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“Fearful and protracted economic and financial trouble looms when the spending excesses
during the boom… involve soaring indebtedness of consumers and corporations. Historically, the
worst excesses of this kind have typically occurred in association with more or less pronounced
asset price bubbles, as the soaring asset prices provide the collateral that facilitates and fosters
the borrowing binge.
When the bubble bursts and asset prices plunge in the face of persisting high debt levels, the
implicit ravaging of balance sheets impels borrowers as well as lenders to greater prudence and
measures to adjust their balance sheets. Correcting the maladjustments… intrinsically requires
an adjustment process far more protracted and painful than the regular inventory correction.
Recessions of this kind might be specified as ‘post-bubble’ or ‘balance sheet’ downturns.”
— The Richebächer Letter, February 2001
turns out the households primarily relied on lower savings rates and higher consumer debt growth to plug the gap
between more subdued increases in labor compensation and continued increases in consumption.
Debt allows a borrower to deficit spend in monetary terms — that is, to spend more money than he earns — and
w Faster to consume more than he produces in real or unit volume terms. Governments are not the only ones who deficit
spend. Companies and households can deficit spend, and when enough of them do, private nonfinancial debt will
tend to grow rapidly. Private-sector debt growth surged in the recovery up to 1985, surged again through most of the
’90s and expanded once more in the first half of the last decade. Accompanying each of these surges in private debt,
you will notice the trade deficit as a share of GDP widened roughly in concert with private debt growth.
As will be spelled out in more detail later, Dr. Richebächer distinguished between the use of productive and
unproductive debt. Debt issued to finance new plant and equipment has a chance of producing new income in the
future — income that can be used to service the interest expense and pay down the principal of the debt. Debt issued
to finance the purchase of a consumer good, or to finance a residence that will be owner occupied, has no such chance.
The former is productive, in the sense that a future income stream is likely to be generated to service debt, while the
latter is unproductive, as no capacity to service the debt issued is apparent in the actual use of the borrowed funds.
In addition, through the various
merger waves and share repurchase U.S.State & Local Government Employment
efforts, much of the business debt
issued was for financial engineering
Overtook Manufacturing Jobs
95 00 purposes,05 not for10 expansion of 20000
the capital stock. Debt allowed
on Expenditures
hn. 2005$ households to consume more than
18000
pensation Per Hour
they were producing. The choice
00
of business to use debt for
rearranging control and boosting 16000
short-term earnings growth had little
to do with expanding production
capacity, and so left U.S. global 14000
ed the Gap, competitiveness further at risk.
U.S. Manufacturing Employees
(in thousands)
Absent sufficiently strong 12000
reinvestment
ic Private Nonfinancial Debtrates in the U.S. U.S. State and Local Employees
(in thousands)
tradable
ange — Year to Year goods sector, the push for
higher labor productivity meant 10000
jobs in the manufacturing sector 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Source: Haver Analytics
shrank over much of the past three
decades. While the first contraction
in 1979–82 is most widely known, the deepest cuts in manufacturing employment have been over the past decade,
with two sharp and prolonged contractions accompanying the last two recessions. The failure of firms to find
profitable reinvestment opportunities in the United States, and the failure of the United States to attract foreign direct
investment in U.S. production facilities, has become dramatically apparent.
By 1999, it finally got to the point where the number of people employed in the manufacturing sector fell below
the number employed by state and local government. The productivity of manufacturing workers has tended to
hare of GDP exceed that of government employees, and the products of state and local government employees are generally not
tradable goods and services. The production structure, at least as revealed by the composition of employment, had
5 00 become05 10 two decades of minimal reinvestment of profits (with the notable exception of the tech/telecom
skewed after
bubble, which ended poorly).
In addition, the revenue to pay state and local government employees inevitably comes from taxes on workers,
consumers and homeowners. State and local bond issuance also claims private savings that otherwise could go to
finance capital equipment in the tradable goods sector. Such taxes increase the effective cost of employing U.S. labor
in the tradable goods sector, so from a variety of perspectives, this shift in the structure of production compounds the
problem of international competitiveness.
will lead to an escalation of protectionist responses and a balkanization of trading blocs around the world. Already,
the proliferation of capital controls in emerging nations is pointing in the latter direction.
Chairman Bernanke’s controversial return to quantitative easing may force the issue of a new international
system, though not without first promoting more discord. We do, however, find it at least encouraging that he has
become willing to name the underlying issue. Such was the case in his November speech in Frankfurt where he noted
rather candidly:
As currently constituted, the international monetary system has a structural flaw: It lacks a
mechanism, market based or otherwise, to induce needed adjustments by surplus countries, which
can result in persistent imbalances… In particular, for large, systemically important countries with
persistent current account surpluses, the pursuit of export-led growth cannot ultimately succeed if
the implications of that strategy for global growth and stability are not taken into account.
Thus, it would be desirable for the global community, over time, to devise an international
monetary system that more consistently aligns the interests of individual countries with the interests
of the global economy as a whole. In particular, such a system would provide more effective checks
on the tendency for countries to run large and persistent external imbalances, whether surpluses
or deficits.
We have no illusions that such a rebalancing can happen overnight. Nor would we for a moment pretend to have
the blueprints for a new system. But this is the underlying issue that global investors and policymakers will be
wrestling with over the next five to 10 years. In the meantime, the path of least resistance is likely to take the form
of more money creation and eventual debt restructuring by Western nations — and with any luck, a more rapid
emergence of domestic consumption and infrastructure spending in the developing nations.
Through the disruptions and disarray, we would expect precious metals holdings to be favored as the U.S. dollar
status as the international reserve currency is brought increasingly under fire. In addition, history suggests the largest
creditor nation eventually gets to define international monetary arrangements. China’s leaders are unlikely to cede
control of the yuan to market forces they still distrust. We would not, however, be surprised if somewhere along the
way they propose a new international reserve currency backed by a basket of durable commodities — many of which
they may have substantial control of by then.
contagion effects to other European banks with loans out to Ireland (especially to Irish banks), no doubt some sort of
loan package and bank capital contingency fund will be allocated out of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF)
before long. Our analysis leads us to believe Portugal and Spain will be next to tap the EFSF for similar purposes. We
expect the eurozone will be maintained, but only at the price of eventual public and private debt restructuring once the
game of repeatedly socializing bank losses has reached it inevitable limit with eurozone taxpayers.
Second, regarding quantitative easing, we have never quite been able to understand the wisdom of a monetary
policy that simultaneously seeks to raise inflation expectations by creating money out of thin air, and then using it to
bid up the prices (and lower the yields) on Treasury bonds. Investors are bound to ask themselves why they would
want to buy Treasuries at historically low nominal yields while facing the prospect, if the central bank achieves its
stated goal, of escalating inflation. This strikes us as a mug’s game — a recipe for instant losses once nominal yields
rise to accommodate inflation expectations. We suspect this is why PIMCO officials, who represent one of the largest
institutional fixed-income shops around, have openly declared the end of the bull run in Treasuries.
Beyond the question of exit strategies facing the Fed, the shift in portfolio preferences toward commodities that
accompanied the latest foray into quantitative easing is problematic. Not only is it likely to act as a supply-side shock
on a number of producers who may find it difficult to pass on higher costs (and U.S. consumer staples stocks, like
the food processors, are at risk here — see Dan Amoss’ work in Strategic Short Report in this regard), but absent a
large improvement in household income growth in the West, the commodity price increases that do get passed
through are more likely to act like a tax. Absent stronger employment and stronger household income growth,
discretionary spending is likely to be cut as prices go up on nondiscretionary items like food, clothing and energy.
Prices on discretionary items will tend to fall as the commodity price shocks are passed through to consumers.
Third, we have previously highlighted Fred Sheehan’s work on risks in the U.S. municipal bond market. By
mid-November, investors had begun to recognize the wall of new supply likely to be issued in 2011, and municipal
bond mutual funds and ETFs were reporting heavy outflows. States and municipalities are likely to run out of smoke
and mirrors unless quantitative easing promotes a much stronger recovery in the United States. On that subject, New
York Fed President and former Goldman Sachs economist Bill Dudley recently noted, “It’s going to make the
economy grow a little bit faster. It’s going to generate a little bit more employment growth. But you know, we have
a long, bumpy road to travel. Modest effect. It’s not a fantasy. It’s not a magic wand. This exit could be years away.”
With the new House composition, federal appropriations to states, which are already programmed to wind down
in 2011, are unlikely to get bumped higher anytime soon. State and local employment cuts are just beginning to
mount, and these will have ripple effects on state income growth. For those who are in a tax bracket that forces them
into municipal bonds, owning only the highest quality bonds is the watchword.
Finally, China’s economy now has the unenviable combination of overinvestment, malinvestment and escalating
inflation. The credit boom China engineered to avoid getting dragged down during the events of 2008–09 has come
back to haunt it. While food prices are the main culprit, minimum wages are reported to have been lifted some
10–20% over the past year, and wage gains in the coastal manufacturing regions have been reported to be quite high
of late. Administrative price controls and reduction of commodity stockpiles are under way, but a series of hikes in
reserve requirements, as well as policy rates, suggests Chinese officials are not convinced price controls will do the
trick. Over the years, we have found it expensive to bet on China slowing down. However, there is a chance Chinese
inflation is so much higher than reported that monetary tightening will need to be pursued more aggressively in 2011.
In this regard, we are told the monetary stock in China, following the recent credit boom, now exceeds that of the
United States.
While we still expect Chinese officials to back off before slowing the economy too much with monetary policy
tightening, the waves of new capacity coming on line that may not find domestic Chinese buyers suggests tradable
goods markets could get glutted. This, of course, will tend to exacerbate the international competitiveness issues we
highlighted earlier across many Western nations. We would suggest solar panels are one area in which the surge in
Chinese capacity coming online is likely to clobber global pricing.
These are a few of the fault lines we believe are still not well recognized but will be important drivers of 2011
financial market and economic outcomes. Each of them is tied, in one way or another, to the credit imbalances that
Dr. Richebächer placed at the center of his analysis.
The structural distortions arise from the fact that the credit excesses do not spread evenly across
the whole economy. They always concentrate on certain areas — real estate, business investments in
plant and equipment, consumer durables — and accordingly they fuel specific bubbles of demand.
In other words, they distort the economy’s demand structure. There is no fixed pattern for this.
During the 1920s, the bulk of the credit excesses in the United States went into private consumption.
In the case of Japan’s bubble, they poured overwhelmingly into commercial building, plants and
equipment. In the present U.S. case, it is again private consumption and the high-tech sector.
But that’s only the initial part of the maladjustment process impacting the economy. The
resulting distortions in the composition of demand implicitly evoke corresponding dislocations in the
economy’s output and investment structure. In order to meet the credit-drive surge in demand, those
sectors in the economy that largely attract the inflated demand for their products tend to step up their
investment spending, which the economy’s later slowdown will expose as malinvestment.
The ease with which credit can be created, and the failure of creditors to properly assess risk and return prospects
under contemporary monetary systems, thereby becomes a source of both demand and supply distortions. Eventually,
these must be worked off. In the extreme, this can involve the economy entering a balance sheet recession.
Asset price bubbles: Credit excesses are easier to build on the back of asset price bubbles. If a persistent shift in
investor portfolio preferences favors a particular asset class, the spot prices of that asset will rise, and all the holders
of that asset will experience an increase in net worth, whether the capital gain is realized via sale of the asset or not.
Since the willingness of banks and other creditors to lend is often influenced by the collateral that prospective
borrowers control, credit excesses often have a symbiotic relationship with asset bubbles. Each can enable the other
in a leapfrog fashion. As Dr. Richebächer put it in December 2000:
The particular danger of asset price bubbles rests in the fact that the soaring asset prices
inherently provide ever more collateral value for more and more borrowing… If monetary policy
accommodates these excesses, the business cycle essentially develops into the self-feeding,
precarious Bubble Economy… In the case of Japan… when the bubble burst, the crashing stock and
land prices simply devastated the collateral to these loans, leaving behind corporations and banks
with appallingly overextended balance sheets.
Financial versus real wealth: Contemporary economists frequently confuse the monetary value of financial
claims on tangible assets, and the productive capacity of the underlying plant and equipment. This is actually an old
dispute going back to Adam Smith, who recognized the wealth of nations has more to do with their capacity to
produce useful goods and services than with the amount of gold in the bank vaults. In December 2001, Dr.
Richebächer wrote:
It used to be common knowledge for thinking people that net capital accumulation is the key
source and the benchmark of a nation’s prosperity. It generates growth and wealth through four
different effects: first of all, producing the capital goods creates jobs and incomes; second, the
finished capital goods add to productive capacity; third, the new machinery tends to improve
productivity; and fourth, the resulting factories and buildings represent the nation’s true wealth.
Earlier, in November 2000, he took on the prevailing view of the time:
The first great myth to debunk is that soaring stock prices represent valid wealth creation for the
economy. They do so, of course, for the stockowners. From a macroeconomic perspective, though,
an economy’s total wealth is in its capital stock of structures, equipment and inventories…
Manifestly, rising stock prices add nothing to an economy’s capital stock. What they create is…
soaring claims on the part of the stockowners on the national product and its capital stock.
Financial imbalances: It is not well understood that if one sector wishes to increase its net saving (or, in other
words, reduce its expenditures relative to its income), this can be achieved only if the remaining sectors of the
economy are willing to increase their deficit spending. Absent this — which is nothing but double-entry
bookkeeping — the attempt of one sector to increase its net saving will tend to lead to falling incomes. Dr.
Richebächer worked with the sector balance approach most closely in his analysis of Japan. He wrote in May 2000
about the Japanese situation:
[T]he personal and business sectors together spend that much less than their total, current
revenues. Instead, they are repaying debts and accumulating financial assets. As a result, private
demand for goods and services keeps contracting. In order to fill the big, chronic demand gap
arising from the private sector, it has needed ever larger injections of public deficit spending.
It follows from the financial balance approach that budget surpluses and trade deficits both drain cash flow from
the domestic private sector. In order for the private sector to net save — which it frequently attempts to do most
dramatically after an asset bubble has burst — fiscal balances must decrease, trade balances must increase or some
combination of the two is required if falling nominal incomes are to be avoided. Yet few recognize just how these
sector financial balances are interdependent, as is now being made apparent with the eurozone retrenchment.
Balance sheet recessions: We have frequently referred to the work of Richard Koo, from the Nomura Research
Institute, regarding the unique signature of balance sheet recessions. Koo pieced together the clues from his analysis
of the lost decades since the Japanese asset bubble burst in 1989. Balance sheet recessions, as mentioned in the
opening quote, tend to present more challenges than the conventional inventory-led recessions that characterized
much of the post-World War II period. Dr. Richebächer was early in identifying this distinction — probably well
before Koo. Writing in December 2000, he noted:
The typical imbalance in the short-term business cycle used to be inventory accumulation.
Depending on its size, the liquidation of the stockpiled goods and related debts could be quite sharp
and painful. But resulting recessions were always of very brief duration.
In the February 2001 Letter, Dr. Richebächer contrasted this with a balance sheet recession:
America had its first postwar encounter with this type of recession in 1990–1. It was different
from all prior recession in two ways: first, the boom-related excesses had their brunt not in inventory
excesses, but in huge malinvestments in commercial real estate; and second, it was not tight money
imposed by the Fed that caused the credit crunch, but soaring bad loans that paralyzed the banking
system and the financial markets.
It is the long-tailed quality of balance sheet recessions (as both balance sheet and real capital stock overshoots
must be worked off) that can unfortunately drive policymakers into what amounts to an addiction to serial or
sequential asset bubbles. They see no other way to return economic growth closer to its long-term average in a timely
fashion. In this sense, Dr. Richebächer identified a slippery slope that policymakers enter once they tolerate or
promote an asset bubble that lasts long enough to distort the allocation of productive capital and allow the build up
of debt on business and household balance sheets.
Shareholder driven capitalism: While Dr. Richebächer had great respect for the ability of markets to guide
resource allocation, during his time, he witnessed the transformation of incentive structures for both managers and
investors toward short-term profitability, and he witnessed the corruption of profit and earnings per share
measurement. As described above, his macro view of profits suggested cost cutting and merger activity were no
replacement for net investment in tangible productive capital in securing long-term profit growth. He highlighted this
in the August 2001 letter when he noted,
The one big structural profit depressant is Corporate America’s preference for acquisitions and
mergers at the expense of net investments... Chasing fast profits in this way, Corporate America
undermines its long-term profits. The main source of macro profits… is investment spending in excess
of depreciation charges — that is, net investments. And they are badly lagging.
In the November 2000 letter, Dr. Richebächer came to call this beggar-thy-children capitalism, exclaiming:
It’s late, degenerate capitalism in the sense that saving and capital accumulation, the key features
of a capitalist economy, have fallen into complete oblivion… the corporate strategies that result…
impart increasingly long-term macroeconomic consequences to economic growth…What really
happens is rampant over-consumption at the expense of future generations who are to inherit depleted
domestic capital formation, a mountain of foreign indebtedness and lots of worthless paper assets…
From the time of the first large merger and leveraged buyout waves in the middle of the ’80s, the redefinition of
corporate earnings became a frequent sport of managers and the equity analysts on Wall Street who covered their
companies. Institutional investors facing short-term performance pressures increasingly relied on the game of beat
the quarterly earnings expectation to inform their stock selection. The temptation of stock option-laden managers
to redefine earnings along the way became all too evident to Dr. Richebächer, who further protested in the August
2001 letter,
The main task of today’s American manager is no longer efficient production but efficient
ballyhoo that boosts the company’s share price. The systematic deception was plain to very many
people, but nobody wanted to spoil the profitable game. Integrity and reason went out the window.
In reality, it was much more than just that. It was systematic fraud.
Corrupted economics: Dr. Richebächer was no stranger to controversy. During the latter part of his career, he
saw the profession he devoted his life to become more and more of a marketing racket for Wall Street. Back in
December 2000, as the outlines of the burst dot-com bubble were becoming more visible, he wrote:
Today, the stars among private sector economists domineering public discussion and public
opinion are the investment banking economists… The chief qualification of these so-called
economists is not their analytical acumen, but their ability to bring business to their employer with
buy recommendations for stocks and bonds. Besides, the analyst who dares to depart from the bullish
consensus is well aware that he is putting his job on the line. Never before has economic “research”
been so corrupted… Honest, critical economic research virtually disappeared. The few economists
who warned were ridiculed.
These are but a sliver of the perspectives Dr. Richebächer’s unique analysis provided over the course of several
decades of research and analysis. We have found them indispensable over the years in guiding our own attempts to
make sense of an increasingly complex and confused macro and financial market environment. We offer this brief
summary as a guide for you to carry into the future.
argued, set the stage for the crisis, and the overhang of debt continues to act as a drag on recovery…
The current preoccupation with debt harkens back to a long tradition in economic analysis.
Irving Fisher (1933) famously argued that the Great Depression was caused by a vicious circle in
which falling prices increased the real debt burden, which led in turn to further deflation. The late
Hyman Minsky (1986), whose work is back in vogue thanks to recent events, argued for a recurring
cycle of instability, in which calm periods for the economy lead to complacency about debt and
hence to rising leverage, which in turn paves the way for crisis. More recently, Richard Koo (2008)
has long argued that both Japan’s “lost decade” and the Great Depression were essentially caused
by balance-sheet distress, with large parts of the economy unable to spend thanks to excessive debt.
Given both the prominence of debt in popular discussions of our current economic difficulties
and the long tradition of invoking debt as a key factor in major economic contractions, one might
have expected debt to be at the heart of most mainstream macroeconomic models — especially the
analysis of monetary and fiscal policy. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, it is quite common
to abstract altogether from this feature of the economy.
Actually, we are not surprised at all by this glaring omission of credit from mainstream macroeconomics. While
it is in the nature of all models to abstract from the details and complexities of reality, mainstream economics has
often made an art form out of omitting salient elements like debt. All too often, its preference is to impose simplifying
assumptions that leave its models in a world that barely resembles the one we actually inhabit. Perhaps by the time
Chairman Bernanke returns to Princeton, enough of an investigation of the history of work done in this area of
macrofinancial dynamics will have been completed that Dr. Richebächer’s contributions will be held up alongside
those of Fisher, Minsky and Koo.
PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW
By Rich Lee
Here is a final look at our open recommendations and some guidance for the months ahead.
With Ireland accepting bailout assistance from both the greater European Union and the International Monetary
Fund, Spain and Portugal will be the next focus. The ongoing crisis will likely mean further downside in the iShares
MSCI Europe Financials ETF (EUFN). It is priced at the top of its 52-week range — not too far from where we
initiated the short position back in May. Although the investment has the potential to reach $18 in the next few
months, we don’t recommend holding above $24.50.
We also have faith in our short recommendation of the iShares MSCI Germany Index Fund (EWG). It’s
slightly positive as we go to press and should continue to reflect the current concern over European stability. Still,
we would be inclined to close the position above $26.
It’s also time to let go of two other bearish euro plays — the UltraShort MSCI Europe ProShares (EPV) and
UltraShort Financials ProShares (SKF). Close them ahead of the end of the year.
Continue holding the NASDAQ December euro 110 put until expiration. There is still potential for it to pay off,
as the spot currency has moved lower in the past few weeks. Any losses should be minimal at this point, with only
the premium being lost.
Things are brighter with some of our U.S. choices. Consumers are turning to equity issues with a staple presence —
making a long-term case for both Wal-Mart (WMT) and Coca-Cola (KO). Although we expect WMT to continue
to rise at a slow and appreciable rate, KO may be nearing the end of its short-term rally. We believe the stock to be
fairly valued at around $67.
Finally, we come to our high-yield picks. Gains in International Bancshares Corp. (IBOC) shares have
outweighed the decline in shares of Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd. (NAT). Still, with the high-yield trend
set to hit a snag in the next couple of months, we suggest closing these positions.
We also say to exit IQ Merger Arbitrage ETF (MNA). It has done little good for us so far, and we don’t
anticipate that to change. Mergers and acquisitions will continue to be lackluster as long as the U.S. economy moves
along sluggishly and domestic stock market volatility remains brisk.
[Ed. Note: Rich Lee will continue contributing to The Daily Reckoning website. And don’t forget you can stay
in touch with Rob by e-mailing macrostratedge@yahoo.com. On behalf of the entire Richebächer Society team, thank
you for your loyalty and support!]