a developing condition of concern. The notification system is used to communicate the
need to evacuate once the decision that failure is imminent has been made. The objective of the
Silver Creek Dam notification system design is to provide notification to all inhabitants in the
downstream inundation area within the city limits of Silverton, so that they may be evacuated.
The following sections describe the recommended design for the detection and notification
system. The described system is similar to what was presented in the preliminary design report
prepared for the City of Silverton by Squier Associates (April 2003).
4.2Detection System
The recommended detection system consists of improving the monitoring capability by
enhancing existing instruments and adding new instruments installed at various locations on the
dam. The improvements will include:
1,7
4.2.5 Reservoir Gauge
A new Reservoir Level Site Gauge will be installed to provide a back-up point of reference for
visual monitoring during high flow condition. A remote controlled camera will be installed to
visually observe the reservoir staffgauge and to observe the critical outlet controls for security
purposes.
Automated Data Acquisition and Alarm Notffication: The MCU located at the dam will collect
the data from the instruments and compare the data to threshold values. This MCU will also
collect and store readings on a daily basis from the other MCU's for use in long term
performance and trending evaluations. Each MCU will be programmed with logic such that it will
independently poll its sensor's and compare the readings to predetermined threshold levels. This
architecture strengthens the integrity of the system by reducing the risk of the entire system going
down due to an equipment failure of one component.
Resemoir Level Monitoring: An automated sensor will be installed to monitor the reservoir level.
This instrument will be located on the upstream face of the dam and will be installed within a
PVC pipe buried on the face. The sensor will be located at approximately elevation 400 feet. The
instrument will be monitored hourly and compared to the threshold levels. If the reservoir level
rises to within 8 feet of the crest, then the system will activate the callout procedure to City
personnel to indicate a condition of concern. The reservoir level monitoring will also be used
during an alarm condition to keep track of the reservoir level and rate of rise. During normal
operation, daily readings will be stored for use in evaluating the historical performance of the
piezometers and weirs. A manually read site gauge will also be installed to provide a visual
confirmation of the reservoir level during a flooding condition. This gauge will be constructed in
the vicinity of the right abutment at an elevation of 430 feet so it can be easily observed during a
developing unstable condition.
Piezometer Level Monitoring: Ín order to improve the ability to detect changes in the seepage
performance of the dam and right abutment, automated sensors will be added to the existing
piezometers. These sensors will be monitored hourly and compared to predetermined threshold
levels. If a threshold level is exceeded, the system will activate the callout procedure to City
personnel to indicate a developing condition of concern. In addition to the hourly readings, daily
readings will be stored for historical evaluation purposes.
Seepage Flow Monitoring: Excessive seepage through the dam or at the contact with the
abutments could lead to a developing unstable condition. To monitor for this condition, weir
boxes will be installed. The weir boxes will measure the flow rates from the horizontal drains and
4-inch diameter toe drains that are currently installed in the dam. One of the weir boxes will be
18
used to collect and measure seepage from the left abutment contact area. Flow measurement will
be collected hourly and compared to predetermined threshold values. If a threshold level is
exceeded, then the system will activate the callout procedure to City personnel to indicate a
developing condition of concern. In addition to the hourly readings, daily readings will be stored
for historical evaluation purposes.
Data Evaluation/Management: Data will be recorded daily for historical evaluation purposes. The
purpose of collecting and evaluating this performance data on a regular basis is to identiff
developing conditions ofconcern through observation of increasing or decreasing trends in the
dam's long-term performance. This regular monitoring is a key part of developing an
understanding of how the dam normally performs so that changes in performance can be detected
and properly evaluated regarding the on-going safety of the dam. Because of the quantity of data
being collected and the long term monitoring objective of the system, a database application
needs to be integrated with the system. The database application will be installed on a personal
computer in the City's ofhce and will be used to manage and evaluate the data. The database will
also aid in dam-safety reporting tasks.
TV or Radio Broadcast Notification: This type of notification is based on using television or radio
station broadcasts to provide flood notification to the public. In an emergency, special messages
would be broadcasted to the public.
Strengths:
t9
. Instant communication to all affected people.
. Gives detailed information and can keep people up-to-date.
. Generally available (most people have TV's).
Weaknesses:
. Emergency management control is limited (involvement by broadcast stations is
voluntary).
. Only applicable to local cable and antenna broadcast stations (satellite or non-local
programming would not carry the broadcast).
. Limited usefulness during most times of day or when TV/radio is turned off.
. Limited usefulness for people outside of the house at time of emergency.
. Not a selective broadcast audience so emergency message will carry to all people
receiving TV/radio signal.
. Not available during po\À/er outages.
. Not able to reach sight or hearing-impaired citizens unless specially equipped with
TDD/TDY equipment.
This type of notification is typically used for school closures and other types of warning or news
information affecting alarge population area with notifications that do not require immediate
action. Therefore, using this type of notification for the early warning system is not feasible.
Audible Sirens: Audible sirens provide immediate notification by broadcasting a tone consisting
of a siren wail and a voice message. Audible sirens typically consist of equipment mounted on a
utility pole and can include options to broadcast prerecorded voice messages to provide
instructions during an evacuation. Most sirens are powered by AC povver with a battery backup
system in case of power outages and can be controlled via a direct telephone type connection or
individually via radio signal from a central Siren Control Unit. Audible sirens are available in
both a directional signal of varying degrees and an omni- directional signal broadcasting in a 360o
circle. Both types of sirens come in models that can broadcast varying distances up to
approximately 5,000 feet. In order to assure appropriate sound quality, the audible sirens are
driven by speaker amplifiers similar to those used in public address systems or large music
concerts.
Strengths:
. Instant communication to all affected people.
. Can give detailed informatión as to what action to take.
. Easily maintained and City owned.
. Flexible and expandable for future emergency action plans.
. Available during both phone and electric outages.
Weaknesses:
. Limited usefulness for people inside sound dampening facilities/buildings at time of
emergency, or for the hearing-impaired.
. Not a selective broadcast audience so emergency message will carry to all people within
sound range.
An additional method of siren notification is via sirens or warning lights installed within special
structures or facilities such as police departments, fire stations, hospitals, etc. Buzzers, sirens,
20
and/or waming lights can be installed within the structures or buildings housing these facilities to
provide notification to the occupants or special personnel within these facilities.
Notification Via Automated Telephone Service: The use of automated telephone services is
another type of notification system available. Automated telephone notification is a service
provided by an outside (non-City) service provider that uses a computer to phone the affected
population, delivering a warning message or evacuation notice. If the line is busy or does not
answer the computer keeps dialing the number. If an answering machine answers the phone then
the notification message is recorded. To initiate this type of notification system, a phone call is
placed to the telephone service provider. Once security authentication is completed, the service
provider starts a call-out operation to notifu the population of the need to evacuate. Most service
providers operate with the ability to place 200 calls simultaneously, with the average callout
capacity of approximately 3000 calls in one hour (based on a 2O-second notification message).
Typically, these service providers charge an initial "setup fee", an annual "subscriber fee", and a
per call charge for each number called during the emergency.
Strengths:
. Targeted, rapid notification to only those affected or "on the phone call lisf'
. Can give detailed information as to what action to take.
. Relatively low cost.
Weaknesses:
. Only effective if people have a phone, and it is turned on, it is not in use, and they
answer the call.
. Cannot reach people if they are not within reach of the phone (outdoors).
. Not available during telephone outages.
. Not effective for hearing-impaired people unless TDD/TDY equipment is used.
Mobile Loudspeakers.' Another type of notification method is the use of loudspeakers mounted in
vehicles. Police or fire crews typically carry out this notification method by driving a vehicle with
a loudspeaker through the effected area broadcasting a live or recorded message to the public.
Strengths:
. Targeted notification to only those affected.
. High degree of credibility to audience.
Weaknesses:
. Limited information can be delivered.
. Only a limited area can be notified quickly.
. Cannot reach hearing-impaired people.
. Messages can be hard to decipher if people are indoors.
. Risks exposure to personnel delivering message.
. Ijses equipment and personnel that could be used more efficiently elsewhere.
Personal Notification: Waming each and every citizen personally in the aflected area is also a
method of notification. With this method, police officers, ftre crew, or City personnel would
2l
spread out and blanket the entire inundation area, delivering the evacuation notice personally to
all occupants. While this method does insure notification to everyone within the inundation zone,
it is not feasible to use it as the only notification system because of the limited amount of time
available to get the notice to the evacuees. Similar to the use of mobile loudspeakers, this method
of notification is only effective for small areas and taking the crews away from other more
essential tasks and risking the personnel and equipment going door-to-door.
Strengths:
. Targeted notification to only those affected.
. High degree of credibility to audience.
. Very strategic notification.
. Can reach all people, including those with disabilities.
Weaknesses:
. Extremely time consuming
. Risks exposure to personnel delivering message.
. Uses equipment and personnel that could be used more efficiently elsewhere
Notification Flow Charts: Details of who will be notified should be evaluated and incorporated
into the City's Emergency Action Plan as Notification Flow Charts. The Notification Flow charts
will be used as a guide to execute a call out to certain City staff and crew that are expected to
respond to the evacuation emergency action plan. Any inter-agency coordination or notification
(i.e., interagency coordinators, Marion County, downstream communities, etc.) will also be
warned via the Notification Flow Charts. The specific details will be developed as part of the
22
design and construction phases
Personal Notificationfor the People l{ith Disabilities: Another vital component of the
Notification System is a system or procedure to provide notification to the population within the
flood inundation area that have disabilities. The police department should maintain a list of
addresses of households for people with disabilities that will be affected by the flood inundation.
This list of households will then be used during an evacuation event so that police and fire
personnel will notifr those households personally and can provide assistance as necessary. The
individual who will be responsible for assuring the households have been notified and evacuated
should be identified in the Notification Flow Charts.
Policies and Procedures: Policies and procedures should be incorporated into the City's
Emergency Action Plan to assure proper execution of an evacuation. These policies and
procedures should include:
. A Notification Flow Chart.
. A comprehensive public education program.
. An on-going public awareness program.
. An on-going interagency and interdepartmental coordination program.
. Regular scheduled maintenance of the notification equipment.
. Regular testing of the notification system and evacuation procedures.
23
"Developing Alarm" condition and should initiate procedures to prepare for evacuation before the
evacuation order is given. Occupants from the Silverton Union High School may be able to
evacuate on foot to higher ground outside of the inundation zone to the west. However, the
location of Eugene Field Elementary School precludes this alternative, and busing of the students
will most likely be required.
In addition to the notification flow charts, all personnel must be hained on the proper response
including where and how they report in and what their responsibilities are during the alarm
conditions. Each assignment must be fully understood and coordinated. The agency that will
coordinate the evacuation must be identified and an emergency chain of command must be
established in advance. The following is a brief description of some of the responsibilities that
each agency should be planning for. The final evacuation plan should include the names of the
individuals and what they will be responsible for under each alarm condition.
4.4.3.1Police
Generally, the police department should direct the evacuation operations. They should establish
and maintain an outer perimeter to maintain the outward flow of traffic from the inundation area.
They should provide for traffic and crowd control. They should be prepared to provide security
for any emergency housing or shelter facilities established during the evacuation.
4.4.3.3 Fire
Fire personnel should establish and maintain an inner perimeter of the inundation zones. They
24
should be prepared to rescue trapped victims within the inundation zones or provide assistance to
evacuees with special needs that cannot otherwise leave the area on their own. They should
provide fire stations for use as reception points for the evacuees. They should assist in the
evacuation process as requested by the Police department or incident command.
Federally listed species that may occur in the proposed project area include bald eagle
(Haliaeetus leucocephalzs), Fender's blue butterfly (Icaricia icarioidesfenderi), golden Indian
paintbrush (Castilleja levisectc), Willamette daisy (Erigeron decumbens var. decumbens),
Howellia (Howellia aquatilis), Bradshaw's lomatium (Lomatium bradshav,ii), Kincaid's lupine
(Lupinus sulphureus var. kincaidil), Nelson's checker-mallow (sidalcea nelsoniana), steelhead
(Onc or hync hus my ki s s), and Chinook s almon (Onc ho rync hu s t s høwyt s c ha).
Based upon site surveys, literature searches, discussions with natural resource agency personnel,
and considering the scale of disturbance associated with this project, it was determined that there
will no effect to any threatened or endangered species or critical habitat.
4.1 Geotechnical
Silver Creek Dam is located in the foothills of the Cascade Range Physiographic Province of
Oregon near the margin of the Willamette Valley. The area is characterizedby eroded terrain of
accordant peaks and ridges, with moderate to steep sided dendritic stream valleys. At the dam
site elevations range from 350 feet in the valley floor to over 1000 feet on the surrounding ridges.
Landforms along the creek include alluvial terraces, benches, bluffs formed by basalt flows, and
hummocky surfaces of landslide deposits. Extensive landslides have been mapped along the
north side of the valley at, and near the dam site. These landslides have developed at locations
25
where weak marine sedimentary rocks underlie thick flows of Columbia River Basalt, and at
deeply incised portions of the stream valley. The slide debris at the site is generally composed of
fragmented angular basalt with a fine-grained plastic silt matrix. The material is dense to very
dense. No major geologic structures have been identified at the dam site. Columbia River Basalt
is exposed in the left abutment, and alluvial deposits of sandy gravel cover the valley floor.
There are no known regional faults at the site.
26
5.0 COMPLIANCE AND COORDINATION
Endangered Species Act: It was determined that there would be no effect to any endangered or
threatened species or their critical habitat.
Clean Water Act: There will be no fill in any waters of the United States.
Cultural Resources: Due to the scale of proposed activities, it is unlikely that any cultural
resources would be affected by construction, operation, and maintenance activities.
27
6.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND SCHEDULE
Implementation of the system improvements includes new instrumentation, the Automated Data
Acquisition System (ADAS), the data evaluation/management tool, and the notification system
and would need to be programmed and installed.
The system construction task will consist of procuring the instrumentation, ADAS, and
notification equipment; programming the ADAS; development and programming of the database
tool; and performing bench tests of the detection and notification system components. The bench
testing is performed in a controlled environment to assure that the system components are
working properly and communicating appropriately before they are installed. Installation of the
systems would then proceed with 1 ) installing the new instrumentation, 2) installing the MCU' s,
3) installing the data evaluation database tool, 4) installing the notification sirens and 5)
performing a complete test of the system operation to demonstratethat it is functioning properly.
Operations and maintenance documentation will be prepared to provide guidance for the
operation and maintenance of the detection and notification systems. This would also include
documentation on the system configuration. The operations and maintenance documents will
serve as the main references for the training task. After the system has been successfully installed
and tested, the training task will be performed. The training will involve a discussion of the
response procedures for alarm conditions, activation ofthe notification system and how to operate
and maintain the system. The task will also include "hands on" experience for the users in
performing the typical operations that will be required for successful operation of the system,
including the education of the public. This task will be considered complete when the system has
been accepted in accordance with the plan as described in the following section.
28
6.3 Acceptance Criteria Plan
The Acceptance Criteria Plan (ACP) outlines necessary acceptance criteria for successful
completion of the implementation phase. The ACP is initially developed by the system
developers and then reviewed and commented on by the City of Silverton personnel. The
acceptance criteria plan will be used during the system training session for final acceptance of the
system. The system will be deemed successfully complete when the following items are
completed to the satisfaction of the City or otherwise resolved with the development team.
1. Demonstrated ability to detect and notiff City personnel of an exceedance of threshold
levels representing a developing condition of concern at the Dam.
2. Demonstrated ability to transfer historical instrument data from MCU to the designated
City workstation PC using a telephone modem communication link.
3. Demonstrated the abilþ to initiate a reading of the instruments from the remote
workstation PC and the on-site monitoring station using a laptop PC.
4. Demonstrated the ability to activate the evacuation notification system.
5. Demonstrated the ability to test (silent and/or audible) the evacuation notihcation
system.
6. Demonstrated the ability to load the dam monitoring instrumentation data into the
database application and generate the required time history plots for on going dam safety
evaluation.
7.The Operations and Maintenance provides the information needed to operate and
maintain the system.
8. The user training session objectives have been completed.
9. Public has been notified and educated.
6.4 Schedule
Plans and Specifications Phase:
Initiate December 2004
Construction Phase:
Initiate April2005
29
7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
7.1 Conclusion
Installation of a flood warning system in Silverton is economically justified based on the analysis
of the benefits and costs. Assuming the more conservative estimate of 6 additional hours for
evacuation, the benefit to cost ratio is 1.2 to l 0.
Most importantly, providing a flood warning system would increase the amount of time residents
have to evacuate, thereby reducing the risk ofloss oflife.
7.2 Recommendation
The results of this study provide a design for an improved monitoring and early warning system
for the Silver Creek Dam in Silverton, Oregon. The system design is based on the need to
improve the ability to detect a developing condition of concern regarding the safety of the dam,
and to provide a system for notif,ing the downstream inhabitants of the need to evacuate under
and imminent failure condition.
It is recommended the next phase of work include finalizing the remaining design and installation
details, and implementing the design improvements as recommended in this report.
30
LIST OF REFERENCES
Cornforth Consultants , July 21,1999, Seismic Stability Analysis, Silver Creek Dam, Prepared for
City of Silverton.
Foster, M.4., R. Fell, and M. Spannagle, 1998, "Analysis of Embankment Dam Incidents," The
University of New South Wales, UNIGIV Report No. R-374.
Fell, R., Wan, Cyganiewicz, and Foster, April2003, "Time for Development of Internal Erosion
and Piping in Embankment Dams" Journal of Geotechnical and Geo-Environmental Engineering,
Yol.729,Issue 4.
Oregon Water Resources Department in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
June 1981, Phase 1 Inspection Report.
Philip Williams & Associates, Ltd, January 18, 2000, Silver Creek Dam Break Analysis Final
Report, Prepared for City of Silverton, Oregon.
Squier Associates, April2002, Silver Creek Dam Early Warning System Preliminary Design
Report, Prepared for City of Silverton, Oregon.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, July 2003, Supplemental Information, Silver Creek Dam
(Silverton, Oregon).
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, July 1997, Unpublished
Residential, Commercial, and Vehicle Damage Data due to Flooding in Salem in 1996.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,Institute for rWater Resources, March 1988, "National Economic
Development Procedures Manual-Urban Flood Damage," IWR Report 88-R-2.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering Regulation (ER) 1105-2-100, Planning Guidance
Notebook and current cost sharing requirements cited in the Water Resources Development Act
of 1986, as amended.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,Institute for Water Resources, March 1988, "National Economic
Development Procedures Manual-Urban Flood Damage," IWR Report 88-R-2.
31
Appendix A
32
Geotechnical Investigation of Silver Creek Dam
Silver Creek Dam Silverton Or.
Probability of X'ailure due to Seepage
Weighing Factors
Ws W¡ wnr'
Embankment Mode Foundation Mode Emb into Found
(frlt) 0.2 (filt) 1.2 (filt) I
(ego) 1.25 (fnd) s (cot) I
(cst) L2 (crt) 0.9 (fnd) l.s
(cc) 1.2 (rg) 3 (ecm) 5
(con) 1 (obs) 2 (er) 1.3
(ft) 1.2 (mon) 2 (se) s
(obs) 2 (cog) 1.25
(mon) 2 (cst) L2
(cc) 1
(ft) 1.1
(obs) 3
(mon) 2
Pp: 0'0032049
Inverse Po: 312.022216
ESTIMATED FAILURE TIME - (From table 8 "Time for Development of lnternal Erosion and Piping in
Embankment Dams" Fell, Wan, Cyganiewicz, and Foster; Journal of Geotechnical
Engineering, Apr 2003)
JJ
Justiflrcation for Selection of Weighting Factors
Weighting Factors for Piping through the Embankment (Factors from Table 11.2)
Embankment Filters Ws (slt) - A factor of 0.2 was selected because the embankment was
constructed with a filter but there are no indications that a specific gradation was specified nor
that any test were performed on the material. It must therefore be assumed that the filter may be
poor quality.
Core Geologic Origin WE (ceot)- The core material is of colluvial origin therefore the selected
factor is 1.25
Core Soil Type W¡ i.,9 - The core material is described as plastic silts and clays therefore a factor
or 1.2 was selected.
Compaction We (".) - Available information indicates that at least a modest amount of control was
maintained during compaction, which would lead to the selection of a factor of 1.2.
Conduits Vy'e ("on) - The outlet conduit is located at the embankment foundation interface,
construction drawing indicate that the conduit \ilas constructed using practices similar to USBR
practices of the time, which allowed a factor of L0 to be selected.
Foundation Treatment Ws(n) - Drawings indicate that the foundation contained some
irregularities and steep areas, but was treated using standard practices of the time allowing a
factor of 1.2 to be selected.
Observations of Seepage WE(or.) - Seepage was initially observed on the right side of the
downstream face during initial filling. Horizontal drains were installed into the right abutment,
which to date appears to be controlling the seepage. Seepage continues to flow from the left
abutment contract but does not appear to be increasing at a detectable rate. Based upon these
conditions a factor or 2 was selected.
Monitoring and Surveillance W¡ 1.on¡ - The embankment in monitored annually, therefore a factor
of 2 was selected.
Weighting Factors for Piping through the Foundation (Factors from Tabte 11.3)
Filters W¡ (rr,) - A factor of 1.2 was selected because the design drawing show no foundation
filter.
Foundation Type Wp 1¡,q - A factor of 5 was selected because about half of the embankment is
founded on slide debris.
Cutoff Type Soil Foundation W¡1"1.¡- Construction drawing show a cutoff trench with an
upstream blanket on the right side and a cut of to rock (well constructed cut off trench on the left.
The left abutment is the more critical in this case therefore a weighting factor of 0.9 was selected,
34
Soil/Rock Geology Type W¡ 1.r¡¡ - The left abutment is basalt rock, the right abutment is derived
from landslide debris. A factor of 3 was selected due to the basalt bedrock. The factor could
possibly have been set at a higher number but soils of landslide origin are not addressed.
Observations of Seepage Wp (ou,) - Seepage was initially observed on the right side of the
downstream face during initial filling. Horizontal drains were installed into the right abutment,
which to date appears to be controlling the seepage. Seepage continues to flow from the left
abutment contract but does not appear to be increasing at a detectable rate. Based upon these
conditions a factor or 2 was selected.
Monitoring and Surveillance W¡1.on¡ - The embankment in monitored annually, therefore a factor
of 2 was selected.
Weighting Factors for Piping from the embankment into the Foundation @actors from
Table 11.4)
Filters War (nr,) - From table 1 1.4, all cases have a factor of l.
Foundation Cutoff Trench Ws¡i"og - A factor of 1 was selected. The cutoff trench is considered to
be of average depth and width.
Foundation Type W¡¡ 16,a¡ - The embankment is partly founded on rock and partly on slide debris.
The partly founded on rock condition appears to control therefore a weighting factor of l 5 was
selected.
Erosion Control Measures of Core Foundation Ws¡(""r)- A factor of 5 was selected due to the
lack of erosion control measures in the landslide debris. The landslide debris were considered
equivalent to open jointed bedrock or open work gravels.
Grouting of Foundation Wsp6¡- Records indicate that grouting of the rock did not occur,
therefore a weighting factor of 1.3 was selected.
Soil Geology Type War (rct) - The left abutment is basalt rock, the right abutment is derived from
landslide debris and considered similar to colluvial material. A factor of 5 was selected due to the
nature ofthe soil.
Soil Geology Type W¡¡ 1"go¡ - The core material is believed to have been borrowed form colluvial
deposits at the site, therefore a weighting factor of 1.25 was selected.
Core Soil Type Wsp p.9 - The description of core material best representing the material used is
Clayey and Silty sands with a weighting factor of 1.2.
Foundation Treatment WEr (r) - Drawings indicate that the foundation contained some
inegularities and steep areas, but was treated using standard practices of the time allowing a
factor of 1.1 to be selected.
Observations of Seepage W¡r(ouÐ - Seepage was initially observed on the right side of the
downstream face during initial hlling. Horizontal drains were installed into the right abutment,
35
which to date appears to be controlling the seepage. Seepage continues to flow from the left
abutment contract but does not appear to be increasing at a detectable rate. Because of the way
the seepage initially manifested itself it was felt that a factor of 2.0 was probably inappropriate,
but since seepage flows have not increased significantly a factor of 10 seemed to high, therefore a
weighting factor of 3 was selected.
1. Determine the average annual probabilities of failure from Table 11.1 for each of the
three modes of piping failure:
- piping through the embankment
- piping through the foundation, and
- piping from the embankment into the foundation,
allowing for the age of the dam, i.e. whether less than or older than 5 years (about 213 of
piping
failures occur on first filling or in the first 5 years of operation).
2. Calculate the weighting factors WE, WF mad WEF from Tables 77.2,11.3 and 11.4 to
take account of the characteristics of the dam, such as core properties, compaction and
foundation geology, and to take account of the past performance of the dam. The
weighting factors are obtained by multiplying the individual weighting factors from the
relevant table. So, for example,
WE : WE(filt) X WE(cgo) X WE(cst) X WE(cc) X WE(con) X WE(ft) X WE(obs) X
WE(mon).
3. Obtain the overall annual probability of failure by piping (Pp) by summing the weighted
probabilities:
If the probabilities are high, allowance must be made for the union of events in this
calculation.
36
I)ocument from UNICIV Report - AnalysÍs of Embankment I)am Incidents. September
1998.
Tabte 11.1: Average probability of failure of embankment dams by mode of piping and dam
zoning.
earthfill
Earthfill with 1.5 190 3t
filter
Earthfill with 8.9 I 160 160
rock toe
Zoned earthfill t.2 160 25
earth and
rockfill
Concrete face 5.3 690 75
earthfill
Concrete face (<l) (<130) (<17)
rockfill
Puddle core 93 t200 38
earthfill
Earthfill with (<l) (<130) (<8)
corewall
Rockfrll with (<l) (<130) (<13)
corewall
Hydraulic fill (<l) (<s)
Notes: (1) PTe, Ptg and Ptef ars the average probabilities of failure over the life of the dam.
(2) Pe, Pq and Pef are the average annual probabilities of failure.
37
I)ocument from UMCfV Report - Analysis of Embankment Dam Incidents. September
1998. Page 124
If a factor has two or more possible weighting factors that can be selected for a particular dam
characteristic, such as different zoning types or different foundation geology types, then the
weighting factor with the greatest value should be used. This is consistent with the method of
analysis that was used to determine the weighting factors, as only the characteristics relevant
to the piping incident were included in the analysis.
The method is intended for preliminary assessments only. It is ideally suited as a risk ranking
method for portfolio type risk assessments to identiff which dams to prioritize for more
detailed studies. Since the method is based on a dam performance database approach, it tends
to lump together these factors which influence the initiation and progression of piping, and it
is not possible to assess what influence each of the factors is having. It is recommended that
more rigorous event tree based methods be used for detailed studies so as to gain a greater
understanding of how each of the factors influences either the initiation or progression of
piping, or the formation of a breach.
The user of the method is cautioned against varying the weighting factors significantly when
applying the method to actual dams as they have been calibrated to the population of dams so
that the net effect on the population is neutral.
It is recommended that the effect of the length of the dam is not included in the assessment of
the probability of failure using this method. Vanmarke (1977) demonstrates the length of the
dam might be expected to influence the probability of failure of sliding as long dams are
more likely to have some defect or other feature in the dam or foundation that could
potentially cause failure of the dam. However, for piping this is considered not to be a
significant factor, as the piping failures often occurred at locations such as conduits passing
through the dam or steep abutments, which are independent of the length of the dam.
38
I)ocument from UNICIV Report - Analysis of Embankment Dam Incidents. September
1998, Page 125
Table 11.2: Summary of the weighting factors for piping through the embankment mode of
failure
39
Document from IIÌ\IICIV Report - Analysis of Embankment Dam Incidents. September
1998,Page126.
Well constructed
cutofftrench [0.9]
SOIL GEOLOGY Dispersive soils [5] Residual U.2l Aeolian, Colluvial, Alluvial t0.91 Glacial t0.51
TYPES (below Volcanic Ash t51 Lacustrine, Marine
cutoff) WF(sg), [l 0] Sandstone, Shale, Conglomerate [0 5]
OR Siltstone, Andesite, Gabbro
ROCK GEOLOGY Limestone tsl Claystone, [0.5]
TYPES (below Dolomite t3l Tuff l.sl Mudstone, Granite, Gneiss
cutoff) WF(rg) Saline(gypsum) t5l Rhyolite 12) Homfels [0.7] t0.21
Basalt t3l Ma¡ble I2l Agglomerate, Schist, Phyllite,
Ouafzits t21 Volc. Breccia [0.8| Slate t0.51
OBSERVATIONS Muddy leakage Leakage gradually Leakage steady, Minor leakage Leakage
OF SEEPAGE Sudden increases increasing, clear, clea¡ or not measure none
wF(obs) OR in leakage fup to Sinkholes, obsewed tl.0l t0.71
OBSERVATIONS l0l Sandboils A) or very small
OF PORE Sudden increases Gradually High pressures l0.sl
PRESSURES in pressures [up to mcreasrng measured in
pressufes ln foundation U.0l Low pore pressures
WF(obp) 101
foundation 121
in foundation [0.8]
MONITORING Inspections Inspections Irregular seepage Weekly-monthly Daily
AND annually monthly observations, seepage
monitoring of
SURVEILLANCE inspections weekly monitoring, weekly
inspections seepage, daily
WF(mon) t2l Ir.2l tl 0l t0.81
inspections
t0.sl
40
I)ocument from UNICIV Report - Analysis of Embankment Dam Incidents. September
1998, Page 127,128.
Table 11.4: Summary of weighting factors for piping from the embankment into the foundation-
accidents and failures.
FACTOR GENERAL FACTORS INFLUENCING LIKELIHOOD OF INITIATION OF PIPING-ACCIDENTS AND
FAILURES
MUCH MORE MORE LIKELY NETJTRAL LESS LIKELY MUCH LESS
LIKELY I,IKELY
ZONING Refer to Table I I .l for the from embankment into foundation
FILTERS Appears to be independent ofpresence/absence ofembankment or foundation filters [1.0]
WEF(filt)
FOUNDATION Deep and narrow Average cutoff Shallow or no
CUTOFF cutofftrench [1.5] trench width and cutofftrench [0.8]
TRENCH depth tl.Ol
rWEF(cot)
FOTINDATION Founding on or Founding on or
TYPE WEF(fridO partly on rock partly on soil
foundations [l.51 foundations [0.51
ERIOSION No erosion control No erosion control No erosion control Erosion control Good to very good
CONTROL measures, open moasufes, average measures, good measures presgnt, erosion control
MEASURES OF jointed bedrock or foundation foundation poor foundations measures present
CORE open work gravels conditions conditions t0.sl and good
FOUNDATION [up to 5] tt.2\ t1.01 foundation
WEF(ecm) t0.3-0.1-l
GROUTINGS OF No grouting on Soil foundation Rock foundations
FOUNDATIONS rock foundations only-not applicable grouted t0.81
tt.3l tl.01
SOIL GEOLOGY Colluvial t5l Glacial tzl Residual t0.81 Alluvial, Aeolian,
TYPES wEF(sg), Lacustrine, Marine,
OR Sandstone Dolomite, Tuff, Agglomerate, Sandstone, Volcanic [0.5]
ROCKGEOLOGY interbedded with Quartzite U.5l Volcanic breccia Conglomerate [0 8]
TYPES wEF(rg) shale or limestone Shale, Siltstone,
t3l Rhyolite, Basalt, Granite, Andesite, Schist, Phyllite, Mudstone,
Limestone, Marble ll.2l Gabb¡o, Gneiss Slate, Homfels Claystone
gypsum 12.51 tl.0l t0.61 t0.21
4t
Appendix B
Baseline Cost Estimate for Silver Creek Dam Early Warning System
Section 205 Project
42
Insert Total Project Cost Summary sheet 1.
43
Insert Overall Project Summary Page
44
Narrative
1. Proiect Description: Silver Creek Dam is located just south of the city of Silverton,
OR. It is a 65 foot high embankment dam with a concrete spillway. The early waming
system is intended to reduce potential hazards posed by dam. The system will measure
piezometers and weirs, route the information through control units and to cþ offices. A
siren notification system is also included.
a. Basis of Design . The basis of the design is the Feasibility Report for subject
project dated I|lIay 2004.
b. Basis of Estimate. The estimate for this project was developed using
information provided by the designers, including plans and quantities. The construction
cost estimate is a detailed MII estimate using labor and equipment crews, quantities,
production rates, and equipmentlmaterial price quotes. The Total Project Cost Summary
sheet includes costs for construction; real estate; planning, engineering and design;
construction management; contingencies; and infl ation.
4. Acquisition Plan. It is anticipated that this job will be accomplished through either an
A-E contract or a sole source construction contract.
5. Subcontracting Plan. It is envisioned that all work will be done by the prime
contractor except earthwork, electrical and telephone work.
6. Project Construction.
a. Site Access. Access to the right abutment and spillway will be via highway.
Access to the main embankment will be by a boat crossing the reservoir.
45
1) Mob & Demob. Assume mob/demob will be from the Portland area.
Equipment mobilized will include an excavator /loader, a small crane, a small
boat and a small barge for transporting equipment to the south side of the dam. A
direct cost of $5,000 was allowed.
4) Prefab Building. A 10' by 12' f,rberglass building was assumed for this
building. A quote was received from TRACOM, Inc. for the building, see backup.
Assume the site will be prepared and a 4" thick concrete slab will be placed. The
building will be erected (20 crew hours), then wired for power and phone service
(covered in Electrical Work and Phone Lines items). Costs for an access road and
floodlights were computed using Cost Book items. The cost for a backup generator was
obtained from the Grainger catalog.
5) Electrical Work. This item covers all power needed for MCU-I,
transducers, weir sensors, and the prefab building. Power would be brought over to the
building from a nearby restroom in the park. MCUs on the south side of the spillway
would transmit data to MCU-1 via radio signals, and these MCU's would have solar
power. So no power or phone lines would need to be installed to these MCUs.
Quantities for required trenching and cable installation were provided by the designer.
Appropriate Cost Book items were used to price these items. Production rates were
reduced due to the small quantities on this job.
46
6) Phone Lines. This item covers installation of a phone line from a
nearby neighborhood across the highway from the dam, to the prefab building.
Again, quantities for required trenching and cable installation were provided by
the designer. Appropriate Cost Book items were used to price these items.
Production rates were reduced due to the small quantities on this
47
hours were estimated by David Scofield of the NV/P Geotechnical Design Section. Items
include:
a) A standard PC and a laptop PC at the EOC in a City of Silverton
building.
b) A PC at the dam site, installed in the prefab building.
c) Damsmart software (single users).
d) Geonet Module for Damsmart.
e) Programming. Estimated to require 40 crew-hours.
Ð MS Office Suite (Excel and Access).
g) Data backup.
h) Installation at EOC. Estimated to require 16 crew-hours.
i) Miscellaneous Hardware. Estimated at $1,000.
14) Notifrcation System. This covers all work related to installation of the
siren system. Four sirens are to be installed. This system may be constructed by the City
of Silverton. Design and cost data were obtained from Barry Myers. Included are:
a) Siren Activation Panel.
b) Radio Transmitter.
c) Siren Control Station.
1. Sirens (Federal Signal MOD6024 or equal)
2. Utility Poles (decorative style)
3. Wiring
4. Power to each siren
d) Testing System.
16) Evacuation Plan. These items would be developed during design and
implemented by the City of Silverton. An Evacuation Plan and Brochures would be
developed.
48
g. Unique Construction Techniques . N/A
i. Overhead. Proht and Bond. A low JOOH percentage (5%) was used because
several overhead type items were detailed in the estimate. Standard percentages were
used for HOOH and bond. Profit was computed using weighted guidelines.
Dates for Labor. Equipment. Material Pricing. Effective date for all pricing
9. Effective
is March 2004. The most recent Davis-Bacon labor rates were used. The 2001 Cost
Book database was employed, covering labor, equipment and unit price items.
10. Costs: Costs for Real Estate, Engineering and Design, and Construction
Management were provided by the project manager
49