WWII 1st Marines Division

COPY NO.
c^Q
PECIAL ACTIO
REPORT
A U CA N LS
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tt tt O
NSEI-SHOTO
UNr.lASSIFIED
FIPST MARINE DIVISION

30UCE0 BT MAPPING REPRO ON SECTION FIRST ENGINCER ,ON FIRST MARINE DIVISION
1945
01718 1990-5-80 485/390
OE
F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n ,
F l e e t Marine Force,
c/o F l e e t Post O f f i c e , San Francisco, CONFIDENTIAL From: To : Via :
California.
10 July, 1945. The Commanding General* Commandant of the Marine Corps* (1) The Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps.
(2) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.
(3) CINCPAC - CINCPOA. Aotion Report, NAN3EI SHOTO Operation, 1 Aroril 30 June, 1945, submission of. P a c i f i c F l e e t Confidential Letter 1CL-45. (A) Subject Report.
Subject; Reference: Enclosure:
In accordance with the r e f e r e n c e , enclosure (A) 1. i s submitted herewith. 2. Each has been forwarded r e p o r t i n order to c o p i e s through the organization shown on d i s t r i b u t i o n l i s t the required number of copies o f subject preclude tne n e c e s s i t y of forwarding a l l chain of command.
P. A. d e l VALLE
DISTRIBUTION: CinC
Commander i n Chief, U, S. F l e e t .
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CINCPAC - CINCPQA (3)
CG, FMF, PAC.
CG, 10th Army (2)
Commander in Chief, Soutnwest Pacific Areas.
CG, V Amphibious Corps
-.? '"'* |",,.i:
< *- J * >.\ ' ~ - 1 1 .
11 I
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: Action Report, NANSEI S O O Operation, 1 April HT 30 June, 1945, submission of. (Con^d). CO, 2d Marine D i v i s i o n . CO, 3rd Marine Division. CO, 4th Marine Division. CG, 5th Marine Division. CG, 6th Marine Division. Commander Third Amphibious Force. ANSCOL. Naval War College.
Command and General Staff School.
Marine Corps Schools (3)
Commander Amphibious Training Command Pacific.
Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic.
Commanding General Troop Training Unit Pacific.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Lejeune.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Pendleton.
Commander Third Fleet.
Commander Fifth Fleet.
CO, 8th Marines.
CG, XXIV Corps.
CG, 7th Infantry Division.
JttUSSIFB
TABLE of CONTENTS
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Chapter Chapter I - Introduction
II - Task Organization
Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

Personnel Annex
Intelligence Annex
Operations Annex
Supply Annex
Medical Annex
Chapter Chapter Chapter IV - Training and Rehearsals
V - Loading and Embarkation
VI - Movement to and Arrival at Objective Area
Chapter VII - Assault Phase

Narrative
Division Field Orders
Tank Support Annex
Artillery Annex
Naval Gunfire Annex
Air Support Annex
Signal Annex
Engineer Annex
Logistics Annex
Shore Party Annex
Medical Annex
Personnel Annex
Chapter v m - Intelligence
Chapter Chapter IX - Operational Results
X - Comments and Recommendations
DECLteSfflED
CHAPTER I ; INTRODUCTION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SHOTO
INTRODUCTION Special Action Report Nansel Shoto Operations of the First Marine Division (Reinforced) against
the former Japanese island of O I A A are divided into three
KN W Phases for purposes of this report:
Phase I included training, planning and rehearsals conducted in the RUSSELL ISLANDS, G A A C N L Area. The movement UDLAA of t h i s Division to the target area concluded Phase I . Phase II began with the assault ship-to-shore movement on 1 April. 1945. Ground action in Central and Northern O I A A was included in t h i s phase which terminated on 22 April, 1945. KN W Phase I I I consisted of the battle for Southern OKINAWA the final destruction of organized resistance on the island, and the mopping up of enemy remnants. Phase III was o f f i c i a l l y terminated on 30 June, 1945. Phases I and II of First Marine Division operations on O I A A KN W provide few lessons for future study that may be included in an action report. The primary reason for this i s that the negligible enemy resistance i n this Division's zone of action provided few opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of a combat organization. Weapons and equipment were not tested under conditions which would warrant qualified opinions on their e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; the only t a c t i c s employed were previously time-tested; and the lessons from Japanese t a c t i c s were almost completely non-existent* I t was during Phase III that the efficiency of this Division was tested and proved. In the protracted, fiercely-contested b a t t l e for Southern OKINAWA, valuable lessons were learned. I t i s the purpose of t h i s report to oroject these lessons against a background of the action as i t developed. While basic doctrine i n a l l cases was again oroved sound, i t i s necessary to point out the application of t h i s doctrine i n s p e c i f i c situations. Pertinent narratives, comments, and recommendations are grouped in the following chapters. Before the detailed operations of the First Marine Division can be analyzed, i t i s well to putline the over-all role played in the invasion of the NANSEI SHOTO. The task of the newlycreated U.S. Tenth Army and supporting units of the Unites jttffes
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UNCLASSIFIED
Fleet was to continue the growing assault on the inner defense
lines of the Japanese Empire and to secure naval and air bases
for further blows against the enemy* Capture of principal
islands in the NANSEI SHOTO would provide these bases and secure
a r a sage to the China Seas, the coast of China, and the
approaches to the Japanese mainland*
As a part of this army, it was the mission of the First
Marine Division, functioning under the control of the III
Amphibious Corps, to defeat the enemy in its zone of action and
be prepared to carry out any further assigned operations. The
Division's initial assignment consisted of landing on the west
coast of OKINAWA and driving to the opposite coast on a proposed
timetable of fifteen days* As the action unfolded, initial
successes came with surprising ease. Central and Northern OKINAWA
fell quickly to Tenth Army forces* Major Japanese defenses were
located in Southern OKINAWA: in that area the decisive battles
of the island were fought*
The following chapters record the part played by the First
Marine Division in seourlng vital OKINAWA. The results of this
experience are incorporatea for the future benefit of those who
participated in the campaign and for those who may be faced with
comparable situations in the future*
3 Ji -
(HUISSYW**
...CHAPTER IE... ..TASK ORGANIZATION... SPECIAL ACTION QE1POQT ...NANSE1I SWOTO...
Btcussro
UECmSIFltD
TASK ORGANIZATION
Nansei Shoto
CT - 1
lBt Marines
Co A let Engr Bn
Co A 1st Plon Bn
Co A 1st Med Bn
Co A 1st MT Bn
Det Ord Co 1st Serv Bn
Atchd: 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
(less 2d and 3d Sqds)
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
1st Plat 1st MP Co
Det 4th JASCO
Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (3 DUKW)
CT - 5
'!><?
*^
Col Kenneth B. CHAPPELL, USMC
Col John H. &RIEBEL, USI'C
5th Marines
Co B 1st Engr Bn
Co B 1st Plon Bn
Co B 1st Med Bn
Co B 1st MT Bn
1st Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Atchd: 3d Sod, 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
2d Plat 1st MP Co
CT - 7 Col Edward W. SNEDEKER, USMC
7th Marines
Co C 1st Engr Bn
Co C 1st Plon Bn
Co C let Med Bn
Co C 1st MT Bn
8th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Atchd: 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, 1st Bonb Disposal Co
Det S&SJfct life, Serv Bn
3rd PlaC iST*Wl

Det 4th JASCO
Arty gp
Col Wilburt S. BROWN, USMC
11th Marines 3rd Amph Truck Co Det 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (22 DUKW) VMO-3 Det 1st Amph Trao Bn (12 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (8 LVT)
Armd Amph Trac GP
3rd Armd Amph Bn (Prov)
LtCol A. J. STUART, USMC
Tk Gp
1st Tk Bn
Det 1st Amph Trac Bn (3 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (4 LVT)
Tk Malnt Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Col Francis I. FENTON, USMC
Engr gp
1st Engr Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
145th NCB (less Det)
Shore Party *Gp
1st Plon Bn (less Cos A, B, C) i 11th Special NCB Det 145th NCB Det 4th JASCO Replacement gp Serv Op
1st Serv Bn (less Dets)
1st MT Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
2d Plat 1st Laundry Co
MP gp
LtCol Austin C. SHOFNER, USMC
Col John KALUF, USMC
LtCol Robert g. BALLANCE, USMC
Ma J John I. WILLIAMSON, USMC
Army MP Co
1st MP Co (less 1st, 2d, 3rd Plats)
OKLASSIIW
Div Trs
Lt Col James S. MONAHAN, USMC
Div Hq Bn (less 1st MP Co) 1st Med Bn ( less Cos As Bp C) 4th JA8C0 (less Dets) 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (less Dets) (9 DUKW) Dets A-1& B-l AMG l?th & 18th G-10 Dispensary Units Assault Air Warning Teams 4th Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog Plat
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CHAPTER
HE
PRELIMINARY PLANNING
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
NANSEI SMOTO-
Annexes: Personnel lntelli aence Operations Supply j Logistics Medical
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PERSONNEL ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Composition of the First Marine Division (Reinforced), for
the OKINAWA Operation was as follows:
First Marine Division:
Commanding General Major General Pedro A. del Valle Assistant Division Commander - Brigadier-General Louis R 0 Jones Chief of Staff Colonel Robert 0. Bare G - 1 LtCol Harold 0. Deakln
G - 2 G - 3 G - 4
LtCol. John W. Scott, Jr. LtCol. Russell E. Honsowetz LtCol Harvey C. Tschlrgi
Elements composing the Division for this operation were;

1st Marines 5th Marines 7th Marines 11th Marines let Tank Bn 1st Engineer Bn let Pioneer Bn 1st Motor Transport Bn 1st Service Bn 1st Medical Bn Division Headquarters Bn Colo Kenneth B. Chap-oell, USMC
Colo John Ho Griebel* USMC
Col. Edward W Snedeker, USMC
Col, Wilbert S. Brown, USMC
LtCol Arthur J0 Stuart, USMC
Majo Theodore E Drummond, USMCR
LtColo Robert Go Ballance, USMC
LtCol. Marion A. Fawcett, USMCR
LtColc Calvin C. Gaines, USMC
LtCoradr. Francis Guiffrida, USNR
LtColo James Sc Monahan, USMC
Attached to the Division for operational control for this

operation were:
1st Amphibian Tractor Bn 145th NCB
8th Amphibian Tractor Bn 2d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co
3rd Armored Amphibian Bn(Prov)2d Plat 1st Laundry Co
3rd Amphibian Truck Co. Dets A-l & B-l AMG
4th JASCO 17th & 18th G-10 Dispensary Units
4th War Dog Platoon Assault Air Warning Teams
11th Special NCB Co B, 1st MP Bn (USA)
454th Amphibian Truck, Co (USA) 4th Pro-v Rocket Det
The strength of the First Marine Division embarked for the
OKINAWA Operation was 943 officers and 16,979 enlisted men.
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The First Marine Division rear echelon, with a strength of 80

officers and 1,229 enlisted remained at PAVUVU, RUSSELL ISLANDS
awaiting transportation to the HAWAIIAN Area. The strength of
the rear echelon of the attached units was 11 officers and 207
enlisted. Only personnel essential for the operation and forward
movement of the rear echelon remained a PAVUVU* Two Battle
Replacement/Drafts, the 29th and 32nd, consisting of approximately
110 officers and 2,400 men combined, were also embarked in
assault shipping and comprised the bulk of the labor troops.
Their initial employment as shore party was planned to include
ship and boat platoons.
The total strength of the First Marine Division (Reinforced)
was 25,166, Including Marines, Navy and Army. Of this number
1,289 were officers and 23,877 were enlisted men. The breakdown
of the First Marine Division (Reinforced) was as follows?
a. First Marine Division, Forward Echelon;
USMC 830-15,956 b. USN 113-1,023 TOTAL
17,922
Attached Units (including Battle Replacements);
USMC 257-4,720
USN USA TOTAL
75-1,898
USN 188-2,921
14-280
USA 14-280
7,244
c.
Total First Marine Division (Reinforced):

USMC 1,087-20,676 TOTAL
25,166
At the time of embarkation the First Marine Division was b% over the authorized Table of Organization strength. The total sick in hospital was 240. After returning from the PALAU Operation, there remained attached to the Division 246 officers and 5,600 Marine enlisted who had served overseas nearly 30 months, and had participated in the GUADALCANAL, NEW BRITAIN, and PALAU Operations. It appeared that only half of these officers and about 3,000 men could"be rehabilitated in the United States after their lengthy tour in the combat zone. However, after a conference between G~l and the Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, a partial solution to this problem was found, in that all the enlisted men could be rotated by diverting two additional Battle Replacement Drafts, the 23rd and 25th, to the First Marine Division. An extensive leave program for officers was also worked out, and53 officers elected to take thirty j3.ays_leaye_In the United States/ in view of the m\ rotated. ^Xn'addltio4, six went tof^fTfzii^j|r%*<ê|lfe MW|15ALAND
2o
Some fifty key enlisted men also elected to take leave in

AUSTRALIA in order that they could continue to serve in the
First Marine Division,*
Replacements received and absorbed into the Division after
the PALAU Operation weres
October, 1944 - 45 Officers - 4400 men
November, 1944 - 45 Officers - 1900 men
January, 1945 - 125'Officers - 2500 men
These5 plus individuals transferred into the Division, brought the
officer strength to the authorized figure, and the enlisted
strength 10$ in excess At the end of January, orders were
received to transfer 900 enlisted men to the 6th Marine Division
and Third Amphibious Corps Troops* However, in view of an intensive
training period at GUADALCANAL during which this over-strength
had been fitted into the divisional organization, authority
was requested and subsequently received to transfer the 900
enlisted from the 29th Replacement Draft, then billeted at
nearby BANIKA (Fourth Base Depot) The divisional over-strength
was then ear-marked for shore party employment, and later
re-assignment to the organization with which trained.
The absor'btion of some 8,000 replacements in the last
quarter of 1944 was accomplished with a minimum of difficulty
despite a serious shortage of experienced noncomralsioned officers,,
However, the replacements received were inadequate in specialist
personnel, and acute shortages existed in Communication, Engineer,,
and Quartermaster branches0
Authority to temporarily promote enlisted personnel was
limited to Line, Commisary, and Field Music branches, which
aggregated only 2,800 Men who had proved themselves in battle
received these promotions, which had a decided morale factor,
somewhat offset by the lack of promotionof the specialist
branches mentioned above. The noncommissioned officer shortage
in the Engineer granch was particularly acute aggregating about
500, or 67$ of authorized, and in Signal Communications totaling
about 300, or 25^. There were instances of Privates First Class
acting in the capacity of Staff Sergeants. The overall picture
therefore was that there was sufficient manpower available, of
which two-thirds of the officers and one-half of the enlisted
personnel had combat experience.
However, many enlisted personnel were performing the
of a higher rank, since there was no authority to jpr
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Many of these men, were deserving of promotion for creditable

performance in combat0
After OKINAWA^ there-will once again exist the problem of necessary officer and enlisted rotation* Present survey indicates there may remain 205 officers of various ranks having twentyfour or more months overseas as of 30 June, 1945 Over half of these will have over thirty months9 There will be approximately 3,200 enlisted with two years or more in the field, of which nearly 800 will have thirty months. As the fall of 1945 approaches the situation will become more acute from the morale viewpointp,inasmuch the personnel entering the two-year category will have spent their entire tour in cocoanut grove or Jungle with not a single opportunity for leave or liberty,,
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INTELLIGENCE
- NAN8EI SHOTO
Prior to landing on OKINAWA 3HIMA this Division oonduoted
a vigorous and comprehensive training and planning program.
The part played by the Division Intelligence Section consis
ted of conducting a school to train and Instruct Intelligence
personnel in their duties* Instruction was given in the
functions of combat intelligence, beach reconnaissance, and
Japanese language; regimental and division field exercises
were carried out.
Schoolst
An intelligence sohool for the enlisted personnel of
the various intelligence sections within the division was con
ducted by the D-2 section from 12 Deo ember to 5 January* It's
main aim was to present a baslo understanding of the organ
ization and function of intelligence agencies and the indiv
idual duties required of all such personnel* The training
was particularly adapted and well timed* since a large number
of new men had entered the D-2 section and were in need of
such instruction*
Among the variety of courses offered; certain ones of
basic importance were stressed* They were as follows: Map reading and orientation. Use of the compass and azimuth hikes*
Panoramic and planemetrlc sketching*
Construction and purpose of observation posts*
Form for and use of Periodic Report, Work Sheet,
Journal, Intelligence Plan and Annex*
(6) CP procedure*
Practical work in the field included CP procedure and the
function and organization of its various component parte.
One night was devoted to a compass march without benefit
of light, to test the ability to work under handicap and to
further facilitate the use of the compass*
At the conclusion of the school, a Division CPX was held allowing each enlisted man to perform the duties ft*"^3^1! R-2 and- D-2, ,of ,the .division. fl L F 1 -* i ^ ' \1)
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During each CPX, time was allowed for instruction and

operation of radio sets, A radio school of one week's dur
ation starting 12 January, 1945 was conducted by the Signal
Company for all Division Intelligence personnel, in which
the complete operation and function of the SCR-300 and 610
radio were explained in detail. The purpose of the D-2
net was given special consideration,
A Beach Reconnaissance School was held from 7 January,
1945 to the 26th by the D-2 section. Representatives of the
2-sections throughout the Division were required to attend*
Instruction in hydrographic reconnaissance, API, photography,
rubber boating and range estimation was featured* This type
of training was undertaken in view of the probable necessity
of euch reoonnale sanee on the Impending operation. The work
of the Navy UDT was fully explained so as to coordinate the
two functions later on. Practical exercises in water borne
reconnaissance from the reefs edge, was practiced on nearby
islands and complete photographic coverage of the landing
beaches obtained. The results of the above training has
now become self evident.
Eleven lectures ranging from one to two hours on combat
phrases, pronunciations, simple vocabulary, numbers, geo
graphical terms, and dates were given by officers of the
language section to the Reconnaissance Company; enlisted
intelligence personnel of Division Headquarters and separate
battalions; enlisted personnel of 5th and 7th Marines R-2
sections; "E*, "P-, and "a" Companies, 2nd Battalion, 5th
Marines; 1st Tank Battalion; and General Duty and Band
personnel of Headquarters. A syllabus was given to each
of these groups to supplement the lectures. These lectures
were given between 28 November, 1944 and 15 February, 1945
Three courses of a similar but more detailed nature
were also given by personnel of the language section be
tween 8 December, 1944 and 16 February, 1945, as follows:
(1) Five weeks oourse to the MP Company l hours
a day, five (5) days a week with speolal
emphasis on vocabulary for handling of PWs
around the stockade and on working parties*
A twelve (12) page syllabus was supplied
with the course.
Five weeks course to the Red Cross Service Center
(2)
w o n ^ { l ) , 4 h o ^ r Ud^SC^>two (2) days ja, jffifik^

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with special emphasis on combat phrases. The

syllabus used in the eleven lectures and some add
itional pages were supplied with this course.
(3) Three (3) weeks course to the Medical Battalion one (l) hour a day, four (4) days a week with special emphasis on medical vocabulary. The MP
syllabus and some additional pages on medical
terms were used as a basis.
During December and January a training film on combat
phrases was shown at the various movie areas, and a combat
phrase was published each day for about a month in the
Pavuvu Press after the middle of January.
On 23 February, 1945 fifteen (15) sets of combat phraser
cartoons such as were used prior to the PELELIU Operation,
and 10,000 cards containing thirty-six (36) phrases were
distributed to the various front line units of the Division,
Indoctrination material concerning the handling of PWs
end captured materiel was presented in all the lectures and
courses mentioned above. In addition, one to two hour lec
tures on these subjects alone were presented to the enlisted
intelligence personnel of the let Marines; the R-2 personnel
of the 7th Marines; and the enlisted intelligence personnel
of Division Headquarters Bn and the separate battalions.
These were given between 8 December, 1944 and 2 January, 1945
A training film on the handling of PWs was shown to the last
group above on 29 Deoember, 1944. Plans to give similar
lectures and films to the intelligence officers of the Div
ision during January were cancelled because of the absenoe
of various regiments on training programs.
Special training of language personnel. After the
PELELIU campaign it was decided to send the members of the
language section to JICPOA for further training in trans
lation and interrogation in order that the officers and men
should not stagnate between operations. It was planned to
leave two officers and one enlisted man behind for admin
istrative and training purposes and to rotate them with two
others at a later date. The time element prevented the
carrying out of the second part of this plan, but eleven (11)
offioers and ten enlisted men (including one each from the
MP Company.the 1st Marines, and the 5th Marines) left for

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MfiWSSIFIE
Liaison:
PEARL H R O on 17 November, 1944, while one o f f i c e r en route ABR baok from eeoorting a group of PWe from PELELIU to the Main land arrived at FMF, Pao. on 16 November, 1946*and vafi a s s i g n ed to the same type of duty as the others assumed upon t h e i r arrival* All personnel returned to the Division between 17 January and 15 February, 1946 Suoh training was found to be invaluable to both o f f i c e r s and men, and a greater effort to have a l l personnel participate in t h i s training between future operations i s recommended*
Because liaison teams from the Division Intelligence Sec

tion proved to be of so much value during the previous oper
ation, it was decided to employ them again. Great profit was
derived from the lessons learned on that operation and a
period of intensive training was undergone by the officers
and men chosen to form the teams. A uniform procedure for
reporting to Division, adjacent, and lower echelons was care
fully worked out; printed forms for the making of written
reports were printed and distributed to the officer in charge
of each team; instruction was given in telephone and radio
procedure; and each team was carefully briefed and instructed
in its primary function, which was to make detailed periodic
reports to Division and to keep a constant stream of infor
mation flowing to Division and adjacent units.
After a period of training had been successfully brought
to a close, the Division Intelligence Section immediately
set to performing its functions in preparation and planning
for the coming operation. It concerned itself with the
procurement, study, and distribution of aerial photographs,
and maps, including relief maps. An Intelligence Estimate
and an Enemy Order of Battle were prepared. Personnel were
briefed, and the Division Intelligence Section was carefully
organized to perform its duties during the operation in the
most efficient fashion.
Photographs:
Photographs of the target area were furnished entirely
by JICPOA, distributed chiefly through the III Amphibious
Corps. The following sets of photographs were regej^
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Date Rec'd 27 Dec 44 27 Deo 44 28 Deo 44 9 9 9 5 8 Jan 45 Jan 45 Jan 45 Feb 45 Feb 45
Type Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Higi A l t . Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert-. Vert. Vert. Vert.
Scale
1:12,300 1:15,500 1:5,000 1:5,000 1:10,000 1:11,000 1:6,000 1:6,000
13 Feb 45 13 Feb 45
22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 3 Jan 45 3 3 Jan 45 Jan 45
14 Feb 45 16 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 20 Feb 45 25 Mar 45 25 Mar 45 5 Mar 45
1:5,000 1:6,000 1:10,000 ~ 1:10,000 1:3,000 1:8,000 1:8,000 1:10,000 1:15,000
Photo coverage varied from poor to excellent but cover age capable of Interpretation was limited to approximately 5,00 yards inland, from the landing beaches and a narrow s t r i p along the opposite (East) ooast which included the en r. t i r e uifjagtf HANTO. ^
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Beach coverage was especially good. A written report on

beaches and an annotated mosaic were included in the intell
igence annex to the operation order end a detailed pictorial
study of beach and reef conditions was prepared for each beach.
These studies included a mosaic of entire Division landing
area showing beach boundaries and defenses. A profile of the
reef, beach, and terrain immediately inland showing extent
and character of reef, obstacles, and water depths, a stereo-
pair, an oblique, and a panoramic sketch. This information
on each beach was reproduced on a single sheet and distributed
as far down the chain of command as platoon leaders* The
studies proved to be quite correct* Water depths did not
vary over 1 or 2 feet from the estimated depths and the char
acter of the reef was as stated. The oblique of the beach
was very poor but was the only one available at the time*
One excellent oblique was received on the morning of LOVB-Day
and would have proved very valuable had it been received in
time. No submarine photos were available and it was necess
ary to substitute the panoramic sketch which proved to be
Just as useful or perhaps even better as submarine photographs
are rarely clear in detail* They would be of very great
value in the preparation of the sketch, however.
If in future operations photographs of landing beaches,
particularly those fringed by a coral reef, were taken at
different states of tide and, what is especially important,
one sortie were made as near low tide as feasible, this
would make possible the location and determination of the
maximum amount of underwater obstacles, and, if the reef
should be drying or near drying, would be of the utmost val
ue in estimating water depths* The photographic scale should
not be smaller than 1:5,000.
The terrain report Included in the intelligence annex was
prepared largely from photographic information*
Enemy defenses and other military installations were
taken solely from photographs and the final interpretation was
presented as the Enemy Situation section of the intelligence
annex to the operation order* All installations were looated
by target area coordinates* An annotated mosaic was also pre
pared and distributed to all company oommanders and staff
personnel. Preliminary interpretation reports were prepared
and distributed as additional photography was received*
The interpretation of military installations suffered
from the lack of comparative sorties. Suitable photographs^ *
jt were taken on only three different dajtej,, 1<^ Q ^ j
28
22 January, 1945, and 1 March, 1945# Also the scales of com

parative sorties of the same area varies so greatly that an
accurate comparison was very difficult. An illustration
of this is the difference in the photographs reoeived of
IE SHIMA whose successive large scale sorties each covering
almost all of the island soon made it apparent that the
enemy were abandoning or had abandoned that island.
It is recommended that in future operations that every
effort be made to obtain as many comparative sorties of as
near the same scale as possible. This scale, for best re
sults, should not be smaller than 1:5,000. Photographic
coverage of this theater of operation was received taken by
high altitude bombers using only a six inch focal length
camera and consequently were of no use for interpretation
because of their small scale. Had a 40 inch camera been used,
the photography would have been most helpful.
Throughout the planning phase copies of the best photo
graphy received on the area were reproduced and distributed
to regimental and battalion intelligence sections as soon
as possible after receipt.
A report on island facilities within the Division Z of
A was prepared for the Engineer Battalion.
Maps:
Maps used in the OKINAWA operation were furnished by d i r e c t shipment from TENTH Army to 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n and Included t h e f o l l o w i n g : Scale 1:10,000 Designation Line Map "A" of Key Terrain i n D i v i s i o n Z of A. (Note: A 1:10,000 Photomap (mosaic) covering the i d e n t i c a l area as Line Map "A", p r i n t e d on the r e v e r s e s i d e of Line Map "A".) Line Map HBM of IE SHIMA. T a c t i c a l maps Red, Blue, Green, Brown, Black and Purple, each c o l o r d e s i g n a t i n g various s e c t i o n s of Target Area. (For color chart of a r e a s , see Annex Baker to Opn Plan 1 - 4 5 ) . 64th Road Map. Road and Planning MapÔKINAWA. Planning and Orient a t t a i n J 0*!tfM?> | J" - 7
1:10,000 1:25,000
1:50,000 1:100,000 l:25Q,000
*?
In addition, a special map, HAGUSHI B A H area, scale EC 1:5,000, was prepared by the Division Mapping and Repro duction Section of beaches in the Division Z of A and inland approximately 6,000 yards, information being taken from the 1:25,000 Tactical Map, plus additional information from the most recent aerial photographs. This special 1:5,000 "Beach Area" map was f i r s t introduced in the planning and opera tional phase of the PALAD campaign and distributed to com pany commanders and platoon leaders. More than 600 copies were printed and the maps furnished to battalions in large quantities. One (1) copy only of a complete set of hydrographic charts pertaining to the area between F R O A and JAPAN OMS were furnished the D*-2 Section by CinCPAC-CinCPOA. These charts were received several days prior to embarkation. The f i r s t shipment of t a c t i c a l maps was received by the 1st Marine Division on 6 February, 1945, and there after at irregular intervals u n t i l 27 February, 1945, the l a s t s i x (6) boxes arriving one day after embarkation. Final distribution of maps was made to units afloat following the return to BANIKA and PAVUVU after rehearsal maneuvers at GUADALCANAL. On 5 January, 1945, the Division Relief Mapping Unit com pleted work on a r e l i e f map of the l e t Marine Division beaches on OKINAWA. A plastelena map mounted on plywood, scale app roximately 1:7,000, was prepared from an aerial sortie of 10 October, 1944. Special attention was given not only to the beaches and area of the a i r f i e l d s within l i m i t s of the map, but also to the road network and v i l l a g e s then e x i s t i n g . Oil color was applied to the model for greater definition of d e t a i l of airports, v i l l a g e s and road networks. The Division also received r e l i e f maps of i t s Z of A from CinCPAC-CinCPOA, FMF, Pac, III Phib Corps and A.T.B # , Camp Bradford, Va. These maps, cast in both p l a s t e r and rubber, were of two s c a l e s , 1:5,000 and 1:10,000. Each regimental headquarters and assault battalion was furnished with a r e l i e f map of i t s Z of A. Other units r e c e i v ing r e l i e f maps were 1st Engineer Bn, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Amph Trac Bn, the l a t t e r unit Jointly sharing i t s map with the 8th Armd Amph Trac Bn.
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Final distribution of relief maps was made to all above-

named units 28 February, 1945, two days after embarkation.
This late distribution was due to the failure of relief maps
reaching PAVUVU in time for dissemination ashore.
It is recommended that in the planning phase of future
operations a standard scale relief map be distributed to assault
divisions in such quantity as will provide at least one complete
map for each divisional unit, plus attached units. It is fur
ther recommended that distribution of relief maps be made to
divisions in ample time for dissemination and study prior to
embarkation. Final distribution of relief maps in the OKINAWA
operation to units afloat between SUNLIGHT CHANNEL, BANIKA,
and PAVUVU posed a difficult problem.
Another difficulty encountered with regard to relief maps
resulted from lack of advance information from higher head-
Quarters as to the number of maps to be allotted the Division.
Accordingly, no plan could be made for ample distribution and
possible readjustment of numbers of maps issued to each organ
ization.
Enemy Order of Battle:
Aerial photographs provided the only estimates of enemy
strength in our Z of A. They showed positions for one batt
alion of infantry in the high ground inland from the YONTAN KATENA road; for elements of one battalion of infantry direct
ly behind the beaches in our left sector, and for elements of
another behind the beaches in our right sector. On the east
coast, positions for three battalions of infantry were shown
at the base of KATCHIN Peninsula. CD, AAA, small boat, and
supply installations also were Indicated.
Aboard ship, aerial photographs were received which showed
more than enough artillery positions to accommodate an artill
ery regiment. Concurrently, III Amphibious Corps estimated
one regiment of artillery in the Corps Z of A. Therefore, a
regiment of artillery was added to the estimate for the 1st
Marine Division Z of A.
Experience, freshly confirmed at IWO Island, indicated
probable support of the infantry with mortars, rockets, artill
ery, and tanks. A mortar battalion, a rocket detachment, a
battalion of divisional artillery, and a company of tanks
therefore were added to the estimate though no photographs
actually showed these weapons.
nrri s ^ i n r
s
- "Estimates of Order of Battle in the TENTH Army Z of A

used by the let Marine Division were those issued by higher
echelons, with the exoeption of the D-2's final estimate on
tyOVE minus nine. At that time late reports of shipping sight ed in OKINAWA waters appeared to demand a further Increase In
the enemy1s estimated strength*
Preparation and Distribution of D-2 Estimate and Study:
The D-2 Estimate of the Biemy Situation was completed
by 10 January, 1945 and formed part of the Intelligence
Annex to the Operation Plan for the OKINAWA Operation, On
5 February, 1945, a current Estimate was issued on the basis
of the latest information, and oh 23 March, 1945, Supple
ment No* 1 to the D-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation was
published at sea*
In accordance with orders from CG, TENTH Army, the
Division Intelligence Section organized the briefing of
troops aboard ship.
12.
OPERATIONS ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Initial planning within the First Marine Division for
this operation was based od the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Intelligence study of the NANSEI SHOTO, OKINAWA GUNTO in
particular. The large scale plan was laid down in ComPhibsPac
Operation Plan Al-45. First detailed planning was taken from
this order and the tentative operation plan of the Tenth Army,
received 8 December.
The first basic conceptwhich was to undergo some changes
during the campaignwas as follows:
Phase I - capture of KERAMO RETTO, KEISE JIMA and
OKINAWA JIMA south of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
Phase II - capture of IE JIMA, and the remainder of

OKINAWA as considered necessary.
Phase III - succesive seizure of OKINO DAITO JIMA and
MIYAKO JIMA.
Original concept for this Division was an assault on the
west coast of OKINAWA as a part of the III Amphibious Corps,
in turn an element of Expeditionary T roops, Task Force 56
XXIV Army Corps on the right and the Sixth Marine Division on
the left and push across tb the East coast of the island. It
was anticipated (after verbal discussions) that the Second
Marine Division would come out of Army reserve, pass through
and take the peninsula to our Southeast.
The original plan for this Division was slightly changed
with the receipt of the Corps Operation Plan on 3 February.
That order took away some land on the North of this Division's
Zone of Action, and the Southern boundary previously in doubt,
was verified as the BISHA GAWA. The scheme of maneuver placed
CT-5 on the right, CT-7 on the left and CT-1 in reserve. A
further revisionlater grantedwas requested in BLUE Beaches
One and Two, making them virtually the same width, thus
enabling one landing team to go ashore in entirety on one beach.
The Division established its own 0-a line short of I>3, to aid in control, and confirmed its plan to assist the Sixth Marine Division in the capture of YONTAN k%vtV^d ;t v rto* IJhdj ' *jufrt North of ouavZoine b%fAgtoiafy*.*; *\\ 1 ' *
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Tentative S'irsi, Marine Division Operational Plan 1-45 was

complexed on 2 February, but It had to be held up for slight
revisions on receipt of tne Corps oraer. The plan was issued on
5 February and on that day operations officers from all units
were briefed by G-3, Earlier, regimental and some separate
battalion commanders had been briefed as information became
available. About this time dissemination of information to
lower units began to enable them to initiate detail planning
This Division, embarked on TransRon 18 with the CP aboard
the US3 BURLEIGH, continued planningwith only minor changes
throughout rehersals and the approach to the target area.
SUPPLY ANNEX
NANSEI 3H0TC
The Division returned from the PALAU Operation in three
echelons, the last of which arrived at the rehabilitation area
in mid-November < Reequipping did not commence as soon as had
, been desiredo
Reequipping proceeded at a satisfactory rate0 However,
as in the past, the Division wan still receiving equipment and
supplies after transport and LSTs had been loaded. This was
particularly true in the erase of signal supplies0 Prior to
embarkation, orders were received to embark ninety days signal
supplies replenishments instead of the customary thirty days
replenishments,, This necessitated shipping bf air to the
serving depot many signal supply items In order to meet the
n
required deadline Steps were initiated early in the reequipping phase to
obtain fifty-five gallon water drumsc Previously, used
petroleum drums had been cleaned and sterilized and then used
as water containers This method was entirely unsatisfactory and
the problem of embarking five days water was solved by the
use of the new type galvanized water drum0
During the reequipping phase, full cooperation in all
supply matters was received from the Fourth Base Depot This contributed immeasurably to the high state of equipment
readiness of this Division for the OKINAWA Operation0

Logistical planning was based on two premises? first, that
landing beaches would be strongly defended, and secondly, that
the enemy would contest our advance determinedly from his
positions in the advantageous terrain.
For this reason, it was decided to land only dpeclfied
amounts of high priority orargo during the first dayQ High
priority cargo Included one unit of fire for all weapons, one
days' rations, one days0 water, sufficient fuel for tanks, DUKW's
and LVT's, necessary medical and signal supplies, fortification
materials and demolitions0 Priority cargo LCVP, LOK and LCT loads
were drawn up and presented to the Navy for final approval.
This plan, known as the, "hot cargo" plan, was then embodied in
CTF 53o2 Attack order0
I B ^ I I ittmri'ilffliy^'"^
The OKINAWA Operation was similar to the PALAU Operation

in that a fringing reef off the landing beaches would be
encountered and that a reef-transfer line would have to be
established, utilizing swing cranes on pontoon barges for
transferring cargo from shlpns craft to LVTs and DUKWso
Therein, all similarity between the two operations end.ed0
In the planning phase it was apparent that after beachheads
had been secured the problems of tactical and logistical
motor transport imposed by operations on a large land mass .
over a poor road net would be encountered,. It was decided that
all available shipping space should be utilized to transport
Division organic motor vehicles to the Target Area0
Logistical planning for the OKINAWA Operation was
simplified due to the fact that all units would be mounted
from either PAVUVU or BANIKA in the RUSSELL ISLANDS,, No complex
movement of ships to various mounting out areas was encountered
which greatly facilitated embarkation and loading
~* f
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MEDICAL ANNEX
Nansei 3hoto
MATERIAL
Upon return to PAVUVU from the PALAU Islands It was
necessary to reequip the medical department with many units
which had been lost in action0 Approximately one-half of
all medical units were lost in the PELELIU operation.
The Medical Supply Facilities at GUADALCANAL and
ESPIRITU SANTOS gradually supplied most of the necessary equipment and supplies to bring all medical activities up
to standard strength,, In many cases, due to shortages at
nearby medical supply facilities it was necessary to request
supplies from PEARL HARBORo The fault seems to lie in lack
of coordination between the various supply facilities.
Empty First Aid Jungle Kits for most all combat troops
were available, but there were no supplies with which to
equip them, e 0 g 0 , no vials for salt and Atabrlne tablets
and no bottles for fungicide solution. Such a situation is
regrettable because theê kits were used both at CAPE GLOU
CESTER and PELELIU and were found to be far superior to the
standard first aid packet. Approximately 7000 were equipped
by utilizing such containers as could be procured by devious
mean So
Efforts were made to obtain adequate supplies of medi
cinal Brandy0 In combat, brandy has been found to be very
valuable in the treatment of combat fatigue, shock and ex
posure cases. However, due to disapproval of requisitions
by higher medical echelons, an adequate supply could not be
obtainedo
Plans were made to make extensive use of serum-albumin
in accordance with numerous directives from the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery,,
All supplies and equipment not carried by combat units
were dispersed for transportation to the five medical com
panies.
^1
- 1
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V** **
SANITATION
Three sanitary squads were trained to operate with
each combat team to spray DDT on all bodies and assist in
mosquito and fly control. On previous operations these
squads had proven invaluable Their work was to be later
supplemented by the Malaria Control Unit. Prefabricated
seats were prepared and issued to all units for use on emp
ty 50 gallon drums as latrines. Each drum was to be buried
to about 3/4 of Its height and the seats close fitting to
avoid entrance and egress of flies. It was believed that
these fixtures would keep all the usual gastro-intestinal
diseases at a minimum. These drums also were to have 5 gal
lons of DDT in oil added to them before use.
All units were fully instructed in the value of sani
tation while in oombat.
PERSONNEL
Each combat team was assigned litter bearers for each
rifle company to evacuate casualties from the front lines
to aid stations. These litter bearers were trained in first
aid and the evacuation of casualties*
Each infantry battalion had 40 hospital corpsmen assign
ed, permitting t he use of two corpsmen to each platoonB
All medical personnel were brought up to authorized
strength.
CLASSIfliO
3d
-CHAPTER BE TRAINING # REHEARSALS SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -IMANSEI SHOTO
TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Nansei Shoto
TRAINING
<
Training for the NANSEI SHOTO Campaign cannot be said to

have started with the First Marine Division's return to its
base camp in the RUSSELLS during late October and early
November of 1944 after a hard-fought selge in the Southern
PALAUS. Training of the Division had bnen continuous since
it struck the first offensive blow of the war against the
Japanese on GUADALCANAL in August of 1942 It had continued
throughout the campaigns in N T / BRITAIN and the PALAUS, and
E/ the four months prior to OKINAWA were merely added to the
sum total.
True, the organization that landed for rehearsals on
GUADALCANAL in March of 1945 was almost a totally different
organization than landed on the same island in 1942, for its
rotation and training of personnel had been a continuous process*
When the Division embarked for OKINAWA, approximately
one-third of its men had been in two actions against the enemy,
one-third had faced him once, and the remainder had seen no action
Most of these replacements were awaiting the Division at PAVUVU
upon its return from PALAU and received the full benefit of
four months rigourous training in addition to their earlier
indoctrination in the United States*
Training was hampered somewhat in the RUSSELLS because of
the lack of suitable areas and the necessity of reaching these
areas by limited water transportation. This was overcome
for the most part by sending the artillery and regimental
combat teams to GUADALCANAL for large scale field maneuvers.
This was accomplished in rotation with one Division problem
being held in late January. Basic training, small unit problems,
and Division specialized schools were held near the base camp
at PAVUVU. Special emphasis was placed on preparing the
Division for the possibility of a type warfare it had not
faced in previous campaigns. For the first time it was landing
as an integral part of a much larger landing force. It was
invading a large land mass which contained extensive road nets,
large inhabited areas, cities and villages, large numbers
of enemy civilians, and types of terrain differing in many
respects from the jungles of GUADALCANAL and NEW BRITAIN,
-1
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In addition to training for these new types of warfare,

experienced hands in the Division were schooled in the use
of new weapons and the replacement personnel was thoroughly
Indoctrinated in the roles they were to play as a part of the
Division team. Included among the weapons not previously
used by this Division were truck-mounted rocket la;, richer s .and
certain secret weapons still in the experimental stage.
Defense against chemical attack was stressed in training
with the growing possibility of the enemy's use of chemical
agents as we pressed ever closer to the Japanese homeland,,
Also encouraged by this factor was the training in defense
against paratroops and indoctrination in the proper attitude
to be adopted toward hostile civiliansa problem not -pre
viously faced by this organization.
REHEARSALS
The first days of March found the First Marine Division
undertaking the initial steps in its fourth operation aîlnst
Japanese Imperial Forces. Some four months after its return
from the Southern PALAUS, the Division was embarked for
rehearsals and transport to the target area. Functioning as
a part of the IIIAmphibious Corps and the Tenth Army and
embarked in naval Transport Squadron 18, units of this
. Division sailed from the RUSSELL Islands on 1 March, v vjund
for the training area off TA33AFAR0NG-A, GUADALCANAL for
rehearsalso
Preliminary maneuvers wepe initiated the following day
with emphasis on disembarking practice and shlp-to-shor^
drill. Only scattered communications personnel were actaally
put ashore. On 3 March, larger scale landings, with the
assault units going ashore and including simulated naval
gunfire and air support, were staged. There was little man
euver ashore since the Division already had held extensive
land warfare problems; however, communications received a
thorough testing. CT-1, Division reserve, was disembarked
and maneuvered away from the transport area but did not land.
After a critique for unit commanders and various staffs
aboard the Corps command ship on 4 March the activities of
3 March were repeated on the 5th, emphasis still being
placed on ship-to-shore movement.
A full scale dress rehearsal was staged on 6 March, All
ftnifts* .with the,,exception of the Division Reserve, were landed
J; lite*-Division- t P was. established asljpijpjâ/jiggmmunicatlons
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again received a thorough test in an extensive command post

exerciseo Some supplies were taken ashore for limited beach
party activity and the exercise included real and simulated
naval gunfire and air support. In the late afternoon of the
6th all units, less CT-1, returned to the RUSSELLS for
refueling of ships and replenishment of supplies. *
On 7 March, CT-1 conducted brief landing exercises, then
returned to the RUSSELLS. The Division, except for those units
embarked on the Northern Tractor Flotilla which departed for
ULITHI on 12 March remained in the RUSSELLS until the 15th.
Most elements spent some time ashore at PAVUVU and BANIKA for
final conditioning of equipment for combat, recreation, and
conditioning hikes.
The complete convoy rendezvoused at BANIKA on 12 March.
With receipt of ComTaskFor 53 Attack Order A405-45 final phases
of the planning were completed.
*"* i
- CHAPTER Yl LOADING t EMBARKATION SPECIAL ACTION QEPOQT NANSEI SHOTO
5! " " PIT"

HP ^ ^
^5
LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Nansei Shoto
Embarkation of the First Marine Division on Transport
Squadron 18 and Northern Tractor Group began 17 February
1945. All supplies and ammunition were loaded by 4th Base
Depot at BANIKA, Troops and combat equipment were loaded
by this Division at PAVUVU.
Planning for Transron 18 was done under difficult con
ditions. Ship's characteristics, as furnished,.were not
correct, and no characteristics were available for two ships0 Ship's TQMs were slow in reporting to this Headquarters, and
for this reason loading was delayed on the Jefferson and
Betelgeuse. The Andromeda had taken both tween decks of num
ber three hatch for ship's space,, This was a serious loss
as number three hatch is serviced by a thirty ton boom.
The forms required by FMF, Pac, are much too detailed

and difficult for the average line officer to complete. When there is not sufficient time for trained TQM personnel to do
this work, the Troop TQMs become confused and make many er
rors. The Cargo and Loading Analysis shows no information
not covered by the Stowage Plan or Profile Plan; the Con
solidated Vehicle Table only repeats information shown on
the Consolidated UP&T Table and the Vehicle Debarkation
Priority Table. It is recommended that more emphasis be
placed on the Stowage Plan and Profile Plan and that re
petitious forms be eliminated.

Loading progressed as planned. Unloading priorities
were followed. The 12th Special NCB, under Commander Naval
Base, RUSSELL ISLANDS, furnished necessary stevedores for
the loading of supplies at BANIKA. The loading,of ships at
BANIKA was continually in advance of schedule, due to the
full cooperation of the 4th Base Depot and 12th Special NCB.
Since the harbor and other port facilities at PAVUVU were
limited, some difficulties were encountered. However, the
schedule was met and loading completed by 26 February 1945.
All ships were slightly overloaded. It is believed
that thirty-two days rations and thirty days fuel are in
excess of that which should be embarked in assault ship
ping.
LST planning was based on information from higher h(
quarters which stated that six (6) LSTWiwuWfcaflrjr*!* '
n
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-l
After plans were made on that basis, the Division was.^ % assigned eleven (11) LSTs carrying LCTso This lovered * the available space by fifteen thousand (15000) square feeto Furthermore, all LSTs carrying an LOT had 12" 12" timber shoring on the tank deck to support the main deck which greatly hindered loading and movement of LVTso The tactical plan of employing LSTs was changed just
prior to loading* No representative of the LST Flotilla
was available during planning0 Arrival dates were unknown
and substitutions were made daily0 Proper planning was
consequently impossible
Many LST Captains firmly believed that their ships should not carry fuel or ammunition. Navy ammunition on top side was not stowed according to plan, and in many cases had to be restowed in order to load vehicles top side* Captains received confusing orders* For example, one LST left BANIKA for PAVUVU and was next heard of in TULAGI. Information concerning personnel and cargo which would be aboard LSTs upon their arrival at PAVUVU was Inaccurateo LST 949 arrived carrying 162 Navy passengers This worked an undue hardship on assault troops0 No loading schedule for LSTs could be followedo
Troops were alerted and broke camp but LSTs did not arrive
Other LSTs arrived unannounced, but with resultant delay
in loadingo
In spite of difficulties encountered, the embarkation
schedule was met and loading accomplishedo It is believed
that if recommendations made herein are followed, future
movements will be simplified,,
48
CHAPTER, m .MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SWOTO...
OtC'X'W
*?
r.ccM.'tn *:.f L * * * ~ h*
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-WW*
MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE
Nansei Shoto
Command post afloat for the First Marine Division was
established aboard the U3S APA BURLEIGH, flagship of TransRon
18, at 1600 on 28 February, lying in MAQUITTI BAY, RU3SELL
ISLANDS* The rear echelon of this organization remained
temporarily at the Division base camp at PAVUVU.
Portions of TransRon 18, with the reinforced division
embarked, sailed from the RUSSELLS at approximately 0600
1 March, 1945, bound for TASSAFARONGA, GUADALCANAL and seven
days of amphibious rehearsals before sailing for the target
On 6 March, following rehearsals,, ships returned to the
RUSSELLS for replenishment of supplies and refueling The
entire division convoy had rendevouzed in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL off
BANIKA ISLAND by 12 March, and on that same date the Northern
Tractor Flotilla, carrying assault elements of the Division, depar
ted for the target. At 0600 on 15 March Transport Group Baker
(TransRon 18), under command of Commodore Moyer, weighed anchor
in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL and departed the RUSSELLS for ULITHI in
the WESTERN CAROLINES, From that time to 21 March, this
Division was at sea enroute to ULITHI along a route generally
parallel to the Northern coast of NEW GUINEA
The convoy dropped anchor at approximately 1400 21 March
at ULITHI and remained there until 1530 on 27 March at which
time it departed for the NANSEI SHOTO, While in the CAROLINES
troops were sent ashore for conditioning and recreation and
final planning conferences were held aboard the various
flagships. After departure, all troops were thoroughly briefed
on the coming operation, making extensive use of materials
provided by various Intelligence sections and the Tenth Army.
All hands received literature relative to the target area,
officers held daily lectures and conferences, and detailed
maps and relief maps were placed in the enlisted men's mess halls.
In the morning of 31 March UDT reconnaissance teams were
taken on board from APDs, bringing late information on reefs,
beaches, tide conditions, and enemy shore defenses* All
reports were favorable, and as the convoy moved toward the
transport area it received word that preliminary air and naval
preparat3^m^4E|[j^Bafiiê^Lln6 o n schedule with excellei
ncf *
News was also received, as L day neared, of the successful

preliminary landings in the KERAMA RETTO, Troops listened
daily to the Radio Tokyo version of Allied intentions in the
RYUKYUS
Following heavy seas for two days out of ULITHI the approach
weather was ideal. For almost the entire period there was
overcast with somewhat limited visibility, and the sea running
moderate swells.
There was no attempted enemy interception and the convoy
reached the transport area on schedule completely without
incident and with no losses to enemy action.
DECLASSIFIED
^ ^ ^ Y - v v ^ r - rffc.
* ^ w i* n ^- ^ n 11,. 1
CMAPTEQ 3ZH
ASSAULT PMASE

NANSEI SHOTO
Narrative Division Field Orders Tank Support Annex Artillery Annex Naval Gunfire Annex A i r Support Annex
3inal Annex Engineer Annex Logistics Annex Shore Party Annex Medical Annex Personnel Annex
-lU'-.USSUM
ASSAULT NARRATIVE
Nansei Shoto
When assault waves, of the First Marine Division surged onto
the western slopes of OKINAWA JIMA on Easter morning of 1945
they cane expecting to wage one of the costliest battles yet
fought in the war against Japan and three days later on the
eastern beaches they were still looking for that battle. The
Division had raced across its nine-mile-wide zone of action
virtually "standing upH against light,scattered resistance
To the South, Array units of the XXIV Corps,' also operating
against negligible opposition, reached the east coast with
similar speed and swung South for a drive on the center of enemy
resistance above NAHA, principle city and capital of the island.
The American advance continued without pause till it reached the
Japanese defensive network running across the island generally
North of the NAHA-SHURI Line. There it was nalted by the enemy for
the first time, and our forces paused for an extended period to
bring reinforcements ashore and allow for extensive air, artillery
and naval gunfire preparation before renewing the attack.
The Sixth Marine Division, in assault on the left of this
organization, sped through its lightly held area and by 16 April
had elements patrolling the northern tip of the island. The only
heavy opposition found in its sector was on MOTOBU Peninsula, a
large area Jutting into the CHINA SEA north of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
Initial action in the NANSEI SHOTO was something of a departure
from earlier campaigns of this Division, not only in the
surprising lack of resistance but in the type of warfare. Here
was the blitz-style war of speed and movement, combined with its lat
stages with the same type aggressive patrolling and mopping up
that this Division had seen earlier on GUADALCANAL and CAPE
GLOUCESTER.
The rolling checkerboard terrain of this Division's zone of
aetlon on OKINAWA was Ideally suited for defensive tactics* Most
of the First Marine Division sector was excellent defensive
country, gently rolling, but covered with a multitude of finger
ridges and interlocking valleys. A vast part of the area was
covered with emplacements in varying states of readiness^plainly
indicating earlier Jap Intentions to defend this area. The usual
caves, many of them civilian shelters, honeycombed the entire zone.
The hills and terraced fields were interlaced by, as one observer
put it, "an excellent network of very poor roads." Most of the
streams were spanned by narrow bridges which the enemy had made
littii^ntiMPt to destroy. The principle bridge over the BISHA
YONTAN Airfield had excellent command of all landing beaches

and observation to the other coast and far to the north and south.
The only thing lacking In the defensive setup was the most
Important: personnel to defend the ground.
Defense of this Division1s zone of action was left almost
entirely in the hands of scattered home defense units after the
major Imperial forces withdrew to the south. Bnemy action was of
a purely harassing nature carried on by small groups for the most
part and aimed only at slowing our progress. Principle Jap
efforts were placed on night infiltration, a maneuver with which
this Division was thoroughly familiar from past experience.
But the Jap's scattered and half-hearted effort* here were a far
cry from his usual destructive strikes.
Such was not the type campaign expected by Marines of the
First Division while standing off the west coast of OKINAWA at
dawn of 1 April and watching the naval bombardment that climaxed
seven days of heavy preparation. The pre-landing pounding
started at 0530, some 20 minutes prior to dawn. Transport squadron
18 reached the transport area at approximately 0510 and began
immediate preparations to launch the assault troops. The early
morning weather was ideal; cool, with a moderate breeze, calm seas
and a slight overcast. Visibility cleared rapidly and by 0700 was
unlimited though the target was still partially obscured from
seaward by low-lying horizon clouds and haze.
Our air support approximately 0650. convoy, but most of aircraft or knocked arrived over the target in force at
There were scattered enemy air attacks on the
the raiders were Intercepted by our carrier
down by 8hips anti-aircraft.
This Division went ashore according to plan over Beaches Blue 1

and 2 and Yellow 1 and 2 a total of approximately 2400 yards in
width. The off-shore reef extended seaward on an average of
600-700 yards, and, though not mined or artificially obstructed,
offered the familiar problems to amphibian vehicles. Particular
difficulty was experienced with the circular reef guarding the
approaches to our left flank beaches.
Assault waves, spearheaded by armored amphibians, encountered
difficulty in crossing the reef and were delayed in reaching the
shore despite lack of heavy enemy fire. Fighter strikes were on
schedule with the lifting of naval bombardment Just before How-
Hour at 0830. First waves were on all beaches at 0839, with air
observation reporting no damage to landing craft in the initial
waves,
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J?I
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Flra$ reports from assault elements of the Division reported

very light resistance with all units moving rapidly inlando Air
spot reported our troops pouring ashore and racing inland standing
up 0 All assault BLTs were ashore by 0920 with beaches clearing
rapidly unimpeded by wreckage0 CT-7 on the left had advanced
through the village of 30BEP first priority objective, by 0940*
Our attack" continued to progress against very light opposition

throughout the morning0 Because.of rapid movement there was little
information from front-line units. Other units of the Division
continued to pour ashore, and by noon first elements of our
artillery (4-11) had been landed,, The assault wave of the First
Tank Battalion landed at approximately 11500
Delay in embarking the tanks caused many of thera to come in
at low tide late in the afternoon and three machines were lost
on the reefu Five others were damaged but remained operational*
Two companies were ashore by 16300
The Commanding General and the Division CP0 arrived ashore
at 1630 and set up on the outskirts of S0BE Front line units were
immediately ordered to halt their advance^ establish a defensive
line for the night and carry out extensive patrolling to their
fronto Artillery was ashore and emplaced before nightfall ready
to furnish necessary fires* Our advance on Love-Day was halted
on a line running generally from IRAMMIYA on the north to the
Division boundary below MAKIBARUo The Sixth Marine Division on
the left was abreast of this unit, having crossed YONTAN Aifield
against light opposition, and to the south the Army had advanced
beyond the L/3 line*
A summary of the day's activity showed an almost complete
lack of contact with the enemy and negligible casualties within
this Division,, No mines were encountered on thebeaches, roads,
or routes of'egress from the beaches0
There was no intelligence report on estimated enemy casualties
for the first day, but few were possible because of lack of
contacto Our forces had captured 76 Okinawans, all civilians of
no military value* These civilians reported that the last Jap
forces had.been moved from the First Marine Division sector two
days prior to the American landings. In the Array sector two POWs
said the bulk of the enemy troops -had been withdrawn to the south,
a fact which was later proved to be true0
By nightfall all beaches including Yellow 3 which had not
been used for landing, were open to traffic and unloading of
priori^yûpp*W.es continued throughout the night
-3
<T?
Weather continued clear after dark, but there was no enemy

ground activity in the Divislon~zone, Enemy planes were over
the convoy, at dusk but were driven off by intensive ack-ack from
the ships. Two more Red alerts were sounded at 0410 and 0540 but
no enemy aircraft were sighted.
On the second day of the invasion CT-7 and CT-5 jumped off
at 0715 and 0725 respectively in accordance with plans drafted
the previous evening at a conference between the Commanding
General and hnit commanders. The attack was continued in perfect
weather. It was cool in the early morning with a bright sun
and unlimited visibility. No artillery preparation was laid
down before the advance, but all' guns were available on call for
support fires.
The attack, spearheaded by extensive advance patrols, continued
to progress satisfactorily against light resistance throughout
the^ day. Our aircraft were in complete control of the air at all
times. Our rate of advance was slowed somewhat later in the day
by difficulty of supply created by the"*'speed with which our units
were moving and by lack of good roads into the increasingly
rough terrain.
In the late afternoon two battalion's of CT-1 were moved into
position along the Division's right boundary with one battalion
up and one back to assist the advance of CT-5 through its rapidly
widening zone of action. The Third Battalion, First Marines
passed into Division Reserve. Our forces were still unable to
locate the center of enemy resistance and at 1600 our position
was stabilized for the night at a line running generally along
the L/5 line in the north and slightly short of that phase line In
the south. Our casualties up to this time were 3 KIA and 18 WIA.
Twenty Japs had been reported killed and 330 civilians had been
interned.
Field Order 1-45 was issued at 1630, calling for the attack
to be resumed the following day at 0730 with the combat teams to
continue the advance to the L/10 line. In addition, the First
Reconnaissance Co was ordered to reconnoiter the area along our
right boundary to the east coast. By this time the Army,
operating over easier terrain, was well in advance of our forces
and this patrol was ordered out in an attempt to establish contact
laith Army units on our right.
First enemy infiltration was reported on the night of 2-3
April. The Seventh Marines lost seven men killed and seven
wounded in destroying a Jap force of 25, but the First and Fifth
regiments reported no night activity. Two Red alerts were
sounded at 0130 and 0330, but again no enemy aircraft were over
the Division zone.
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**
In continued clear weather the attack Jumped off on 3 April

In column formation with extensive patrolling to the front0 Our
ever widening zone of action prohibited the "hand-in-hand" advance
of some amall Island operations and our units were able to
maintain contact and clear their areas only by patrolling to
the flanks and to the fronto Opposition was virtually non existant on the right and light on the left as all three combat
teams pushed forwardo By 1600 advance elements of the First
Marines had reached the east coastj the main bodies of CT-1 and
CT-5 had reached L/10 and were continuing to push the attackc
CT-7 encountered one enemy strong point just short of L/10 line
and was forced to halt for the night In that area0 All troops
were ordered to halt on the most advantageous ground at 17000
The First Reconnaissance Co under the command of First
Lieutenant Robert J0 Powell, on 3 April began a series of patrols
which were to cover virtually the entire Division zone of action0
During the morning motorized units of this company had reached
the vicinity of IKEBARU-NUPUNJA, and continued along the right
boundary to MIYAZA against no opposition It was then ordered
by radio to continue Its patrols throughout the KATCHIN Peninsula
and up the east coast road network to the village of HIZA0NNAo
Only enemy military activity observed was a lightly-held tank trap
at TA 8591 So The patrol returned to headquarters before darko
After nightfall there were scattered infiltration attemts In
areas of CT-5 and CT-7P but other ground activity was negligible0
There were three Red alerts during the night but no enemy aircraft
reported over the First Marine Division areac
Darkness of the Division"s fourth day ashore saw our initial
zone of action virtually secured some 11 days ahead of the
proposed schedule The attack on 4 April jumped off without
artillery preparation at 07300 The First and Fifth Marines moved rapidly against very little resistance and reached the east coast (L?15) during the afternoon In addition OT-1 occupied the
KATOHIN Peninsula and both regiments consolidated and prepared
defensive positions,, CT~7 on the left continued to meet moderate resistance, particularly in the vicinity of INUBI. Its advance
continued^, however, and by nightfall the front-line battalions
had reached the coast and were in contact with the Fourth Marines of the Sixth Division,,

The Division C P o was displaced forward during the day to

8991 To Intensive patrolling was initiated Immediately in all
sectors, the Reconnaissance Company covering the area forward
of the Division Command Post and in the vicinity of INUBI where
the enemy was still offering sporadic resistance; and all regiments
patrolled back to L/10. Third Battalion^, First Marines, Division
Reserve, patrolled rear areas in an effort :o mop up any by-passed enemy positions0
With the entire zone of action, excluding a few enemy pockets

in our hands, the true situation of Japanese defense still was
cloudedo At this time the Army still was pushing southward
against light resistance and the Sixth Marine Division continued
to push to the north against only scattered enemy groups Some
79 Japs had been killed by this Divislonin its push across the
ieland two POWs were in our hands, and 500=600 civilians had
been internedo
In the early evening of 4 Aprilp 3-1, with one platoon of
tanks attached, was ordered to relieve CT-29 (6th Mar Dlv) in
defense of YONTAN? Airfield as a part of III Corps Reserve0
Temporary plans also were formulated for releasing CT-7 to Corps
reserve to assist the Sixth Marine Division in its drive to the
northo
No air activity marked the night of 4 April, but there was a
slight increase in ground infiltrationso It was difficult to
determine if this was the activity of Imperial forces^. Home Guard
outfits, or armed civilians<, Approximately 45 Japs were killed
in the CT-7 zone with light losses among our troops0 The Nips
were reported using rifles, grenades, bayonets and "idiot sticks?
The fifth day of April in actuality was the start of Phase II in the NANSEI; ^ 3H0T0 Operation,, On that date this Division began to devote Itself primarily to defensive activity5 though extensive mopping up remainedo All units started heavy patrol activity back to the L/10 line, blowing some 50 caves and killing approximately 70 Japso Units of OT-1 patrolled the island of YABUCHI off the east coast against no resistance, and finding no military installations,, The enemy actually was showing increased activity^ but in small scattered groups behind our lines;; there was no organized resistance0 Our casualties up to this time showed 12 KIA and 34 WIA.
During the morning of 5 Aprils friendly F6Fs operating from
carrier support forces, strafed and bombed units of the First
Marines on KATCHIN Peninsula0 One man was killed and 14 wounded
during the at tack,
Civilians, now convinced that they would not receive the
expected harsh treatment from the American forces^ were pouring in
i i ever-increasing numbers^, heavily burdening Military Government
i and Military Police facilities Concentration areas were
established at central point^ and the internees were shuttled into
these sectors as quickly as possible to avoid their interference
with military activity0
The Division reserve was sent to Y02JTAN Airfield for defense
of that sector on Corps order and Field Order 2=45 was issued,
calling for two battalions of CT-7 Jo page ^nder^Cpfrps^contrpJ.0
The order also outlined the zones (^^spBlsi^ffyL^c^rdefenSl of
m,^
7 .m**
|J , ir L ft %# * ' " * l"
ASSIFIED
the Division Z of A*
--* *
' * ' W * . '': ... * .> .'
* ;-4
,
With the Array scoring good progress in Its drive to the

south for the high ground overlooking the city of NAHA, and
the Sixth Marine Division reorganizing to continue its northward
pushp unloading was proceeding rapidly over all beaches, and
routes of supply to inland areas were being constantly improved
by engineer units By 5 April this reinforced Division was
estimated at 85 per cent unlosded0
Light rains in scattered areas began in the early evening
but they proved no hinderance to military operation0 Some air
^tivity was reported over shipping units lying offshore, but. no
Hiid alerts were sounded in the Division areae Scattered ground
infiltration continued with some Japs being killed in the CT-7
area and in the vicinity of the Division CoPo
The First Marine Division wasln a more or less static
defensive position on 6 April0 Units took over the defensive
sectors assigned them in Field Order 2=45 and continued extensive
patrol activity, blasting caves and rounding up civilians Few
snemy soldiers still were operating in our sector0 CT-7, less
:he Third Battalion, was moved to the vicinity of ISHIKAWA from
which it would operate as Corps Reserve0 Also on this date
III Phib Corps Operation Order'2-45 took most of the attached units
from this Division and placed them under Corps control as service
troopSo
The sixth of the month brought the first signs of a major
Japanese attempt to salvage something from the OKINAWA debacle0
The enemy made large-scale air attempts to reach our shipping
off the island, but most of his aircraft were intercepted by our
fighters with excellent results.before they reached 0KINAWAo
Those that did succeed in breaking through encountered intense AA
fire which was highly effective0 Some damage was done to naval
units offshore, but no attacks were made on troop areaso
A new estimate of our casualties placed the figures at 53
killed, 99 wounded, with 104 listed as non-battle casualties0
Japanese dead were estimated at 335 with 11 POWs In our hands.
Hundreds of civilians, most of them frightened and confused but
cooperative^ continued to pour In daily0
Unloading was almost completed and though most engineer units still were operating with line outfits they were maintaining muchused bridges, Improving supply roads, and installing water distillation unltSo Water provided something of a problem; all streams and wells had been condemned by the Division Surgeon and water no in tfr-~- at ill too few in numbeHj^î$) |he#o^yr$<|upc!e$*c l
supplTf^f* , *
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The air battle raging off OKINAWA continued into the night
of 6~? April with the results going increasingly in American
favor though some Navy surface units were reported hit. There
was intermittent AA fire throughout the night, but no, bombs or
Red alerts in the Division ares,, Ground activity was nil.
Our patrols were operating in cooler weather and light rains
on 7 April Japs were still present in this sector and carrying
on harassing activity, but groups of four or five now were the
largest encountered by this organization0
By this date, morning and dusk patrols of Marine fighter units
were operating from YONTAN Airfield In support of our ground forces
and carrier-based aircraft0
The picture of the Japanese defensive plan on OKINAWA had been
greatly clarified by 8 April. The situation still was static in
the Marine's sector, but the XXIV Corps were now running into stiff
resistance in the south0 The enemy held strategic high ground
and was well dug in throughout the rugged terrain north of NAHA
and was reported using massed artillery in that area almost
the first instance in Pacific warfare0 It was now evident that
the Japanese commander Intended to make his stand in the south of
the island and had moved the majority of his troops and equipment
to that area. Intelligence estimated some 53,000 Japs in that
zone, including the 62nd Division, the 24th Division, and the
44th Independent Mixed Brigade. In the late evening of the
8th three battalions of the Eleventh Marines were ordered to stand
by to move to the support of the Army0
Patrolling remained the primary activity in the First Division
sector0 First Tank Bn carried out reconnaissance of all road
nets and drafted plans to furnish support in case of enemy counter
measures such as a paratroop landing or amphibious counter-
invasion,, All units reconnoitered beaches in a search for suicide
boats, motor torpedo boats, or midget submarines with no results.
Engineers were making steady progress on roads and bridges and had now put in sufficient water points to alleviate the previous shortage0 Light rains continued into the night and there was limited air
activity. Some fire was received in the sector of the First
Marines but it was traced to friendly units in the south.
Infiltration continued despite the fact that Division Intelligence
had ordered all able-bodied men to be treated as prisoners of war.
During the day two young men posing as women had been captured
and all indications pointed to their beijig- soldiers.
JI I ( * I /;p
* is J^r|
70
, #
^ *
-*
Our casualties to dates 41 KIA, 163 WIAQ Enemy dead was

placed at 371 and we had 13 Japanese prisoners of war0
Enemy activity in the central part of the island was almost
at a standstill on 9 April0 This Division issued Field Order 3-45
reassigning defensive sectors after the departure of three
artillery battalions that morning to the XXIV Corps and redrafting
the task organization for units still assigned to the Division,,
Third Battalion, First Marines was returned to this organization
by III dorps at 0800o The only Red alert of the night was sounded
at 1905 but again there were no planes over the Division zone0
In the pre-dawn hours of 10 April the earlier light rains
became a downpour that continued throughout the day Roads were
whipped Into a mire by heavy traffic, and by evening transportation
was severely hampered. There were no reports of any enemy~actlvlty0
Small-scale enemy action flared slightly on 11 April0 Several
patrols of CT-1 were involved in fire fights and there was increased
sniper activity,, Tanks were called in to knock down one small
town housing a sniper oest 0O One of the Japs involved In the
fighting carried an A C - pass All civilians were now being headed
M3 into the southern peninsula to aid in their control0 The heavy
rains ceased in the early morning, but the weather continued cloudy
and the cold was almost intense to troops just up from extended
duty in the tropics
Ground activity continued light through the night and into
the 12th of April, but with improving weather air action again
became intense,. There were repeated night raids in the vicinity
of YONTAN Airfield despite heavy anti-aircraft fire Air action
continued into the 12th with several large-scale battles being
fought some miles off the island,, Our interceptors continued to
hold most enemy planes out of range
In the afternoon the weather cleared, bringing bright sunshine
and warm temperatures* Roads and bivouac area dried quickly,
greatly aiding construction work and supply,, All Division units
continued patrol workmotorized wherever possible.
One platoon of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, then under Corps control, was ambushed on a patrol along the ISHIKAWA Isthmus with three men killed and twenty-four wounded The ambush was well-planned and carried out by an estimated fxifty well-organized JapSo In the afternoon the First Battalion, Eleventh Marines was sent to join the mass of artillery forming in the south to support the Army drive on the center of Jap >a\ oAA&oft a ^ncr thfl NAHA-SHURI Line,,
4*'
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^SifiED
The situation saw.no change on the 13th of April, There was little activity in the First Marine Division sector, but four tanks of "CM Co, First Tank. Battalion fired 300 roundstheir first of the campaignwhile conducting a harassing indirect fire mission for the -Second Battalion, 3evetith Marines A house, believed to conceal an enemy C0Po, was knocked out with nine rounds,, On 15 April, Third Battalion, First Marines was moved to the
north, of the island and placed under the control of the Sixth
Marine Division to assist that Organization in covering its
extensive areac By this date the Sixth Division *|&$- encountering
stiff 'organized resistance on the MOTOBU Penin'sula0 All units of
CT-7 w e r e ^turned at the same time to this Division and our zone
of responsibility was extended to the road net marking the northern
boundary of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus0 All units continued patrol
!
activity but there was no contact with the enemy0 Air activity again held the spotlight on the night of the 15th0 There was repeated harassing action by Nip planes that managed to
sneak through our fighter screen Ack-ack downed two enemy
aircraft in the area of CT-70 Two bombs were dropped in that
sector bu' caused no damage, and one low-flying enemy craft was
over the Division C 0 P 0 but attempted no strafing or bombingo On
the ground, the Seventh Marines reported scattered activity and
four Japs killed, but all other sectors were quiet0
Sixteen April marked the invasion of IE SHIMA, three miles

off the west coast of OKINAWA by the 77th Infantry Division. On
the same day the First Marine Division issued Field Order 4=45,
reassigning defensive sectors to cover its expanded area*
Patrolling continued with the only enemy activity still in the zone
of GT~7c One unit of that regiment surprised a group of 12 Japs
eating near a cluster of straw huts in a concealed valley and wiped
out the entire group in a brief skirmish,. Night activity was
negligible; Service Battalion killed one Jap carrying a hand
grenade near the Division dumpo
The next two days saw continued quiet in the Division sector,,
On the 17th the Third Armored Amphibian Battalion^ less companies
B C" and M D", reverted back to Division control The following day
plans were made to send the Reconnaissance Company and some of
these tractors on a patrol of the four islands lying off KATCHIN
Peninsula*, CT-5 was assigned to garrison these islands, which had
previously been reconnoitered by Array and FMF troops, following
the initial patrols0
On both the 17th and 18th there were the usual early evening
Red alerts, but no activity over this sectore m
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Assault Narrative
Phase III
During the Spring days of late April the First Marine
Division continued its small-scale "guerilla war" in the
rolling country of central OKINAWA against scattered remnants
of a Japanese delaying force and waited for the Tenth Army's
decision on its future employment. On 27 April the decision
came: to be attached to the XXIV Army Corps. Division and
regimental staffs began immediate reconnaissance of southern
sectors and drafted tentative plans for executing a passage
of lines through the Army's 27th Infantry Division.
On 30 April the First Marine Division and attached units
initiated motor movement southward. Two assault regiments,
First Marines on the right, Fifth Marines on the left, had
passed through the three assault regiments of the 27th Infantry
Division by raid-afternoon of the first day of May, and MaJ. (Jen.
Pedro A. del Valle, by mutual agreement between the two
Division Commanders, assumed command from the 27th Infantry
Division, at 1400 that date. May brought with it cloudy, cool
weather, scattered rains and the opposition this Division
had not found when it landed one month earlier.v Field Order
No. 7-45 was issued, calling for the units first push to the
south, supported by tanks, air, naval gunfire, and artillery.
The objective was placed as the north bank of the ASA KAWA.
In its first day of action in the south the First Marine
Division was greeted by the determined, well-planned resistance
that it was to encounter throughout its hard-fought drive to
the southern tip of OKINAWA. Operating in continued light rains,
the Division Jumped off at 0930 on 2 May but was held to 200-300
yard advances. Right flank units attempted to move down the
west coast to the ASA KAWA Estuary line but were halted by
heavy flanking fire from the steep ridges Jutting northwestward
from the city of SHURI. Our forces were faced all along the
line by heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.
This stiff enemy resistance Increased on the following day,
but the Fifth Marines in the center of our zone of action made
gains of 400 to 600 yards. The First Marines on the right,
however, were engaged in a heavy fire fight for the village of
NAKANISKI and were held to limited gains. Our forces, supported
by tractors of the Third Armored Amphibian Battalion, lying off
ASA KAWA Estuary, were able to move well ahead of our lines, but
then were hit with murderous flanking machine gun and mortar
fire from northwest of SHURI which exacted heavy casualties.
Four tanks were damaged by enemy fire and one temporarily
aced with this fire which Drohlblted the advance along

the flat, narrow coastal plain, plane were formulated to pivot
the attack to the southeast against the commanding ground.
The First Battalion of the Seventh Marines, which had moved
south in Division reserve, was attached to the Fifth Marines
to assist in their advance. The remaining two battalions of
the Seventh Marines were moved into position to protect the
Division right flank as the attack pivoted to the southeast.
Coupled with minor air action which included bombs in the
vicinity of the First Marines command post and strafing in other
areas, the Japanese attempted counter-landings during the night
of 3 May all along the coastline on our right flank. An esti
mated one company to one battalion was landed in small groups
north to the ASA KAWA Estuary,, but was pinned down in the tiny
village of KUMAN. Other isolated elements landed on the coast
in the vicinity , f the Division command post. The Third
o Battalion of the Seventh Marines was sent to assist the First
Marines in destroying enemy elements that succeeded in getting
ashore despite heavy fire from guns of the fleet units offshore
and supporting armored tractors.
Our attack Jumped off at 1000 on 4 May, following a ten
minute artillery preparation. The infantry, supported closely
by tanks, continued to advance in the face of dogged resistance
with the right flank taking heavy casualties from enemy fire
from south of the river. Gains of 350 yards were marked up
during the day. One tank was damaged by artillery fire south
of MACHINATO Airfield, but was later retrieved. Advance on the
left was slow because of necessity of maintaining contact with
the 77th Infantry Division, ^llch was operating over
extremely difficult terrain.
The enemy shifted his counter-attacks to the land on the
nigjit of 4-5 May. A counter-assault, preceded by two hours of
150mra shelling, was launched against Third Battalion, Fifth
Marines during the t>re-dawn hours but was repulsed.
During the morning the Division continued Its yard-by-yard
advance and succeeded in reaching the ASA KAWA Estuary line.
Encouraging progress also was registered on the left flank where
the Fifth Marines scored 600 yard gains in some sectors and
reached the nose extending westward from Hill 187. The Seventh
Marines were following close behind the First Marines in order
to fill the gap resulting from the Division's eastward swing
along the right flank.
On 6 May preliminary plans were drafted for the movement
of elements of the Sixth Marine Division into the lines on this
Division's rigit flank, with this organization sideslipping to
the left. There was very little advance on the ground, with
the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines standing fast along the
eatuary line and other elemen t strati 11s fa clngp^
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defense. The south of the island was under a constant air,

naval gunfire and artillery bombardment and enemy artillery
action showed a noticeable decrease under our accurate counter-
battery fire. Particular attention was being paid to the
extensive ridge network to the front of this Division. Two of
our tanks in attempting to blast enemy cave positions before
the Fifth Marines at close range were knocked out during the
day by enemy anti-tank fire. The First Marines, now under
the command of Col. A. T. Mason, were unable to advance.
At 0600 on 7 May this Division reverted to control of the
Third Amphibious Corns as plans were formulated for a Tenth
Army attack to the south, with Corps abreast, on the tenth.
It was now apparent that the Japanese commander, when he had
pulled his entire defense to the south of the island, had
established the core of his line at the fortress city of SHURI,
the island's second largest, and anchored it at the coast
cities of NAHA and YONABARU. The SHURI bastion was protected
on three sides by formidable, cave-infested ridges that covered
every approach and overlooked the ground over which the
American troops were forced to advance. The Japanese commander
used his terrain advantages well. Every small emplacement was
mutually supported by others and the campaign, like others
against the Japanese, became a death struggle in which every
enemy soldier had to dug out of the ground.
A heavy air strike was delivered against the village of
DAKESHI, strongpoint on the approaches to SHURI, during the
early morning of 7 May. Both assault regiments made limited
gains. The First Marines seized the high ground at 7775 W and
the Fifth Marines advanced about 200 yards in the center of
their zone of action. Patrols ranged even farther to the front
but they were driven back by heavy mortar and artillery fire.
In the early morning of 8 May the Japs threw a counter
attack in force against First Battalion, Fifth Marines. The
assault was turned; back with an estimated 100 enemy dead left
in front of our lines.
Heavy rains immobilized our tanks and M-7s later in the
morning and the attack was unable to get under way in the mud,
but numerous caves and pillboxes were destroyed in a general
mopt>ing up. One battery of 75mm pack howitzers was attached
to each the First Marines and Fifth Marines to nrovide direct
fire support against the well dug-in enemy positions. By 1600
the Twenty-Second Marines of the Sixth Marine Division had
relieved the Seventh Marines on the west coast and the latter
regiment moved into an assembly area as Division reserve.
Rain continued through the night and early morning keeping
ground and air action at a standstill. However, the south of
the island was still rocking under a steady rein of shells

from American artillery and naval gunfire including, at
noon, one round from all artillery pieces and supporting
ships in celebration of the Allied victory in Europe.
The eleventh of May brought gains all along the line,
putting American forces in position to threaten seriously
breakthrough to the enemy's final defenses in the SHURI
sector Behind a constant bombardment from sea, air and land,
the First Marines continued to drive the Japs back along the
southbound railroad near the Division right boundary and reached
positions west of the high ground protecting SHURI, Advances
in the center and left of the line were slower in the face of
determined resistance, but the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines
smashed into the western outskirts of the long-troublesome
village of DAKESHI and gained control of the ridge line running
through that village. DAKESHI was made further untenable for
the Japanese by forces of the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines
which swung toward the town from the northeast, placing it in a
rapidly closing pincers. Flame-thrower tanks and engineers
were being used extensively in routing the Japs from emplace
ments and caves that they were determined to defend to the death.
By mid-afternoon of the twelfth this Division had secured
DAKESHI and elements of the First Marines on the right were
threatening the SHURI bastion from the west. Our troops were
held to limited gains on the ground by a network of pillboxes
and emplacements to the east of DAKESHI, but already the Japs
outer defenses were crumbling under the steady pounding of our
heavy guns and the close-range fires of tanks and infantry.
Just prior to nightfall the Japanese charged positions of
the First Battalion, Seventh Marines behind a heavy barrage of
mortar fire. A company was forced to give some ground but
succeeded in turning back the attack after suffering heavy
casualties. Our forces were called upon again before dawn of
thirteen May to turn back enemy counter-assaults. In the
sector of the First Marines, the Japs launched two counter
attacks both of platoon to company strength. The first attack,
against the Third Battalion, First Marines,, faltered and gave
way in the face of heavy mortar fire and point-blank machine
gun and bazooka fire which took a heavy toll of enemy troops.
The same battalion smashed a later smaller scale attack with
heevy small arms fire.
With the enemy standing firm in the face of determined
onslaughts all along the line this Division halted in its
salient on the right until the commanding ground on the left
could be overrun by the Seventh Marines. Elements of the First
Marines, however, operated successfully against enemy positions
to the front with 37mm guns and mortars. Slight gains were
registered on the left where Seventh Marines units pushed some
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200 yards south of DAKESHI through a maze of caves and pillboxes.

With the Japanese outpost line at DAKESHI smashed, the
battleground for this Division shifted to the formidable WANA
approaches to the SHURI hill mass. It was now evident that the
main enemy defenses of Southern OKINAWA radiated from SHURI
like the spokes of a wheel and the hub of that wheel was
protected by some of the most rugged terrain encountered in the
drive southward. The main assault on this line fell to the
First Marine Divison and the Army!e 77th Infantry Division,
with the Sixth Marine Division and the 96th Infantry Division
attempting to break through on the flanks.
This Division's operations against the WANA ridge and WANA
valley brought tank-infantry operations to their maximum uee.
Tank-infantry teams worked constantly against the well guarded
draw formed by WANA ridge on the north and the slopes of the
BHURI hills on the south, moving in under devastating fire to
blast caves and emplacements which prohibited infantry assault.
During the morning of 15 May, the Fifth Marines passed
through the First Marines on the right flank and advanced 600
yards down the NAHA railroad. Under protective covering fire
tank-infantry teams of these units succeeded in stabbing deep
into the WANA valley and knocked out several enemy caves and
anti-tank guns in that vicinity.
Under the continued pounding of one of the most concentrated
assaults in Pacific warfare the enemy's fortress was showing
signs of cracking by 17 May. On that date, advance elements of
the Fifth and Seventh Marines drove to the crest of the vital
WANA ridge and were moving one spearhead along the ridge into the
village for which the ridge was named. The Division also in
creased its threat to SHURI from the west when the Fifth Marines
pushed their thin right flank line along the NAHA railroad to a
position at 7773 VW. This Inverted U, resulting from the two
arms of the pincers driving on SHURI from the north and west,
continued to provide a theater for extensive tank-infantry
operations. Our Infantry and armored units maintained a constant
assault on the WANA ridge through the mouth of the valley to the
south as well as with frontal advances from the north.
On the 18th, the north-south corridor along the NAHA rail
road was expanded to the eastward, with one platoon of the Fifth
Marines gaining a foothold on the hill at 7773 R. This unit,
however, was pinned down on the reverse slope by heavy enemy
fire and was unable to expand its position. Elsewhere along the
line, gains were measured by yards won, lost, then won again.
The battle closed to bayonet range on 20 May. Fresh troops
of the First Marines moved into the lines, relieving the Seventh
Marines, and in recurrent hand-to-hand combat smashed the enemy
bpck to the northern outskirts of S l W ^ f ^ ^ ^ f ^ V ^ V ^ J l ' ^ " n
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advance of 600 yards. On the right of the First Marines the

Third Battalion continued its drive southeast along the WANA
ridge in the face of heavy fire. These advances placed our
troops on dominating ground overlooking SHURI and in position
to launch a renewed assault against the weakened enemy defense.
On 21 May our forces still were forced to fight against
fanatical resistance for every yard, but maintained their un
relenting pressure against SHURI, threatening the heart of the
enemy's defense from two directions. By nightfall the Second
Battalion, First Marines, moving abreast of the 77th Infantry
Division on its left, had completely occupied the small village
marking the northern boundary of SHURI itself. With the outer
wall of his fortress breached by this spearhead, the Jap continued
to hold fast in his death struggle along the crest of the WANA
ridge During the afternoon the Third Battalion, First Marines,
closely following tank-infantry teams, attempted to move two
companies across the troublesome WANA draw and up on the high
ground to the south, but they were pinned down by withering
mortar and machine gun fire and forced to mill back under cover
of smoke to their original positions. This Division, however,
did register further gains in its drive on SHURI from the west.
Elements of the Fifth Marines stabbed closer to the city's
flank in pushing their lines to 7773 X.
During this period Division tanks, in addition to their
fire support, were providing valuable services in the evacuation
of wounded under fire and in supplying units on the line.
Late in the afternoon of 22 May, intermittent rains that
had been promised by overcast skies for several days began to
fall and continued fojr nine days. That period brought every
thing from liît, scattered showers to driving rain storms that
turned the entire southern front Into a morass. Within two days
our attack, deprived by the mud of its vital armored support,
was at a virtual standstill*
With vehicles mired, the Division resorted to aggressive
patrolling to maintain its constant pressure on the enemy - already on the verge of cracking before SHURI. Our forces also
took advantage of the lull in the attack to relieve elements of
the Sixth Marine Division in occupying a widened zone of action,
putting all three of the Division's infantry regiments in the line.
Despite the pouring rains the Japanese received no respite
from the guns of the Eleventh Marines. Our artillery pounded the
enemy defenses night and day in conjunction with Corps and Army
artillery units all along the line.
On 26 May the enemy hoping to succeed under the cover of limited observation resulting from the pouring rains which had brought our ground and air operations to a virtual halt, began a withdrawal southward from his SHURI fortress positions. An estimated three to four thousand J a T W f ^ V | r e h 1 & $ P $ |M
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open under a devastating barrage from the main batteries of our

ships offshore, artillery, and the machine guns and bombs of our
planes. More than 50 Marine aircraft took off despite limited
ceiling and difficult operating conditions to strafe and bomb
the moving groups. Some 13 minutes after front-line units of
this Division reported indications of troop withdrawals the
first salvo from the guns of the US3 NEW YORK began to fall on
Be retreating Japs. Approximately 15 minutes later, support
aircraft had taken to the air and were strafing foot and motor
ized columns traoped on the muddy roads. With air soot confirm
ing the magnitude of the troop movements, additional support
ships from the 77th Infantry Division and Sixth Marine Division
were brought to bear and by nightfall the villages of ZAHANA,
GISUSHI, and DAKITON, all sheltering troops, had been pounded
into a shambles; t i o truck convoys had been smashed; six light
xr tanks and two mobile field pieces had been destroyed. Filter
pilots reported the roads littered with enemy dead and smashed
eauipment.
The next four days confirmed the belief that the Japs had
taken advantage of our lack of observation, the poor flying
weather, and our inability to follow up the retreat closely, to
withdraw from his crumbling defenses. Under constant pressure
from the front and now threatened with a sweeping flajik drive
from the east coast by the fresh troops of the Army's 7th Infantry
Division the Japs had pulled back to their final defense line
in the south.
The beginning of the end for SHURI came on 28 May. With
enemy resistance apparently confined to determined rear guard
action in the high ground north of the city, elements of the
First Battalion, Fifth Marines on the right advanced almost 1000
vards to a point south of the town of ASATO. Other elements
also captured formidable BEEHIVE Hill at 7772 M. On the Division
left, however, the enemy continued to defend bitterly hie
positions before SHURI. Twice the First Marines assaulted the
hotly-contested KNOB Hill at 7873 N and twice they were thrown
back by machine gun fire from three directions and satchel
charges mounted on sticks and flung from close range. Troops
hauled 37mm guns forward through deep mud for ooint-blank close
support, but heavier support weapons were mired and unable to
move. Continued rains and mud also were severely hampering
our supply and evacuation of wounded.
Ancient SHURI Castle, onetime seat of OKINAWA rulers and
modern symbol of Japanese defense on the island, fell to infantry
forces of this Division at 1015 on 29 May after a rapid thrust
across the still muddy approaches to the southern part of the
fortress city. The First Battalion, Fifth Marines Jumped off
at 0730 and, moving across muddy terrain against scattered
opposition, quickly occupied the ridge line at 7772 RST. From
that position forward elements pushed op, lotp^ ^HUI>an^ oqeupe<t^
rm
the moaced castle. Apparently this drive completely surprised

the Japs who believed us incapable of any major advance over
the muddy terrain.
With this sudden breakthrough on the western slopes of
the SHURI hill mass, the Division plan was quickly revised to
bring the Third Battalion, First Marines driving into the city
from the southward through the Fifth Marines zone to form a
pocket around the Japs still fighting doggedly for KNOB Hill
and the high ground north of the city. By mid-afternoon, the
Third Battalion, First Marines had relieved the elements of
the Fifth Marines slong SHURI ridge and those units continued
to push southward.
The Japanese moved wisely in their withdrawal to the south. Supply and evacuation problems, complicated by extension of our
lines and continued bad weather, prevented complete exploitation of this Division's breakthrough into SHURI. By 30 May ground
supply, with heavy rains still falling, was virtually impossible beeause of mud and lack of approach routes. Repeated efforts to sunply from the air were bnly partially successful because of
freauent storms and a constant limited ceiling. Despite adverse ground and supply conditions our forces maintained relentless
pressure against the enemy with extensive patrolling to the
front. Unite of the First Battalion, First Marines pushed north
ward through the city of SHURI before halting at the steep, well-
defended draw at 7872 ABC. During the night enemy counter offensive efforts stiowed a noticeable decrease with even the
usual mortar and artillery fire decreasing.

By 31 May this Division had completed the occupation of the

Jap's SHURI fortress and was pushing southward. The last day of
the Divisions second month on OKINAWA finally brought a break
in the weather with solid overcast and rains changing to sun
shine and high, scattered clouds. With the clearing weather,
units of the First Marines closed their pincers on SHURI from
the north and south, and in a coordinated sweep with the 77th
Infantry Division, cleared the area of strongly-held enemy
pockets. The First Battalion moved northward through the
devastated city and Joined with other elements of the regiment
that had driven southward after clearing the long troublesome
WANA valley and KNOB Hill. The hill was finally taken after
repeated assaults at grenade and bayonet range in some of the
bitterest fighting of the Southern OKINAWA Campaign.
The Fifth Marines, still hampered by supply and evacuation
over muddy terrain, continued their advance to the southeast
toward the hi#i ground overlooking the NAHA-YONABARU highway,
key trans-island motor route. By nightfall the regiment's
right flank had reached the sloping ground north of the village
of SHICHINA and other units had sent patrols ranging 500 yards
further southward against scattered opposition.
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The first day of the month that was to see the end of the
battle for Southern OKINAWA brought our infantry forces to the
crest of the ridge overlooking the highway and the river valley
through which it runs. Rolling ahead against light opposition
on a one regimental front, this Division had occupied the ridge
by mid-afternoon, after overrunning enemy positions in the
vicinity of SHICHINA.
On 2 June, for the first time in eight days, tanks were
able to operate in support of our infantry but had been
Immobilized again by nightfall because of renewed heavy rain
squalls which turned to steady rains by evening. During the
day our forces breached the NAHA-YONABARU highway line and
crossed in several places, the river that flows parallel to the
road. The Fifth Marines pushed across the stream during the
early morning and seized the ridge guarding the approaches to
the village of TSUKASAN. In attempting to advance beyond this
ridge, however, troops were pinned down by intense rifle and
machine gun fire from the front and flanks. Throughout the
remainder of the day our advance was bitterly contested by
Japs strongly emplaced in the vicinity of Hill 69 and we
were limited to only local gains south of the river. The
bridge at 7869 G was destroyed by the enemy, but our troops
poured across the still intact railroad span to establish a
bridgehead on the south bank. On the Division right, the
Seventh Marines relieved the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Ninth
Marines of the Sixth Marine Division in their positions along
the KOKUBA GAWA. Patrols Immediately crossed the river and
gained the heights north of TOMIGUSUKU MURA, but were forced
to pull back in the face of heavy Jap mortar and machine gun
fire. A heavy artillery barrage was called down on the enemy
guns and two additional companies Joined the original forces
south of the estuary. By nightfall the entire Second Battalion
had regained the higi ground and dug in.
Just prior to midnight of the same day, the enemy launched
his first determined counter-attack since his withdrawal from
SHURI. The assault was turned bock by G Company of the Seventh
Marines with approximately 20 Japs killed.
A major breakthrough was scored by this Division on 3 ûne. Fast moving advance infantry elements advanced more than 2500 yards in outflanking Jap defenses north of GISUSHI and occupied Hill 57 west of that town. With two battalions of the Fifth Marines pinned down south of the NAHA-YONABARU highway by heavy rifle and machine gun fire, the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines moved through the Army zone of action on its left to the village of TERA, then struck westward against the enemy's flank. Remain ing elements of the Fifth immediately followed up.this sweeping "end run" by overrunning Jap positions in TSUKASAN and surrounding hills. , ^T j , w
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to smash the enemy southward, advancing some 800 yards and
establishing complete control of virtually all the hill mass
to the south of the KOKUBA GAWA. Division Reconnaissance
Company for the second day had patroli in advance of the
Seventh Marines. The company, attempting to reach Hill 68 at
7668 T, ran into an enemy platoon and in the stiff fire figrt
that ensued killed 15 Japs with no Marine casualties.
By 4 June supply difficulties were becoming acute. The
Division is not equipped for a rapid advance over a large land
mass and driving rains whipped the already-muddy roads into
impassable mires, requiring hand carry for supplies to forward
units. Evacuation of wounded also was at a critical stage, and
forward displacement of infantry command posts WSB virtually
impossible because of inability to haul vehicles out of the mud,
even with tractors. All tanks were ordered off the roads in
an effort to facilitate movement of supplies.
Despite the obstacles of bad weather and lack of supplies
this Division rolled up gains of 1800 yards in Its drive south
from the NAHA-YONABARU valley. During the day of 4 June our
forces reached positions Just north of the plateau stretching
toward the HANJA-IWA line and were prepared to launch an
attack along the approaches to DAKITON and HANJA. In the after
noon, the Fifth Marines were pinched out by elements of the
First Marines which had enveloped the hostile right flank by
moving through the Army zone on the left. The First Battalion,
First Marines attempted to continue the drive southward, but
when two platoons of C Company attempted to cross the swollen,
unfordeble stream on a foot bridge at 7866 UV they were hit by
heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire and wer< forced to
pull back.
Rain on the 5th of June continued to make evacuation
extremely difficult for all front line unite, eight men being
reauired to carry out a single casualty. Forward elements
were forced to operate on limited rations despite the more
than 40,000 pounds of supplies that were parachuted to our
troops from aircraft operating between rain squalls.
Ground action on that date was centered in the rl#it of
the Division zone of action. The Seventh Marines in that zone
scored gains of up to 1000 yards in driving to positions Just
north of the village of HANJA which anchored the Division
objective on the right. The regiment was held up during the
morning by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from a hill mass
to the right of the Division boundary in the Sixth Marine
Division zone of action, but our forces were able to advance
again after laying a heavy artillery barrage on the high ground.
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With our continued push to the south peet the base of

the enemy-held OROKU Peninsula the lengthening Division right
flank was becoming exposed, so one battalion of the Twenty-
Second Marines, Sixth Marine Division, was moved into
defensive positions along that line.
On 5 June another flanking attack was carried out through
the adjacent 96th Infantry Division1e zone when the Third
Battalion, First Marines moved south through the heavy mud to
strike the enemy flank from the east and succeeded in reaching
the high ground north and west of the key town of IWA. Thie
unit, closely trailed by the First Battalion, First Marines,
moved more than 3000 yard6 under adverse conditions to carry
out the envelopment.
On 6 June this Division turned its direction of attack
toward the west coast of the island in a maneuver designed to
split the enemy into two pockets: (1) those on the south of the
island and (2) those on OROKU Peninsula who were now facing an
amphibious attack by the Sixth Marine Division. Infantry units
continued to roll ahead despite still critical supply and
evacuation problems that forced our troops to rely solely on
hand-carry and air drop.
The Seventh Marines pushed through the village of DAKITON
and started their drive on Hill 108 at 7465 0, a peek over
looking the approaches to the East China Sea and the objective
town of ITOMAN. At the same time the left fl8nk of the regi
ment pushed 300 yards past the crest of Hill 95 and into the
village of HANJA. On the left of the Division zone, the Third
Battalion, First Marines also smashed ahead to gain positions
atop the ridgellne running northwest from the anchor village
of SHINDAWAKU. Behind the front lines in the zone of the First
Marines the First Battalion pushed northward from IWA in
mopping up the pockets of enemy resistance by-passed in the
Division's previous enveloping maneuver.
At this time the enemy began to show his first signs of
extensive artillery action since his withdrawal from SHURI,
but accurate counter-battery fire under control of the Eleventh
Marines soon silenced many of the Jap guns.
Engineer units throughout the early days of June were
working constantly in an effort to open sorely needed supply
routes to the infantry, but were hampered by swollen streams
and mud# Despite adverse weather, however, by 7 June the
bridges spanning streams of the NAHA valley had been completed
and routes were being opened to the forward areas.
On 7 June, under clearing skies, the First Marine Division
scored the first of two breakthroughs:f$&-tl^|gej
shatter final Japanese defenses on So|
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flote t h e Seventh Marines smashed to the coast of the China Sea
on the right of their zone, cutting the last escape route of
Jap forces on OROKU Peninsula, The Second Battalion, Seventh
Marines, after earlier overrunning vital Hill 108, reached the
high ground overlooking the beach in 7364 and 7365. On the
left of the regiment, the Third Battalion pushed almost 2000
yards in driving to the ridgeline running from ZAWA to the
coastal town of ITOMAN. Advancing abreast of the Seventh Marines,
elements of the Second Battalion, First Marines also were on
the northern outskirts of ZAWA, with the remainder of the
battalion holding favorable ground 200 yards farther north.
The Third Battalion, Flr6t Marines also moved almost 1500 yards
to reach positions along the northern slope of Hill 49 at 7662 C.
This drive to the coast, in addition to bringing our troops
into position to swing southward for a final drive against the
Japs in the south of the island, opened a water supply route via
LVT to our forward elements which had been operating under
critical supply and evacuation difficulties.
By nightfall of 8 June infantry forces of this Division had
expanded their foothold on the west coast of the island south
ward to the MUKUE GAWA. B 0 th the First and Seventh Marines had
Jumped off in early morning attack and rolled forward rapidly
against light opposition. The First Marines had patrols south
of the river toward YUZA, while on the Division right the
Seventh Marines swept through the village of ZAWA with few
enemy encountered and continued its push down the ridgeline
to a point south of ITOMAN.
Long-awaited supplies began to flow to our front line troops
via water on 8 June. An amphibian tractor group of eight cargo
tractors, supported by ten LVT(A)s, reached the newly-won
beeches at 7363 H during the morning with no opposition from
enemy guns. The convoy was covered by constant air patrol over
the email islands lying off the west coast, and the Sixth Marine
Division, from positions on OROKU Peninsula, laid smoke on
SENAGA SHI MA. The same tractors that brought in the supplies
were used in the evacuation of wounded later in the day. Follow
ing initial success with this supply route, tractors continued
to haul supplies into and evacuate from these beaches daily.
On 9 June, with advance elements of this Division now
probing the outposts of the Japs' last defense line remaining
on OKINAWA, enemy resistance began to show an increase. Our
units maintained pressure against the enemy line with aggressive
patrolling south of the MUKUE GAWA, but were limited to small
advances. In attempting to cross the river both the First and
Seventh Marines were met with heavy rifle and machine gun fire
and were forced to resort to small infiltrations to force the
stream. On the Division right, the Seventh Marines made two
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efforts to reach the crest of Hill 59 at 7562 X and also were

met by devastating enemy fire from well-prepared positions.
One company succeeded in reaching the hill and established
positions on the northern slope.
Tanks, by this time, were operating in close support of our
forward elements. Marshy ground in the Division zone of action,
however, limited their operations to roads in most sectors.
At 0808 on 9 June the Division command post closed out
at its old location at 7976 N and displaced to 7769 R.
On 10 June the infantry continued to push ahead over the
approaches to heavily defended KUNI3HI ridge, advancing the
lines in some sectors up to 600 yards. The Seventh Marines
moved their right flank Second Battalion through the coastal
village of ITOMAN and the First Battalion secured Hill 59 in
7461 BC. The First Battalion, First Marines, moving along the
Division left boundary, sent two companies up the northwest
slope to the crest of the hill Just west of YUZA.
Division engineers, in an effort to get tanks forward to
where they could support the infantry against the enemy's last
terrain barrier, succeeded in getting the vehicles across the
fire-swept MUKUE GAWA by construction fords made of oil drum
culverts, which reauired constant maintenance to keep the
heavy tanks moving. A crossing was established at 7562 Q over
which ten tanks passed during the day, and another was
established at 7662 E over which seven tanks moved across the
stream.
By 11 June ligît planes were flying casualties from front
line areas, using the small ITOMAN air strip captured by the
Seventh Marines in their push to the sea on the seventh of the
month. Five planes evacuated 52 casualties from virtually
under the enemy's guns during the field's first day of operation.
On the same day infantry forces completed the capture of
ITOMAN, and pushed the Division's right flank a distance of 650
yards south of the town. The First Battalion, Seventh Marines
moved forward against heavy resistance to establish a line
along the high ground across the southern limits of the town
of TERA. The Second Battalion, First Marines was engaged in a
fierce day-long struggle for Hill 69. After oft-repeated
assaults in the face of heavy fire the battalion captured the
position in the late evening and dug in along the crest.
The final stand for the Japs on Southern OKINAWA began 12
June. In a surprise, pre-dawn attack the Seventh Marines
Jumped off at 0330 and drove rapidly forward nearly 1000 yards
to seize positions on vital KUNISHI ridge before daybreak. F
Company established itself along the ^ ^ ^ w i t h i n J O O 7 * * ^ '
- 13 -
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the town of MEZADO, with C Company extending along the ridge

to the left. With the coming of daylight these elements came
under extremely heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire.
Three companies were sent forward to reinforce, but were
pinned down almost Immediately. Even when tanks were brought
Into position south of TERA to place fire on the enemy
positions, our infantry was unable to advance.
During the late afternoon tanks went forward with water,
ammunition and blood plasma, and returned with wounded men.
With reinforcements unable to gain the ridge, a plan was
formulated whereby tanks, carrying six infantrymen each, could
move forward with fresh troops. Before nightfall 54 men had
dropped from tank escape hatches onto KUNISHI ridge and 22
casualties had been evacuated on return trips. Then, under
the cover of darkness, the elements of the two assault
battalions that had been pinned down during the entire day
commenced moving forward. By midnight, both battalions
succeeded in reaching the ridge and took up positions on the
crest, reinforcing and extending the line originally
established by F and C Companies.
First Marine patrols ranged south along the Corps boundary
into the northern reaches of the village of OZATO.
The 13th of June was devoted primarily to preparations
for a large scale pre-dawn attack on the 14th. The entire
southern part of the island remaining in the hands of the
Japanese shook under constant bombardment from the guns of ,
our artillery and the ships lying offshore. Naval gunfire
added the fire of two LSM(H)s to its usual striking power,
with the rocket-launching craft moving into position off the
southern tip of the island to rake reverse slope defenses.
More than 800 5M rockets were hurled into the village of
MAKABE and KOMEBU alone.
Infantry forces concentrated on consolidation of positions
along hard-won KUNISHI ridge. Several enemy groups were elimi
nated along the western nose of the ridge and in the area
between our lines and the town of MEÂDO. Surjply reserves also
were built up during the day, both by air drop and by the use
of tanks. Armored vehicles again did excellent work in trans
porting troops and supplies to the Seventh Marines over ground
covered by enemy fire. More than 50 infantrymen were ferryed
to the high ground and 35 casualties were evacuated on the
return trip. Patrols ranged along the west coast as far as
7360 Q end toward Hill 69 but heavy fire from the eastern
reaches of KUNISHI ridge pinned them down and they had to be
withdrawn under the cover of smoke.
At 0330 on the morning of 14 June the First Marines jumped
off in a pre-dawn assault and moved rapidly forward 600 to 800
yards to take up positions alon^JCUNISHI ridge east of the
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SIFiED
Seventh Marines lines. Initial advances were made without

resistance and two platoons of E Company soon reached the
crest. The reserve platoon, however, came under heavy fire
short of the ridge and had to fight Its way forward to the
line established by the advance elements. On the regiment's
left, G Company met heavy mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire
from the front and flanks while still 300 yards short of the
objective, but succeeded In pressing forward to positions
alongside E Company. Both companies remained under heavy
fire throughout the day but held their positions despite
heavy casualties. Reinforcements could not be moved forward
during the day, the low ground between Hill 69 and the ridge
line being under continuous enemy fire from three sides.
After nightfall, however, F Company moved up under the cover
of darkness without opposition to Join the forward companies.
The Seventh Marines, meanwhile, continued to work against
strong enemy positions along the nose of the ridge and along
the high ground surrounding the draiv which separated the
regiment's left flank from the First Marines.
Tanks were seeing extensive use throughout this Division's
zone of action and were facing some of the most devastating
47mm anti-tank fire of the campaign. Two vehicles managed to
get over the crest of KUNISHI ridge to bring direct fire
against Jap positions in MEZADO and several others worked
south along the coastal highway to positions from which direct
fire could be laid against the nose of KUNISHI ridge. Tanks
also were still being used to carry supplies to forward
elements. They were limited by terrain mainly to roads.
CT-8 of the Second Marine Division arrived off the shores
of OKINAWA on 14 June, and on the following day commenced un
loading prepared to move into the lines of the First Marine
Division as an attached unit. This CT moved Into an assembly
area on the right of the Division zone, immediately initiated
reconnaissance of the forward areas and began planning to
effect a passage of lines through the Seventh Marines.
This Division's battle continued to center on the heights
of KUNISHI ridge on 15 June. Our patrols continued probing
the southern slopes and destroying enemy caves and emplacements
temporarily by-passed in our night drives up the hill mass.
At approximately 2030 on this date the Second Battalion, Fifth
Marines commenced the relief of the Second Battalion, First
Marines on the Division left, the fresh troops moving up under
the cover of darkness. By 2300 the relief had been effected
and the First Marines moved back into Division reserve.
By 16 June KUNISHI ridge was no longer a major obstacle in
the path of this Division's drive to the sea. The ground that
had been so bitterly defended and the approaches to MEZADO had
Seen virtually cleaned out by that date. T ^ 7 ^ ^ t ^ h ^ 1 ? ^
succeeded in smashing the Jap strongpoint at 7560 K which for
two days had prevented physical contact with the Fifth Marines,
holding the Division left flank.
Under cover of darkness, beginning at 0200 on 17 June,
elements of the Sixth Marine Division relieved the rlgit
battalion of the Seventh Marines. On this same day two important
hills, guarding the right flank approaches to MAKABE and the
IBARU-KOMESU ridge, the last major enemy strongpoints in this
zone of action, fell to this Division. The Third Battalion,
Seventh Marines, pushing south from its line atop KUNISHI ridge,
moved 1400 yards across the plateau north of MEZADO to seize
the heights of Hill 69 and Hill 52 at 7459 H and I. The same
battalion later attempted to drive to the crest of Hill 79,
last barrier on the road to MAKABE, but was forced back by
heavy fire from strong defensive positions.
On the left, our forces were unable to advance because of
devastating enfilade fire from the vicinity of ARAGACHI in the
Army zone. In the early evening the Japs launched a last gasp
counter-attack against G Company of the Fifth, but it was
thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy.
Enemy defenses remaining in this Division's zone of action
were brought to the verge of final collapse on 18 June, with our
advance elements rolling forward to positions Just short of the
IBARU-KOMESU ridge. Fresh troops of the Eighth. Marines, which
had moved into the lines during the preceding night, smashed
southward to occupy a line west of MAKABE frcTi which they could
launch an assault against the last formidable hill mass barring
the Division's path to the southern coast. LMlts of the
attached regiment Jumped off in the early corning following a
concentrated night artillery bombardment and drove 1400 yards
before halting Just north of the KUWANGA-MAKABE road. As the
Eigith pushed ahead on the right, the First Battalion, Fifth
Marines crushed one of the two remaining enemy strongpoints
between our forces and MAKABE. This battalion moved rapidly
in a swing through the Eigith Marine zone, then struck Hill 79
at 7559 L from the west flank. As the attack moved forward all
along the front, other units of the Fifth Marines continued
reduction of remaining enemy pockets in the vicinity of
KUNISHI ridge.
Infantry forces of this Division climaxed a two-day
breakthrough of the final Japanese defenses on Southern
OKINAWA on 19 June, splitting the remaining enemy garrison
into twvo parts with a rapid drive to the sea the first
American troops to reach the southern tip of the island.
Shortly after 1600 right flank elements of the Eiîth Marines
reached the beach after advancing more than 2500 yards and
overrunning the IBARU-KOMESU ridge.
They were closely followed by one company of the Third
Battalion, Fifth Marines, which lâd enveloped the village of
/oz.
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OKINAWA SHIMA
6TH. MAR. 01V. ft XXIV CORPS SECURED THEIR PORTION OF ISLAND 21 JUNE 1945
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THROUG H TO COAST 19 JUNE
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00
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MAKABE from the west, then swung southward for theîish across
the final ridge to the coast. Confuted Japanese forces attempted
a final stand on the beaches and cliffs rising from the sea,
closing to hand-to-hand combat, but they were quickly overrun.
Behind our fast-moving forward elements, however, the
enemy still was offering desperate resistance from several
strong pockets. The flank of this Division was under heavy
fire from Hill 81 on the left boundary. During the day the
height was under constant artillery, rocket, and mortar fire.
The Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, driving on the hill,
were receiving heavy enfilade fire all along its flank from
enemy positions in the vicinity of ARAGACHI.
By 20 June Hill 81 at 7559 Y had become the last major
point of enemy resistance confronting this Division. The
battle for Southern OKINAWA within this Division's zo.-e of
action had by that time virtually dissolved into the moDDing
up stage except for the drive against Hill 81. After three
days of concentrated pounding by artillery, naval gunfire, and
close-range fire from tanks and M-7s, the Japanese were still
defending the hill to the death. The Second Battalion, Fifth
Marines launched an assault on the 19th after keeping the hill
under night-long barrage. By afternoon one platoon had succeeded
in gaining positions on the slopes, but reinforcements were met
by heavy enemy fire from the crest and by enfilade fire from
the Army zone, and the platoon was forced to withdraw.
Mopping up operations were initiated throughout the
remainder of the Division zone. The Fifth Marines eliminated
the last vestige of enemy resistance around Hill 79 and the
village of MAKABE while the Seventh Marines continued to close
caves end mop up by-passed positions along the southern slope
of KUNISHI ridge.
The assault on Hill 81 continued through 20 June and by
the following day, after four days of fighting which included
bombardment by land, sea, and air, the hill was secured by the
Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. The battalion reached the crest
only after having had some companies driven from the hill on
two previous assaults.
With the conquest of Hill 81, organized enemy resistance
came to an end.in this Division's zone of action. And on the
same day, 22 June, Tenth Army headquarters wrote the official
finis to the battle for OKINAWA with a brief flag raising
ceremony and announcement th8t the island was secure.
From 22 June until 30 June the First Marine Division
cbmpleted mopping up the remaining Japanese in its zone of
action south of the NAHA-YONABARU lin^ -Pîca.anfl flrtWSff ft
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SIRED
details buried enemy dead and retrieved friendly and enemy

material. Enemy activity fas confined to isolated attempts
at night infiletration by individuals or small groups.
Coincidentally with the police and salvage of the Southern
OKINAWA areas, the First Marine Division initiated
preparations for movement into its new rehabilitation area on
MOTOBU Peninsula in Northern OKINAWA.
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ISSIFIEL
Following are some of the more Important Field Orders issued by this command.
/ o<?
1990-5-8ol> F ft I A 0 0 l i ! " I D f V 8 t Marine Division (Rein)

4 53 0 II1* 8/9
UECLASS
I .I U \ \ l r | y
In The F i e l d o
1830, 2 A p r i l , 1945.
F i e l d Order No. 1-45 MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, Is 25,0000
lo (a) Enemy forces in our Z of A believed to be negligible0

(b) 6th Mar Div abreast of CT-7; 7th Div (Army) 5000
yards in advance of Div right flank.
2o This Div will resume the Atk at 0715, seize L/5 and L/10
in Z of A 0 Continue the Atk from L/10 on order For LD,
objectives and boundaries see Opn 0verlayo
3 0 (a) (b) (c) (d) CT-1 See Opn Overlay0
CT-5 See Opn Overlay,,
CT=7 See Opn Overlay0
Ren Co (motorized) will, commencing at daylight, i reconnoiter along road on Div right flank0 Contact left flank unit of 7th Div as soon as possible0 Reconnoiter side roads up to 2000 yards
(x) Push advance vigorously, utilizing column formation

with patrols between unless enemy resistance demands
more deployed formations0
4 0 Omittedo
5. (a) Div Ren Co enter Div tactical common EASY NET0 (5880).
(b) 11th Mar monitor this net and be prepared to answer .
, any calls for Arty firee Fire missions take priority
over all other traffic on that net*
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLEs
R0 Oo BARE, Colonel, Uo S Marine Corps, Chief of Staffo ANNEX A - Operation Overlay0 DISTRIBUTIONS Special.,
O-F-F-I-CÎ-A-L
R 0 Eo HONSOWETZ,
LtColo, USMC,
1990=5=80
SSINED
Field Order
No. 2=45
MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, l$25p000o
BSUK2U RETTO, lgl0,000o
Omittedo
TASK ORGANIZATION
First Marine Division (Rein)

In The Field.
1130, 5 April, 1945
1. Omittedo
2o This Div will organize and defend its present Z of A and conduct
mopping up operations. For defensive sectors see Opn Overlay
3, (a) CT-1 (less LT 3=1) defend sectors assigned. Patrol KATCHIN
Peninsulao See Opn Overlay.
(b) CT-5 defend sector assigned. See Opn Overlay.
(c) CT-7, Atchd Co C, 1st Tk Bn, becomes Corps Res. Move to
Corps Res area vicinity of village of ISHIKAWA. Report
to CO, III Phib Corps for further orders.
(d) 11th Mar defend sector assigned, prepared to furnish Arty
Spt fireso Patrol area shown in Opn Overlay. Coordinate
patrols with CT-1, CT=5 and Hq Coradt. See Opn Overlay.
(e) LT 3-1, Atchd 1st Tk Plat, organize and defend YONTAN Arfld
(f) 1st Tk Bn (less Dets) no change.
(x) (1) All units continue patrolling and mopping up within
sectors asslgnedc
(2) This order effective 0700 I, 6 April, 1945
4, Omittedo
5, Report location of CP's.
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLE;
R. 0. BARE,
Colonel, Uo S. Marine Cores Chief of Staff.
A - O p e r a t i o n O v e r l a y , DISTRIBUTION Special.
ANNEX?
Q-F-F-I-C-I-A-Lg R. E 0 HONSOWETZ, L t C o L , USMC, G~3
T'\ i
U LU Li \u%JU
pii n x \ H ^ P
"3
1990-5-80
First Marine Divisio

In The Field0
1000, 9 April, 1945o
Field'Order
Noc 3-45
MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, ls25p000o
TA3K ORGANIZATION
(a) CT-S
5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
Plat Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
Det 4th War Dog Plat
(b) OT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st Med Bn
Plat Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
(o) 3rd Bn, 7th Marines
(d) 11th Marines (less 2nd, 3rd,
4th Bns)
LtCol A. Jo Stuart, USMC
(e) 1st Tank Bn
Col Francis I. Fenton, USMC
(f) 1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
Col John Kaluf, USMC
(g) 1st Serv Bn
1st Serv Bn (less Dets)
Bomb Disposal Plat
(h) 1st MT Bn (less Cos A8 B and C)
(1) 1st Ron Co
(J) MP Go
Army MP Co
1st MP Co
LtCol Marion A Fawcett, USMC
IstCt Robert Powell, USMC
LtCol Austin Co Shofner,USMC
LtCol Hunter Hurst, USMC
Col Wilbert S Brown, USMC
Col Kenneth B0 Chappell, USMC
Col John H 0 Criebel, USMC
p r r . * . '~\ r\ r * ~ * *
-1
&-V ..
\f
US'
(k)
Div Trs
L ASblritU
j fi a* i r 5 r ft k
LtCol James. S. Monahaf^s^Wfife^
Div Hq Bn ( l e s s M Co and Ron Co)

1 s t Med Bn ( l e s s Cos A,B, and C)
Dets A-l and B-l AMG

17th and 18th G-10 Dispensary Units
Assault Air Warning Teams
4th Prov Rkt Det
4th War Dog Plat (less Dets)
1. (a) See current Intelligence Summaries*
(b) No Change
20 3o 1st Mar Div will occupy anddefend Div sector,, Overlay
See Opn
(a) CT-5g Occupy and defend sector shown on Opn Overlay.

Continue active security patrolling and mopping up
operationso See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay) 0
(b) CT~ls Occupy and defend sector shown on Opn Overlay.
Continue active security patrolling and mopping up
operationso See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay) Secure
reservoir (8491) against sabotage
(c) 3rd Bn, 7th Marinesi Occupy and defend sector shown on Opn Overlay0 Continue active security patrolling and mopping up operations,, See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay),, (d) 11th Marinest Occupy and defend sector shown on Opn Overlay,, Continue -active security patrolling and mopping up operationso See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay). Prepare to furnish Spt fires in Div sector (e) 1st Tank Bn; No Change
(f) 1st Engr Bn; Continue maintenance and repair of routes

of Com in Div sector,,
(s) 1st Serv Bng No Change0
(h) 1st MT Bng Normal0
(1) 1st Ren Cog Continue aggressive patrolling in assigned

sectorso Be prepared to assemble at Div CP on 1 hr notice,,
(J) MP C p r g Normalo Classify all able-bodied male civilians
as POWso
JttLASSIFIEb
(x) (1) Camouflage discipline will be rigidly enforced. ,- The practice of wearing exposed white undershirts or white outer clothing will be prohibited,, (2) Units with coastline in sector will continue search
for midget submarines, motor torpedo boats and
suicide boats0
4, 5. See current Adm 0
CPss See Annex'ABLE (Opn Overlay)0 location,.
Report changes in CP

R0 Oo BARE
Colonel, Uo S Marine Corps,
Chief of Staffo
ANNEX: ABLE - Opn Overlay
Spec ial.
DISTRIBUTION:
O-P-F-I-C-I-A-Ls
R. E. HONSOWETZ,
LtCol., USMC,
- ^
1(6 4
&>
<
0013-AE 1990-5-80 485/389
*fe#'!30F
First Marine Division (Rein) In The Fieldo 1400, 15 April, 1945
Fiel No 4-45
bLA^lntD
Col Kenneth Bo Cnappe11,USMC
MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, 12 25,000,,

RYUKYU RETTO, OKINAWA SHIMA, Is 100,000
TA3K ORGANIZATION
( a )
CT-1
1 s t Marines ( l e s s LT 3-1)
Co A, 1 s t Med Bn
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
(b) CT-5 5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
3rd.Plat, Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
(c) CT-7 7th Marines
Co C, 1st Med Bn
1st Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
Co C, 1st MT Bn
Co C, 1st TK Bn
Det 4th JA3C0
1st Section, 4th Prov Rkt Det
(d)
(e) (e)
Col John Ho Griebel, USMC
Col Edward W 0 Snedeker. USMC
11th Marines
Col Wilburt 3 0 Brown, USMC
11th Marlnes(Less 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Bns)

1st Tk Bn LtCol AJ. Stuart. USMC 1st Tk Bn (less Co C and one Plat Co A) Maj Theodore E. Drummond, USMC
(f) 1st Engr Bn

1st Engr Bn(less Dets)
U Lb i
//?
1st Serv Bn 1st Serv Bn (less Dets)

Bomb Disposal Plat
W 1st MT Bn
LtCol Marion A. Faweett, USMC
1st MT Bn (less Cos A, B, and C)

(i) MP Gp Co B, 1st Prov MP Bn
1st MP Co
(j) Div Trs LtCol James,: S.Monahan, USMC
LtCol Austin C, Shofner, USMC
Div Hq Bn (less MP Co)

1st Med Bn (less Cos A, B, and C)
Dets A-l and B-l AMG
17th and 18th G--10 Dispensary Units
Assault Air Warning Teams
4th Prov Rkt Det (less 1st Section)
4th War Dog Plat (less Dets)
1* (a) See current Intelligence Summaries,
(b) 24th Corps is preparing to continue drive to South with
three Divs abreast, 27th Inf Div on the right, 96th
Inf Div in the center, and 7th Inf Div on the left.
77th Inf Div will land on IE SHIM on 16 April.
6th Mar Div continues operations to eliminate enemy
resistance on MOTOBU peninsula. Otherwise no change,
2 3, 1st Mar Div will continue mopping up and defense of Div
sector. See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay).
(a) CT-1
Occupy and defend assigned sector. Continue active patrolling and mopping up Opns. See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay). (b) CT-5
Occupy and defend a s s i g n e d s e c t o r . Continue a c t i v e p a t r o l l i n g and mopping up Opns. See Annex ABLE (Opn Overlay). (c) CT-7 \ Occupy and defend a s s i g n e d ffectpr;r ? jElnii^$e jpftG&et s of enemy r e s i s t a n c e . Continue'acfivJe p a t r p l l i f t g * ' :+$Beg~Apnex '-'** i ^ H ,|gi ABLE (Opn O v e r l a y ) . - 2{-
UNCtASSfflED
*I APgMtlth
UtilHtU
(d) 11th Marines

Conduot active security patrolling within radius of
600 yds of present bivouac area0 Guard spillway at
8491 against sabotage0
(e) 1st Tk Bn
No change
(f) 1st Engr Bn
No change
(g) 1st Serv Bn
No change
W 1st MT Bn No change (1) MP ftp
No change
(J) Dlv Trs
No change
(x) All units will be on the alert for Japanese wearing
Marine uniform and equipment0
See current Adm 0
For location of OPs see annex ABLE (Opn Overlay)0 Report
< any change s>
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLEg
R. 0, BARE,
Colonel, U0 So Marine Corps
Chief of Staff
DECLASSINED
//?
I I - \ ^ *f* It*
.
ANNEX:
ABLE - Opn Overlay,
DISTRIBUTIONS
COFS D-l ,
D-2P
.___
.--
. 1 - 1
-.
D-3
.- 1
DSO -..-.-.-.-. 2 DEO - . 1 DivSurg . - . . . . . . 1 1st Marines .. .-. 2 5th Marines -. . . . 2 7th Marines . . 2 11th Marines . . 2 Engr Bn -. , 1 TankBn . .. 1 MedBn . . -.-.. 1 4th WarDogPlat .-.. 1 4thProvRktDet - - - . _ J 1 ' DivHqBn - . _ . . 1 IstMTBn ~ . 1 ServBn -,_-. ,___<-. . 1 Provost Marshal .> . 2 War Diary -. . . ~ 1 Special Action Report 1 ' FILE . 1 O-F-F-I-C-I-A-Ls
R0 E. H0NS0WET2,
LtCol., USMC,
D-3.
mrm ^
i
0015-AE
1990-5-80 485/389
First Marine Division ' <

** In The Fields
2000, 17 April, 1945,,
MAPS:. RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000.

RYUKYU RETTO, OKINAWA SHIMA, 1:100,000,
TASK ORGANIZATION
No changes except as follows: (1) 3rd Armd Amph Bn (less
Cos C and D and 3rd Plat Co B) returns to Div control as
separate task unit. (?.) 3rd Plat Co B, 3rd Armd Amph Bn
Atchd to CT-5 effective 20 April, 1945. (3) One Co 1st
Amph Trac Bn Atchd to CT-5,
1. (a) -5he Islands of HAKAHIKA SHIMA, HEANZA 3HIMA, TAKA BANARE
SHIMA, and IKE SHIMA have previously been patrolled by
Army units and are reported to have been cleared of enemy
military personnel. It is possible, however,that small
scattered G-ps still are present. See Current Int
Summaries,
(b)No change.
2. 1st Mar Div will:
(a) Continue mopping up and defense of present sector.
(b) Assume responsibility on IB April, 1945, for patrolling
and security of the islands of HAMAHIKA SHIM^, HEANZA
SHIMA, TAKA BANARE SHIMA, AND IKE SHIMA.
3 (a) Div Trs:
(1) 1st Ren Co: (Atchd: one Plat Co B, 3rd Armd Amph Bn) On 18 April, 1945, utilizing LCRs, reconnolter the islands of HAMAHIKA SHIMA and HEANZA SHIMA; capture or destroy any enemy forces encountered. On 19 April, prior to daylight, land on TAKA BANARE SHIMA; reconnolter; destroy any enemy forces encountered; then on the same day, repeat this operation on the island of IKE SHIKl, and upon completion, return to base, (2) Other units - no change.
-1~ 5*1
\
: * * K h' v * t "
i 1 '
( -
'
A v-
t1 ^ W -
.< I n %j W i*
* *
LASSIFIED
Co) JJsJN
^ ^f
Pl&s, twe Plate in pilin high |rufi& v i c i n i t y village f HHf&egRA, prepare! to *elior e&U f i f f f - r fires n -targets ef eppertunity in l e t f pn @ f l i t Ren a On HmkMlU :SHIMA m& BSANZA IHIMA* Otherwise,, n hanfe*
On 80 April, 1141, farrisn the island of TAKA IANAEE

8HIMA with one rifle 0, This 0, utilising LCIHs t
be furnished by piv, will patrol daily the islands of
HEAN2A SHIMA, HAMAHIKA SHIMA, and IKE SHIMA, Atohd
Atnph Trae 0 will not be used for patrol purposes, but
will be usea. for movement of Trs from OKINAWA to AKA
BANAHE^ and for supply purpose@e Attaoh 3rd Plat, Co B,
3rd Arrnd Amph Bn^ to rifle Co garrisoning TAKA BANAR2N
Otherwise no change?
(d) 3rd Armd Amph Bn (leas Pets)2
'
winHIII inn B I I I iimi mail in in in IIIIIIUHIHIIIJIJMM \imS mil ITTT^ I I I M I H I B mrtiiirliiiiirn I H I I I I H I I M T T
Move to bivouac area near beach East of UKIN (village).

Attaoh one Plat to 1st Ren Co until completion of Opns
of that unit on HEANZA SHIMA, HAMAHIKA SHIMA, TAKA
BANARE SHIMA, and IKE SHIMA, Continue maintenance
and training*
(e) All other units - no change.
(x) Reports - no change,
4 0 Omitted.
5 - Communications as follows?
(a) 1st Ren Co and 1st Sig Co maintain continuous guard on
Div Ren (Fox) Net except when Impracticable due to
difficulty of erection of equipment in LCRs
(b) Internal Com as required using SCR-300 (Channel 5)
(c) Liaison and fire control Com between 1st Ren Co and
supporting Tks on Co A, 1st Tk Bn frequency. SCR-510
equipment and liaison personnel furnished by CO, 1st
Tk Bn0
(d) Report CP locations when established,,
&.3A
2=
JlECUSSIFitu
(e) Use effective shackle code for encoding all coordinates

(f) All other Cora normal0
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLE's
RcOoBARE
Colonel^ UoSo Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.
DISTRIBUTION ;
CGr, III.BhibCQaspg _ . . . _ 1 J r , , . . . B 5 , . , . . . CGP 6 t h MarDlv CGP 1 0 t h Army - - . - . _ _ . . , COr9 XXIV Corps . - CGc8 1 s t MarDlv _ . . . . ADC - - _ . . . . 2 1 2 2 1 1
DIS
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_Z i
D_4 . . _ . _ , . , ,1 DSO - - - - . - - . . 1 DlvSurg , . ,. 1 1st Marines - ,. ., 2 5th Marines .' . . 2 7th Marines -........_ ..., ..-. . . 2 11th Marines ..... . ... 2 EngrBn .. . . . .. ,. .. 1 MedBn . - . , . . 4thWarDogPlat . .. 4thProvRktDet DivHqBn . . - . . ServBn . . . . . .._ Provost Marshal . . SrdArmdAmphBn -....-.... . .
Ren Co . . . . .
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
O-F-F-I-d-I-fl-Ls R0 Eo HONSOVETZ L t f i o l . , USMC, D.3
"H" AT?
'2&
0020-AE
1990=5=80
485/389
& $ &
1st Mar Dlv In The Field
.... <' ' "
1000 29 Aoril, 1945
No 6-45
MAPSs RYUKYU RETT09,ls25,000
Special Road Map, OKINAWA,
TASK ORGANIZATION
Col Kenneth B. Chappell, USMC
(a) CT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st Med Bn
Co A,1st Engr Bn
Co A, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
1st Plat, 1st Ord Co
5th Marines
Co B, 1st Med Bn
Co B, 1st Engr Bn
Co B, 1st MT Bn
Det 4th JASCO
2nd Plat, 1st Ord Co
(c) CT-7
7th Marines
Co C, 1st Med Bn
Co C, 1st MT Bn
DUt 4th JASCO
3rd Plat, 1st Ord Co
(d) 11th Marines
(e) 1st Tk Bn
1st Tk Bn
Co B, 713th Tk Bn
(f) 1st Engr Bn
1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
'n&S
18100,000,
Col John H Grlebel, USMC
Col Edward W, 3nedekerfl USMC
Col Wilburt So Brown, USMC

LtCol Arthur JB.Stuart, USMC
Major Theodore E Drummond,USMC
/ t\ T- i
i V I
I t^^^*
I2.S
KSlHEtt
1st Serv Bn
1st Plat, Bomb Disposal Co
25th Depot Co (h) 1st MT Bn
#.S
. . . , ., ,.
.- . . LtCol Charles G Gaines, Jr, USMC
1 B $ MT Bn (less Cos A, B, and C)

(1) 3rd Armd Amph Bn (J) 1st Amph Trac Bn (k) Div Trs LtCol John I. Williamson, USMC LtCol Maynard M Nohrden, USMC LtCol James S. Monahan, USMC
Div Hq Bn 1st Med Bn (less Cos A, B, and C)

Co B, 88th Chem Bn
4th Prov Rkt Det
4th War Dog Plat(Less Det)
lo (a) See Annex ABLE (Int)
(b) (1) 1st Mar Div Atchd XXIV Corps effective 0600, 20 Aprllo
XXIV Corps will resume Atk to the South with three Dlvs
abreast, 77th Inf Div in the center, 1st Mar Div on the
right and 7th Inf Div on the left*
(2) Upon relief by 1st Mar Div, 27th Inf Div Atchd IsCom
as garrison Trs0
(3) Arty and NGF will Spt Atk of XXIV CorpsD 20 1st Mar Div will move by motor shuttling and marching to the
Z of A of the 27th Inf Div and will relieve that unit, prepared
to continue Atk to the South, For details of motor march see
Annex BAKER (March Table), For assembly areas and boundaries
see Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)
(a) CT-1
On 30 April, move by motor shuttling to Z of A of 27th Inf
Div, detrucking at RJ Hwy 32 - Hwy 1 Upon detrucking,
move by marching and relieve elements of 165th and 106th
Inf Regts within assigned Z of A Occupy and defend lines
held, prepared to Atk on ordera See Annex BAKER (March
Table) and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay).
3o
'IT
f'\
*r
<
y^Z*#*W%'.
(b) CT-5
On 1 May, move by motor shuttling to Z of A of 27th Inf
Div detrucking at RJ Hwy 32 = Hwy 50 Upon detrucking,
move by marching and relieve elements of 106th and 105th
Inf Regts within assigned Z of A, Occupy and defend
lines held, prepared to Atk on order. See Annex BAKER
(March Table) and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)
(c) CT~7
On 2 Mayp move by motor shuttling to Z of A of 27th Inf
Div detrucking at RJ Hwy 32 - Hwy 16 Upon detrucking^,
move by marching to Res Area indicated in Annex CHARLIE
(Opn Overlay) and remain in this area in Div Resc See
Annex BAKER (March Table) and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)
(d) 11th Marines
Occupy p o s i t i o n s i n Div Z of A, prepared to f u r n i s h Arty Spt f i r e s o Report Bn p o s i t i o n s when located., See Annex CHARLIE (Opn O v e r l a y ) . (e) 1 s t Tk Bn On 30'.April, Move to Bivouac area indicated in Annex
CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)0 See Annex BAKER (March Table)
and Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)0
(f) On 1 Mayp move to bivouac area indicated in Annex CHARLIE
(Opn Overlay)o 3ee Annex BAKER (March Table) and Annex
CHARLIE (Opn Overlay)o
(g) Serv G p
Move elements designated by Op Comdr to selected areas,
commencing 30 Aprilo Other elements remain present
location. Carry on normal functions.
W 1st MT Bn Provide motor transport to assist in carrying out troop
movements as outlined in Annex BAKER (March Table)
'27
mik
(i) 3rd Armfl Amph Bn
-J * %; " > :
- " > - * , ,J? * \
Move to area selected by Bn Comdr0 Provide security for

beaches from front lines north to a point to be designatedo
Prepare to furnish Arty Spt fires 0
(J) 1st Amph Trao Bn
Move to area selected toy Bn 0omdr o Prepare to furnish
vehicles for use in amphibious Atk and/or for water supply
and evacuation of front line units 0
(k) Div Trs
Commencing 30 April move units to areas designated in
vicinity of TA 8380 JIG 5 prepared to carry out normal
and assigned missions 0
(x) (1) Direct communication between all units concerned is
authorized,,
(2) A total of 113 2% ton trucks will be furnished each Regt in the evening preceeding day on which Regt concerned is to move 0
(3) A total of 9 trucks other than organic vehicles will
be retained by Regts for independent shuttling of Trs
and equipment
(4) Trucks turn around as follows after disembarking Trs?
Turn SE on Hwy 32; proceed about 500 yards to RJ 8178
JIG; turn NW and proceed to RJ 8380 JIG; take Hwy 30
here and proceed SW to Hwy 1; turn Northo
(5) Trucks in column will maintain at least 50 yards distance at all times: particularly when stopped and Trs are embarking or disembarking0 (6) Each vehicle will post an air sentinelo
4, 50 See Adm 0 6=45.
(a) Regts take over existing wire facilities*
(b) Com in accordance witl CentComTwo as revised ror present
Opn, $nd X Army SOIo
(c) All untts report location of CPs when established,,
/2-8
' * .
'

R Oo BARE5
Colonel, Uo S 0 Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.
ANNEXES;
ABLE - Intelligence
BAKER - March Table
CHARLIE Opn Overlay
* DISTRIBUTIONS
CGP 1st Mar Div
^1
.
s^ 0
-,.,.^
^^

1
|
f\
Tfl
(=;>
M -sp m
fc^
. ^ . ^ ,^j
e^
to?
^>
a^^ ^ ^
^ ^
^^
D-2 . - - ___ -TTrr-TT: - T D~3 ~ "
^ ^ -
i 1
Provost Marshal ~"~---T~ .--~~--.~ i (60 additional copies Annex BAKER) ADC - . 1 1st Marines "" ' ""' * 6 (10 additional copies Annex BAKER) 5th Marines - 6 (10 additional copies Annex BAKER) 7th Marines 6 (10 additional copies Annex BAKER) " """ -"""" " "" 5 " 11th Marines DivHqBn ~~ -----r -1 IstEngrBn : 1 IstMedBn 1 1 IstTankBn . - *-- (5 additional copies Annex BAKER) ~ IstSerBn 1 IstMTBn -
(10 additional copies Annex BAKER) ~** ' * IstAraphTracBn 3rdArmdAmiDhBn - - - - - - T - T :--r-- l Ca, IHPhlbCorps CG, XXIV Corps --- * CGP 6thMarDiv l CG, 7thInfDiv -
/*<}
-4 ^ - _ _ DivAdJ - - ^ - ^ DSO DE0 .

D
_ ___ 1 ^--7-r-- - - , ~ 1 , , - l ,. l
$&B
CG, 10th Army -_.-_. CGP 77th InfDiv _._. CG, 27th InfDiv . Record Section File . File ___________-__.
---:-
2 1 1 1
0=P-P-I-O-I-A-Ls
R. E. HON30WETZ, LtCol., USKC, G-3.
'$*
fCLASSIFIF
(30
Annex BAKER to Field Order No* 6$4dC 1st M a r O ^ ^ f MARCH TABLE
i|pff (*\ h^HtlVli

MAPS? RYUKYU RETTO, ls25fl000o
CLASSIFIED
30 April, 1945
1st Mar Dlv

in'irK'rirta
In The Fielt 1000, 29 April, 1945
Speelal Road Map, .OKINAWA, lgl00p000,
Principal Unit? 1st Tk Bn

IP ! RJ Hwy 16 - Hwy 5
Rate of March s 7 MPH
Serial 1 Unit No Veh Entrkg Pt DERAGAWA
Hr Head Leaves EP 0530
Time Time Head Houte Lgth Clears IP To 5min

0615 24S-16W 5S-30W
13
Route
Ret
Co A 24
IN
"i"" ~co i ""ii""""do""""

.
5rain """o63o"" ~~J~~~"~"
"24" do
~~0600 """ 5min ~6li"""" irain
0645" """do"""""""IN""
0700 do
=
i"" HAS
"34"" do
~IN~~
Principal Units CT-1

5 RJ Hwy 16 - Hwy 5
IP Rate of March s 7 MPH
No Veh EntfcJcg Pt Hr Head Leaves EP 0655 Time Lgth 8rain Time Head Clears IP 0738 Route Route
To Ret
240-16W IH-I6E
5S-130W 24N
13
Serial 1
Unit
ROM 28 9390P
'11^ 26~~~9288W~~~~~07i5
8min
5i5i
16W-53 IN-16K 13 24N
Serial Unit 3 4
"" "5 ""6
No Veh 26 26
Eritrkg
Hr Head Leaves EP Pt
9288W
690F 0755 0825~
085^ ' 09^5
Time Lgth 8min ~8min
Time Head
Clears IP
0838
Route To
Route Ret
let Bn
""3rd Bn
16W-5S'" -1N-16E
130W-1S : 2 N
-4
0908 " 5S-T30W I M H R E

"
23 24N
53-130W 1N-16E 13 24N 243~lW~Noh~" 5S-130W 13
3r<T ~ 26~ ""8?90P ~ Bn Wpns ""30 "" "9289H

Co
26 ~ 9290D
8889Q,
2"5 ~ 92*90X
8889Q
8mTn~ ~ 0938 8min 100$
~ 7 HAS ,; , , A f -J [ * Eng
~* 8 " A Med
A Eng Ord Plat 2nd Bn
0955 1022 Io"39 1105
8mln 8min 8rain
Io38" ~ 243-T6W 1N~16E~ 53-130W 13N 13 1122 243-lBvTNone' ~" 53-130W IS
~ 9
26 " 92$0D
12^3
8min
13li
2"43-16VriN-T6E 53-130W 13N IS
~ l 0 ~ ""2nd Bn
" Tl " H&S
26 ~ "9290D
1303
8min
134T
243-16W~lN-l6E 5S-130W 13N

IS
24S-16l'/"lN-16E 53-130W 13N
13
24S-I6W TN~16E
5S-130W 13N 13
9 ~ 9290D
1333
3min " ~14lT

5
~ 12
RQfa
17 " 9390P
~
T4"03
5mlh
1441
-2
ECLA
i?5L
L v n ^ v" > ? -; :
'fci-
Principal Units 1st Engr Bn IP S RJ Hwy 16 - Hwy 5 Rate of March % 7 MPH Serial 1 2 " 5 Unit Co C No Veh 21 Entrkg Pt 8888H Hr Head Leaves EP 1545 Time Lgth 6min Time Head Clears IP 1600 Route To Route Ret

16W-5S IN 130W-1S
1601 H&S ~~25 ""87iii"""""""""" H&S~ 25 " 8789Y~~"

1619 1637
8min 1616 do -
IN . 8min mln
1634 "do"

~IN
"IN
"liii"""
mln
1657 NOTEs
"1712"-"
~1N
Move heavy equipment over same route commencing 2400
Principal Units CT-5

IP s RJ Hwy 16 - Hwy 5
Rate of March 7 MPH
No Veh 30 Entrkg Pt INUBI Hr Head Leaves EP 0630 Time Lgth 7min Time Head Clears IP 0715 Route To Route Ret
Serial
Unit 3rd Bn
~5rd Bn
13S-16W IN to
53-130W OYASHI
IS for 1=5
do
25~~~INUR]T ~~~0700
" "Smin
0745 " 1SS-16W 5S-130W IS
ind"""30"""sUNAN"^"" = , 0715^ r o = " = 7mln""' 0815 Bn
133-16W 1N-16E 5S-130W 13N IS INUBI f o r QJ4
- +
.0cÔ
'**
'^mssf-fi}Hr Head No Entrkg

Serial 4 Unit 2nd Bn Veh 25 Pt SUNAN Leaves EP 0745
Time Lgth 6min
Time Head Clears IP 0845
Route To
Route Ret 1N-16E 13N INUBI for QM
133-16W 5S-130W 13
Wpn Co B Med
2~INUBI~~~~l)i30~~~~~6^
6 7 8
24
INUBI
0900
5S-130W 13
imin^ôiii"""""^ "None"* ""None""" None
~H&i ""23 B Eng 20
ZNUBZ """"0930 ~'~-~6min""l015""""~do 8889R 1030 4min 1045 16W-53 130W 13

53-130W 13
Bn 10 1st Bn
25 OYASHI 1330 6min 1430
13N do
do
.----.-^---------------^--
~6min " ~1500~~~13S^16W~~1N-16E

1S-130W 13N
IS
5min 1530 do do
m irirrrMminTTWTirw~rtr*'"M"'TT"r*'"îr^^
li"~
QM
r_*.
20~ INUBI
(wnMiwiwuMwiaMiimp
1430
* n ^w>
i w i n i i i a ITTIIII i i ii HIMirv->r irf*ri-iirir-ii-wiirr 1 MTIW mill"|irmm imi a i m*u mw
Principal Unit? CT-7

IP : HIZA0NNA
Rate of March ; 7 MPH
No Entrkg Hr Head Serial Unit Veh Pt Leaves EP 1 1st Bn 28 KIN 0800
Time Lgth 7min
Route To
Route Ret
13N-16W IN to
53-130W YAKADA
13
/5f
n **"%
Serial
Unit 1st Bn 3rd Bn
No ftntrkg
Hr Head Veh Pt
Leaves EP 26 i5 KIN CHUDA 0830
Time Lgth 7min
Rout? To
Ret IN to
YAKADA

13N-16W 53-130W IS
' 0734 ""=^m"'--g"'"^'=TO='====ra'

13S-16W 5S~130W
IS
0804 7mln~ ~~1056~~li~6W IN 13S-16W
5S-130W
IS
7min
l o t u a ^
3rd
26
CHUDA
H&3
25 ISHI
KAWA
1116
1126
13S-16W IN 5S-130W
IS
= Wpn ~24^~
" xaiiz
1146" Co KAWA
ISHI-
Engr 1 KAWA
Det
7min-"""ll56"l3i^l5f"""lNi 5S-130W
IS
7min 1226 133-16W IN 5S-130W
IS
H&3 4 "i&s""" 4 Wpn Co

C Med 4 14
I SHI-
1216 """"liie"
KAWA
ISHI-
KAWA
3 May, 1945
CT-7 (Contd)
1100 1S-6W 133-16W 58"13CW IS IN
2nd Bn
--
~YAKADA
"""looo
7rain
i
'*- ' 1 1 /
/if
r.
Serial Unit 2nd Bn No Veh 26 Entrkg Pt YAKADA Hr Head Leaves EP 1030 Time Lgth 7min Time Head Clears IP 1130 Route To Route Ret
do
IN
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLEs Rf Oo BARE, fl Col, U3MC, C of 3 DISTRIBUTIONS OFFICIALS Same as Field Order 6-45
R. E. HONSOWETZ, LtColo, USMC, G-3
r*\
/?fe
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER NO 6-45
lOOO 29 APRIL, 1945
.
/
r MARDW(REIN)
OFF-ICIA-L
MOKISOWCTZ.
G-^ DEL VALLE C G Scale- 1/D,000
6
/ /
(ôute of
Convoy
I
/
i 75S0
-in .
O
ts>
7 "1
Tp- Detrucking < Turnaround ^
8?77
Front lines as of .9 April , 194-5
78SO
V7b
. Div. t*9umc aV ^ e V. 0*Vhi dirat\ft no
FIELD ORpER. MO. 12r45

4 OPERATION OVERLAY
MA>R..l)lV.(RJE.\N} 0-F-F-\-C-\-A-l
HONSom Gi-3 DEU VAU.E Map Rc-i.-Qinuû ^zVio s>ca\e - 1/25POO
1990-5-80
_*.
First Marine Division,
I n The F l e l d
'i$ t ft ^ Q S C L l
\i 1L
w*
1500, 10 May, 1945
Field Order
No 16-45
MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000.
TASK ORGANIZATION
No change*
1. (a) See current Int summaries.
(b) (1) Tenth Army Atks to South at 0700, 11 May with Corps
abreast III Phib Corps on the right, to destroy
enemy forces in Southern OKINAWA. Initially it
will envelop and reduce the SHURI position (initial
Army objective) and divide enemy forces by seizing
the hill masses in the area KARA (7767) - KAMIZATO
(8066) (second Army objective).
(2) XXIV Corps Atks on our left at 0700, 11 May, envelopes
SHURI hill mass from the east and assists III Phib
Corps in reducing that position, and seizes portions
of Army objectives within 3 of A.
(3) III Phib Corp* Atks td the south at 0700, 11 May,
with two Divs abreast, 1st Mar Div on the left, and
malting main effort in the left, envelopes the SHURI
hill mass from the west and assists XXIV Corps in
reducing that position, and seizes portions of Army
objectives within Z of A. It will also capture
NAHA and OROKU Peninsula.
(4) 6th Mar Div Atks to the south at 0700, 11 May and
seizes that portion of the general line NAHA (7371 F) RJ (7669 L) - RJ (7869 G) within Z of A; assists
1st Mar Div by fire and movement; maintains contact
with 1st Mar Div; protects Corps right flank;
designates one RCT as Corps Res which will not be
committed without Corps approval.
(5) Army Atk will be preceded by air, Arty, and NGF
preparation.
(6) TAF, Tenth Army, continues air Spt.
(7) CTG 51.22 continues NGF Spt.
2. 1st Mar Div will:
(a) Atk to south within Z of A makin p^jrps mafn^Co1|.
-1- ;
L L* L jK u u ***
JIL
11
& &
7676
0-3
0-3
OPERATION OVERLAY
HELD ORDER NO 16-45
1 6 0 0 lO MAY, 1945
ST
MAR D1V (REIN)

DEL VALLE C G Mapl^l^yukyu-êtto, Scale: 1/25,000
OFFIC1ALMONSOW
G-5
1990-5-80 îf3^ ^lfc<*<*irirn

F i e l d Order No 27-45 TASK ORGANIZATION No change* 1.
EGLASSIF1EB
First Marine Division,

In The Fleldf '
0700, 23 May, 1945*
(a) See current I n t summaries. (b) (1) XXIV Corps continues envelopment of SHURI from the EAST with three Diva abreast, 96th Inf Div i n the c e n t e r , 77th Inf Div on the r i g h t and 7th Inf Div on the l e f t , (2) I I I Phib Corps continues Atk at 0730 24 May with two Dive abreast, 6th Mar Div on the right and 1 s t Mar Div on the l e f t , i n order to envelope SHURI from the West, (3) 6th Mar Div continues Atk at 0730 24 May. making main e f f o r t on the l e f t , and s e i z e s North bank of KOKUBA G W within Z of A, prepared for further A A Adv on order. 6th Mar Div w i l l p r o t e c t the Corps r i g h t (West) flank and maintain contact with 1 s t Mar Div. (4) I I I Corpe Arty continues i n general Spt. (5) Air and NGF on c a l l .
2.
1 s t Mar Div w i l l : (a) Complete r e l i e f of elements of 6 t h Mar Div within Z of A by 1600 23 May. (b) Continue Atk at 0730 24 May, making main e f f o r t on the l e f t and s e i z e 0 - 2 prepared f o r further Adv. (o) Maintain pressure on the enemy within Z of A and a s s i s t XXIV Corpe i n reduction of the SHURI p o s i t i o n . (d) After r e d u c t i o n of the SHURI p o s i t i o n , s e i z e North bank of KOKUBA G W w i t h i n Z of A, prepared f o r further Adv A A on order. (c) Maintain contact with XXIV Corps on the l e f t . ^ a r* M i r~J LD present front l i n e s . r For formation, boundaries, 1 c&3#ctjl\v*J \ e # pTpili 't'
_! J i t b L r*0 lULLL
m$
Complete relief of elements of 6th Mar Dlv within Z of A

by 1600 23 May. At 0730 24 May, resume Atk and complete
seizure of 0-2 within Z of A prepared for further Adv on
order. Assist CT-1 on the left by fire and maneuver*
(b) CT-1
At 0730 24 May, resume Atk. a s s i s t e d by CT-5, and s e i s e 0-2 within Z of A, prepared for further Adv on o r d e r ,
(o) CT-7
DIT Res* Remain present looatlon prepared t o reinforce or r e l i e v e e i t h e r a s s a u l t CT. (d) 11th Mar Deliver f i r e s on c a l l , and h a r a s s i n g f i r e s on t h e SHURI p o s i t i o n . (e) 1 s t Tk Bn
Spt Atk.
(f) All other u n i t s no change. (x) Assault regiments w i l l exert continuous pressure on the enemy be conducting constant aggressive p a t r o l l i n g to the front and by l o c a l Tk-Inf action aimed a t softening the ais or o aches to t h e SHURI p o s i t i o n . Advantage w i l l be taken of every opportunity t o hold advanced p o s i t i o n s on favorable t e r r a i n features occupied by p a t r o l s . 4 . See current Adm Order. 5 . (1) Com normal. (2) Report any changes In CP l o c a t i o n . BY C M A D OP MAJOR GENERAL d e l VALLB: O MN R. 0 . BARE, Colonel. U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of S t a f f . DISTRIBUTION! S p e c i a l . 0-F-F-I-C-I-A-L;
1990.5-60
HWi
Field Order
No 36-45
MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000.
TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) CT-7
7th Marines
Co C, 1st MT Bn
2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn
3rd Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(b) CT-5
5th Marines
Co B. 1st MT Bn
3rd Plat, Co B, let Engr Bn
2nd Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
2nd Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(c) CT-1
1st Marines
Co A, 1st MT Bn
3rd Plat, Co A, 1st Engr Bn
1st Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Det 4th JASCO
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Plon Bn
(d) 11th Marines
1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n , I . flti The Field 1200, 2 June, 1945.
Air"*
Col Snedeker
Col Griebel
Col Mason
Col Brown
11th Marines
Det 3rd Armd Aaph Bn (four Plats)
(e) 1st Tk Bn
1st Tk Bn
Co B, 713th Tk Bn (less Dets)
Tk Maint Plat, Ord Co
(f) 1st Engr Bn
1st Engr Bn (less Dets)
* r<?>*
Ma J Drummond
LtCol Stuart
A ^
'Jf *
$< W"'
'7
Hi 0
LtCol Ballance
1st Plon Bn (less Deta)
(h) 1st Amph Trao Bn (1) 8th Amph Trae Bn (J) Serv Qp 1st 3err Bn (less Dets)
2nd Plat, Bomb Disposal Co
1st Plat, 3rd Ammo Co
3rd Sep Laundry Plat
Co C, 1st Plon Bn
(k) 1st MT Bn LtCol Gaines
LtCol Nohrden
LtCol Nerren
Col Kaluf
1st M Bn ( l e s s Dets) T (1) Dlv Trs

DIT
Col Chappell
1.
Hq Bn
1st Med Bn
Co B, 88th Chem Mortar Bn
4th Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog Plat (a) See ourrent Int summaries. (b) (1) Tenth Army w i l l continue Atk to pursue and destroy enemy forces on Southern OKINAWA* (2) XXIV Corps w i l l make i t s main effort to s e i z e C A HN (7968), converging with III Phlb Corps in t h i s v i c i n i t y and then drive southeast to south coast O I A A to KN W prevent enemy from r e t i r i n g into CHINEN Peninsula. XXIV Corps w i l l maintain contact with III Phib Corps* (3) I I I Phib Corps w i l l : a. Drive southeast, making main effort to converge with XXIV Corps in v i c i n i t y of h i l l s north of TERA (7968) b. Secure N H port and a i r f i e l d . AA c. Seize CHIKUTO (7466) - T M S (7866) h i l l mass. O UU d# Continue Atk to south coast O I A A and destroy KN W remaining enemy; ff>fces i n Z of A. ^ - ^ ~ ~ ~ ?>
. 2 - 1 : : i
& *
- igslft: i i
/yf
% 9
s3 xL
<*:
i-f.T*
yil
5 Be?. V f
1
(4) 6 t h M a r Div will:
**
' "' "*

' '" .
a. On KING- Day, to be announced, (probably 4 June) land

on the northwestern portion of OROKU Peninsula,
seize NAHA airfield, OROKU Peninsula, and NAHA port
b. Seize CHIKUTO (7466) - TOMUSU (7866) hill mass
within Z of A.
o. Continue Atk to south coast OKINAWA and destroy
remaining enemy forces within Z of A.
d# Protect Corps west (right) flank,
e. Designate one CT as Corps Res,
(5) III Phib Corps Arty continues present missions.
(6) Corps Res will assemble in general area 7573 prepared
to move on order,
(7) TAP, Tenth Army continues to provide air Spt.
(8) CTG 51.82 continues to provide NG-P Spt.
2. 1st Mar Div will J
(a) Continue Atk at 0730 3 June in order to seize objectives
shown on Opn overlay.
(b) Seize CHIKUTO (7466) - TOMUSU (7866) hill mass within Z of A.
(c) Continue Atk to south coast OKINAWA and destroy remaining
enemy forces in Z of A*
(d) Maintain contact with 6th Mar Div on the right.
LD present front lines* Por formation, boundaries, objectives
and scheme of maneuver see Opn Overlay.
3. (a) CT - 7
Seise o b j e c t i v e i n d i c a t e d on Opn overlay, prepared for f u r t h e r Adv on o r d e r . See Opn o v e r l a y . (b) CT - 5 Seize o b j e c t i v e i n d i c a t e d on Opn overlay, prepared for f u r t h e r Adv on o r d e r . See Opn o v e r l a y . Malnjaj-n^contact e opn
with CT-7.
9 *
Dt
II r p I II V V
I^Cj
NfilASSlflED
(c> C T - 1 (d) 11th Marines
Spt Atk. (e) 1 s t Tk Bn Details no change.
*i.-.t*i
In Dlv Res; remain present location prepared to reinforce, or pas8 through either assault CT. Expedite absorption of replacements and reorganization i n preparation for action i n the immediate future. Continue policing 3HURI area and la sten burial of enemy dead*
Complete Fwd displacement at earliest practicable time.

Until Cos A and C are displaced Fwd Spt Atk of both assault
CTs with Co B. Reconnoiter for favorable routes of approach.
(f) 1st Engr Bn Normal missions. Expedite repair of designated routes and bridges needed to Spt assault elements* (g) 1st Pion Bm
Unload Dlv Rear Echelon upon arrival and commence construc
tion of camp at rehabilitation area.
(h) 1st Amph Trao Bn
Spt Opns of CT-7, Furnish three vehicles to CT-1 and two
vehicles to Evac Sta at 747 4-Y.
(1) 8th Amph Trac Bn
Spt Opns of C$-5.
(J) Serv 3p
Normal missions,
(k) 1st MT Bn
No anal missions.
(1) Dlv Trs
(!)
H q B n
- Normal missions. Ren Co Atchd to CT-7 for

supply only.
U L
/<ro
\J
L f% v* w li *
(2' 1st Med Bn - Normal missions.

(3) Co B. 88th Chemloal Mortar Bn - Complete displacement Fwd
to new position areas at earliest practicable time and
Spt Atk with two Plats in direct 3pt of CT-7 and one
Plat in direct Spt of CT-5.
(4) 4th Prov Rkt Pet - Complete displacement, Fwd at earliest
praccicaDie zime and Spt Atk with one Sect in direct Spt of CT-7 and one Sect in direct Spt of CT-5. (5) 4th War Dog Plat - Remain present location and continue
training, prepared to furnish Dets on call.
(x) (1) Contact from left to right.
(2) The main hostile position has been broken. Every
effort will therefore be exerted to prevent the enemy
from consolidating on new positions and to this end, the
Atk will be pressed with the utmost speed and vigor.
4. See Adm Order No 8-45.
5. (a) Com normal.
(b) Report changes i n CP l o c a t i o n s . BY C M A D OP MAJOR GENERAL del VALLE: O MN R. 0 . BARE, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of S t a f f . DISTRIBUTION: Special.
O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L: R. E. HONSOWETZ, L t C o l . , USMC, G-3.
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDEQ NO 36-45
1200 Z JUNE 1945
1*T MAR OIV (RON)

O-F-F-IC-I-A-L
HONSOWETZ
DEL VALLE CG
Scale: l/5,000
G-5
1990-5-80 485/390
_ _ ^&
First Marine Division,,,,

OKINAWA ISLAND. ' '"* ~"*
* 1500, 14 June, 1945.
F i e l d Order No-. 49-45 MAP: RYUKYU RETTO, 1 : 2 5 , 0 0 0 . TASK ORGANIZATION (a) CT - 7 7 t h Marines Co C, 1 s t M Bn T 2nd P l a t Co C, 1 s t Engr Bn 3rd P l a t Ord Co, 1 s t Serv Bn 3rd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pi on Bn Det 1 s t ASOO Det 1 s t Bomb Disposal Co (b) CT - 1 1 s t Marines
Co A, 1 s t M Bn
T 3rd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Engr Bn 1 s t P l a t Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn 1 s t P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pion Bn Det 1 s t ASOO ( c ) CT - 5 5th Marines Co B, 1 s t M Bn T 3rd P l a t Co B, 1 s t Engr Bn 2nd P l a t Ord Co, 1 s t Serv Bn 2nd P l a t Co A, 1 s t Pion Bn Det 1st ASOO
Det 1st Bomb Disposal Co
(d) CT - 8 (less 2d Bn, 10th Mar & Tk Co) 8th Marines
( e ) 11th Marines 11th Marines
2nd Bn, 10th Mar
VMO-3
( f) 1st Tk Bn
-1 Col BROW Col GRIEBEL Col SNEDEKER
Col MASON
Col WALLACE
v * * *"
Jt'k\
^
- - L i
% *
I.
Co B, 713th Tk Bn
Tk Maint Plat, Ord Co
One Co, 2nd Tk Bn
(g) 1st Engr Bn (less Dets) (h) 1st Plon Bn (less Dets) (1) Serv Gp 1st Serv Bn (less Det)
1st Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
1st Plat, 3rd Ammo Co
3rd Separate Laundry Plat
Co C, 1st Pion Bn
(J) Dlv Trps Dlv Hdqrs Bn (less Dets 1st ASCO)
1st Med Bn
Co B, 89th Chem Mortar Bn 4 t h Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog P l a t 1 s t Amph Trac Bn 8 t h Amph Trac Bn 3rd Armd Amph Bn 1 s t M Bn ( l e s s Dets) T 1. (a) Se? current I n t summaries (b) (1) Tenth Army w i l l continue Atk t o destroy enemy forces on Southern OKINAWA, (2) XXIV Corps w i l l make I t s main e f f o r t to s e i z e Y J A TZ DAKE-YAEJU DAKE H i l l mass. (3) I I I Phlb Corps w i l l continue Atk to south. Dlv i n Coros Res. (4) I I I Phib Corps Arty and 27th Div Arty w i l l the f i r e s of 11th Mar. 6 t h Mar reinforce
MaJ DRUMMOND L t C o l BALLANCE Col KALUF
Col CHAPPELL
(5) TAF, Tenth Army continues to provide Air Spt. (6) CTF 51 continues to provide NGF Sxt. 2 . 1 s t Mar Div w i l l Atk 0730, 15 June to s e i z e K W N A RIDGE. U AG LD l i n e s held at time of Atk. see Opn o v e r l a y .
-2
For formation and boundaries
DEGLAS
LLASSIFIL
3. (a) CT-7 Seize MAZADO, Hill 69 and KUWANGA RIDGE In Z of A.'

(k),CT-1Continue reduction of Jap positions on KUNISHI RIDGE.
Maintain contact with and 8pt Atk. of 96th Inf Div. Upon
being relieved by CT-5, prior to 0600, 16 June, revert to
Div Res and assemble vicinity of SHINDAWAKTJ.
(c) CT-5 Relieve CT-1 prior to 0600, 16 June, prepared to Atk
on order*
(d) CT-8 (less 2d Bn, 10th Mar A Tk Co) Upon landing move to
assembly area designated on Opn overlay. Commence
preparations for passing through CT-7.
(e) 11th Mar Spt Atk, Details no change.
(f) 1st Tk Bn Spt Atk.
(g) 1st Engr Bn Normal missions. Expedite repair of designated

routes TO apt assault elements.
(h) 1st Plon Bn Continue unloading of Div Rear Echelon and
construction of camp at rehabilitation area.
(i) Serv GP Normal missions.
(J) Div Trps
(1) Co B. 88th Chem Mortar Bn Atk with 2 Plats in Spt
of CT-7 and 1 Plat Spt CT-1.
(2) 4th Prov Rkt Pet continue reconnaissance for areas
to Spt Atk. 1st Sec Spt CT-7, 2d Sect Spt CT-1.
(3) Ron Co continue reconnaissance and mopping up of
rear areas.
(4) 4th,War Dog Plat Sot Ren Co.
(x) (1) Contact from right to left.
(2) Tks will not be used for Ren purposes.
4. Omitted. 5. (a) C m normal. o Details for CT-8 l a t e r .
(b) Report changes in C l o c a t i o n s . P O MN BY C M A D OF MMJP^fflEJlAL. dal JWW*V " % MA^^JJEjlAI^ djjL $ A | ^ 5 |
lUFTTl*\*T B-H
Q&TiQ#el9 U. *5. ^MSTinV Corpe^ * * ' . ! ; Chief of Staff. /r?
DISTRIBUTION:
Special.
O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:
R. E. HONSOWETZ, L t C o l . , USMC, 0-3.
J$*
<Sth Manncs
A s s E M b u y AREA
î
7663
li1|(nLLii>
l-2>8S
1-7
735<=)
OPERATION OVERLAY F\EU> ORjDER. NO. 4 9 - 4 5

1500 l A JUME n 1945
MAR,DIV(R.EIN)
O-F-F-1-C-l-A-L HONSOWETZ. DEL VALLE

Mao Qef - Q ^ u W 1&tto scale-1/2.5, OOO
lQSUH.jByf L j I ^ J % J | I J ^ P 485/390 Field Order

No. 59-45
TASK ORGANIZATION
0LASSiFIL,
$Nfl**!WW^Si
First Marine Division, O I A A ISLAND. KN W 0900, 24 June, 1945.
Delete CT-1 and Co B, 88th Chem Mortar Bn.

1. (a) See current Int summaries.
(b) (1) Tenth Army will mop up enemy unite and personnel.
(2) XXIV Corps has been directed to mop up its Z of A.
(3) III Phib Corps will mop up its Z of A.
(4) 1st Mar will prevent enemy elements from moving N of
1st Mar Div Z of A.
2. 1st Mar Div will continue to mop up enemy remnants in Z of A
S of Phase Line 1 and on order about 25 June Adv N to Phase
Lines 2 and 3 mopping U D enemy remnants in Z of A.
Coordinate Adv with XXIV Corps. For Bdrys, Phase Lines,
and Assembly Areas see Opn overlay.
3. (a) CT - 7
(1) Continue to patrol and mop up Z of responsibility.
(2) On order cease patrolling and permit CT-8 and CT-5
to pas8 through present positions.
(3) On order commence patrolling in rear of CT-8 and
CT-5 as far as KUNISHI Ridge.
(c) CT-5 (1) Continue to mop up enemy in Z of A S of Phase Line 1 . (2) On order Adv N from Phase Line 1 to Phase Line 2 and on order from Phase Line 2 to Phase Line 3 , mopping up enemy remnants in Z of A. (3) Coordinate Adv with XXIV Corps. (4) On completion of mopoing up, be prepared to move on order into designated fiynMSfc a ! 8 %* A t i i l t t
*^
/(pi
-ni HCCKlEi'
(d) C I - 8
(1) Continue to mop up enemy in Z of A S of Phase Line 1*;<& (2) On order Adv N from Phase Line 1 to Phase Line 2 and
on order from Phase Line 2 to Phase Line 3 mopping
up enemy remnants in Z of A,
(3) Coordinate Adv with CT-5.
(4) On completion of mopping up, be prepared to move on
order into designated assembly area.
(f) 1st Tk Bn - Spt mopoing up and on completion assemble
in present location*
(J) PIT Trs
(1) Ren Co continue patrolling Z of responsibility,
(k) Other Units - No change.
(x) (1) Caution will be exercised to prevent firing on
friendly Trs and installations.
(2) To insure coverage of area a line of skirmishers will
be used and any suspicious areas, especially cane
fields and scrub browth, will be burned or smoked prior
to Inf movement therein.
(3) All units will be prepared after monping up to move to
rehabilitation areas.
(4) There will be physical contact between adjacent units,
during the sweep N.
(5) All units will complete mopping up by OBOE plus TEN.
(a) In order that existing dumps of Japanese Ammo, mines,
shells, bombs, and demolitions may be disposed of immediately
by competent personnel, it is directed that units of the
Div make dally reports to the Div Ord 0 giving the TA
location, amounts, and types of such enemy supplies
located during the day. Tenth Army personnel will make
disposition.
(b) Mark and report to Div Ord 0 the location of those "duds"
and unexploded bombs which cannot be destroyed by unit
personnel in order that prompt action may be taken by
Bomb Disposal Units.
(c) Units.#ake immediate steps to recover all types of U. S.
kl
Ammo and explosives, not in organized dumps, and deliver

to Array ASP at TA 7657-F. It is imperative that remnants
of the enemy be denied the use of our own grenades and
Ammo abandoned in old positions and fox holes.
(d) Empty brass cases and metal Ammo containers will be
salvaged and turned in to Army ASP at TA 7667-F.
(e) Salvagable fuel drums will be delivered to empty fuel drum
dump of the 521st QM Depot Gp at NAHA.
(f) Units will inspect all areas occupied by them in Southern
OKINAWA and conduct necefiary police salvage and closing of
tombs in such areas as have not since been occupied by
other units. Reoort when areas are ready for Inspection
by Div.
(g) Other details see Adm 0 9-45.
5. No change,
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL del VALLE:
R. 0. BARE,
Colonel, U. 3. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.
DISTRIBUTION; Special.
0-F-F-I-C-I-A-L:
ft. E. HONSOWETZ,
LtCol., USMC,
G-3.
Following are some of the more important Fragmentary Field Orders issued by this Command.
/frr
jm:
7- if
FIELD ORDER 7-46 X 77TH INF DIV ATKS 0900 2 MAY X NGF ENGAGES
TARGETS HIGH GROUND SOUTH BANK ASAKAWA ESTUARY 0830 - 0900 X
AIR STRIKES VICINITY AMIKE TOWN 0855 X AIR AND NGF ON CALL AFTER
0900 X 1ST MAR DIV ATKS 0900 2 MAY MAIN EFFORT ON LEFT AND SEIZES
OBJECTIVE LINE NORTH BANK ASAKAWA ESTUARY - 7674 GEORGE 4 - 7774
PETER 3 - 7774 XRAY 1 - 7874 WILLIAM 2 PREPARED FOR FURTHER
ADVANCE X ASSISTS ADVANCE 77TH INF DIV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINE X
BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X CT-1 SEIZE OBJECTIVE LINE WITHIN Z OF A
PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON ORDER X CT-5 SEIZE OBJECTIVE
LINE WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON' ORDER X ASSIST
ADVANCE OF 307TH INF X CT-7 UPON ARRIVAL REMAIN RES AREA IN
DIV RES X 11TH MilR SPT ATK X FIRE PREPARATION 0830-0840 AND
0850-0900 X 1ST TK BN SPT ATK X OTHER UNITS NORMAL MISSIONS X
CONTACT RIGHT TO LEFT X
FIELD ORDER 9-45 X 24TH CORPS RESUMES GENERAL OFFENSIVE 0800

4 MAY X AIRCRAFT WILL SMOKE HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF ASAKAWA ESTUARY
FROM 0800 TO ABOUT 0930 IF WIND FAVORS X AIR AND NGF ON CALL AFTER
0800 X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK AT 0800 4 MAY X FORMATION
BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES NO CHANGE X CT-1 SEIZE 0-1 AND 0-2
WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON ORDER X CT-5 SEIZE
0-2 WITIJIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADVANCE ON ORDER X CT-7 IN
DIV RES REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR -RELIEVE
EITHER ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR FIRE PREPARATION FROM 0750 TO
0800 X LAST SALVO ON HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF ASAKAWA ESTUARY TO
CONTAIN SMOKE AS MARKER FOR SMOKE AIRCRAFT X 1ST TANK BN SPT ATK X
3RD ARMD AMPH BN IN DIRECT SPT CT-1 DELIVER DIRECT FIRES ON CALL X
IF ANY UNIT UNABLE TO ATK ON SCHEDULE NOTIFY DIV BY 0700 X OTHER
DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 10-45 X CT-7 WITH 3RD ARMD AMPH BN ATCHD IN DIV RES X
AS CT-1 ADVANCES COMPLETE OCCUPATION OF RES AREA SHOW ON OVERLAY X
OCCUPY AND DEFEND THIS AREA PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO BEACH
DEFENSE X CONDUCT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS X PRIORITY ON HWY NO 1
TO CT-1 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 12-45 X NGF WILL FIRE PREPARATION ON HIGH (BOUND SOUTH
OF ASA-KAWA ESTUARY FROM 0900 TO 0915 6 MAY X AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON
STATION COMMENCING 0915 FOR CALL MISSIONS AND FOR ATKS ON TARGETS
OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0900 6 MAY X LD PRESENT
FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X
CT-I MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON RIGHT SEIZE 0-1 AND 0-2 WITHIN Z OF A X
CT-5 SEIZE 0-2 WITHIN Z OF A X COORDINATE ADV WITH 3p7TH JNF M D
ASSIST ADV OF THATÛNIT X CT-7 PASSftf*gU&&jAN^1î;r^(l|f^BR|
*>$-.
V-mc
&
1ST MAR AND SEIZE 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X DESIGNATE ONE BN TO BE COMMITTED ONLY WITH AUTHORIZATION BY DIV X 11TH MAR DELIVER FIRES 0*1 CALL X WHEN 2ND BN 5TH MAR I S RELIEVED BY 77TH INF DIV 3RD BN 7TH MAR REVERTS TO PARENT CONTROL X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 1 4 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 1 2 0 0 9 MAY IN ORDER TO SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X CT-1 SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 AND 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A X CT-7 I N DIV RES X REMAIN I N DIV RES AREA PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PASS THROUGH EITHHR ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR FIRE PREPARATION COMMENCING 1 2 0 0 TO BE LIFTED ON CALL OF INF COMERS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 1 8 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 1 3 MAY AND SEIZES 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X TIME OF ATK 0 7 3 0 X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 MOVE ONE BN TO RES AREA I N REAR 0 * CT-1 X AREA TO BE SELECTED BY CT COMDR X CO B 88TH CHEM MORTAR 3N PLACE 2 PLATS IN DIRECT SPT OF CT-7 AND ONE PLAT I N DIRECT 3PT OF CT-1 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 0 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS CONTINUES ATK 0 6 3 0 1 7 MAY X AIR AND NGF ON CALL X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES AT* 0 6 3 0 1 7 MAY AND SEIZES 0 - 1 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X FORMATION AND BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR OBJECTIVE SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-7 SEIZE 0 - 1 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 IN DIV RES X REMAIN PRESENT LOCATION PREPARED TO RELIEVE OR REINFORCE EITHER ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR DELIVER FIRES ON CALL X 1ST TANK BN SPT ATK WITH COS A AND B IN DIRECT 3PT OF CT-5 AND CO C IN DIRECT SPT OF CT-7 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 3 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK AT 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY X RIGHT REGIMENT OF 77TH INF DIV WILL ATK TO SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY COORDINATING WITH CT-1 AND WILL SEIZE. HIGH GROUND IN TA 7 3 7 3 N.O, 3 X AIR STRIKE ON TARGETS IN TA 7 8 7 2 QR 0 6 3 0 TO 0 7 1 5 X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 0 MAY AND SEIZES C - 2 P ^ ' ^ R E D FOR FURTHER ADV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVE AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 MAKING MAIN
77ao
Si
E&
All
11
-^7
(g)
--0-2.'
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER. MO. 1 0 - 4 5
1400 4KAAV^*94-&
KAAR, DlV.(REtN)
O-F-F-t-C-l-A-L
HONSOWETZ D E L VALLE
Map >ef. Qû\û Qetto s o a k - 1/25 ..OOO
8777
OPERATION CN/ERLAY F\ELO ORDER. NO. 14-4.5

1BOO S K A A N \ 19<45
1*T KAAR..X)iv.(RE\K^
O-F-F-l-C-l-A-U
\ \
DEL VALUE
HOMSONWHTZ.
scaW-l/Z5,000
/?/
OPERATION O V E R L Y
FIELD ORDER. NO. lfc-45
1600
12. MAY,
1^45
1ST MAR.DN.(REIN:)
O-F-F-t-C-l-A-L HOMSOWtT 1 DELVALLE
ca
Map Rcf.-RLjuk.Mu êtto s c a W - 1/25,COO
E3
577
E3
- in -. 5
OPERAÔU OVERLAY
FIELD OQPEli. MO. 2 0 - - 4 5
7e>74
noo l e M A V A ^ f t
1*T KAAU..SMV.CR.EIN}
O-F-F-l-C-l-A-U HOUSOVNETZ. d-3 D E L VAA.LE Map Pef. R.ûKû QgWo s c a l e - 1/Z.5.POO
LV *
11
6j?l
76H3
o-z.
OPERAT\ON OVERIAY
FIELD ORDER MO. Z2>-45
1160 1QMAV,1Q45
MAR. IV. (RE IK)

O-F-F-l-C-t-A-L HOWSOWE7
DEL VfcLLE CG Map Ref.-'Rûkuu %-H"0
ecale-l/5,000
UiELLASS
EFFORT ON THE RIGHT 3 EIZE 0 - 2 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON THE LEFT WITHIN OWN Z OF A AND WITHIN Z OF A OF 77TH INF DIV A3 FAR EAST AS ROAD , 7 8 7 3 D 2 D 4 J 5 S 5 SEIZE 0 - 2 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X COORDINATE ADV WITH TROOPS OF 77TH INF DIV W O WILL ADV TO 30TTTH H ALONG EAST SIDE OF ROAD 7 8 7 3 D2 L4 J 5 S5 X CT-7 IN DIV RES X REMAIN I N RES AREA AND REORGANIZE PREPARED TO RELIEVE OR REINFORCE EITHER ASSAULT CT X 11TH MAR SPT ATK X 1ST TK BN SPT ATK X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 2 5 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS .RESUMES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 2 MAY X AIR STRIKE ON ENEMY STRONGPOINT I N TA 7 7 7 0 Q,R,V,W 0 6 3 0 TO 0 7 1 5 2 2 MAY WEATHER PERMITTING X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 2 MAY IN ORDER TO S EIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES OBJECTIVES AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X CT-1 SEIZE 0 - 2 AND 0 - 3 WITHIN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X UNITS MAY CROSS BOUNDARIES OF ADJACENT UNITS AS NECESSARY BY COORDINATING WITH AND OBTAINING PERMISSION OF UNITS CONCERNED X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 3 0 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK 0 7 3 0 2 9 MAY X COMMENCING 0 6 3 0 2 9 MAY HUNTER-KILLER AIRCRAFT WILL SEARCH SOUTHERN OKINAWA FOR TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK TO THE SOUTH 0 7 3 0 2 9 MAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FORMATION AND BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE X RCN CO RECONNOITER TA>3 7 6 7 0 , 7 6 7 1 , 7 7 7 1 . 7 7 7 2 AND DETERMINE ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION THEREIN X CT-5 ADV TO THE SOUTHEAST AND SEIZE THE NOSE IN TA 7 7 7 2 R , S , T , THE HIGH GROUND IN THE GENERAL AREA 7 7 7 1 S AND OTHER FAVORAELE POSITIONS I N THESE AREAS X SPT OPERATIONS OF RCN CO X CT-1 COORDINATING ATK WITH 77TH I N F DIV SEIZE HIGH GROUND SOUTH OF WANA DRAW AND THAT PORTION OF SHURI WITHIN Z OF A X 11TH MAR SPT ATK X 1ST TK BN BE PREPARED TO SPT ATK WHEN AND WHERE GROUND CONDITIONS PERMIT X LIMIT OF ADV NAHA-YONABARU ROAD ( 7 7 6 9 - 7 9 6 9 ) X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 3 1 - 4 5 X I I I PHIB CORPS RESUMES ATK T<" SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 3 0 MAY X COMMENCING 0 6 3 0 3 0 MAY HUNTER-KILLER AIRCRAFT WILL SEARCH SOUTHERN OKINAWA FOR TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES ATK TO SOUTH AT 0 7 3 0 3 0 MAY IN ORDER TO SEIZE HILL 9 8 AND CONTINUES REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR FORMATION BOUNDARIES AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER SEE OVERLAY X
^"tâwsp
CT-5 SEIZE HILL 98 AND FAVORABLE POSITIONS IN VICINITY THEREOF X

CT-l CONTINUE REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI X MAINTAIN
CONTACT WITH ?7TH INF DIV X CT-7 MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA GENERALLY
ALONG RAILROAD TRACK WEST OF DAKESHI-VANA X COMMENCE PREPARATION;
FOR PASSING THROUGH CT-5 ON 31 MAY X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGS X
FIELD ORDER 32-45 X CANCEL FIELD ORDER 7-1-45 X 1ST MAR DIV
CONTINUES REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI ON 70 MAY AND
REORGANIZES PREPARATORY TO RESUMPTION OF ADV TO THE SOUTH X FOR
FORMATIONS AND 30UNDARIES SEE OVERLAY X CT-5 CONSOLIDATE PRESENT
POSITIONS AND REORGANIZE PREP.ARATORY TO RESUMPTION OF ADV TO THE
SOUTH X PATROL AGGRESSIVELY TO THE FRONT AND FLANKS X CT-1
CONTINUE REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS IN SHURI X TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES TO OCCUPY FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES COVERED
BY PATROLS X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 38-45 X CANCEL FIELD ORDER 37-45 X ATK 0730 4 JUNE X CT-7 SEIZE THAT PORTION OF LINE IWA-SHINDAWAKU-HANJA WITHIN Z OF A X CT-1 MOVE SOUTH THROUGH Z OF A OF 96TH INF DIV TO VICINITY OF TERA X MEET 77TH INF DIV GUIDES AT RJ 7971 UV AT 0530 X RELIEVE ELEMENTS OF CT-5 ON HILLS 57 AND 107 X THEN SEIZE THAT PORTION OF LINE IWA-SHINDAWAKU-HANJA WITHIN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE HILL 107 X THEN UPON RELIEF BY CT-1 REVERT TO DIV RES X MOP UP BETWEEN T5UKASAN AND GISUSHI X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 42-45 X 1ST MAR DIV ATKS 0730 8 JUNE TO SEIZE OBOE
FIVE AND OTHER FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES IN THE VICINITY THEREOF X
CT-1 SEIZE OBOE FIVE WITHIN Z OF A X CT-7 SEIZE OBOE FIVE WITHIN
Z OF A X REPORT FAVORABLE LOCATIONS ALONG COAST FOR LANDING SUPPLY
LVT'S X BE PREPARED TO COVER LANDING OF THESE VEHICLES X 1ST TK
BN BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON ORDER ON ROUTES TO BE DESIGNATED ONE CO
TO SPT CT-1 AND ONE CO TO SPT CT-7 X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 45-45 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0730 11 JUNE 1945 IN ORDER TO
SEIZE OBJECTIVE SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY X LD PRESENT FRONT LINES X FOR
FORMATION AND BDYS SEE OPN OVERLAY X CT_7 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN
Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV ON ORDER X SEE OPN OVERLAY X CT-l
SEIZE HILL 69 AND KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A PREPARED FOR FURTHER ADV
ON ORDER X COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X SEE OPN OVERLAY X
CT-5 RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY OF DIV RIGHT FLANK WITHIN ASSEMBLE
AREA X SEE OPN OVERLAY X 11TK MAR FURNISH SPT FIRES X 1ST EN OR BN
EXPEDITE BUILDING OF DESIGNATED BRIDGES AND BYPASSES AND REMOVAL OF
MINE FIELDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE FWD J^VEMENT OF TKS Am) INF X
CONTACT . R G T "TO ^L^T X OTHER UNITS f u n f ! * J\ 0 C I

.IH
.111
11
OPERATION OVf.R)-JW
HE U> OR.DEQ. KiO. 25-45
1 A 3 0 Z l K AY, 1 9 4 6
A
l*r KAAR..OW. (RJEIN}
O-F-F-t-C-l-A-L HONSOWE"
DEL VALLE CO
JL L
11
7678
^ ^ Front tine* a o*P 1 6 0 0
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER MO ? M 5
1 9 0 0 2 9 MAY, 1949
1* MAR DIV (REIN)

O F F I C I A L MONSOWETZ. DEL VALLE. CG
Map ifo: f^yukyu-l^fctto, Q ca le: 1/25,000
7675
S0T3
OPERATION OVERLAY FIELD ORDER NO ?2-45
2 1 0 0 29 MAY, 1945
I T MAR DIV(REIN)
O-P-F-UC-l-A-L MONSOWtTZ G-3 DEL VALLE C G

Map Qif: K^/ukyu- ktto, Scale: 1/25,000
5 t h Marines
ASSEMBLV
AvREA
5i7
T963
9G*MNF.DW.
- C P ' s MOT 1 s t Mav.Dw. 5th Ma\l."Q_e. ,''
/
TA7769 Re TATI68VJ5
KUNtSttl
I I
/
O-a
T557
OPERATION OVERLAY FIELD ORpER. NO. 4 5 - 4 5

WOO iOJUNE^1945
MA^DIVCCEIN)
O-F-F-l-C-l-A-L HONSOWED E L VMJLE
Map Tâf.- ^ u kû. ^ t t o scale -1/5,0QQ
55iriLy
FIELD ORDER 4 6 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 1 2 JUNE SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE AND OTHER FAVORABLE TERRAIN FEATURES IN VICINITY THEREOF X CT-7 ATK 0 3 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-1 ATK 0 7 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-5 HAVE ONE BN PREPARED TO MOVE ON ORDER TO VICINITY OF TERA X NO ILLUMINATION SOTTTH OF DAKITON AFTER 0 2 4 5 EXCEPT IN CASE OF EMERGENCY X 3RD ARMD AMPH BN REVERTS THIS DIV 1 2 0 8 0 0 JUNE X MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY OF ITOMAN X FURNISH SPT FIRES FOR CT-7 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER. DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 4 7 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 3 JUNE X CT-1 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE I N Z OF A, COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 SEIZE REMAINDER OF KUNISHI AND MEZADO RIDGES IN Z OF A. ASSIST THE ADV OF CT-1 X 1ST ENGR BN INSTALL BRIDGES OR BY-PASSES AT 7 3 6 2 DOG. AND ROGER X NO ILLUMINATION SOUTH OF DAKITON BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 2 0 3 0 AND 2 4 0 0 , 1 2 JUNE, IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE ADV OF ELEMENTS OF CT-7 t o KUNISHI RIDGE X 4TH RKT DET RECONNOITER FOR ROUTES TO FIRING POSITIONS IN DIV Z OF A X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 4 8 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV RESUMES ATK 0 3 3 0 , 1 4 JUNE X CT-1 ATK 0 3 3 0 SEIZE KUNISHI RIDGE IN Z OF A, COORDINATE ADV WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 ATK 0 7 3 0 SEIZE MEZADO. HILL 6 9 AND KUWANGA RIDGE I N Z OF A X 1ST E G R 3N EXPEDITE REMOVAL OF MINEFIELDS AND NB BUILDING OF DESIGNATED BRIDGES X NO ILLUMINATION EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY SOUTH OF DAKITON AFTER 0 2 4 5 X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 5 0 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 6 JUNE MAKING MAIN EFFORT ON RIGHT, SEIZE MEZADO RIDGE IN ORDER TO PERMIT PASSAGE OF 6TH MAR DIV OiT THE RIGHT ON 1 7 JUNE X CT-7 SEIZE MEZADO RIDGE, AND OTHER FA ARABLE TERRAIN I N VICINITY THEREOF X CT-5 SPT ATK OF CT-7 BY FIRE. CONTINUE REDUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS ON KUNISHI RIDGE X CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING TO FRONT AND ELANKS X CT-8 CONTINUE MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA AND PREPARATIONS TO MOVE INTO FRONT LINES X 2ND PLAT, B CO, 713TH TK BN DETACHED 1ST TK BN ATTACHED 6TH MAR DIV EFFECTIVE 1 2 0 0 16 JUNE X 1 PLAT CO B , 88TH CHEM MORTAR BN DIRECT SPT CT-5 AS OF TIME OF EFFECTED RELIEF X CONTACT RIGHT TO LEFT X DIRECT COMMUNICATION AUTHORIZED BETWEEN RELIEVING UNITS AND UNITS RELIEVED X OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE X OTHER DETAILS NO CHANGE X
J 8?
FIELD ORDER 5 2 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV ATK 0 7 3 0 1 8 JUNE X CT-8 PASS THRPT-3H C T - 7 , ATK 0 7 3 0 18 JUNE X SEIZE FAVORABLE TERRAIN IN VICINITY OF 0 - 1 IN Z OF A PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATK ON ORDER TO SEIZE IBARU-KOMES^ RIDGE IN Z OF A X CT-5 SEIZE 0 - 1 I N Z OF A PREPARED TO CONTINUE ATK ON ORDER X MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH 96TH INF DIV X CT-7 DIV RES X UPON BEING PASSED THROUGH. MOP UP ON POSITION THEN MOVE TO DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA X CO B, 88TH CHEM VORTAR 3N SPT ATK, ONE PLAT DIRECT SPT C T - 8 , 2 PLATS DIRECT SPT CT-5 X 4TK PROV RKT DET SPT CT-5 X DET BOMB DISPOSAL CO DETACHED CT-7 ATTACHED CT-8 X OTHER UNITS AND DETAILS NO CHANGE X
FIELD ORDER 6 2 - 4 5 X 1ST MAR DIV CONTINUES MOPPING UP, POLICE AND SALVAGE I N Z OF A X CT'S 5 AND 8 WILL CARRY OUT SCHEDULE AS SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY X CT-5 COORDINATE ADV WITH XXIV CORPS X CT-7 EFFECTIVE 0 7 3 0 , 2 8 JUNE, CEASE PATROLLING UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS X CT-1 CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION X OTHER UNITS AND DETAILS NO CHANGE X
Ar l&oo 30 J u n ^
PL-3 -,,
Ar 1800 29 June Lv. o r 30 50 J u n e
PL-abJ.
7?67
6jTi
Ar. 1800 2& J u n e Lv. OT50 29 cJane
PL-2AV
PL-Z-ILv. 0730 2.8 J a n e
OPERATION OVERLAY
FIELD ORDER NO 62-45
1 5 0 0 2 7 JUNE 1942F
1 MAR. DIV (REIN)

O F F I C I A L HONSOWCTZ
ST
DEL VALLE
CG
Map $ l^yukya-l^ctto, e>cale. 1 / 2 5 , 0 0 0
TANK SUPPORT ANNEX

Nansel Shoto
rytni A o( o re r. n !J L b L w ^ m u
/93
* *
*
*
"THE ENEMY1 S POWER LIES IN ITS TANKS.
IT HAS
* *
*
BECOME OBVIOUS THAT OUR GENERAL BATTLE AGAINST
THE AMERICAN FORCES I S A BATTLE AGAINST THEIR Ml AND M4 TANKS."
*
*
t h e l a t e Genera l
*
*
*
Ushijima, CG 32 Army, Imperial Japanese Forces,* OKINAWA.

#
*
*
*
*
TANK SUPPORT ANNEX

Nansei 3hoto
Training
This organization was handicapped by a training
Ke*2 ? c n l y eleven weeks prior to boarding ship for the
NANSEI SHOTO Operation,, Replacements received arrived throughout
the training period. Approximately fifty percent of these
enlisted replacements comprised tank-trained personnel, the
balance had basic infantry training. Eighty percent officer
personnel had previous tank training. Twelve replacement tanks
were received mid-period to replace those lost at PALAU. The
full authorized allowance of retrievers was finally received
Just prior to embarkation.
The training period was divided into three phases,
as follows:
(a) Basic tank driving and operation (emphasis on
hatches closed),
(o) Tank gunnery and range practice for all weapons,
tank and individual. This included firing of the coaxial
machine gun (and simulated 75mm gun fire) at a moving tank,
especially prepared for use as a target,
(o) All aspects of tank-infantry training and
coordination, rollowed by regimental maneuvers, during which
special attention was devotea to tank-infantry combat, were
carried out. Each infantry unit down to the squad and its
component fire teams worked for several days with the tank
company normally assigned in support of its regiment. Lectures
and demonstrations were given to the infantry regarding the
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the tanks.
Tanks and tank personnel were always at the disposal of ^the
infantry and infantry units cooperated whole-heartedly in
devoting considerable time to tank-infantry training. This
small unit training, that of the infantry squad and fire teams
with the tank and crews, proved invaluable and was mutually
beneficial to both tank and infantry personnel.
Special training was carried out in the employment
of tank dozers, and 2rt bomb projectors. It was impossible to
to devote as much time as desired training with the tank flame
thrower because the Flamethrower, Mechanized, E4R2-5R1, sub
stituted for the E4-5 model, used at PELELIU, was not made
1.
mUSSIFiE
a v a i l a b l e u n t i l a f t e r tanks had returned from the f i n a l man euvers. Considerable time was devoted to i n d i r e c t l a y i n g of tanks and i n d i r e c t f i r i n g . Each company averaged f i r i n g a t o t a l of f i f t e e n hundred rounds with good r e s u l t s . A uniform r e v i s e d tank-infantry SOP, based on p r e vious combat, was prescribed for the e n t i r e D i v i s i o n . fci. Special Preparations Maintenance
-4*k
(a) Sections of track block were spot-welded around the turret and front slope p l a t e , with the track guides t o ward the armor face. Experience at PELELIU had proven that t h i s extra track saved at l e a s t three tanks from penetration by armor-piercing p r o j e c t i l e s of approximately 75mm caliber and had lessened considerably the effect of several other h i t s . (b) Beach matting was welded on hangers on tank sponsons as protection against magnetic mines and A gre T nades. (c) Armor plate was welded on a l l spoke-type bogle wheels and rear i d l e r s . (d) Brackets for support of the SCR-300 radios were Improvised and welded in turrets of a l l command tanks* (e) Tank-infantry phone boxes, of one-quarter inch armor, were constructed and welded on the right rear bustle of a l l tanks. (f) Vision cupolas were i n s t a l l e d on a total of f i f t y tanks. Hatch hinge pins were d r i l l e d so that hatches could be opened approximately three inches to allow tank commanders better vision when required. (g) Duck-bill extended track end-connectors were i n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks* (h) Increased capacity ready racks were Installed in a l l tank t u r r e t s . ( l ) New flame thrower units were Installed after old u n i t s were removed. (J) All doors on ammunition racks were cut off* (k) Chains were welded on eeoape hatches to prevent t h e i r loss* (1) Wheeled vehicles were water-proofed* (m) Standard deep-water fording k i t s were welded and i n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks* (n) T-6 Flotation Devices were i n s t a l l e d on a t o t a l of s i x tanks. (Army technicians with special training a s s i s t ed*dn t h i s inatfiHilation).
- DECLftSM
HB
(o) .30 oallber machine guns had been previously

substituted for .50 oaliber machine guns on sky mounts.
Ordnonoe
Spare parts for a l l weapons were carried t o the t a r get by t h i s organization. Some c r i t i c a l items, among which were .30 caliber M solenoids and .45 caliber p i s t o l parts G were needed and supply depots could not furnish them. The 75mm tank guns, M-3, were in good condition following the P e l e l i u operation. A 75mm gun was removed from a tank and set up for Instructional purposes. Each tank l e f t the training area with four machine guns (complete, c a l . . 3 0 , ML919A4), and four spare machine gun barrels. An ext.ra twenty machine guns (complete), and five hundred barrels were carried by the Battalion Ordnance Section. The following i s the composition of the ammo stow age with which each tank l e f t for the target!
40 rds 15 rds 10 rds 20 rds 15 rds 6,750 rds 12 H.E., M-43, SC, w/PDF, M-48. H.E., M-48, SC, w/fuze TSQ-M-54.
12
H.E., M-48, SC, w/fuze T-105 and booster T-l. APC,-M-61, w/BDP M-66A1, w/tracer. Smoke, WP, M-64, w/PDP, M-57. Caliber .30, MG, belted 4-AP, 1-tracer. Grenades, hand, (4 Fragmentation M-II, 4 H.p. Smoke, M-8, 2 W.P. M-15,2 Thermite, incendiary, M-14.) S h e l l s , smoke, 2" M-3.
Supply In practically every instance, higher echelon supply agencies offered f u l l cooperation in meeting supply problems of t h i s organization, during the training and pre-embark at ion period. Requests for special operational items were acted upon promptly and particular effort was made to expedite d e l i v e r i e s . Several items of c r i t i c a l supplies arrived either Just prior to embarkation or during rehearsals. I t i s believed,, however, that the delay resulted more from lack of shipping and necess ary time than inefficiency on the part of supply agencies. 34 exerted f u l l effort in expediting delivery of 11 tank requirements and in laying plans for the beaching of "hot cargo" on LOVE DAY. and a v a i l a b i l i t y of balanced supplies thereafter.
Communi cations
During the training period a large amount of repair and maintenance work was performed and radios were i n s t a l l e d .
]1;
f| - , ^ i I i .'
-3
DEGLtf!ED
/??
^_
. _ - . __
nrni sopirir
;"*#
Communications (Cont'd)
Five l i n e duty men were adequately trained to operate the t e l e phone switchboard and to do l i n e and telephone maintenance work. They were also given instruction in the operation of the SCR-SLO as were the reconnaissance personnel in each com pany. This training was not as adequate as was desired. There was neither time nor additional personnel to take over radio repair duties so that these personnel could be better trained. As a result repair work was l e s s e f f i c i e n t and slower than would have been necessary had additional communications personnel been available* Extensive experimentation was carried out with tankinfantry telephone systems u t i l i z i n g the normal tank i n t e r phone c i r c u i t before deciding in favor of the sound-powered phone system. Following t h i s decision i t was necessary to substitute a single headphone unit of the sound-powered head and chest set for the sound-powered headset TS-10 originally planned upon due to unavailability of the l a t t e r . I n s t a l l a t i o n of the tank-infantry telephone was delayed considerably due to delayed delivery of the sound-powered u n i t s . I n s t a l l ation on a l l tanks was effected prior to embarkation but too l a t e for maneuvers, Again, in the case of the SCH-300 radios, delayed delivery held up i n s t a l l a t i o n u n t i l Just prior to embarkation. A system was devised whereby the SCH-300 used the same antenna as the SCR-508 (or 528), thus speeding up i n s t a l l a t i o n , which was effected i n a l l command tanks prior to embarkation. For further l i a i s o n between units a frequency was designed for TK-INF-ARTY common use. This frequency i s common to both the SCR-600 series radios used by the a r t i l l e r y .and infantry and the SCR-500 series radios used by t h i s organiza tion. Depot signal supply and repair was generally poor and greatly handicapped the Division in tank-infantry training, i t being virtually impossible to carry out r e a l i s t i c tank-infan try training with neither interphones, SCR-300rs or SCR 510's none of which were provided in time for training or maneuvers i n spite of repeated requests. Miscellaneous - Two tongue-like metal extensions were welded bn the ramps of the two LOT'e which were employed in the transport of tanks ashore. A similar procedure had been followed with LCT's u t i l i z e d in the Pelellu operation where i t was found that these extensions (four f e e t long,
'
*>
9LOO
eighteen Inches wide, and made of one-half inch s t e e l p l a ting) - when the tank t r a c k s ran over them, held the ramp down u n t i l r e a r waterproofing was clear of the ramp. P r a c t i c e landings of tanks in an LCT and an LSM were c a r r i e d out. I t was found that an LCT, loaded with f i v e tanks M4A2 and an LVT-4, although overloaded, was seaworthy. I t was noted however, in the case of the LSM with only one tank aboard, t h a t t h i s craft beached in seven to eight feet of water. A minimum of tanks was therefore loaded in t h i s craft. Landing and Passage of Reef Fifty M4A2 medium tanks and t h r e e tank r e t r i e v e r s were embarked f o r t h e t a r g e t area. Shipping furnished for
t h i s t r a n s p o r t of tanks consisted of two LSDs, one LST, and four LSM's. Each of the LSD's was loaded d i f f e r e n t l y - one had a t o t a l of sixteen LGM'g #6 with t a n k s , and 1 the other a r r i v ed at t h e t a r g e t with two LCT's #6, and six LOH s #6. Every effort was made to get as many as possible, of the tanks be longing to the two a s s s u l t companies on LSD's, thus p r e s e r ving company control and t a c t i c a l u n i t y . Although the LSD on which a p a r t of Company !,C" embarked l e f t the staging area with t h r e e LCT's #6, each loaded with five tanks and one LVT #4 guide, one LCT was recalled enroute to the t a r g e t . In i t s stead was s u b s t i t u t e d the six LCM^s # 6 . Although t h i s organ i z a t i o n r e l a t e d i t s experience i n the landing at PELELIU, dur ing which LCT's were loaded with the five tanks and one guide, the Navy Transport Group Commander believed that an LCT #6 loaded t h u s l y would not prove seaworthy in a rough sea. The change i n LCT #6 loads meant the l o s s of a second LVT #4 guide. The LCT's were loaded one with f i v e tanks, the other with four tanks and one guide. The l o s s of the LVT guides, used to lead tanks from fringing coral reef to beach, could conceivably have e i t h e r cost t h i s organization t h e l o s s of several tanks in bomb c r a t e r s and potholes and/or delayed the shoreward move ment of tanks considerably. Fortunately, because the landing was v i r t u a l l y unopposed, tanks were allowed adequate time t o form up at reef, behind a v a i l a b l e guides, for the run to the beach. The s i x T~6 tanks, together with one LVT #4 guide, were embarked on an LST. These f l o t a t i o n tanks, per Commander Amphibious Group Four attack order, were t o have been launched from reserve LST area CHÊLIE, in time to meet the remaining Company MCW a s s a u l t tanks to r e a r of Line of Departure no l a t e r than H p l u s 20 on LOVE VCs ,However, in d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of 3.
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the above order, the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LST #628, refused to launch these tanks at a l l without direct orders from higher authority. I t was especially important that the T-6 tanks be in position to go in with the assault tanks as planned, since any delay would result in a receding t i d e and l e s s e n the chance of these f l o t a t i o n tanks, with their bulky pontoons, negotiating the reef successfully. At H plus 60, after much argument, these s i x tanks were finally launched, out of p o s i t i o n , f u l l y ten miles from the beach and did not reach the Line of Departure u n t i l H plus 5 hours. I t was necessary that two Headquarters tanks in LCM1s #6 wait until 1330 at the Line of Departure off Blue Beach, to guide the T-6 tanks toward t h e i r previously designated sector at the reef off ELue Beach. As a result of t h i s delay none of these tanks beached until 1445, at which time the tide condition made beaching extremely d i f f i c u l t . Cne tank was l o s t and a l l suffered from sea water damage, having been in the water over f i v e hours. Meanwhile the LCM1 s #6 and the LCTs #6 made the run from the Line of Departure to the reef and from there to Beach ELue 2 on time and. with l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . Condition of reef was moderately smooth and high t i d e enabled LCM's to cross over the fringing resf and beach in water which aver aged three feet in depth. Tanks launched from LCT ramps, with one exception, had no trouble in following guides in from reef to beach. One tank however, was l o s t between reef and beach in a bomb crater. Due to several tanks removing t h e i r water proofing on the beach, t h i s tank had to swing wide and in doing so ran off into a pothole and sank. The LCM's #6 and the LCTfs proved to be satisfactory as tank landing craft. With regard to the L M # 6 , care must be exercised to ascertain C that the tank i s In the exact center of the LCM, otherwise i t may capsize In a heavy sea. Further, t h i s type craft pre sents a smaller, l e s s lucrative target to enemy f i r e , and i f sunk, only one tank would be l o s t . While the L M #6 i s not C suitable for transport of tank dozer because of width of dozer blade, i t w i l l accommodate the tank r e t r i e v e r , and i s consider ed the most satisfactory type of tank landing craft yet used * by t h i s organization. M Four medium tanks together with an LVT #4 guide and other heavy gear belonging to other u n i t s , were loaded on each of the four LSM's furnished for the operation. Nearly a l l the tanks transported on t h i s type ship belonged to the reserve company which was scheduled to land, on Beach Blue 2 , approx imately one hour after assault tanks reached beach. The plan
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c a l l e d f o r LSM1 s l e a v i n g the Line of Departure two abreast then dropping t h e i r ramps on the r e e f , from which point tanks with g u i d e s would proceed shoreward. The f i r s t two ships arrived at t h e reef on schedule and attempted t o land t a n k s . The f i r s t tank to be landed dropped i n t o a deep pothole with t h s r e s u l t a n t l o s s 1 of the tank and one man by drowning, whereupon both LSi-1 s then p u l l e d rsmps, with no further l a n d ing of tanks, and sought a more fevorable r e e f . This search met with l i t t l e success however, c h i e f l y because the LSM's, heavy i n the bow, had to wait for a t i d e which would permit them t o beach on the r e e f , wait f o r the t i d e to recede, then d i s c h a r g e the t a n k s . Of the four LSM's employed, two f i n a l l y landed t h e i r tanks on beach Yellow Two, l a t e afternoon of LOVE DAY, a t h i r d got i t s tanks ashore on noon of LOVE -plus ONE, and the l a s t LSM landed four tanks on LOVE plus TWO. The LSM has c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s somewhat s i m i l a r to the LST end i s s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r landing tanks on a sharply sloping beach. Orientation Tank r e c o n n a i s s a n c e - l i a i s o n personnel were landed with a s s a u l t i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s 1 headquarters i n advance of t a n k s , and succeeded i n meeting t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e u n i t ' s tanks on the beach and guiding them inland v i a most d i r e c t and s u i t able r o u t e s , to r e s p e c t i v e supported infantry u n i t s , thus ex p e d i t i n g considerably i n i t i a l contact between tanks and i n f a n t r y . All such personnel had the additional mission of being e s p e c i a l l y watchful f o r enemy land mines. In the l a t t e r connection, engineers attached t o a s s a u l t regiments had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o e i t h e r c l e a r or p l a i n l y mark a l l mines found covering routes which had been^previously t e n t a t i v e l y s e l e c t e d f o r use of tanks i n g e t t i n g off beaches. No tanks were d i s a b l e d by enemy mines during the l a n d i n g . I t was decided, with regard to the time of l a n d ing t a n k s , that en advance reconnaissance s e c t i o n , made up of tank p e r s o n n e l , would land with the F i f t h Wave and make a r e p o r t / v i a r a d i o , on the general condition of reef and beach a r e a s , and make recommendations regarding the a d v i s a b i l i t y of l a n d i n g a s s a u l t tanks ahead of t h e reserve b a t t a l i o n s of a s s a u l t regiments. The d e c i s i o n regarding t h i s early l a n d i n g , ahead' of Ninth Wave, rather then i n Fourteenth Wave, was l e f t s o l e l y 'with Commanding O f f i c e r , Tank G-roup. Because reef and beach conditions were favorable and enemy o p p o s i t i o n to t h e landing was so meager, i t was d e cided to execute t h e Early Landing Plan. Reserve t a n k s , those from the LSM's and two LCK's as w e l l as the LST t a n k s , 4.
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Oontrol This B a t t a l i o n , t o g e t h e r with the Tank OrdnanceMaintenance Platoon and a detachment from the Eighth Amphi bian T r a c t o r B a t t a l i o n , was organized as a Tank Group, under control of Commending Officer, t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Since t h i s Division was landing two Regiments in a s s a u l t , a tank, company, reinforced by one platoon of tanks, was assigned i n i t i a l l y in d i r e c t support of each of t h e two a s s a u l t Regiments, The remaining tank company, l e s s detach ments, plus Headquarters and Service Company, formed the Division Tank Reserve Group. On the morning of LOVE plus ONE the two detach ed tank platoons reverted to parent control and increased the reserve s t r e n g t h . Under the above arrangement, with tank companies in d i r e c t support of, r a t h e r than attached t o , regimental com bat teams, the Battalion assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for and con t r o l of supply of a l l companies. I t i s f e l t t h a t the above arrangement has the major advantage over the attachment of tanks to combat teams t h a t control i s c e n t r a l i z e d . Available tanks are assigned to i n f a n t r y elements most in need of them. This g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i s e s p e c i a l l y Important i n the matter of countering l o s s e s and meeting changes i n tank requirements, p a r t i c u l a r l y with the comparatively small number of tanks a l l o t t e d a Marine Tank Battalion f o r support of a Division. T a c t i c a l Employment Due to t h e lack of strong enemy opposition to our l a n d i n g , and t h e continued disorganization of the enemy for t h r e e weeks following, i n f a n t r y u n i t s moved f a s t a s s i s t e d by close tank support. From time of landing u n t i l LOVE plus FOUR, when t h i s Division assigned defensive s e c t o r s , only ten rounds of 75mm ammo and a few" thousand rounds of .30 c a l i b e r were expended in action against t h e enemy. At t h i s time one company was detached to Seventh Marines Reinforced, i t s e l f detached in reserve for Third Amphibious Corps. 1 The remainder of the B a t t a l i o n , including two companies of tanks, moved to DERAG-AV/A and set up bivouac, where the B a t t a l i o n , l e s s detach ments, remained for t h e balance of the two phases covered by this report. While set up at DERAG-AWA, t h i s organization t i e d in i t s area defense with t h a t of the F i r s t Marine Regiment. The two tank companies then under Battalion control made ex t e n s i v e reconnaissance of the e n t i r e Division defensive sec t o r . Each company was however a d d i t i o n a l l y assigned a. regimen t a l s e c t o r of primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and was placed in general 6.
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support of t h a t regiment. Arrangements were made to lend maximum support to the t a c t i c a l plans of the various sector commanders. The Battalion was In t h i s way organized as a mobile Division Armored Reserve, prepared t o operate in any defensive s e c t o r , with p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n devoted to the best r o u t e s to be followed in r e p e l l i n g possible enemycounter-attacks or counter-landings. Tank dozers were employed to remove road blocks and f i l l in bomb c r a t e r s on routes s u i t a b l e for tank movement. A f u l l scale r e h e a r s a l over road6 throughout the Division Sec t o r was carried out with two tank companies and Headquarters and Service Company p a r t i c i p a t i n g . This timed rehearsal was carried out early - Just as soon as " jeep" reconnaissance and clearing of routes had been completed. Armored p a t r o l s of platoon strength, with infan t r y f i r e teams r i d i n g on t a n k s , were employed in general mop ping up and p a t r o l operations. One rapid advance consisted solely of i n f a n t r y and w,ar dogs riding on tanks. This combina tion was successfully used for the f i r s t time in m i l i t a r y h i s tory. While in t h i s defensive role t h i s organization sent l i a i s o n - o b s e r v a t i o n groups to tank u n i t s of XXIV Army Corps and Sixth Marine Division. Valuable information was gained. On three occasions tank platoons were tempora r i l y assigned to and based with infantry b a t t a l i o n s defend ing e s p e c i a l l y important i s o l n t e d s e c t o r s . a v h i l e Company n0 was detached to Seventh Mar i n e s , i t furnished armored p a t r o l s to t h a t organization and f i r e d several supporting missions. Both d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r i n g wa.s done, with r e s u l t s in a l l instances reported as e x c e l l e n t . Tanks furnished overhead support for infantry advances and also covered infantry evacuation of wounded by f i r e and use of smoke. Terrain in t h i s area, v i c i n i t y of ISHIKAV/A, was not suited for concerted tank action. Tanks were confined to narrow roads and could only support, by d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t overhead f i r e , infantry elements moving forward i n t o the rugged i n t e r i o r . 7. Japanese. Anti-Tank Methods - Because of the fast moving offensive ^niL s c a t t e r e d l i g h t enemy opposition, no d i r e c t contact was made with enemy tanks, A guns, or T c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s . No tanks were l o s t to enemy action. Some s c a t t e r e d mines were removed, roadblocks, canals, e t c . , were t*-nk dozered and fords constructed around blown bridges.
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S p e c i a l Equipment - The t a n k - d o z e r again proved v e r y v a l u a b l e I n t h e f i l l i n g of bomb c r a t e r s , d i t c h e s , c a n a l s , e t c . and removal of road b l o c k s . Six tank d o z e r s were l a n d e d and a l l remained o p e r a t i o n a l . The t a n k r e t r i e v e r was I n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r r e c o v e r i n g bogged t a n k s , e s p e c i a l l y on t h e beach d u r i n g LOVE DAI, and i n r e p a i r i n g suspension s y s t e m s . Extended t r a c k end c o n n e c t o r s were observed t o i n c r e a s e c o n s i d e r a b l y t h e a b i l i t y of t h e tank t o n e g o t i a t e soft t e r r a i n . Although tank commanders had l i t t l e n e c e s s i t y f o r o p e r a t i n g with h a t c h e s c l o s e d , i t i s knox-m from e x p e r i e n c e a t P e l e l i u t h a t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of v i s i o n cupolas w i l l n o t only i n c r e a s e tank o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y but c o n t r i b u t e ' m a t e r i a l l y to t h e saving of l i v e s of many tank men i n h e a v i e r combat o p e r a t i o n s . The flamethrower E4R2-5R1, while not y e t used i n combat, proved d u r i n g p r a c t i c e f i r i n g s t o have a b e t t e r i g n i t i o n system t h a n t h e E4-5 flamethrower used a t P e l e l i u . Espe c i a l l y t h e E5R1 gun w i l l stand up b e t t e r under rough h a n d l i n g . 9. Supply .- Since t h i s B a t t a l i o n assumed r e s p o n s i - ' b i l l t y f o r t h e supply of a l l coaroonent u n i t s , S-4 s e t UP at noon on LOVE DAY at t h e D i v i s i o n Shore P a r t y OP. B a t t a l i o n supply p e r s o n n e l were p o s t e d on a l l beaches- t o m a i n t a i n a c o n s t a n t watch f o r tank s u p p l i e s r e a c h i n g Beach and D i v i s i o n dumps. A p o s i t i v e guide system was a c t i v a t e d , i n s u r i n g prompt d e l i v e r y of s u p p l i e s of c o r r e c t t y p e and q u a n t i t y t o Company Forward Dumps as soon as t h e y r e a c h e d t h e beach. The f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s may be made: (a) Tank s u p p l i e s d i d not r e a c h t h e beach i n s u f f i c i e n t and balanced q u a n t i t i e s u n t i l LOVE p l u s FIVE d a y s . (b) The Shore P a r t y d i d not at any s t a g e know t h e r u a n t i t y , t y p e o r l o c a t i o n of tank s u p p l i e s i n beach dumps. ( c) Shore P a r t y p e r s o n n e l were not s u f f i c i e n t l y i n s t r u c t e d i n r e c o g n i t i o n of t a n k s u p p l i e s . (d) No a c t i o n was r e c e i v e d on emergency r e q u e s t s u n t i l D i v i s i o n a g e n c i e s assumed c o n t r o l of beach dumps on approx i m a t e l y LOVE p l u s t h r e e d a y s . (e) I n s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s , l o a d i n g of s u p p l i e s was s e r i o u s l y d e l a y e d due t o t h e Shore P a r t y dumps suddenly r u n n i n g s h o r t of working p a r t y p e r s o n n e l . (f) Shore P a r t y p e r s o n n e l made every e f f o r t t o e x p e d i t e d e l i v e r i e s but a p p a r e n t l y were handicapped by i n t e r f e r e n c e from h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y .
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Fuel and ammunition supply l e v e l s b u i l t up t h r o ugh LCVE p l u s THREE would have presented serious problems under normal operating c o n d i t i o n s . There was a c r i t i c a l shortage of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n t i l LOVE plus FIVE days, when a l l Batta l i o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n was finally^ beached. I n i t i a l l y additional t r f n s p o r t a t i o n was secured by S-4 from D i v i s i o n P o o l s . No d i f f i c u l t y was encountered witty supply of r a t i o n s and water. S-4 employed SCR-509 radios f o r d i r e c t l a t e r a l communications with h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on a l l beaches and f o r communications forward. 10. Maintenance - Following the landing, constant maintenance was performed on a l l tanks. This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the T-6 t a n k s , the engines of which were damaged by s a l t water. The D i e s e l Engine has again proved h i g h l y s a t i s factory and capable of taking considerable sustained abuse. The Ordnance-Maintenance Platoon attached to t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n performed a l l echelons of maintenance on M7s, and m a t e r i a l l y a s s i s t e d the Battalion Maintenance Section in the maintenance of tanks. I t was completely ashore with f u l l equip ment by LOVE p l u s FIVE. 11. Communlc at1on s - Tank B a t t a l i o n Headquarters was i n i t i a l l y aboard LSD # ? . Communications were e s t a b l i s h e d at H minus 90 with a l l three tank companies, ut>on launching of LCMs and LCT's from LSD's, By use of an S0IU5O9 pack s e t communications were set up f i r s t between B a t t a l i o n Headquarters and the a s s a u l t Tank Reconnaissance Group ashore, then with the tank companies ashore, during movement shoreward of B a t t a l i o n Headquarters. Tank B a t t a l i o n Headquarters landed at 1530, LOVE Di&, set up i n the v i c i n i t y of SO BE, and communications were e s t a b l i s h e d by 1 6 3 0 . At no time t h e r e a f t e r was t h i s B a t t a l i o n out of con t a c t with any company f o r a period longer than one hour. The SCR-508 again proved h i g h l y e f f i c i e n t , f l e x i b l e and dependable. The main weak p o i n t s are the overheating of the SCR-508 t r a n s m i t t e r and the p i t t i n g of the p o i n t s of i t s dynamotor s t a r t i n g r e l a y . The SOR-510 has one disadvan t a g e i n that i t i s e a s i l y Jarred o f f frequency and r e q u i r e s communications personnel f o r e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n . Another drawback i s the comparatively short range of the SCR-510 s e t . When h i g h ground I n t e r v e n e s , the e f f e c t i v e range of t h i s s e t drops as* low as two m i l e s . One SCR-508 per company, mounted i n a J - t o n 4x4 truck with a twelve v o l t a u x i l i a r y system would g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y e x i s t i n g communications, problems. The
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p r e s e n t TBA allowances of Test Equipment T*ould be adequate i f s u p p l i e d . One hundred percent replacement p a r t s (as nor mally supplied with a l l Navy radio s e t s ) f o r the SCR-500 s e r i e s would g r e a t l y a s s i s t i n t h e maintenance and r e p a i r of p r e s e n t equipment, which has g e n e r a l l y been very e f f i c i e n t , g i v i n g only the normal amount of trouble to be expected. Basic radio n e t s were found to be inadequate i n one c a s e . Due to the use of B a t t a l i o n frequency f o r supply purposes during the landing o p e r a t i o n , t h e channel was o v e r crowded. The B a t t a l i o n Supply Net should have a separate f r e quency. In a l l o t h e r cases b a s i c radio n e t s were adequate. I n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r n e t s on t h e same or adja cent f r e q u e n c i e s was very heavy, p a r t i c u l a r l y so on LOVE DiiY. w h i l e the B a t t a l i o n remained i n v i c i n i t y of the beach. I n t e r f e r e n c e on B a t t a l i o n frequency was noted i n a l e s s e r degree than on the company f r e q u e n c i e s . The SCR-300 set has been used very l i t t l e in the tanks to d a t e but i t s operation has been s a t i s f a c t o r y . The sound-powered t a n k - i n f a n t r y phone, also used l i t t l e during the phases covered, seem6 t o work much b e t t e r than any o t h e r system d e v i s e d t o d a t e . R e e l s used have a tendency to short out and develop "dead spots" which s e r i o u s l y impair opera ting efficiency. 12. Ordnance - No major damage t o weapons was exper i e n c e d . Some d e f e c t s were found i n the 75mm ammunition. The W.P. M64 w/fuze M57 p r o j e c t i l e was found' to be l o o s e i n the case thereby causing s e p a r a t i o n . This ammunition however, was used a f t e r the case had been recrimped to the p r o j e c t i l e . Another l o t of W.P. M64, w/fuze M57, was found to be t e n p e r cent dud 8. Re comm end at i on s (1) That the one-ton "recon", I n t e r n a t i o n a l , be r e p l a c e d by a t h r e e - q u s r t e r ton Dodge t r u c k . (2) That T-6 f l o t a t i o n d e v i c e s not be used on f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s except p o s s i b l y as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r the armored amphibian on beaches of favorable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . (3) Thrt a new or improved s t a r t e r be i n s t a l l e d on M5 I n t e r n a t i o n a l t r u c k s . (4) That a t e n - t o n wrecker be authorized f o r Tank B a t t c l l c n Maintenance Section . (5) That each tank company be supplied one "weasel" f o r reconnaissance purposes. (6) That each tank company be supplied one SCR 508 mounted i n a one-quarter ton 4x4 truck with a twelve v o l t a u x i l i a r y system ( d e c r e r s e ^x4 trucks with SCR-510 p r o p o r t i o n ate! vj. r * t 9t 13.
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(7) That a s p e c i a l modified exhaust adapter be I n s t a l l e d on a l l tanks i n such a manner as to enable the t i g h t e n i n g of tank tracks without removing the adapter. The adapter does not hinder the performance of the tank and p r e vents dust from being blown up, thus enabling the e n g i n e ' t o r e c e i v e cleaner a i r . From the standpoint of tank-infantry o p e r a t i o n s the adapter prevents exhaust fumes and dust from blowing back i n t o the f a c e s of the i n f a n t r y . (8) That the t r a c t o r , TD-18, be retained i n the T/0 of a Marine Tank Battalion and that an operator for same be authorized. (9) That eight Amphibian T r a i l e r s be furnished t h i s organization f o r beaching of c r i t i c a l supplies i n the i n i t i a l s t a g e s of a landing operation. (10) That both ends of "Hot Cargo" Tank Gun cloverlefcfs be c l e a r l y painted or marked for quick i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n beach dumps during early stages and t h a t , i n com bat loading Tank lun Ammunition aboard s h i p , i t be placed i n p i l e s widely separated from howitzer ammunition i f p o s s i b l e . (11) That additional communications personnel
be provided i n the T/0 of a Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n , as f o l l o w s : Increase the present t o t a l of t h r e e communications personnel i n each of the t h r e e l i n e companies to t e n , as f o l l o w s : Four ( 1 7 4 ) , and s i x radio operators (voice) per company. Increase communications personnel i n Battalion Headquarters to eighteen as f o l l o w s : Three ( 1 7 4 ) , three radio operators ( v o i c e ) , three radio operators (CW)-(776), three switchboard operators, four linemen, t e l e p h o n e , one Wire Chief, one Communications Chief. (12) That more research be devoted to the develop ment of a rugged waterproofed, sound-powered telephone with s e l f - r e t r a c t i n g cord for use i n tank-infantry communications. (13) That the Landing Ship Medium not be used for transport and combat landing of tanks i n future o p e r a t i o n s . Without a. very s t e e p , favorable beach c l e a r of r e e f s t h i s type c r a f t i s 1not s u i t e d f o r tank landing o p e r a t i o n s . (14) That further a t t e n t i o n be given at once t o t h e technique of mine d e t e c t i o n , marking, and removal. (15) That a l l higher operational s t a f f s contain a tank s t a f f s e c t i o n or s u b - s e c t i o n . (16) That the T/0 f o r the Marine Tank Company i n c l u d e one a d d i t i o n a l o f f i c e r f o r reconnaissance and l i a i s o n purposes. (17) That the T/0 f o r a Marine Tank Battalion be changed to four eighteen-tank companies with f i v e - t a n k p l a t o o n s , company headquarters platoon to include three tanks, two of -13
^^^^^SS*-
Mttumm
whiqh ara tank-dozere and one command tank. It is further

recommendedHchst a fifth tank company, to be made up of
large-capacity (CB-H1) flamethrower tanks, be added to the
above. This proposed flamethrower tank company should be
organized with three platoons of five tanks each, ho headquarters
tanks being necessary,
(18) That Tank Ordnance Platoon personnel be
made an integral part of the Marine Tank Battalion - for both
administrative and operational control,
(19) That the T/0 for the Marine Tank Battalion
be changed to authorize majors as tank company commanders and a
captain as Battalion Communications Officer,
(20) That the T26 tank be substituted for the
present M4 series medium tank at the earliest possible date.
TANK SUPPORT ANNEX

Nansei Shoto
Phase III
*/f
I-N-D-E-X
Page I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX . X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. PREPARATION OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY CONTROL BATTALION FORWARD DISPLACEMENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION PERSONNEL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLY MAINTENANCE ORDNANCE FLAMETHROWER TANKS TANK-INFANTRY
TANK-ARTILLEHY
1 fc 19 19 *0 z7 s7 *9 34 38 41 44 51 53 54 54
TANK-ENGINEER TANK-NAVAL GUNFIRE TANK-AVIATION
OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THi; COMMANDER.. 55
*#*
ik B a t t a l i o n
'on, F l e e t Marine Force
c/o F l e e t Post O f f i c e , San F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a .
S e r i a l : 024 4 J u l y , 1945.
. Tank Support Annex Special, Action, Re port - S o u t h e m Okinawa. I. IRE PARA TI ON:
Following the completion of Phases I and I I i n CENTRAL OKIK&sVA t h e F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n c a r r i e d out equip ment overhaul and d a i l y p r e v e n t i v e maintenance on a l l t a n k s and wheeled v e h i c l e s t o r e s t o r e a l l equipment t o peak o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y i n p r e p a r a t i o n for f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . A t r a i n i n g schedule was followed i n each company, c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h i s maintenance work. On 27 A p r i l the B a t t a l i o n was a l e r t e d f o r movement t o SOUTHERN OKINAWA., e f f e c t i v e 1 May. Although many of t h e t a n k s were o l d , a l l were i n e x c e l l e n t mechanical c o n d i t i o n . Movement o r d e r s were r e c e i v e d 29 A p r i l , e f f e c t i v e 0 5 3 0 , 30 A p r i l . The B a t t a l i o n convoy l e f t t h e bivouac a r e a a t DERAGArtA a t 0530, 30 A p r i l , and began movement, i n four (4) s e r i a l s , each s e p a r a t e d by f i f t e e n minute time i n t e r v a l s , t o a p r e v i o u s l y s e l e c t e d b a t t a l i o n bivouac a r e a , .Vest of M CHINA TO town. This a r e a was chosen f o l l o w i n g a A two-day r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of t h e 27TH DIVISION r e a r a r e a s and f r o n t l i n e s b y t h e commanding o f f i c e r , s t a f f , and company commanders on 28-29 A p r i l . I n moving South, t h e order o f companies was BAKER, ABLE, CHARLIE, and HEADQUARTERS AND SLRVTCSL. -Vorthy of n o t e i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e n t i r e convoy, composed of some n i n e t y - s i x (96) v e h i c l e s , i n c l u d i n g f o r t y seven' (47) t a n k s , covered t h e d i s t a n c e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i f t e e n (15) m i l e s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n s . There were no major mechanical f a i l u r e s en^route and convoy d i s c i p l i n e was e x c e l l e n t . A i l companies moved i n t o d e s i g i a t e d a r e a s and had r e v e t t e d , by u s e ' o f tank d o z e r s , and camouflaged t a n k s and v e h i c l e s by 1300. Throughout o p e r a t i o n s i n CENTRAL OKINAWA t h i s b a t t a l i o n had m a i n t a i n e d o b s e r v a t i o n - l i a i s o n groups w i t h 24TH itRMY CORPS1 t a n k b a t t a l i o n s i n a c t i o n on t h e SOUTHERN OKINAWA , f r o n t and was t h e r e f o r e f a m i l i a r with JAEkNESc a n t i t a n k weapons and t e c h n i q u e a s w e l l a s g e n e r a l t e r r a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . On 1 May t h e b a t t a l i o n j o i n e d i n a c t i v e combat i n support of the D i v i s i o n ' s d r i v e on SHUBI. - 1
DECLASS I
II.

OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY:
' *%.i '...;
* *
:U,^
3Q P r i l , 194 ? R e l i e f of the 27CH ARMY DIVISION by the FIRST MARINE DIVISION having been completed t h i s d a t e , the F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n was ordered t o support the DIVISION a t t a c k 1 May. Accordingly ABLE Company was placed i n d i r e c t s u p port of CT-1, BAKER Company i n d i r e c t support of CT-5, and CHARLES Company in D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, a v a i l a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e or r e l i e v e e i t h e r or both a s s a u l t companies, a s ordered. Company ttBw, 713th Armored Flamethrower b a t t a l i o n , a t t a c h e d t o F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n t h i s date and placed in battalion reserve. 1 Mav. 1QAS Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d with flame t a n k s , sup ported the F i r s t Marines i n the a t t a c k on and seizure of the v i l l a g e of YAFUSU and adjacent ground. Napalm employed e x t e n s i v e l y . E x t e n s i v e mining encountered. A l l other elements continued reconnaissance and preparations t o Join i n b a t t l e . Reconnaissance of MACHINATO AIRJISLD completed, and n e c e s s a r y orders i s s u e d t o a l l companies i n order t h a t the b a t t a l i o n might r e p e l a day or n i ^ i t enemy mechanized counter-attack t h a t a r e a . 2 May. 19 2,5 Company &", r e i n f o r c e d by one tank platoon and one flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i r s t Marines advance Southeast of IAFUSU and v i c i n i t y of KUR&N. Overhead f i r e employed l a t t e r s e c t o r . Enemy a r t i l l e r y , mortars and i n f a n t r y f i r e heavy. Action heavy. Company "B", r e i n f o r c e d by one flame platoon^ supported F i f t h Marines a t t a c k i n s e c t o r North of DAKESHI. Ground boggy and r e s t r i c t e d . L i ^ i t tank a c t i o n . Remaining elements in b a t t a l i o n r e s e r v e . Company *", 713th Armored Flamethrower B a t t a l i o n , moved from bivouac at CHIYDNNA t o F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n bivouac v i c i n i t y of M CHINA TO town. A 3 Mav. 19/.5 Company "A**, r e i n f o r c e d by one tank platoon and pne flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i r s t l/krines a t t a c k v i c i n i t y of v i l l a g e of ASA. E x t e n s i v e mining. Mortar f i r e heavy. Y/.P. smoke used v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y t o mark enemy automatic weapon empla cements Company "B", reinforced by a flame platoon, supported the F i f t h Marines, a t t a c k i n g Northwest of AYJACHA. C.P. T-105 fuze v e r y e f f e c t i v e in tank d e s t r u c t i o n of numer ous enemy r e i n f o r c e d - c o n c r e t e p i l l b o x e s . I n f a n t r y support of tanks and a r t i l l e r y smoke support and coordination both excellent. $#
jfttjir'---',{'
,fA
' - ' ^ ' ' " ^ *
Remaining elements in Battalion r e s e r v e . I May. 1QA.S Company "A", reinforced by one tank platoon and one flame platoon supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks, from MaCHINiiTO AIRFIELD, delivered overhead f i r e t o cover i n f a n t r y advance i n t o high ground South and Southeast of ASA. KAtfA ESTUARY. Extensive mining. Company "B", reinforced by one tank platoon and one flame platoon, supported the Fifth Marines in advance t o the 0-2 l i n e . Enemy grenadiers and satchel-charge c a r r i e r s were encountered for the f i r s t time in t h i s s e c t o r . Evacuation of i n f a n t r y wounded by both tanks and flame t a n k s . Tank-infantry a t t a c k well coordinated and i n f a n t r y fire-teams support of tanks e x c e l l e n t . Action heavy along e n t i r e Division f r o n t .
5 May. lQ/,5
Company "A", reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks f i r e d from a draw Southeast of NAKANISHE on numerous caves, pillboxes, and b u r i a l v a u l t s Southwest of AWAGHA. AT fire and mining heavy. Flame tanks not employed because of limited t e r r a i n . Company tB", reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported Third B a t t a l i o n , Fifth Marines, in advance //est of ArfVACHa. Many enemy k i l l e d in open a f t e r leaving caves a s tanks beîn f i r i n g . Infantrymen r i d i n g inside tanks helped designate t a r g e t s t o tank commanders and t u r r e t gunners. Action heavy in s p i t e of limited t e r r a i n . Company f,Cw, reinforced by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t B a t t a l i o n , Fifth Marines. Enemy's f i r s t use of thermite grenades against t a n k s , Snoke, (75mm Y/.P. and M-3 2" Snoke Bombs) helped evacuation of several wounded i n f a n t r y . Tanks working forward of i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t elements successfully called f o r and adjusted a r t i l l e r y f i r e on enemy p o s i t i o n s . Ammunition expenditure heavy and flame tanks very effective against l a r g e , deep caves. Mining noted t h i s s e c t o r f o r f i r s t time. 6 May. 1945 Company "A", reinforced by four platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, supported t h e F i r s t i/kr i n e s . Tanks, while operating East across t h e r a i l r o a d track in a draw Southwest of AWACHA, were subjected t o unusually heavy and a c c u r a t e enemy 47mm AT f i r e . A H three tanks of one platoon were h i t a t o t a l of ten times by a well-concealed enemy AT gun, believed located East of the r a i l r o a d t r a c k , in t h e high ground between A A H and DAKESHI. Enemy AT gunners WCA m*.-': j $^<& ? *
t
* ? "* _ 3 _
DECLASM3
2/7
6 May. 13 2i5 (Cont'd)

took t h e s e tanks under f i r e , from the flank and r e a r , a s
t h e y returned N o r t h w e s t e r l y out of the draw, t o rearm, A
squad of m i n e - d e t e c t o r personnel were a t t a c h e d t o ABLE Com
pany for t h i s day o n l y . Mining continued heavy.
Company *BM, reinforced by a platoon of flame
t a n k s , supported the F i f t h Marines. Tanks worked i n r e l a y s
of two platoons each, f i r i n g South from a draw Northwest
of DAKESHI, i n t o h i g h ground honeycombed with c a v e s . Ammu
n i t i o n expenditure was correspondingly heavy.
7 May, 19V?
Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks
and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported the F i r s t Marines.
Tanks worked in r e l a y s of two platoons each. Napalm expendi
ture t h i s s e c t o r , draw Southwest of AtfACBA, was heavy, twenty-
four hundred g a l l o n s , and e f f e c t i v e *
Company "B", r e i n f o r c e d by CHARLIE Company l e s s
one p l a t o o n , and two platoons of flame t a n k s , supported the
F i f t h Marines. Action was heavy a s tanks and flame tanks
c r o s s e d the r a i l r o a d and advanced Southeast up the draw, t h o r o u ^ i l y "processing" the high ground just North of DAKE3HI.
In t h i s s e c t o r demolition teams designated occupied caves and
emplacements, which tanks then destroyed. This was the b e g i n
n i n g of t h e heavy "processing" work by tanks which enabled
i n f a n t r y t o advance t o p o s i t i o n s from which a t t a c k s a g a i n s t
W N and DAKESKI Ridges could e v e n t u a l l y be s u c c e s s f u l l y
AA launched.
8 May, 1QA.5 Tank a c t i o n was v e r y l i g h t because heavy r a i n s
of previous nigfrt s e r i o u s l y hampered tank movement. One p l a
toon however, destroyed an enemy s t r o n g point l o c a t e d a t the
Southwestern end of AWACHA.
Q May. 19/L5 Company "A", reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines. Tank dozer b u i l t a road which' enabled tanks t o more c l o s e l y support i n f a n t r y advance South through draw Northwest of DAKESII. lank a c t i o n and ammunition expenditure l i g h t because of un favorable t e r r a i n . Mortar f i r e heavy. Company tfB", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported the Third B a t t a l i o n , F i f t h Marines. Consider a b l e work by a tank dozer was n e c e s s a r y before tanks could get down i n t o the v a l l e y East of the r a i l r o a d and Southwest o f AWACBA. AT d i t c h stopped tank movement South a f t e r dozer bogged
BCCLAS
US
u r n Aocirir
.,^....,3 .*.
9 May. 19 L.5 ( C o n t ' d )

down i n r a i l r o a d c u t . No t a n k s committed.
Company "C", l e s s one platoon d e t a c h e d , was
i n support of Second B a t t a l i o n , F i f t h M a r i n e s . No t a n k s
committed because of t e r r a i n c o n d i t i o n s a s mentioned immed
i a t e l y above.
Company MAM, r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of flame
t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d t h e F i r s t Marines* advance South from 0-2
l i n e toward h i $ i g r o u n d n North of DAKE2H.
Company B M , r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of flame t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d t h e Seventh M a r i n e s . A f t e r AT d i t c h was s u f f i c i e n t l y f i l l e d i n , a t 1400, t a n k s and i n f a n t r y resumed Southward advance through t h e draw. Covered evacuation of s e v e r a l wounded i n f a n t r y . Company "C", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of flame t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d the F i f t h M a r i n e s . T a n k - i n f a n t r y advance South of AWACHA resumed. Heavy enemy m o r t a r and a r t i l l e r y f i r e . I t was n o t e d t h a t one promising t a n k r o u t e c o n t a i n e d t h i r t y - f o u r mines. Flame t a n k s d e s t r o y e d ammunition dumps i n deep caves. 3,1 13a y, 19 V? Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d by two t a n k p l a t o o n s and one flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i r s t M a r i n e s . Action was heavy a s t a n k s d e l i v e r e d heavy f i r e upon s t r o n g enemy em placements l o c a t e d on t h e Southern bank of the ASA- KAWA. Mortaf and a r t i l l e r y f i r e u n u s u a l l y h e a v y . Flamethrowers very effective. Company 'tB", r e i n f o r c e d by a p l a t o o n of flame t a n k s , supported t h e Seventh b r i n e s . A f t e r armored TD-18 dozed in A T d i t c h , t a n k s c l o s e l y supported i n f a n t r y advance t o higji ground due North of DAKESHI. Tanks evacuated many wounded by s e v e r a l methods, through escape h a t c h e s , on back of t a n k s and s t r e t c h e r c a s e s were s h i e l d e d by t a n k s from enemy f i r e from one d i r e c t i o n . Company "C", l e s s two p l a t o o n s , r e i n f o r c e d by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d t h e F i f t h M a r i n e s . Action confined t o mopping up of enemy s t r o n g p o i n t Southeast of AWACHA. Napalm p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . F i r s t P l a t o o n , Company Bnf 7L 3th Armored Flame thrower B a t t a l i o n detached from F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n t h i s date and a t t a c h e d t o SIXTH MAKINE DIVISION 12 Ifey. } ft Mav. 1QL,5 Company *&", r e i n f o r c e d by t h r e e t a n k p l a t o o n s and one flame s e c t i o n , s u p p o r t e d t h e F i r s t Marines 1 advance
" P
10 May. 1QL<>
SIFIEQ
12 May. 1QA.S (Cont'd) a c r o s s the North-South r a i l r o a d and drove East up the W N AA Draw t o the v i l l a g e of W N i t s e l f . Multitudinous caves AA and bunkers, a l l a l i v e with JAPANESE, were attacked with great e f f e c t on the South s i d e of WMA Ridge', head of W N AA Draw, and South Wall of wANA Draw. In a d d i t i o n cave and gun p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on the Northwest face of the c l i f f c i t y of f o r t r e s s SHURI now l a y exposed t o tank guns a t r a n g e s from n i n e hundred t o f i f t e e n hundred yards. This tank a t t a c k c o n s t i t u t e d the f i r s t penetra t i o n of the JAPANESE f i n a l i n n e r d e f e n s e s before SHURI by e n v e l o p i n g DAKESHI and W N R i d g e s . I t was e x p l o i t e d and AA caused obvious consternation among the JAPANESL who were ob served swarming from cave t o cave. Heavy c a s u a l t i e s were i n f l i c t e d by shrapnel f i r e . This penetration was e x p l o i t e d by r e l i e f of tanks on s t a t i o n by t h i s h e a v i l y reinforced tank company. Extremely heavy a c t i o n . Company "CM, r e i n f o r c e d by one p l a t ben of tanks and one flame p l a t o o n , and employing the TD-18 armored dozer, supported the Seventh Marines drive South up DAKESHI Ridge. Heavy a c t i o n i n reduction of innumerable caves, tombs, and bunker p o s i t i o n s . The small B a t t a l i o n r e s e r v e , c o n s i s t i n g s o l e l y of Headquarters tank s e c t i o n of Company *E", dispatched a t 1200 t o support the F i f t h Marines in e l i m i n a t i o n of a pocket of r e s i s t a n c e encountered by that Regiment in mopping up oper ations. 13 May. 1QA.5 Company '&', reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a flame s e c t i o n , supported the F i r s t Marines, a s heavy a c t i o n continued in the W N Draw a r e a . Several enemy p o s i t i o n s in AA W N Ridge destroyed by t a n k s . In t h i s comparatively open AA t e r r a i n , i n f a n t r y f i r e teams from covered p o s i t i o n s behind t e r r a c e s some one hundred yards d i s t a n t , furnished adequate p r o t e c t i o n t o t a n k s , and incurred v e r y l i g i t c a s u a l t i e s from the heavy mortar f i r e d i r e c t e d a t tank f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s . Company n C w , r e i n f o r c e d by three platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , and again making e f f e c t i v e use of armored TD-18, supported Seventh Marines i n drive t o take h i g i ground dominating v i l l a g e of DAKESHI. Preceding the general advance, t a n k s , covered by f i r e teams, crossed f i l l over drainage d i t c h and, making a s i n g l e enveloping move ment, advanced i n t o p o s i t i o n s from which enemy p o s i t i o n s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s of DAKESHI Ridge were d e s t r o y e d . Tanks moved on i n t o v i l l a g e , but heavy mortar f i r e kept i n f a n t r y on Northern slope of Ridge. Satchel charge a t t a c k s numerous.
-DECLASSIFIED
> Ml
1L May. 1Q A.S Company nA.", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, continued t o support the F i r s t Marines by "processing" M A V i l l a g e and the w a l l s South of WANA. Tanks moved forward i n t o p o s i t i o n s from which t h e reverse slope of 'tfANA Ridge and the v i l l a g e were s u b j e c t e d t o c l o s e - i n , d i r e c t f i r e . This a c t i o n b e i n g carried on concurrently with tank operations v i c i n i t y of EAKESHI, c o n s t i t u t e d a c l o s e l y coordinated double envelopment of WANA-DA-KESHI Ridges and, most important, thoroughly destroyed enemy p o s i t i o n s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s of these Ridges, e v e n t u a l l y making i t p o s s i b l e for i n f a n t r y t o t a k e , and hold, t h i s high ground, prepared for an a l l - o u t a s s a u l t on SHURI H i l l . Company "CM, reinforced by three tank platoons and a flame platoon, and armored TD-18, supported the Seventh Marines from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on DAXESEH Ridge. The v i l l a g e was s u b j e c t e d t o heavy f i r e a s was a l s o the North s l o p e s of W N Ridge. Enemy had blown c r a t e r s , during pre AA c e d i n g n i g h t , in b e s t tank route l e a d i n g i n t o DAK&SHI thereby temporarily r e s t r i c t i n g tank movement South- Enemy mortar and AT f i r e , from SHURI H i l l , was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy and a c c u r a t e . Eight tanks were h i t a t o t a l of seventeen times by 47mm AT f i r e . I t was e v i d e n t , at t h i s t i m e , that the enemy was making f r a n t i c use of every p o s s i b l e weapon a v a i l a b l e t o him t o stop our t a n k s . Replacement AT weapons were brought forward n i ^ i t l y and emplaced where accurate f i r e could be d e l i v e r e d upon tanks working forward of e n t i r e D i v i s i o n f r o n t in W N Draw. AA Heavy a c t i o n a l o n g e n t i r e f r o n t . More tanks, h a d . t h e y been a v a i l a b l e , could have been employed t o great advantage
15 Mav. 1Q2L5
Company ^B", reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a flame p l a t o o n , supported the F i f t h Marines, f o l l o w i n g r e l i e f of F i r s t ftkrines. Action in t h i s s e c t o r remained heavy a s r e l a y s of tanks advanced through the YiANA Draw and s h e l l e d SHURI and i t s d e f e n s e s . Enemy used AT grenades for f i r s t time i n t h i s . sector. Company WCW, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines. Due t o i n f a n t r y r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , no tanks were committed. Tank elements s h i f t e d at llflO t o r e i n f o r c e Company ^B" i n W K Draw. AA 16 Mav. 1QA.5 F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n , l e s s Company "C n , and using ox*e f&aa&e. glajy^n^ supported* the Second B a t t a l i o n , F i f t h Marines,
- 7
DECLASSED
S1F1ED
i ^
16 May. 1QA/5 ( C o n t ' d ) employing r e l a y s of t w e l v e t o f i f t e e n t a n k s e a c h deep i n W N Draw. Over f i v e t h o u s a n d rounds of 75mm f i r e d N o r t h AA i n t o WANA R i d g e , E a s t i n t o head of W N Draw and SHURI AA C i t y and South i n t o H i l l 55 and SHUEI C i t y . Flame used with success in burning W N . v i l l a g e . AA W W Company C , r e i n f o r c e d by one flame p l a t o o n s u p p o r t e d t h e d r i v e of t h e Seventh Marines South a g a i n s t W N R i d g e . H u l l d e f i l a d e f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s a l o n g DA.KKSHI AA Ridge were a g a i n employed t o d e l i v e r overhead f i r e a g a i n s t WANA R i d g e . S u p p o r t i n g a c c u r a t e t a n k f i r e , i n c l u d i n g s h r a p n e l and M54 time f i r e , played a major r o l e i n r e p e l l i n g two enemy c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s launched a l o n g W N Ridge from t h e AA East. E x t e n s i v e m i n i n g , heavy AT gun o p p o s i t i o n and many a t t e m p t e d c l o s e - i n a t t a c k s c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e enemy's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s t o p our t a n k s . E x t r e m e l y heavy a c t i o n along e n t i r e Division f r o n t . 17 May. 1QL.5 Company Bn, r e i n f o r c e d by f o u r p l a t o o n s of t a n k s and a p l a t o o n of flame t a n k s , s u p p o r t e d F i f t h M a r i n e s . A c t i o n was a ^ i n c o n c e n t r a t e d i n W N Draw a s t a n k s con A& t i n u e d t o pound h e a v i l y enemy p o s i t i o n s on SHUKE R i d g e . Tanks covered i n f a n t r y w h i l e t h e y dug i n on forward p o s i t i o n s and a l s o were used t o h a u l food, w a t e r , and ammuni tion t o front l i n e elements. Heavy m i n i n g . Company W C", r e i n f o r c e d by a p l a t o o n of flame t a n k s supported t h e Seventh b r i n e s i n a s s i s t i n g i n f a n t r y advance t o p o s i t i o n s on W N Ridge- When t h i s ground was AA made u n t e n a b l e i n l a t e a f t e r n o o n , t a n k s covered i n f a n t r y w i t h d r a w a l . TD-18 dozed out d r a i n a g e d i t c h i n v a l l e y , making a r o u t e t a n k s used i n moving South of DtiKESHI. Enemy threw smoke grenades a t t a n k s p r i o r t o attempting several unsuccessful close-in satchel-charge attacks. A c t i o n heavy a l o n g e n t i r e f r o n t . N e a r l y s i x t h o u s a n d rounds 75mm ammunition expended. 18 Mav. 1915 Company , f B", r e i n f o r c e d by one p l a t o o n of t a n k s and one flame p l a t o o n s u p p o r t e d F i f t h M a r i n e s , from p o s i t i o n s i n W N Draw. Numerous SHURI H i l l emplacements, r e o c c u p i e d AA d u r i n g p r e v i o u s n i g h t , d e s t r o y e d . Supply of f r o n t l i n e i n f a n t r y c o n t i n u e d . Flame a g a i n used a g a i n s t WANA. Mining con tinued heavy.
6ECLAS#*
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18 May. 1Q u> ( C g r ^ ' ^ Company w C n , reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a flame p l a t o o n , supported Seventh Marines by d i r e c t over head f i r e a s i n f a n t r y a g i i n attempted to occupy tfANa Ridge. Furnished smoke i n h e l p i n g t o e f f e c t evacuation of wounded. Action moderately heavy along e n t i r e f r o n t . Company "Bw, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of flame t a n k s , supported F i f t h Marines in continuing d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy emplacements, v i c i n i t y of H i l l 55, from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s in W N Draw. Undoubtedly AA many of these emplacements are e i t h e r improved or newlyconstructed during darkness* Company n C", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a platoon of flame tanks, supported the Seventh Regiment, i n d e l i v e r i n g d i r e c t overhead f i r e , a s s i s t i n g i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t a g a i n s t W N Ridge. AA Mining heavy. Several n e w l y - l a i d mines along entire front. Attached a r t i l l e r y forward observers, operating
from i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n O.P.*s with tank company commanders,
furnished several v e r y e f f e c t i v e f i r e missions t o support
and conceal advance of tanks in both s e c t o r s .
20 May. 1QA.5 Company MAM, r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the F i r s t Marines 1 advance i n t o the suburbs of SHURI. Iknks and cover i n g i n f a n t r y f i r e teams accomplished the f i r s t a c t u a l pene t r a t i o n of SHURI. FLame tanks were p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n burning out the v i l l a g e , d e s t r o y i n g many machine gun em placements. Following t h i s reduction of enemy r e s i s t a n c e , i n f a n t r y elements moved i n t o the v i l l a g e and attempted to hold the r i d g e south of v i l l a g e , but were driven back off s l o p e by heavy enemy f i r e d e l i v e r e d from SHURI H i l l t o the
West.
S p e c i a l tank hunter groups employing grenades and s a t c h e l charges, again made f r a n t i c attempts t o h a l t the tank advances. Company "BM, r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the Fifc;h Marines* f i r i n g from the W N Draw, i n t o SHURI H i l l a / / t h e infantry AA advanced t o take H i l l 5 5 . At 1100 a platoon of tanks from the Division Qknk Reserve was dispatched t o add extra f i r e power t o t h i s d r i v e . A squad of e n g i n e e r s , working under covering tank f i r e ' d i d e x q e l l e n t work .in removing an e x t e n s i v e mine f i e l d l a i d # a c r o s s ^tank^reît/s through 'flANA Draw.
'
>DECL*WE
2D Mav. 1QIJ5 (Cont'd) Supply runs were made by tanks in both s e c t o r s . A c t i o n extremely heavy. 31 May 1945 Company "A", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines, again moving i n t o t h e small v i l l a g e a t the Northern t i p of SHUEI t o mop up enemy who had i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o v i l l a g e f o l l o w i n g i n f a n t r y withdrawal of previous e v e n i n g , Flame again employ ed v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y . Enemy produced another of h i s AT weapons. While tanks were preceding i n f a n t r y return t o the v i l l a g e , one tank had ten square-shaped charges, about the s i z e of a # 2 can, p r o j e c t e d a t i t from d i s t a n c e s estimated to be t h i r t y t o seventy f i v e y a r d s . This charge had two *V "-shaped f i n s on the end of i t , which helped t o control i t s f l i g h t , and i s b e l i e v e d to have *been a l o c a l improvisation t o d i s a b l e t a n k s . Company ^BM, r e i n f o r c e d by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the F i f t h Marines a s i n f a n t r y further con s o l i d a t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s on H i l l 55. I n f a n t r y , f i r i n g t r a c e r s , helped tanks by d e s i g n a t i n g t a r g e t s l o c a t e d North o f H i l l 55 Tank f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e ^ s l i g h t l y Southwest of H i l l 5 5 . Observed f i r e was d e l i v e r e d a g a i n s t reverse s l o p e s of high ground i n t h i s v i c i n i t y a s an a r t i l l e r y F . O . , r i d i n g i n s i d e a tank, c a l l e d f o r and e f f e c t i v e l y a d j u s t e d a r t i l l e r y f i r e i n t o t h i s d e f i l a d e d area with t e l l i n g e f f e c t . Extremely heavy a c t i o n a l o n g e n t i r e D i v i s i o n ; > front. 22 May. 1915 Company *&", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines. Heavy r a i n s of the previous n i g i t made tank movement through W N AA Draw an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Accordingly a l l tanks secured f o r the day a t 1 0 3 0 . Company *BW, r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , was t o have supported the F i f t h Marines, but a l l tanks were secured a t 0800 because of t e r r a i n c o n d i t i o n s due t o r a i n . ?r1 May. iq/i5 Company &", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the F i r s t Marines. Only two tanks moved forward t o Northern SHUEI where boggy t e r r a i n
23 May. 1915' ( Cont'd) **-*. ' / ,'!;,/ i " Prohibited forward movement. Company *BW, reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported F i f t h Marines, v i c i n t y H i l l 55 o n l y . Action was very l i m i t e d due to mud and poor v i s i b i l i t y . One tank h i t what was apparently e i t h e r a delayed a c t i o n or e l e c t r i c a l l y - c o n t r o l l e d mine. PA. Mav to 31 Mav. 1915 Due t o continued d a i l y r a i n s , which made a quagmire out of a l l road n e t s , no movement of tanks from the bivouac area took p l a c e . Continued d a i l y l i a i s o n with a l l regiments and d a i l y reconnaissance. Badly needed tank maintenance was continued by a l l companies througiout t h i s period of i n a c t i v i t y . 1 June, 191L5 Bains slackened and e x t e n s i v e reconnaissance of D i v i s i o n f r o n t made. At 1500 Company ", l e s s heavy maintenance u n i t s , d i s p l a c e d South in convoy t o NAHA., where bivouac was e s t a b l i s h e d for the n i g h t , prior t o continuing in support of the F i f t h Marines the following day. 9 June. 1915 Reconnaissance of the Division s e c t o r continued with a view t o forward displacement of the B a t t a l i o n . Company ", in s p i t e of washed-out roads and blown b r i d g e s , supported F i f t h Marines. One platoon of tanks cleaned out machine gun p o s i t i o n s and s n i p e r s , enabling the F i r s t B a t t a l i o n to s e i z e high ground v i c i n i t y of SHICHINA. -} June. 1915 The e n t i r e B a t t a l i o n , l e s s heavy maintenance u n i t s , d i s p l a c e d South in convoy t o v i l l a g e of SHICHINA. Roads v e r y muddy. ^ ^ ^^ There was no tank a c t i o n due to unfavorable weather and road c o n d i t i o n s . (t June. 1915 Because of v e r y poor condition of roads and b r i d g e s tanks could not cross the NAEA-"YONABARU V a l l e y . Engi n e e r s were n o t i f i e d of t h e s e conditions and rendered prompt assistance. C o m p Q n y c w > supported the Seventh Marines. A platoon of tanks supported the Second B a t t a l i o n by f i r i n g -11
* *
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225
/ . J u n e . 1QA.5 ( C o n t ' d ) from t h e N o r t h e r n bank of t h e KOKUBA G W a t enemy machine A A gun p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on t h e Southern bank of t h i s r i v e r , E a s t of TQMIGUSUKI. 5 J u n e . 1Q15 Made an e x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of the TOMUSU TERA-CHAN a r e a , checking on t h e c o n d i t i o n of r o a d s capable of s u p p o r t i n g t a n k s and s e e k i n g a l o c a t i o n f o r f u r t h e r f o r ward d i s p l a c e m e n t of the B a t t a l i o n , , Company MC" a c t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e Seventh Mar i n e s . Two t a n k s covered e n g i n e e r s d u r i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b r i d g e a c r o s s the KGKUBA GAtfA. Enemy a u t o m a t i c wea pons l o c a t e d on h i g h ground South of t h e r i v e r and which had been d i s r u p t i n g b r i d g e c o n s t r u c t i o n , were s i l e n c e d . 6 J u n e , 1945 E x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of D i v i s i o n forward area continued. Company MCM s u p p o r t e d t h e Seventh M a r i n e s ,
two t a n k s c o n t i n u i n g e x a c t l y t h e same mission a s d e s c r i b e d
in 5 June, above.
7 J u n e , ;<H*i That p o r t i o n of t h e B a t t a l i o n l o c a t e d a t SHICHINA p r e p a r e d t o d i s p l a c e forward 8 J u n e . No tank action. 8 J u n e . 19L5 At 0600 B a t t a l i o n began movement South, by company convoys, t o bivouac a r e a a t TOMUSU. Company '&" s e n t f o u r t a n k s t o t h e F i r s t Mar i n e s for s u p p o r t of t h e i r a t t a c k , but no t a n k s were committed. 9 J u n e , 1945 E x t e n s i v e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of t h e D i v i s i o n f o r ward a r e a resumed with a view t o f u r t h e r forward d i s p l a c e m e n t of t h e B a t t a l i o n , i n o r d e r t h a t t a n k s might be more r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o support t h e impending D i v i s i o n a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e s t r o n g l y - h e l d KTJNISHI Ridge s e c t o r . Company "A" s u p p o r t e d t h e F i r s t J f a r i n e s . One p l a t o o n covered t h e S o u t h e r l y i n f a n t r y advance from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s North of t h e MUKUE G W and TERA-YUZA R a i l r o a d . A A . Tank f i r e c o n c e n t r a t e d a g a i n s t h i l l West of YUZA. L i g h t a c t i on
OECLAS difffclJ
^ * * *_ - i -XX i .
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10 June. 1QA5 Commencing a t 0600, that portion of the B a t t a l i o n a t TCMUSU d i s p l a c e d South, by company convoys, t o a bivouac West of AWA. Company "A", reinforced by one platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. Tanks pushed across the M K E G W over a ford constructed DU A A before dawn and from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s near H i l l 59, South of the TERA-YUZA Railroad, destroyed many enemy emplacements l o c a t e d on H i l l 69 and in 0ZAT0 and YUZA a r e a s . This was the s t a r t of the p r o c e s s i n g " which enabled i n f a n t r y t o e v e n t u a l l y s e i z e t h i s o b j e c t i v e , prior t o t h e i r attack a g a i n s t XUNISII Ridge. n Action moderately heavy. Company C", reinforced by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines. These tanks a l s o used the ford a c r o s s MUKUli GAWA, then swung southwest a l o n g the road which p a r a l l e l s the TERA-TTOZA Railroad. Tanks p r e ceded i n f a n t r y advance through the v i l l a g e of TERA, Light action. Mining and what i s b e l i e v e d t o have been d i r e c t heavy c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y were both heavy. 11 June, 194? Company MAM, reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported F i r s t Marines by con t i n u i n g d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy p o s i t i o n s located on reverse slope of H i l l 69 and YUZA H i l l . E f f e c t i v e use of flame tanks. Tanks moved down the road, running Southwest from 0ZAT0 through KUNISHI Ridge, a s s a u l t e d H i l l 69 f r o n t a l l y and then s p l i t and a s s a u l t e d reverse slopes by double envelopment enabling i n f a n t r y t o s e i z ,f the H i l l . e Company "C , r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines. Again a c t i o n was l i g h t in t h i s s e c t o r a s l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e was met in and around TERA and TERA. Draw. Mining and d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y remained e x tremely heavy. IZ June, 19 45 Company *&", r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. No tanks were committed a s the e n t i r e day was spent by Engineers removal of mines from tank routes l e a d i n g South from H i l l 69 t o KUNISHI Ridge, and by heavy a r t i l l e r y and NGF b l a s t i n g of enemy d i r e c t f i r e a r t i l l e r y suspected p o s i t i o n s which had roads- in t h i s s e c t o r so a c c u r a t e l y covered.
M
.*'-*
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-OECL
12 June. 1915 (Cont'd) Company "C", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the Seventh Marines. Tanks experienced considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n moving South from TERA over the narrow roads l e a d i n g i n t o TERA Draw, from which t h e "processing" of t h e forward s l o p e s of KUNISHI Ridge began. Extensive tank dozering cleared tank r o u t e s both along the Coastal Road and TERA-KUNISHI Road, enabling tanks t o c r o s s AT d i t c h and c l o s e to the base of KUNISHI Ridge and b l a s t and burn numerous emplacements, Flame tanks very effective. In a d d i t i o n tanks b e ^ n what turned out t o be an e x t e n s i v e "ferrying" system in t h i s s e c t o r . Troops and s u p p l i e s , ( f o o d , ammunition, water, grenades, wire and blood plasma), were carried forward from TERA t o p o s i t i o n s along KUNISHI Road cut on KUNISHI Ridge, thereby r e i n f o r c i n g two companies which had made a s u c c e s s f u l advance during darkness the previous n i g h t . , On re/turning each tank e v a c uated wounded i n f a n t r y . Because t h i s one thousand yard s t r e t c h of open t e r r a i n was swept by heavy enemy automatic f i r e , tanks were the only p o s s i b l e overland means for t h i s reinforcement, supply, and evacuation. Heavy a c t i o n . H June, JL94S Company "A", r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines. No tanks committed. Engineer clearance of heavily-mined a r e a s continued, while i n f a n t r y reorganized. Company "C", reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines. "Processing" of the forward slopes of KUNISHI Ridge continued both from p o s i t i o n s in T&Bk Draw and along the c o a s t a l road, where, a f t e r considerable tank dozer work, tanks advanced South a l o n g the road, through a break i n the sea w a l l , and, from p o s i t i o n s a l o n g the reef, took p o s i t i o n s on the Western end of KUNISHI Ridge under f i r e . Tanks continued t o carry forward from TERA t o KUNISHI Ridge troops and s u p p l i e s returning with wounded. Flame tanks were employed most e f f e c t i v e l y , burning out enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d in caves and b u r i a l v a u l t s a t the base of KUNISHI. Action moderate. AT guns and mines encountered. The a r t i l l e r y F.O. teams from F i r s t B a t t a l i o n Eleventh Marines, were again a t t a c h e d t o t h e B a t t a l i o n and were employed v e r y e f f e c t i v e l y for the balance of the campaign
- 14
228
wwII i k y
1L June. ^Qy^
* *
Company "A", reinforced by a platoon of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported F i r s t Marines. From, p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d South and East of K i l l 69 tanks began heavy "processing" of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d a l o n g the base of the .Ridge, and a l o n g the road leading t o East end of KUNI3HI V i l l a g e . Company n C", reinforced by three platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the Seventh Marines, lank elements pushed a l o n g the coastal road and TERA. V a l l e y t o reach f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s from which Western and Northern KDNISHI Ridge -was again subjected t o heavy tank f i r e . Other u n i t s and the flame section drove South through the Ridge and began the a l l - i m p o r t a n t destruction of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on reverse s l o p e s and MEZADO Ridge forward s l o p e s . Very e f f e c t i v e use of napalm. Supply, reinforcement, and evacuation in both sectors continued on l a r g e s c a l e . AT and l a r g e - c a l i b e r d i r e c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e continued heavy. Heavy a c t i o n along e n t i r e f r o n t . Exten s i v e dozering. The one platoon in Division Tank Reserve was committed a t llfiO t o f u r t h e r support Seventh Iforines.
1? June, 1945.
Company *&, reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i r s t Marines, by continuing t o d e l i v e r heavy f i r e a g a i n s t the" forward s l o p e s and base of KDNISHI Ridge, from f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s South of H i l l 6 9W W . Company C , reinforced by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Mar i n e s . Action continued in the area South of KUNISHI Ridge a s tanks and flame tanks accomplished further destruction of enemy d e f e n s e s on reverse slopes of KUNISHI, a s w e l l a s those in MEZADO and on reverse slopes of MEZADO Ridge Flame tanks expended three thousand three hun dred g a l l o n s of napalm, destroying many cave emplacements a l o n g D i v i s i o n front and i g i i t i n g one large ammunition dump. AT and mortar f i r e continued heavy. Action heavy. 16 June. 1QL.5 Company ", r e i n f o r c e d by a platoon of tanks and a s e o t i o n of flame tanks, supported the F i f t h Marines, by continuing d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy p o s i t i o n s l o c a t e d on Northern s l o p e s of KUNISHE Ridge. - 15
ULULntJuMHnL
nrniAXtairir
>?;
16 June. 1QA5 I Cont'd) Company ,CW, r e i n f o r c e d by three p l a t o o n s of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines, by further reduction of enemy opposition concen t r a t e d a l o n g reverse s l o p e s of KUNISHI Ridge and forward s l o p e of MEZA.DO Ridges. Supply and evacuation continued. One tank alone evacuated f o r t y - s i x c a s u a l t i e s . Elements of Company *&", Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , a r r i v e d and were placed i n D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve. 17 June. 1QA.5
Company t*BTf
, reinforced by a platoon of tanks
n (Company A, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n ) , supported the F i f t h
Marines. Mission remained same a s previous day a s heavy
f i r e was again d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Northern s l o p e s of KUNISHI
R i d g e . In mid-efternoon however, following e x t e n s i v e
armored dozering, one tank, protected by f i r e teams, pushed
South througi the cut i n KUNISHI Ridge, East of KUNISHI
V i l l a g e , and observed nature of t e r r a i n and tank routes
running South. Once again an infantryman r i d i n g i n platoon
command tank was h e l p f u l ni n t a r g e t d e s i i a t i o n .
Company w C , r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a flame tank, supported the Seventh Marines* a t t a c k on MEZADO Ridge. Enemy 75mm AT f i r e , from the high ground, v i c i n i t y of ARAGACHI, was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy and a c c u r a t e l y covered the road running Southeast below KUNISII V i l l a g e . L a r g e - s c a l e supply and evacuation continued both s e c t o r s . Remaining elements of Company MA*, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , arrived and joined the D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve. 18 June. 1QLI Company WBW, r e i n f o r c e d by two platoons of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame tanks supported the F i f t h Marines, pushing South through the cut East of KUNISHI V i l l a g e and d e s t r o y i n g enemy p o s i t i o n s on the reverse slope of KUNISHI Ridge. Other u n i t s began the d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy em placements on H i l l 79. Flame tanks were e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s a r e a . D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, c o n s i s t i n g of one tank platoon and one flame tank, committed a t 1230 t o further support a t t a c k a g a i n s t H i l l 7? Mining e x t e n s i v e . Company MA, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , supported Eighth Marines' a t t a c k South from MEZADO Ridge t o MaKABE. Narrow, ; tycggy roads channelized and hampered tank movements in t h i s s e c t o r . > * Continued evacuation of wounded in both s e c t o r s . Actiien: heavy^^ftând mortar f i r e p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy ai d accurate.
ASSlfltD
18 June. 1915 (Cont'd)

At 0815, a Battalion Air Spot began reconnaissance of both regimental sectors. This plane carried a tank o f f i
cer who maintained direct contact, via SCR-$09, with tanks
in a c t i o n . This tank-Air Spot functioned extremely well
for the entire day and was instrumental in destruction of
at l e a s t two active AT weapons, seen f i r i n g from Hill 81.
Hane observed heavy a r t i l l e r y and NGF concentrations de
livered against t h i s H i l l and a l s o called for effective
a r t i l l e r y concentrations against exposed groups of enemy
personnel South of the Division front. 1Q June. 1QL.S Company "BM, reinforced by three tank platoons and a flame tank, supported,the Fifth Marines, delivering heavy f i r e a ^ i n s t H i l l 79, as tanks continued destruction of enemy positions prior to infantry's attack on t h i s ob j e c t i v e . One section of flame tanks, ordered from the Eighth Marines' sector, and the one tank platoon in Division Tank Reserve, joined in t h i s attack at midday. Action heavy. Company nft., Second Tank Battalion, reinforced by a section of flame tanks, supported the Eighth Marines' advance, against light opposition, South from MAKABE,. through IBARU-KQMESU Ridge, t o a point at the Southern end of the island. Extensive mining t h i s area. Napalm e f f e c t i v e . AT fire continued moderately heavy and accurate from the Army sector on the l e f t flank. 20 June. 1QL.5 Company nB", reinforced by three tank platoons and a section of flame tanks, supported the Fifth Marines, as tanks worked in relays delivering heavy fire a ^ i n s t both H i l l s 79 and 81. Tank and flame tank fire destroyed many enemy emplacements as tanks fired from positions close to the base of Hill 79, enveloping i t from the North, f r a n t i c a l l y defending enemy around Hill 79 l e f t their fox noles and made several unsuccessful close-in assaults upon the tanks, attempting to use both satchel-charges and frangible grenades. Following tank-infantry mop up of enemy ma.ch ine gun positions located in MaKABE, tanks pushed almost d i r e c t l y North taking H i l l 81 under f i r e from the South wreaking great destruction upon forward slope emplacements - 17
*S/
20 June. 1915 (Cont'd) At 1300, the D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, c o n s i s t i n g of two p l a

t o o n s of tanks and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , was committed
a g a i n s t H i l l 81
Company nd, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , supported the Eighth Marines, in whatamounted t o mopping-up operations i n the v a l l e y 7/est of MAKABE. Tanks covered e x t e n s i v e evacuation of wounded
by gunfire and smoke
Plane d e s i r e d for B a t t a l i o n A i r Spot was un
available.
21 June, 19 V?
Company t*Bw, r e i n f o r c e d by two tank platoons
and a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported t h e F i f t h Marines'
a t t a c k s on both H i l l s 79 and 8 1 , contributing g r e a t l y t o
the i n f a n t r y ' s s u c c e s s f u l seizure of these two o b j e c t i v e s .
The D i v i s i o n Tank Reserve, c o n s i s t i n g of one
platoon of tanks and a flame tank, was committed a t 1000,
t o a s s i s t in the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p o s i t i o n s on H i l l 79.
E x t e n s i v e d o z e r i n g , begun a t dawn, enabled
tanks t o e v e n t u a l l y envelope H i l l 81 from the East and
wreak havoc on i t s r e v e r s e s l o p e s . F i r i n g from a pass
between H i l l s 81 and 8 5 , tanksâlso a s s i s t e d the Army's
a s s a u l t a g a i n s t H i l l 8 5 , M o the S o u t h e a s t .
t Company "C , l e s s one platoon, supported
the Seventh Marines in mopping up small enemy pockets i n
the draw Southeast of KUNISHI.
Company "A", Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , supported
the Eighth Marines' mop up. No a c t i o n .
Flame tanks expended twenty-eigjit hundred g a l
lons of napalm and were e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e a ^ i n s t deep
cave p o s i t i o n s on both H i l l s 79 and 8 1 .
22 June. 19 L5 Company 1fBn9 r e i n f o r c e d by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported the F i f t h Marines* f u r t h e r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of H i l l s 7) and 8 1 , and a s s i s t e d i n f a n t r y reduction of pockets of r e s i s t a n c e on the H i l l s . F i r i n g of 75mm tank guns l i m i t e d by proximity of our own t r o o p s . Company WCW, r e i n f o r c e d by a s e c t i o n of flame t a n k s , supported Seventh Marines' mopping up near KUNISHI Village. Company tfA% Second Tank B a t t a l i o n , supported the E i ^ i t h Marines. Flame tanks employed. * Napalm used v e r y e x t e n s i v e l y i n c l e a n i n g out of enemy caves and emplacements. A i l other elements in D i v i s i o n Tank R e s e r v e , not committedTank a c t i o n l i g h t . Orûiized r e s i s t a n c e ceased t h i s date and i s l a n d declared secured.
V i
1*
&&UISSIFIEQ
III. CONTROL
*1
i>
23 - ?5 J u n e , ] 9 ^ Small t a n k elements o c c a s s i o n a l l y c a l l e d out t o a s s i s t i n mop up of p o c k e t s , c h i e f l y by flame.
The F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n , w i t h Company *B",

713th Armored Flamethrower B a t t a l i o n and t h e Tank Mainten
ance Ordnance Platoon a t t a c h e d (and a d d i t i o n a l l y r e i n f o r c e d
by a t t a c h m e n t of Company nM, Second Tank B a t t a l i o n on 15
June) f u n c t i o n e d under c o n t r o l of t h e F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n
commander. I t f u n c t i o n e d a s a r e i n f o r c e d tank b a t t a l i o n
a t a l l t i m e s a n d , fully i n t e g r a t e d with a l l o t h e r a r m s ,
s u p p o r t e d t h e a t t a c k of t h e FIRST MA.RINi; DIVISION d i r e c t l y
under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e D i v i s i o n Commander. At no time
were any t a n k elements detached from t h e b a t t a l i o n or a t t a c h e d t o i n f a n t r y u n i t s . Tank and flamethrower support was a l l o c a t e d d a i l y t o a s s a u l t i n f a n t r y regiments a s r e q u i r e d i n implementation of t h e i r scheme of maneuver. I t was a l l o c a t e d i n view of t e r r a i n l i m i t a t i o n s and in a c c o r d ance w i t h t h e D i v i s i o n main e f f o r t and scheme of maneuver. N e c e s s a r y s h i f t s in armored s t r e n g t h were e f f e c t e d f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g t h e day a s emergencies a r o s e o r a s appeared n e c e s s a r y i n l i g h t of midday o p e r a t i o n a l developments. Thus d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k maximum a v a i l a b l e tank s t r e n g t h was main t a i n e d where most n e e d e d . Supporting tank elements ranged i n s t r e n g t h from one tank platoon i n support of an i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t up t o t h e e n t i r e r e i n f o r c e d tank b a t t a l i o n l e s s one t a n k company i n support of a s i n g l e i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n . The v e r y l i m i t e d number of t a n k s o r ^ n i c t o t h e Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n , f u r t h e r reduced by heavy t a n k l o s s e s , only p a r t i a l l y off s e t b y an e n t i r e l y i n a d e q u a t e supply of replacement t a n k s , r e n d e r e d i t i m p e r a t i v e t h a t t h i s f u l l e s t and most e f f e c t i v e employment be made. I t was u s u a l l y n e c e s s a r y t o employ the e n t i r e B a t t a l i o n , r e t a i n i n g only one or two p l a t o o n s i n r e s e r v e . During t h e t h r e e week a s s a u l t on SHUEE e v e r y t a n k was employed day a f t e r day and more could have been employed. Tanks were so d e s p e r a t e l y needed t h a t i t was simply i m p o s s i b l e t o r e t a i n any i n D i v i s i o n Reserve d u r i n g t h i s p h a s e . A f t e r t h e enemy's w i t h d r a w a l of h i s remnants from SEUSI he made h i s l a s t g e n e r a l s t a n d on KUNISHI R i d g e . Again d u r i n g t h i s second and l a s t major b a t t l e t a n k s played a v i t a l r o l e . A l l were employed and a d d i t i o n a l could have been most p r o f i t a b l y employed. IV\ BATTALION FORWARD DISHACEMiflJT A. General - The b a t t a l i o n was d i s p l a c e d forward
**
three t i m e s in order t o keep within c l o s e operating range of the f r o n t . Time required for tanks to reach the front ranged from f i v e t o twenty minutes. Displacement in r e s p e c t t o the front i s shown by d a t e s on a t t a c h e d o v e r l a y , Appendix # 1 . A l l tanks returned to the B a t t a l i o n lark e v e r y n i g h t . B a t t a l i o n heavy maintenance d i s p l a c e d f o r ward only once - from MACHINATO t o v i c i n i t y of ZArtA b i v o u a c . B. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of B a t t a l i o n Bivouacs Areas s e l e c t e d f o r b a t t a l i o n bivouac were in each case d e f i l a d e d from enemy observation and a r t i l l e r y f i r e , p o s s e s s e d two or more r o u t e s of a c c e s s and provided firm f o o t i n g . When n a t u r a l concealment did not e x i s t , camouflage n e t s were used e x t e n s i v e l y . C. S e c u r i t y - Equipment and tanks were dugi n by dozer when rock w a l l s , e t c . , did not o f f e r p r o t e c t i o n . D i s p e r s a l was g e n e r a l l y l i m i t e d t o only f i f t y f e e t in the i n t e r e s t of c l o s e - i n s e c u r i t y . SOP c a l l e d for the c o o r d i n a t i o n of a l l s e c u r i t y by the Headquarters and s e r v i c e Com pany Commander and c o n s t r u c t i o n , under h i s d i r e c t i o n , of a complete perimeter of a t l e a s t s i n g l e strand t r i p wire ( w i t h cans) before f i r s t n i g h t f a l l , and l a y i n g of complete concertina perimeter as soon a s p r a c t i c a b l e . Ground machine gun and r i f l e p o s t s were l o c a t e d v i c i n i t y of perimeter wire and i n a d d i t i o n one crewman remained on guard a t each tank. Some twenty JAPANESE were k i l l e d a l o n g perimeter wire through out the operation, h a l f of whom were carrying demolition charges. No tanks were destroyed and no personnel l o s t while i n bivouac due t o any cause whatsoever. V. INTELLIGENCE SECTION A. Performance of 5-2 Section
1 . The S-2 succeeded throughout the oper a t i o n in e v a l u a t i n g and d i s s e m i n a t i n g information t o subordi nate u n i t s with a minimum of d e l a y . This was accomplished through the careful study of a l l information r e c e i v e d from h i g h e r echelons and subordinate u n i t s , the preparation of maps, o v e r l a y s , s k e t c h e s , and memos for subordinate u n i t s , and the dissemination of information v e r b a l l y and by radio where speed was e s s e n t i a l . I t was further a s s i s t e d by such measures as the i n t e r r o g a t i o n of a POtf from the 27th Tank Regiment and by the 3-2 a c t i n g a s an a e r i a l observer in d i r e c t radio contact with the t a n k s . Close l i a i s o n with G-2 was maintained throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n , r e p o r t s being sub m i t t e d t o that o f f i c e d a i l y and o f t e n e r a s warranted.
DECLASSM
*3<<
46fcASSIFiED
w ^
2. Maps and A e r i a l hotos a . Three r e v i s i o n s of t h e t a c t i c a l map, 1/25,000,^were s u p p l i e d by h i $ i e r e c h elon d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n , t h e f i n a l r e v i s i o n b e i n g t h e only one t h a t was s u f f i c i e n t l y a c c u r a t e and r e l i a b l e . A l l maps were s u p p l i e d in s u f f i c i e n t quantities. b . A e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h i c coverage was g e n e r a l l y adequate and i n c l u d e d s p e c i a l l y r e q u e s t e d s t e r e o p a i r s of c e r t a i n key a r e a s . Only one copy of each s e t of photos was s u p p l i e d which n e c e s s i t a t e d t h e i r s t u d y by company o f f i c e r s a t the B a t t a l i o n CP r a t h e r than on t h e ground where t h e y would have been of g r e a t e r value 3. Enemv T a c t i c s and Defensive Organization 1. General: a . The JAPANESE defense of OKINAWA was based l a r g e l y on the s k i l l f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s u c c e s s i v e r i d g e l i n e s and h i l l m a s s e s . ach of these r i d g e l i n e s was honey-combed by an i n t r i c a t e r e i n f o r c e d cave and t u n n e l network c o n t a i n ing f i r i n g positions for r i f l e s , auto m a t i c weapons, and AT guns, e t c . A n p o s i t i o n s had numerous e x i t s on r e v e r s e s l o p e s , a l l o w i n g the enemy t o p l a c e heavy m o r t a r and grenade f i r e on the c r e s t s and forward s l o p e s a f t e r t h e i r occupation by our i n f a n t r y and f u r t h e r a l l o w i n g him t o execute a withdrawal wi.th minimum l o s s e s when he so d e s i r e d . b . That t h e enemy e a r l y became aware t h a t t a n k s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e major t h r e a t t o t h i s type of defense h a s been r e p e a t e d l y borne out by t r a n s l a t i o n s of enemy o r d e r s and documents and by P W i n t e r r o g a t i o n s . O The enemy c o r r e c t l y assumed t h a t a r t i l l e r y and a i r s t r i k e s would have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h i s type of p o s i t i o n , and t h a t t h e only e f f e c t i v e method of o v e r coming t h i s defense would be by l a r g e c a l i b e r d i r e c t f i r e , capable of p e n e t r a t i n g cave e n t r a n c e s and embrasures*
v.v
^>r,v ^
*3r
Furthermore the reduction of such a defense would require a weapon capable of d i r e c t f i r e on reverse s l o p e s . c . Thus the enemy was faced with the n e c e s s i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g an adequate a n t i tank defense which he appears to have attempted, by using a plan i n v o l v i n g three s t e p s : ( l ) To separate our i n fantry from our tanks by the use of a r t i l l e r y , mortars, and grenades, and small arms f i r e ; (2) To s t o p or slow the progress of the tanks by the use of mines, AT guns, and o b s t a c l e s ( n a t u r a l and a r t i f i c i a l ; (.3) To d e s t r o y the tanks by c l o s e - i n a s s a u l t with smoke, i n c e n d i a r i e s , and d e m o l i t i o n s . As a coordinated measure t h i s plan f a i l e d l a r g e l y because s t e p ( l ) was never s u c c e s s f u l l y completed. How e v e r , the enemy achieved considerable success with s t e p (2) and obtained zero r e s u l t s with s t e p (.3) except in those cases where our tanks were aban doned in front of f r i e n d l y l i n e s . A c t i v e Defenses: a . The Vfam AT gun was the e f f e c t i v e back bone of the enemy a c t i v e a n t i - t a n k d e fense and proved i t s e l f capable of pene t r a t i n g any part of the M4 armor with the exception of the front slope p l a t e . These guns were .invariably w e l l con cealed i n cave type emplacements and often had one or more a l t e r n a t e p o s i t i o n s branching from the same t u n n e l . They were g e n e r a l l y emplaced so a s to flank the l o g i c a l tank approaches to a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n and although the f i e l d of f i r e was u s u a l l y quite l i m i t ed, there were often two guns covering the same a r e a . The 47mm AT gun was most often employed a t ranges from two hun dred t o s i x hundred yards and with few e x c e p t i o n s , f i r e d only a t the sponsons, suspension systems, or r e a r of our t a n k s .
-W&ttASSIFIE
The rate of fire fop t h i s gun can be

extremely high for, short periods -~
a s high as six to eight rounds in ten
seconds in a t l e a s t one instance
without adversely affecting accuracy.
Although i t was almost impossible t o
observe these guns before they f i r e d ,
they were usually seen when f i r i n g
due to the prominent muzzle b l a s t
which can be seen a t ranges up to
twelve hundred yards.
During the action North of SHUKL the enemy employed h i s a r t i l l e r y chiefly for i n d i r e c t f i r e , but during the l a t t e r action in the KUNISBI and AEa.Gw.CHI area the enemy used much of h i s remaining a r t i l l e r y a s d i r e c t f i r e weapons f i r ing from cave emplacemeivts. This s h i f t in employment resulted in the damaging and destruction of several of our tanks by heavy and medium a r t i l l e r y f i r e from ranges between a thousand and fifteen hundred yards and g r e a t l y increased the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in locating the enemy guns. Several of these guns were 75mm guns (probably Type 90) f i r ing A.P. Hti. ammunitixai which penetra ted a tank sponson a t a range of one thousand yards. Tanks drew mortar f i r e of a l l types f r e quently, but such f i r e only occasionally i n f l i c t e d damage t o r a d i a t o r s by near misses and to t r a c k s and engine com partnents by d i r e c t h i t s . However, mor t a r f i r e often made the close cover of tanks by i n f a n t r y a d i f f i c u l t t a s k . Numerous a t t a c k s were attempted by s u i cide troops carrying demolition charges. Only one of these a t t a c k s caused s l i g h t damage. Such a t t a c k s were launched from covered positions close to the tanks and were attempted both by single enemy s o l d i e r s and by small groups, and usually involved the use of smoke. Only the a l e r t n e s s of the covering i n f a n t r y and the
-j
5 t f : i
- 23 -
DECLMHH#ED
53?
tank crews prevented the s u c c e s s f u l completion of t h e s e a t t a c k s . e. Miscellaneous: (1) AT r i f l e grenades were encountered often but were not a major problem. Penetration of the tank armor was achieved in only one c a s e , the g r e nade making a hole the s i z e of a p e n c i l in the front slope p l a t e . (2) The enemy completely destroyed a t o t a l of seventeen tanks by the use of demolition or i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r the t?nks had been damaged and abandoned forward of f r i e n d l y lines. (3) Several d i s a b l e d tanks were crudely booby-trapped by the enemy and on s e v e r a l occasions destroyed tanks were used a s p o s i t i o n s f o r machine guns and grenade d i s c h a r g e r s . (4) In one instance a group of f i v e enemy s o l d i e r s were detected at dusk f o l l o w i n g i n the tanks' d u s t - t r a i n s as they were returning t o bivouac. They were armed with grenades and ; demolition charges. (5) On another i n s t a n c e ten square-shaped charges about the s i z e of a #2 can were projected a t our tanks from ranges between t h i r t y and s e v e n t y f i v e yards, but only one detonated and i t caused no drrage. These charges were f i t t e d with a V-shaped f i n and might w e l l have been impro v i s e d by a s i n g l e unit a s t h i s was t h e i r only appearance. Bassive Defenses? a . The enemy made e x t e n s i v e use of mines of v a r i o u s t y p e s , and t h i s was the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e cause of damage t o our t a n k s . Ceramic and s i n g l e horn conical mines were the most common encountered, yard s t i c k , tapemeasure, and k e t t l e mines were found l e s s o f t e n . There i s some evidence that e l e c t r i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d mines may have been used. At l e a s t one
of our tanks h i t a burled a e r i a l bomb and in several i n s t a n c e s they were seen and destroyed or avoided, hut i t can not be said that they were employed e x t e n s i v e l y a s mines in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. Mine f i e l d s were g e n e r a l l y hap hazard, there being no i n d i c a t i o n that mines were l a i d in d e f i n i t e p a t t e r n s . Most of the mines were encountered on roads and the areas adjacent t h e r e t o . Often the enemy l a i d mines a t n i g h t in areas our tanks had been operating in during the day and sometimes l a i d them in the tracks made by the tanks. H.B., c a n n i s t e r , and machine gun f i r e were employed with some success in d e tonating mines in suspected a r e a s . b. Obstacles (1) Four AT d i t c h e s were encountered in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. They were from one hundred to s i x hundred yards in length and averaged ten t o twelve f e e t in width and f i v e t o eight f e e t in depth. They were a l l well placed but only two were covered by AT guns. A l l of these d i t c h e s were s u c c e s s f u l l y crossed with the a i d of tank d o z e r s . (2) Road blocks encountered c o n s i s t e d of l o o s e stoned p i l e d about f i v e f e e t high and they were e a s i l y e l i m i n a ted by tank d o z e r s . None were found fo contain mines and none were cover ed by AT guns. (3) The enemy destroyed n e a r l y a l l the bridges of any consequence and often destroyed portions of road f i l l s . Such action was only p a r t i a l l y s u c e s s f u l as a delaying, a c t i o n , a s cur tanks were u s u a l l y able to find a l t e r n a t e r o u t e s and t o construct by-passes and fords with l i t t l e l o s s of time. The g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y was f i l l i n g blown roads, due t o the f a c t that the roads were narrow and material for f i l l i n g purposes was u s u a l l y not at hand. The enemy could have delayed our advance more s u c c e s s f u l l y had he chosen t o e f f e c t a more thorouft destruction of the 1 * ^ . ^ i s t i n e read n e t .
DECLfiSSffffD
23?
Qit^SlFltO
C. R e s u l t s jof Enemy A n t i - t a n k Measures; flanks Damaged bv Enemv A c t i o n CAUSa Mines Heavy A r t y & M o r t a r s 75mm S a t c h e l Charge A . T . Grenade 20*im TOTAL DAMAGED TOTALLY DISABLED 30 1 20 2 14 1 3 1 1 (very sligjit)0 31 22 15 4 1 5 1
>;#**'
'
&
TOT&L
5
1
4>
0
74
F.T. Tanks Damaged by Enemy A c t i o n
79
Mines 47mm TOTaL
2 1 3 0
2 1 3
Of t h e s e v e n t y - f o u r t a n k s damaged p l u s t h r e e t h a t were bogged down, f i f t e e n were d e s t r o y e d by enemy demo l i t i o n s o r i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r b e i n g abandoned and seven were d e s t r o y e d by f r i e n d l y t a n k f i r e t o prevent t h e i r use by t h e enemy. Thus a t o t a l of t w e n t y - s e v e n t a n k s were t o t a l l y l o s t . I n ' a d d i t i o n t h e two F . T . t a n k s damaged by mines were d e s t r o y e d by enemy d e m o l i t i o n s o r i n c e n d i a r i e s a f t e r b e i n g abandoned. D. Damage I n f l i c t e d on. Enemv By. Tank A c t i o n :
1 . No a t t e m p t can be made t o a s c e r t a i n a c c u r a t e l y t h e l a r g e number of weapons and emplacements d e s t r o y e d by our t a n k s , a l t h o u g h t a n k p e r s o n n e l a c t u a l l y observed t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of many weapons i n c l u d i n g 47mm AT guns, a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , m o r t a r s , and a u t o m a t i c weapons. I t i s i m p o r t a n t . t h a t nfiny c a p t u r e d enemy documents and POW i n t e r r o g a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e enemy was t r y i n g d e s p e r a t e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e o p e r a t i o n t o r e d u c e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of our t a n k s . 2 . I t i s e q u a l l y t r u e t _ a t no a c c u r a t e e s t i n a t e can be made of t h e p e r s o n n e l c a s u a l t i e s i n f l i c t e d on t h e eneD.y by t a n k s and flamethrower t a n k s , but i t can be s a f e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e y were e x t r e m e l y h i g h .
%
-,*Vi t '>v,,
#t4Kw<
,. '-..*-.î)sflB.
VI. casualties!
PERSONNEL A. C a s u a l t i e s - The below t a b l e s e t s forth
UNIT DRVJRIA KLA DAI WIA AI SICK TOTAL QM O M OM OM O O C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M ENL C M M L C M H&S Co. 2 - 4 i - 0 0 - 5 3 - 9 "A" Co. 1-0 0 - 6 3-50 0 - 1 l -15 5 -72 f w E Co. 1-2 5-53 0 - 3 0 - 7 6 -65 "C" Co. 0 - 2 0 - 1 4-14 1-0 5-17 Ord P l a t 0 - 1 0 - 1 0 - 2 '"Co, 713 T k B n 3-17 0 - 1 0 - 2 3-20 A"Co,2d T k B n <dN TOTAL 1-0 1-10 0 - 1 17 -119 2 - 6 1 -30 ?? -186 RETURNED 9 - 8 6 2 - L 0 -?1 11 -111 z z = REMAINING 1-0 1-10 0 - 1 6 - 53 & - 2 1-9 11-75 B. Medical - J o unusual d i f f i c u l t i e s were'en
countered in the Medical f i e l d .
1. Percentages of Casualties in and out of
tanks!
KLA KIA WIA WIA i n s i d e tank outside tank i n s i d e tank outside tank 63% 37$ 65$ 35$

2 . Nitrogen poisoning was noted to cause mild headaches and in some i n s t a n c e s nose bleeds among approximately
75$ of a l l tank crewmen C h a r a c t e r i s t i c ^ only of heavy action
and due in part t o inoperative v e n t i l a t i o n blowers on many old
t a n k s . No p a r t s for sane a v a i l a b l e .
VII. CC&fliONIGATICNS
A. B a s i c Radio N e t s - Nets were inadequate d u r

i n g t h i s o p e r a t i o n . I n t h e new assignment of f r e q u e n c i e s the
t a n k b a t t a l i o n was cut from t h e normal s i x t e e n channels n e c e s s
a r y t o o p e r a t i o n t o t h i r t e e n c h a n n e l s . The n e c e s s i t y of u s
i n g c h a n n e l s i n common w i t h amphibian t r a c t o r s caused c o n s i d e r
a b l e confusion and d e l a y in t r a n s m i s s i o n s . A s e v e n t e e n t h s e p
a r a t e channel f o r supply i s recommended.
27 -
DECbWO
><//
im&SIFIED
B. I n t e r f e r e n c e - Interference from other n e t s on t h e same or adjacent frequencies was very heavy and almost continuous d u r i n g the operation. However, only a t d i s t a n c e s of three miles or more was i t impossible t o work through the u n i n t e n t i o n a l Running, some enemy jamming was encountered on 25.0 meîcycles. This jamming was continuous wave type and was strong enouî t o blank out s i g n a l s from the SCR-^lO's. Side-tuning picked up the signal but d i s t o r t i o n was g r e a t . C. Personnel - Additional communication p e r sonnel was the g r e a t e s t need of the communication s e c t i o n . Although a t one time ten a d d i t i o n a l men in Headquarters and Service Company were assigned t o communication duty, the number of communication personnel was s t i l l inadequate t o properly maintain communications. For example, i t was n e c e s s a r y for approximately eight days t o maintain two complete communication centers with twenty-four hour operation of both switchboard and r a d i o . Suqh a s i t u a t i o n w i l l not be a t a l l uncommon in any operation on a large land mass due t o slow moving maintenance equipment and dumps lagging behind as the B a t t a l i o n CP moves c l o s e l y behind the front l i n e s . D. Materiel - The present radio equipment proved e x c e l l e n t , r e q u i r i n g only normal maintenance. How ever, there i s s t i l l a great need for an SCR-5O8 mounted in a i - t o n Zpc4 truck in each company. The two such s e t s furnished by Corps proved t o be of inestimable value in maintaining c o n t r o l . SuPflv - Signal supply during t h i s oper ation was very s a t i s f a c t o r y in most c a s e s . However, s h o r t age of a small number of items, in p a r t i c u l a r the supply of H5-3O T-17, t u b e s , and c r y s t a l s were d e f i n i t e l y i n a d e quate. F. Radio Maintenance - Radio maintenance functioned most e f f i c i e n t l y . Improvised one ton company communication t r a i l e r s , equipped with Homelite power, spare s e t s , b a t t e r i e s , t u b e s , e t c . , proved very v a l u a b l e . A l l radio equipnent was generally kept operative and no tanks deadlined for any appreciable time. G. Tank-Infantry Phones - Sound-powered t a n k i n f a n t r y phones were of great value althouî few remained s a t i s f a c t o r i l y operative throughout the long o p e r a t i o n . , A s e l f r e t r a c t i n g cord feature i s urgently needed t o prevent dragging and ripping out of phones. Many tanks used a very simple expedient a f t e r regular phones became i n o p e r a t i v e .
.*
n r r i ACCtciLn
A sound-powered phone was attached t o each end'of ''a* twenty f o o t - c o r d and c o i l e d and kept in the t u r r e t . Upon occasion rtQ t a l k , t o i n f a n t r y , one phone was dropped out through the p i s t o l , port and allowed to drop t o the ground t o the prone infantryman and pulled hack i n t o t u r r e t upon comple t i o n of c o n v e r s a t i o n . H. fiteynrab-py - 11 b a t t a l i o n n e t s were kept oper a t i v e , although a t time;s the use of r e l a y s t a t i o n s was r e quired. A l l companies; and most s t a f f s e c t i o n s , including supply, leaned h e a v i l y on radio communication. Communications were g e n e r a l l y e x c e l l e n t and contributed immeasureably t o t h e . c o n t r o l . a n d combat e f f i c i e n c y of the B a t t a l i o n . VIII. SUPPLY
A. General - A l l phases of combat supply were again c o n t r o l l e d and coordinated by S-4 in the manner pre s c r i b e d in B a t t a l i o n Administrative Order Number 1-45, and i n accordance w i t h armored force d o c t r i n e . Rapid tank i n f a n t r y advances, adverse weather and road conditions and extremely heavy ammunition and f u e l expenditures put an unprecedented strain on organ i z a t i o n supply f a c i l i t i e s . I t i s t o the s p e c i a l credit of personnel of t h i s s e c t i o n that supply always succeeded in keeping a b r e a s t of the f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n and that tank o p e r a t i o n s were n e v e r h a l t e d or r e s t r i c t e d a t any time by lack of s u p p l i e s . Tank radio was e f f e c t i v e l y and e x t e n s i v e l y used i n connection with forward displacement of s u p p l i e s t o tank r a l l y i n g p o i n t s . B. Shortages - A number of v i t a l l y important items were not carried by higher echelon l o c a l supply in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y and, as a r e s u l t , c r i t i c a l shortages e x i s t e d throughout t h e p e r i o d . Chief of these were a s f o l l o w s : 7$mm Gun Ammo, p a r t i c u l a r l y EE. At several s t a g e s WP, HE, M48, s t e e l case, super, w/fuze PD M48, and HE M54 fuze had t o be s u b s t i t u t e d . Tanks, medium, M/,A2. Tanks, medium, M4A2, p a r t s . Tanks, medium, MZ,A2, w/dozer. V e h i c l e , Tank Recovery, p a r t s . Truck, 2 i - T , 6x6, cargo, parts Solenoids. Truck, 2J-T, Machine a i o p , ML6Al,w/load nA".
The major shortages l i s t e d d i r e c t l y e f f e c t e d The causes apparently the o r ^ n i z a t i o n 1 s combat e f f i c i e n c y . o r i g i n a t e d e i t h e r in higher echelon long-range planning or e x i g e n c i e s i n the o v e r a l l supply p i c t u r e with which Ic V r echelon s e c t i o n s are not acquainted. Supply a g e n c i e s on OKINiWA made p e r s i s t e n t attempts t o procure c r i t i c a l i t e m s , but l a s t minute s t e p s could not p o s s i b l y r e l i e v e the s i t u a tion. The v e r y e x t e n s i v e employment of tanks made i t v i t a l l y n e c e s s a r y that adequate q u a n t i t i e s and t y p e s of r e p l a c e ment v e h i c l e s , spare p a r t s , and ammunition be a c t u a l l y on
hand a t l o c a l dumps and r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . This e s s e n t i a l
reserve did not e x i s t .
Replacement tank supply by Supply Service e c h e l o n s was inadequate and appeared t o completely break down. Replacement tanks were r e c e i v e d ( l ) inadequate i n number and a t no time brouît the B a t t a l i o n up t o authorized strength (2) were changed from M4A2 to M/3 models and (3) were d e
l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n , while on the move and locked
i n combat, in an e n t i r e l y unserviceable c o n d i t i o n . Changing
of types of replacements from M4&2 t o M4A3 n e c e s s i t a t e d t h a t
tank crews t r a i n e d in operation of one model were required
t o a t t a c k the enemy in tanks with unfamiliar instruments and
c o n t r o l s . This break down in higher supply planning i s t o
be p a r t i c u l a r l y deplored. As t o s e r v i c a b i l i t y of almost a l l
replacement MÂ.2 tanks r e c e i v e d , t h e i r condition i n d i c a t e d
an u t t e r lack of care of any kind while in storage and e n -
r o u t e . They were d e l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n (which
was forced t o pick them up a t unloading beaches twenty m i l e s
t o the rear because t h e y were i n o p e r a t i v e ) with such major
d e f e c t s a s cracked engine b l o c k s , cracked engine heads,
burnt out frozen c l u t c h e s , rusted i n o p e r a t i v e governors, c o n t r o l boxes and machine guns and 75mm parts r u s t e d and corroded beyond a l l r e p a i r . They were m i s s i n g sucn combat e s s e n t i a l s - t o c i t e only a few - a s si<5hts f o r 75mm, p e r i s copes, r a d i o headphones, and towing c a b l e s . I t i s emphasized here that t h i s equipment was d e l i v e r e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n , while in heavy a c t i o n , with no shops or parts a v a i l a b l e , and a l r e a d y overburdened by combat maintenance. These tanks may be a c c u r a t e l y described n o t only as junk but r u s t y junk. C Supply Structure - The supply structure and d i s t r i b u t i o n of supply personnel were adapted t o the changing s i t u a t i o n througiout the displacements Southward. Supply S i t u a t i o n Numbers 2, 3 , 4, and 5, a s s e t f o r t h i n B a t t a l i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Order 1-45 > were employed in v a r i o u s s t a g e s of the o p e r a t i o n . Each proved h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . Assignments of B a t t a l i o n transportation and B a t t a l i o n working p a r t i e s were again under the control of t h i s s e c t i o n an arrangement n e c e s s a r y t o the e f f i c i e n t coordina t i o n of supply ^ s h u t t l i n g . Each was handled on a " p r i o r i t i e s "
yiECLftSSIFIED
b a s i s , t h e r e b y i n s u r i n g the employment t o b e s t advantage of a l l a v a i l a b l e equipment and manpower. D.
.,>
Expenditure . Tonnage. and Truck Loads, by "Type" S u p p l i e s .
Below a r e given g e n e r a l , o v e r a l l breakdowns of e x p e n d i t u r e s , t o n n a g e s , and t r u c k l o a d s r e q u i r e d t o h a u l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s u p p l i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e of a t t a c h e d u n i t s , during the e n t i r e operation: 1. Ammunition a . Expended (Rounds) J S h e l l , f i x e d , HE, M48, supercharged, w / f u z e , PD, M48, 75mm gun * S h e l l , f i x e d , HE, M48, supercharged, w / f u z e , T-SQ,, M54, 75mm gun P r o j e c t i l e , f i x e d , A . P . C . , M63A1, and t r a c e r , 75mm gun S h e l l , f i x e d , smoke phosphorus, "W.P., M64, w/fuze, PD., M57, 75mm gun S h e l l , f i x e d , c a n n i s t e r , T-30,75mm How S h r a p n e l , f i x e d , M 1 , 75mm gun K Bomb, smoke, M l / L , M3, f / 2 " Mortar K Comp. Fuze, PD., CP, T-105, w / b o o s t e r , e x t r a I l l u m i n a t i o n , M83AI, 60mm mortar G-rena de s , han d: F r a g . , M 11 K VP, 10.5 HC, KB -. I n c e n d . , M14 --" Snoke , c o l o r e d , MIS, Orange .30 C a l i b e r : AP T r a c e r , b e l t e d ( 4~l) .45 C a l i b e r , b a l l , M1911 .30 C a l i b e r , AP, M2, 8/cp/bl, (Rifle) .30 C a l i b e r , b a l l , Ml (Carbine) b . T o t a l Tonnage c . T o t a l Truck Loads 2. White Gas 80 Octane Fuel a . Expended: 5,550 41,900 41,579 13,328 10,905 :4,46l 173 3,163 1,860 3,819 166 327 2^ 863 75 101 3,107,500 17,574 2,200 1,300 1,239 250
S ^ /r30 3Ai, ^50 Diesel Kerosene

SAIL ,,-90
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -
4,950 g a l s . 4,100 " 63,500 " 300 "

530 lbs.
w
Gen . F u r # 1 Gen. Fur # 2 wheel B e a r i n g Grease
- - - - , - - - -
1 , 710 620 220
"
"
b . T o t a l Tonnage - - - - - c. T o t a l Truck L o a d s ' - - - 3. Rations! a . Expended
506 t o n s 125 l o a d s
Type "B" Type "C" Type "K" Type "10 in 1 " PX Components Coffee Fruits Juices Bread b . T o t a l Tonnage - - - - - c . T o t a l Truck Loads 4. Spare P a r t s a. Items!
1,785 r a t i o n s
30,203 "
1,831 "
15,713 "
- 35,900 "
- 34,680
6,490 "
800 "
,f
33,857 150 t o n s . 50 l o a d s .
Batteries - - - - - - - - - - - 56O l b s Bogie T i r e s 8,280 " Track Connectors - - - - - - - - - - 365 w Boîe Wheels 14,910 " B a t t e r i e s (l2v) 7,534 " Track R o l l e r s 400 " Tank R a d i a t o r s 400 " Sprockets . 185 Battery ^cid 24O " Truck T i r e s 4,200 " Jeep Tires 1,200 " Power U n i t s , M/^2 10,000 " Power U n i t s , M/^3 4,000 " Power U n i t s , M l , Y/recker 1,600 " Track " H 5 tons Salvage -. 10 " Miscellaneous 5
k
' -/ j
b . T o t a l Tonnage
- -
i5 7 t o n s ifi l o a d s
c . Total Truck Loads - - - < -
5 . T o t a l Tonnage and Truck Loads (Consolidated) a . Ammunition b . Fuel c. Bations d . Spare l a r t s e . Quartermaster f. Communication * Grand Total Tons 1,239 506 150 157 18 2 2,072 Truck Loads
250 125 50 40 10 1 476 (* Does n o t i n c l u d e water and m i s c e l l aneous items)._
Losses 1 . V e h i c l e s and Tanks Damaged Beyond R e p a i r , L o s t , or Destroyed: I t e m s Month
1 Truck, i - T , 4x4, cargo ' June 1'Truck, 2g-T, 6x6, cargo June J 4 Tanks June I3 ranks May 2 . I n d i v i d u a l Equipment and Clothing - Losses under t h e s u b j e c t h e a d i n g s , a l t h o u g h c o n s i d e r a b l e , a r e consider ed normal f o r the type and l e n g t h of o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v e d . 3 . LOVij p l u s Six - An a c c u r a t e count of t h e
l o s s e s on t h i s shipment cannot be submitted a t t h i s t i m e . I t
i s e s t i m a t e d , however, t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y a l l cots and o f f i c e r ' s
b e d d i n g and c l o t h i n g r o l l s shipped were l o s t , and t h i s i n
s p i t e of c o n s t a n t b e a c h - w a t c h i n g d u r i n g the unloading p e r i o d .
Tank w a t e r p r o o f i n g , g a l l e y g e a r , a few o f f i c e r ' s bedding and
c l o t h i n g r o l l s , and a small q u a n t i t y of m i s c e l l a n e o u s gear
a r r i v e d i n s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n d i t i o n -
F, MsL.1or I t e m s Received - The b e l o w - l i s t e d major i t e m s were r e c e i v e d from h i g h e r echelon supply d u r i n g the p e r iod1 * Tank, Medium, M/A2 23 Tank, Medium, M4A3 -13 .# - 33
2</7
ft
if. Ma.jor Items Received - ( Cont'd) Vehicle, Tank Recovery, M32B3 - Truck, 2i-T, 6x6, cargo Truck, 1-T, 4x4, cargo - - - - Trailer, water, 2-v;, 300 gal. 1 1 2 3
( *L!ostly inoperative and received only a few days before end of operation) Gr. Transportation - Battalion transportation was heavily taxed and generally was operated to capacity continuously "by day and by night. O occasions i t was inade n quate and V^LS supplemented by G-4. During'a very few slack days a few surplus trucks were furnished G-4 for other use. E. Attached Units - Company "B", 713th Armored Flamethrower Battalion, U.S. *-rmy, was supplied ammunition, fuel, rations, and miscellaneous requirements, exclusive of clothing, by this organization, from 1 Liay, 19 45, and through out the period. All classes of required items were furnished
Company "A", Second Tank Battalion, Second Mar in e Division,
beginning with the date of i t s attachment, 14 June, 1945>
and throughout the period. Indirect vision cupolas were in
stalled on command tanks during period attachment.
I . Rer>orts and Records - The period evidenced marked cooperation by reporting units in providing prompt and reasonably accurate data covering periodic expenditures and requirements. The S-4 section received daily, at pre scribed hours, from company executive officers, Battalion and company ordnance NCOs, Battalion and company maintenance officers, a l l necessary information concerning equipment, supplies, transportation requirements, and working p a r t i e s . Accurate, prompt reports were furnished to higher echelons as prescribed by those echelons. IX. M&.BTTEMHKCE
A. Tank Maintenance Ordnance Platoon - This unit was attached throughout the operation and supplemented Head quarters and Service Maintenance Section in performance of third, fourth, and fifth echelon repairs, under direction of " the Battalion Maintenance Officer.
- 34
QECLA&iA
UL.ULft<
B. Parts Supply - Replenishment spare*fcefc'rtfs',' both tank and wheeled v e h i c l e , were received only in n e g l i gible q u a n t i t i e s . Therefore, upon exhaustion of i n i t i a l supply, cannibalization (often under f i r e ) aâin constituted the chief source of p a r t s . C Replacement Tanks - Old M/^.2 replacements, worn out in service and received inoperative- added to the normal b a t t l e maintenance load. Only a few of these inoper a t i v e tanks could be r e b u i l t i n time to join in action b e fore the close of the campaign and these broke down several times d a i l y .
::
D. Additional Armor - Track blocks had been

welded on t u r r e t s and front slope p l a t e s in the staging a r e a .
However, during the operation i t became necessary t o weld
track on a l l sponsons. This, plus the n e c e s s i t y to weld
track on a l l p a r t s of replacements, n e c e s s i t a t e d extensive
welding and a l s o salvage of t r a c k .
E. Test of T1E3 Mine Exploder - This Battalion was issued one T1S3 Mine Exploder tank. The t e s t s conducted included the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the Exploder onto a M/^-l tank and observing the possible use of the unit t o detonate land mines and by a t e s t run under the Battalion Maintenance O f f i c e r ' s direction. The Jixploder consisted of two units of five eight feet in diameter three inches thick s t e e l d i s c wheels driven by a chain attached to a small sprocket attached t o the sprocket of the tank. I t s weight, 32j t o n s , was the f i r s t disadvantage. Another disadvantage noted was the chain drive attachment was so constructed that a sharp pull on e i t h e r hand brake of the tank caused the chain driven from the corresponding sprocket to the exploder to buckle and break. Both chain drives broke during the t e s t . The r e s u l t s of t h e ' t e s t showed that the Exploder would be very effective a ^ i n s t land mines, but i t s use i s ccnfinued t o a hard surface, very s t r a i g h t roadway or a i r f i e l d . Only very gradual t u r n s are p o s s i b l e . I t was concluded that i t was e n t i r e l y unsuited for r o l l i n g t e r r a i n , c u l t i v a t e d f i e l d s and other v a r i a t i o n s of OKBIAWAN t e r r a i n . No use was, or could be, made of the exploder in a c t i o n . I. Attached Units - Headquarters and Service Company, with attached Tank Maintenance Ordnance Platoon, per foimed normal maintenance functions for the two attached tank companies and 105mm Motor Gun Carriages^ M T
* v\ f{.
-* " * <
-"
F n flCOinr
35
G. I l l hib COPES Ordnance Center - A Corps Ordnance Center was a c t i v a t e d during the operation. I t rendered valuable a s s i s t a n c e on a small .scale by doing weld i n g , furnishing some large p a r t s such a s transmissions and f i n a l d r i v e s salvaged by the Center from destroyed tanks* use of i t s tank conveyor,' providing certain supplies and procurement of certain p a r t s and supplies from-^nay and ICavy a g e n c i e s . I t was handicapped by l a t e a c t i v a t i o n , i n adequate equipment, and p a r t i c u l a r l y no supply pool of r e placement tanks and p a r t s . The service rendered in spite of these handicaps, i t i s f e l t , proved the idea most sound. I t i s believed t h a t a Corps maintenance agency, stocked with a pocl of replacement, tanks and p a r t s and adequately equipped would rrove of great v a l u e . I t would, of course, serve two or more tank b a t t a l i o n s and i t i s thought that a c t i v a t i o n of such an agency would preclude many of the serious t r o u b l e s experienced in connection with replacement t a n k s , p a r t s , and maintenance. H. Summary - Battalion and Company Maintenance Sections were hard pressed due to b a t t l e and operational m a t e r i e l c a s u a l t i e s r e s u l t a n t from sustained heavy a c t i o n . They were handicapped by receipt of replacement tanks in extremely d e t e r i o r a t e d condition and by receipt of spare p a r t s in n e g l i g i b l e q u a n t i t i e s only. However, being f u l l y aware of the great need for tanks a t the f r o n t , the b e s t was done with what was a v a i l a b l e , and working day and nig&t, the maximum number of tanks were kept in a c t i o n . Maintenance i s proud of the following record. Action p a r t i c i p a t e d in r e s u l t e d in t h i s B a t t a l i o n having one hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e tanks damaged t o the extent of r e q u i r i n g major maintenance work t o r e p a i r them (enemy and o p e r a t i o n a l ) . The maintenance s e c t i o n s of t h i s B a t t a l i o n were able t o r e p a i r one hundred and t h i r t y s i x tanks of the t o t a l one hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e tanks t h a t had been damaged. Thus l o s i n g completely twenty-seven t a n k s , the majority of which were t o t a l l y destroyed and the remainder beyond the r e p a i r f a c i l i t i e s of t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Foregoing f i g u r e s do not include tanks of two attached tank companies.
SIRED
'^ -- >^
BECLA
2J
FIRST TANK BATTALION TANK RECORD (Does n o t i n c l u d e flame t a n k s of Company " B " , 7 1 3 t h Armored F l a m e t h r o w e r B a t t a l i o n ( P r o v ) , o r t a n k s of Company f & " , Second Tank B a t t a l i o n ) ' Repaired & Replaced Replenishment In S e r v i c e * Tanks R e c e i v e d Date Operational Damaged L o s t M4A2 MAA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 May May Iây kay ây May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May May 15a y May May May May May May May i&y June June June June June June June 47 46 45 44 41 43 41
1 2
41 37 39 39 38 39 39 36 37 38 -33 33 30 31 31 35 34 35 34 34 35 36 37 38 39 39 39 39 39 39
. :, \ i *
4 3 5 3 6
1 0
0 0 0
1
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1
2
- 3
- 0
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 7
1 6 1 0 2 8 4
3
8
5 5 5 4 7 6 3 3 3
9
-
o
l l
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 6 - 2 - 2
- 5 - 3
- 2
6 6 4 3 7
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1
0
1
0 0 0 0 0
**
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0
4
0 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
- 4
- 0 - 0 - 0
- 37 -
DECtAWED
FIRST TANK BATTALION TANK RECORD (CONT'D)
Date 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 June June June June June June June June June June June June June June June
Operational 39 39 38 39 30 29 29 28 21 19 22 IS 20 25 28
Damaged o o o 9 i 2 3 7 2 3 6 19 4 3 7 163
Lost 0 0 0 o 2 1 2 0 4 i 1 9 2 0 0 28
R e p a i r e d & Replaced Replenishment In S e r v i c e Tanks Received UUL2 &/A3 0 0 1 0 0 22 - 0 06 2 17 9 - 6 0 135 0 - - 0 o - 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0- 0 0 - - 1 3 - - 0 0 - - 0 0- - 0 1 - - 12 3-0 3 - 0 0 - - 0 0 - - 0 21 17
Total
* Replacement t a n k s r e q u i r i n g mors t h a n normal t u n e ups and small r e p a i i s when r e c e i v e d hy t h i s B a t t a l i o n was p l a c e d on t h a t d a y ' s damaged t a n k l i s t , ** Denotes M3233 R e t r i e v e r ( F o r d ) . X.
ORDNANCE
A. Ammunition - The t o t a l ammunition expended by t h i s B a t t a l i o n and a l l a t t a c h e d u n i t s was a s f o l l o w s * S h e l l , f i x e d , H . E . , M48, S.C. w / P . D . F . , M48, 75mm Gun. 13,328 r d s . S h e l l , f i x e d , H . 2 . , M48, S.C. w/fuze TSQ, M54, 75mm Gun. Sh e l 1 , f ixe d, smoke, p h o s p h o r u s , W . P . , 4, ll r d s . M63, w/fuze P . D . , M57, 75mm Gun. S h r a p n e l , f i x e d , M 1 , 75mm Gun. K 3,163 r d s . P r o j e c t i l e , f i x e d , ^PC, M6lAl, w /BDF 10,905 r d s . M66A1, and t r a c e r , 75mm Gun. 173 r d s .
G a n n i s t e r , f i x e d , T30, 75mm How. T o t a l 75mm ammunition expended - 73,609 r o u n d s .
41,579 r d s .
; #- 3
ZTl
BEGUSSIFIED
3,107,500 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , b e l t e d , 4"A.P. 1 tracer. 1,300 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , Carbine, Ml. 2,200 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , .30 c a l . , Ml. 1 7 , 5 7 4 r d s . C a r t r i d g e , b a l l , .45 c a l . 1,860 r d s . Bomb, smoke, M l / L 2" M o r t a r , M3, K complete round. 166 r d s . S h e l l i l l i m i n a t i n g , M83A1, w/fuze t i m e , ( f i x e d ) M65, 60mm Mortar. 327 Grenades, hand f r a g m e n t a t i o n , M I I A l . K 863 Grenades, hand smoke, HC, M8. 101 Grenades, hand, smoke, HC, Orange, K18. 204 Grenades, hand, i n c e n d i a r y , Ml4. 3,819 g a l s .Napalm (6f* m i x ) . 452 b o t t l e s 002.
: f ; :?*;
3 . Ammunition Supply - 75mm gun ammunition of t h e H . S . t y p e became a c r i t i c a l h i g h e r echelon s h o r t a g e a f t e r one week of a c t i o n and remained in t h a t s t a t e d u r i n g t h e oper a t i o n . A l l o t h e r t y p e s of ammunition was a v a i l a b l e in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n . C. Remarks Concerning Ammunition
1 . E x c e l l e n t r e s u l t s were o b t a i n e d from the ammunition used on t h i s o p e r a t i o n . 2 . Very few duds were r e p o r t e d in t h e 75mm t y p e , however t h e 2 n smoke bombs were a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d duds. 3 . E e p o r t s have been submitted t o h i g h e r echelon re g i r d i n g t h e improper packing of .30 c a l i b e r , 4 AP - 1 t r a c e r . 4. The C.P. T-105 fuze when a t t a c h e d t o HJS. M48 proved t o be v e r y e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t c o r a l and concrete em pla cement s . 5 . l a i r r e s u l t s were o b t a i n e d from S h r a p n e l , with fuze set on t w o - t e n t h s second. This time g i v i n g t h e p r o j e c t i l e a cannister effect at a n e a r l y fixed range. 6 . C a n n i s t e r a l s o was used on s h o r t - r a n g e targets. 7. The F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n expended a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e tiUBS t h e maximum ammunition expended b y a n y Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n i n a n y p r e v i o u s o p e r a t i o n .
-/;i.<
i DEMMD
ssiflEB
D S-pare Parts and qui-omen t - Ma j o r r e p a i r work on tanks during the operation was as follows: 1* Replaced: 2 2 3 3 3 1 10 350 50 2 Gun t u b e s , 75mm, M3. un U n i t s , with r e c o i l mechanism and combination mount 1&3J&-1* E l e v a t i n g Mech. (complete) Turret Drive motors. Traverse Pumps. Traverse Motor. Chains, c a b l e s , chain, t e r m i n a l s , and l i n k p i n s . B a r r e l s , .30 c a l i b e r , M1919A4, B.M.G. Covers, .30 c a l i b e r , M1919.&4, B.M.G. Periscope h o l d e r s .
2. Repaired: 25 30 c a l i b e r s o l e n o i d s .
3 . Many smaller repairs on ordnance items too numerous t o mention were a l s o performed by t h i s s e c t i o n . A l l spare p a r t s for ordnance items were a v a i l a b l e a t supply depots and ordnance companies except the .30 c a l i b e r solenoid. This solenoid has been a c r i t i c a l shortage in a l l t h e a t e r s for several months. This section modified t h e .50 c a l i b e r a v i a t i o n solenoid and i n s t a l l e d several in tanks for t e s t . This t e s t proved s a t i s f a c t o r y and the solenoids a r e s t i l l in o p e r a t i o n , thereby r e p l a c i n g a l l shortages in t h i s B a t t a l i o n . 4. The replacement tanks received by t h i s B a t t a l i o n required major ordnance r e p a i r work before t h e v e h i c l e s were ready for a c t i o n . The b e l o w - l i s t of major o r d nance items and ordnance spare p a r t s were minimum needed to put these tanks i n t o a c t i o n , not properly equip the tanks 2 Periscope Holders. 4 P e r i s c o p e s , M4 (complete w/telecopes 1438) 12 Periscopes, M6. 30 Periscopes, M4-M6, head assembly. 1 Telescope, M70 F. 4 Gyro-Control Boxes 2. .30 c a l i b e r Machine Guns, M1919A4, unserviceable 8 A r t i l l e r y Gun Books
0|p
23.
FLAMETHROWER TANKS
**.
In a d d i t i o n a l a r g e amount of ordnance
s p a r e p a r t s and ordnance a c c e s s o r i e s were n o t i n c l u d e d in
t h e s e replacement t a n k s and were f u r n i s h e d by t h i s s e c t i o n
A . General - Company t B " , 713th Armored Flame thrower B a t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d t o t h i s tank b a t t a l i o n on 1 May and r e p o r t e d t h a t d a t e with f o u r t e e n CB-El flamethrower mount ed i n M4AI medium t a n k s , company motor t r a n s p o r t , and main tenance equipment. The f i r s t platoon of t h i s company was d e _ . t a c h e d t o the SIXTH MARINE DIVISION on 11 May, r e v e r t e d back on 14 June and again a t t a c h e d to SIXTH MARINE DIVISION on 18 June for remainder of o p e r a t i o n . This f la me throwing tank com pany, p r i o r t o i t s a t t a c h m e n t t o t h i s B a t t a l i o n , h a v i n g a l r e a d y engaged i n some t h r e e weeks a c t i o n on t h e 24th CORPS f r o n t , m a i n t a i n e d a c o n s i s t e n t l y o u t s t a n d i n g record of p e r formance i t s f i f t y - t h r e e days of a c t i o n - w i t h t h e FIRST Liiw-RlNji, DIVISION. The e n t i r e company was hard working, e f f i c i e n t , a g g r e s s i v e and most a b l y l e d . I t rendered i n v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e . B.' Use - Flame t a n k s were used a s s p e c i a l purpose t a n k s - Line t a n k s (with i n f a n t r y a s s i s t an ce) s e l e c t e d flame t a r g e t s and c a l l e d up the flame t a n k s in much the same manner a s tank d o z e r s a r e c a l l e d up. Line t a n k s i n v a r i a b l y covered them w h i l e t h e y were in o p e r a t i o n and coached t h e i r f i r e by r a d i o . C. Target s - Flamethrower t a n k s were used p r i n c i p a l l y and most e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t rocky c r a g s , reverse r i d g e s (by high a n g l e ) and a g a i n s t towns. Flame proved t o be t"he most, and a t t i r e s t h e o n l y , e f f e c t i v e weapon a g a i n s t such t a r g e t s - . D. Report of ComTJanv Commander - Inasmuch a s the 713th Armored Flamethrower B a t t a l i o n i s t h e f i r s t organ i z a t i o n of i t s type t o be formed and t h e only one t h a t has en {taped in s u s t a i n e d a c t i o n , i t i s thought most worth-while t o ' i n c l u d e here t h e S p e c i a l Action Report of Company Tt B". The Report covers only t h e p e r i o d of attachment t o t^his B a t t a l i o n , 1 l&y t o 23 June and t h e Chronology h a s been ommit t e d due t o broad i n c l u s i o n in t h e f o r e g o i n g Chronology of t h i s B a t t a l i o n . The Report f o l l o w s : "Summary* Flamethrowers from t h i s company have always o p e r a t e d a s p a r t of a Ta nk -In fan try-Flame thô-.ver team. This team has been found t o be v e r y e f f e c t i v e , with t h e 75mm f i r s t t h o r o u g h l y s h o o t i n g up Infantry an a r e a , then t h e FTs moving in t o b u r n .
:;
- BEC&
was always close enough to keep any enemy satchel charge men from sneaking in and knocking out the FTs. Fire team from reserve companies seem to be a very e x c e l l e n t method of p r o t e c t i o n - They have no o t h e r job than t o p r o t e c t PTs and a r e well pro t e c t e d themselved by the tanks and FTs. Neither tanks nor i n f a n t r y were ever too f a r away from FTs for s u i t a b l e p r o t e c t i o n . Our FTs o c c a s i o n a l l y went in with no f i r e teams, but never without t a n k s . Numerous occasions have a r i s e n where, a l though the tanks have shot a number of rounds of 75*am ammunition, the enemy would only be driven out of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s by the flame or the prox imity of i t . Targets for the FTs are many and v a r i e d and a l l types have been encountered on t h i s operation. Area burning i s not an effective use of the FT a s i t has been found that portable flamethrowers and sniper p a t r o l s could do the work. During the days spent a i d i n g mopping up operations i t has been f e l t by the officers and men of t h i s company t h a t t h e y have been called out on missions which could much b e t t e r be done by the i n f a n t r y themselves with less waste of fuel and manpower. Communications: Communication has been e x c e l l e n t between our own FTs and between us and Marine t a n k s . I n f a n t r y communi cation has been a l i t t l e mixed up due t o the f a c t t h a t we have no phones on our FTs for commun i cu t i en - H owev e r , th e f ew t ime s tha t we have had no commun.ications we have found t h a t by 1 a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of route and t a r g e t i t has been possible t o o p e r a t e . Both our own and Marine E&intenance has been very e f f e c t i v e . Liii.tenance: Both our own maintenance and S&rine Tank B a t t a l i o n maintenance has been very e f f e c t i v e . Due t o the types of engines, conditions of the FTs, and the number of days in operation, maintenance has been very busy, but has somehow managed t o keep a maximum number of v e h i c l e s operative a t a l l times. Our maintenance has aided the F i r s t Tank B a t t a l i o n maintenance crews with p a r t s and r e t r i e v i n g work and has in turn been aided in t h e same way by company and headquarters maintenance. Supply: Our Supply has been a very e f f e c t i v e u n i t , a c t i n g under our supply o f f i c e r s . Supply r o u t e s have been long and roads impassable a t times, but we have
never been without a s u f f i c i e n t supply of napalm.

Headquarters and Service units of the F i r s t Marine
Tank B a t t a l i o n have been very helpful with the
loan of trucks and men t o bring napalm t o u s .
General Comment: Tactics developed by us for use
of FTs f i t i n very n i c e l y with the way the F i r s t
Marine Tank Battalion had trained t h e i r officers
and men. Cooperation of F i r s t Marine Tank B a t t a
lion has been e x c e l l e n t . Both officers and men of
t h i s company can ask for no b e t t e r cooperation than
they g o t . ie in t u r n did our utmost t o keep a
maximum number of v e h i c l e s operative and f u l f i l l e d
every mission requested of u s . There has never
been a time during our attachment when the r i v a l r y
between Army and Marine units has been anything
but f r i e n d l y .
Attached t o 1st Marine Division 1 May 19 45. Number of days attached 53 Days operated with 1st Marine Div 34 FTs committed during period 135 FTs completely destroyed while attached 2 Gallons of napalm expended during p e r i o d . . . . 44,700 19 B,000 Cal..30 ammunition expended during p e r i o d . . . Recommendations: - A. That the 75mm command tank be replaced by another FT. Since we l o s t our f i r s t FT the p l a toons have been s h o r t . Having a spare FT would make on more a v a i l a b l e for use. Losses are to be expected and t h i s would help some. B. That a company of large capacity FTs be add ed a s part of every tank b a t t a l i o n . This would enable officers and men to be together more often and gain more confidence in each o t h e r ' s work. A l s o , a s we were the only'unit of i t s kind ever formed and as we were formed very r e c e n t l y , i t was found t h a t i n f a n t r y and tank units had no conception of our p o s s i b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s . Due to t h i s f a c t we had t o t r a i n them a s we worked with them. As a r e s u l t , i n i t i a l r e s u l t s were not a l l t h a t cculd be expected. C. That the large capacity flame throwing tank not be made with a 75xnn gun, as t h i s w i l l change i t from a special -ffirpose weapon to a general purpose weapon with losse's bôth^ weapons.
2r^
turpi AV
> '>*:
1\
D. That flame t h r o w i n g t a n k s be made out of r e g u l a r t a n k s r a t h e r than from s a l v a g e d t a n k s . They have t o go t o t h e same p l a c e s and e n c o u n t e r t h e same f i r e a s r e g u l a r t a n & s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e y n e e d t h e same p r o t e ct ion E . That f i r e teams from r e s e r v e company of i n f a n t r y be always used w i t h FTs for p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t s a t c h e l charge men and t h e y n e v e r be used w i t h o u t r e g u l a r t a n k s t o t a k e care of l a r g e c a l i b e r weapons and t o e v a c u a t e crews i f IT i s knocked out F . T h a t , i f p o s s i b l e , t h e y p u t a 360 degree t r a v e r s e on t h e s e FTs t o h e l p them p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s . A l s o , t h a t b o u n c i n g B e t t y " mines be i n s t a l l e d on t u r r e t t o use a g a i n s t enemy i n f a n t r y . " / s / ROBERT L . HOFFMAN ROBERT L . HOFJMAN C a p t . , Cav., (Armd) Commanding-. XII. TaflK-INFANTRY
A. General - Tanks fought a t a l l t i n e s a s i n f a n t r y t a n k s and f u n c t i o n e d a s a major d i r e c t f i r e c l o s e support weapon, At no time did t a n k s o p e r a t e beyond t h e o b s e r v a t i o n and, cover of i n f a n t r y . T e r r a i n and d e n s i t y a s w e l l a s t y p e of u n d e r g r o i n d enemy d e f e n s e s p r e c l u d e d s u c c e s s f u l p a n z e r a t t a c k and none was a t t e m p t e d by t h i s B a t t a l i o n . Such t a c t i c s a t tiroes a t t e m p t e d by o t h e r i'jJS'JE ARMY t a n k u n i t s met with d i s a s t e r i n each c a s e . B . T a n k - I n f a n t r y Backg:round - Tanks had proven an i n v a l u a b l e c l o s e s u p p o r t weapon d u r i n g t h e C^tE GLOUCtuSTi: %R and IAIAU o p e r a t i o n s and t h e i r e f f i c i e n t employment was n o t a new m a t t e r t o t h i s D i v i s i o n . A h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e b a t t l e proven T a n k - I n f a n t r y SOP h?-d been used in t r a i n i n g and numer ous r e f i n e m e n t s in t e c h n i q u e of employment had been d e v e l o p ed t o a h i g h degree p r i o r t o t h i s o p e r a t i o n . Of p a r t i c u l a r importance and i n e s t i i o a b l e v a l u e was t h e p r i o r e s t a b l i s h m e n t between i n f a n t r y and t a n k u n i t s of mutual t r u s t and p r i d e in each o t h e r and a r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e power of t h e combined team.
2J8
iwfenSSIrlEB
C Technique of iimplovment - The current t a n k i n f a n t r y SOP proved effective t o a high degree. No basic changes were required and hence the tank-infantry team fought as i t had t r a i n e d .
1. Tanks, a r t i l l e r y , rockets, e t c . , l a i d
down heavy n e u t r a l i z a t i o n fire and i n f a n t r y preceded by
tanks moved forward and seized ground. This type of a t t a c k
however successfully secured ground only r e l a t i v e l y l i g i t l y
defended. Against areas embodying Heavy underground f o r t i
f i c a t i o n s , i t only succeeded in temporarily n e u t r a l i z i n g
the enemy, often permitting the infantry to move forward
only t o find i t s e l f in possession of ground swept by enemy
f i r e from several d i r e c t i o n s the moment supporting n e u t r a l
i z a t i o n f i r e ceased. No movement was possible on the s e
cured objective and no c i r c u l a t i o n t o the r e a r . Such ground
'became untenable and n e c e s s i t a t e d withdrawals with heavy l o s s e s and no ground gain the net r e s u l t . 2. A second method, developed by t h i s Division e a r l y in the operation, was far more successfully employed a g a i n s t heavy enemy f o r t r e s s defensive a r e a s . I t consisted of the preparatory point destruction of cave, bunker and tomb emplacements by tanks covered by fire teams p r i o r to a general t ank-in fan t r y advance. Tanks and flame tanks ranged out to p o s i t i o n s up t o eight hundred yards beyond our front l i n e s , systematically destroyed p o s i t i o n s on forward and reverse slopes within t h a t distance by point 75mm gunfire i n t o cave i n t e r i o r s and by flame a t t a c k . In a d d i t i o n , tanks destroyed in a similar fashion enemy d i r e c t f i r e p o s i t i o n s on forward slopes for an a d d i t i o n a l f i f t e e n hundred yards t o the front beyond the f a r t h e s t point of tank advance. In order t o give the enemy no opportunity; t o reorganize and r e i n f o r c e , two r e l a y s of tanks were necess a r y t o permit rearming while maintaining a continuous a t t a c k . This "processing" (term mutually coined by tank and infantry officers) then permitted the i n f a n t r y to advance l i n e s some five hundred yards with r e l a t i v e l y ligjit l o s s e s , using the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n support f i r e s of preceding tanks and a r t i l l e r y . E s p e c i a l l y important was the f a c t t h a t ground so gained by "processing" was tenable and h e l d . The procedure was then repeated in a zone extended f a r t h e r t o the f r o n t . The f o r e going t a n k - i n f a n t r y technique enabled the FIRST DIVISION t o s t e a d i l y , though slowly, advance a g i i n s t f o r t r e s s SHUKL and e v e n t u a l l y f i r s t penetrate i t s l a s t defenses while a l l other elements of TMTH ARMY facing SHUEL had long been brought to a v i r t u a l h a l t .
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' I n f a n t r y Coverage of Tanks - JABiN^SCi close a s s a u l t tank hunters employing a v a r i e t y of techniques in innumerable attempted a t t a c k s on tanks r e q u i r e d the c l o s e s t of i n f a n t r y coverage. This coverage vjas c o n s i s t e n t l y e f f e c t i v e l y provided by the three superb i n f a n t r y regiments of the Division, Not a single tank in a c t i o n was destroyed or even stopped by tank hunters during t h e PAIAU and OKIr:^;^ operations although JAPANESE doctrine on QKIKA<A emphasized t h i s as a primary method to stop ,our t a n k s . I t should be s t a t e d here a s a t r i b u t e t o t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s i n f a n t r y t h a t a l l other tank b a t t a l i o n s in TciftOH ABMY l o s t a sizeable number of tanks by JAErtNiiSci close a s s a u l t . 1- This p o s i t i v e i n f a n t r y coverage r e q u i r e s simply that s p e c i f i c i n f a n t r y u n i t s , having no other d u t i e s , be assigned t o cover t a n k s . They must be i n , or m a i n t a i n , a position from which the tanks a r e kept under constant observation and from which accurate 'and i n s t a n taneous f i r e can be d e l i v e r e d . This coverage was provided in three p r i n c i p a l ways. They were used both in general a t t a c k s and in t a n k - i n f a n t r y preparatory "processing"t a . By t h r e e or fur man f i r e teams c l o s e l y accompanying each tank. Used in r u b b l e , hi^h. v e g e t a t i o n , e t c . F i r e teams used protection of tank h u l l a ^ i i n s t f i r e from known d i r e c t ions. b . Coverage by f i r e teams moving from cover to cover by bounds at d i s t a n c e s from respective tanks up to three hundred yards. This method was used in fields, etc. c. Coverage by s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g i a t e d platoon, squad, e t c . , of the front l i n e s occupying favorable p o s i t i o n s on c r e s t s . Frequently used when tanks operated over v a l l e y or canyon floors when our i n f a n t r y h e l d one side or wall closely a d j a c e n t . 2 . Best r e s u l t s were obtained by u t i l i z i n g f i r e teams frori support platoons or companies r a t h e r than front l i n e , e q u a l l y important was preliminary b r i e f i n g in each new zone. Best r e s u l t s were obtained when tank platoon l e a d e r s
- 46
'ZGO
and NCOfs were assembled a t a commanding OP. The tank p l a

toon l e a d e r would s t a t e h i s platoon's mission, route and
d e s t i n a t i o n and point out same on the ground. The infantry-
platoon leader would then inform the tank platoon leader
of special enemy locations and other information and orders
received via the i n f a n t r y command chain. vVith h i s NCO's,
he a l s o plans the route and destination of the covering
f i r e teams (not n e c e s s a r i l y exactly the same a s the tanks)
and points them out on the ground. Normal i n f a n t r y technique
of use of cover and concealment and movement by bounds were
used f u l l y by f i r e teams and greatly reduced c a s u a l t i e s .
3 . rfhile the covering infantry fire team
so l o y a l l y protected the tank and i t s crew, i t i s the un
w r i t t e n code in t h i s Tank Battalion that such f i r e teams
are owed the a s s i s t a n c e and maximum protection possible
by t h e i r respective t a n k s , anoking and evacuation of wound
ed f i r e team members became common. On accasion e n t i r e
f i r e teams were picked up via the bottom escape hatch. Tanks
never withdrew without v i s u a l l y accounting for a l l members
of t h e i r f i r e teams. On the other hand the fire teams never
f a i l e d to f a i t h f u l l y watch over the tanks as stated h e r e t o
fore and rendered maximum a s s i s t a n c e t o h i t tanks by smoking,
evacuation of wounded tank crewmen, e t c .
JS. Control of Tank-Infantry Action - Control
i s normally d i f f i c u l t but was successfully exercised with
precision on OKINAWA:
1- 3y allowing time and opportunity for
small unit b r i e f i n g as described in foregoing.
2. In O I A A t e r r a i n , which furnished KN W N e x c e l l e n t ground OP's, the supporting tank company (or other unit) commander took station with the infantry b a t t a l i o n com mander a t the l a t t e r * s forward OP. The tank officer was in continuous communication with a l l b i s tank platoons (tank com panies' were reinforced by a d d i t i o n a l tank platoons and flame thrower tank sections a s needed) and could see t h e i r movements, f i r e and our i n f a n t r y . The i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n commander was in communication with a l l his companies by radio and wire and could see them and the t a n k s . Ke also had a t immediate hand, a r t i l l e r y , NGF, e t c . Thus control was effected with minimum delay and confusion and c e n t r a l i z e d a t one spot. The tank b a t t a l i o n commander took s i m i l a r s t a t i o n at such OP's when ever e s p e c i a l l y major e f f o r t by tanks was made and a s s i s t e d and advised. He sometimes shifted tanks from support of one
regiment t o another in l i g i t of unforseen mid-day develop ments, and committed elements of the tank reserve when needed. He a l l o c a t e d d a i l y the tank support furnished (with approval of G-3) in view of t e r r a i n , enemy d i s p o s i t i o n and Division scheme of maneuver. QQ one occasion when two or more f u l l tank companies were employed in the same i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s e c t o r , he functioned in a s i m i l a r manner a s described for the tank company commander. 3 . F i r e teams and other i n f a n t r y design
ated t a r g e t s for tanks by t a n k - i n f a n t r y phone, arm and
hand s i g n a l s , smoke and t r a c e r s . In close country t h e y
s i m i l a r i l y coached the tanks in maintenance of d i r e c t i o n .
4. Usually tank b a t t a l i o n 0P f s were e s t a b ^ l i s h e d alongside a s s a u l t tank company commander's OP's. These OP's were manned by a SC& 509 radio team in charge of a B a t t a l i o n Staff Officer. This maintained the b a t t a l i o n r a d i o n e t and t i e d i t in with respective companies ( o t h e r wise d i f f i c u l t as the tank company commander's SGR 509 must normally be maintained on h i s company n e t ) . The Staff Officer in charge of the OP f u r t h e r was of great a s s i s t a n c e t o the company commander, handling for him a l l r e p o r t s to and from the"Tank B a t t a l i o n CP. This system of b a t t a l i o n OP's not only solved a communication problem but a l s o was conducive to b e t t e r control. 5. I n f a n t r y commanders soon developed great s k i l l in planning t h e i r a t t a c k s to make the f u l l e s t use of tank support and u t i l i z e d the technical advice of tank o f f i c e r s f u l l y and gave careful consideration to t h e i r recommendations and s p e c i a l requirements. No tanks were l o s t due to a r b i t r a r y o r d e r s . A high degree of coordi nation and cooperation e x i s t e d between tanks and i n f a n t r y personnel of a l l r a n k s . I n f a n t r y learned the value of tanks and came t o lean h e a v i l y upon them. On the other hand tank personnel were d a i l y witnesses of the common-place d a i l y heroism of the front l i n e Marine I n f a n t r y and were i n s p i r e d to do t h e i r b e s t in a s s i s t i n g the i n f a n t r y a s much and in every way p o s s i b l e . y# Miscellaneous l a n k - I n f a n t r y Employment - Dur ing the OKINAV/AN Campaign tank elements of t h i s b a t t a l i o n performed a v a r i e t y of miscellaneous s e r v i c e s for the i n f a n t r y . Common sense in implementation of the mission and d e s i r e t o lend maximum h e l p t o our fine i n f a n t r y was the guiding rule (and not the f i e l d manual) m
nrp,
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JUU X C
1. Tanks rendered v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e by
the emergency e v a c u a t i o n and supply of forward i s o l a t e d
i n f a n t r y u n i t s throughout t h e o p e r a t i o n .
a . In accordance with the Division SOP ( s p e c i a l s i g i a l e t c . ) , tanks s e v e r a l times s u c c e s s f u l l y s t r a d d l e d f i r e swept wounded and evacuated them i n t o t h e t a n k v i a t h e bottom escape h a t c h . b . Wounded were evacuated on s t r e t c h e r s on t h e a f t e r h u l l . c . Tanks moved a t slow speed (forward and r e v e r s e ) l e n d i n g t h e s h e l t e r of the h u l l t o l i t t e r b e a r e r s exposed t o heavy f i r e from only one d i r e c t i o n . d . Tanks provided smoke (2 W Smoke Bomb and 75mm V/P) t o cover l i t t e r b e a r e r s . e . Tanks f r e q u e n t l y c a r r i e d s u p p l i e s t o forward u n i t s whose h a n d . c a r r i e r s otherwise had to cross a u t o m a t i c f i r e swept open ground. f. While e v a c u a t i o n and supply was by no means a primary r o l e f o r t a n k s , such r u n s were often combined with n o r mal n e c e s s a r y tank movements. P e r haps more important than the a c t u a l a s s i s t a n c e thus r e n d e r e d i n f a n t r y u n i t s in d i r e s t r a i t s was the r e s u l t a n t drawing t o g e t h e r of t a n k p e r s o n n e l and i n f a n t r y . ,2. Tank borne r e i n f o r c e m e n t , e v a c u a t i o n and supply played a major r o l e i n the s e i z u r e of XUNISHI Ridge, f i n a l 32nd Ai&iY d e f e n s i v e l i n e - Our i n f a n t r y , by a b o l d s u r p r i s e n i ^ i t a t t a c k i n i t i a l l y s e i z e d a small s e c t i o n of t h e v e r y c r e s t of KIMISHI Ridge. Upon a r r i v a l of d a y l i g h t t h e enemy s t i l l h e l d a d j a c e n t s e c t i o n s of t h e c r e s t and p o s i t i o n s a l l a l o n g t h e R i d g e ' s lower s l o p e s which com manded t h e one thousand yard wide v a l l e y t o t h e North and r e a r . During the f i r s t day t a n k s f e r r i e d up a t h i r d company of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s i n s i d e t a n k s and s i m i l a r l y evacuated l a r g e numbers of accumulated wounded. During the second n i g h t , b y s u r p r i s e n i g h t maneuver t h e major elements of t h r e e additional infantry b a t t a l i o n s seized ridge-top positions. However throughout t h e n e x t s e v e r a l days a l l d a y l i g h t c i r c u l a t i o n t o t h e r e a r was d e n i e d except by t a n k s . During t h i s p e r i o d l a r g e s c a l e t a n k e v a c u a t i o n , s u p p l y , and r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t o KUNISHI Ridge i n s u r e d t h e s u c c e s s of i n f a n t r y n i ^ i t a t t a c k and t e n d e r e d t&9* r i d g e t e n a b l e . During t h i s p e r i o d the
- 49
*SIFIED
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i i
f o l l o w i n g .equated t o t a l s , were, j b r a n s ^ o r t e d :
R e i n f o r c i n g t r o o p s with equipment c a r r i e d forward - 550 bounded e v a c u a t e d from Ridge t o r e a r - -*115G " S u p p l i e s (plasma, ammo, w a t e r , e t c . ) - - - - - - 90 t o n s (est) I n c l u d > s a v e r y s m a l l number of non-wounded t r a n s p o r t e d t o r e a r t o make r e p o r t s , e t c . During t h e f i r s t day and a h a l f a l l wounded had t o be l o a d e d v i a t h e ; t a n k bottom escape h a t ch i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f o r e g o i n g v i t a l r o l e of e v a c u a t i o n and r e i n f o r c e m e n t e x e c u t e d by t a n k s , t h e y d e l i v e r e d t h e u s u a l p o i n t g u n f i r e d e s t r u c t i v e support f i r e s a g a i n s t caves and emplacements on t h e forward and r e v e r s e s l o p e s of KUNISEH R i d g e . Flame was used e x t e n s i v e l y . Tanks moving out on f i r i n g m i s s i o n s p i c k e d up s u p p l i e s and r e i n f o r c e m e n t s and dropped them off a t the Ri&ge. A f t e r completion of f i r e m i s s i o n s ( e x p e n d i t u r e of a l l ammo) t h e y p i c k e d up wounded on t h e r e t u r n t r i p . In a d d i t i o n , i t was found n e c e s s a r y t o a s s i g n one p l a t o o n of t a n k s i n each r e g i m e n t a l s e c t o r t o do n o t h i n g b u t make f e r r y r u n s . A l l members of t a n k crews of such tanks e x c e p t t h e t a n k commander and d r i v e r were d i s mounted t o make a d d i t i o n a l room i n s i d e the t a n k h u l l . I t was found t h a t ; such t a n k s could c a r r y s i x infantrymen with e q u i p ment i n s i d e t h e t a n k a n d . e v a c u a t e : a s many a s seven wounded. Other t a n k s covered t h e movement -of the t r o o p - l a d e n t a n k s * xeq nil While r e c e n t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y makes f r e q u e n t mention of the; . - t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of i n f a n t r y on t s n k s , i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of complete t a c t i c a l r e i n f o r c i n g i n f a n t r y u n i t s i n s i d e tanks was executed f o r t h e f i r s t time d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of KuTHail Ridge^., 3 . I n f a n t r y Off l e e r s : made f r e q u e n t ' a n d ' ^ v a l u a b l e employment of tanks, by going forward i n t a n k s "dur i n g " p r o c e s s i n g " r u n s to view ground , o c c a s i c n a l l y n o t v i s i b l e from OP'sv Normally t h i s , I s n e i t h e r ^ n e c e s s a r y n;or d e s i r a b l e b u t i n unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s - w h e r e .the ground "over,.,vhich an a t t a c k had t o be planned was n o t v i s i b l e from ^ ' s or by o t h e r forward r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , i t . ; d e f i n i t e l y p r o v e d to be a most p r o f i t a b l e e x p e d i e n t . . .hebmov bod 0 #xscfer. 4 . , Tank o f f i cce rrs m ^ tamis,.ôn o.cca.^s i tw S S ^ ci " of 1 e s ^ l ^ ^ v M ^ ^ ' ysrrie ^ ^cise r e g i s t r a t i o n . . o f 4.2m<S<$&^WTMM^/?%W*8? ed -pre. i the in:f c n t r y i n p r e p a r a t i o n : o n i g W f f %fo
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XLU. TANK-ARTILLERY A. Early Use. p Artillery - During the first

ten days of the operation extensive use was made of a r t i l l e r y
by tank units. Chief early employment, utilizing the a r t i
l l e r y support structure of respective supported infantry
units was:
1. Screening of tank movements and blind
ing of AT guns by smoke.
ize AT guns*
2. Artillery fires to destroy and neutral
3 facing of a r t i l l e r y on targets of oppor tunity by tank officers in tanks calling for, and adjusting, a r t i l l e r y fire, Artillery Employment with First Battalion Eleventh b r i n e s in Primary Support of First Tank Battalion - I t having been proved during the early days of the operation that extensive a r t i l l e r y support of tanks not only could be, but must be, employed, the First Battalion, Eleventh Itarines was placed in primary support of th6 First Tank Battalion. This direct a r t i l l e r y support was characterized by; 1. with minimum delay. irompt a r t i l l e r y support of tank action B.
2. No disruption of infantry sector's a r t i l l e r y support by additional burden of demands of tank a r t i l l e r y support as heretofore. 3. Very extensive use of sustained smoke screens to blind A gun positions. Screen's prompt and T very efficiently maintained. 4. Extensive and effective use of a r t i l l e r y f i r e s , particularly 155mm, to destroy and neutralize A guns. T This was speedily obtained and adjusted by l - l l FO's. 5. Tank officers in tanks calle*d for and adjusted fires on targets of opportunity. 6. Air burst a r t i l l e r y fire placed ahead of advancing tanks to destroy close assault teams in spider holes, e t c . ,
* * * %. .^hî^-im 7. The supporting a r t i l l e r y battalion's

iU s on occasion rode in tanks and effected valuable regis-,
.--" '-...-.- -.~^~ ".".:! <-;;. *-^
tration s C. Technique of Direct Artillery Support of Tanks
Technique of support proved very simple and effective. The

supporting Artillery Battalion furnished an a r t i l l e r y field
officer as liaison officer to the Tank Battalion , and forward " observer teams sufficient to accompany assault tank company
commanders. These teams provided their o n 'communication to
w their Battalion. The forward observers accompanied the 1tank
company commanders and took station on forward ground Ot Q
(except when in tanks). As the need for a r t i l l e r y support
arose, the tank company commander simply indicated in gen
eral terms such requirements and the a r t i l l e r y FQ, using
his o n communication and working through the F C of "his
w D o n Battalion promptly obtained and adjusted appropriate
w f i r e s . The K) assumed responsibility for safety clearance
of fire'sv* He also kept the local infantry sector commander
informed of a l l fires called in support of tanks (by direct
liaison with the infantry commanders supporting a r t i l l e r y
FO's).

D. Indirect Fire and Tank Support of Artillery No indirect fire employment was made of tan AS during the Southern O I A A operation. No need for^sUch employment arose K W N as the relatively slow advance never out-stripped a r t i l l e r y displacement. Also a l l available tank strength was fully em ployed fighting in i t s primary role. This Tank-Battalion, didhowever, fire two effective indirect fire missions (total seven hundred rounds) during the Northern O I A A phase K W N when the infantry advance outran a r t i l l e r y support. This was the f i r s t such combat mission fired by Lkrine tank units. As more tank strength is made available and the T-26 tank with 9 m gun procured, the use of tanks in support of 0 m a r t i l l e r y should become more practical and profitable. E. Comment - Fullest coordinated employment of tanks and a r t i l l e r y yet obtained in Marine Corps operations was effected with highly satisfactory results. Direct support ing a r t i l l e r y definitely destroyed several A guns and neutral T ized others and provided prompt and effective screening. I t definitely saved a number of tanks from destruction at a c r i t i cal time. As the enemy's steadily stiffening AT defenses be fore S i K were penetrated, this highly effective and prompt LU I a r t i l l e r y support i s thought to have constituted perhaps a deciding factor that the tank attack was never actually " brought to a halt by the enemy.
iMs/.T '$lvJ kfy:>frj*M
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XIV. TANK-EN GELHEER
A . General - E n g i n e e r s were e x t e n s i v e l y em ployed i n e f f e c t i n g t h e prompt passage of t a n k s . A n e l e ments of the F i r s t E n g i n e e r B a t t a l i o n extended t h i s B a t t a l i o n t h e f u l l e s t c o o p e r a t i o n . Tank r o u t e s g e n e r a l l y were b l o c k e d by e x t e n s i v e demolition of b r i d g e s and f i l l s and by heavy m i n i n g . B . B r i d g i n g and Construction of Tank Routes - En n e e r s o p e r a t i n g i n conjunction with t a n k dozers and the TD 18 Armored t r a c t o r dozer of t h i s B a t t a l i o n performed i n v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e s in c o n s t r u c t i n g r o u t e s of tank a c c e s s t o zones which t h e JAPANESE had f e l t confident t o be e n t i r e l y i n a c c e s s i b l e t o our t a n k s . L i s t e d below a r e the p r i n c i p a l ( b u t n o t a l l ) zones by which Engineer armored dozers b r i d g i n g and demolition teams l a r g e l y prepared a c c e s s tank r o u t e s * 1. Railroad f i l l b l a s t e d to effect t o SUGAR LOAF HILL and v i c i n i t y . 2. Stream doze red in five p l a c e s t o a c c e s s t o DaKESil Ridge and v i c i n i t y . 3. ',/ANA V a l l e y .
KOKUBA
passage effect
Ford c o n s t r u c t e d to e f f e c t passage t o
4 . B a i l e y b r i d g e t o e f f e c t c r o s s i n g the GAtfA and passage of NAHA-YQNABARU ISTHMUS.
5 . Ford c o n s t r u c t e d a c r o s s MUKUE Ga^'A p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s t o e n t i r e KUNI SHI Ridge s e c t o r . 6 . Road dozered t o ^ i n t a n k a c c e s s t o r e v e r s e s i d e of H i l l 8 1 . C. Mine D e t e c t i o n and Removal
1 . Enemy mining was e x t e n s i v e and e f f e c t i v e . E n g i n e e r mine d e t e c t o r s and c l e a r a n c e a g e n c i e s were g e n e r a l l y unable t o cope with t h e s i t u a t i o n . A l a r g e number of t a n k s were d e s t r o y e d o r p u t out of a c t i o n a s a r e s u l t throughout the entire operation. 2 . E n g i n e e r s on many o c c a s i o n s d i d most e x c e l l e n t work in mine d e t e c t i o n and removal. A n o t e w o r t h y
- 53 -
Hii/
DEcrariE
jAxrwaefHa
example may be c i t e d i n the t a k i n g of SUGaa 1X5A#-&11 whef# E n g i n e e r s , a d v a n c i n g on h a n d s and toiees in f r o n t of a d v a n c i n g t a n k s e f f e c t e d t a n k a c c e s s t o t h e r e v e r s e ^srtte ; Of the H i l l 9 and e n a b l i n g t h e r e c a p t u r e and h o l d i n g "Sf rthat^MMM&rJH ^rq 3 . Mine clearanqeReam's Use$ We;re"La iiJiQ^: su0L[: : a t t a c h e d t o i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s . lifogfiienej?efsoSiSl ^St^1 t ? ^ t i m e s accompanied t a n k r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a r t i e s . '&m& & yy^n /.- 4 . Lline -f r ^ S ,^ m ? f t r 4 ^ ; s ' -: ' ^ t , l i ' Jl>e came / ambulance t r a i l s , s u p p l y tra!ifs, L ;an/i M^&s,/'.; MliTe; rîi6;v^ti "' a : ? for a d v a n c i n g t ^ n k r , f i l e m e n t t r a . . t K r a ^ a i r e c r r f ^ e O T f f W a '';- *** o t h e r a n a * i T - - .f ,+ > - , , . . ' J r l - v i ^ /
in.b o n a QO criVv a ao-s
w i t r A ^ ^ ^ d V | ^ c e ^ ^ e a t f t f ; i ; ci r ^ a [j & t f % J f r a t f $ r : a n d 1 f f e cE ' aB e ~ t i v e n e ss* or >the t a n k " a t t a c k . ' fei"e % e w t ? r a i 'aiitf êtiova !1 age^g^^j^rOjY^d^ due. to, i n s u f f i c i e n t p e r sonnel, anci eq.uipnent ng&ee^"ii&A.-^rl^liL Ijjmsmwifcs ,-should,, o ; H be g r e a t l y expanded and e l e m e n t s %^dtkt^^^^^^^Swd -Ûo dip%^^4p|C^ tjie g t g p ^ ^ a ^ a l ^ p n s &~ dj&^3^3ftfe r mine e x c a v a t o r t a n k s should' be" provldect a x ^ 2 m 1 ^ | ^ a c t ^,. K p m^Jie problem i s s e r i o u s and demands an e a r l y s o l u t i o n . i-essd-Aim od es30Qi3
proved a powerful weapon a g a i n s t 3d* %nj&>x>z%RB 7> ^^ AT g u n s . " Sain Dajêjjg 3 ^ f % 3 S ^ = ^ B i jx^ ^ i e - i? S ^ F?-a? ffiS7' nir . ri J s m a l l s e c t i o n s o f h i l l s i d e s i K n o w n T o in cluiy" ^3r%iffl I ^c^TO(t^ J U an d whoseôjca^fcjyan, cjûld np.t Jae,exactl: y ;pinpoint e d . Thi s t r e a t m e n t proved viary <ej?&oti^'er&/& o c c a s i o n s 'when heavy a r t i ofTen i n ^ p e n e t r a t i o n of fifflttftfcffifiiwcq; l l e r y had f a i l e d .* ^Jset defenêsj^ 3 a 9 0 Q i j ^ a 3 j - l X i ^ 0 J 5 9 l s s 0 j , bBO% ^ B . Technique. - NGF used was ôbtaîn-'e-d'^yifeûe3l?9V t o i n f a n t r y s e c t o r , c o l a n d e r s . T h e , , i n f a n t r y ,sectgr T s ^ ^ ? _ l i a i son and s p o t t i n g % g e r ere t ftfwiwii^feir normal c a p a Q j ^ ^ . v . - w . t t o of n,ot,e, however, i s t h e f a c t t h a t in a t l e a s t one v c a ( s e i ^ L . N ^ i p d i ^ e r ' s i g h t e d ttffi giar : :flash and de s t r o y e d . an ATgOUfejoriUills. IWL I n i t i a t i v e . , . ; ; .. , ; ; : ; - ;;;;' - - 7-7 L ^?Oi:laiio-^KÎ^TIQK n o ! J O B "to JUO o JE>8YO^J8SJ5 -,- m """ rEDllBêqo a i j fne sxld +00 - h'&i A i r Support - No d i r e c t support of t a n k s by a i r c i ^ m ^ ^ t e m p t e . 4 . " . . 1*0 n e c e s s i t y o r need t h e r e f o r e a r o s e
I >OM
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due t o t h e slowness of t h e a d v a n c e . A r t i l l e r y a t a l l t i n e s
was w i t h i n s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e and provided more p o s i t i v e
and p r e c i s e support than w i t h i n the c a p a b i l i t i e s of a i r
craft.
B . A i r Spot - A i r Spot by an a i r b o r n e t a n k
o f f i c e r i n d i r e c t r a d i o communication with a t t a c k i n g t a n k
companies proved i n v a l u a b l e d u r i n g the b a t t l e of KUNISHI
Ridge and was' employed i n a c t i o n f o r the f i r s t time i n Marine Corps H i s t o r y . For two consecutive days every a t t e m p t t o push t a n k elements E a s t v i a t h e v a l l e y South of KUNISHI V i l l a g e were stopped cold by high v e l o c i t y 75mm AT g u n f i r e , w i t h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of 1 s e v e r a l t a n k s by armor p i e r c i n g high e x p l o s i v e s h e l l . NO , heavy a r t i l l e r y , s p e c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n , c o v e r i n g tanks and a l l o t h e r methods h i t h e r t o so s u c c e s s f u l in e l i m i n a t i n g AT guns were u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d . An OY plane was r e q u e s t e d and g r a n t e d f o r 18 J u n e . S-2, t h i s b a t t a l i o n , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h s u r v i v o r crewmen of t a n k s h i t and c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of a e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h s , went a l o f t e a r l y 18 J u n e . He manned an SGR 5Q9 r a d i o (antenna p r o t r u d i n g h o r i z o n t a l l y through the Cub door) on t a n k b a t t a l i o n f r e q u e n c y . Hovering a l o f t over t h e advancing t a n k s and in d i r e c t r a d i o communication w i t h them, he s p o t t e d t h e muzzle b l a s t of a cave-emplaced 75mm gun i n t h e s u s p e c t e d s e c t o r d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f h o u r . T h i s gun was immediately brought under f i r e by t a n k s and M7 s and d e s t r o y e d . Tanks 'were then able t o c l o s e on H i l l 7} and p a s s t h r o u g h LlfcZADO V i l l a g e . L a t e r in the day t h i s t a n k a i r spot l o c a t e d a s e c t i o n of 47mm AT guns f i r i n g v i c i n i t y H i l l 81 and c a l l e d for and a d j u s t e d both heavy a r t i l l e r y and NGF. One gun was d e f i n i t e l y d e s t r o y e d and t h e o t h e r p r o b a b l y s o . Tank a i r spot was continued most of t h e f o l l o w i n g day b u t l i t t l e AT gun r e s i s t a n c e was encountered d u r i n g t h e b r i e f remainder of t h e o p e r a t i o n . XVII. OPINIONS AND BEQQMMDA.TIONS OF IKE QQLMANDSR A. Opinions
1 . That tanks played a major r o l e in t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s v i c t o r i o u s a s s a u l t of SHURI and KUNISHI Ridge, the two p r i n c i p a l b a t t l e s of the o p e r a t i o n . 2. That tank support, employing t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s h i g h l y developed t a n k - i n f a n t r y technique, enabled t h e FIRST MARINE DIVISION t o drive slowly but without a h a l t i n t o the h e a r t of SHURI while a l l other TENTH A M units f a c R Y i n g ' t h i s , . f o r t r e s s were brought t o a s t a n d s t i l l before i t .
3 . That t h i s Division was "Handicapped - t o cost of l&rines* l i v e s - by the present organic inade quacy of the Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n aggravated by i n e f f i c i e n c y of h i ^ i e r echelon supply and service as pertained t o t a n k s . 4. That tank action was i n t e g r a t e d , t o a degree h i t h e r t o unattained in the Marine Corps., with the e f f o r t of a l l other arms with proportionate increase in the D i v i s i o n ' s o v e r a l l f i t t i n g power. 5. That the two p r i n c i p a l t a c t i c a l lessons learned concerning tank-in fan t r y action a r e ! a . That the t a n k - i n f a n t r y preparatory "processing" of ground to the front a s described, i s necessary before launching a. general t a n k - i n f a n t r y advance in order t o economically reduce heavily f o r t i f i e d cave-type f i e l d works. b . That in order to destroy enemy under ground f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on ridges and h i l l s i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important that tanks gain access t o the enemy's reverse slope i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Analysis of the seizure of DkKjiSHI, -,ANA and KUiVISHI Ridges, H i l l s 79, 69, 61 and SUG&R LOAF w i l l reveal t h a t none were completely secured u n t i l t a n k s gained access to reverse slope cave entrances, e t c . B. Recoinmendations - That the e n t i r e f i e l d of tanks in the Marine Corps be reviewed a s a question of high p o l i c y which has a r i s e n a s the r e s u l t of the elevation of the tank from the r o l e of a minor supporting weapon t o t h a t of a major one. That t h i s review be made t o the end t h a t the Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n be expanded t o a s t r e n g t h commen s u r a t e with current increased combat employment and v a l u e , and, t o the strength l e v e l of s i m i l a r armored or^Lnizations in world contemporary m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . That t h i s expansion be r a d i c a l and immediate - t o e f f e c t creation of a Marine Tank B a t t a l i o n b a s i c a l l y comprising a strong Headquarters and Service Company, four Tank Companies, and a f u l l Flame thrower Tank Company. And that t h i s review be extended to
- 56
17 .
SIF1E0
-'Wii^
include procurement, supply and service agencies of the l&rine Corps to effect badly needed increased continuity and efficiency in the functioning of those agencies as per t a i n s to tanks.
74-78
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OVERLAY SHOWING DISPLACEMENT OF 1 S T T A N K . 2> 14.
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ARTILLERY ANNEX
NANSEI 3H0T0
INTRODUCTION
' " 4 # ; ift. * *t*.**VS!tAftt,Sjfltt'
Artillery support during Phase I of this operation was

not required because of failure of the enemy to oppose our
landing, and subsequent lack of contact with enemy forces.
Except during displacement, there wae only one occasion
when all the artillery of the division could not have been
utilized fpr close support of any infantry unit. But the
necessity for using more then a few rounds of ammunition
never arose. Enemy resistance wae such that few suitable
artillery targets, for either call or scheduled fires,
presented themselves. For this reason, the artillery under
went no tactical or technical tests, and functioned only as a
potential supporting arm.
During Phase II, the artillery battalions were detached
from this division and attached individually to elements of
the 7th, 96th, and 27th Infantry Divisions. There they
functioned primarily to reinforce direct support battalions
of the aforementioned divisional artillery and were under
the control of those divisional artillery commands. Their
activities will be more fully reported on by the divisions
to which they were attached.
LANDING PHASE
Artillery of this division was mpunted on 13 LSTs,
8 APAs, and 2 AKAs. One battalion was mounted on as many
as 10 ships. Control during the lending phase was there
fore difficult and would have been much more so if resis
tance had been met on the beach.
Forward observer and liaison elements of 2-11 (direct
support of 5th Marines) and 3-11 (direct support of 7th
Marines) landed in early waves with the assault troops.
Reconnaissance parties of direct support battalions were
called from line of departure at H { 120 by liaison
officers ashore and landed on schedule. Reconnaissance
parties of 4-11 (general support) and 1-11 (reinforcing
3-11), scheduled to be called from line of departure at
H 4 160 were able to land earlier than planned, due to the
clesr condition of the beachhead.
teconnaissance party of Regimental Headquarters landed at

H 4 240 on advice of general support battalion party ashore.
Forward observers and liaison of 1-11 landed later with
1st Marines. Forward observers and liaison of 4-11 were
not committed and landed with the battalion.
Suitable position areas were found in the areas
originally selected from photos prior to landing, and
the remainder of the battalions and Regimental Headquarters
were called in by reconnaissance parties. These elements
had some delay in getting all howitzers ashore, since
certain ships did not release our landing craft as called
for in the unloading plan. Either through misunderstanding
of orders or failure to carry out orders given, the commander
of L3T 580 refused to permit DUKWs belonging to 4-11 to
be disembarked until considerable personal pressure was brought
to bear.
Two howitzers of 4-11 and one of 3-11 were lost by
sinking of DUKWs. All remaining howitzers were in position
by 1958 of L-Day.
Initial supply of ammunition was restricted in some
battalions due to delay and the loss of DUKWs from shipping
water. Resupply to bring ammunition up to two units of
fire was very slow - DUKWs and LVTs on shuttle trips were
appropriated for other use6, and there was no floating
dump available for reloading landing craft. This situation
would undoubtly have t?een critical if artillery fire had
been necessary.
INITIAL OPERATIONS ASHORE
Although howitzers began to land as early as 1130,
registration wa6 not begun before 1730. 2-11 FOe registered
2-11 and 4-11 prior to 1800. 3-11 made incomplete registra- ^
tions on normal and emergency barrages. 1-11 did not
complete registration on L-Day. This situation was brought
about by lack of observation. Ground observers had at best
limited observation on suitable check points and in addition
were required to be continually on the move to keep up with
leading assault troops. Carrier-based spotting planes,
although called from carriers through channels at 1200 did
not arrive on station until shortly before dark and were
unable to complete registration of 1-11.
Defensive fires were planned for both 5th and 7th
Marines, with 3-11 and 1-11 prepared to fire in front of
7th, and 2-11 and^4-J.1.prepared in front of 5th. These fires
were not called for. 2-11 fired interdiction and harassing
fires throughout the night.
a r * 4 f -21^ I *
n<>
On L } 1, carrier-based spotting planes were on station

at 0600, and in spite of communication difficulties registra
tion of all battalions was completed. Only five missions
were fired throughout the day, three in Z of A of ?th Marines,
using airspot and ground observation, and two long range
unobserved missions. When the 1st Marines was committed,
1-11 reverted to direct support of this unit. Interdiction
fires on roads leading to front were fired throughout the
night by 2-11, 3-11 and 4-11. By nightfall, troops were
beyond range of 1-11. During the night of L f 1 - L + 2,
11th Marines and 15th Marines were prepared to support each
other with two battalions each. Defensive fires were planned
as required by all front line units, but were not called for.
The 3rd Arm Amph Trac Bn was 60 disposed that only two
companies could mass their fire to reinforce artillery fires.
These companies were prepared to reinforce 4-11 and 2-11
respectively, but were not called on to fire. On L-Day>
communications between FOs and amphtrac platoons were
established which would have permitted fire missions, but
none were required. On L f 2, this battalion wa6 assigned
the mission of beach and airfield defense, and no longer
functioned as artillery.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS IN PHASE I
Displacement was necessary for all battalions by the
night of L f 1, and over due for 1-11 by that time. A
reconnaissance was made for forward positions on L 4 1,
but no transportation was available. A second reconnaissance
was made on L | 2 and positions selected in the vicinity
of CHIBANA. Transportation having come ashore during the
night, 1-11 displaced at 0840 on L 4 2, and was in position
at 1035. By shuttling transportation and adding further
transportation as it came ashore, 2-11 displaced to new
positions, and was in position at 1430. No missions except
registrations were fired during the day, and night defensive
fires were planned only in front of 7th Marines. These were
not required.
On L + 3, 3-11, 4-11 and Regimental Headquarters dis
placed to new positions, arriving at 1100, 0730 and 1700
respectively. Advance elements of headquarters established
a forward C.P. at 1125.
tt&SSIFIED
VMO-3 landed first planes with pilots and observers on

YONTAN AIRFIELD at 1200, and all elements were ashore on
L | 4. Fires were confined to registrations and adjust
ments of defensive fires on the eastern beach of the main
island and northwestern portion cf KATCHIN PENINSULA.
On L I 5, 1-11 displaced to the vicinity of AGINA to
cover the KATCHIN PENINSULA. They were withdrawn to CHIBANA
on L | 8. Between L + 4 and L 4 8, the principal activity
of the regiment was patrolling its assigned area for enemy
stragglers.
OPERATIONS DURING PHASE II
At the request of XXIV Corps, the battalions of the
11th Marines were detached and assigned to reinforce direct
support battalions of the divisional artillery of the 7th
and 96th Infantry Divisions, Assignments were made as
follows: 1-11 2-11 3-11 4-11 reinforce reinforce reinforce reinforce 362nd 361st 921st 57th FA PA FA FA Bn Bn Bn Bn 96th 96th 96th 7th Div Div Div Div Arty Arty Arty Arty
Displacements were made to positions in the vicinity of

reinforced battalions, 1-11 on 12 April, and 2-11, 3-11,
and 4-11 on 9 April.
When the 27th Infantry Division has committed, 3-11
was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 104th FA
Battalion, 27th Div Arty. This assignment became effective
L + 14. 2-11 was assigned to reinforce 249th FA Bn, 27th
Div Arty, on L 4 15. 1-11 was shifted to reinforce 3618$
FA Bn on L | 21. Other assignments remained unchanged
during the period covered by this report.
Regimental Headquarters was assigned no mission in
connection with its battalions. Liaison was maintained
with XXIV Corps Arty, and Div Arty of the three Army
divisions. The experimental regimental sound ranging
section (Dodar) was attached to 4-11 to determine its value
in locating enemy batteries. The results were very
unsatisfactory and are made the subject of a separate report.
-4
4UUSS1HED
, ^-
Control of VMO-3 was taken over by III Phib Corps Arty-- on L \ 2. Until the battalions were committed in the south, air observation was not required by this regiment However, after the committment, organic air observation of the Army Dlv Artys was not sufficient to provide for our battalions. Losses in both VMO-3 and VMO-6 had reduced the number of planes to the point where both III Phib Corps Arty and 11th and 15th Marines could not be adequately supplied. Planes were assigned to 11th Marines battalions on an hour-to-hour basis, so that air observation was both insufficient and unpredictable. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following comments on various artillery aspects
covering the whole period and recommendations for possible
improvements are submitted. It is realised that many
conditions suggested for improvement were beyond division
control In this operation. Because of the urgency of sub
mitting this report, additional comments will not be made
until a later report.
TRAINING
Artillery training at PAVUVU was makeshift. No suit
able artillery range exists there. Training was confined
to school and drill in restricted areas. Little firing and
no RSOPs (Field problems) were possible.
The training on GUADALCANAL, on the other hand offered
excellent opportunities for battery, battalion, and regimental
problems - both firing and non-firing. Frequent and effective
practice was made in conduct of fire, massing of battalion
and regimental fires, and displacements.
Three serious factors hampered training which on the
'hole was most beneficial. First, the major portion of the
training was conducted with approximately 60# officer
strength. Field officers and captains were almost non-existent.
Consquently, many positions were unfilled throughout all
exercises and many personnel were fulfilling duties which they
would not carry out on the operation. When replacements
arrived (most of them at or near the end of the GUADALCANAL
period), the majority of Junior officers were completely
untrained in field artillery, and field officers and captains
occupied positions with which they had little chance to be
come jâm.|âin^*ii(econd, only limited opportunities were
offered for combined training with infantry.
Forward observers and liaison parties were thus incompletely

equipped to carry out the important duties of intelligence
and liaison, and lacked practical experience in all fields
except conduct of fire. Consquently, infantry commanders
were unable to become acquainted with field artillery
capabilities, methods, and personnel to the extent desirable.
Third, many items of equipment, necessary for training
as well as combat, ware lacking. The most sorely felt need
was for fire control equipment (particularly GFTs), cam
ouflage nets, SCR 608 Radios, and insufficient howitzers
and sighting equipment.
Another circumstance which made the training less com
plete than desirable was lack of knowledge of exact conditions
under which the operation would be made. Information as to
terrain and amount of equipment (particularly transportation)
to be mounted would have altered our training program.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Replacements of personnel and material be made available
prior to training period.
(2) A training area be provided which permits combined
infantry-artillery exercises and artillery-tank
exercises.
(3) Information pertaining to the coming operation which
affects training be disseminated as early as possible.
PLANNING
The planning of the operation, as far as this regiment
was concerned, was seriously interrupted by a five weeks1
stay aboard ship. As stated earlier, the artillery was
scattered throughout the Transron, and all information which
did not arrive prior to 25 February was distributed only
by a most painful and makeshift process.
The segregation of artillery units from each other, as
stated earlier, also made control during the landing a tick
lish problem, which was solved chiefly through lack of enemy
resistance.
-6
V&o
The priority of loading on each ship was controlled by

the C O , of troops aboard that ship, and no overall priority
was laid down for the division. Consequently, the actual
priority of artillery vehicles on each ship differed con
siderably from any other ship, and was not always to the best
interests of the operation as a whole.
The rehearsal at GUADALCANAL was completely valueless
for the artillery, since the howitzers were not landed and
the Headquarters units which landed operated on terrain
completely different from that on the" target.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The period aboard ship be reduced.
(2) Artillery battalions be assigned one LST each, with all
excess personnel mounted aboard one AFA with Regimental
HAS and under artillery control.
(3) A minimum of two DUKWS be assigned Regimental H&S Battery
for reconnaissance party, to be landed on call. Transfer
of reconnaissance elements and equipment from LCVPs to
LVTs is not satisfactory and also results in being dropped
at the beach line with large loads of heavy gear and no
transportation to the selected position area.
(4) Division exercise overall control of priorities in loading.
DECtftSSfflE
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ARTILLERY ANNEX
S p e c i a l Action Report
Nansei Shoto
INTRODUCTION This report covers the period from 1 May, 1945, to the
completion o f the OKINAWA Campaign. I t does not include
any of the period from 9 April, 1945, to 1 May, 1945, while
the b a t t a l i o n s of t h i s regiment were attached to the XXIV
Corps (Army).
In support of the F i r s t Marine Division the b a t t a l i o n s f i r e d almost continuously for f i f t y - o n e (51) consecutive days and expended a t o t a l of 223,891 rounds of ammunition ( 1 s t Bn - 72,700 rounds, 2nd Bn - 49,850 rounds, 3rd Bn 46,716 rounds, 4 t h Bn - 54,625 rounds). For the e n t i r e operation the regiment expended 304,089 rounds, and in so doing the 1 s t Bn expended 100,570 rounds of t h i s t o t a l MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTILLERY: The a r t i l l e r y was organized so that there was a 105ram
Howitzer B a t t a l i o n i n d i r e c t support of each combat team.
That i s , 2-11 i n d i r e c t support of CT-5, 3-11 i n d i r e c t
support of CT-1, and 4-11 i n d i r e c t support of CT-7, t h i s
arrangement was followed throughout the campaign. 1-11 was
i n general support being capable of rendering close i n
suDoort along the e n t i r e D i v i s i o n front and r e i n f o r c i n g
the f i r e s of any of the d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s . An
a d d i t i o n a l mission of the F i r s t B a t t a l i o n was to give d i r e c t
supoort to the tanks operating i n the D i v i s i o n ' s zone of
a c t i o n . L i a i s o n and forward observers were attached to each
tank company.
SUPPORTING ARTILLERY F O CORPS: RM The o r g a n i z a t i o n of the supporting and r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y of Corps changed from time to time throughout the o p e r a t i o n . While the Division was attached to the XXIV Corps, the 27 Div Arty, and the 3rd 155mm Howitzer B a t t a l i o n were assigned the mission of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of t h i s regiment. However, when the D i v i s i o n reverted to control of the I I I Phib Corps on the 7 t h of May, 1945, the 2nd prov FA Group was assip-ned the mission of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of the 11th Marines. This arrangement continued throughout the operation. The 2nd Prov FA Group c o n s i s t e d of three (3) 155ram Howitzer b a t t a l i o n s , namely the 3rd and 6 t h 155mm Howitzer B a t t a l i o n s (Marine) and the 145th FA B a t t a l i o n (Army 155mm How. Later the 145th FA B a t t a l i o n was replaced by the 1 s t 155mra How Bn (Marine). . ft p Q J O O I 1JT
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This arrangement was i d e a l , g i v i n g us three medium a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s on which we could c a l l d i r e c t l y to handle any m i s s i o n s we had for them. And of course no c l e a r a n c e from Corps Arty was necessary except when m i s s i o n s i n v o l v e d l a r g e expenditure of ammunition such as preparations and night harassing m i s s i o n s . Control of these b a t t a l i o n s was maintained under the group headquarters. Requests for medium a r t i l l e r y were made by regiment to the group FDC and never d i r e c t l y to one of the b a t t a l i o n s . The Foley Group, c o n s i s t e d of tne 7 t h , 8th, and 9th 155mm Gun B a t t a l i o n s , was i n general support of the Corps. However, r e q u e s t s for support from t h i s group were made d i r e c t to the group headquarters, no clearance from Corps A r t i l l e r y was r e q u i r e d . This arrangement functioned so smoothly that r e q u e s t s
for medium a r t i l l e r y by our d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s and
a i r observers were answered and f i r e d e l i v e r e d on the
t a r g e t almost as quickly as f i r e d e l i v e r e d by our own
general support b a t t a l i o n s .
LIAISON WITH ADJACENT ARTILLERY UNITS: L i a i s o n was maintained throughout the operation with the adjacent Army D i v i s i o n a l A r t i l l e r y , An exchange of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s was made. That i s , we sent an o f f i c e r to the adjacent a r t i l l e r y CP and they i n turn sent one o f f i c e r to our C?m D i r e c t telephone communication was establibh.'xL between FDC1 s and was maintained by both o r g a n i z a t i o n s . While the 6 t h Marine D i v i s i o n was o p e r a t i n g on the flank of the 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n , an exchange of l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s between the two a r t i l l e r y regiments was not made. During the t r a i n i n g p e r i o d , the regiments had worked t o g e t h e r , and one combined e x e r c i s e (with Corps Arty) had been held so each regiment had a c l e a r understanding of the o t h e r s t e c h n i q u e . Therefore, i t was f e l t that an exchange of l i a i s o n was not n e c e s s a r y . However, d i r e c t wire communication was e s t a b l i s h e d between the two regimental FDC's. FIRING CHARTS A*!D PHOTOGRAPHS: The RYUKYU-RETTO, 1:25,000 map, 1 s t , 2nd, and 3rd Re v i s i o n s was used throughout as the f i r i n g chart. This map proved to be e x c e l l e n t i n both h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l c o n t r o l . Although c e r t a i n areas showed only scanty d e t a i l (due to i n s u f f i c i e n t photo coverage), the coast l i n e and
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road n e t s were, with few exceptions, very accurately l o c a t e d . On the l a t e r e d i t i o n s , the ground forms were more t r u l y portrayed. The high q u a l i t y of horizontal control was proven time and again by the accuracy of transfers fired without adjustment. V e r t i c a l control proved to be as r e l i a b l e as h o r i z o n t a l for a r t i l l e r y purposes, as evidenced by the proper height of burst which was almost always obtained when f i r i n g time t r a n s f e r s . This l a t t e r feature i s new to b a t t l e maps used by t h i s D i v i s i o n to date, and i t i s hoped that future maos w i l l continue t h i s high standard. The lithographed mosaics on the reverse of each map sheet were almost v a l u e l e s s for s e l e c t i n g point t a r g e t s . The photographs used were often poor and the reproduction destroyed much of the d e t a i l . One copy of a l l s o r t i e s flown by Tenth Army covering our D i v i s i o n z one of action was furnished to regiment. This supply was s u f f i c i e n t for a e r i a l photographic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at regiment, but did not permit d i s t r i b u t i o n to b a t t a l i o n s . Normal d i s t r i b u t i o n of photos for higher echelons did not include coverage outside our zone of a c t i o n . Since many t a r g e t s appropriate for our a r t i l l e r y l i e out s i d e our zone, i t is" f e l t that standard d i s t r i b u t i o n should i n c l u d e an area at l e a s t 1000 yards wide on each flank of the D i v i s i o n . The regimental a e r i a l photographer did e x c e l l e n t work i n providing s p e c i a l v e r t i c a l and oblique coverage of areas r e q u i r i n g s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . Organic reproduction f a c i l i t i e s were used for development and p r i n t i n g , permitted rapid d i s t r i b u t i o n . This feature was most helpful throughout the operation. Copies of a gridded mosaic, aporoximately 1:5,000 were furnished to regiment and each b a t t a l i o n and proved very u s e f u l i n r e s t i t u t i n g t a r g e t s . A gridded mosaic, 1:25,000, i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers for a l l observers, would be extremely u s e f u l . The great d e t a i l would permit more accurate l o c a t i o n o f t a r g e t s and reduce the number of rounds required for adjustment. During the l a s t few weeks of the camoaign the 3nd Battalion used a grid s h e e t , gridded to conform to 1:25,000 map, as a f i r i n g chai"t. The prescribed map was used for VCO data. I t was found by u s i n g t h i s method one map rtKrt establishment from a new p o s i t i o n oroved very s a t i s f a c t o r y throughout the zone o f f i r i n g . The' errors Introduced by attempting to match unmatched* s h e e t s j>t a mao were overcome . t h u s preventing the êstafeliphm.enj o f % e ^ e m l maoK" as f i r e was s h i f t e d
18T
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from one s e c t o r to another. CHECK POINTS AND REGISTRATIONS: Each b a t t a l i o n s e l e c t e d i t s own base p o i n t for each p o s i t i o n occupied by choosing a p o i n t i d e n t i f i a b l e on chart and ground. Check p o i n t s were s e l e c t e d by observers i n the same way. Regiment was informed of l o c a t i o n o f each check p o i n t so chosen and assigned a number to i t , and a l s o kept a record of c o r r e c t i o n s obtained from each r e g i s t r a t i o n . Plans were made f o r coordination of r e g i s t r a t i o n among b a t t a l i o n s , i . e . , to have a l l b a t t a l i o n s r e g i s t e r on a comnon check p o i n t , but massing o f f i r e s continued to be so accurate throughout the o p e r a t i o n t h a t i t never became necessary to put t h i s plan i n t o e f f e c t . Occasionally e x c e s s i v e c o r r e c t i o n s were obtained from a c e r t a i n check p o i n t ; t h i s point was then discarded and another, more a c c u r a t e l y l o c a t e d , was used. R e g i s t r a t i o n s , except for adjusted fuze s e t t i n g , were infrequent a f t e r the f i r s t two or three days i n a p o s i t i o n . Metro c o r r e c t i o n s , combined with D- and d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t i o n changes, worked out as a c c u r a t e l y as r e s e n t r e g i s t r a t i o n s . The majority o f r e g i s t r a t i o n s were oerformed by AO. Road Junctions and coast l i n e t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s were most frequently used as b e i n g most e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e and most permanent. A t r i b u t e to the accuracy of the chart was rendered by one b a t t a l i o n which was forced to r e g i s t e r on a h i l l t o p and obtained nor mal c o r r e c t i o n s . MASSED FIRES: This o p e r a t i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t a b l e , as far as t h i s D i v i s i o n was concerned, for the amount and weight of a r t i l l e r y a v a i l a b l e at any p o i n t i n the D i v i s i o n zone of a c t i o n at any t i m e . The organic d i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y was always d i r e c t l y r e i n f o r c e d by a minimum of t h r e e , and as many as seven b a t t a l i o n s . In a d d i t i o n , most u n i t s of I I I Phlb Corps and XXIV Corps A r t i l l e r y were a v a i l a b l e on c a l l , and frequently a r t i l l e r y o f d i v i s i o n of the two c o r o s . In p a r t i c u l a r , a r t i l l e r y of flank d i v i s i o n s was quickly a v a i l a b l e . Massed f i r e s of four or f i v e b a t t a l i o n s were a common occurrence, and the maximum i n massed f i r e s c o n t r o l l e d by t h i s D i v i s i o n was twenty-two (22) b a t t a l i o n s (from 75mm How t o 8rt How) the town of MAKABE. "TOT" became a by-word of the campaign. Although not a new procedure, t h i s method was not e x t e n s i v e l y p r a c t i c e d by t h i s D i v i s i o n p r i o r to t h i s o p e r a t i o n . I t was g e n e r a l l y
" "0ECLn9StHtU
f e l t by a l l observers, a r t i l l e r y and Infantry a l i k e , that "Time on Target" was by far the most e f f e c t i v e way of bringing doim massed f i r e s . Standard methods of f i r e d i r e c t i o n were used i n ureparing data for TOT ! s. Regimental FDC assigned to each b a t t a l i o n p a r t i c i p a t i n g , the target area, method of attack, and ammunition. Time was controlled by Regimental FDC who gave "mark" 60 seconds before the time the p r o j e c t i l e s were to reach the t a r g e t . Each b a t t a l i o n FDC picked up the time by s t o p watch and gave the command to f i r e to each battery defending on i t s time or f l i g h t . On one occasion, where battalion" of the XXIV Corps, far removed i n point of communications, were p a r t i c i p a t i n g , a clock time was given a f t e r an accurate time check. In general, however, the "mark" system i s much p r e f e r a b l e , as i t provides actual s p l i t - s e c o n d timing with r e s u l t a n t greater impact e f f e c t . Massed f i r e s of more than one b a t t a l i o n following adjust ment were i n f r e q u e n t . The few that were used however, showed excellent result. The key to raDid and accurate massing of f i r e s i s communications. By i n s t a l l i n g a complete Fire Direction wire n e t , with switchboard i n Regimental FDC, conference c a l l s among a l l b a t t a l i o n FDC's and regiment, and b a t t a l i o n FDC1s of groups and regiments u s i n g a similar communication s e t - u p , were s e t up immediately. Units without the Fire D i r e c t i o n net and switchboard found i t more d i f f i c u l t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n TOT1 s or other massed f i r e s . Although massed f i r e s were used on a l a r g e r s c a l e than ever before i n t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s h i s t o r y , i t i s f e l t that too much importance may have been attached to the sound and fury of the d i s p l a y . E s p e c i a l l y against an enemy who kept himself and h i s weapons protected i n deeo c a v e s . A well conducted p r e c i s i o n adjustment which sealed a cave or d e f i n i t e l y knocked out a f i e l d - p i e c e , was more e f f e c t i v e than seven or e i g h t b a t t a l i o n s hammering a h i l l t o p from which a l l the enemy had r e t i r e d i n t o a s i x t y - f o o t deep cave. PREPARATIONS AND PREPARED FIRES: Preparations were f i r e d as requested by the infantry regimental commanders, and as ordered by D i v i s i o n . These planned f i r e s were prepared by regiment upon the request
^87
of the infantry and recommendations of the a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n officers. However, i t i s f e l t that in many i n stances full benefit from these preparations was not realized. Division orders covering the next days attack would s t a t e a definite time for the infantry to launch i t s attack. Preparations were scheduled based on the hour of attack as ordered by Division. However, i t was not always possible for the infantry to launch the attack at the ordered hour. The preparation was fired regardless of readiness of the infantry and i t s benefit was l o s t because the infantry could not make their attack u n t i l they were ready, which in many cases was two to three hours after the preparation had been fired. I t i s f e l t that whenever possible, preparations should be delivered on call of the infantry regimental commander and not at a definite time determined the night proceed ing the attack. I f i t i s a coordinated Division attack of two or more regiments and a preparation i s required, i t s duration should be determined far enough in advance so that a l l Dlanning by a l l arms can be carefully completed. But the hour at which the preparation i s to be fired should not be determined u n t i l the day of the attack and after a l l infantry units have reported to Division that they are ready to attack. During each day's operation, direct support battalions delivered preparations reinforced by the general support a r t i l l e r y on call of the infantry they were supporting, as intermediate objectives were attacked, and these were not fired u n t i l the infantry reported ready. In this way the infantry was able to take full advantages of the a r t i l l e r y f i r e and launch i t s attack with success. The planning of night defensive fires was always done by the direct support b a t t a l i o n s , regiment in turn coordinating the fires between battalions and adjacent a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . Reinforcing battalions of Corps as well as our own general supoort battalions were registered on normal Darrages and this support was balanced between d i r e c t support battalions by regiment based on their request ard the situation for the night. Direct suuoort battalions submitted requests for add i t i o n a l harassing^ fires to regiment. These were combined with harassing fires originated by regiment. Our own
CECLA3PD
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general support b a t t a l i o n handled as many of these as was p o s s i b l e , and the remainder were submitted to Corps A r t i l l e r y . A l l harassing f i r e s were coordinated with D i v i s i o n Naval Gunfire e l i m i n a t i n g a l l unnecessary duplication of f i r e s . The TIC was s e t up with three men and an o f f i c e r . One man was experienced i n keeping maps and other Two-section work. Two of the men were without t>revious experience i n t h e work. Later i n the operation the TIC o f f i c e r became 3-2 and the men of the TIC combined with the S-2 Section and performed interchangeably. This provided f i v e men and two o f f i c e r s i n the s e c t i o n . Personnel with Division l i a i s o n o f f i c e r added two more to the t o t a l a v a i l a b l e . There was work for a l l of them. The c l e r i c a l work consisted of keeping a card index on a l l t a r g e t s , two up to date maos, two overlays, one show i n g a l l enemy b a t t e r i e s , the other showing r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s . This together with a board showing r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s , action taken, date. time, concen t r a t i o n number, and r e s u l t s of f i r e were the worfc of the TIC S e c t i o n . The g r e a t e s t source of information and the greate3t re ed for i t s proper dissemination was found i n the a r t i l l e r y . Hence the TIC operated in the FDC, and f u l f i l l e d the func t i o n a l o b j e c t of both TIC and S-2. A d i r e c t l i n e conaected the FDC with a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n at D i v i s i o n . With the Eleventh Marine l i a i s o n o f f i c e r were the D i v i s i o n a i r and naval gunfire o f f i c e r s . NCP and air t a r g e t information as well as API information derived at D i v i s i o n were thereby added to our sources of information. Targets obtained by TIC were checked against the card index, given to the aoorooriate arm or assigned to a i r soot for search. The information was passed on to proper l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s and recorded on a card for f i l i n g a f t e r b e i n g placed on the map i f important. The l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , a r t i l l e r y i n t e l l i g e n c e s e c t i o n and the operations s e c t i o n of the regiment were mutually cognizant of information. CO'PITER BATTERY: When p r a c t i c a b l e , the b a t t a l i o n s operated f l a s h bases and the regiment operated one c o n t i n u a l l y . At the s t a r t of Southern campaign for the El event If* f * U < , Tnird pnib CorDs
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sound ranging gave sound ranging spots by d i r e c t wire t o the regimental FDC. This l a s t e d u n t i l Corps took o v e r . Air spot and s h e l l i n g reports w i t h a l l of i t t i e d together w i t h API completed the agencies for l o c a t i n g enemy b a t t e r i e s . A l l enemy b a t t e r i e s were p l o t t e d on a r o l l e d down a c e t a t e o v e r l a y on the TIC map. Various symbols i n d i c a t e d source. This was sup Diem en ted' by another overlay of r e c e n t l y a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s and a board showing those a c t i v e enemy b a t t e r i e s by t a r g e t square, d a t e , and time a c t i v e , a c t i o n taken and r e s u l t s ; e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i f renorts i n d i c a t e d the b a t t e r y as again a c t i v e . The information on the b a t t e r i e s was also kept, as a t a r g e t i n an index file. The s h e l l i n g reports were relayed to Corns A r t i l l e r y and i f azimuth was given, t h i s was p l o t t e d on the mar? and the r e l a t i o n to p r e v i o u s l y l o c a t e d enemy b a t t e r i e s was thus e v i d e n t . I t became SOP to take under f i r e immediately a l l f l a s h base i n t e r s e c t i o n s . Beacuse of the accuracy of the survey and the p r a c t i c e of t h e s e teams i n o b t a i n i n g f i v e i d e n t i c a l readings before reporting, and i n computing a l l coor d i n a t e s , i t was found that these i n t e r s e c t i o n s were e x tremely a c c u r a t e . The use of the map and other information a v a i l a b l e determined the amount of f i r e to be given each t a r g e t . In some i n s t a n c e s i d e n t i c a l reports were turned i n to FDC from d i f f e r e n t OP*s. The f l a r h bases were used t o adjust f i r e on the b a t t e r i e s , but the prevalence of f l a r e s and i n t e r v e n i n g d e f i l a d e areas made t h i s d i f f i c u l t . There was only one r e o o r t o f such a l o c a t i o n being a c t i v e a f t e r f i r e had been l a i d down on i t . S h e l l i n g r e p o r t s , because of the usual i n a c c u r a c i e s of f l a s h bang and of estimated azimuth, were used mainly as c o r r e l a t i v e information. But as t h i s regiment r e c e i v e d s e v e r a l reports p l o t t i n g i n the same v i c i n i t y , that area i f p r e v i o u s l y a c t i v e was f i r e d upon. The enemy was a c t i v e at night i n the great majority of c a s e s so that r e s u l t s were unobserved. I t became n e c e s s ary to keet) a l i s t of areas for a i r search the next day. These r e p o r t s were valuable but the l i m i t a t i o n on the rjlanes a v a i l a b l e , r e g i s t r a t i o n , and more important and a c t i v e t a r g e t s on the next day did not give us f u l l use o f t h i s means of check. Air spot l o c a t e d enemy b a t t e r i e s , but the camouflage minded Jap made t h i s d i f f i
- 8
BECLA
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API, although handicapped by limited coverage and delay in obtaining photos, picked out from t h e i r study valuable t a r g e t s , l i k e l y gun p o s i t i o n s , and looked over areas that we had fired upon from f l a s h base l o c a t i o n s . One ereat use of API was to l o c a t e areas for TOT's and i t i s f e l t that t h i s contribution to counter-battery f i r e for these strong p o i n t s were usually centered around enemy guns. Our own a e r i a l photos taken by our photographer were used, but the quantity was very l i m i t e d . Other r e l a t e d information came by i n t e r r o g a t i o n of Drisoners and cantured documents, but because of the general l o c a t i o n rather than the p i n - p o i n t , f i r e could not p r o f i t a b l y be c a l l e d down on these t a r g e t s . Three Third Phib Coros 155 How Bn's were used for the greater part of the campaign as r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y and were thus the main o u t f i t s used i n counter-battery f i r e . When ammunition allotment permitted, several b a t t a l i o n s f i r i n g TOT was the method of attack. SURVEY: I n i t i a l l y , p o s i t i o n areas were l o c a t e d by traverse from XXIV Corps p l a c e marks, b a t t e r i e s being l a i d by base angle with r e g i s t r a t i o n by one gun r>er b a t t a l i o n . R e g i s t r a t i o n corrections proved moderate, but no smaller than those obtained i n the e a r l i e r phase of the operation, where l o c a t i o n of b a t t e r i e s was by Inspection and d i r e c t i o n obtained from e i t h e r map or n e e d l e . All Instruments were d e c l i n a t e d at Corps s t a t i o n s . Regimental survey i n t h i s r>hase was concerned with extending Corr>s control forward and e s t a b l i s h i n g bases for f l a s h ranging and Corps sound ranging microphones. Survey personnel manned these f l a s h OP 1 e, the r e s u l t s obtained proving of great value throughout the operation. Displacements at t i n e s outstripped Corps and regimen t a l c o n t r o l , so b a t t a l i o n s reverted to the o r i g i n a l s y s tem of l o c a t i o n by i n s p e c t i o n or by traverse from a l o c a l I . P . Re-computation of r e g i s t r a t i o n corrections on a Corps-control basis showed no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s , so the f i n a l displacements found a l l b a t t a l i o n s using i n s p e c t i o n or l o c a l I . P . data. I t i s I n t e r e s t i n g to note that magnetic aberrations were almost completely absent from the area, no reported needle reading d i f f e r i n g from Corps
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DEfltttSIFIED
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BHMKIFIEU
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d i r e c t i o n by more than four (4) mile. This factor, combined with the excellence of the msp i t s e l f , undoubtedly con tributed to the success of the survey system followed. No target area survey was attempted, targets being obtained from the map, gridded mosaics, and r e s t i t u t i o n from v e r t i c a l and oblique photographs by the photo i n t e r pretation section.
METEOROLOGY: As noted above, a majority of our f i r i n g was done with
metro corrections. Weather conditions were f a i r l y constant over short periods of time, and normal metro procedure was used throughout. Because of the large number of a r t i l l e r y u n i t s in direct communication with the regim ent, metro messages were always available at two or three hour i n t e r v a l s except when the c e i l i n g was very low. Raw i n g p a r t i a l me a 8 ages were obtained on a few occasions from XXIV Corps Observation Battalion when viausl obser vation was impossible. Due to a shortage of hydrogen and to the numerous other sources of metro data, t h i s regiment made i t s own observations only i n special cases; e . g . , prior to preparations, during c l o s e - i n night harassing fires. OBSERVATION - AIR: As in previous operations, the a i r OP proved invalu able for search, conduct and surveillance of f i r e , and i n t e l l i g e n c e reports. The p i l o t s and observers, for the most part previously experienced, turned in excellent Jobs in spite of heavy A f i r e and planes flown greatly i n A excess of the prescribed number of hours. The e f f e c t i v e ness of our a r t i l l e r y was, as usual, increased tremendously by t h i s agency. Aerial observation throughout was controlled by regiment. Planes reported to regiment on station and were assigned to a battalion for f i r e missions, generally the general support b a t t a l i o n . Search was directed by regiment. Assign ments were made to battalions other than general support for special missions, including r e g i s t r a t i o n s . Because of a shortage of Planes, i t was generally impossible to keep more than one plane on station during a l l day-light hours, with one on c a l l at the f i e l d . This shortage was f e l t on several occasions when two or three planes on s t a t i o n would have been mast useful.
'
-f f
These f a c t o r s made the a i r OP l e s s e f f i c i e n t and e f f e c t i v e than d e s i r a b l e for t h i s D i v i s i o n on t h i s operation. F i r s t , there was an o v e r a l l shortage of planes throughout I I I Phib Corps. I l l Phlb Corps A r t i l l e r y took over a l l a r t i l l e r y planes and apportioned them to Corns and D i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y . This regiment was a l l o t e d so few that at times planes were a v a i l a b l e only on an hour-to-hour b a s i s . U n t i l NMO-7 arrived, i t was often d i f f i c u l t even to r e l i e v e our one plane on s t a t i o n . Second, many of VMO-3's planes passed the standard maximum l e n g t h of s e r v i c e early i n the operation. In add i t i o n to e x c e s s i v e wear and tear, damage from enerav f i r e kept many planes grounded. Excellent maintenance kept l o s t time to a minimum under the circumstances, but on the whole, too many of the too few planes were on the ground too l o n g . Third, the base for VMO-3 planes and observers was at YONTAN A i r f i e l d throughout the operation, far from regim e n t a l headquarters. Communications, by TCS radio, were d i f f i c u l t at best and impossible a f t e r 2000 due to C W I n t e r f e r e n c e . The proper l i a i s o n between observers and S-3 and S-2 was Impossible to maintain. Observers had to be b r i e f e d on s t a t i o n and report r e s u l t of search on s t a t i o n . During the l a s t four days of the operation, the observers O A were based at I T M N A i r f i e l d and picked UP by Dlanes from YONTAN for each f l i g h t . This set-up permitted direct wire communication and made complete b r i e f i n g of observers p o s s i b l e . The i d e a l set-up a base for planes near enough to a r t i l l e r y headquarters to permit d i r e c t wire communications and to allow the observers to report in person to the regimental FDC whenever necessary was never achieved. A fourth d i f f i c u l t y was solved before i t became s e r i o u s . Trouble was experienced with RCA type radios i n the p l a n e s . Some of t h e s e were replaced with SCR-610 radios and t h e r e a f t e r communications were adequate. However, t h i s arrangement made i t necessary for ground s t a t i o n s to have two radios always ready for spot u s e . I t i s d e f i n i t e l y f e l t that the e f f i c i e n c y a r t i l l e r y would have been increased one hundred per had a l l of the air-sr>ot planes been a v a i l a b l e . all air of the cent
I f i t i s contemplated that there w i l l be needs of t h i s type of plane by other agencies of the D i v i s i o n , steps should be taken to obtain more planes. Never, except in
DttUSSIFILD
extreme emergencies, should the twelve planes of VMO-3 have any m i s s i o n i n b a t t l e except i n carrying of a r t i l l e r y o b s e r v e r s for a i r - s p o t . COMMUNICATIONS: The SOP for a r t i l l e r y communications was observed through out the o p e r a t i o n . At times combat c o n d i t i o n s made s l i g h t changes i n t h e normal t>rocedure n e c e s s a r y . These v a r i a t i o n s are of i n t e r e s t and are noted i n the d i s c u s s i o n . Wire as a means of communication was s a t i s f a c t o r y . The u s u a l trouble with amphibious t r a c t o r s c u t t i n g and break i n g wire was experienced. However, during the wet weather tracked v e h i c l e s were confined more or l e s s to main roads a i d i n g m a t e r i a l l y problems confronting the communicator. Also c o n s i d e r a b l e wire was l a i d i n open t e r r a i n , and e x c e l l e n t f a c i l i t i e s for over-heading l i n e s were o f t e n present. Over one thousand miles of wire was l a i d during the o p e r a t i o n by the regiment. Wire was l a i d to a l l r e i n f o r c i n g a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . In a d d i t i o n , wire communication was maintained w i t h other a r t i l l e r y u n i t s when coordination o f f i r e s was n e c e s s a r y . This meant l a y i n g numerous l o n g l i n e s t h a t are not considered i n the A r t i l l e r y SOP. A 48-drop switchboard (BD96) was employed and on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s a l l the drops were i n use and many of t h e s e were p a r t i e d . Two (2) twelve (12) drop switchboards (BD72) were maintained i n the regimental FDC. These were u s u a l l y f i l l e d to c a p a c i t y . At times the b a t t a l i o n s were q u i t e s c a t t e r e d and the d i s t a n c e between them was c o n s i d e r a b l e . To ease the s t r a i n on wire communication a forward board was used with s u c c e s s . This gave an a l t e r n a t e means of communication and aided m a t e r i a l l y during d i s p l a c e m e n t s . Radio communication brought f o r t h many problems. The few F f r e q u e n c i e s that were made a v a i l a b l e were so c l u t t e r e d M up with t r a f f i c from Army and Navy s t a t i o n s that s e v e r a l were of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l v a l u e . As a r e s u l t , the regimental C r e l i e d almost completely on w i r e . I t was found that the O p r e s e n t TO f o r communication personnel was inadequate to l a y and s e r v i c e the l i n e s required. At one p o s i t i o n the regiment had over 212 m i l e s of wire i n u s e . I t was necessary to augment the CP s e c t i o n with l i n e personnel needed for
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ISSIFIED
o t h e r t a s k s . Three F channels are a minimum r e q u l r e M men J ? e J \ a t a l i o n - A r t i l l e r y should have f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n SCR-610 frequency assignments. This would eliminate h a l t i n g f i r e missions because of i n t e r f e r e n c e from nona r t i l l e r y service units. Three big frequency changes were made. Each came when a great percentage of our radio s e t s were with FO teams causing considerable inconvenience. Obtaining spare parts for SCR-608 s e t s was p r a c t i c a l l y out of the question. As a r e s u l t , s e v e r a l radios that were g r e a t l y needed were out of a c t i o n for lack of minor p a r t s . The RCA type radios used In the O a i r - s p o t planes were Y gradually replaced by SCR-610 s e t s . Although the RCA type radio performs w e l l when new and has man/ c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are p r e f e r a b l e , i t was found that the SCR-610 s e t i s more dependable i n wet weather, i s e a s i e r to keet> i n r e p a i r , and much more simple to operate. DISPLACEMENTS: Because of the lack of adequate transportation and i n view of the f a c t that the two and one-half ton s i x by s i x ( 2 | - t o n , 6x6) prime movers could not operate in *he mud and c o n d i t i o n s which p r e v a i l e d , a l l b a t t a l i o n s had great d i f f i c u l t y i n making displacements. The s i t u a t i o n developed that the b a t t a l i o n s had to d i s p l a c e during an extremely rainy period of the campaign. To do so the b a t t a l i o n s had to borrow M 5 t r a c t o r s from the Army a r t i l l e r y u n i t s , and TD-18 t r a c t o r s from Marine 155mm howitzer b a t t a l i o n s . Had not these v e h i c l e s been a v a i l a b l e , the displacements would have been impossible. As there were never more than two b a t t a l i o n s In d i r e c t support at any one time, d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s were allowed to d i s p l a c e by b a t t a l i o n ; that i s , the e n t i r e b a t t a l i o n came' out of action at one time. One of the two general support b a t t a l i o n s would take over and handle a l l m i s s i o n s of the d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n u n t i l i t s d i s placement had been completed. This was done merely by the general support b a t t a l i o n s e t t i n g i t s 608 radio up on the f r e q u e n c i e s of the b a t t a l i o n d i s p l a c i n g . Also when p o s s i b l e the phone l i n e s to l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s with the Infantry regiment were extended to the b a t t a l i o n handling the miss i o n s f o r the d i r e c t support battalion*. -' 13
I t was f e l t safe to make displacement in this manner because there was always sufficient reinforcing a r t i l l e r y available.
M T R TRANSPORT: OO The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 2-ton 6x6 proved i t s e l f an e x c e l l e n t v e h i c l e r e q u i r i n g few r e p a i r s even when operated under the most arduous circumstances. The parts most frequently r e p l a c e d were the l e v e r shaft studs i n the s t e e r i n g gear.
Out of seventy-five (75) trucks i n this operation, t h i s oartlcular part was broken and replaced in nineteen (19) trucks. This particular oart was not available from regular sources of suooly but had to be made from materials at hand.
The l e a s t e f f i c i e n t vehicle used in t h i s regiment dur ing the operation was the International 1-ton 4x4. To maintain forty-three (43) of these trucks required the replacement of more parts than to maintain seventy-five (75) 2|-ton 6x6 trucks. The greatest weakness i n the 1-ton 4x4 was the spider and side gears in the d i f f e r e n t i a l assembly. In the forty-three (43) 1-ton trucks in the operation, twenty-seven (27) s e t s of spider and side gears were replaced. The experience of t h i s operation, plus a l l previous experiences, have only added further proof to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l ranks of this regiment that t h i s truck i s absolutely u s e l e s s for military purooses. All other tyoes of v e h i c l e s , -ton 4x4 (Jeep) and M29C Cargo and Personnel Carrier (weasel), operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with comparatively l i t t l e repair. The mobility of t h i s organization was not as great as was desired on several occasions due to the lack of trans portation. This organization was only Dermitted to bring about seventy-five per cent of the transoortation author ized by the Tables of Organization. There were two prin cipal disadvantages a r i s i n g from this situation; (1) the mobility of the regiment as a whole was decreased since i t was necessary to transfer vehicles from one b a t t a l i o n to another when any battalion was to displace, the a l t e r native being numerous shuttle t r i p s ; (2) due to the limited amount of transoortation available, vehicles were used frequently when they should have been deadlined for preventive maintenance servicing.
|jnHSfQi*lr!i.U
The dependence of the regiment entirely upon wheeled
vehicles nearly resulted In complete Immobility of the
regiment during one period of especially heavy rainfall.
Had it not been for the co-operation of certain Army
organizations in providing M-5 tractor T>rime movers to aid
in displacement during this period, the regiment would
have been nearly immobile.
AMMUNITION:
Due to circumstances beyond our control, ammunition
supply was not always adequate. However, it was felt that
on some instances there was a lack of coordination between
the Three and Four Sections of higher echelon. Twice
during this operation Corps Field Orders allowed the ex
penditure of a certain amount of ammunition during a def
inite period of time. However, sufficient ammunition to
coincide with the attack order was not orovided and the
Four Section went so far as to issue orders limiting the
expenditure of ammunition that conflicted with the attack
order.
The new HC, BE M84 smoke s h e l l was found to be far

superior to the White Phosphorous s h e l l in building up and
maintaining a smoke screen. The p o l i c y was e s t a b l i s h e d i n
t h i s regiment that whenever supply permitted, the HC, BE, M84 s h e l l would be used e n t i r e l y for t h i s purpose, White Phosphorous would not be used except in adjustment. The regiment did not f i r e s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s of the
VT fuze to make any statement as to i t s use. Although the
one8 that were fired did not function oroperly (nearly a l l r e s u l t e d i n early b u r s t s ) . I t i s f e l t that s u f f i c i e n t numbers of t h i s fuze should be made a v a i l a b l e during the next t r a i n i n g period so that a l l hands can be indoctrinated i n the use of the VT fuze. USE OF A M R D A P TRACKS AS ARTILLERY: R O E MH For a period of about one month nineteen armored amph
i b i a n t r a c t o r s of the 3rd Armored Amph Track B a t t a l i o n
were attached to the regiment with the mission of r e i n -
f o r cine: our f i r e s . Eleven of these were attached to the
1 s t B a t t a l i o n , four to the 2nd B a t t a l i o n , and four to the
4th B a t t a l i o n . In the 1 s t B a t t a l i o n two (2) t r a c t o r s were added to each of tfie three (.6), : ;f\ririg b a t t e r i e s , and f i v e were ^ S a p i s j j *
I *
into a fourth battery. This increased the battalion to four

batteries, three consisting of six guns and one of five guns.
The tractors were laid and fired as accurately as the normal
firing batteries, and massed the fire effectively with
the battalion.
In the 2nd and 4th Battalions the tractors were formed
into an extra battery and fired right along with the three
batteries of 105fs with no difficulty whatsoever. As these
battalions were often in direct support, they found add
itional use for the extra battery in that it could handle
a large portion of the night harassing missions as well
as orovide an additional normal barrage in the night
defensive plan.
No special problems were introduced in the attachment
of the armored amphibian tractors to the artillery batt
alions. A fourth computor was added to the battalion PDC
to handle the computation of the extra battery. The ease
and the rapidity with which they were intergrated into the
battalions testifies to the enthusiasm and cooperation of
the personnel of the 3rd Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
and Justifies the time spent in training this battalion in
artillery methods. It is recommended that all armored
amohibian tractor units be trained in indirect fire proce
dure, and that any battalions attached to this Division
be allowed to work with the artillery as much as possible
during the training period.
DIRECT ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR THE TANKS:
At various times during the operation it became very
noticable that the direct suooort battalions were unable
to give adequate support to the tanks working with the
infantry regiments.
To solve this Droblem, the 1st Battalion (75mm Pack How)
was placed in direct support of the Tank Battalion. Liaison
with the Tank Battalion was established and forward obser
vers were placed at the OP*e from which the Tank Company
CO's directed the employment of their tanks. A radio
channel direct from the forward observers to the FDC provided
the communication. When the tanks were operating in areas
not visible from the OP a forward observer rode in a tank
end controlled fire through the tank net back to the OP,
then to the FDC over the artillery fire control net. The
-16 J
tank personnel were prepared to r e c e i v e t i n e f i r e over them I f necessarv to discourage enemy personnel from c l o s i n g In on a tank and d i s a b l i n g i t , or from wrecking one that had been p r e v i o u s l y stopped. A great many missions were f i r e d for the tanks, the majority of which were smoke. While no f i r e was brought a c t u a l l y over the tanks, several missions as c l o s e i n as 100 yards were f i r e d . Liaison was good, the f i r e was extremely e f f e c t i v e , and there were no occasions when tanks were damaged by our f i r e . The accuracy of the pack howitzer and the f a c t that the medium tank w i l l sustain without damage a l l except a d i r e c t h i t from the weapon, make t h i s use of a pack howitzer b a t t a l i o n an e f f e c t i v e o n e . The armored amphibian t r a c t o r s could a l s o be used for t h i s m i s s i o n . However, l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s and forward observers would have to come from the a r t i l l e r y . The m i s s i o n s could have been performed through normal a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n and FO f e. but the system employed was rapid and e f f e c t i v e , and i t avoided tying up infantry d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n s with a d d i t i o n a l unrelated m i s s i o n s . This use of a pack nowltzer b a t t a l i o n i s considered normal and i s recom mended. Employment i n t h i s manner does not replace infantry f i r e support teams I t augments them, p a r t i c u l a r l y under c o n d i t i o n s of t e r r a i n and enemy action which render the i n f a n t r y - t a n k f i r e support teams i n e f f e c t i v e . COORDINATION BETWEEN ARTILLERY, NGF, AND AIR: Coordination between a r t i l l e r y , NGF, and a i r , on the whole during the campaign was e x c e l l e n t . However, there were several Instances when a i r and NGF did not consult the a r t i l l e r y or coordinate t h e i r missions with the a r t i l l e r y . I t i s f e l t that several a i r missions could have been handled as w e l l , i f not b e t t e r , by a r t i l l e r y f i r e had the a r t i l l e r y been consulted. Throughout the campaign the D i v i s i o n NGF and a i r o f f i c e r s , stayed at the D i v i s i o n CP and an a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r from regiment was sent to D i v i s i o n to work with these o f f i c e r s . The a r t i l l e r y regimental FDC stayed with the a r t i l l e r y CP. Prior to the operation i t was planned that the FDC would be l o c a t e d not more than 600 yards from the D i v i s i o n CP. But t h i s was not e f f e c t e d u n t i l the l a t t e r phases o f the o p e r a t i o n . The FDC had to be near i t s b a t t a l i o n s for control and communication r e a s o n s . The D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y O f f i c e r , or i n h i s absence a f i e l d o f f i c e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , -was always at D i v i s i o n CP.
' DECiMflE
A d i r e c t telephone l i n e was maintained between the FDC and the. coordination center ( a r t i l l e r y , NGF and a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) at D i v i s i o n G-3 S e c t i o n . In t h i s way the three arms coordinated t h e i r missions and the FDC could be c o n s u l t e d without d i f f i c u l t y . Also the exchange of i n f o r mation between the two agencies was e x c e l l e n t . Air, NGF, and G-2 API t a r g e t s were thus reported to the TIC, as w e l l as a r t i l l e r y t a r g e t s from i t s own 3 - 2 . With t h i s set-up the a r t i l l e r y commander ( o v e r - a l l coordinator of the three arms) was not forced to stay at the D i v i s i o n CP, but wa6 free to confer with a l l echelons and attend to h i s other d u t i e s with the a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s and keep an eye on h i s regimental and b a t t a l i o n FDC's. When not at the coordination center, the D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y O f f i c e r or h i s e x e c u t i v e were constantly a v a i l a b l e at the regimental FDC. In the lower echelon, i n f a n t r y regiment and b a t t a l i o n s , again the a r t i l l e r y , NGF and ai'r o f f i c e r s worked together as a team i n the employment of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e arms. But i n a l l cases the a r t i l l e r y l i a i s o n o f f i c e r i n the lower echelong was not consulted by the l o c a l commander i n the making of the f i n a l d e c i s i o n as to which arm should be u s e d . Frequently, observers i n a Naval alr^spot plane would find t a r g e t s which NGF could not handle. In these cases the m i s s i o n s were turned over to the a r t i l l e r y . That i s , the naval observer would send h i s t a r g e t and spots to the NGF l i a i s o n o f f i c e r , these i n turn were relayed through a r t i l l e r y channels to the b a t t a l i o n to which the mission was a s s i g n e d . Plans VICTOR and NEGAT were seldom used. P r i o r to an a i r s t r i k e a l l echelons of the a r t i l l e r y were n o t i f i e d o f the time and place of the s t r i k e . Observers and a i r s e n t r i e s , at t h e gun p o s i t i o n s , then stopped the f i r e when the planes were over the t a r g e t and making t h e i r runs. With t h i s method the time during which the a r t i l l e r y could not f i r e was kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, NGF support ships did not f o l l o w t h i s procedure. When an a i r s t r i k e was even mentioned, NGF ceased u n t i l reassured l o n g a f t e r that the a i r mission was completed. Considering the l i m i t a t i o n o f ammunition and l i f e o f a gun tube i n naval a r t i l l e r y , i t i s b e l i e v e d that e x c e s s i v e u s e of NGF was made'in t h i s o p e r a t i o n . After f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i s ashore, NGF should be used as r e i n f o r c i n g only on m i s s i o n s so deep or so s i t u a t e d that a r t i l l e r y oannot ftkSl1^^*! reach them as e f f e c t i v e l y as NXtf\_ AllJIgF
" ^V* MI-MIX
H I V 3
U U l
^HipBBw^yyir ikU
d e l i b e r a t e and observed on productive t a r g e t s during d a y l i g h t , NGrF ammunition should otherwise be conserved for i t s deadly harassing effect at n i g h t . I t s s t a r s h e l l illumination i n Invaluable a t n i g h t , but t h i s use became an abuse and misuse.
Jo/
SCIF!ED
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

NANSEI SHOTO
TRAINING
The Shore Fire Control Parties furnished by the Fourth JASCO
were well trained,, While only 4 of the 13 LD's had previous
combat experience in this field, the others were well acquainted
with naval gunnery because of previous experience with the fleet. Seven of the nine naval gunfire spotters were combat veterans
The Naval Liaison Officers, spotters, and assistant spotters had
all received the Naval Gunfire Refresher course offered by Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific. This course, which included communication procedure and doctrine, an extensive training in shore fire
control SOP, and a brief course in gunnery (offered for Shore
Fire Control Personnel by Fleet Gunnery School) was of
inestimable value in perfecting a well organized shore fire
control party. While attending this course officers and enlisted forward observers spent considerable time aboard ship in order
to observe shipboard procedure during shore bombardments. Several periods of time were spent on KAHOOLAWE, shore fire bombardment
range where SFCP's had ample opportunity to direct the firing of
all types of naval weapons suitable for shore bombardment work.
A two divisional "shoot11 was held at KAHOOLAWE in the middle of
January which allowed SFCR's from the First and Sixth Marine
Divisions to coorinate their efforts.

mOPERATION
While the rapidity of advance and lack of serious opposition

during Phase I and II of this operation prevented the utilization
of naval gunfire to the limit of its capabilities, firing ships
were available at all times for fire support on call missions,
targets of opportunity, or for illuminating, harassing or
interdicting missions. Illumination was provided throughout
Phase I and II with excellent results. Harassing and interdicting
fires were delivered throughout the nignt when requested or
deemed necessary.
Preparation fires prior to How Hour, Love Day were thorough and numerous hits on prepared positions were observed Had the enemy chosen to defend the-beach area, there is no doubt that the characteristic thoroughness of this preliminary bombardment would have made his attempts extremely difficult. - 1 -
IfUtUVvv" I * E
Communications of the shore fire control parties were very

satisfactory,, All BLT parties who had been assigned firing
ships were in contact with their ships on firing frequencies
by H/90 minuteso Regimental and Division NLO's were in contact
with CTF 53 (net control station and naval gunfire support
commander) by H^120o Communications remained good throughout
this phase0 Communications between SFCPs was by tactical wire.
A definite need is felt for an SCR 300 channel for communications
between SFCP" s within the Division,, Such a channel would greatly
expedite the approval by higher echelons of targets and thereby
speed up delivery of fire thereon
Excellent liaison was maintained between air, artillery and
naval gunfire to the mutual benefit of each supporting weapon
as well as to the infantry,,
The need for motorization of shore fire control parties has
been clearly demonstrated in this operation,, *t is strongly
urged that the ^ and TE as amended by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Special Order 86-44 be followed,.
Since Naval Gunfire Doctrine for shore bombardment is still
being developed and since ample facilities exist at Headquarters,
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for instruction and training in
these new procedures, it is strongly desired that the policy
begun by Fleet Marine Force, Pacific of recalling all SFCP's for
additional training and Instruction be continuedo
5w
WASsira
e III
.'If
MW*
Naval Gunfire Support Annex

Naneel Shoto
Naval Gunfire played one of its most important roles to date
in the Pacific war in the support of the ground forces throughout
the Southern OKINAWA Campaign, Seven battleships, seven heavy
cruisers, four ligit cruisers, and fourteen destroyers were
utilized.throughout the fifty-two day period to lend close support
to the advancing infantrymen of the First Marine Division, 1063
call fire missions were handled by these ships utilizing ground
end air spot, and 567 harassing or interdicting night missions
were also fired. The chart below shows the caliber, number of
rounds, and the weight of ammunition expended from April 30
through June 19, when Naval Gunfire was secured.
CALIBER 16" HC 16 AP 14" HC 14" AP 8" HC 6" HC 5H38 AAC 5"38 WP 5"38 COM 5"51 HC 4,2 Mortars) 5" Rockets) NO, of RDS..
WT. of PROJECTILE 1900 2700 1275 1500 260 105 54 50 54 50 40 TOTAL WT, 1,140,000 121,500 3,256,350 18,000 503,880 250,740 2,095,848 49,450 13,230 126,100 257,240 7,832,338
600 45
2,554
12
1,938 2,388 38,812
989 245
2,522 6,431
56,536
In addition 4,118 5 H Star shells provided illumination

throughout the period.
While these figures in themselves give a good overall picture
of the expenditure of Naval ammunition, they in no way describe
the damage wrought by its excellent usage, Shuri Castle alone
was under ceaseless bombardment for a ten-day period, Sixteen-
inch shells from the U3S COLORADO and fourteen-inch shells from
the USS NEW MEXICO were registered with precision adjustments by
forward observer and air spot on this enemy-held bastion. Caves
were sealed, artillery emplacements destroyed, Japanese weapons
silenced and the area itself devastated by the merciless pounding.
- 1 7#
DECtfnctflED
lor
%\
The most accurate main battery fire ever delivered for this
Division on a shore installation was delivered by the battleship
COLORADO on SHURI CASTLE. No correction was necessary
greater than 150 yards and frequently the initial salvo was a
direjt hit.
When the report reached Division that the enemy was evacuating
SHURI under cover of rain and low-ceiling, the USS NEW YORK was
requested to send up its plane to investigate. Thirteen
minutes after the request was received the battleship had opened
fire. Other fire support ships, as well as artillery and air,
were quickly brought to bear on the target with devastating
results, the roads becoming littered with enemy dead and wounded.
Ships were positioned throughout the operation to give the
most effective line of fire to the desired" target. In this
manner, Naval Gunfire was enabled to hammer reverse slooes and
to fire into draws in which it is normally difficult to obtain
results.
4.2 Mortars and 5* Rockets from LCl(G)s and LSM(R)s were
utilized with excellent results on the southern ridges where
the ships could use their own spot. 40mm. fire from ships was
also effective on these beach areas.
Harassing fire from the fire support ships was utilized
nightly against enemy personnel. Roads, supply dumps, known
or suspected strongpoints, towns and villages were constantly
under area fire at night. Star shells from the ships hindered
enemy infiltration In strength. On at least one occasion,
ships broke up an attempted counter-landing behind our front
lines.
SHIP ASSIGNMENTS
Generally, three ships were assigned for support of the
Division. Each assault regiment was assigned a minimum of one
fhip per day and the third ship was used by the Division for
deep suooort fires. On occasions where extra fire support was
desired"by the regiments, as when a target required larger
caliber guns than the regiments1 direct suoport ships could
handle, the Division ship was assigned to a Naval Gunfire
spotter to fire the mission. Air soot was provided for each
ship, either by the shio*s own aircraft or by specially trained
pilots from VOF squadrons. Air spotters did an excellent Job
though they were frequently handicapped by poor observation
conditions caused by,,.rain and low-hanging clouds.
--
DECL
- \ * t . A: ' - m*x ** %*f''^*m e x t r a f i r e support was d e s i r e d , additional ships were furnished f o r the d i v i s i o n s ' "use. For night i l l u m i n a t i o n a minimum of one ship per regiment was assigned but where the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n warranted it as many as three were furnished. SFCP OPERATIONS SFCP SOP as prescribed by F l e e t Marine Force, P a c i f i c was followed i n i t s e n t i r e t y by the D i v i s i o n Shore Fire Control p a r t i e s Each b a t t a l i o n was furnished with a Marine O f f i c e r s p o t t e r , an e n l i s t e d a s s i s t a n t s p o t t e r and communication Dersonnel to do the a c t u a l s p o t t i n g of Naval Gunfire. A Naval O f f i c e r with communication personnel was assigned to each b a t t a l i o n for l i a i s o n p u r p o s e s . Each regiment had a naval o f f i c e r with communication personnel to coordinate the functioning of the b a t t a l i o n SFC Teams, The D i v i s i o n NGF Team was composed of a Major ( a r t i l l e r y ) , a Captain ( a r t i l l e r y ) , a Naval Lieutenant and communication personnel to s u p e r v i s e the functioning within the D i v i s i o n and to coordinate NGF support with adjacent u n i t s . SFCP COMMUNICATIONS Communications throughout the Southern OKINAWA Campaign were e n e r a l l y good. Each s p o t t e r and N O with the b a t t a l i o n s was L urnishea an SCR 694 r a d i o , an SCR 300 radio, and wire communications. The SCR 694 was used for communication between the NLO, s p o t t e r , and f i r i n g ship on assigned f i r e support f r e q u e n c i e s . In cases where t h e b a t t a l i o n s allowed use of t h e i r a s s i g n e d channel, the SCR 300 was used f o r communication between s p o t t e r and the NLO. Fire commands were given by the s p o t t e r to the NLO over the SCR 300 who i n turn relayed over the SCR 694 to t h e f i r e support s h i p . This method, because i t provides for g r e a t e r m o b i l i t y of the* s p o t t e r , i s the most e f f e c t i v e means of s p o t t i n g Naval Gunfire. P r o v i s i o n s should be made to furnish Naval Gunfire w i t h assigned SCR 300 channels. The SCR 694 radio was used most o f t h e time for a l l s p o t t i n g functions and normally performed very s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Hoi*ever, t h i s s e t I s much too s e n s i t i v e for prolonged operations under severe adverse f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s , and should be replaced a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l phase of the a s s a u l t by a s t u r d i e r s e t .
Regimental NLO's were equipped with TBX(8) radios with which they* monitored a l t e r n a t e l y the Naval Gunfire Common and the f i r e support frequency of t h e i r a s s a u l t b a t t a l i o n s . The performance of t h e TBX(8) r a d i o s was more than s a t i s f a c t o r y , but the regimental NLO1 s should be equloped with at l e a s t two s e t s to permit them t o monitor at a l l times the f i r e support frequency and the Naval Gunfire Common. The SCR 300 i s s u e d to regiments was of no b e n e f i t
? * J * ? 'i
4 ^ i * l
. i
10?
uUUU
2Ur
mmsst'*"
as f r e q u e n c i e s were not a v a i l a b l e . The d i v i s i o n Naval Gunfire party was equipped with a TCS r a d i o , a TBX(8) radio and an SCR 300. The l a t t e r was of no use to the D i v i s i o n due to the l a c t of a frequency. The TCS was used f o r communication with the f i r i n g ship assigned t o the D i v i s i o n . The TBX(8) was used f o r communication with t h e Naval Gunfire control o f f i c e r and the D i v i s i o n was at no time out of contact* COORDINATION WITHIN DIVISION E x c e l l e n t coordination of e f f o r t by the various SFCP's w i t h i n the D i v i s i o n was evidenced* B a t t a l i o n p a r t i e s cleared with adjacent u n i t s before f i r i n g at t a r g e t s out of t h e i r zone of a c t i o n 0 I t i s due t o t h i s e x c e l l e n t coordination t h a t , while more Naval Gunfire was used oa t h i s i s l a n d than any other i s l a n d in- the P a c i f i c ^ not one casualty r e s u l t e d from t h e f i r i n g of naval v e s s e l s by t h i s Divisio.no COORDINATION WITH ADJACENT UNITS L i a i s o n with the Shore F i r e Control P a r t i e s of adjacent u n i t s was maintained to a high degree of e f f i c i e n c y . Permission to f i r e upon t a r g e t s out of the D i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n was r e a d i l y o b t a i n e d . I f for some reason, the SFCP's of t h i s D i v i s i o n were unable to take under f i r e t a r g e t s which could be observed by any adjacent u n i t these u n i t s responded quickly and c h e e r f u l l y t o r e q u e s t s for a s s i s t a n c e * This D i v i s i o n quickly cleared for f i r i n g t a r g e t s within i t s zone that were harassing adjacent u n i t s and many times f i r e d missions that were to the b e n e f i t of t h e s e u n i t s . Targets observed by one u n i t were quickly relayed t o o t h e r u n i t s and front l i n e information was frequently interchanged i n order t h a t a l l s a f e t y f a c t o r s might be observed* COORDINATION BETWEEN ARTILLERY, NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR The Target Information Center was l o c a t e d near the a r t i l l e r y regimental FDC while the D i v i s i o n SFCP and Air L i a i s o n Party were s e t up t o g e t h e r at the D i v i s i o n CP. A d i r e c t wire l i n e was l a i d to t h e regimental FDC, In t h i s manner D i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y was l e s s c o n j e s t e d , and the D i v i s i o n Commander had r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the t h r e e supporting arms within reach at a l l t i m e s . By t h i s means a l s o the a r t i l l e r y r e c e i v e d the b e n e f i t of D i v i s i o n API as w e l l as t h a t of i t s own s e c t i o n . Other Target Information coming i n t o the n2tt and "3W S e c t i o n s of D i v i s i o n was immediately passed to a r t i l l e r y over t h e d i r e c t wire l i n e .
#r
- 4
309
SSIFIED
During the entire operation there was an= officii of ihef **^
G-2 Section assigned to keep the Artillery,.Naval Guntire, and Air LiaiaCn personnel Informed as to all targets uncovered
by API, prisoner Interrogation or translation of enemy
documents. In addition to target information records kept
by TIC this officer kept a card index of all targets and
action taken as well as results which aided materially in
assuring adequate fire on all targets and helped to eliminate
duplication of fire on any one target.
Battalion NLO's cleared targets with the regimental NLO's,
who In turn coordinated with the Artillery Liaison Officer of
the direct support battalion before firing. When targets were
of an emergency nature, or fleeting targets of opportunity,
they were taken under fire without clearance by spotters, if
this fire did not endanger friendly troops.
On three different occasions planes from the U3S NEW YORK
spotted artillery fire from the 11th Marinea onto targets
which Naval Gunfire was unable to hit. On one occasion, fire
from the 11th Marines upon an enemy machine gun position was
directed from the conning tower of the US3 TUSCALOOSA by the
gunnery officer of that vessel. These variations from stand
ard procedure required excellent coordination, perfect communi
cations and a knowledge and understanding of available
weapons. It is a credit to all concerned that these missions
were successfully and effectively accomplished.
The close contact employed by these supporting arms was
highly effective in furnishing each arm with the type target
it was best suited to destroy. This method of coordination
should be preserved in future operations.
PERSONNEL
Personnel of the SFCP were highly trained. Officer
personnel were all thoroughly indoctrinated in Naval Gunfire
nd had received additional training under the direction of
naval Gunfire.Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Their
knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and limitations
of Naval Gunfire served to produce the most efficient use of
this invaluable supporting weapon.
Several casualties were suffered by SFCP personnel but
due to a higily efficient replacement program the Naval Gunfire
teams were never short of needed personnel. Enlisted replace
ments were rapidly furnished for communication duties by the
First Assault Signal Company. Officer personnel was furnished
by theJJaval Gunfire. Section, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
Two NLcrs and one NGF spotter were sent to this Division prior
to the OKINAWA Campaign as Mon the spot" replacements. A
dispatch to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, --*-*
promptly
Pacific x y * ?*iSi.i ^--. 4.i.~. and-tape
brought; thi|ee^NliO|i, .three apotters, "d^hree assistant
OfrfifflHinrtr
SB
spotters to the aid of the Division. The rapid availability

of trained replacements was responsible for the Division
remaining over strength at all times in Naval Gunfire
personnel.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the SCR 694 radio, because of its
inability to stand up under rou$i handling and adverse field
conditions, be replaced by TCS radios after the initial
assault. Channels for the SCR 300 should be provided and this
radio should be used for spotting with the spotter relaying
commands via this weans to the NLO who in turn will contact
the Fire Support Ships over the fire support frequency using
for this purpose the TCS radio proposed.
Each regimental NLO should be furnished one TCS radio and
one TBX(8) radio. It is essential that he have two radios so
that he may maintain a constant watch on the Naval Gunfire
Common and so that he can at the same time guard the fire
support freouency assigned his regiment.
Full advantage should be taken after each operation of
the well planned refresher courses offered by the Naval Gunfire
Section, Fleet Marine Force,- Pacific. These courses are
designed to bring up to date SFC personnel in the latest
approved methods of Naval Gunfire control and to eliminate
any errors made in previous operations.
Kgfefcssin
a %
AIR SUPPORT ANNEX

NANSEI SHOTO
Preliminary air support for the OKINAWA Operarion was

furnished by the Far Eastern Air Force, the Twentieth Air
Force, and the Fast Carriers. Close Air support for Phase
I and II was furnished by Task Group 53.
Initial control of Close Support Aircraft for the III
Phib Corps was vested in Commander Air Support Control Unit,
NorUkFor (TO- 53.10) until Commander Air Support Control
Unit, Landing Force Headquarters, III Phib Corps was
established ashore and assumed control on LOVE plus SEVEN.
Due to the tactical situation and lack of enemy resistance
the need for close air support was not evidenced. During
Phases I and II the First Marine Division had no requests
for close air support'.
Although its practicability was never tested thefollowing
procedure was established for control of Air Support Requests.
Requests for air support made to the Battalion ALP by the
Battalion Commanding Officer were to be submitted via tactical
wire to the Regimental ALP for relay and approval. The
regimental ALP contacted the control stations via the SAR net.
The Division ALP monitoring the net would approve or disapprove
said mission by contacting the control Btation over the SAR net
It was the intention that all air requests should be closely coordinated with artillery and Naval Gunft -e. Targets being allocated and engaged by that supporting arm best suited to take that particular target under fire. It was established in the Division TIC that the artillery,liason officer irrespective af rank was the senior coordinator and the final decision as to whether artillery, Naval Gunfire, or air was employed rested with him. Thefunctloning and work of the ALPs of the Fourth JASCO
was on the whole excellent. The personnel in addition to being
well trained were combat experienced. Although their useof
Judgement in selecting suitable air targets for support was
not tested due to the inactivity, they did demonstrate a
thorough knowledge of communication doctrines and procedure.
It l s - v ' * c i l L ^mj5osslb]je. to make suggestions or
i ' $iftaJy recommendation?^ because t>f established system never beinr;
given an adequate test.
3/
/
tBM&PED
0*M
rt :-*-*,#
Daring the First Marine Division's participation in the

Southern OKINAWA Campaign Air Support was farm shed by the
Support Carrier Groups, the Past Carrier roups and the Taotioal
Air Foroe. As a result of missions planned by the division,
regimental and battalions, as well as call missions, a total of
722 sorties were flown from 1 May, 1945, to 22 June, 1945, when
Air Support was secured. During the flying of these sorties a
total of 2849 rockets were launched against enemy strongpointe.
installations and personnel and a total of 364.5 tons of bombs
were dropped, in addition 561 sorties were flown for supply
drops and 641 for air evacuation of casualties making a total
of 1924 sorties flown for this Division in 53 days. The chart
below breaks the sorties, missions and tonnages down on a daily
basis showing types of bombs employed.
METHOD OF REQUESTING AIR STRIKES
The method originally planned and that practiced during
the training phase was used by the First Marine Division and
its component units when requesting call strikes. The battalion
ALP would, whenever possible, employ tactical wire to relay
his request on to the regimental ALP. When the use of tactical
wire was not available, or was not sufficiently expedient, the
battalion ALP would request an air strike of the Control
Station directly over the SAR net. In the case of relaying
the call mission by tactical wire where the regimental ALP
approved they would request the battalion's mission for them
on the SAR net. In the case of the battalion ALP requesting
their strike directly over the SAR net the regimental ALP
would approve or disapprove the battalion strike on the SAR
net by contacting the Control Station. In both cases the
Division ALP, monitoring the net, would approve or disapprove
by contacting the control station on the SAR net. This
system was found to be most satisfactory and proved Itself to
be the most expedient way of securing air strikes and yet
clearing with all interested parties within the Division.
COORDINATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE. ARTILLERY AND AIR
As a general statement the coordination of Artillery,
Naval Gunfire and Air was excellent. The standard practice
followed was for the Artillery Liaison Officer with each unit
to have the final decision as to what support arm would be
employed on a particular target. The time required to clear
an air strike with Artillery or Naval Gunfire was at all
times kept to a minimum. The normal rule of Artillery, then
Gunfire and Air was generally followed. However, because of
- 1
utbLASSffft
FIT H i I ft fti i r ifir
ULULIfU
the nature of some of the targets available, ( I . e . the SHDRI Castle) a l l three arms were employed on one particular target. This was found to be highly successful. There were several instances of the employment of a l l three supporting arms simultaneously on targets within a r e l a t i v e l y small area and there were no recorded cases of aircraft being h i t by our own Naval Gunfire or A r t i l l e r y . During the entire operation there was an officer of the G-2 Section assigned to keep the A r t i l l e r y . Naval Gunfire, and Air Liaison personnel Informed as to a l l targets uncovered by API, prisoner interrogation or translation of enemy documents. In addition to target information records kept by TIC this o f f i c e r kept a oard index of a l l targets and action taken as well as r e s u l t s which aided materially in assuring adequate f i r e on a l l targets and helped to eliminate duplication of f i r e on any one target. Plans Victor or Negat were used very l i t t l e and were, for the majority of the air s t r i k e s , unnecessary. I t i s believed that Plan Victor and Plan Negat are not necessary, for aircraft can, through proper briefing, operate i n an area where Naval Gunfire ana Artillery are f a l l i n g . The Control Station i s informed as to the acirauth and direction of fire of Naval Gunfire and A r t i l l e r y ; p i l o t s can then be Informed as to the aafe direction from which to make their attack. COORDINATION OF FRONT LINE UNITS I t was generally necessary for the Control Station to clear with adjacent front l i n e battalions before running a c a l l s t r i k e . In many cases i t was further necessary to clear with more than one unit on either or both flanks of the unit requesting the air s t r i k e . *t can be e a s i l y seen i n an operation of t h i s s i z e (where on an average there were four d i v i s i o n s in the l i n e ) that certain requests would be sub mitted requiring clearance from an adjacent d i v i s i o n within one corps and at times with a division of the adjacent corps. In oases of clearing with adjacent battalions of t h i s Division only there was very l i t t l e delay as the front l i n e clearance was requested via the SAR net. There was only one instanoe where two men were injured in an adjacent unit of t h i s Division during the carrying out of a strike for another unit of t h i s Division, and in that case clearance had been obtained. Where clearance had to be obtained from units of another d i v i s i o n of the Third Amphibious Corps, the process was more involved and A required more, time. However, in general the s i t u a t i o n was -handled hf use of the SAR net and was eecured promptly enough.
v , .
..
*-
- 2 VH
eWfePPv^ll!
of However, In the case
having to clear a missffm wTthâ** unit of the adjacent Corps the situation l e f t much to be desired. Due to the fact that the XXIV Corps Control Station was on a different frequency the front l i n e clearance had to be secured via t a c t i c a l wire either by the Control Station or the Divisions concerned. This caused much delay and in several instances resulted in Strike Groups of the XXIV Corps h i t t i n g the l i n e s of units of this Division. EXECUTION OF MISSIONS As the operation progressed the execution of the missions improved considerably. However, the problem of aircraft f a i l ing to report on station on time caused a large number of s t r i k e s to be cancelled. Since Air Support i s to aid the Infantry i t i s most l o g i c a l that the Infantry should not change their attack plans as a result of aircraft falling to check in on station at the previously designated time. In many cases, particularly i n early morning attacks prior to the Jump-off the coordination of f i r e s Naval Gunfire, Artillery and Air were timed to the minute and the failure of aircraft to be on s t a t i o n resulted in a period when the enemy was not subjected to any of our supporting f i r e s . This i s a most important item and i n future operations every effort should be made by a l l hands to correct i t . Aircraft must be on station on tlme There were instances of the delay of aircraft due to being unable to l o c a t e the target resulting in the cancelling of s t r i k e s . However, when i t was possible for front l i n e units to display panels and mark the target, as i t was in the majority of the cases, the execution of the strikes was highly satisfactory. AIR LIAISON PARTIES The function of the Air Liaison Parties was excellent both for air strikes and a i r supply drops. The fact that there was a large percentage of the officers and men who were experienced showed i n the way the net was conducted. Good Judgement was generally shown in requests for air support and in the targets selected. The ALPs demonstrated a thorough knowledge of communication doctrine and procedure.
The present communication equipment supplied the ALPs i s considered satisfactory although i t i s believed that i f the radio Jeeps were replaced with radio weasels i t would enable the battalion vehicular radio equipment to keep up with the movements of the battalion during Inclement weatner when the roads become^veryjniddy.
- 3
om&siHi
AIR OBSERVATION
The use of air observation continued to show its relative
merits and its importance. The use of the air observer was
coordinated with the use of artillery spotting planes to give
the maximum amount of aerial observation obtainable.
AIR SUPPLY DROPS
Air supply drop was the determining factor in this
Division's rapid advance southward after the SHURI break
through. Had it not been for Air Supply the troops would have been unable to receive any type of supplies for, due to the
heavy rains, the roads became impassable and it was impossible to supply them even ty tracked vehicles. A total of 561 TPM
loads of supplies were dropped totaling nearly 400,000 pounds
of all types of supplies. During the initial phases of Supply Drops the weather was in several instances hazardous for
flying, however, the pilots did an excellent Job of bringing
the supplies to the front line units even though in several
cases it was necessary to drop bv instruments and radar. The pilots of VMTB 232 did excellent work during this period.

AIR EVACUATION
Air evacuation by light aircraft from Just in rear of the
front lines was not instituted by this Division until late in
the campaign. However, during the period of 13 days in which
air evacuation was employed a total of 641 casualties were
removed to rear areas. The initial evacuations were made from
a straight stretch of highway 1200 feet long and 12 feet wide
that was clear of most hazards. Later on a small strip was
built from which the aircraft could operate more freely.
Many lives were saved as a result of the lessening of time
required to transfer casualties from front line aid stations
to the base hospitals. During the peak of evacuations there
was one casualty leaving the air strip every 17 minutes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Control Stations be provided
with additional radio equipment to Permit them to monitor the
nets of adjacent Control Stations. It is impossible for the
battalion and regimental ALPs to monitor their own frequencies
and those of another Control Net as well. This would
facilitate the obtaining of front line clearance of adjacent
units operating under different control station!

3(C
DfliUCTlFil
It is reoommended that every possible effort be made to

insure that aircraft will be on station and that a mission
will be carried out at the pre-arranged time.
It is recommended that the availability of heavier bombs
(of the 1000# and 2000# class) be increased. The 100# bomb is
ery seldom required in an operation of this kind. In many
ases the bombs employed were not heavy enough for the task
s signed.
It is recommended that whenever Napalm is employed it be
sed in large quantities to achieve the maximum results* The
rea must be thoroughly saturated with Napalm to give the
! est results.
It is reoommended that the battalion ALP a be supplied with
an Aldis Lamp which they can use in aiding the supply planes to
make the drop in the correct area. After a series of drops,
when the tactical situation is such that it is Impossible to
remove the parachutes from the ground, it is often confusing
for the pilots to pick out the correct markings on the ground.
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Nansei Shoto
Signal communicationa in this Division during Phase

I and II brought out certain points which merit attention.
(a) Each essault Division Commander should be assign
ed an AGC as Headquarters Ship. Portable radio
equipment strewn all over an already cluttered
ship is an impracticable solution to the problem.
This Division w*s fortunate in being assigned a
ship which was fitted out as a relief AGC. The
ship's crew, assisted by Marine Corps technicians,
soent two weeks installing radio eauipment for
lending force use and extending telephone commun
ications to the various executive and special ,
staff officers aboard shiD This V P S accomplished
by utilizing organic division signal eauir>ment in
the latter esse since the shio's telephone system
was inadeouate to serve a division headnuarters.
Radio eoulT>ment oerraanently Installed for use by
the Division Commander was invaluable. There was
however, insufficient frequency modulated equip
ment aboard to meet the needs of both Commander
Transport Squadron, Commanding Officer of the
ship, and the Landing rorce Commander. It was
necessary to hastily Install six SCR-610 equip
ment topside to alleviate this shortage.
Mediocre performance resulted due to the necess
ity for bunching all of these sets together on
the after boat deck. Mutual Interference result
ed between sets due to the close oroximity of the
qntenns. Permanently Installed SCR-609 sets
would have been much more satisfactory.
(b) It is believed that all comraunications aboard a
ship carrying two or more headquarters groups
should be under a single communication officer,
and in view of the mission assigned a headquarters
ship in which is embarked an assault Division
Commander, it should be under the Division Signal
Officer. Maximum efficiency would result by
combining all facilities such as coding boards,
message centers, runners, radio and other types
o^ signal equipment, in a similar fashion to the
Joint Communication Centers established at all
our island, objectives. There is nothing slngu ftrly unique^ about landing force communications
-i-
iiLi-IILCC!
which would preclude such an arrangement.

(c) Signal equipment was carefully packed, loaded
and unloading priorities correctly assigned.
However, unloading did not proceed according to
plan. Had more equipment and supplies been
needed on LOVE and LOVE plus ONE due to heavy
opposition on tne beach and attendant losses
in gear, the signal supply situation would have
presented a difficult if not impossible problem.
(d) Weasels were used as wire laying vehicles for tne
rirst time by tnis Division. Their mobility
over certain types of terrain makes tnem a val
uable additional tool to the wire communication
system. They should not be considered a sub
stitute for the present wire laying Jeep, but
their performance places them in tne category
of a highly desirable complement.
(e) Radio equipments Model MZ, mobile mounted SCR 608 and SCR-508, SCR-610 and SCR-510, and SCR 300 have functioned satisfactorily and are zae backbone of tne Division radio system. (f) Very high frequency radio link equipment was
used for the first time by this Division. Too
much praise cannot be given it. Without it,
telephonic communications witn higher echelons
would have been very unsatisfactory for the
rirst week after landing due to the rapidity
of movement and tne ever-present vulnerability
of field wire. This equipment and its use will
oe covered more thoroughly in a separate report.
(g) The frequency plan prepared' for Expeditionary Troops, at a conference attended by cognizant Signal officers and approved by Commander
Amphibious Forces Pacific was adequate and
effective. No difficulty was encountered in
radio communications until mass changes and
deletions were made in the original frequency plan. Assault divisions have borne the brunt of the effect of these changes.

1.
GENERAL
(a) During Phage III the First Marine Division

was engaged in combat operations with the Japanese forces
on Southern OKINAWA.
(b) The signal communication activities of the
Division were continuously employed in support of these
operations* Although many difficulties were encountered
due to personnel and equipment shortages and for a period
of two weeks, extremely adverse weather conditions pre
vailed satisfactory communications were maintained.
There was no instance where tactical or administrative
missions were delayed despite the, at times, very rapidly
moving situation*
2* WIRE COMMUNICATIONS
(a) As in most operations! telephone circuits

bore the greatest portion of the communication load*
Between Division snd Corps the wire telephone circuits
were supplemented by carrier equipment, CF-1. This
equipment was operated either on splral-4 cable or on
VHP radio link equipment AN/TRC-1 with operating time
about equally divided between these two means. The use
of carrier equipment not only resulted in more circuits
for telephone conversations but also in better talking
circuits where the distances involved approached the
limit of talking range for the various types of field
wire and cable in use. Advantages of this equipment
include the speed with which communications can be
established using the radio link between carrier terminal
sets and its freedom from the vulnerability of field
wire. All in all, too much praise cannot be given to
this equipment*
(b) Wire, W-110-B and Wire, W-130 were used in
nearly all installations by this Division, with the latter
.""
*
* ' * -
y .&
| *"!
''it.
being used primarily within the infantry battalions a t c '

'ff to Observation Posts and Forward Observers. Wire, W-143
was employed for some lines between the Division Command
Post and service units to the rear. No rubber covered
cable was used althougn Wire, W-110-B was made up into
5-12 pair cables for use within and adjacent to tne
Division Headquarters.
b&mw
(c) In order to minimize damage to wire lines

by friendly vehicles and personnel, overhead installat
ions were used wherever possible. A fairly extensive
use of this type of construction was possibly due to the
number of trees and Japanese pole lines available. In
addition, it was directed tnat all wire lines be laid on
the South and East sides of all roads and trails to
permit widening and otner Improvements to be made witn a
minimum of interruption to wire facilities. Drivers of
all vehicles were warned against carelessly damaging wire
and were schooled in tne ways of avoiding such damage.
While some damage inevitably occurs to field Wire install
ations it was greatly minimized by the above procedures.
(d) In general tne following number of telephone
circuits were installed: Battalion to Companies, 1;
Regiment to Battalions, 1-2; Division to Regiments, 2-3;
and Corps to Division, 5-7. In addition to tne telepnone
channels between Corps and Division two teletypewriter
circuits were operated. Of tnese one served tne Division
Message Center and one was Installed in tne G-3 office,
connected directly 'witn tne Corps (U3 section and 6th
Marine Division G-3 section. The Division Signal Company
operated at least three Telephone Central Office Sets
TC-4 at all times during the period and upon some occas
ions operated four or these sets spread between tnree
different locations. The Division had an overage of
Telepnones, EE-8, and an elaborate telephone service was
installed at all command posts. This excess above T/A
allowances or telephones proved very advantageous. The
Division Headquarters switchboard operated an average of
50 locals and 28 trunk lines. Tne Division Service
Battalion and associated activities were normally located
sufriclently close together to warrant tne installation
of Central Office Set, TC-4. Adequate trunk lines between
chis board, Corps, Division, and IeConwere installed.
Signal^Company oDerated this board and maintained lines.
The Snore Party^bmmander was provided at all times witn
Telephone Central- Office Set, TC-4, operated by 1st
Assault Signal Company. An adequate system of laterals
was installed between subordinate units. A enortar-e of
Reel Eouipnent , CE-11, made the laying of wire fcrv*=rd
of Battalion Command Posts a difficult task.
-4-
nrpi j^îEir
lib
UtuLrWSfoC
JIEHASSIHE
(e) Dtirlng the period of almost continuous
rain for two weeks the maintenance of wire lines was
extremely difficult. After several days of rain Jeeps
could not operate at all, and the few weasels available
to communication units proved valuable. However as the
roads became worse due to the continued rainfall and
heavy traffic even the weasels became useless and tne
use of 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, trucks became necessary. The
weasel is a valuable supplement to the Jeep for wire
laying and line maintenance, but it is by no means a
substitute due to its snorter life and greater maint
enance required. The rainy period was a trying one to
wire personnel but all hands exerted themselves to tne
utmost and the decrease in communications efficiency
was slight.
(f) Telegraph service was not employed within
this division although in some locations direct simplex
telephone circuits were installed between the Division
Message Center and Regimental Message Centers. Tne tel
ephone system of the Artillery Regiment, centering around
a TC-4, was operated in a normal manner and gave excell
ent service. As in previous operations, the Switchboards
BD-71 and BD-72 were not entirely satisfactory due to
their poor ratio of weight and bulk to capacity for tel
ephone lines and their vulnerability to moisture.
Infantry Regiments made use of their TC-416 except
during rapidly moving situations. All TC-4's tnat were
used performed in a satisfactory manner.
(g) The T/0 allowance of wire personnel is gener
ally adequate provided the men allowed are furnished In
proper quantity, rank and speciality. Tnis division suff
ered a serious handicap in that this operation' was begun
with a shortage of 219 wiremen and suffered 38 casualitiee
(9 KIA and 29 WIA). This shortage was further complicated
by a large shortage in rank and tne failure to have re
ceived any substantial amount of promotions for over a
year. A small number of radio personnel were used as wire-
men and a considerable number of basics were field trained
and used as wire personnel. In tnis latter matter, the
quantity of basics thus absorbed for communication duty
reached tne saturation point with a shortage still ex
isting. None of the replacement communication personnel
received during the operation were wiremen.
3. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
Ii
(a) The general efficiency of radio communications

in the Division for this operational period was excell
ent. Much use was made of radio facilities and they proved
extremely y^lu^yLe^ Interference was encountered, but
no mor| .thj&n must 6e expected in an opi
X*
***! -
op
|||^[ ^g|rirn
arge number of units aije employed. In nearly all cases,

It was possible to operate despite interference by a
slignt shift in frequency. Because of tne transfer of
the let Marine Division between control of tfte XXIV
Army Corps and trie III Pnio Corps, considerable alteration
was made in frequency assignments. Tnis switch in Corps
control resulted in a loss of frequencies available to tne
Division with consequent confusion and a decrease in
efficiency in radio communications. The use of frequencies
. assigned to units whicn were not then in combat became
necessary to maintain a sufficient numoer of cnannels
for efficient communications. Tnis was serious hand
icap due to the relatively great amount of work involved
in changing the frequencies of the SCR-508, SCR-610,
SCR-608 and SCR-510 sets.
(b) The radio nets of the 1st Marine Division
were operated as shown by the III Phib Corps SOI. Tnis
plan was generally satisfactory with the exception of
the loss of frequencies mentioned in (a) aoove. No major
changes in frequency plans are recommended or contemplated.
The use of the same word names for radio and telephone
proved highly satisfactory.
(c) The over-all performance of radio equipment
was satisfactory although minor troubles occurred with
most type8 of sets. The Division had a T/A overage of
one SCR-299 but made excellent use of it and the others
of that type- Much use was made throughout the Division
of type MZ equipment and their performance was excell
ent except for minor design faults. Considerable improve
ment in TC3 performance was secured by the use of larger
and higher antennas than the standard venicular whip an
tenna. Many small parts failures occured in tne Division's
SCR-SOO's but good service was obtained from tnis type.
Where the situation permitted tne Installation of RC-291
antennas for tnese sets resulted in an approximate doubl
ing of the range obtainable with the long whip. Radio
sets TBX-4 were used out were not satisfactory due to
their long warm-up time and are considered obsolete.
The TbX-8 equipment proved to be an.improvement over tne
earlier model but tney still leave much to be desired.
Tne receiver selectivity is much too broad for operation
with channel spacing tnat is satisfactory for other types
of radio sets, spacing that cannot be widened with tne
present demand for frequencies. The principal trouble
with the TBX-8 transmitters occured with the 2E22 tube
which was not sufficiently rugged to withstand field
usage. Some SCR-694 radio equipment were available to
the Division and they operated excellently altnougn their
narrow frequency range somewhat restricted their use. In
0!t!E
a T l w comparYsons the SCR-694 proved superior rtdrtrie TBX- '

8. The operation of tne SCR-508*s and SCR-603'^s. was igmy
satisfactory. However tne SCR-510's and SCR-610s a r
*e not sufficiently rugged and suffered from nard usage by
Forward Observers. Also tne power of tne SCR-510's was
not great enough for use within the Tank Battalion. The
operation of SCR-536s was satisfactory but their use
was limited by an initial shortage of T100 plus casualites
to anotner 50 sets. Considerable use 'as made of remote
control on MZ and SOR-299 equipment . This allowed
commanders and their staff officers to talk directly
from tneir local telephones as required. This service
increased tne communication efficiency of the Division
and will result in even better communication after more
training in voice procedure for all officers. The radio
sets, TBW and SCR-624 were not used.
(d) Communications for Shore Fire Control Parties
and Air Liaison Parties were adequately provided and oper
ated in an efficient manner. The ALP's did not employ
their VHF radio equipment as they did not operate on the
Support Air Direction Net and such equipment is only an
added burden on these teams. Lateral communications be
tween Air Liaison Parties consisted of both wire and radio
circuits. The Shore Fire Control Parties operated eff
icient radio nets with excellent circuit discipline.
Frequencies for these parties were assigned twice dîly
by tne Naval Gunfire Control Officers according to the
p Jan for support for tne next twe Jve-nour period. The
only exception w a s the Naval Gunfire Common frequency
waich remained unchanged. The iacK of SCRp-300fs in tne
SFCP'S hampered tneir operation silently. Regimental
Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers found a need for two radios,
or as a mlnumum two receivers and one transmitter to
permit keeping a watch on the NGF Common as well *s the
frequency in use by their battaJion Parties.
Ve) Countermeasures employed by the Japanese
involved Jamming and attempted deception. The Jamming
was avoided by changes in frequency when our operations
were blocked. No case of sucessful deception by Japanese
operators is known. Some interference, mostly at night,
was caused by Japanese CW point-topoint stations in Japan
proper but this was not an attempt to Jam our circuits.
It was avoided in the same manner as Jamming and other
Interference. The Japanese w=re known to have captured
SCR-300 and SCR-536 radios, however POW interrogations
revealed tnat tney were able to make no use of tne equip
ments. Our authenlcation system was adequate and sucess
ful in tne suppression of Japanese attempts at Invasion
of our radio circuits and traffic.
(f) The initial shortage in radio personnel wag
only 28 men but tnis was aggravated by tne general snort-
ULULAOJH i t
age in rated personnel and the nearly total absense of promotions. The casualities suffered by radio personnel added uo to 49 with 2 KIA and 47 WIA, A 1-^rge majority of the êv communications replacements received during the operation were radio repairmen and technicians with only one radio operator (^SN776) being received.
4,
MESSAGE CENTER
(a) Message Center operation was normal and efficiently conducted. 3cheduled 8nd special messenger service was operated and good service was given except during the period of heavy rains when the speed of mes sengers was greatly reduced. Jeer* travel was impossible ôr a number of days and messenger runs h^d to be made by 2^-ton, 6x6, trucks, or on foot. Sufficient weasels weê not available to r>ermit their use by the Division Message Center. (b) The cryptographic aid9 employed during this operational period we-e CSP-1500 (Hagelin), CCBP 0130-D3 (Assault Code)'and CSP-2156 (Shckle) Plus a class 2 ashore allowance. These were adequate and were r>roperly used. Navajo talkers were widely used to safeguard class ified information on voice circuits. Their performance while Blow ws satisfactory and further training should Improve their speed. All incoming messages were screened and marked for distribution by a Communication Assistant to the Chief of Staff. This provided F>Y\ excellent solution for the problem of setting up the distribution for each message received & sent. Separate cooies were made for each office to which the messnge was routed. (c) The present Marine Corns Field Message Book
is excellent for field use in lower echelon command ôsts
but is not satisfactory for use at a Division Headouarters
as it is too small. The form N.M.C. 929 A&I WAS sucess fully used.
(d) The T/O allowance of personnel for Message
Center is adeouate for operations. This Division was
short 18 Message Center men u oon embarkation and suffered
7 casualities, all WIA. The Message Center personnel
were also affected by the general l*ck of rated men andi
promotions.
5,
SIGNAL SUPPLY
The Signal Supply situation was generally satisfactory, despite the extended period of operations. The items in most critial need were; Wire W-1.30 en DR-8's; Wire V-110-B on DR-4'3; SCR-536'sj^ SfceX qu; - 8
S5
spare partrInFfASeWBHfe for SCR-SOC^s; SCR-610's;

Radio Sets MZ; and Switchboards, BD-71 and BDu72. The
source of supply or the Division Signal Quartermaster
was the 7th Service Regiment supplemented by the TENTH
Army Signal Depot. Some equipment wfls issued b y the
Signal Company of the 7th Service Regiment in an unusable
condition, showing a lack of proper inspection before
the issue of the gear.
(b) For Signal repair work the îvlsion Signal
Repair Section was backed by the III Corps slgnal Re
pair Shop and the signal repair facilities of tne 7th
Service Regiment. Items most frequently repaired were:
SCR-300, SCR-508, SCR-536, SCR-608, SCR-110, TCS, TBX,
Switchboards BD-71, BDL-72, and BD-96, Telephones EE-8,
Radio Sets AN/TRC-1, SCR-284, SCR-694, and power unit
PE-75. The repair service afforded by tne 7th Service
Regiment was very slow and it became necessary to drop
by certificate items turned in for repair and to re
quisition new equipment as replacements. This service
was further slowed by tne necessity for the Division to
provide transportation both to and from the Service
Regiment. It is believed that much more and better ass
istance can be given tne Division Signal Quartermaster
by higher eche ions. Insufficient spare parts were avail-
e ab ] to the Division to make all repairs within its cap
abilities, thus necessitating the forwarding of more
equipment to higher echelon repair units, vhlch in turn
increases the length of time that such equipment is out
of service.
- 9 -
DESmfi
33/
6,
RECOMMENDATIONS.
(a) Changes In T/A allowances of equipment.

(1) Division Signal Company.
PRESENT RECOMMENDED ALIOWANCE ALLOWANCE Bracket, PF-57 Chest BC-5 40 Head & Chest Set MHS-9 6 Holder, M-167 16 Insulator IN-25 Insulator IN-35 Insulator IN-53 Insulator IN-62 Kit, Crystal Group NN 50 Kit, Crystal Group Ob 50 Lanoe Pole, PO-2
(replaced with 20 foot
2x4s or 4x4s) Sig-152/8 Plow LC-61 0 Slg-162 Power Unit PE-95 2 Radio Set RBY 0 S i g - 1 9 2 Radio Set SCR-300 30 Radio Set SCR-399 1 Sig-196 Radio Set SCIU610 0 Sig-204 Radio Set SCR-608 ( i n Carrier, Cargo M29C) 0 S i g - 2 0 5 Radio S e t SCFU610 6 Slg-207 Radio Set TCS ( i n Carrier, Cargo M-29-C) 0 7 ( i n T rU ok, 1 / 4 - t o n , 4 x 4 ) S h e l t e r H0-17 0 S i g - 2 2 0 Signal Lamp Equipment EE-84 18 S i g - 2 2 1 Signal Lamp Equipment SE-11 50 Sig-235 Stamp MC-181 1 Sig-237 S t e e l Helmet, Navy Type 18 S i g - 2 4 8 Telegraph P r i n t e r EB-37 2 Sig-249 Telegraph Set TCk5 8 S i g - 2 5 3 Telephone, EE-8 65 S l g - 2 7 8 Tool Equipment TE-50 1 Sig-2B8 Typewriter, standard, W.U, Type 5 Sig-298 Wire, W-UO-B on Dfi-5'8 (add corresponding mileage t o Wire W-110-B on DR-4*s) S i g - 3 0 1 / 2 Wire, W-143 on DR-5. Miles ----Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C 0 T * Clock, 8-day 0 '3g0B-;34 Desk, F i e l d 3 D u p l i c a t o r , P l i | 3 f r P e l s s K f* Sig-52 Sig-64 Sig-97 Slg-100 Sig-103 Sig-104 Sig-105 Sig-106 Sig-110 Sig-111 Sig-120 0 50 10 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 40 2 6 1 30 % 12 8 0 0 8 0 5 0 200 2 8 0 100 3
3091-29 Equipment, Drafting,

Company, Set
3091-30 Expendable Supplies, Equip
ment, Drafting, Company, Set
2184-5 Fuse, Electric, Plug, 10 Amp, 126 Volt
2184-18 Insulator, Porcelain, Split
KnoD, L.3/16" x L-3/4" f/ No 12 to 14 w i r e , w/Nail and g a t h e r Washer 2184-7 Lamp, E j * o t r i c , 60-Watt, 115-Volt, Medium Serew Base 2B4-ID Soolet. Weather-proof, C0m p o s t i t l o n , Medium Screw Esse 2184-19 Switch, Entrance, Plug Fuse, 30-Amp, 125-Volt, Double
Pole, 2-Wire
3208-52 Table, Folding
trailer, 1/2-ton, 2-wheel,
greasing (for Company Hq)
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo
Truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo
(for (Jompany Hq)
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo
(for Company Hq)
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, amphibian
(for Company Hq)
Typewriter, Portable
2184-29 Wire, Copper, Stranded, No.
12 B&S Guage, Rubber Covered,
Double Braided, Ft. (On ree j,
3000 Ft to reel)
2# Assault Signal Company
(A) Shore and Beach Party Section Sig-392 Radio Set SCR-300 Slg-205 Radio Set SCR-610 Sig-252 Telephone Central Offloe Set TC-4

FIED
. V I.
0
0
0
1
1
100
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
13
0
8
0
0
2500
200
200
12
7
1
5
16
4
10
2
3
5000
0
0
7
3
(B) Short Fire Control Seotion

Sig-100 Holder M-167
Sig-121 lantern TL-303/U
Sig-192 Radio Set SCR-300
Slg-207/2 Radio Set TBX
Radio Set SCR~694
Sig-207/2 Radio Bet TCS(in
Truok, 1/4-ton
- 11
-i
0
0
0
26
0
26 26 23 0
35
Sig-218 Seat EN-l/GR Radar Beacon Mark I I (C) Air Liaison S e c t i o n
SIF
26 0*
0 4
Slg-100 Holder M-167 0 Sig-121 Lantern, TL-303/U 12 Radio Set AN/TRC-7 0 S l g - 2 0 7 / 2 Radio Set TBX-8 12 Sig-218 Seat EN-l/GR 12 ( 3 ) M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Company, Headquarters, Bn. Sig-198 Radio Set, SCR-536-C Sig-204 Radio S e t , SOR-608 ( i n Truck, 1 / 4 - t o n , 4x4) 0 0
26 27 13 0 0 6 5
( 4 ) Headquarters Company, Infantry B a t t a l i o n . Sig-192 Radio Set SCR-300 Sig-204 Radio Set SCR.608 ( i n Truck, 1 / 4 - t o n , 4x4) Sig-237 S t e e l Helmet^ Navy Type Sig-249 Te jegraph Set TGk-5 Carrier, Cargo M-29-0 9 0 5 2 0 12 1 0 0 1
( 5 ) Weapons Company, Infantry Regiment (Communication Section)

Sig-237 Steel Helmet, Navy Type 8
0
(6) Headquarters and Service Company,

Infantry Regiment (Communication
Platoon)
Sig-207/4 Radio Set TCS
(in Truck, 4/4-ton,
4x4) Sig-249 Telegraph Set TGk-6 Carrier, Cargo M-29-C Trailer, 1/4-ton,
, 2-whee J cargo
2 4 0 0
3 0 2 2
(7) Headquarters and Service Battery, 105mm Howitzer

Battalion (Communication Platoon)
Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C 0 1
(8) Headquarters and Service Battery, 155mm Howitzer

Battalion (Communication Platoon)
-t.-" Carrier, Cargo, Jfc2g-C ^^ ^J.
12
LLLLn
-JttlASSIFIED
Sig-2 Sig-4 Sig-61 Sig-64 Sig-66 Sig-125
HjnWU,*.^
( 9 ) Headquarters and Service b a t t e r y , A r t i l l e r y Regiment (Communication Platoon) Carrier, Cargo, M-29-C (10) Headquarters and Service Company, Motor Transport B a t t a l i o n . A , TL-135 Axte, HL-27B Case, MCS-2 Chest, BC-5 C l i p , TL-123 lineman' s Equipment MTE-1 S i g - 2 0 7 / 4 Radio Set M Z Sig-211 Switchboard BD-72 Sig-242 Tag MC-72 Sig-245 Tape TL-83 Sig-253 Telephone EE-8 Sig-260 Terminal S t r i p TM-iS4 Sig-297 Wire, W-110-B on DR-4, miles 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
2
1
1
10
1
0
1
200
10
12
3
(11) Amphibian Truck Company

Sig-205 Radio Set, SC&-610 Sig-274 Tool equipment TE-36 (12) Tank,Company, Tank battalion
Radio Set, SCR-508
mounted in truck, 1/4-ton,
4x4 0
(13) Provisional Rocket Detachment
Sig-64 Chest BC-5 Sig-95/5 Head & Chest Set H-25/GT Sig-100 Holder M-167 Sig-192 Radio Set SCR-300 Sig- 398 Radio Set SCR-536 Sig-204 Radio Set SCFU608 ( i n Truck, 1 / 4 - 1 on 4x4) Sig-209 R e e l Equipment CE-11. Sig-274 Tool Equipment TE-36 Sig-301 Wire W-110
(14) Marine Observation Squadron
Sig-64 Sig-85
v
0 0
6
1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 5 6
3
4
1
10
Chest BC-5 Frequency meter Se 211.

;
w
* . *
i : S , 13 5
Sig-100 Holder M-167 Sig-274 Tool Equipment TE-36
0 0
2 1
(15) Allowances of accessories, batteries, spare

parts and other minor Items have not been listed above
but should be changed to correspond with the major Items.
(b) Modifications recommended for existing equipment .
( J) All wire W-110-B snould be issued on Reels DFU4.
(2) All Wire W-130 should be issued on Reels DR-8
and all DR-8's snould be issued completely filled
with approximately one-half mile of wire, rather
than partially filled as many are issued at
present*
(3) Headset, Sound Powered TS-10 snould be issued as
a separate item as well as a part of Reel Equip
ment CE-11 and in quantities approximately equal
to tne allowance of CE-111s; These handsets should
be provided with staggered leads to minimize tneir
shorting together when tapping lines.
(4)ffeadeetMHS-11 snould be adopted as the standard
headset and snould replace all other types.
(5) Microphone MT-1 should be adopted as tne standard
microphone and used to replace all other types.
The provision of a hand-holder would make possible
a wide use of tnis microphone.
(6) All cable connectlore for radio equipment should
be tnoroughly protected from salt-water corrosion.
(7) Radio Sets MZ snould be provided with a more
practical type of waterproof box. Tne present
type of box uses fasteners on tne covers tn^t are
very unsatisfactory. Tne key clicks present in
the transmitter should be removed by a redesign
of the circuits involved.
(8) Radio Set SOR-299 should be improved by the sub
stitution of better qua iity relays for the ones
presently used.
(9) The receiver of tne TBX-8 should be redesigned to
narrow its selectivity. A battery pack should be
provided to repJace the five separate batteries
now used. The han&-generator should be replaced
by one of the silent type.
(c) Recommendations for new equipment .
(1) A new type of ewit onboardââp^ce* t n e OTpsent
ft $ f !& t e n
'" ^ ;'W*4-:. >
BD-71 P.nd BD-72. It should be smaller end

lighter, provide 8 and 16 lines respectively,
and be superior on moisture proof qualities.
This need is a most urgent one,
(2) Light weight voice-scrambling equipment should
be provided for all types of radio equipment.
There is a very definite need for gear of this
type.
(3) The Radio Set SCR-610 should be replaced by
the SCR-619 because of the latters lighter
weight and greater portability.
(4) The SCR-300 radio sets snould be supplemented
by a simillar set oovering the range 48 to
60 mcs.
(5) The Division Signal Company should be given
radio telepypewriter equipment for use to
Corps and a lightweight type facsimile equip
ment for use to Regiments.
(6) The Radio Receiver RCB should be replaced
with a set simillar to size and weight but
of superior design.
(7) The Artillery Regiment should be issued elect
ronic balloon tracking equipment such as the
SCR-658.
(d) Recommendations for ohanges in T/O's.
(1) Division Signal Company
PRESENT ALLOWANCE Technical Sergeant Inspector and mechanic (QM)(4iS) (2) Assault Signal Company Company Headquarters Staff Sergeant Clerical (501) Shore Fire Control Section Sergeant
Radio Operator (CP)(776) Radio Operator-mechanic (CP)(174) 0 RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE 1
0
13
* 0

0 22
Field telephoneman (C?)64l)13 Radio Operator (CP)(776) 13 Radar beacon Operator (CP) 0 Private First Class/Private
Field Te Jephoneman
13 (CP)(64i) 0 Radio 0perator(CP)(776) Air Liaison Section
Captain
Air Liaison Officer (ACI)
Corporal
Radio Operator (Avn)(755) 33
0 35 8
.>#&
0
88
27
0
67
Private First Class/Private

13 Truck driver (Avn)(245 Radio Operator (Avn)(755) 0 (3) Headquarters and Servioe Company, Engineer
Battalion.
Lieutenant (0200) 0
(4) Headquarters and Service Company, Motor Transport Bn.

Corporal 2 Radio Operator (CP)(776) 0 Field Te Jephoneman 0 1 (CP)(641) Private First Class/Private
Field Te iephoneman
(CP)(641)
(5) Marine Observation Squadron
Warrant Officer
Communication
Staff êrgeant
Communication Chief
(CPM592)
Sergeant
Kadio Repairman
(CP)(174)
Corporal
n adio Repairman
(CP)(174)
*-, Private First Class/Pr
ftadid Operator (CP)( ~ - 16
(e) Miscellaneous recommendations

{!) The shackle numeral cipher forms should be printed on water resistant paper and made in small booklets of convenient size. A printing of 600 copies is sufficient for a Divison.
(2) The assignment of radio frequencies and channels

should be carefu jly made to give the widest poss
ible spacing between the assignments within the
Divi8i6n. Once made, assignments should be changed
as little as possible, particularly with the FM
sets.
(3) All communication personnel sent to divisions
should be well trained in tne operation of the
equipment currently in use by FMF units prior to
their arrival. Similarly, maintenance personnel
should h a % a good knowledge of the equipment
they vri jl have to repair. If this training is
not avallab J in tne United States it should be
e given by FMF, Pacific beefore the personne l are
sent on to Divisions. FMF, Pacific should also
continue their refresher courses and courses in
new types of equipment . Divisions should be
given an opportunity to send adequate number? of
men to the schools. Rep Jaoement personnel should
be received soon after the end of an operation
in order that sufficient time will be available
for integrating the new men into the communication
organizations.
- 17
JDELJ1?C!
ANNEX

Nansei Shoto
TRAINING AND MANEUVERS
TBse First Engineer Battalion had three months, December
through February, in which to prepare, reequip and train for
this operation,, The training schedule adopted and followed by
this organization left little to be desired. Inthe early
stages there was a tendency to stress assault demolitions,
which was natural after PELELIUo Later emphasis was placed on
bridge construction and road maintenance0 This training was
extremely valuable though it was found that more schooling on
road work could have been used0 The demolition and mine schools
were more than adequate. The only weak spot was in the maneuver
stage* ^During this period engineer tasks were not written into
the problems with the resultant loss to both combat teams and
engineerso The general plan of maneuvers did-|not call on
engineer troops to perform their normal functions0
Before the training period was started this organization,
with the approval from Division, reorganized the motor transport,
utilities and heavy equipment section. Equipment and trucks
were pfc&led in Headquarters^ and Service Company instead of
dispersing them with the letter companies0 The result proved
to be excellent; namely better control of equipment, better
repair facilities, and more work accomplished,. The necessary
personnel changes were made at the same time. The only other
pertinent remark concerning this period is that late camp
construction interfered with launching the training schedulee
L to L/6
Companies MB" and HC" landed on Lrday per operational plan,
namely with one platoon attached to each Landing Team and the
Headquarters Section with the Combat Team Headquarters0
WAM
Company came ashore with Combat fTeam #1 Very little was done
during this period in the way of engineering work0 There
were practically no mines found and two short access roads were
built. Portable water units were set up by all the companies
during this period and the Combat Teams had sufficient water0
The only other engineer work done was the erection of one jeep
bridge send a drum culvert During this period several caves
were blown and a total of fourteen single horn anti-boat mines
removedo On L/6 the companies reverted to battalion control
each leaving one platoon attached to each Combat Team for general
engineering work. Casualties at this time totalled one killed
and five wounded. R f A l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I f M I*
T
2y/
HWSiflB
U g to T(/ PL
4^W
' -
"
During this period ninety-five percent of the work was

accomplished.
Road work was somewhat retarded by heavy traffic and rainy
weather. On the whole, however, results were most satisfactory.
There was an abundance of good coral in the vicinity and a total
of six coral pits were used. These were worked by two three-
quarter yard shovels with thirty-two to thirty-seven trucks
hauling. This coral was good for surfacing material and all
roads in the Division Zone of Action would have been covered had
time permitted,, The majority of the work was on Routes #5, #6,
#8, #13, #16, and #24 There was much work in the way of stump
blowing on Route #13 and cut and fill on Route #8, but outside
of that it was routine widening, patrolling and surfacing. All
roads and villages within the Division Zone of Action were plainly
marked with signs0
Bridging was appreciably less than expected. Two Bailey
Bridges and three temporary pier bridges were erected. All
bridges within the Division zone of Action were marked as to
load and speed. The thirty-five ton ponton bridge was not needed
and was turned over to the Third Amphibious Corps. Nothing out
of the ordinary was encountered in this bridge work. It should
be noted at this point that the results of the enemy demolition
work on their concrete bridges as they fell back was excellent.
>
The water situation was more than satisfactory throughout the

period. Both mobile arid portable units were employed and the
majority of the water points eventually had showers adjacent to
them. There was a total of twelve water points set up at the end
of the period. The average daily output for the period was
seventy-four thousand gallons per day. The major source for water
was streams, but one spring and four wells, two-of which were
drilled, were also used.
When this organization was ready to leave the staging area
it had one hundred and two prefabricated 20x0 galleys.
Upon arrival at the target there were only eighty-two, twenty
having been lost, or not loaded. These eighty-two were Issued to
the companies of the Division and were erected with engineer
supervision. Shortages in lumber were made up from dunnage
and the canvas for roofing was furnished by the Individual units,
REMARKS
There was definitely insufficient shipping space alloted to
this organization for this operation. Bridging material had to
be bulk loaded Instead of mobile loaded on trailers. This meant
three; days^^fb load and ?three days to unload instead of three
hours'for each process.; Fortunately there was no call for,
DtCLAWttO
1H*~
Jim
bridglng u n t i l L/6 and no damage was done* But had there been a need fpr bridging before this time the results could have been ery s e r i o u s . Also note that some galley lumber was l e f t on the beach at PAVUVU. This was due to the fact that loading spaoe was cut down at the l a s t minute. Because of a need for heavy equipment in the earlj stages of the operation i t i s suggested that a higher unloading priority be given to the shipping with engineer equlDment aboard. Supply has been very good on the whole. I t has hot been satisfactory, however, in regards to spare parts. The replenishment on truck and Jeep parts has been very slow and on heavy equipment not at a l l / Equipment was deadlined for twenty days because requisitions were not f i l l e d . The acute situation on spare parts for motor transport and heavy equipment i s due to the fact that most of the items were not issued when requisitioned by this organization in staging area. All vehicles and equipment brought forward were in an operating condition when unloaded. Lettered companies moved south with their respective combat teams on 30 April, 1945, and remained with them until 5 May, 1945, at which time they reverted to battalion control. One platoon was then detached to each combat team to perform necessary engineer tasks and allowed to c a l l upon the Battalion for additional engineer equipment needed. This system was used u n t i l the completion of the operation on 22 June. 1945, On 17 June, 1945, a platoon of engineers were attached to Combat Team Eight to support the advance of their infantry. During Phase I I I the platoons under battalion control were employed in road and bridge construction, maintaining bridge guards, water supply and performing other engineer t a s k s .
MINE R M V L AND T N - ENaiNEER T A S E OA AK EM The removal of mines assumed great importance in expediting f i r s t , the movements of tanks and second, the movement of supplies to the front l i n e s . Although the enemy made extensive use of mines the damage caused was relatively minor, due to close l i a i s o n between the engineers and infantry and tank u n i t s . Most of the mines were placed in the shoulders and tracks of the roads and at intersections. The only real mine-field pattern consisted of two (2) rows of mines in the tracks of a one-lane road staggered at five (5) pace i n t e r v a l s . This pattern was used several times. A great number of mines were scattered in open f i e l d s and valleys apparently for harassing purposes. A total of three hundred
- 3
L'LASSIi
^3
MfiUttW
and f i f t e e n (315) mines were reported and another estimated three hundred (300) were removed but unreported due to the exigencies of combat. The mines encountered were single horn anti-boat mine, terra cotta mine, wooden box mine, yardstick mine, tape measure mine and two new tyoes. One of these was a twenty-eight inch (28*) diameter anti-tank mine and the other was a small serrated anti-personnel mine. Many of the mines had a booster charge of picric attached to them which proved to be very e f f e c t i v e . Most of the mine removal was done by probing, augmented by the standard mine detectors* Probing proved to be most satisfactory slnoe the detectors picked up a l l small fragments and caused frequent delays. I t i s believed that mine detectors would prove useful i n many instances i f highly trained operators were available. Such training would require months of work rather than days. Mines were de-loused by fuse removal or detonation i n place. Tank-engineer teams worked successfully in many instances when tank approaches were mined. Much of this work i n front of the tanks was done under heavy enemy f i r e and no doubt saved many tanks. The use of the "Demolition Snake" was anticipated i n the W N D A Area to clear a path for tanks AA RW but due to the d i f f i c u l t y in c o l l e c t i n g the necessary parts the device was only p a r t i a l l y assembled when a break through was made by our troops. An attempt should be made to carry a complete "Snake" unit on the next operation and other mine removal devices suoh as the tank f l a i l and r o l l e r . Engineer Battalion equipment damaged by land mines included two (2) TD-18 Dozers, one (1) D-8 Dozer, one (1) Motor Patrol, one (1) P u l l Grader, one (1) Cargo truck and three (3) Dump truoks.
DEMOLITIONS
Extensive use was made of heavy demolitions in closing
oaves and destroying emplacments. Approximately sixty
thousand (60,000) pounds of explosives were used in closing
a total of three hundred and thirty-four (334) caves and
numerous gun emplacements. It was found that the most
efficient method of cave closing is to use a five (5) man
demolition team. More men than that are not needed for the
Job and fewer casualties are received. In this respect, unit
commanders should at all times consult the engineer officer
attaohed to his unit for an estimate of the personnel and
equipment needed for a given Job since often more men and
ear were requested than were actually needed to do the Job*
n most instances the engineers received excellent cooperation
in their 1B avy demolition work. Occasionally there was an
insufficiency of explosives In the unit quartermasters1 dumps
and it is recommended that extra demolitions be carried by
~~ D t R W ^
JEDLASSIFIED
BRID&INS
<.;;
them to meet emergencies which arise when supply l i n e s lengthen and roads become Impassable. Enemy demolitions can be classed as good, H demolished E most of the important bridges and blew many effective road craters which were well placed in deep cuts or large f i l l s .
Pre-fabricated bridging was found to be Indispensable to the advance of the Division front. Nine (9) Bailey Bridges, two (2) 35-ton Temporary Pier Bridges, one (1) 10-20-ton Temporary Pier Bridge and one (1) 25-35-ton Pontoon Bridge , were erected during this period. All bridges were marked as to speed, load l i m i t and type of t r a f f i c . Bridging in general was satisfactory, but Division Engineer Battalions should be allowed by Corps to establish forward Bailey Bridge dumps to expedite erection since a bridge of the Bailey type i s generally needed on short order. Since this Battalion had p r a c t i c a l l y no training in the ereotion of the Bailey Bridge prior to leaving PAVUVu some d i f f i c u l t y was encountered in night erection. In addition to t h i s , flares usually illuminated the bridge s i t e and drew considerable enemy f i r e . Night errection of this bridge may prove satisfactory on the next operation i f the Engineer Battalion i s allowed sufficient time from camp construction to properly train these men. The decision as to the type of bridge crossing should be made by the engineer o f f i c e r , of the combat team, and not by infantry or tank personnel. Often there are fords or culverts that can serve as temporary expedients until a more permanent structure can be erected. ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE. Road construction and maintenance for the Engineer Battalion was of paramount importance since the Division 1 s zone of action covered ground which had no existing roads that could be used as MSK's without a great deal of work. In general the roads were sufficient for sui^ply except for a period of approximately eighteen (18) days from 15 May to 1 June, 1945, when torrential rains made t r a f f i c over d i r t roads impossible. Two (2) coral p i t s , three (3) rubble p i t s and one (1) sand p i t were worked for road surfacing by two (2) threequarter yard shovels. Routes #1, 9, 34, 36, 37, 40, 44 and 153 were maintained and several new sections of road b u i l t . Many tank t r a i l s were b u i l t with armored bulldozers which were constantly employed on and in front of the front l i n e s .
"*-'.l **
i*
V
DETOlFIED
^Yr
S1FIEH
TRAFFIC C N R L OTO Traffic control was carried out by a platoon of MP's working with the Engineer Battalion. This system proved to he very s a t i s f a c t o r y and i t i s strongly recommended that on future operations the Engineers be allowed to work out the t r a f f i c control plan i n close coordination with the Military P o l i c e , I t i s particularly necessary i n country i n which t r a f f i c c i r c u l a t i o n i s one-way only. Realizing the varied functions of the Military Police Company and i t s limited personnel i t i s also recommended that a greater number of men be assigned 1to t r a f f i c control since this i s an important faotor i n keeping MST s open. All roads were marked with Route number and directional
signs and a l l towns were pas ted with names.
C B STRIPS U Two (2) cub strips were built for evacuation of wounded.
MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT
Once again the operations of the Battalion were hindered
by a serious lack of spare parts both for heavy equipment
and motor transport. At times thirty percent (30) of the
engineer equipment was dead lined due to the lack of spare
parts, which condition was relieved only by the determination
and ingenuity of the officers and men in that section* Before each operation numerous requisitions have been submitted to
base depots but have not been filled, which condition can be
relieved only by pressure from higher authority.

The resupply of both parts and equipment damaged beyond
repair was non-existent. Not one piece of equipment destroyed
by shell fire or mines was replaced. The only emergency
requisition filled was one for parts for a motor patrol.
The parts were flown from GUAM but the time lapse was in excess
of thirty days before the piece of equipment was off the
deadline. In short the field deoot serving this organization
had completely inadequate facilities in this respect. This
lack of resupply coupled with the initial shortage of spare
Darts caused a difficult and nearly disastrous situation
that could have brought the operations of this Battalion to
a near standstill. It is restated that this deplorable
condition was alleviated only by the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of the officers and men in the Battalion
Equipment Section.
*m
JELLIFIED
WATER SUPPLY
Water supply was eminently s a t i s f a c t o r y during t h i s period* Average d a l l y output was 70,000 gallons and a t o t a l o f 17 water p o i n t s was operated using streams and springs* Surface water treatment followed tie method e s t a b l i s h e d by Tenth Army I . e . : a d d i t i o n of c h l o r i n e , f i l t e r alum, and soda ash followed by one (1) hour s e t t l i n g before f i n a l f i l t e r i n g . This method insured the e l i m i n a t i o n of flukes and c y s t s thought to be present i n the surface water on t h i s i s l a n d . At no time did the D i v i s i o n suffer from a lack of p u r i f i e d water. TRAINING SCHEDULE After PELELIU t h i s B a t t a l i o n was put to work on camp c o n s t r u c t i o n and a l i m i t e d period a f t e r January 1 , 1945, devoted to t r a i n i n g . This t r a i n i n g was of considerable value but the time a l l o t t e d for i t was d e f i n i t e l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . The t r a i n i n g of engineer personnel i n road construction, bridge e r e c t i o n , demolition and water supply, cannot be accomplished overnight contrary to popular b e l i e f . A minimum of three months should be allowed t h i s B a t t a l i o n for t r a i n i n g i f i t i s to enter the next operation f u l l y prepared for i t s Job. During t h i s time the B a t t a l i o n should be completely r e l i e v e d of camp c o n s t r u c t i o n , RECOMMENDATIONS In summation, the following recommendations are made as a r e s u l t of c l o s e observation during the OKINAWA Campaign: (1) Time be allowed for complete I n v e s t i g a t i o n of a l l methods of mine removal for tanks, Including thorough t r a i n i n g of s k i l l e d operators for the e l e c t r i c and radar-type d e t e c t o r s . (2) A l l u n i t s be thoroughly i n d o c t r i n a t e d to consult t h e i r engineer o f f i c e r s before making d e c i s i o n s concerning engineer tasks such as bridge e r e c t i o n and heavy d e m o l i t i o n s . (3) S u f f i c i e n t M i l i t a r y P o l i c e personnel be assigned to work i n c l o s e coordination with the engineers to maintain proper t r a f f i c c o n t r o l . (4) Recognition be taken of the f a o t that u n l e s s a supply of spare parts for heavy equipment and motor* transport be made a v a i l a b l e to t h i s b a t t a l i o n before the next o p e r a t i o n , i t s operational e f f i c i e n c y w i l l be s e r i o u s l y impaired.
<%$; -HZ
(5) At least tliree months be made available to this

Battalion for training of personnel in bridge
erectionj road construction, demolitions, mine
removal and other engineer tasks.
HECIASMD
IASSIHED
LOGISTICS ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Unloading Report
%--
v^-*
Ship8 s equipment was in good condition and suffi

cient in quantity, except for the lack of adequate cargo
nets on the AKA Andromeda0 Standard type riggings were
used? double line yard and stay, jumbo booms
Navy personnel, in most instances, had little or no
experience in unloading; boat coxswains were awkward at
firsto
Ships began unloading selected types of supplies at
0800 on LOVE Day Progress was exceedingly slow for the
following reasons?
lo LST's were extremely tardy in launching pontoon barges and LCTs0 Of twenty two (22) barges, only eight (8) engines could be started,. Con sequently, shore party cranes designated for reef transfer duty could not be set up on timeB The transport area was first established about eighteen thousand (18000) yards off shore0 After all boats had been loaded and dispatched to the beaches, transports moved in about eight thousand (8000) yards0 Lack of resistance on the beach permitted the landing of many troops which were not expected to go ashore until L0VE-plus-0ne~or-Two-Days* This caused a shortage of boats originally scheduled to mve cargo, and resulted in delay of unloading selected cargo which was to be sent ashore on LOVE Day0
20
3o
The rapid advance of front lines promted many urgent calls for vehicles0 This was so con trary to planning during the loading phase * . * that?, "added-to the notable slowness of LCT launchin&s, these* requests could be filled h ' only ill part; Vehicle requests further con fused the unloading procedure of designated selected cargo0 W&:
4a
-1.
*>
5o
Beach and reef conditions were hazardouso Un

loading efficiency was dependent entirely upon
ability of the shore party to handle cargo at
the reefs and beaches; not upon the ships0
ability to unloado
<MWinj mmst****1*
Following are the unloading completion dates for

all ships lifting First Marine Division cargo?
April 1945 L3T 582
LST 564
LST 580
4 April, 1945 - 1200 Burleigh Jefferson Carroll 1600 Marathon Renville Rawlins 5 April. 1945 LST LST LST LST LST LSM 949 687 227 628 581 166
LST LST LST LST L3M 672 739 986 950 220

(PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA) (PA)

6 Aprils 1945 LST 762

7 April, 1945 McCracken Magoffin Navarro Effingham Andromeda New Kent Centaurus Betelgeuse Dade (PA) LST 633
(PA) LST 728
(PA) LST 651
(PA) LST 747
(KA) LST 625
(PA) LS$ 265
(PA) LSK 162
(KA) LSB 84
(PA)
8 April, 1945
9 April, 1945
LST 759 LST 71

LST 834 LST 268
LST 939
NB0 ~ LST 772 was unloaded by the 8th Amphibian Tractor Bn op

as spare parts and other equipment were needed0 This
ship never put in at #n organized beach, for conventional
unloadingo No unloading record is available
>;#
DECLAIM
3H9 A
-JECLASSIFfE
;?4b->&im*
Transportation
Due to the light resistance encountered on beaches

and subsequent lack of enemy resistance inland, a need
for large cargo trucks was evident in the very early
stages of the operation. At the end of LOVE Day, as
sault units had progressed an average of four thousand
(4000) yards inland from landing beaches.
During LOVE Day assault regiments routed supplies
coming from the transfer line in amphibian tractors di
rect to front line battalions. Battalions, in turn, used
cargo jeeps and weasels to move supplies to assault com
panies o
It was not feasible to operate LVT's very far inland
due to the narrowness of roads and in order to prevent
congestion of traffic, Jeeps, jeep trailers and weasels
were used solely for front line supply.
As more and more supplies came ashore and assault
troops progressed farther inland, the need for additional
trucks became more critical Beach Yellow Three began
receiving small craft on the morning of LOVE plus two
days and trucks were required to move supplies direct
from LCVPfs, LCMs and LCT's to beach dumps0
Unloading priorities were changed and highest prior
ity was given the unloading of cargo trucks aboard APA s
and AKASo Still, it was necessary to request additional
trucks from the III Amphibious Corps.
At the end of LOVE plus seven days, all trucks of
the Motor Transport Battalion which had been lifted in
the assault echelon were ashore and the transportation
situation improved considerably,,
Commencing at 0800, 9 April, one (1) Motor Transport
Company was attached to each Infantry Regiment for oper
ational controlo However, it was necessary to call on
these companies for trucks for troop movements and other
movements which were of an operational priority nature
By LOVE plus fourteen days, the cargo trucks of H&S
Company of the Motor Transport Battalion had been unload
ed from the ship carrying first echelon cargo. This made
It possible to release trucks which had been borrowed
from letter companies. H&S Company trucks then formed
the nucleus of the Division Motor Pool and it was only
aiecessary^to call.oa the companies assigned to infantry
'xîm^jj^jLivKan^priority troop movements were to b^ "*^
taken o
= 3
<wmLwmtkl
m w%
3798
will til
--*
The difficulties encountered in the handling of

motor transport in this operation were due entirely to
the tactical situation,, All plane had been bated on an
opposed landing and intense fighting over the entire
width of the island. If such had been the case, unload
ing priorities would not have been changed and the motor
transport equipment landed in the early stages would
have been sufficient for supplying assault units ae well
s providing transportation for the Division Shore Party.
Adequacy of Supply
Each assault Battalion Landing Team loaded two amph
ibian tractors with high priority cargo prior to departure
from the rehabilitation area8 These tractors furnished
the Initial supplies for the respective LT's upon landing.
In addition, each Infantry Regiment was assigned
five (5) amphibian cargo trailers and the Artillery
Regiment was assigned twenty (20) amphibian cargo trail
ers. These trailers were also combat loaded with high
priority cargo before leaving the RUSSELL ISLANDS and
served to further augment the initial supply of ammuni
tion, rations, water, communication equipment and medical
supplies landed in support of assault units
It had been planned to unload approximately one thou
sand (1000) tons of Mhot cargo" during LOVE Day. However,
due to the fact that the reef transfer line was very late
in becoming operational, the majority of "hot <sargo" did
not reach beach dumps until the morning of &0VE plus one
day.
At the conclusion of LOVE Day approximately one and one
one half (1-|) units of fire, and one (1) days' water were
ashore. No "hot cargo" rations had reached the beach,
but this was not serious because troops had landed with
two (2) days0 rations in their possession.
The flow of supplies to the b?ach increased in the
early hours of LOVE plus one day and at no time was the
supply situation critical0
By 1600 on LOVE plus two days the following amounts
of rations and ammunition had been unloaded from trans
ports?
Rations Ammunition 650 short; tons
2231 short tons
75-0
These amounts proved sufficient for all needs and no

shortages existed
On U)VE plus two days, it was necessary to request an ,
air drop of water and rations for CT70 This was necessary
because of the inability to get supplies to one of the
assault battalions and not because there was a shortage of
these items. This air drop was made at 0700 on LOVE plus
three days0 Nine (9) out of twenty (20) parachutes failed,
although the supplies carried in these chutes were not
totally destroyed. Some water bags were lost, but, on the
whole, the air drop proved successful, A second air drop
was made on LOVE plus three days at 1200, at which time
one unit of ammunition was dropped and only five (5) para
chutes failedo In both instances drops were made in prop
er areas and were successful
The Division embarked four thousand (4000) fifty-five
(55) gallon water drums and eighteen thousand (18000) five
(5) gallon expeditionary cans filled with water. This
proved sufficient until the first major waterpoint was
established on LOVE plus three days. This water point was
capable of producing twenty three (23000) gallons
of water daily. At the present time Division water points
produce a daily average of eighty four thousand (84000)
gallonso
No shortages of fuel or ammunition were experienced
during this operation Mounting out requirements proved
sufficient in all classes of supplies..
Functioning of Supply System
Combat Team supply echelons took over initial beach
dumps of Landing Teams upon landing.
All beach dumps were under control of the Shore Party
Commander working in conjunction with assault Combat Teams
until beach dumps were taken over by the Division Quarter
master on LOVE plus three days.
As Combat Teams progressed inland they established
both forward and rear dumps. Dumps were not consolidated
until assault units had reached the eastern side of the
island and sufficient trucks were available for movement
of organizational property.
All beach dumps remained under the control of the
Division Quartermaster until 0800, 15 April, at which time
contMl'iMM assumed by the 7th Field Depot.
SlASSIFlEi
fl I PUU&i&Ut IF
T ULbLHdjn It
, * -*'
,.
The supply mission in this operation was accomplished

successfully and combat units were supplied throughout the
entire operation in an expeditious and efficient manner
despite developments which varied considerably from past
operations,,
*#&ASS "**t!
'*
tflSTICS
The OKINAWA campaign was characterized by the em

ployment of the First Marine Division' on a fairly large
land mass. There êre periods of rapid advance and some
of relative immobility. At times roads were non-exist
ent, or very noor. During a considerable period of
continuous rain the majority of the roads were washed
out, and travel was next to impossible. It might be
said that conditions were, and will be, those that can
reasonably be expected in fighting in this part of the
world. _ The logistical problems encountered in operations
in SOUTHERN OKINAWA were many, and varied in a number of
respects from any of those previously encountered by this
Division. This was the first occasion where the Division,
at one time or another during the course of the campaign,
supplied assault units by air drops, by sea, by pack
horse, by LVT's, tractors and Athey trailers, M-5 prime
movers and trailers, tanks, and by large carrying parties.
Practically every type of hindrance to rapid supply of
front-line units was encountered.
If it is contemplated that the Marine Divisions are
to be employed in operations on large land masses, it
x/ill be necessary to augment their present supply organ
ization. This extends from the Rifle Company to the
Division Service Battalion. It is felt that the present
organization is ideally suit-ed for atoll and small island
operations. However, if the -'arine Divisions are to
maintain the pace and be able to operate over large dis
tances from the beach, which we will probably be called
upon to do in future operations, it is felt that an organ
ization should be established for- supply within the Div
ision similar to that in the Army Infantry Division.
During the entire operation the railhead system of
distribution for Class . 1 and IV supplies was used. The
1 7th Field Depot, now vnown as the ?th Service Regiment,
was unable to deliver, and in most cases was unable to
load, supplies on Division trucks. This necessitated
sending Division trucks and working parties to the ?th
Field Depot for thrtse classes of supplies, a distance of
twenty (20) mll.es in the later part of the operation.
For a greater part-of the operation Class I, III and V
. dumps were Army controlled.' Aprs in the Division was re
quired to send trucks and worvi'ng parties back to these
* iJI -',
-1
"L'ilMff
3rj
&
**&.
dumps to get these classes of supplies. This burden

placed on the Division supt>ly agencies made unit dist
ribution impossible and lower echelons were burdened
x f t the job of coming end getting their sullies with
tih a corresponding loss of combat efficiency. This prac
tise is directly contrary to the principle: "the impe
tus of supply is from the rear."
Great assistance was rendered by TJI Phib Corns
in causing ration, fuel and ammunition dumps to be set
up well forward in the later stages of the operation.
Due to the rainy weather during the latter part of
May-and the early part of June, ground SUPPI:/" routes
were rendered Impassable and the bulk of supplies de
livered to front-line units was by air. This means,
however, did not alone suffice and when inlets on the
western coast at ASA-KAWA and ASATO-GAWA were made pass
able, plans were formulated to move supplies by sea to
this forward area. Ration, fuel and ammunition dumps
were established at these two -noints on 1 June by send
ing pre-loaded DUKW's under Corns control. On 2 June
it was deemed prudent to have DUKWfp make a sea run
down the coast, then procede inland two (2) miles on a
concrete road secured the previous day and discharge a t
' a small advance battalion dump of CT-5 rather than at
the advance Division dumps. This advance battalion
dump was supplying troops actively engaging the enemy
only a few hundred yards away, and had been supplemented
up to this time by air drops. Making direct delivery "by
DUKW's at this point relieved a critical emergency supply
situation and lessened appreciably the pressure on the
already over-loaded Air Delivery Section.
On 8 June, when elements of CT-7 broke through to
the southwestern coast of OKINAWA, six (6) LVT'a carry
ing much-needed rations and ammunition, and supported
by ten (lO) LVT(A)'s, ships and planes, landed at a
point fourteen hundred (1400) yards north of the to^.m
of ITO:-fAN. The beach, designated BERGER BEACH, served
as a forward Division Supply Point from 3 June until
the conclusion of operations. LVT supply trains under
Corps control continued to make daily runs to EERGER
'BEACH and, in addition, LVT's pre-loaded with rations
and ammunition were transported by LST to designated
points off EERGER BEACH and then run ashore. Civilians
-2
QECLA38int'
were evacuated by the L3T' R on their return trip. Re

quests were submitted to Corps the day previous for
types and amounts of supplies to be delivered.
The system of daily requests for ammunition and
ration needs for the following day for delivery by Corps
Agencies (LVT's, DUKW8 and LST's) was highly efficient
in delivering Class I a t V to Division Dunns and con-
nf tributed greatly to the combat efficiency of the Div
ision. This system of delivery j urni shed part of the
f Division's reouirements. Later Army dumps for Class I,
III and V vere established in NAHA."
On June 1st the First Pioneer Battalion was returned
to Division control. Two* companies were immediately
assigned to support the sagging and overtaxed supply
agencies of the Division. One platoon of approximately
fifty men and one officer wa? assigned to ach infantry
regiment. This platoon was user? to augment the regiment
al service platoon. One company was assigned to the
Service Eatt.alion and -provided dump labor. These per
sonnel were an invaluable aid in sunnlying the Division.
TRANSPORTATION
Throughout operations in SOUTHERN OKINAWA, each infantry regiment was assigned one 'letter company of the First Motor Transport Battalion. This arrangement pro vided each combat team with twenty-five (25)- two and onehalf (2%) ton cargo trucks. Inasmuch as unit distribution was not made, it was
necessary for combat teams to truck thîr supplies from
dumps in rear areas. Under these circumstances, the
allowance of trucks was not sufficient.
On 5 June, eighteen (18) two. and one-half (2^) ton
trucks of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion were assigned
this Division. This unit remained attached until con
clusion of operations.
Due to the lack of transportation throughout the Division, control over transportation of H & S Company, First Motor Transport Battalion, and trucks of the pla toon of the 11th Motor Transport Battalion was exercised by G-4. G-4 screened .$11 transportation requests from
Jt
service and supply elements of the Division and made

daily allocations to these units.
It was apparent from experience gained from the
OKINAWA Operation that the transportation facilities
afforded a Marine Division are totally inadequate when
operations are conducted over long distances. From .
the infantry battalion through Division service and sup
ply units, transportation is not sufficient for supply
and evacuation purposes in a moving situation.
AIR DELIVERY
During operations in SOUTHERN OKINAWA, it became
necessary to call for air delivery of supplies at vari
ous times. Dates on which drons were maê and number
of planeloads of supplies dropped follows:
DATE 10 May 11 May 30 May 31 May 1 June 2 June 3 June 4 June 5 June 6 June 7 June 8 June 9 June 12 June 13 June 14 June 15 June 16 June 17 June Total PLANELOADS 11 14 7 44 71 28 48 18 53 51 63 67 6 11 21 17 3 20 8

561

The first air drops made on 10 and 11 May were not

successful for the following reasons:
(a) Our positions were divulged by dropping of
parachutes.
# . *, m , w , .
_4_
H f
3^
-JttlASSIFIED
(b) Ground troops were unable to reach supplies

dropped because of enemy fire.
(c) Lack of experience of ground unit6 concerning
the use of air deliveries.
(d) Close liaison between ground and air was
absent.
Commencing 30 May, and continuing until 9 June,
it was again necessary to surely assault units through
the medium of air deliveries. This WAS necessitated
by the -orolonged period of inclement weather which ren
dered roads impassable, not only to trucks, but also to
LVT's, tractors, and trailers. During this same period,
enemy resistance slackened somewhat and our assault
units advanced rabidly, rendering the sunoly situation
even more critical.
During this period, four hundred fifty six (456)
planeloads of supplies were parachuted to front-line
units, the results of which were excellent. From three
(3) to five (5) assault battalions were supplied by air.
The bulk of supplies dropped consisted of rations, ammu
nition and water, although in isolate-d Instances, medi
cal supplies and signal items were dropped.
Planes used for air drops were part of the Tactical Air Force. Requests for planes were submitted to the Corps Gr-4 on' the day prior to date of delivery. Because the availability of planes was not at ail times sufficient, and in order to cooperate with the III Amphibious Corps Air Delivery Section, it was decided to attempt to stand ardize an air drop for an Infantry battalion. An add itional reason for a standardized air drop was that dur ing the period when the Division was supplying a number of assault battalions the situation arose where the unit scheduled to receive the drop at a specific time was unable to do so at that time because of forward movement, enemy resistance or some other factor. When this situ ation was encountered, and when the standard drop x r s â being utilized, it was a simple matter to tell the planes via radio to drop to the next scheduled unit. If the stand ard drop was not used, it was necessary for the planes to return to the field, unload and reload and. taê off for the next scheduled drop, thus consuming valuable time. The standard drop was used by this Division for a
period of two days and did not prove in all situations to
^rc
0^
be satisfactory. Units were in need of specie! items

which could reach them only by air, also other units
were engaged 1& heavier fighting and required no re ammu
nition and less rations. In spite of the foregoing,
however, it is felt that when several units must be
supplied by air a standard dror>' should be used whenever
practicable.
On 12 June elements of CT-7 reached KUNISHI RIDGE
and the use of the supply route to them was denied to us
by the enemy. Some sullies were carried forward by
tanks, but the bulk of the supplies were delivered: by
air. This situation continued through 17 June when the
enemy pocket was eliminated and the supply situation
became less critical.
The utmost cooperation on air deliveries was rend
ered by all .echelons; the G--4 Section of the III Amphib
ious Corps, the III Amphibious Corps Air Delivery Section
and pilots of the Tactical Air Force. It would have
been Impossible for this Division to maintain its rate
of advance during the period of inclement weather, If
supplies had not been delivered by air. Approximately
two hundred (200) tons of supplies were dropped to
assault units during operations in SOUTHERN OKINAWA and
the value of this means of supply cennot be over-eirmha sized.
AMMUNITION'SUPPLY
See Enclosures I and II for number of units-of fire
expended, and tons of ammunition expended during oper
ations in SOUTHERN OKINAWA.
Each Infantry regiment, from its attached motor
transport company, furnished its own trucks for hauling
ammunition. Regimental Ordnance Officers knew what they
were to haul and could designate the items for priority
handling. Regiments utilizing their own transportation
could haul direct to Battalions, thus eliminating unneces
3ary loading and unloading.
Each Regimental truck train stopped at the Division
Ammunition Officer's office and obtained the necessary
Transportation Orders. At the same time they would pick
up necessary working parties and, if needed, guides.
nrfl AOCiriC
*6kASOT
Although no personnel were available In the Division *

for running a Division ASP, oersonnel of the Ordnance
Company were used as ammunition handlers and established
an ASP for critical items. 0 n 22 May the 1st Platoon of
the 3rd Ammunition Company of the 7th Service Regiment
was attached to the Division. This enabled the Division
to furnish labor for loading all ammunition for the in
fantry regiments and the tank battalion. This greatly
eased the labor problem for the above units.
*t:^M
Artillery ammunition sutrnly was handled as described

below. Upon receiving an allocation for artillery ammu
nition from the Corps Ordnance Officer, the Division
Ammunition Officer would telephone the allocation to the
Artillery Ammunition Officer who, In turn, would make
allocations to the various artillery battalions. Each
battalion transported its own ammunition. The artillery
regiment furnished its own transportation and necessary
working parties. No difficulty other than lack of
amounts of certain type>s of ammunition was experienced
and satisfactory levels were maintained.
ORDNANCE
Throughout operations in SOUTHERN OKINAWA, one pla
toon of the Division Ordnance Company was attached to
each regimental combat team. The headauarters platoon
of the Division Ordnance Company functioned under Div
ision control and handled overflow work from the platoons
attached to infantry regiments and, in addition, performed
fourth and fifth echelon maintenance. For this operation
the Tank Maintenance Platoon was attached to the First
Tank Battalion. The Tank Maintenance Platoon concentrated
it main efforts on tank maintenance and maintenance of
M-7's, and performed other maintenance services for which
they were particularly adapted.
Maintenance work performed by the Division Ordnance
Company from LOVE Day through 30 June arrears below:
Weapons & Instruments repaired
27 SHOTGUN, 12 ga., riot type
443 CARBINE, U.S., Cal.,30, Ml
2344 RIFLE, U.S., Cal..30, Ml
410 RIFLE, automatic, Browning, Cal..30
inmu^r
DESEOTE
Weapons & Instrumenta repaired 85 40 48 12 100 36 16 61 14 52 55 43 5 19 3 7 1 38 18 1 2 5 44 76 11 8 13 63 3 1 3 46 3 4 65 29 6 8 1
(Cont'd)
GUN, machine, Browning, Cal..30, M1919A4

MOUNT, tripod, Cal..30, M2
GUN, machine, Browning, Ca1..30, M1917A1
MOUNT, tripod, Cal..30, M1917A1
GUN, submachine, Thompson, Cal..45
PISTOL, automatic, Cali.45, M1911 & K1911A1
GUN machine, Browning, Cal..50, M2 HB
LAUNCHER, rocket, AT, 2.36M, M9
FLAME THROWER, M2-2
MORTAR, 60mm
MORTAR 81mm
GUN, AT 37mm
HOWITZER, Pack, 75mm
HOWITZER, 105mm
HOWITZER, 105mm (in M7 carriage)
CIRCLE, Aiming, Ml
GENERATOR (f/Milly & Molly)
GLASS, Field, 6 x 30, pr.
GLAS3, Field, 7 x 50, pr.
LIGHT, Aiming Post
LIGHT, Instrument
QUADRANT, Gunner's, Ml
MILLY
MOLLY
SIGHT, Panoramic, Ml
SIGHT, Panoramic, M12A2
TELE3C0PE M6 (f/37mm)
SIGHT, M4
SPOTTER, flash, artillery, British
TELESCOPE, B.C., M1915A1
TELESCOPE, M70
TELESCOPE, rifle, Sniper's, Unertl
TIMER, Swiss
TRANSITS
WATCH, wrist, Elgin
WATCH, wrist, Hamilton
WATCH, wrist, Waltham
WATCH, wrist, Miscellaneous
WIND INDICATOR
Maintenance work performed by the Tank Maintenance

Platoon is not included in above.
-8
3&0
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CASUALTY EVACUATION BY OY
*
PLXN
^ ( ' ' ' " ^ ' ^ w ^ - ^ y*
*AFSC
By 9 June the evacuation road net from forward

units to rear hospitals was in extremely poor condition s and it was necessary to provide alternate means of trans
ferring casualties to the rear. Consequently, a cub
landing strip was built two thousand (2000) yards in
rear of the fron lines and placed in operation on 11 June.
Planes evacuating patients continued to operate from this
strip until the conclusion of operations in SOUTHERN
OKINAWA. During this time the following numbers of front
line casualties of the First Marine Division (Rein) were
evacuated to rear hospitals:
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
June June June June June June June June June June June June Total
52 67 35 82 72 68 73 89 54 22 14 13 641
The value of this means of evacuating casualties cannot

be over-stressed. Casualties were evacuated from the
medical clearing station to rear hospitals, a distance
of twelve (12) miles, in less than eight (8) minutes,
obviating the necessity of a land haul over roads practi
cally non-existent.
RESUPPLY
CLASS I. Receipt of this class supply throughout
the OKINAWA Operation was without Incident. Supply
levels were maintained sufficient for all demands. (See
Enclosure III.) All ration dumps were placed directly
under I scorn control early in April. It then became an
Iscom responsibility for establishing ration dumps in
forward areas to facilitate the supply of the combat units
H a
-9 r
CLASS II. Items of this class were considered

critical during the operation in SOUTHERN OKINAWA. Re
ceipts of items such as ponchos, shelter halves, packs,
BAR belts, stationery sullies and tentage were at no
time adequate. Ponchos were in a critical status since
the beginning of the operation, and resupply was not
sufficient to meet the constant demand.
Spare parts for Motor Vehicles, Engineer Equipment,
and Bakery Equipment were sorely needed durlnp* the entire
operation. These items were not received in Quantities
sufficient to meed demands. In particular are those
parts for 1-ton trucks, tractors, LVT's, cranes, and road
building equipment, the lack of which- caused much equip
ment to be "deadlined" when badly needed by assault
units.
Receipt of major items of motor transportation was
satisfactory. Few requisitions were back-ordered and
all requests within reason were promptly filled.
Stationery and office supplies were not available.
In particular: mimeograph paper, stencils, ink, pencils,
pads and NAVMC Forms. With the large dissemination of
intelligence data, attack orders, operation and admin
istrative orders and the quantity of paper required for
the administrative functioning of a Division, the amounts
furnished by resupply facilities were totally inadequate.
Items of Engineer Equipment such as acetate, grease
pencils, overlay paper, drafting supplies and certain
photographic materials were classed as "critical items"
during the operation due to their scarcity.
CLASS III. A n items of adequate quantities with the #2, and Gear Lube 140. (See maintained during operations this class were received in
exceptions of Grease, G.P.,
Enclosure IV for Fuel Levels^
in SOUTHERN OKINAWA.)
CLASS IV. The resupply of fortification material

(sand bags, concertina and barbed wire) was not sufficient
to meet urgent needs in the early phase of operations in
SOUTHERN OKINAWA.
CLASS V. In the early stage of operations in SOUTHERN
OKINAWA, many items of ammunition were critical, and conse
quently, their expenditure was controlled by Corps order.
These items were 81mm Mortar light shell and heavy shell
with instantaneous fuse; 60mm Mortar Illuminating shell 75mm ( t T Shellf HE, w/fuse, M48; 105mm shell, w/fuse, M48;
fR and 105mm Howitzer shell, WPW
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TONS OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN OKINAWA
I MAY - 2 2 JUNE 1945
IQQQ
975
950
925
900
875
850
825
800
775
750
725
700
675
650
625
600
575
550
525
500
475
450
425
400
375
350
325
300
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0 1 2
-. *
| 1
1
1
A
/
1
I
\ I
\ \ <
(|
_jj
U 1
1
u
/
r
l\
J\ \
/ /
\\
i
__
3 4
9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 2
JUfC
3 4
8 9
10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
ENCLOSURE E
RATION LEVEL OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN OKINAWA I MAY - 2 2 JUNE 1945

300 290 200 270
_..
._. _.._
.__
|
i
260
250 240 230 220
.__._.
i
- __ ._.
....
._._ .._. -
___ - - -
210 200 190 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 1 j
VI
i
!
I 1
i
A
Sy
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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
0
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i
i
1
\
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1
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1 1
] MAT
10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 2 23 2 4 25 26 27 2 8 29 30 31
JUNE
1 2
3 4
10 II 12
M 15 16 17 18 19 2 0 21 22
ENCLOSURE
37/
FUEL LEVELS OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN OKINAWA I MAY - 22 JUNE 1945

100
MOTOR
GAS
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
0 1 2
MAT
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 2 6 27 28 29 30 31
1
JUNE
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
z o
-1 -1
tn
100
WHITE !
1
GAS
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
0 1 2 3 4
I
<
u. O </>
s
i
i
</i
D O
X
AND
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0 31
1
JUM
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 16 19 2 0 21 22
100
DIESEL
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1 1
n
** ^v
~v| s
* ^> s ^
A , / s V
AWP
0 1 2
MAY
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 0 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 26 2 7 2 8 29 3 0 31
1 2
JUS
3 4
10 II
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 0 21 22
ENCLOSURE E?
3-7^
U\S!!F
SHORE PARTY ANNEX

Nansei Shoto
The First Pioneer Battalion and attached units consti

tuting the Division Shore Party arrived at the target area
with the primary mission <j unloading the assault shipping
of the First Marine Division in as short a time as possible.
This Division was embarked on fifteen (15) APAs and
AKA's, twenty-four (24) LSTs, two (2) LSDs and five (5)
LSMBSo
The Division Shore Party was organized into two prima
ry groups; one to operate afloat, the other ashore The
Pioneer Battalion provided personnel to supervise and con
trol unloading as well as operators for equipment used,
while attached units were used as ships platoons, boat
riders and labor
The plan of operation provided for unloading of cargo
from ships into small boats by ship's platoons; for boat
riders to assist with handling of cargo loads at ships and
at the transfer line; for movement of cargo in nets to
barge mounted cranes off the reef; for transferring net
loads to LVTs and DUKW's, and for ferrying cargo therein
across the reef to beach dumps<> LVT Bs were to carry assault
troops ashore before being released for the unloading of
cargo, and DUKWs were to transport Division Artillery ashore
and build up><aj supply of two units of fire of artillery
ammunition at the gun positions before being released to the
Shore Party Commando
Each APA was assigned eight (8) LGVP loads for priority cargo and in addition,, thirty-four (34) LCM's and two (2) LCTs were loaded with priority cargOo This made a total of approximately one thousand (1000) tons of priority cargo In addition, fifty (50) amphibious cargo trailers were employed to provide immediate supplies to assault units* The First Pioneer Battalion and attached units, consist ing of two hundred and eight (208) officers and four thousand four hundred and sixty five (4465) enlisted men, Included the following units? Naval Beach Party; 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, less Shore Fire Control and Air Liaison Sections; three platoons of the Military Police Company, First Marine Division; one-half of the 11th Special Naval Construction Battalion; detachment of the 145th Naval Construction Battal ion; detachment of the First Motor Transport Battalion; and 29th and 32nd Replacement DraftSo H P ft I tk 4% 4%
Personnel of the Pioneer Battalion were used primarily

to control the movement of cargo in the beach area, to
improve and construct roads for handling of cargo to the
dump areas, and to operate barge mounted cranes at the
transfer line,, The Military Police controlled movement
of traffic on the beach and in the dumps, handled p'oWs
and civilians, and guarded dumps against looting,, The
4th JASCO established communication, both by wire and
radio, laterally/ along the beach between the dumps and
the Beach Command Post, and by radio and visual from
shore to control boats off shore. The Naval Beach Party
provided radio and visual communication between the
shore and ship^ provided Beach Evacuation Stations to
supplement those of the Pioneer B attalion, and'controlled
the movement of the boats from the ships to the transfer
line0 The 145th Naval Construction Battalion provided
ship" s platoons as did the 11th Special Naval Construct
ion B attalion and portions of the 29th and 32nd Replace
ment Drafts,, Boat riders were furnished by the 145th
Naval Construction Battalion, 11th Special Naval Con
struction Battalion, First Motor Transport Battalion, and
the 29th and 32nd Replacement Drafts0 T he greater por
tions of the 29th and 32nd Replacement Drafts were used
as beach and dump labore
The first unit of the Shore Party, consisting of the
Plank Marking Section of Company "Cw landed on Beaches Blue
One and Two with the sixth wave at H hour plus thirty (30)
minuteso The Company Commander and the Reconnaissance
Section landed with the 7th x r v at H hour plus forty (40)
âe minuteso No opposition was encountered on the beach and
the flank and dump markers were erected,, The remainder of
the company and attached JASCO units were called ashore at
1030 and arrived at 1200 Heavy equipment arrived, roads
were improved, dumps were established initially up to three
hundred (300) yards inland and the beach was ready to re
ceive cargo at 13000
The Company Commander of H B M Company with the Flank
Marking and Reconnaissance Sections landed on Beaches Yel
low One and Two with the thirteenth wave at H hour plus
one hundred twenty (120) minutes, encountered no opposition
and erected the flank and dump markers. The remainder of
the company and attached JASCO units were called in at 1100
and arrived at 1200. Heavy equipment arrived, roads were
constructed to selected dump sites up to four hundred (400)
yards inland and the beach was ready to receive cargo at
1400 o
* OECLA
37*
Headquarters and Service Company landed on call at v " 1402 on the left flank of Beach Yellow One, set up the
Division Shore Party Command Post and assumed control of
operations of Beaches Blue One and Two and Yellow One and
Twoc

A reconnaissance was made of Beach Yellow Three to
determine the feasibility of using Beach Yellow Three for
the direct landing of small craft Beach conditions Justi
fied the intended use of Yellow Three and at 1530 Company
H B
A was called ashore to land on Beach Yellow Two and pre
pare Yellow Three for the receiving of cargo0 Company nAw
landed at 1800 and set up a defense of the right flank of
Yellow Twoo
The 29th and 32nd Replacement Drafts were called on to
the beach and arrived in the late afternoon of LOVE Dayc
These troops were utilized that night in the preparation of
the Beach Defense0 The defenses were strengthened by the
strategic use of armored amphibian tractors which were not
required for the support of front line troops0
Communications between the beach and the ships was
established by Naval Beach Parties who landed with the com
mand elements of each beach Lateral telephone and radio
communication between the beaches and telephone communica
tion between the dumps and the command post of each beach
was established by the JASCO elements in the afternoon of
LOVE DayQ
Due to the fact that transfer barges did not arrive on
the transfer line at schedule time, priority cargo was
transferred by hand from small boats at the edge of the
reef to LVTs for further transportation to the dumps and
direct delivery to front line troops0 By 1800 of LOVE Day
only six of the twelve transfer barges had arrived to com
mence transfer of cargo as planned0 Unloading of priority
cargo continued on a full scale until the morning of LOVE
plus two days, at which time general unloading of assault
shipping commenced*
TThe unloading of priority cargo was seriously impeded
by the late arrival of barge mounted cranes which were to
establish the transfer llne0 These barges which were car
ried aboard LSTs were to have proceeded immediately to the
APA's and AKA 0 s, receive their cranes and then proceed to
the transfer linec Two of the barges were lost in transit
to the target area and the full transfer line was not esta
blished until LOVE plus two days0
On LOVE*plus one day, the feasibility o*^^êachil!gÊ^^T, s

on the reef at high tide was determined and operations com
menced on Beaches Blue One and Yellow Two- Vehicles were
driven or towed across the reef and cargo was discharged in
to LVT's and DUKW's which were now operating under direct
control oll the Shore Party Commanders.
The Commanding Officer of Company "A" on LOVE plus one
day began the preparation of Beach Yellow Three by clearing
underwater obstacles and hulks from the channel, repairing
roads of egress and organizing dump area. Beach defenses
were established on the night of LOVE plus one day and car
go was received on the beach early on the morning of LOVE
plus two days.
Two LSM's were landed on Beach Yellow Three and unload
ed directly to the dumps with the use of trucks. However,
it was decided to discontinue the use of Beach Yellow Three
for unloading LSM's because more tonnage could be handled
across the beach from LCVP's, LCM'S and LCT's0 Also there
was the danger of an LSM blocking the narrow channel and
putting this beach entirely out of operation. Ten slots
were developed on Beach Blue One A channel was cut through
the reef at Beaches Yellow one and Blue Two. LCVPs and LCM's
were brought directly to the beach at high tide and unloaded
at the beach line into DUKW's and LVT's by means of long boom
cranes0
G-eneral unloading of cargo continued from the morning
of LOVE plus two days, 3 April, to 13 Aprilo A summary of
the unloading progress of the ships was received until
1600, 3 April, at which time forty-five per cent (45$) of
the assault shipping aboard the APA's and AKA's had been
unloaded. Progress reports were not received from the ships
for the period ending 1600, 5 April and 1600, 6 Aprilo No
tonnage figures were obtainable for the L3T8s of the III
Amphibious Corps and these LST's were estimated to have car
ried six hundred fifty (650) tons of cargo eache Approxi
mately eight hundred forty (840) tons of cargo for the XXIV
Army Corps in addition to numerous vehicles were received on
Beach Yellow Three The average daily tonnage unloaded by
the Shore Party up to 13 April was three thousand fifty
(3050) tons. Checking of supplies in the dump was assumed
by the Division Quartermaster on 4 April8 Control of the
movement of supplies to forward areas was also handled by
the Division Quartermaster.
Evacuation of casualties for the first seven days was
conducted by five evacuation stations; two were operated
by the medical personnel of the Pioneer Battalion,and three
wesa^.peâÛgy the Medical Section of the Naval Beach
v All evacuation stations were operated under the direction " of the Senior Medical Officer of the Battalion,, With the
completion of unloading of assault shipping all evacuation
stations were operated " y the Battalion Medical personnel
b and all stations except one on Beach Yellow Two were closed.,
Casualties were evacuated from the beach by LVT6 and DUKWs
to the transfer line and there loaded aboard small boats to
LST (H)s for further disposition to the Hospital ships
Enemy p&anes attacked the unloading areas on the even

ing of LOVE Day0 Five air attacks and about twenty air
alerts during the first twelve days of the operation did
not seriously impede the unloading operations. Casualties
resulting from enemy action were few0
Stockades for POWs and civilians were erected on
Beaches Blue One and Yellow Two under the supervision of
the attached Military Police, until the Division Stockade
was established on 3 April0 No POWs were apprehended in the
the beach areas but numerous civilians were taken into
protective custody*
A transient center covering two hundred (200) yards by
five hundred (500) yards was established about eight hundred
(800) yrds inland from Beach Blue Two All personnel sepa
rated from their units or in transit to the forward area were
bivouacked in this area0 Sanitary and messing facilities
were established,,
Control of LVT's and DUKWs was facilitated by the pre
sence of a dispatcher at each dump entrance and a liaison
officer at the Shore Party Command Post, All problems
arising in the use of amphibious vehicles were handled direct
ly through these channels. No serious difficulties were en
countered and excellent control was maintained at all times.
All beaches worked twenty-four (24) hours a day for the
first five (5) days,, In most cases labor was worked for
fourteen (14) hours out of twenty-four (24)Q All equipment
operators were on duty twenty (20) hours a day for the first
five (5) days,, All dump officers were on duty twenty (20)
hours a day until all ships of the Division were unloaded.
Commencing on 8 April, unloading was retarded by the weather
and eight (8) hour shifts were instituted for all personnel.
This was aided by the return of ship's platoons and boat
riders to the labor pools at the dumps. More officers train
ed in Shore Party Procedure could have been used during the
initial days to relieve the strain on dump officers. More
labor could have been used during the flrst_five days of
unloading to decrease the fatigue of be<
PI A^tnrn
Generally, all heavy equipment of>ttie Battalion was

adequate for the task assigned,, There was'a'definite early
shortage of trucks and more could have been used in the movement
of supplies that arrived directly at the beach in small
boatSo It was found that the crane mounted on the TD-14
Diesel Tractor was not satisfactory for the use needed be
cause the boom was too short. The crane mounted on the CT-9
Trackson Crane was suitable for work in the dumps because it
had a longer boom0 The swing crane of five (5) ton capacity
with thirty (30) foot booms proved invaluable both on the
barges and forunloading boats ashore.
The First Pioneer Battalion and attached units con
stituting the First Marine Division Shore Party were at
tached to the III Amphibious Corps for operational control
on 13 April.
From 13 April until the completion of Phase II, the
First Marine Division Shore Party unloaded fourteen thousand
two hundred twenty eight (14228) tons of garrison and re supply shipping and were still engaged in unloading operations
at the completion of Phase II of the OKINAWA Operation*,
nrn îFiFn
%# * * &MEDXCAL ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Medical planning was in accordance with directives from
higher authority and with SoOPo, and based upon experience
gained in previous operations. The medical plan has shown the
benefit of proper planning prior to the operation,.
Late in January 1945 a Medical Officer, with wide experien
ce in clinical medicine, was assigned temporary duty as the rep
resentative of the Division Surgeon to investigate health con
ditions found in the operations at LEYTE, GUAM and SAIPAN, His
investigations showed that this step was invaluable in the pro
per planning of an operation. Many of the diseases expected on
OKINAWA were found in LEYTE. As a result of this investigation
proper recommendations were mp.de to the staff, resulting in no
cases of Schistosomiasis and negligible dysenteries, in spite
of the fact that great numbers of streams have been found to be
contaminated,.
Loading of medical supplies, equipment and personnel was
done in such a way as to give maximum dispersal,,
Sanitary conditions aboard the various ships were excell
ent* Daily inspections by troop and ship's medical officers
maintained a very high degree of sanitation Sick call showed
a negligible amount of sicknesses requiring hospitalization.
Heads were adequate. Galleys and messing facilities were excell
ent, galley personnel of the ships were aided by troop cooks
and messmen0
Medical personnel attached to the line Battalions and Reg iments landed with their units at various times on LOVE DAY, The Medical Battalion started landing on Love plus One and by Love plus Six all medical battalion personnel and equipment was ashore without loss, On Love plus Five Medical Companies "D" - "E" and H&S Medical Battalion started erection of the Division Field Hospital Patients were received on Love plus Seven0 The Field Hospital was located on the main North-South
highway and provided easy access for ^j^ttl^tf|s.j|Ewc|y|ion pro-
0&^::^:%i**& '*
ceeded smoothly Cover was partly natural and partly artific ial9 camouflage nets being used to great advantage0 The wards, admission tent, laboratory, pharmacy, operating room and X-Ray were dug in to a depth of three or four feet and banked with sand bagSo All essential departments were light proofed and all work was able to continue in emergencies0 Sufficient cots' were set up to care for 200 cases, with a reserve oh hand to expand to 400 in an emergency^ Evacuation for the first week was from the beaches to LST (H) 949 and 950, which had been designated as casualty receiving shipso All evacuation was promptand all casualties received adequate treatment in a very short while after being wounded. After the first week all evac uations were through the Division Field Hospital and the III Corps Evacuation Hospital N d 30 A total of 460 combat casualties were treated, of these
524 were evacuated and 136 returned to duty0 Three died of
wounds while under treatment0 Disease and injuries (acciden
tal) totalled 1084, of these 447 were evacuated, 60? returned
to duty and 4 died0 A grand total of 1544 cases were treated0
At this time a total break down by types is not available0
One Hospital Corpsman and 19 marine enlisted personnel are
attached to combat teams to serve as sanitary squads* Their
function is immediate non-specific insect control in the combat
area during the assault phase0 These teams are supplied with
DDT in Oil and spraying equipment and have proven invaluable in
their specific taskSo
Until water points could be established and tested, all
water used by this Division was either obtained from ships or
was combat loaded at the staging area0 The first water point
used distillation, later the method involved filtration and
chlorinatlon was adopted,. As water points were established,
weekly analysis was maintained,, No outbreaks of any water borne diseases have been encounteredo
C" and HK" rations have been used by combat troops and
have been satisfactory as to quantity and quality* A number of
10 in 1 rations have been used, and have proven far superior to
all other ratlonso No hot food has been prepared until screened
galleys were available^ as well as boiling water for cleansing
[Q outbreaks of any gastrointestinal diseases have fe^T'e^flc'o'Snêredo
2c
ASSiFIE
The Sanitary Squads following the combat teams spray all

dead bodies and the adjacent ground with DDT in Oil0 Enemy dead
as well as civilian dead and livestock have been sprayed and
burled bj- working squads where found, Our dead have been collect
ed and transported to the Division Cemetery* There is a crying
need for more personnel and transportation for the Graves Reg
istration Section,, This addition would greatly expedite removal
of dead, which is a much desired condition, both for a sanitary
reason, as well as morale0
Each combat team is supplied with one dental officer to
take care of emergency dental treatment Each Medical Company
has a regularly assigned Dental Officer with a field u#it to
ta ke care of all dental cases that may arise0 This number of
dentists is considered adequate. In addition, each Dental Off
icer assigned to the Forward Echelon received extensive train
ing at a Fleet Hospital during the month of January 1945 in An
esthesia o This training has proven invaluable, in that medical
officers have been allowed to care for many more patients than
they could have ordinarily been able to0
A negligible number of civilians have been cared for, inas much as the Military Government medical activities have been functioning throughout this operation and all casualties have been referred to them0 Forward units have given emergency first aid treatment and routed civilians to the military government installationso Laboratory examinations of selected groups of civilians have shown negative results for Malaria and ZZ% pos itive for FilariaslSo Actual prisoners of war requiring treatment have been prac
tically nilc They have been evacuated through the regular chain
of evacuation to the III Corps Medical Battalion
The Medical Organisation is considered suitable. As oper
ations enlarge in scope to cover more territory, consideration
will have to be made for more vehicular transportation than is
allowed, especially the larger ambulances.
Medical Department Personnel has been adequate in the com
missioned ranks, enlisted personnel should be carried in at
**>^
least a 10$ excess Line Hospital Corpsmen have always suffered

heavy casualties and there should be a readily available supply
for replacement for these trained men0 All personnel have been
highly trained, both prior to arrival with the Division and in
the divisional training prior to mounting out0 It is understood
that the Medical Battalion is now allowed a trained Psychiatrist*
As yet, none have been ordered to this Division and such an add
ition is highly desirable
Field Medical Equipment has been adequate There have been no losses atributable to pilferage or combat Armed guards sho uld always be placed over medical supplies Resupply has been good, but due to the low priority of medical supplies, receipt in some cases has been quite slow0 Each division should have an adequate supply of replacement parts on hand for all equipment so that a medical salvage unit could operate0 Such an organiza tion would save much time on critical equipment in the field, A thirty day supply of all medical supplies are carried in
to combat, except on a few critical items that are not in stock
at any medical supply facility These Items have usually beens
Iodine Ampules, Brandys Merthiolate^ and Adhesive Tape, In many
cases resupply has been poor and it seems to be the fault of the
procurement agencies in the United States,, Block shipments
would be adequate and an ideal solution, if they would be ship
ped in the amounts necessaryfl but as in cases of resupply many
items have been deleted, and by the time the block shipment ar
rives, it is usually too late to try procurement by other means
prior to mounting out for an operation
Attached to the Medical Battalion there ares 6 - 2^ ton M5
trucks; 5 - 1 ton 4x4 Cargo trucks and 2 - i ton 4x4 (Jeep)
trucks; 7 - 3/4 ton Dodge Ambulances; 3 - J.ton 4x4 ambulances
and 32 - i ton 4x4 (jeep) ambulances; 5 - 3i ton Amph0 Trailers;
5 - 7 KVA Generators; 4 Ster Shower units and 5 Water trailers,,
No losses to any rolling stock were sustained. All ambulances
are utilized in carrying patients and the trucks for carrying
all supplies and equipment for the Battalion. Servicing has
been regular and all vehicles have stood up well under the con
stant use0 On short operations covering short distances, the
present number of truck and ambulances are adequate, however,
as operations cover more territory a definite need fo more ve
hicles will ariseo The Dodge ambulance has proven far superior
to the standard International now in use and much improvement
in handling of stretcher casualties would result in the use of
this type ambulanceo The Jeep ambulance, now in use, could be
' - > * i #
*-
?*Y
doubled In efficiency if the Army style Jeep ambulance were a doptedo Our present type carries two stretchers and the Army
type carries four stretchers.
The full allowance of quartermaster supplies were carried
and have been adequate. Some losses in smail items occured at
the beaches on landing. These items weres storage tents, tent
poles, shovels, picks and other engineering tools0 These loss
es were replaced in a short while. Resupply has been adequate.
Prior to the operation, each medical company was issued 200'
suits of khakio This practice is considered ideal and should
always be continued, as morale of evacuees is greatly elevated
by bathing and having clean uniforms. Supplies have been
adequate with the exception of ward tents. Each Medical Com
pany could operate much more efficiently with 5 ward tents each0
Bakery equipment should be incorporated into the galley equip
ment of each Medical Battalion, the value of good hot food being
ea-sily seen0 Supplies and equipment are suitable.
Epidemic and Malaria Control equipment and supplies have
been adequate,, Fifty men with heavy equipment were assigned to
this unit from the attached Construction Battalion and proved
to be valuable. This practice should be continued so that a
high degree of efficiency can be maintained. These same person
nel should remain attached to this unit for the entire operation
both for operation and administration purposes. This would pre
vent the loss of trained personnel and discipline would be im
proved,
RECOMMENDATIONSi
(1) That unit commanders be held strictly accountable for
sanitation in their area3, ,
(2) That the amount of large ambulances be increased, A
total of twenty-five (25) is considered to be the minimum num
ber that will enable the Medical Battalion to properly evacuate
patients over large land masses that will invariably be en
countered in future operations,
(3) That steps be taken to replace all International Ambu lances with Dodge Ambulances0
nr '] .v?tirirn
Phase I I I
On 30 A p r i l 1945 when elements of t h e D i v i s i o n s t a r t e d moving t o t h e Southern S e c t o r "ABLE" Medical Company was moved n e a r ISA (TA 8280-X) and immediately s t a r t e d r e c e i v i n g c a s u a l t i e s on t h e same d a t e . Due t o the r>roxlmlty of the main NorthSouth Highway "BAKER" Medical Company was moved on the f o l l o w i n g day t o J o i n "ABLE" Company and form an advanced D i v i s i o n F i e l d H o s p i t a l . C a s u a l t i e s were r e c e i v e d i n p;ood c o n d i t i o n end i n s u b s t r n t i a l numbers. This advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l w?s l o c a t ed behind a l a r g e r i d g e which p r o v i d e d ample r>rbtectlon from t h e o c c a s i o n a l enemy a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s e n c o u n t e r e d . Keeping pace w i t h t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n "CHARLIE" Medical Company on 2 May 1945 was moved t o UCHITOMARI (TA 7877-K), r e c e i v i n g c a s u a l t i e s on t h e same d a y . With t h i s Medical Company l o c a t e d a p r o x i m a t e l y two miles s o u t h of the advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l , and on t h e main North-South Highway, a smooth r u n n i n g c a s u a l t y e v a c u a t i o n system was e s t a b l i s h e d . The main D i v i s i o n H o s p i t a l composed of H&S Medical B a t t a l i o n , "DOG" and "EASY" Medical Companies remained n e a r CHIBANA (TA 8788-H) u n t i l 24 May 1945 a t which time i t was moved n e a r FUTE4A (TA 8 0 8 3 - 1 ) . P r i o r t o t h i s time and w h i l e under t h e XXIV Corps t h e chain of e v a c u a t i o n had been from our advanced F i e l d H o s p i t a l s t o t h r e e Army F i e l d H o s p i t a l s i n c l o s e proxim i t y . During t h i s p e r i o d t h e Army Medical D e p a r t m e n t ' s c o o p e r a t i o n was a t a l l times e x c e l l e n t , a d d i t i o n a l ambulances, s u p p l i e s and l a u n d r y s e r v i c e s were g l a d l y f u r n i s h e d at a l l t i m e s . Without t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l ambulances our s i t u a t i o n would have been c r i t i c a l . I t was d e s i r e d t o move t h r e e Medical Companies f u r t h e r South d u r i n g t h e l a s t week i n May, but t h e Impassable roads made t h i s i m p o s s i b l e and no moves could be made u n t i l 7 June 1945 a t which time "ABLE" Medical Company was moved t o NAHA (TA 7 3 7 2 - T ) . The move ^Tas s t a r t e d a t dawn and by 1600 t h e same day c a s u a l t i e s were b e i n g r e c e i v e d and t r e a t e d . No attempt was made t o u t i l i z e any b u i l d i n g s i n t h e c i t y as i t has been found t h a t a much b e t t e r s i t e f o r a h o s p i t a l can be o b t a i n e d by u t i l i z i n g a b u l l d o z j r . t o push away a l l pf^tfrtff; fcul&d-Jhngw, Kiiwkpther
debris, leaving a much better surface for tents with less

chance of encountering mud during the rainy spells. This loca
tion T r s on the main North-South Highway as well as the West
-a ern terminus of the East-West Highways. Evacuation from this
medical company was via ambulance and LVT to an LST (H) an
chored off an estuary approximately one mile North of the city
of Naha. After Nana harbor had been cleared an evacuation point
was established at a dock in NAHA approximately 400 yards from
the Medical Company.
On 8 June 1945 "BAKER" Medical Company was moved to TSU KASAN (TA 7867-0) and started receiving and caring for casual
ties the same evening. For about ten days the casualty flow was
rather heavy, but the fast moving of the infantry soon left
this Medical Company behind the usual route of evacuation and
on 20 June 1945 it was moved to ZAWA (TA 7562-V), remaining at
this location through the end of the operation.
Taking advantage of fair weather conditions and the avail
ability of transportation^ "CHARLIE" Medical Company on 10 June
1945 was moved into NAHA to temporarily bivouac with "ABLE" Com
pany while awaiting an advantageous opportunity to move further
South. On 13 June 1945, immediately after the highway between
NAHA and ITOMAN was ot>en to traffic, this convDany was moved near
ITOMAN (TA 7364-Y) adjacent to the main NorthlSouth Highway.
Upon order of the Corps Surgeon, III Amphibious Corps, a trailer
Operating Room was sent on 14 June 1945 to aid the Medical Com
pany in it's surgery. This unit performed remarkably well and
the operating team with it performed 25 surgical operations.
Hospitalization throughout this campaign has been entire
ly adequate and the medical facilities in the Division are con
sidered adequate. Penicillin and whole blood have been used ex
tensively and found extremely valuable. Whole Uood was used as
far forward as the Battalion Aid Stations as a regular procedure
and proved to be a valuable life saving factor. A total of 1057
pints of Whole Blood were transfused during the entire operation.
Throughout the entire operation 1273 surgical operations were
performed in the medical companies, exclusive of the many emer
gency surgical procedures performed in the battalion aid stations
and collecting stations.
A valuable adjunct to the medic
eration has been the amphibious trac
- 2
?tf
mmm
operating room. When utiliced as an emergency operating room

the amphibious tractor proved very valuable and veraatlle. On
at least one occasion one was ambushed with a machine gun at
very close range. Due to the armored protection no damage was
done to personnel or equipment. The blackout feature was res
ponsible for apparently saving many lives, in both collecting
and battalion aid stations. This feature allowed the surgeon
to take the patient at once into a well lighted, and practical
operating room instead of trying to work in the dark with a
flashlight under a tarpaulin or tent fly or in a small, crowd
ed blackout tent. Ample room and lighting were available for
any operating procedure, laying out"surgical instruments and
the simultaneous giving of blood, plasma or oxygen. During
heavy rains and in deep mud it afforded a dry, protected op
erating room where the patient in shock was completely pro
tected from the cold wind and rain as compared with a tarpaul
in or tent fly. Under such conditions the surgeons had a clean,
dry deck on which to stand, in contrast to standing in mud and
water up to their ankles. When moving a collecting or aid sta
tion the equipment and personnel can be placed in the tractor
which can then proceed to the next site across any kind of
terrain. Another possible use of this sort of operating room
fortunately was not necessary on this campaign. This consists
of taking the operating room to the patient where evacuation
is not possible due to terrain, heavy fire or a large number
of seriously injured in one small area. This utilization of
the amphibious tractor as an operating room has the enthusias
tic support of the line as well as medical personnel.
During the entire operation 12,896 cases were seen by the
Medical Department df this Division, classified as follows:
COMBAT K.I.A. D.O.W. W.I.A. TOTAL 1086 148 6419 7653 NON-COMBAT ACC. DEATHS 14 DIED, NAT.DEATH 3 DIED, S.I.WND 2 SICK 4737 ACC. INJ. 478 PSYCHIATRIC 2

TOTAL 5243

Evacuation throughout the Campaign was novel in that at one time or another everything with wings, wheels or tracks was
**4* ' ;: J">4w# - 3
yLnaCTWLU
3/^
utilized. During the heavy rains of late May and early June evacuation was greatly hampered by knee-deep mud on all roads, and for several days the only vehicles able to get through were 2% ton 6X6 trucks; even the amphibious tractors were bogged down many times. The break-through of the Seventh Regiment to the coast near ITOMAN allowed the collecting section of "CHARLIE Medical Company to reach this area by water while fighting was still going on both Worth and South of this point. The roads to the East still being nothing more then a quagmire, a method of evacuation had to be devised. A t the suggestion of and through arrangements made by the G^4 Section of this Division, evacua tion by Cub Plane was initiated, using a paved road that stop ped approximately 400 yards North of the collecting station. This road worked excellently as a cub strip and from 11 June 1945 until 30 June 1945, 503 of our casualties and approximate ly 200 from other units were evacuated in this manner. These casualties were flown in a matter of a few minutes to the Cub strip located near the Division Field Hospital where a Medical Offie er and sufficient ambulances were standing by to transfer them to the indicated hospitals in the rear areas. This method of evacuation should occupy paramount consideration in planning future operations, as a strip can easily be prepared and in most cases existing roads may easily be utilized. The primary thought of a casualty is to get out of the area. The Cub evac uation provides a rapid and safe method of getting casualties to hospitals in the rear. Experience has shown that this met hod of evacuation is a definite morale booster as well as life saving in that definitive surgery can be initiated much sooner. V/eesels were found to be pracically useless for evacuation be cause of their ability to carry such small numbers of casualties and their inability to negotiate heavy mud. Evacuation on fut ure operations xîll be extremely difficult unless the T/A of ambulances is increased materially, a more detailed study of this subject will be presented in the subsequent paragraph con cerning Motor Transport. Another important factor in evacua tion is the crying need for tra lned litter bearers, it is be lieved that a minimum of 100 personnel should be assigned each line Regiment as litter bearers. In those periods when the Div ision is out of combat these personnel could very well be used as service troops. DDT continues to be the ideal chemical in fly and mosquito control, it is believed that the high toxicity of Sodium Arseni te precludes it's use around combat troops. The Epidemic and Malaria Control Unit attached to this Division has been inval uable. '
*w'*iWi ^^ ->##
j
51o
This operation has nroven the need for rn adequate pool of

trained hospital corps replacements. This Division suffered 478
casualties among the hospital corps personnel, of which 49 were
killed in action, 226 wounded in action, 17 Injured end 186
sick. Dispatches were sent asking for replacements to be sent
via 8ir. On the 5th of June, 10 were received and a like number
on June 7th and 8th were also received. On the 16th and 17th
of June, after the acute need was over, 67 replacements were re
ceived. This method did not prove satisfactory as none of the
lower rated men had been into any combat area and had hardly any
idee of what to expect. It is believed that the only solution
to this situation is to order a minimum of 100 extra hospital
corpsmen to each Marine Division at least two months prior to
mounting- out for an operation. If this were done, the men could
be trained under and with experienced personnel and they would
gradually lose the feeling of insecurity usually encountered
in inexperienced personnel. After these men have been tr- ined
with the line Regiments they could be transferred to the Med
ical Battalion snd be immediately available as combat replace
ments. After the operation they could be retained to relieve
the personnel due for rotation.
It is believed that hospital corpsmen should receive more
training in basic first aid and related subjects during their
period of training at the Field Medical Schools. Experience
has shown that most men are well versed in military tactics
and lack sufficient training in basic subjects required of the
hospital corpsman.
The Psychiatrist assigned this Division reported for duty
on 15 May 1945 and ha s oroven to be a valuable asset to the med
ical organization.
On the long distances encountered on this operation the def inite need for additional trucks a n ambulances has been shown. ^d The 6 - 2k ton M5 trucks have been totally inadequate, the T /A should be at least doubled. The new T/A of i ton 4X4 (jeep) trucks is satisfactory and has shown it's merit. After thorough exoerience, it is not believed that the i ton 4X4 (jeep) ambul ance is a suitable vehicle for the Medical Companies. The 3/4 ton Dodge Ambulance has proven to be the most practical ambulance ever found for the transportation of casualties. It is believed that a more advantageous use of the Jeep ambulance could be ob tained by allocating them to the line and separate Battalions. ?o completely cover the ambulance situation in this Division, each
H n* and separate Battalion rhouJd " e PJ located one jeep ambu

b lance, and each Regimental Headauarters be allocated three jeep ambulances, Artillery Regiment and Battalions should be allocat ed ambulantSF in the came manner. Each Medical Company should be allowed ^ minimum of 6 -3/4 ton Dod*e Ambulances, and H&S Company of the Medical Battalion allowed a minimum of 10. This would allow each Medical Battalion a total of 40 - 3/4 ton Dodge Ambulances, experience on this operation has shown that this figure is not at all excessive. With the constant moving of Med ical Companies over long distances, and the heavy patient loads, the need for more 300 gallon water trailers has arisen, it is believed that the T /A'of this trailer should be doubled so that each Medical Company would be allowed two trailers instead of the one now allowed. RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That 100 personnel be allocated to each line regiment
c'urinfs combat for litter bearer duty only, in the rear areas
these men could be used as service troor>s.
(2) That each Division be allocated 100 additional hosp
ital corpsmen at least two months before an operation, for train
ing and eventual use as combat replacements.
(3) That Hospital Corosmen be given more instruction in
professional subjects in the Field Medical. Schools.
(4) That the T/A of i ton 4X4 (jeep) ambulances be changed
to allow one for each line and separate battalion and three for
each re&icental headquarters* (ARKY Tyr>e)
(5) That the hedlca 1 Battalion T/A on ambulances be
ersngsd to allow 40 - 3/4 ton Dodge ambulances and eliminate
the jeep and International ambulances.
(5) That the T/A of water trailers (300 gallon) be doubled
for ea.ch Medical Company.
***.
.-' ^ PERSONNEL ANNEX
S p e c i a l Action Report Nansei Shotc CASUALTIES AND REPLACEMENTS B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s s u s t a i n e d i n the OKINAWA o p e r a t i o n a r e summar ized: KIA OFF. SKL. F i r s t Marine Division Attached Units F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n Reinforced Combat Team E i g h t 2dMarDiv
WIA OF?. ENL. MIA OFF. E?L. DW O OF?. ENL.
54 1079 1 16
260 5993
8 105 1
1
12
11 1
139 4 143
55 1095
1 48
268 6093 9 241
12
12
A breakdovn by o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r each month i s shown below, Navy c a s u a l t i e s b e i n g shown i n p a r e n t h e s i s : KIA OFF. F i r s t Marines
April May June
TOTAL
VIA 1SML. 15
OFF.
2 ( 1)
ENL.
11
7
18
261 dc) go ( 1)
356 (11) 9
4g 15 ( 1) 65 ( 2) 45 ( 2) 67 ( 2) 6 ( 1) 41
26 ( 2)
3
% 1533 (29) 385 ( 4) 1961 (33) 29 1022 597 1648 ( 1) (24) (13) (38)
F i f t h Marines April May June TOTAL Seventh Marines

April May June * TOTAL -
9 3 12
190 ( 6) 104 ( 4) 303 (10) 31 184 92 307
4 U
c
17
( 1) (14) ( 3) (18)
160 ( 5) 964 (4*0 615 (14)
^1
DE64&S
Eleventh Marines April May June

TOTAL
1 s t Engineer Bn. -April May June TTL OA l 6 t Pioneer Bn. i^ril May June TOTAL Division Hq. Bn. April May June TOTAL 1st Tank fti.
April
May
June
TOTAL
1st Service Bn. April May June TOTAL 1st Mot. Trans. April May June TOTAL
VIA OCT, l e t M e d i c a l Bn. 4*11 May June TOTAL ML. ( 1) ( g ) ( l) (10) OFT. ( 1) ( i) ( 2) SKI, 1 3 (33} 1 (22) 5 (55)
First Marine Division 4>rU 7 May 33 June llf TOTiL 5*1 1st Anph. Tree. &u 4>ril May Jane TOTiL 8th imph. Trac. &u ifcril May June TOTiL 3rd Ann* ioqpih* n ipril May June TOTAL 3 r d Anph. Truck Co. ipril May June TOTAL l e t Assault Sig. Co. April May June TOTAL
69 671 289 1029
( 2) (3*) do) (50)
27 1^7 77 251
( ( ( (
3) 3) 3) 9)
319 3731 1752 5802
( 6) (130) (55) (191)
1 2 3
k 9 13 1 7 1 1 9 6
1 1 2
1 1
2 8 2 2
1 1
2(1) 2 k ( 1)
-3
?*
WIA _ _
fc
OFT.
3SNL.
4th Socket Bet.
4>ril May June

TOTAL
2
2
2 2
k
4 t h War Dog P i t . 4>rll May June TOTAL VMO # 3 April May June TOTAL M i l t . Govt. D e t . B - 1 0 April May June TOTAL 2Sth fiepln Kraft April May June
TOTAL
1 1
1 3 4 1

. 4
2 2
2
. 2
32d Bepln Draft April May June

TOTAL 0ojB9 7 1 3 t h Tank Bn.
7(1)
7 ( 1 )
April May June TOTAL Co.B, 8 6 t h Chem.M. Bn. April Mfl * y, June
TOTAL
2 2
10 8 18
i4 2
16
fiECLASStniB
3f.
KIA
OFF. Attached Units ipril May fune TOTAL Summary Total
USMC USE USA GHAND TOTAL 55 55 10*& 51 1095 DIED QF WOUNDS
April OFF. ENL. May OFF. 256 10 2 268 1 1 ENL. 6(1) 7 2 15 ( 1) OFF.
WIA
ENL. 31 ( 2) ^ 20 ( k) 99 ( 6)
1 5 ( 1) 1 7(1)
5^67 197 3U 6098
June ENL. OFF. ML.
First Marines Fifth Marinea Seventh Marines 1 Eleventh Marines 1st Engineer & 1st Pioneer &u Division H<i. Bn. 1st Tank fti. 1st Service Bn. 1st Mot. Trans. S i . 1st Medical ftu TOTAL, letMarBlv 1
1 k 2 7 2 9
1 1 2 1
36 18 28 1 3
3 1 " -
10 17 13 ( l ) 1 " 1 1 "'
1 6
2 -
88 1
U
-
U3 ( l )
TOTAL, Attached Units 1 G A D TOTAL RN 2
1
UU ( 1)
89
-5
PERCENTAGES OP BATTLE CASUALTIES
By Organization
* MIA^.002%
By O l a s Q i f i c a t
Casualties were reported by number covering the period

0001-2400 daily. This report was due at Army and Corps
Headquarters at noon. It is considered that this is the
most feasible period for casualty reporting for the follow
ing reasons:
(a) It enables a check with the calendar day
reports by name which are transmitted to the Navy
Department.
(b) It enables the assault battalions to obtain
an accurate picture of effective strength by allowing
them to anticipate the day's results while digging in
for the night.
It is believed that the data for a casualty report
covering any other daily period would have to be accum
ulated during attack operations, and would therefore V much less accurate.
The G-l and 3-1 weekly Periodic Reports served to cor
rect the figures submitted daily.
This Division had anticipated that Army Headquarters
would probably require a breakdown of casualty figures, as
between officers and enlisted, and separation by service.
Lower units were issued a form to be kept for their own
information which embodied the above information. Except
for requiring a change in forms reproduced, no Inconvenience
was felt when the shift was in fact ordered.
The following table shows a breakdown of replacements
received and absorbed during the conduct of the operation:
U3MC USN Replacemient OFF. ENL. OFF. ENL. Date Draft 9 0 0 0 Apr 24 32nd 0 0 34 785 24,28,29 29th 26 589 0 0 May 5 32nd 0 0 11 286 7 29 th 4 0 498 22 32nd 0 5 0 0 11 29th 0 24 0 0 32nd 0 0 25 652 16,17 46th 0 0 17 516 27,28,29 54th 0 0 24 510 57th 0 0 229 12 63rd 0 0 357 12 Jun 11 55th 0 0 14 281 16 62nd 0 98 0 0 Jun 5-18 vT O^T"'jflHf fc 206 4703 4 127
As Indicated above the two Battle Replacement Drafts

lifted in assault were not released to the Division in ap
preciable numbers for over a month. While performing
stevedore and other sundry duties, they lost a golden
opportunity for much-needed training, especially in the
patrolling phase in central and northern OKINAWA. This
subject is treated separately in COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDA
TIONS.
Other replacements received were, in compliance with
directives of Third Amphibious Corps, assigned to reserve
regiments, insofar as practicable, and received a few days
instruction and training prior to being committed.
In mid-May, over three hundred fifty emergency re
placements were assigned to an infantry regiment from
division special and service troops. Except for this
Instance, the flow of Marine replacements was beyond ex
pectations, but even so did not allow any infantry regi
ment to exceed eighty five per cent effectives.
Hospital Corpsmen were not included in replacement
drafts received subsequent to those lifted in assault,
and the lack of these was keenly felt. Even though the
Division mustered one hundred forty five from the Medical
Battalion and other separate battalions, utilizing special
skills for necessary front line aid work in the assault
regiments, such methods did not keep pace with the losses
sustained. One regiment had to organize a group of Marine
First Aid men as a substitute for Navy Corpsmen. It is
considered" that replacement drafts must have a propor
tionate number of the latter.
Inasmuch as the Division had been scheduled for early
withdrawal' from the target, Classification Personnel were
assigned temporary duty aboard sixteen APA's and two
LSTtHVs. It was planned that these personnel would fol
low casualties evacuated in assault shipping, obtaining
early information on destinations of patients and changes
in categories enroute to rear area hospitals. The plan
was executed and the early Information proved valuable,
but the full value of such method was not fully tested in
view of the light casualties sustained during April. It
is considered that the employment of the Classification
Sub-Section in this manner would prove invaluable for rapid
and accurate casualty reporting in an operation where rela
tively heavy evacuation is expected during the^
-8
to seven days. A few classification NCO's were able to

return to the Division at an early date, and provided much-
needed assistance when replacements became available in
increasing numbers.
Due to heavy infantry losses, that tyoe of replace
ment was at a premium. The number of commissary branch
replacements was entirely disproportionate, but proved
to be a means of reinforcing stretcher bearer details.
In connection with the above-mentioned details, no
entirely satisfactory solution has been found to the pro
blem of obtaining personnel for this important task.
During the operation, the same haphazard methods of
"finding" stretcher bearers had to be resorted to con
tinuously.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT:
During the rapid advance across central OKINAWA, the
number of civilians uncovered was greatly in excess of
that anticipated. Later intelligence revealed that many
had been evacuated from the heavily defended southern por
tion of the island. The experience of this Division dur
ing that phase was that once the civilians were properly
interned, the "sniper fire" and other means of passive
resistance ceased almost entirely. During Aoril, over
thirty thousand were blocked off on KATCHIN Peninsula,
the units of the Division being employed to a great extent
to accomplish this important task, with its attendant tax
ation of organic transportation.
In the southern zone only stragglers were found until
the front had passed the NAHA-YONABARU line. Then the
whole problem of evacuation was facilitated and congestion
relieved when a plan was conceived to utilize supply LST's
(with LVT's) for the rearward movement to Island Command
stockades. Over fourteen thousand were handled in this
manner during the period 9 - 2 0 June.
/ The problem of interning civilians severely taxed
organic transportation facilities. It is considered that
If 'Military Government Detachments are attached to divis
ions they should have sufficient personnel and equipment
assigned to enable them to render support.. In this con
nection, it JLs believed that such detachments should be
strengthened by organic Military Police and transportation.
See COMMENTS #ND RECOMMENDATIONS.
DEW8IFIED
*
MORALE:
The morale of the reinforced Division at the time of
the landing was excellent. It was, in fact, strengthened
by the amazing lack of resistance and the rapid advance
aeros8 central OKINAWA. The cool weather was a welcome
relief after almost two years in the tropics, as was the
change in scenery.
In view of tne fact that the Division was scheduled for early withdrawal from the target, no appreciable amount of recreation equipment was carried.* Movie equip ment was, however, Included in the scheduled L / 6 ship ping, and movies were made available to units who desired to show them on L / 17. Enemy air activity interfered with attempted programs in most cases, but the attempt to provide movies was nevertheless a factor in maintaining nigh morale. Ten-in-one rations, the new rtCH rations and the early
establishment of the Division Bakery contributed to the
well-being of the troops. Gratuitous issue of PX supplies,
and the many comfort items furnished by the Red Cross were
well received. Separate recommendations concerning aug
menting gratuitous issues have been initiated and directed
to the proper Marine Corps supply agencies.
Postal service throughout the campaign was excellent.
For the most part, airmail service to and from tfte United
States was tne fastest experienced by this Division since
its departure overseas in the Spring of 1942. Parcel Post,
however, including magazines normally distributed by the
Recreation Ori'icer, accumulated due to the changed desti
nation of the rear echelon. Some 720u bags were unloaded
from tnree snipsnot rear ecnelon snipeand the storage
and transportation of this one item was a heavy task to
place on tne already overburdened motor transport.
As the end of tne eighty tnree day operation approach
ed, morale was naturally lowered by reason of having been
employed steadily wlthouu relief from the front lines for
the last fifty five days. This, comolned with the directed
change in renabiiination areafrom HAWAII to OKINAWA where
it was once again necessary to build a campcaused a con
siderable let-down in morale.
BURIAL AND GRAVESHlS(nOTK!dgEN SERVICE:

The Division Cemetery was located by forward recon
naissance on L / 1. It was the determined intention to
select a site well off the beach, and the necessary auth
ority was obtained from Island Command in conformity with
the base development plan.
Light casualties in April allowed painstaking con
struction of the site north of HIZA, and beautificatlon
was initiated as rapidly as burials were made.
The Graves Registration Section attached one squad
of eight men to each combat team. The assigned transpor
tationtwo one-ton truckswas barely sufficient to
transport the relatively few bodies interred in April.
When the Division was committed in the southern zone,
these trucks proved entirely inadequate to cope with the
situation. It was not considered feasible to divert
transportation from important supply tasks, although one
two and one-half and one one-ton truck were obtained.
It was due only to the outstanding initiative of the
Grave8 Registration Personnel that evacuation was accom
plished by one means or another in effecting the follow
ing burials: IDENTIFIED First Marine Division Army Navy Combat Team Eight Other USMC Units including Air. GRAND TOTALS 1215 UNIDENTIFIED 32 TOTAL 1247
16 80 40 78
1429
0 3 0 0 35
16 83 40 78
1464
**S
CHAPTER :m...
-INTELLIGENCE...
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT NANSEI SHOTO...
Vor
INTELLIGENCE
Special Action Reaort
NAN3EI SHOTO
Reconnaissance and Observation Posts:
The 1st Reconnaissance Company landed on LOVE DIUS one.
On LOVE t>lus two the company was motorized and made a recon
naissance in force along the right flank of the Division Z
of A to the East Coast. This mission enabled right flank
units to advance rapidly to their objective in column.
Following this mission the company was employed in mop
ping up operations and providing security patrols in various
sectors of the Division defense sector.
Six weeks orior to embarkation higher headauarter3 in
formed the Division that it would be authorized to send a
total of seven men, one each from the assault battalions, and
one from Division Headquarters, to accompany UDT personnel on
beach reconnaissance of the Target. Division Intelligence
Section set up a school of two weeks duration in order to
train the personnel chosen for this mission. On 20 March,
1945, three officers and four enlisted were flown to LETE
where they Joined the UDT assigned to carry on the recon
naissance. On LOVE minus three and LOVE minus two, two recon
naissance missions were carried out of beach and reef con
ditions, and much valuable negative Information was obtained.
On LOVE minus one the Division personnel returned to those
ships where their respective unit commanders were embarked
and made their reports from information from questioning UDT
swimmers. This Information proved to be of great value and
supplemented that from other sources.
The Division Reconnaissance Company was assigned the
responsibility of operating all observation posts established
by Division. However, due to the rapidity of advance and
the lack of strong organized resistance by the enemy in the
Division Z of A, it was not deemed necessary to establish
Division OPs. After the first several days, OPs were set
ut) by Regiments in their defensive sectors.
Prisoners of War:
The nature of the campaign within the Z of A of the 1st Marine Division rendered the information gained from the questioning of local civilians, OKINAWA Home Guard personnel f little tactical Importance. From the an&.Jsna f&eJX** - 1
*>
MMS1F1E'
.*'+
* i , *
Hi
afternoon of LOVE-Day, when the first oirillana were brought

in, information received served to clarify the picture of the
general withdrawal of the enemy, but no information can be
said to have been of vital importance in influencing the
course of our action.
In the early days of the oampaign two problems immediate

ly became apparent. The general civilian problem and the
difficulties posed by the dialect of the OKINAWAN people.
Both, however, proved to be problems requiring improvised
methods, patience and muoh time* It was discovered that the
local inhabitants had moved, "bag and baggage11, into well
dug caves near their homes to escape the bombing and naval
gunfire* It fell upon the Division interpreters at each ech
elon to use any and all conoeivable means of inducing the
frightened civilians to come out of hiding. Language section
enlisted personnel were made available to patrols specific
ally organised for corralling all oivilians into areas desig
nated by Military Government, and proved themselves valuable*
Where it was possible to reassure the natives of their safety
throuî a loudspeaker mounted on a roving truck, many volun
tarily left their oaves and followed the instructions given
them. However, for the most part, and particularly in in
accessible areas, it was necessary for the interpreters to
enter the caves and verbally pry the dwellers loose.
In attempting to draw information from the oivilians who
understood only the OKINAWAN dialect, younger ones - girls
and boys of high school age were used successfully. The in
formation that was offered clarified and confirmed reports
that only scattered unite occupied our area. Civilians were
very willing to give us their disappointingly limited infor
mation and proved cooperative in carrying out our orders.
Up to 22 April, 1945, twenty-five (25) prisoners were
held in the Division stockade. Of these only twelve (12)
were regular Japanese soldiers. The other thirteen (13 in
cluded eight (8) from OKINAWA Home Guard Units (BOEI TAI),
three (3) locally conscripted people who were attached to
miscellaneous units for menial work, two (2) KOREAN laborers,
and one OKINAWAN doctor who had been conscripted into the
array in February, 1945 at NAHA and held the rank of Probation
ary Officer.
In addition to the prisoners, 185 civilians were detained
during the early phases. The civilians were all able-bodied
- 2
Ho*
UCLA3& IL
males of m i l i t a r y age who were suspected end h e l d , during the p e r i o d of confusion r e s u l t i n g from ordere and counter orders i s s u e d by D i v i s i o n and Military Government o f f i c i a l s , as p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous to the carrying out and accomplish ment of our m i s s i o n . I t was f e l t that the unique nature of the campaign o f f ered an e x o e l l e n t opportunity to use e n l i s t e d personnel as r e g u l a r i n t e r r o g a t o r s . They were used to supplement the r o u t i n e q u e s t i o n i n g of reguler PWs by o f f i c e r s of the Lang uage S e c t i o n . The venture, under the circumstances, nroved s u c c e s s f u l , but not without s t r i c t supervision and careful checking by language o f f i c e r s . In a l l the questioning con ducted at the stockade language e n l i s t e d men and o f f i c e r s were used as i n t e r r o g a t o r s and not merely as i n t e r p r e t e r s . The information gained which could have been converted i n t o t a c t i c a l use was so l i m i t e d by the rapid advance across the i s l a n d t h a t i t s value was governed by the changing s i t u a t i o n . Information from c i v i l i a n s and prisoners aided i n con firming the presence of u n i t s suspected of being i n the v i c i n i t y , a s s i s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the complete Order of B a t t l e of our Z of A, and helped by d i s c l o s i n g both s p e c i f i c and general areas to which the c i v i l population had evac u a t e d . The knowledge of one c i v i l i a n , a dope addict, proved of value t o the XXIV Corps and he was taken d i r e c t l y to t h e i r headquarters. Other c i v i l i a n s had information about t h e southern area of OKINAWA but for the most part i t s gen e r a l i n t e r e s t proved greater than i t s m i l i t a r y v a l u e . Captured Documents: During the campaign a large amount of printed 8nd written material was turned i n to the language s e c t i o n for evaluation and t r a n s l a t i o n . Due t o the fact that the D i v i s i o n Z of A was i n a t h i c k l y populated area a preponderance of material turned i n was c i v i l i a n l i t e r a t u r e and of no m i l i t a r y v a l u e . A l l material was scanned and c l a s s i f i e d into s i x groups. (1) (2) (3) (4) '> * Combat (recent operational orders, defense p l a n s , 00B information, and maps showing defensive i n s t a l l a t i o n s , road and t r a i l n e t s ) * U l t r a (material of current i n t e r e s t to I I I Phib Corps and other f o r c e s operating in the area) Corps (material of current i n t e r e s t to I I I Phib Corps and other f o r c e s operating in the a r e a ) . Routine (material which i s of l i t t l e Immediate value to higher echelon but Important s t r a t e g i c -
i^-aiiy., -, *.:. ;v
_,^ . v"ir5r *
*" fctf Civil affairs (documents and material of interest to the Military Government Section such as docu ments of banks and business concerns, birth cer t i f i c a t e s , insurance p o l i c i e s , e t c . ) . (6) Souvenir (material of no strategic or military value). Two (2) officer interpreters were assigned to each of the assault regiments and one (1) to the reserve regiment. Due to the nature of t h i s operation, these officers were employed mainly on patrols searching for documents and rounding up c i v i l i a n s . When possible the documents were sorted into appropriate groups and sent on to D-2. Whenever documents of immediate value to the regiment were discovered, they were verbally translated to the R-2 who entered the import ant d e t a i l s in the Journal and disseminated the information by telephone and messenger. Rather than make detailed trans l a t i o n , i t proved more expedient to take that Information im portant to the regiment in question and then forward the docu ment immediately to the translators section, D-2, marked "Imm ediate Attention". Other documents primarily of interest to Division were marked "CombatM and sent on at once by D-2 Liaison team messenger* Routine material was sent to Division C by regular P messenger run or by other available transportation. Material of no strategic or t a c t i c a l value was retained in regiment stamped by officer Interpreters and returned to the battalions as souvenirs. When conditions permitted three (3) officer interpreters and one ( l ) enlisted man were on duty in the translation sec t i o n . Due to the great number of c i v i l i a n s , i t was often im possible to retain t h i s many men in the Division CP. Upon arr i v a l at Division CP, documents were sorted into appropriate categories and those of Importance were translated' immediately and given to D-2 for dissemination. Documents having mainly 00B information were turned over to the officer interpreter specializing in such information. Maps bearing useful information were translated at onoe or sent to Corps immediately. Translations were marked with date and number of trans l a t i o n . Such numbers were consecutive for the whole operation*
^s^fefca' 4 :-.;$
4.
The largest amount of documents sorted were classified

"Routine". These documents were so marked and sent on to
JICPOA through III Phib Corps.
Documents having no intelligence value were put in file
boxes for souvenirs and returned to the units that sent them
in.
Due to the comparative absence of enemy troop6, few
documents of immediate value to this Division were found. A code book with all pages torn out and documents with parts
torn out indicated that the enemy was more security con
scious than in previous operations.

On LOVE plus 8 a map was picked up by the 5th Marines
showing completely the disposition and strength of forces
defending OKINAWA south of I SHI KAWA Isthmus together with
many of their installations as of January, 1945. This map
was forwarded to III Phib Corps immediately.
The majority of material of value to this Division were
documents pertaining to Order of Battle.
Counter-intelligence:
The primary purpose of counter-intelligence in the field
being to deny the enemy knowledge of our situation and inten
tions, it became the duty of every Marine in the Division to
take precautions necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining
such knowledge. The Division Intelligence Officer, directly,
and by means of intelligence officers in lower echelons,
carried on a campaign of indoctrination in security measures
througiout the Division.
During the operation, the unexpected situation which con
fronted the Division, the almost complete absence of the enemy,
and the rapidity of our movement forward, eliminated almost
completely any danger to our security. As a result, one in stanoe, namely, camouflage discipline, the Division fell some-
whet short of expectations. The strongest enemy reaction came
from the air, and camouflage of CF locations and bivouac areas
was, as a consequence, the most important phase of counter
intelligence.
In other respects, sucb as keeping a close check on the
disposition of secret weapons, control over passwords, and so
- 5
UNCLASSIFIED U U - ****' |LU
on, security discipline throughout the Division was beyond re

proach and met the exigencies of combat.
The presence of a large civilian population posed a prob
lem new to the Division. However, satisfactory measures were
cerried out to obviate the dangers arising from the presence
of such a large element from whom we could expect varying
degrees of hostility. Able bodied male OKINAWAN civilians
were detained pending clarification of their status, and all
other civilians were removed to areas away from our military
installations.
The wisdom of these precautions was illustrated by sev
eral incidents which confirmed our suspicions. Many a kimono
hid a uniform, and a number of civilians were found to be
armed. The close blood and family ties, both legal end im
provised, which existed between the civilian population, male
and female, and the soldiery, mostly OKINAWAN, which formed
the great bulk of the enemy forces found in the Division's
Z of A, - these close ties of consanguinity and habit, were
prudently regarded as an added danger. A careful check of
the civilian population became necessary and the task fell
on the shoulders of Language personnel.
Army CIC units, however, aided us in our task. CIC Spec
ial Agents interrogated and investigated each male 0KINAWAN
civilian between the ages of 15-45 inclusive. Intelligent,
reliable OKINAWANS previously investigated and cleared by CIC
were enlisted to assist in the interrogations. All suspected
soldier or other dangerous personnel were given special atten
tion by additional interrogation and disposition determined.
Those having military information were Interrogated in great
detail and proper dissemination made through D-2 of all valu
able information. All civilians were registered and tagged
by CIC at time of screening. Records were coordinated with
and maintained; by CIC and Military Government.
Specially; qualified OKINAWANS representing villages and
districts throughout the Island were investigated and enlist
ed to serve as informants for the CIC. Subject and geograph
ical files were compiled and maintained for reference purposes.
Continuous occurrences of Japanese military personnel dis
guising themselves as civilians made it urgent to investigate
suspect oases. Where investigations were completed recommen
dations were made to D-2 for necessary action.
îr
CO
Other incident cases of involving suspected espionage,

Sabotage, sedition, subversion or disaffection were referred
to the CIC a6 additional investigative missions,
Dooumente recovered in Division Z of A and Information
gained through Interrogation have disclosed that since the
10 October, 1944 bombing, active conscription of local civ
ilian population of appropriate age was adopted by the
military authorities. However, even before 10 October, 1944
civilians were required to labor for army construction In
completing local airfields. The political sub-divisions of
the prefecture were held responsible for satisfying the
army's demands for manpower. Each man so selected worked
15 days out of each month he served under ermy Jurisdiction,
for which he received pay.
The regularly conscripted OKINAV/ANS performed similar
duties as the coolies mentioned above but they constituted
a designated unit of the 32nd Army and have the seme code
name* Elements of the 503rd and 504th Specially Organized
Defense Units (TAMA 18817, 13818) encountered in this zone
were, as far as has been determined, organized in January
of this year and reorganized on 22 February, 1945. Other
than local talent conscripted for these units, there is
documentary evidence that ex-servicemen were called upon
from these regions to complete the Tables of Organization of
regular army units on OKINAWA.
It was found that local civilians have been organized into
three (3) types of units: regular army units; specially or
ganized engineering units, with all oereonnel locally con
scripted; and coolie labor units.
Utilization of Intelligence Personnel:
Regimental field problems were held on GUADALCANAL dur
ing January, 1945. These exercises consisted of individual
training of all Regimental Intelligence personnel and then
section training. Division liaison intelligence teams were
assigned to the respective infantry regiments and trained with
them during this period.
Members of the Division Intelligence Section accompanied
the Assistant Division Commander during this regimental train
ing phase and actively participated in the field problems held.
I
W ^ * * A division field problem was held on GUADALCANAL during
January, 1945 which included a Command Poet Exercise Intell
igence information was instigated by Division, and the same
Information was disseminated back to D-2 by lower echelons.
This enabled the Division Intelligence Section to keep a
close check on how information was disseminated by Regiment
and Battalion Intelligence Sections. Wire and radio, comm
unications were established between all units participating,
and a complete test of communications was observed. The
functioning of the Division Combat Intelligence Section was
stressed during this exercise.
The Combat Intelligence Section functioned in the follow
ing manner during the operation:
(1) (2) Liaison team for each Infantry Regiment consisting
of one (1) officer and three (5) enlisted men.
Sufficient officers and enlisted personnel were
selected to run the Division Intelligence Sec
tion on a twenty-four (24) hour basis. One (1)
officer was charged with the responsibility of
handling all Intelligence reports required by
hiîer echelons; he had no other duties to
perform.
The Division Reconnaissance Company was instructed to

maintain all Division OP s and to execute any scouting or
patrolling missions that might become necessary. Therefore, no attempt wss mede to bring the enlisted personnel of the
Combat Intelligence Section up to T/0 strength; scouts and
observers were ommitted.

The API section was organized in the following manner
for the operation:
(1) (2) Liaison team for the 11th Marines consisting of
one (l) officer and two (2) enlisted men.
The interpretation section consisted of the
following:
1 Officer in charge
2 Officer Interpreters
1 Chief of Section
1 Clerk
2 Draftsmen
5 Enlisted Interpreters
- 8
' &
The Japanese Language Section was organized in the follow ing manner for the operation:
2) 3) (4)
\l)
Interrogation Section.
Translation Section, Order of B a t t l e . Psychological Warfare.
In addition, language personnel were assigned to the following u n i t 8 : (1) (2) Infantry Regiments M i l i t a r y P o l i c e Company
When the t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n permitted, Division Language personnel a s s i s t e d the Counter-intelligence Corps which were attached to us by TENTH Army. After landing at OKINAWA they a s s i s t e d i n i n t e r r o g a t i o n and segregation of c i v i l i a n s and army personnel. Maps and Relief Models, Procurement and Distribution; With regard to accuracy, d e t a i l , general value and quan t i t y , maps furnished for the OKINAWA operation were notably superior i n a l l r e s p e c t s to previous operations. Favorable comments was noted from the infantry regiments, p a r t i c u l a r l y with the 1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:25,000 maps. I t i s recom mended t h a t maps of these scales in q u a n t i t i e s sufficient to meet the demands of combat and landing teams for future amph ibious landings, p a r t i c u l a r l y those covering the immediate beachhead a r e a s . The superimposed numbered and l e t t e r e d grid square sys tem on l i n e maps and t a c t i c a l maps found great favor in a l l u n i t s , experience having been gained in use of such system, f i r s t used by t h i s Division in the PALAIJ campaign. A r t i l l e r y and a i r u n i t s expressed great s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h i s system. One f e a t u r e regarding maps for t h i s operation was the fact t h a t a 100 percent map reserve was available over and above the o r i g i n a l allotment to the Division. After ample d i s t r i b u t i o n was made to a l l u n i t s , Division's immediate r e s e r v e , l e s s necessary combat maps carried by D-2, were box ed for d e l i v e r y at the t a r g e t area on LOVE plus 7. However, due t o the swiftness of our advance and great distances cov ered by a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s , Infantry u n i t s were c a l l i n g for addi t i o n a l maps of t e r r a i n immediately to t h e i r front after the f i r s t few days* To f u r t h e r complicate matters, the ship bear ing map boxes scheduled-for LOVE plus ^ i d jipt arrive u n t i l
Hl4 A
LOVE plus 12. Thereafter the Division map reserve was ad

equate to the moving situation.
Due to the situation in combat, no relief maps were re
quired.
Visual ferial Reconnaissance:
Only one reconnaissance mission was flown throughout the
operation. It had as its purpose, determining the suitabil
ity of the beaches on KATCHIN HANTO for landing supplies.
One liaison officer, however, was attached to the 11th Marines
for the purpose of relaying the observation of artillery spot
ters back to D-2.
Due to the fast-moving situation, no photographic recon
naissance was requested. Large scale photogrphs of KATCHIN
HANTO were received however, on LOVE plus 2, but the peninsula
had already been occupied. Enroute to the target area photo
graphs taken 1 March, 1945 were received but showed practic
ally no change from the previous interpretation.
Order of Battle:
Service and home guard troops attempted to defend the 1st
Marine Division Z of A. They never numbered more than 2,500
men and their hasty, inadequate organization collapsed so com
pletely that with one exception, they never opposed our troops
in greater strength than a oompany.
Left behind when the combat troops moved South in early
1945, they were to service any final traffio on the YONTAN
and KATENA fields; and, on order, destroy those fields and
retire to positions from which they oould deny us their use
That they made some attempt at least to slow our advance
is indicated by an order issued by Lt Col iYDYANAGI, C O . of
this motley force, at 1400 on 1 April, 1945. That they would
fail, after they were largely leaderless, without communica
tions, and poorly armed, and their routes of CBOape to organ
ized Japanese forces were cut off. Undoubtedly some of them
did get" through to the South; 663 were killed, 26 taken pris
oner; a balance of several hundred troops, most of whom are
recently conscripted OKINAWANS, probably have retreated to the
northern hills/ or else, remaining in our Z of A, have thrown
off all outer signs of the military. Some, however, have oper
ated as snipers, although dressed in civilian clothes.
The defending force was known officially as the 1st

Specially Organized (Specially Established, or Mobilized)
Infantry Regiment, with its Hq, its 2nd Bn and part of its
3rd Bn in the 1st Marine Division Z of A; the rest of its 3rd
Bn in the 7th Army Division Z of A; and its 1st Bn in the 6th
Marine Division Z of A. None of its captured members knew
they were in this paper organization, however; only one of
them had ever heard of it. Without exception they gave as
their unit the service or home guard unit with which they had
worked at the airfields.
Plans for the organization of this regiment had been
started in January, 1945; but the actual order establishing
it was issued on LOVE minus 4. Even for regular Army service
troops, such fundamental training as the operation of a LMG-
was incomplete on LOVE-Day. On LOVE minus 1 day, materiel to
establish a signal unit was being collected. / .
The regiment was composed of 3,473 officers and men prin
cipally from the following units:
19th Air Sector Command 44th Airfield Bn 56th Airfield Bn MAKOTO 1st Maintainence Unit 6th Fortress Const Duty Unit 503rd Spec Guard Engr Unit (Home Guard) 504th Spec Guard Engr Unit (Home Guard) 42 406 525 172 326 1,031 945

Which of these units were assigned to the 2nd and 3rd Bn's
is not clear, but evidence from the dead and oaptured indicates
the 44th Airfield Bn, the 6th Fortress Construction Duty Unit,
and the 503rd Spec Guard Engr Unit constituted their main
strength*
Less than half the members of this regiment had rifles.
There were 55 LMGs (often as few as 2 per company) in the
regiment; 10 HMGs; 5 AA Mach Cannon (20mm); and 18 grenade
dischargers* No heavier weapons were included* In retreat
the regiment was able to emplaoe some bombs and dynamite as
mines or booby-traps, but it abandoned more of such materials
than it used* A very few airplane machine guns appear to have
been taken along in retreat.
- 11 ?f/-3^*<! .. ._^ ...
DEGLASSfW
y/s
:
1
> ' ; - .
" V .:
ie decision to leave only t h i s inadequate foroe in a defense of the YONTAN and KATENA a i r f i e l d s evidently was made in January, 1945. A naval battery (manning two 6-inch guns) on KATCHIN Peninsula was withdrawn, and i t s guns aban doned. The 5th Co, 12th Independent Infantry Battalion, 62nd Division, which had been on duty at OUSHIKAWA, apparently was pulled back to the main defense sector at about the same time* Only the 2nd Co, 12th Independent Infantry Battalion, - about 120 men - was l e f t , at HANZA (in the 6th Marine Division Z of A). I t became "regimental reserve n for the 1st Specially Or ganized Regiment. An original intention to defend the Z of A of the 1st Marine Division i s indioated by the military roads; concrete s h e l t e r s or earth revetments for tanks or v e h i c l e s ; A guns, T FA and AAA emplacements; bomb shelters and caves; and inf antry trench systems, which were scattered throughout the area. However, they never were occupied. Organization and Tactics: w The enemy in the Division's Z of A adopted a course of action l e a s t suspeoted of him namely, a general withdrawal
from the area. This retreat was accomplished some time prior to our landing. Documentary evidence i s insufficient at t h i s time to e s t a b l i s h the date of that action more c l o s e l y , a l though the probability i s that the withdrawal was neither conceived nor effeoted before 21 March, 1945.
In the planning phase of the OKINAWA operation i t was believed that t h i s Division would be opposed by approximately 8,500 enemy troops whose major strength lay in two infantry battalions and their attached a r t i l l e r y , and one probable a r t i l l e r y regiment. This estimate was set from aerial photo graphs, a rather in ac our ate method of determining infantry organization, and extremely meager documentary evidence. On LOVE-Day there was no manifestation of t h i s number of troops, and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of u n i t s to date has established not 8,500 but only about 2,150 enemy in our zone when we landed. As y e t , the enemy has not been encountered by t h i s Division in any strength greater than one company. The Division Z of A had been prepared for defense. Aer i a l photographs indicated a moderate to strong beach defense i n depth with echeloned strong points ocoupying the high ground up to 6,000 yards in the rear of the landing beaches (nhotographic coverage beyond that point was inadequate) YofaTAN and KATENA a i r f i e l d s appeared to be defended by one - 12 -
OECLASQiniu
infantry battalion each, located in a perimeter defense with supporting a r t i l l e r y on the high ground immediately behind them, a defense that overflowed v e i l into this Division Z of A# None of these defenses were ocoupled on LOVE-Day; the landing was unopposed on a l l unit fronts, The ever-present i n f i l t r a t o r was, of course, encountered in the Division 2 of A# He i n f l i c t e d some casualties, but the effectiveness of his measures to harass our forces remains doubtful. There were several ambushes of our patrols by squads and other small for ces of the enemy* Some passive defense measures were encoun tered. A few roads were mined, several bridges blown, oaves and equipment booby-trapped. But generally speaking, we may consider enemy forces in t h i s Division's Z of A to have effec ted an almost oomplete withdrawal. In arriving at a r e l i a b l e conclusion to explain t h i s un
expected t a c t i c a l decision, the following facts, brought to
l i g h t by c i v i l i a n testimony, P interrogation, translation of
W captured documents and other souroes have been established:
(1) (2) (3) (4) There never were many soldiers i n the Division Z of A, and those troops there l e f t the area three to ten days before our landing. Y N A and K T N a i r f i e l d s were never used exten OTN AEA sively. In November, 1944, one division of the forces garrisoned on O I A A l e f t , and these troops KN W have been "pioked up" in FORMOSA. Total troops on OKINAWA are now estimated to have numbered approximately 52,000 on LOVE-Day. This figure has been reached from the three specific souroes l i s t e d above. The enemy situation after LOVE plus ten, i f not confirmatory, was not at variance with t h i s estimate. On or about LOVE plus eleven, TENTH Army troops driv ing South on O I A A contacted what appeared to be KN W the OPLR for a large troop concentration. Earlier (LOVE plus eight) a map captured by t h i s Division i d e n t i f i e d troops in the NAHA-SHURI area whose numbers would t o t a l , by T/0 strength, about 34,000* Japanese forces in South CHINA have been strengthened in anticipation of an a l l i e d landing there.
(5)
(6)
The enemy probably f e l t that his forces on O I A A were in KN W s u f f i c i e n t to hold the two important areas in the Southern onethird and most m i l i t a r i l y important portion of the Island the/YOJjTAN-KATENA a i r f i e l d area and the NAHA-SHURI sector. The l a t H r ^ c i i i d e s ,the ; island*s; two ohief towns and three main
*** V,.. A
- 13
<//?
QttlSSIfJED
airfields, one on which, NAHA airfield, was the best on the Is

land. Originally he may have intended to defend both areas in
considerable strength prepared defenses in both areas bear
out this contention but such strength was lacking when our
attack became evident and even appeared imminent. Therefore,
rather than put up an insufficient defense in both areas he
felt it wiser to concentrate everything in one, to -out all his
eggs in one basket, so to speak.
However, in sr>ite of the incontestable fact that the NAHA SHURI area is the more important of the two, nevertheless, the
YONTAN-KATENA area, though secondary in importance, would have
been of great tactical importance in denying us the aDDroaches
to the enemy's hub of resistance oentered about the strongly
fortified SHDRI district.
The terrain which characterizes the YONTAN-KATENA zone
does not lend itself so well to the defense as that which lies
on the approaches to SHURI from the north, but none the less,
an enemy as experienced and as determined as the Japanese could
have held that area against the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions
for at least two weeks. Had the enemy employed his infantry
with his customary disregard for human life, he could have made
our advance across the central part of OKINAWA so costly, that
the two Marine Divisions would not have been prepared for fur
ther offensive action for some months, and he would therefore
have greatly lessened the pressure on his forces defending
the Southern lines of defense.
By sacrificing a portion of his artillery and mortars, of
which he has great concentrations in OKINAWA, and by assigning
to elements of his infantry the suicidal mission of defending
Central OKINAWA to the death, a doctrine which is the rule with
him rather than the exception, the enemy could have wreaked
havoc on the two assault Marine Divisions as they crossed the
difficult reef defending the beaches on which we landed. He
could have taken advantage of the observation which the high
ground inland offered him, and forced us to sacrifice men and
materiel out of proportion to his own losses, while we advanced
across the unfavourable terrain which rises inland from the
narrow coastal plain.
The enemy's great tactical error was to permit two Corps
of American troops to get a firm foothold on OKINAWA, and to
land unmolested their prodigious amounts of materiel. The
enemy must compensate for the material disadvantage under
which he has to combat us, by displaying a greater willingness
to sacrifice human lives, and, when he can, he must also make
every effort to reduce that margin between his material resour
ces and ours. Since we are on the offensive, and must
- 14
v/r
the most dangerous of all military operations, namely, amph

ibious assaults, and slnoe the enemy has the great advantage
of being already in place, he should bend every effort to
prevent our gaining a beachhead and from bringing ashore our
artillery, tanks, heavy equipment, and other materiel.
Organization of the troops known to have been in the 1st
Marine Division Z of A, both some time before and Immediately
prior to our landing, was, with one exception, not unusual.
That exception is the OKINAWA Home Guard, the first such or
ganization encountered in the Pacific War. ( A Provisional
Battalion, composed of Japanese residents in the area, was
identified on LUZON). This organization was first activated
in October or November 1944, after the first large U.S. Task
Force attack (another report states organization occurred
early this year) with three companies, totalling 500 personnel.
All troops, men and officers, were conscripted from local civ
ilians. There is little evidence of training; the only report
states that those recruits who had previous military training,
probably under the regular Japanese Army conscription system,
were given no additional training; and that "boots" received
only rifle familiarization. (Armament consisted of rifles,
bayonets, and LMGs) . On 22 February, 1945, the Home Guard
was enlarged to four companies with a total strength of 1000,
and it is assumed that it was at this figure on LOVE-Day.
The combat efficiency of these provisional troops must
be considered low. The OKINAWAN did not prove, in this first
encounter, to be a good soldier, lacking, as he did, ag
gressiveness, determination, and sufficient military training.
The light resistance offered our forces by this Home Guard was
not effective.
It may be noted that organization of the 12th Independent
Infantry Battalion is unusual (having five rifle companies,
one HMG company "and one machine cannon company), but inasmuch
as only the 5th Company of this unit is known to have been in
our area, .further details of its peculiarities are not dis
cussed here.
Equipment:
With few exceptions, a l l eneiry equipment encountered by t h i s Division on OKINAWA was of o r t h o d o x design and manufac t u r e . Small numbers of nearly a l l standard infantry weapons. - 15
^te****'*8*^
H
9/
. A So "and including 37mm) wero Captured, although there was a notable absence of H O and mortars, the only examples of Ms the former being one ( l ) Type 92 Lewis, .303 (several a i r craft MGs,- including Type 89 Vickers, .303, and a Type 100, 7.92mm, twin mount were found), and of the l a t t e r six (6) 50 m grenade dischargers, Type 89. m No f i e l d or mountain a r t i l l e r y was either captured or
observed, although some 105 m ammunition was found caohed
m in a burial vault. Heavy caliber mortar and a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s
were reported f a l l i n g i n nearly a l l areas, but fragments r e
covered were too minute for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
Mines and booby-traps were widespread. Some roads were mined by 63 kg. (and larger) aerial bombs set nose up in the ground; caves, by aerial bombs and Dutch land mines. In some Instances equipment and household furnishings were booby-trap ped with improvised pressure or pull devices (wooden boxes and/or t i n cans containing an explosive and a push-pull i g n i t e r or fuse cord). Several similarly fabricated home-made hand grenades were also found. Naval weapons captured Include two (2) six-inch coastal defense guns emplaced in casemates on the high ground of KATCHIN H N O overlooking the sea and eleven (11) "suicide" AT motor torpedo boats. Four (4) aircraft fighters, were captured. General equipment was encountered in much larger quan t i t y than were weapons. Considerable communications and e l e c t r i c a l gear was found, including one ( l ) small radio station, numerous f i e l d and aircraft radios, four (4) radar vans, trans formers, generators, and spare parts. Seven (7) trucks in operational condition were captured and put to use. Considerable a i r f i e l d and aircraft equipment, demolitions, and engineering gear was encountered, and large dumps of medi cal and quartermaster supplies, gasoline, and fuel were l o c a t ed. A large proportion of the supplies (and motor transport) were u t i l i z e d by the military government. Three (3) new or otherwise significant developments may be noted. One i s the ever-increasing evidence of hurried production i n small arms; most of the r i f l e s captured were badly machined, poorly finished, and had stocks that were hardly more than the original stock blanks. Second, several
Y "fl 4J
- 16
boxes of steel-alloy cased .303 rimless cartridges were found.

This cartridge has been reported before but never encountered
by this Division. It is not felt that this development is
evidence of any critical shortage of brass, but rather im
proved ordnance in that the steel alloy cartridge case is
stronger than the usual brass one. Samples of these cartrid
ges are being examined by JICPOA teams. Lastly, a new hand
grenade was captured. This grenade has the Type 97 fragmen
tation body, but the fuse assembly has been removed and re
placed by a' cast iron screw plug carrying a simple rolled
paper and black powder ignition train. The filling, is also
black powder. The value of this grenade is questionable.
Several pottery grenades, a recent development in Japanese
explosive ordnance, were also found.
This Division encountered few weapons emplacements in its Z of A on OKINAWA. Two (2) orthodox reinforced concrete casemates for A/T - A/B guns (empty) and one (1) uncompleted blockhouse were located near the mouth of the BISHA GAWA (TAs 8089-J-l and 8090-X-3;~RYUKYU RETTO, 1:25,000). Two (2) concrete and steel casemates containing six-inch coastal de fense guns were found at the base of K AT CHIN Peninsula (9489-0-5 and 9488-X-5) on the East coast. Each casemate had connecting, underground tunnels, ready rooms, living quar ters, ammunition storage, etc. A concrete FDC, set into the crest of a hill at 9488-J-4, was ingeniously located to con trol the fire of both guns, one of which fired NE and the other SE. All other emplacements noted were small and of dirt and
log construction. A few were sited to cover beaches, more
to place interdicting fire on road Junctions, curves, and
bridges. None of these emplacements contained any weapons
when encountered, and very few showed any evidence whatso
ever of ever having been occupied.
Countless caves were again observed. In the main, how
ever, they were not as individually extensive as those pre
viously encountered by this Division on PELELIU, and on
SAIPAN and I WO JIMA. Most of them were small, tunnel-like
storage caves (sometimes protected by a blast wall) dug into
the base of the red clay hills, others were man-made or Im
proved natural limestone caverns. A great many of the oaves
were built and utilized by the civilians as living quarters.
- 17
***>;/*
i \ i
DECLAS
**/
Practically none of the oaves constructed for or put

to military purposes had any tactical value, although sev
eral were equipped with electrical and communications equip
ment for command post use* A number of caves were mined and
booby-trapped.
Three significant features were noted in practically all
emplacements studied. One is an increased appreciation on the
enemy's part for the offensive value of terrain in siting his
emplacements. Nearly all emplacements were in tactically
perfect locations sited to fire enfilade fire along the beach
es, to cover bridges, or interdict road Junctions. This con
stant improvement of applied tactics in the Japanese Army has
been noted more than once; within the experience of this Div
ision the emplacements on OKINAWA were better positioned than
any ever before encountered.
The second point to be noted is a modification of def
ensive doctrine as regards the construction of emplacements,
a change that was first noticed on IWO JIMA. The enemy now
realizes more fully than ever before that a compromise must be
made between the offensive value and defensive strength of
an organized position or emplacement. Previously, on PELELIU
and SAIPAN and TARAWA, too many of his concrete and steel
bastions, while capable of firing extremely effective fire
and covering the most vulnerable spots of an assault, were
exposed - to a greater extent than necessary - to naval gun
fire, tank fire, and artillery. Firing ports faced the sea,
embrasures were larger than necessary, camouflage was incom
plete - all these were faults. On OKINAWA, as previously
on IWO JIMA, the enemy took great pains to eliminate these
errors. In both places emplacements were constructed so as
to be effective while least vulnerable. Firing ports of
all emplacements noted on OKINAWA were no larger than absolut
ely necessary and were never in positions exposed to artillery
and naval gunfire. Those of beach positions were sited for en
filade and for even rearward fire, never toward the sea. Those
of inland positions were small, well-concealed, and otherwise
in the least vulnerable but still effective locations.
Evidence of this tactical improvement by the enemy was
captured on OKINAWA in the form of a report on training based
on a lecture made there by the Army C/S that stressed this
point extensively. Quotations from the translation are here
with extracted: MIn organized positions, some small arms ports
and*gun embrasures are conspicuously exposed to naval gun fire.
USLASSlHtD
"Othera...in positions easily discovered by the enemy."

"....necessary to improve positions so that cover will he
provided by natural terrain features....", "....effect meas
ures to protect gun ports and embrasures and tank fire (75mm)
and shells***."
Third, enemy camouflage was better on OKINAWA than ever
before in this Divisions experience. The only materials
used extensively were natural foliage and garnished nets,
but even the most insignificant installation was well-con oealed* Vehicle revetments, gun positions, and cave mouths
were all well hidden from ground observation by nets. Barr
acks roofs and well-beaten paths were concealed from air ob
servation by loosely-strewn tree branches. Camouflage dis
cipline was exoellent, too; the enemy was careful to change
his natural camouflage materials as they wilted and to cover
up his activity as he worked.
Propaganda:
During phase one no propaganda leaflets or voice appeals
by loudspeakers were made by the 1st Marine Division to Jap
anese combat troops. However, officers and enlisted men of
the Division Language Unit frequently accompanied combat
patrols in order to induce civilians to come out of caves and
other hiding places. Before leaving the training area a small
pocket size card listing several elementary combat phrases was
prepared by officers of the Language Unit and distributed a board ship to men of the Regimental Combat Teams. These
proved to be useful in inducing civilians to come out of hid
ing.
No propaganda leaflets were distributed by the Japanese
in the 1st Marine Division Z of A.
MCUSSIFIFD
INTELLIGENCE
DE

NAN3EI SHOTO
PHASE III (SOUTHERN OKINAWA)
RECONNAISSANCE!
Patrols: (Division Reconnaissance Company)
After the SHURI-NAHA line was broken, the Division

Reconnaissance Company was employed effectively to lo
cate enemy strong points in the. Division Zone of Action.
The company was employed both as a company and as pla
toons operating to battalion fronts. The company was
employed up to 1,500 yards in front of friendly lines.
Once heavy resistance was met, the company reverted to
Division control and was further employed in mopping
up operations.
Continuous patrols were made in rear areas. Many
Jap infiltrators were killed or sealed in caves by
these patrols. The company was later employed to pa
trol an exposed flank on the Division right flank.
Normal reconnaissance patrols of platoon strength were
made, probing a 2,000 to 3,000 yard flank. Red patrols
were encountered and in most instances eliminated.
Aerial:
There were no reconnaissance missions flown dur
ing the operation under the direct control of G-2, but
Intercept of Naval gunfire and artillery observer re
ports proved to be a valuable source of information.
Specific targets were frequently verified directly in
this manner with the cooperation of NGF and artillery
liaison officer. There is a definite need for an
aerial observer under the control of G-2 and this is
planned for future operations.
OBSERVATION POSTS:
Organization and Conduct:
The Reconnaissance Company maintained the
i" "~
i"elon OPs from 1 May until the close of the
OKINAWA operation. One platoon of the company was
detached for this mission. The OP was usually locat
ed from 200 to 500 yards behind the lines and was able
to keep the G-2 and G-3 Sections well informed con
cerning both friendly and enemy movements. The OP
was probably most effective in locating enemy OPs and
other small concentrations. A large 20-power Japa
nese scope was used and terrain afforded excellent
vantage points. During the last two weeks of the
operation, two OPs were maintained between 1900 and
0550 in order to obtain a fix on Red artillery flashes.
Communications:
Communication with G-2 was maintained by direct
wire, supplemented by an SCR 610 radio in the event
the former failed.
PRISONERS OF WAR:
Interrogation:
Notwithstanding the difficulties which were posed
at times, by inclement weather and lack of transporta
tion, the procedure of interrogating Prisoners of War
at the various levels within the Division adhered to
the SOP. Brief and pertinent information was gained
at regiment and complete interrogation reports were
submitted and attached to the daily periodic reports
at Division. The mechanical process of evacuating
Prisoners of War from their places of capture
eventually to the Division stockade was on the whole
satisfactory. Failure in some cases served to remind
that the successful execution of the procedure was
at the mercy of transportation.
Interrogation work was unmarked by any outstand
ing developments. Three language officers were kept
well occupied in questioning Prisoners of War and pre
senting their information in a succinct and readable
report. In the closing stages, when the opposition
disintegrated and Prisoners of War were lees valuable,
- 2
DECLA
DECLASSIFIED
but far more numerous, enlisted personnel were given

ample opportunity to develop their own interrogating
technique. In this regard it is reemphasized that
careful guidance is necessary.
Officer interrogators were required to keep con
stantly abreast of the tactical situation. In keeping
abreast it was necessary to work olosely with the 00B
officer and the reference files. Only by the use of
such files was it possible to refer to the many and
varied enemy units, code names and numbers. This de
manded time and patience but the compensatory privilege
of acting as an interrogator and not as an interpreter
was considered more than worth the effort.
As of 28 June, 495 prisoners were taken by the
Division. (This does not include twenty-seven captured
in Central OKINAWA). In the closing phase, prisoners
arrived at the Division stockade in groups of ten to
twenty. The large scale surrendering at the end was
climaxed on 24 June when an artillery captain surrender
ed three officers and thirty-five men from hi6 regiment.
The 495 were divided into the following categories:
212 Regular Military personnel (including
twelve officers)
206 Conscripted OKINAWANS (including BOEI and
GUNZOKU)
32 Japanese Laborers
3? Korean Laborers
4 Japanese Specialist Technicians
1 Japanese Buddhist Chaplain
1 OKINAWAN Army Nurse
2 died before any information could be ob
tained
The type of knowledge sought was, in part, governed
by the situation. However, an attempt was made to gain
a standard minimum amount of Information from all pris
oners. Information gathered served to classify and con
firm our previous knowledge and, in particular, supple
mented the more positive information gained from docu
ments.
Value of Information:
Information from Prisoners of War sources proved to
- 3
**?
be of greatest value in determining the disposition of

the enemy's forces and the losses he had suffered, and
his remaining strength. It was also helpful in rounding
out the intelligence picture by indicating the enemy's
morale, conditions behind the line, and his future in
tentions.
In the absence of a Corps stockade, Prisoners of
War considered to have information valuable to Corps
were held for Corps interrogation. This system had its
obvious disadvantages in time-lag and duplication of
effort. Due partly to this situation the Division in
terrogations tended to deal with a greater scope of in
formation than would be normally required. The exist
ence of a Corps stockade would, it is felt, correct this
tendency and expedite the acquisition of information
desired by Corps from any particular Prisoner of War.
Considerable confusion resulted at the stockade
when other agencies classified questionable civilians
as "suspicious" or "potentially dangerous" and request
ed their detention at the Prisoner of War stockade.
Therefore, it would seem necessary for Military Govern
ment units to be prepared to keep under guard any non-
mil itary internees whom they consider dangerous. In
addition to the classification of border-line civilians,
further difficulties were encountered in categorizing
the sundry varieties of Prisoners of War. Detailed
classification and definition of all categories of enemy
personnel to be detained is strongly recommended. This,
it would appear, should be undertaken by higher echelon.
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS;
Evaluation Procedure:
During phase HT a considerable amount of printed
and written material and map6 were turned in to the
Language Section for evaluation and translation. The
evaluation in lower echelons was much better than be
fore and the proportion of valueless material sent to
Division CP was much lower than heretofore. All mater
ial was scanned and classified into six groups.
(l) Combat (recent operational orders, defense
plans, 00B information, and maps showing
% - * * 4
-,,.*--U >U Jt
Vo^
(2) (3) (4) (5)
(6)
defensive Installations).
Ultra (material of immediate concern to
higher echelon, such as codes).
Corps (material of current interest to III
Phib Corps and other forces operating in the
area).
Routine (material which is of little imme
diate value to higher echelon but important
strategically).
Civil affairs (documents and material of in
terest to Military Government Section such as
documents of banks and business concerns,
birth certificates, insurance policies, etc.).
Souvenir (material of no strategic military
value).

During most of the operation two officer inter

preters were assigned to each assault regiment. When possible documents were assorted into appropriate
groups and sent on to G-2.
Whenever documents of immediate value to the regi

ment were discovered they were verbally translated to
the S-2 who entered the Important details in the jour
nal and disseminated the information by telephone and
messenger. In the case of maps, overlays were taken.
Rather than make detailed translation, it proved more
expedient to take information Important to the regiment
in question and then forward the document immediately
to translation section, G-2 marked "Immediate Atten
tion". 00B Information and targets of opportunity
taken from maps or orders were phoned in immediately.
Other documents primarily of interest to Division
were marked "Combat1* and sent on at once by G-2 Liai
son team messenger or by message center, whichever
seemed more expeditious at the time.
Routine material was sent to Division CP by mes
senger or by other available transportation. Material
of no strategic or tactical value was retained in
regiment, stamped by officer interpreters and returned
to battalions as souvenirs.
When conditions permitted, three officer inter
preters and one enlisted man were on duty in the
- 5
translation section. Upon arrival at Division CP, docu

ments were sorted into appropriate categories and those
of importance were translated immediately and given to
G-2 for dissemination. Maps bearing useful information
were translated at once or sent to Corps Immediately.
The publication of 00B information was expedited by the
use of a miscellaneous identification sheet. By enter
ing the date found and number of items picked up in a
* particular target square with their identifications, it
was found to be a help to the 00B officer and also to
save time for the translators. The miscellaneous iden
tifications were published every day.
If extractions were made from documents being sent
to Corps, a note was made on the page translated to
save duplication of effort.
Translations were marked with date and number of
translation. These numbers ran consecutively through
both phases of the operation.
The largest amount of documents were classified
either "Corps" or "Routine". These were so marked and
sent to III Phib Corps.
Documents having no Intelligence value were put
in file boxes for souvenirs and returned to the units
which sent them in.
Value of Documents:
During the second phase, the enemy's security con
sciousness was apparent in that very little material of
long range value was discovered. This does not, how
ever, apply to maps and documents of immediate value,
A great many maps showing enemy dispositions, weapons,
boundary lines and CPs were translated and overlays
made. A field order with map attached was picked up by
1st Bn., 1st Marines, on 12 May. This showed the dis
position of an enemy battalion and a battalion CP di
rectly in front of the 1st Regiment near DAKESHI. The
information taken from this document enabled the 1st
Marines to carry out what they described as Mthe most
successful mortar mlesion they had ever attempted".
The greater part of all material was, of course,
OOB. However, s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, considering the f a c t that our l i n e s were s t a b i l i z e d f o r some days a t various p o i n t s , a l a r g e amount of material of immediate value (both OOB and otherwise) was found and t r a n s l a t e d . COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: At the time the D i v i s i o n entered the l i n e on Southern OKINAWA i t was apparent that several enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s e x i s t e d requiring c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e measures. With the probable heavy i n f l u x of refugee c i v i l i a n s through our l i n e , the enemy could begin an i n t e n s i f i e d plan of i n f i l t r a t i o n of s o l d i e r s d i s g u i s e d a s c i v i l i a n s f o r the purpose of espionage and sabotage. Upon gaining a c c e s s to our rear areas, s t r i c t c i v i l i a n c o n t r o l would be required to apprehend these agents and t o prevent espionage and sabotage. The enemy could d i s patch Jap s o l d i e r s to pose as f r i e n d l y n a t i v e s i n M i l i tary Government camps f o r the purpose of securing p o s i t i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under Military Government J u r i s d i c t i o n . The p o l i c y was e s t a b l i s h e d and adhered to of g a i n ing c o n t r o l of a l l c i v i l i a n refugees from the time they were apprehended, and maintaining t h i s control u n t i l evacuation to the rear area camps. Consequently, no c i v i l i a n s were permitted to be out of the compounds without armed guard e s c o r t . The r a t i o of one guard to twelve i n d i v i d u a l s was maintained. Personnel of the 310th Counter I n t e l l i g e n c e Corps Detachment were attached to G-2 f o r the purpose of accomplishing c i v i l i a n screening i n accordance with procedure d i r e c t e d by Headquarters, Tenth Army. The i n i t i a l plan developed and coordinated by G-2, G-l, CICt and M i l i t a r y Government, was as f o l l o w s : (1) Mobile C o l l e c t i o n Point. M i l i t a r y Govern ment and the D i v i s i o n Provost Marshal operated the Mobile Forward C o l l e c t i o n Point with the o b j e c t i v e of g i v i n g the RCTs the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e a s s i s t a n c e i n evacuating c i v i l i a n r e f u g e e s from the t a c t i c a l zone e x p e d i t i o u s l y . Refugees were transported immediately to the M i l i t a r y Government C o l l e c t i n g Point, given medical treatment, and prepared f o r further evacuation to the r e a r . At t h i s p o i n t a l l males 15-45 years of
7 -
Lw^/iWWi
age were separated from other refugees and transported

to a separate stockade operated by the Provost Marshal.
Other refugees were moved from the Collecting Point to
the Military Government Detachment B-10 Camp.
(2) Provost Marshal Stockade; At the Provost
Marshal Stockade the CIC accomplished detailed screen
ing of the males 15-45, recommending the release to
Military Government of all those determined to be
bonafide civilians lacking adverse backgrounds. Those
determined to be potentially dangerous because of their
backgrounds, were detained by the Provost Marshal under
authorization of the G-2.
(3) Military Government Camp: At the Military
Government Detachment B-10 Camp all other persons
were screened by the CIC and notification of their
clearance furnished Military Government by the CIC.
(4) Screening Teohnique: In screening civilian
refugees by the CIC, the following procedure was
followed: Thirteen native OKINAWANS, 12 male and 1
female, were chosen and hired by the CIC as civilian
employees from the many interrogated and Investigated.
Each of these individuals was highly qualified, in
telligent, and had above average education. Each had
held a position of prestige or respect and was widely
known and respected. All were familiar with the geo
graphy of the island, its towns and districts. These
"CIC Aides0 were given training and orientation in
accomplishing CIC objectives by the language men with
the detachment. Foremost considerations were (1) the
identification of Jap soldiers or civilians working
for the Jap Army or Navy, (2) identification of OKIN AWAN BOEITAI, GUNZOKU, or other similar organization
members, (3) recognition of leads to information of a
tactical or counterintelligence nature, and (4) the
recognition of the potentialities of especially qual
ified individuals interrogated. With this group of
trained OKINAWAN interrogators set up at writing
tables, the civilian refugees were questioned in de
tail upon their admittance to the Military Government
Compound, by the native OKINAWAN interrogator. At
the completion of the questioning, the refugee and
his questionnaire were carefully checked by a CIC a gent and language man. Any leads were exploited by
holding the Individual concerned for a detailed spe-'*/ clal interrogation. Tentative disposition of the re fugee was determined at the completion of this check, their nationality as OKINAWANS having been previously established by the CIC Aides. All those of Prisoner of War status or those classified as potentially dan gerous, were turned over to the Provost Marshal for detention. Those of no further intelligence value were released to Military Government. The completed questionnaires were assigned file numbers and indexed as to subject and geographic location. At the close of the campaign, upon completion of the CIC mission in the 1st Marine Division Z of A, these files were avail able to the CIC Detachment under Island Command for use in the control of civilians throughout the island. . (5) Security Check: Throughout the campaign, the
310th CIC Detachment made security checks of various
types to determine the existence of security viola
tions or laxity which would be of possible aid to
enemy intelligence ( i.e. handling, storage, and
transmission of classified documents). Radio security
in general was considered satisfactory. Check of
security as to use and storage of Millies and Mollies
by the units using them indicated that adequate pre
cautions were taken. One instance of temporary loss
was reported but investigation established that there
had been no compromise of security. No reports of
blackout violations were received.
(6) Additional use of CIC Aides: By use of the
specially qualified and trained CIC Aides as inter
mediaries, successful use was made of a sound truck in
persuading groups of OKINAWANS to surrender. Consid
erable reasoning was necessary In some instances to
overcome the Japanese propaganda with which the natives
had been indoctrinated.
(7) Results of Counter Measures: With the strict
control of civilians in the Division Z of A, movement
by enemy agents on any roads within the sector was
prevented. On the night of 4-5 May the enemy attemp
ted counterlandings in large numbers in our rear area
north of MACHINATO. Most of these forces were quickly
mopped up by our patrols. Examination of the bodies
and equipment of tfie Japs showed them to be armed with
i*mfo^**?*
- 9
% *
demolitions. Subsequent Prisoner of War interrogation

proved them to be KERIKOMI TAI (suicide units) with a
planned sabotage mission in our rear area. However,
during the period 1 May, 1945, to 22 June, 1945, no
incidents of sabotage or espionage were reported.
The following is a tabulation of the results of
the screening of civilians by the CIC: Total Civilians screened Japanese soldiers apprehended Boeitai (labor troops) Gunzoku (hired labor) Potentially dangerous civilians Tactical Intelligence value Counterintelligence interest UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL Target Information Center: In order to collect and coordinate enemy target
information being received from various sources, a
Target Information Center was established by the G-2
Section. The function of this section was to collect
and verify, if possible, all information as to the
location of enemy positions from the various sources
at our disposal. These sources include Forward Ob
servers, Aerial Photo Interpretation, Prisoner of war,
Civilians, Outposts, Captured Documents, Front Line
Units and Air Spot.
As information was received from any of the above
mentioned agencies, it was plotted on a 1:10,000 sit
uation map by the use of conventional symbols showing
the type of position and its reported location. A
card index file was kept in conjunction with the map,
covering all target squares within our Z of A. Space
was provided on these cards to show such information
as time and date reported, number of target area
square, type of target, source derived, disposition,
and results from our own counter fire. On the re
verse side of the index card ample room was left for
information pertaining to targets of opportunity
which may not have been previously reported and such
action taken is entered thereon. Areas of intense
8,876 5 30 11 26 6 15
enemy activity are noted and reserved for special act

ion, such as air bombardment or Napalm strikes.
Close coordination between G-2 Target Information
Center, Naval Gun Fire, and Air Liaison groups made
possible a variety of enemy targets with a prompt de
liverance of counter fire. Firing results were ob
tained daily from the liaison groups and immediately
marked on the index card. No targets were ever remov
ed from the situation map until our own troops had
passed through that particular area. As an added
check on the validity of targets reported, the index
oards were turned over to Ordnance for verification
after they had served these purposes.
It is felt that the observed results obtained
during the OKINAWA campaign more than justified the
existence of a Target Information Center within the
Division Intelligence Section. Lessons learned may
now be put'to practical use In forthcoming operations,
making possible the speedy locating of enemy artillery
and its consequent destruction.
Photo Interpretation:
One officer was attached to the 11th Marines as &r2 liaison officer. His duties, in addition to sup plying intelligence Information to G-2, Included assis ting the 11th Marines photo interpretation officer. The remainder of the unit was used to perform the normal PI functions of preparing photographs for distribution and Interpreting all sorties as soon as received, (for details see pp 14 ) Some training was given the new men who Joined the unit during the operation, but it was not possible to assign them any other than train ing or assisting duties, because of their inexperi ence. All personnel were sent out from time to time to view the installations on the ground and check their interpretations. Language:
On 1 May, 1945, the Division had with it the same
language personnel as on L-Day. No personnel were at
tached from higher headquarters, although toward the
end of the campaign when the Prisoners of War became
*"- - v ~*&vM!m*v **** "* %0$0 ;rous an occasional interrogator was loaned to
this Division by III Phib Corps. In addition, one offi
cer previously hospitalized in Pearl Harbor rejoined
the Division on 28 May, and a new enlisted language
man Joined on 13 June. This gain was partially offset
by the loss of one officer by transfer to FMFPAC on 12
June. Shortly after 0-Day, (22 June, 1945) one officer
and one enlisted man, who were attempting to get Japan
ese soldiers and civilians out of caves, became casual
ties when their sound truck hit a mine. They were both
evacuated, leaving the total number of language person
nel one less than on L-Day.
At the beginning of the Division's participation

in the Southern OKINAWA campaign, language personnel
were attached to the regimental combat teams and the
MP Company, as in the Central OKINAWA operation. As
demand for personnel at Division increased, however,
personnel were recalled from the regiments so that by
0-Day only three officers and one enlisted man were
still with regiments. Shortly after that date the
officer and enlisted man attached to the 1st Marines
returned to Division with their own personneltwo
officers and four enlisted menGO that there was no
drain on the Division language section. The recalling
of personnel to the Division was accompanied where
possible with a rotation of personnel serving in the
lower echelons. The pooling of most of the personnel
at Division, where their abilities could be utilized
at all times and from where they could quickly be sent
to requesting units, proved superior to the previous
plan of having them remain idle at regiment waiting
for the occasional need to arise, while the personnel
at Division frequently had difficulty keeping up with
the work. This comparative lack of personnel at regi
mental level did not appear to affect -the functioning
of the language section adversely. It is felt, how
ever, that in future operations enough enlisted lan
guage personnel should be available to supply simul
taneously the assault battalions with one each, should
the regimental language officers deem it necessary.
However, permanent assignment of personnel to batta
lions still does not seem advisable.
Of the personnel remaining at the Division CP,
one officer and one enlisted man were used almost en
tirely for Order of Battle work, two officers for in

terrogation, one for translation, and one officer and
one enlisted man for the sorting and forwarding of
documents. The remaining officers were used for
translation, Interrogation, or on special calls for
assistance from the regiments as needed, while the
remaining enlisted personnel were used for the last
two functions only, with the exception of one occasion
when all personnel present were assigned to the trans
lation of an important set of orders.
It is felt that the functioning of the language
section, especially in regard to the maximum efficient
utilization of personnel, constantly Improved through
out the operation and was immensely superior to that
in the PELHJLIU campaign.
MAPS, AERIAL PHOTOS AND MODELS, PROCUREMENT AND DIS
^RiBWIoWi'
Maps:
Throughout the campaign on Southern OKINAWA,
maps of the same scale as those listed in the Central
OKINAWA operation were used. In addition, three re
visions of the tactical map, scale 1:25,000, were
printed by Tenth Army, these revisions containing
additional terrain information and contour lines ob
tained from later photo coverage, plus transposal of
similar information from captured Japanese battle
maps. A complete replica of another captured Jap map,
covering the NAHA-YONABARU line and Southern portion
of OKINAWA, scale 1:10,000, was also printed and dis
tributed. The third revision of the 1:25,000 tactical
map was also "blown upH to scale 1:10,000 and distri
buted.
During the operation, the tactical map, scale
1:25,000, was used as the Division's official battle
map. The 1:10,000 maps were occasionally used by
platoon leaders because of their greater clarity of
small portions of terrain.
The revised maps were vast Improvements over the
original maps used in the Central OKINAWA campaign,
according tc reports and comments by Regimental, Bat-
BWSjWt*,*
j^-:**^t
talion and assault unit officers. Higher Headquarters made the revisions available promptly and generally in sufficient quantity to permit adequate distribution
down to platoon leaders. The numerous printings and
revisions by higher Headquarters enabled this Division to keep an almost constant flow of maps going to lover units, particularly during the heavy rain period in
May when inclement weather took a heavy toll of maps
in assault units. The Division's map reserve, never
at planned strength (100J&), was, in most cases, able
to meet the problem of re-supply for lower units.

Greater familiarity and experience by all hands

in using the present grid coordinate systemsuper
imposed numbered and lettered grid squares vas noted
during the lengthy campaign on Southern OKJNAViA. This
system continues to Increase in popularity with all
personnel as noted In comments by officers of all unite
because of Its greater clarity and rapid use as com
pared to the old "read right, up* formula*
Aerial Photos:
Phase III of the OKINAWA operation marked the
first time In the history of the Marine Corps that
photographs were received regularly enough over a
long period of time to play a major part in the oper
ational phase of a campaign. During the period L
plus 30 to L plus 81, thirty sorties of vertical and
forty sorties of oblique coverage were received by
the Division. The quality of the photography, all
flown by 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, wag
generally excellent, particularly the obliques. All
sorties were distributed through III Phlb Corps with
in the shortest possible time. Oblique coverage was
received in sufficient quantity to be distributed tc
assault platoon leaders and company commanders and
requests for additional prints of any sortie were al
ways filled without delay. Urgent special requests
were flown with the same cooperation.
Many valuable lessons were learned during the
campaign as is evidenced by the fact that the best
all-around coverage was received during the last two
weeks of the operation. The Tenth Army^ "Air photo
graphic Plan", published 6 June,, 1945, is almost i deal for future operations.
"" *
^3 8
DECHWWFIED
One major criticism, from the Division point of

view, of the use of photographs during the operation
lies not in the coverage itself but in the 1:25,000
maps. It was almost an impossibility to orient or plot
accurately the photographs received using the map alone.
The chief aid in this, the road network, was for the
most part Incorrectly shown on the map and innumerable
roads were omitted. It was always necessary to first
plot the photos, particularly obliques, on a mosaic
and then transfer the plot to the map. This Division
adopted the practice of annotating each individual
oblique photograph with the coordinates of a definitely
located point such as a road junction so that the low
est echelon leader could readily orient it.
Prom the interpretation point of view, the map was
inadequate for pin-pointing small military positions.
The shapes of the individual ridges were shown only
very generally and to pin-point the type of installations
the enemy used almost entirely caves was an im
possibility and the general location was of little or
no use as all ridges contained some type of caves. For
such a purpose there should be a larger scale map with
a smaller contour interval, accurately made.
The obliques, taken normally at 400 feet, were
exceptionally good. Their quality was excellent and
they were received in quantity. During the first part
of the operation oblique coverage was flown daily of
the area immediately confronting assault units, inter
rupted only for a short period of time when an attempt
was made to coordinate the photographic runs with ar
tillery. Where the advance was slow, these missions
were changed to alternate days, which proved adequate.
From six to nine sets of prints were received by Divi
sion of this routine coverage, one set being kept by
G-2, the rest divided according, to the boundaries of
the assault Regiments, who handled them in a like man
ner, the distribution of appropriate photos reaching
assault companies and platoons.
In addition to annotating individual photographs,
sortie plots were prepared as an overlay to the
1:25,000 map and distributed with each sortie. Special requests for oblique coverage were submitted by Regi
ments and also by the G-2 Section. This specified

1 5
^MimiM
number of prints was normally received* from within

twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the time sub
mitted.
While there can be little improvement in the qual
ity of the obliques, there is room for Improvement as
to area covered. The front line obliques were taken as a single run across the Army's front and consequently
reached its minimum use when this line is comparatively straight. Any bulge or pocket, under thlt plan cannot
receive proper coverage when actually coverage of this
area is probably needed more urgently than any other.
If it was SOP that a special short run of this area be
made as routine coverage, a great deal of time could be saved. Under the present plan, it is more or less
necessary to wait and see whether the routine coverage
is adequate before submitting a special request. Also, in some cases, special missions failed to cover the
specific area requested, probably due to the pilot's
difficulty of orientation by the map, and valuable time was lost.

Interviews with assault company commanders and
platoon leaders indicate that their greatest need is
oblique coverage of small areas which cannot be seen
from their forward positions, such as reverse slopes
of ridges. It is their opinion that some type of air-
ground communication should be established between the
photographic plane and the assault units so that the
correct coverage of these areas can always be assured
without delay. During a period of rapid advance, the
oblique coverage was useless as the troops had already
passed the area. This may be remedied somewhat by hav
ing the photo liaison officer obtain from the Division
G-2 daily the particular area most likely to be of use
by the time the photographs will be received.
Another point which would definitely Improve the
utility of the obliques, is that there should be some
coverage of terrain on the Division's flanks. As it
stands now, the one run across the entire front line
is divided up and no Division receives any coverage of
its flanks. Quite often, in an attempt to separate
one unit1s share from another, the coverage stops short
of its boundary. The regiments of this Division have
repeatedly requested an extension of its coverage to
include its flanks and the only way these could be
WV.\ ';'< turn

"' ' - - " ":".'|-U ,
obtalned was by sT reprSd Jc%l8if order and was not satis

factory. Each front line Division should have at least
one or two oblique photos covering the terrain beyond
its left and right boundaries as a part of its routine
coverage.
The vertical coverage during this operation, large
ly handicapped by weather and low hanging clouds, was
necessarily less satisfactory than the obliques, which
could be taken with the lowest of ceilings. All but
four of the thirty sorties of M verticals received, were
taken with the K-18 camera (9 X 18M prints), although
these four taken with a 6H focal length camera (9H X 9"
prints), were probably the clearest of all. Of the
thirty vertical sorties received, twenty had a scale of
1:5,000; five a scale of 1:6,000; and the remaining
five, all taken during the last two weeks of the opera
tion, were 1:2,500. It became apparent that photo
graphs at a smaller scale thaii 1:5,000 became increas
ingly useless for interpretation purposes of the Japan
ese cave defensive positions.
Verticals at 1:2,500 were the most satisfactory,
not only because of larger scale and more detail, but
also because the cloud-covered area was less. It is
believed that in all vertical photography, providing
the anti-aircraft defense is not too intense, the best
possible results can be obtained by using different
cameras. If the clouds are H low, use a short focal
length camera such as the 6 ; if they are high, the
K-18 24H focal length camera is best. The 9" X 18"
prints are of course preferable, if clear, as a single
photograph covers a larger area.
Two sets of each vertical sortie covering the Divi
sion Z of A were received from within twelve to twenty-
four hours after the sortie was flown. One set of these
was sent immediately, with a sortie plot, to the 11th
Marines. When good photography covering the entire area
considerably beyond the Division's front lines was re
ceived, additional copies were requested for each Regi
ment and Battalion. Other runs covering particular
areas were periodically requested for distribution to
the Regiments.
Perhaps the greatest improvement that could be
made in the distribution of verticals has already been
- 17
rii aocinrn
mentioned as applying to obliques. It is the need for

coverage on each flank of the Division boundaries. Even
more than the obliques, vertical coverage was often cut
short of the boundaries in its distribution by higher
headquarters, but this is understandable as long as no
attempt is made to provide any overlap into the adja
cent unit*8 Z of A. Artillery has repeatedly requested
coverage beyond that received by the Division and the
policy of ordering additional photographs after the
Division's share has been received is not satisfactory.
It should be SOP that additional prints be furnished the
Division of all satisfactory vertical photography cover
ing an area at least 1,000 yards on each flank of the
Division Boundary.
Sonne Strips:
A Sonne Strip was flown for experimental purposes
at the request of III Phib Corps and proved very suc
cessful. They were used for several critical areas of
this Division during the last two weeks of the operation
with good results. This coverage, with a scale of
1:1,000 to 1:1,200, appears ideal for detailed interpre
tation of a small area. It was exceptionally clear and
its only disadvantage lies in the limited area covered
(a strip approximately 100 yards wide) and the diffi
culty of photographing all of a specific area. It is
strongly recommended that in future landings, all Divi
sions be furnished with Sonne coverage of the landing
beaches.
Dicing Runs:
This Division requested and received dicing runs
of critioal areas on two occasions. These were flown
at an altitude of fifty feet and the obliques were taken
with a K-20 camera (4M X 5" prints). Neither of the two
sorties was satisfactory and it is not recommended for
any other use than landing beach obliques due to the
large number of prints (taken at the rate of three per
second), the extreme difficulty in orientation and
plotting, and the small sizes of the print. It is
recommended, however, that such photographs be obtained
of all future landing beaches. They are ideal for
oblique mosaics.
e ^ ...a'f t. ..^Ft*
- 18
CLASSIFIED
Mosaics:
A 1:7,000 Grldded Uncontrolled Mosaic, prepared by III Phib Corps, proved almost Indispensable throughout the latter part of the campaign. It was made available in sufficient quantities to be distributed to all com pany commanders and,platoon leaders. It was clear In detail and tremendous!^ simplified the problem of orien tation, both as to troopsandto photographs. Prior to the time this mosaic was received, the 1:16,000 Con trolled Mosaic, prepared by JCIRdPAO-OlKCIOA, was used* Although preferable to the map, this mosaic was extremely poor in detail 4- particularly: in the Southern part of OKINAWA, below SHURI. Tenth Army furnished portions of this mosaic which were gridded and contoured. These were available in great quantity and were distributed to the Regiments for the platoon leader' s use. During the operation, fifteen photo interpretation
reports consisting of identification of military Instal
lations, terrain studies, damage assessments, and report
on bridge conditions were prepared and distributed as an
annex to the G-2 Periodic Report. It was soon observed
that the mere listing of targets proved of little value ,
to anyone concerned, due to the inability to pin-point
the defenses on the map. The military installation re
ports were written with the idea of enabling the aerial
observer for artillery and naval gunfire, as well as air
strikes to locate accurately definite targets. This was
done by giving a brief description of the target area
and the target within this area. Excellent results were
obtained in this way.
Interpretation for front line units was done chiefly
by annotating the obliques before distributing them to
lower echelons. Only in this manner could defenses imme
diately confronting the assault troops be pin-pointed.
As the whole island of OKINAWA was filled with possible
defensive positions, an attempt was made to pick out the
strongest areas as area targets for artillery and naval
gunfire. Since nearly every ridge encountered by the
Division contained caves, scattered fox holes and rifle
pits, most of them prepared some time before, it was
believed that a listing of every installation such as
these, could mean no more to the subordinate units than
that opposition could be expected from every ridge which
**>&mmm*0&r^:l*
- 19
CLTOSTTI
**3
had already been made apparent. More Important than a

long 118t of defenses was a description of the ridge
formation and the points along the ridge or flanking
hills where the installations appeared heaviest. In
addition to reports and oblique annotations, targets
were furnished artillery, naval gunfire, and air liai
son officers through the G-2 Target Information Center.
This work constituted the majority of the detailed mili
tary interpretation. Connected with this was the
verification of PW reports by photographs. Liaison
officers were frequently briefed by the section using
photographs of target areas in order that they might
have the maximum of detail in locating their targets for
aerial observers. Excellent results were obtained,
especially in the first month of the operation, when
definite artillery and other positions could be spotted,
as well as areas of greatest activity.
Upon the withdrawal of the Japanese to the South,
however, the limitations of photo interpretation were
recognized as the enemy withdrew entirely into cave
positions. It was soon found there that the accurate
locating of gun positions of all types must necessarily
be confined to "probable1' or "possible" identification,
as similar caves were found to contain anything from an
individual soldier to an artillery piece and even mor
tars were kept in small caves except for the time they
were fired. Camouflage was extensively used and the
movement of weapons, particularly artillery, from one
position to another was great. The chief targets fur
nished from photographs during this period were area
targets. Also during this period considerable work was
done in locating the most probable site of guns reported
firing from a general area.
Distribution of photographs to subordinate units
was a chief function of the API Section. Since the
front line obliques were of Immediate value to the
assault units, every effort was made to deliver them
as soon as possible. When inclement weather made the
delivery of photographs to Division difficult, III Phib
Corps adopted the practice of "air drops" which proved
so successful that it was followed throughout the cam
paign. On two occasions "air drops" were made to the
assault Regiments of this Division, but it was not
practical to continue this because there was no landing
JF
strip within a feasible distance of the Division CP that could be used. It was the duty of the API Section to divide the TUTXB between the assault Regiments, prepare sortie plots, annotate the prints as to defenses, the
names of towns, and the coordinates of a definite point,
and arrange for delivery to the Regiments. Photographs
received'in time to to.of use to the unit that day were
dispatched to the Regiment immediately by Jeep. If not,
they were sent by the next message center run.
It is planned that in future operations, a part of
the API Section will operate at the nearest air strip,
so that they will be able to process all photographs
immediately and arrange for delivery to the assault units by *air drop" within the minimum amount of time. The use of "air drops* of course depends to a large extent on the situation, but if available and the distance from the
Photographic Unit and assault Regiments is very great, it is by far the most satisfactory method of delivery.

Relief Maps:
Showing considerable aptitude at improvising, the
Relief Happing Section, l6t Engineer Battalion, prepared
three relief model8 of key terrain features in the Divi
sion's Z of A during the campaign on Southern OKINAWA.
On 28 April, 1945, work was started on the first
model, which encompassed terrain in the Division's Z of
A from the high ridge north and east of AWACHA extending
down to and including NAHA-KO, NAHA and the KOKUBA-GAWA;
from the west coast extending east to the northern end
of SHURI.
This map, fashioned of plastelena mounted on ply
wood, scale approximately 1:8,000, was prepared from
available aerial sorties, aerial mosaics, captured Jap
maps and the 1:25,000 tactical map. Available photo
coverage was so inadequate that it was necessary to
supplement this data by making both ground and aerial
reconnaissance of the area.
Special attention was given not only to the general
land masses, but also to the airport, rivers, road net
works, and towns existing at that time. Oil color was
applied to the above mentioned features for greater
* * t
definition of detail. Stickups with the names of towns

on same were affixed in their respective locations. The
remainder of the map was in natural green finish. The
map was completed and delivered on 2 May, 1945.
A second relief map covering the SHURI Castle area
was started 24 May, 1945. Because of the lack of neces
sary materials to make a standard relief model, a field
expedient was used. A framework of wood blocking and
10-in-l ration cardboard was covered with G I Navy issue
salt-water soap and this substance modeled. The model
was at a scale of approximately 1:1,000 and prepared
from available air coverage. Special attention was not
only given to the Castle area proper but also the ap
proaches and road network.
A coat of shellac was applied to the soap and the model was then finished in full oil colors to give the greatest possible definition of detail. The model was delivered on 29 May, 1945. The third model, begun 30 May, 1945, was, in reality, an extension and revision of the first map prepared, showing the new Z of A of the 1st Marine Division. The same methods as described in the preparation of the first model were followed. The model was delivered 2 June, 1945. PROPAGANDA:
Friendly:
Prior to L-Day on OKINAWA, carrier planes of the
Air Support Group dropped approximately 5,000,000 leaf
lets for Tenth Army. This leaflet bombardment began on
25 March and continued until 17 April. Leaflets were
prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch of CINCPAC CINCPOA. The principal themes of these leaflets were:
(l) to advise civilians and all non-combatants to leave
likely target areas and to disassociate themselves from
all Japanese military personnel; (2) to point out the
great disparity between the material strength and suc
cesses of American military forces and those of the
Japanese, thus laying a foundation for a more aggres
sive propaganda campaign when the tactical situation
permitted and (3) to counteract the very real fear on
the part of the Japanese that Americans torture and kill
captured enemy troops and civixiaus.
- 22 -
"
&
&
OICLRSSM
*V
About Love plus 14 a Psychological Warfare team of

CINCPAC-CINCPOA, temporarily attached to Tenth Army, came
ashore and began the preparation of suitable propaganda
leaflets and a weekly newspaper, RYUKYU SHUHO. These
were dropped from combat planes flying well behind the
enemy front lines.
On 27 May a representative of this Division met with
interested parties of the 6th Marine Division and the III
Phlb Corps to plan further steps in our campaign to Induce
the enemy to lay down his arms.
It was the opinion of all persons present at the III
Phlb Corps conference that many more Japanese would sur
render if they could be shown a means to do so. Thus
specific instructions were printed on the leaflets for all
who wished to approach our lines for the purpose of sur
rendering. Inasmuch as the success of the propaganda cam
paign depended upon the full cooperation of the front line
troops, the desirability of repeated indoctrination of all
combat troops was stressed. Consequently samples of pro
paganda leaflets were forwarded to all infantry regiments
and the 1st Tank Battalion, for dissemination to all troops
down through the various platoon leaders.
During the week of 3 June-10 June, twenty-four 105mm
propaganda shells were filled with approximately 500
leaflets; each. The first of these were fired on 6 June by
M Btry.-, 4th Bh., 11 tij Marines on previously designated
:^^get^^^tt^'^:.T0p6rte4-'i,-Di8per'jBion was goodeach shell
f^ covering i t slre% abbtit 3QP yards in diameter." On 5 June
appîimatiiy;2,06O\.ieafie>ts were dropped on designated
target ^ plane of VMO-7.
On or about 9f June, 1945, Tenth Army contacted the
Japanese 3^hd, Army Headquarters and informed them a mes
sage would be; dropped at a designated spot the next day.
O n 1 0 June a copy of the following message in Japanese
was dropped;for Ltaen USHIJIMA. ^
Prom: Lieutenant General Simon B,BUCKNER, JR., Com
manding General, U. S. Tenth Army, and Commander in-Chief , All American Forces, OKINAWA SHIMA.
Lieutenant General USHIJIMA, Mitsuru, Commanding
General, Japanese Thirty-second Army, OKINAWA
^ * . . . . - 23
To:
<"/?
SHIMA.
1. The forces under your command have fought
bravely and well, and your Infantry tactics
have merited the respect of your opponents,
in the battle of OKINAWA SHIMA.
2. Like myself, you are an Infantry general
long schooled and 'practiced in infantry war
fare. You fully know the pitiful plight of
your defense forces. You know'that no rein
forcements can reach you. I believe therefore,
that you understand as clearly as I, that the
destruction of all Japanese resistance on the
island is merely a matter of days, and that
this will entail the necessity of my killing
the vast majority of your remaining troops.
3. My forces now firmly hold, and will con
tinue to hold, nearly all of OKINAWA SHIMA,
so that even at the present time it is fulfil
ling its function as an American base of
attack against the Japanese homeland. Since
your purpose in defending the island was to
prevent such use, and your purpose has been
thwarted, you are now following a course of
resistance which is of no value to the stra
tegy of defense of the Japanese homeland, and
which, in fact, is further depleting the re
serve of physically fit young men who must
rebuild Japan after the war.
4. As an infantry general, you comprehend
that one of the most Important duties in the
code of military leadership is that of respon
sibility for the welfare of one!s men. If
there is any possible means by which a command
ing officer can preserve the lives of his men
after the outcome of the battle has been de
cided, it is his honor-bound duty to employ
such means.
5. Although I will prosecute every battle re
lentlessly until final victory in this war
has been won, I also feel that in accordance
with the humanitarian standards of the United
States and the rest of the civilised world,
****'* -**
_24_
rirp
CUT
IFIED
negotiations should be undertaken by you immedi

ately so that the future welfare of your troops
may be assured, rather than that they be
killed to the last man in the futile defense of
a lost cause. The cessation of battle by your
forces will bring credit to your military Judg
ment and earn you the humble thanks of all rela
tives and friends of your troops; the prolonga
tion of hostilities will only malign your family
name for all time by branding you a general who,
for selfish vanity alone, needlessly sacrificed
thousands of brave lives.
6. I am therefore prepared to enter into nego
tiations with you. Negotiations may be initia
ted by you in the following manner: At 1800
hours on "the day following your receipt of this
letter, display a large white cloth, visible
from the ground and air, at the place in your
line nearest the western coast of OKINAWA SHBtA.
This will be a signal to American forces to
give safe passage to your representatives for
negotiation. At that time and place, I will
permit your delegation, consisting of not more
than six persons, to come through the lines on
foot. Your representatives will be escorted to
my headquarters, where I will acquaint them
with the manner in which orderly and honorable
cessation of hostilities may be arranged. Your
delegation will be returned through the lines
at the conclusion of this meeting. You may be
assured that your proposals offered through
your staff representatives at the meeting will
be treated with the respect and consideration
due an officer of your reputation and rank.
7. It is hardly necessary for me to recall to
your mind the instances in the past where Japan
ese military commanders, in both the feudal and
modern eras of Japan, have saved their forces
to prevent needless bloodshed after the battle
has been decided. Humanitarian considerations
should impel you to make the same decision they
did.
* . *
- 25
DECLAWEB
JI*.
8. The English is the official version of thit

communication.
S. B. BUCKNER Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Following the dropping of this message, arrange
ments were made for the passage of the prescribed
surrender party through the Blue lines in this Divi
sion's Z of A. On 11 June a party from G-2 TENTH Army
went to the 7th Marines area, on the west coast, at the
designated time, but no peace emissaries arrived from
the Japanese Army.
Immediately following these events TENTH Army
dropped thousands of leaflets into all remaining poc
kets of resistance. Some of these were direct appeals
to officers of the Japanese Army, others to any who
wished to live rather than die for a cause already
lost. These leaflets contained various appeals but the
most widely scattered leaflet was the surrender pass.
Because of the rugged terrain and the heavy fire
received from the enemy in the Division's Z of A during
the assault phase, little opportunity was given to use
the 1st Signal Company's MPA #1 Loudspeaker, which has
an effective range of well over 500 yards. The Divi
sion was severely handicapped by the lack of a small
mobile speaker system, or one mounted on a Jeep. Since
the only speaker available was the MPA #1, which must
be mounted on a large truck, there were many occasions
when it could not be secured from the 1st Signal Com
pany in time to satisfy a tactical need. For the effi
cient prosecution of a propaganda campaign it is highly
desirable that the G-2 Language Section have a Jeep
with a suitable loudspeaker system mounted on it.
In the closing days of the campaign the MPA #L loudspeaker was used with a fair measure of success. However, it became apparent that it is absolutely es sential that adjacent front line units coordinate their efforts. Oh the day the island was declared officially secured, the sound truck was placed in a desirable lo cation with exceedingly favorable conditions of terrain, weather, wind and mechanical functioning of equipment. Enemy troops could be seen scurrying around on the hill side, well within: effective range of our speaker, but
V H W v t r W w l "
none dared to accept the chance to surrender inasmuch as a combat team of the XXIV Army Corps on an adjacent h i l l s i d e was f o l l o w i n g the more orthodox system of r e ducing the pocket of r e s i s t a n c e through the use of flame throwers and tanks. The f o l l o w i n g day several c i v i l i a n s were persuaded to come out of hiding but no m i l i t a r y personnel were encountered. On OBOE p l u s 3, while continuing the loud speaker campaign, the truck carrying the MPA #L h i t a mine, d e s t r o y i n g the truck and injuring the o f f i c e r and e n l i s t e d man from the D i v i s i o n G-2 Language Unit, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e i r evacuation from the combat zone. During the OKINAWA campaign the h e a v i e s t l e a f l e t bombardment to date i n the P a c i f i c was carried out. It i s d i f f i c u l t to determine what percentage of the l a r g e number of p r i s o n e r s taken l a i d down t h e i r arms because of our propaganda appeal. During the l a s t s i x weeks of the campaign every prisoner interrogated by the 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n I n t e l l i g e n c e Section was questioned concerning our l e a f l e t s . A high percentage of those questioned had seen one or more of the l e a f l e t s and some who had not seen them had at l e a s t heard of them. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine the percentage of p r i s oners who surrendered s o l e l y because of the l e a f l e t s . However, the number who were i n part influenced by them i s undoubtedly c o n s i d e r a b l e . I t i s worse than treason f o r a w e l l i n d o c t r i n a t e d Japanese m i l i t a r y person to d e s e r t rather than d i e or commit s u i c i d e . As a r e s u l t , a high percentage of those who are teken prisoner w i t h out any r e s i s t a n c e w i l l r a t i o n a l i z e h i s a c t i o n , seeking always to J u s t i f y h i s breaking of the w a r r i o r ' s code. In s p i t e of t h i s nearly u n i v e r s a l tendency on the part of the Japanese to deny d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r sur rendering, there were a few who admitted having organ i z e d small surrender groups and who came i n i n accor dance with i n s t r u c t i o n s given on the l e a f l e t s . Among attached labor personnel and r e c e n t l y con s c r i p t e d defense troops there i s a greater response. I t was noticed t h a t these l e s s w e l l indoctrinated men surrendered i n g r e a t e r numbers. However, i t was en couraging to note t h a t a s the campaign reached i t s climax more o f f i c e r s and men from r e g u l a r l y organized
_27_ iirfH U A t f i r
Vxy
military units laid down their arms and came in with

surrender leaflets.
Enemy:
There was no widespread concerted effort on the part of the enemy to disseminate propaganda among Blue forces* However, on three occasions Japanese-prepared propaganda l e a f l e t s were found within t h i s D i v i s i o n ' s Z of A. The f i r s t one (#1) was taken from the body of an enemy s o l dier found in a cave at TA 7975-N, by members of H & S Co., 1st Engr. Bn., on 13 May, 1945. Leaflet Number 2 (#2) and number 3 (#3) were taken together by troops of "GeorgeM Company, 2nd Battalion, 1 s t Marines. They were found on an enemy s o l d i e r ' s body in TA 7873-1, 23 May. Leaflet number 2 was written by brush in script on one of the 1:25,000 Blue Forces map sheet8 for central OKINAWA. An oral report from troops of the 77th Division r e l a t e s that an identioal l e a f l e t was found in their Z of A. Leaflet Number 3, l i k e Number 1, was reproduced by mimeograph on cheap quality paper and i s of i n t e r e s t largely because i t outlines the extravagant claims made by Japanese Army leaders to their own troops. All three l e a f l e t s are reproduced below, #1, Comrades.1
Dear American comradesj I was carelessly wound

ed and is now in the Japanese camp. I am very sorry
that you are fighting hard battles bravely. But I am
very glad that I have come to the Japanese camp and
realized the real circumstance while I am alive. It is
a great pity that you will surely meet with far more
cruel hells. The battles here will be 10 times as severe
as that of the YuBslma Island. I am sure that all of
you that have landed will lose your lives which will be
realized if you come here.
The affairs of Okinawa is quite different from the Is
lands that were taken by the Americans.
Take good care of yourselves.
George S. Flame D.96
'#^V^. #
:
" ^28
rrWiTMnF
MUSE1FIE
#2
Think you old mother gazing at west sky and wait
ing for you come home.
Think your sweetheart embracing your portrait and
crying hot tears.
You never die.1 Your youth is only once for all.1
A many of your friend died calling out the name

of their mother and sweetheart.
#3 American Soldiers.'
Do you believe you are protected by a large number

of your warships?
Juet try to give ear secretly to the talk of your
staff members. And you will be surprised at the fol
lowing topics.
(1) Undoubtedly 412 of your vessels were already sunk
off Okinawa.
(2) There are but few left of your regular carriers.
(3) Many of your battle ships cruising off Okinawa are
seriously damaged by the Japanese special attack corps.
(4) The American vessels out of your sight have one
after another been falling a prey to the Kamikaze at
tack corps.
(5) The supply from your home country is doomed to be
stopped shortly.
ENEMY
Morale:
A Japanese army doctor, a First Lieutenant, inter
rogated at the 1st Marine Division Stockade on Oboe
plus 2, said that during the time he was giving physi
cal examinations to the trorps which were sent in to
reinforce OKINAWA, he found the men tc be in excellent
physical condition and full of confidence that Japan
would not only hold OKINAWA but win the war. Many of
them had battle experience in Manchuria or China and
they were some of Japan's best. This was in July,
August and September, 1944.
The severe American bombing raid on 10 October,

1944, which destroyed most of NAHA, caused many casual
ties and changed the picture considerably, of the men
in the Army, the members of the native home guard were
the most impressed. They had not wanted to take part
in the war, and the raid extinguished what little mili
tary enthusiasm they might have had. The regular army
men were affected too, although they did not express
their feelings quite as freely. They began to feel
that if the Japanese Navy and Air Force could not pre
vent such a devastating raid, there was not much hope
of defending OKINAWA in the event of a landing. The
officers talked enthusiastically about the glory of
destroying the hated enemy on the beaches with victory
a certainty, but the men realized that much of this
talk was just an attempt to bolster morale.
The heavy raids In February and March, 1945, had
an even more depressing effect on the OKINAWA garrison.
An aircraft maintenance man who arrived at OKINAWA
about the first of March, 1945, reported to interroga
tors that he had found all the men at the YONTAN Air
field in a very gloomy mood. There was no talk of
victory, but a widespread resolve to put up a bitter
defense. Many thought then that it would be a fight
to the death, without hope of victory.
After the landing by American forces it was found
that most of the captured enemy troops had possessed
little hope of an ultimate victory. They stated tha"C
the retreat toward SHuRI was part of one strategy which
had been planned long in advance. The Japanese were
digging in for a last-ditch stand, in which the goal
was to make our victory as cosily as possible. Prison
ers captured on the front lines during May reported
that the officers were doing everything possible to
encourage the men, using the following line of argument:
(l) There would be a large scale landing by Japan
ese Airborne troops, with Naval support. There were
varying sxories about the number of planes to be used,
some reports being that it would run into hundreds.
When the small scale landing was finally attempted at
YONTAN Airfield aboui 2b May, the officers reported to
their men that if they could hold out just a few days
longer, strong forces attacking the Americans from uhe
<* - 30
?ry
JUUSSiFiED
rear would relieve them and OKINAWA would be saved.

The men doubted this, however, when they continued to
see only American planes in the air.
(2) It was officially announced that the KAMIKAZE
planes were sinking American ships faster than they
could come in. As a result, the officers said, the
Americans could not get supplies and their reinforce
ments were cut off. All available strength was sup
posed to be on the front lines and if the Japanese
could only defeat the troops immediately opposing
them, they would win the battle. But the trucks and
bull dozers continued to move up with the Americans
and the Japanese believed their eyes more than their
ears.
During all of this period the men were allowed
to hear the details of B-29 destruction in Tokyo.
Many prisoners mentioned this. Instead of making them
angry, it seemed to have a depressing effect.
As time went on, more and more planes, more e quipment, more fresh troops appeared. To the average
Japanese soldier, the American propaganda leaflets
appeared to be more reasonable. The troops discussed
the matter among themselves, being careful not to let
this reach the ears of the officers. There were many
soldiers who would not consider the idea of surrender,
and some cases where NCO's assaulted anyone they
found in possession of a leaflet. But propaganda was
beginning to have a definite effect. Many men read
the newspaper, RYUKYU SHUHO, dropped by American
planes and came to depend on it for news.
The medical situation grew steadily worse. Doc
tors were few and the only nurses available were young
OKINAWAN girls so poorly trained that they were pract
ically useless. Cave hospitals became Jammed with
wounded for whom very little could be done. Finally,
many of the patients were left to die. Resentment
about such inhumane treatment continued to increase.
A wounded man was considered as good as dead.
As the situation became more desperate, officers
stopped trying to encourage their troops. Instead,
they ordered every man who could carry a weapon to
y**K'
DE&LMSU*
dash into the battle and die for the Emperor. Officers kicked the men around and showed no consideration for
their comfort. Strangely enough, however, even after
becoming prisoners, enlisted men were very reluctant
to criticize their officers in any way. Food became
scarce. The troops complained about the poor cooking.
In at least one Instance a sergeant was reduced to PFC
and assigned to line duty because he turned out such
poor meals. The officers issued detailed instructions
about cooking and how to maintain healthful conditions
while living in caves.
Rifle ammunition was scarce. Knowledge of this
fact was bad for morale of the troops, who had no
special desire to resort to suicide missions with
satchel charges and grenades. Orders were issued to
secure grenades and other supplies from the Americans
whenever possible and to conserve supplies and equip
ment in every conceivable way.
In spite of all the factors mentioned above, which
no doubt had a serious depressing effect on the morale
of the Japanese, the average infantryman continued to
fight desperately and to die at his post. It is use
less to say that because his morale is low, the Jap
soldier will not fight. The OKINAWA home guard may
have tried to escape, but as long as the regular Army
man had anyone to command him, he fought on. Of
course this was partly due to a deep-seated fear of
surrender and the widespread belief that the Americans
killed all prisoners. When, near the end, organized
resistance became impossible, more and more of them
v/ho could not bring themselves to the point of com
mitting suicide, laid down their arms and came into
Blue lines to surrender.
In the sense of will to fight and die for hie
country, the Jap soldier's morale was excellent
throughout the campaign. In general, he had confid
ence in his officers, especially in Lt. Gen. USHIJIMA,
and obeyed orders without question.
But morale in the sense of faith in victory was
at a very low ebb. After all, these men had seen
American might with their own eyes.
32
'%
ni
* fifiir
YSZ
% i*'
DttUSSiFIED
Order of Battle:
ii *
Reinforcing and regrouping by night, the enemy's

32nd Army succeeded in keeping 3,000 to 5,000 effec
tives in its line opposing the 1st Mar Div from 1 May
until rain bogged down the attack on 20 May. The ex
tent of the turnover which took place is indicated by
the fact that the 1st Mar Div counted nearly 6,000
enemy dead in that period.
Thereafter the enemy lacked the strength to con
tinue to defend on the same scale and withdrew, begin
ning with his artillery possibly as early as 15 May,
to his line from GUSHICHAN (TA 7362) to ITGMAN (TA 7362). When moderating weather permitted the attack
to be resumed on 29 May, about 1,000 men in scattered
strong point8 opposed the advance.
The enemy's next major line was shorter and he
was able to hold the 1st Mar Div zone, in the KUNISHI-
MaZADO sector (TAs 7460 and 7450), with about 3,000
men. Though less heavily armed than previously, the
enemy fought desperately from strong positions in a
vain attempt to hold this final defensive line. Ano
ther 3,000 men were killed in mopping up the Division
Z of A up to Oboe Day.
Infantry:
At least 26 first-line rifle companies and 10 MG
companies were used against the 1st Mar Div from 1 May
to 20 May. These included the following, all of which
were under control of the 64th Brigade, 62nd Division:
15th Ind Inf Bn5 rifle, 1 MG companies.
21st Ind Inf Bn5 rifle, 1 MG companies.
22nd Ind Inf Bn4 rifle, 1 MG companies.
23rd Ind Inf B n 4 rifle, 1 MG companies.
272nd Ind Inf Bn5 rifle, 1 MG companies.
3rd Bn, 2nd Inf. Unit, 44th Ind, Mixed Brig 3 rifle, 1 MG companies.
4th Ind MG BnIMG Company.
14th Ind MG Bn3MG Companies.
About 15 of the rifle companies and five of the
MG companies had been in action during April and some
33 -
0KWSSIFIED
of these were reduced in effectiveness when the 1st Marine

Division entered the lines. On the other hand, during
the same period the Division was under fire on its left
from the remnants of the 63rd Brigade, 62nd Division,
where they were defending high ground in the AWACHA CHOJIKA sector (TAs 7975 and 7974).
Three second-line infantry companies were added
to the line facing the 1st Marine Division early in
May. They were the three companies of the 3rd Ind Bn.,
formed from the 3rd Sea Raid Base Bn., a suicide-boat
maintenance and guard unit.
A change in the Division!s western boundary on
24 May brought the Division into brief minor contacts
with the 2nd and 3rd Bn., of the 15th Ind. Mixed Regt.,
which previously had suffered heavy casualties.
When the Division's general advance was resumed
on 29 May, it was initially against a rear guard at
SHURI left by the 22nd Ind. Inf. Bn., and then increas
ingly, against service or specialized units fighting
as infantry. Brief skirmishes took place with Navy
air force ground crews around TOKIGUSUKU MURA (TA 7668). As ITOMAN (TA7362) and OZATO (TA 7661) fell,
the 66th Ind. Engr. Bn., the 24th Div. Engr. Regt.,
and the 259th Ind. MT Co., were identified fighting as
front-line infantry. The responsibility and the lead
ership, however, rested with the 32nd Inf. Regt., 24th
Div., which put three under strength battalions, rein
forced by independent MG- companies, on the line at
KUNISHI (TA 7460), MEZADO (TA 7459), and MAKABE (TA 7558) and offered determined resistance.
Penetrating past MAKABE and to the South coast,
the Division overran sectors assigned to the 12th and
13th Ind. Inf. Bns. of the 63rd Brigade, 62nd Division,
finding them occupied by a wide variety of service
troops and stragglers.
Anti-Tank: A/T units having T/0 strengths of twenty-four
47mm A/T guns and twelve 75mm D/P guns operated a gainst the 1st Marine Division in the period 1 May.
They included one company of the 7th Ind. A/T Gun Bn.,
one company of the 22nd Ind. A/T Gun Bn., and the 32nd
Ind. A/T Gun Co., all of which had 47mm guns; and two
companies of the 81st F. AAA Bn., which had 75mm D/P
Guns. An unidentified unit or units also employed
four 37mm A/T guns against the Division in the same
period. Some of these units had seen heavy fighting
in April, but at least eighteen 47mm and six 75mm, in
addition to the four 37mm guns, remained when the 1st
Marine Division entered the lines.
Four additional 47mm A/T guns were employed a galnst the 1st Marine Division in the KUNISHI-MEZADO
sector, by the remnants of the 3rd Ind. A/T Gun Bn.
Tank destroyer teams, armed with demolitions,
A/T mines and A/T grenades, were detailed from infan
try units or were organized from second-line troops
and attached to the infantry on a liberal scale
throughout the operation.
Mortars:
In addition to approximately two hundred and
fifty 50mm grenade dischargers, which were organic in
rifle companies, forty eight 81mm or 90mm mortars of
the 1st Light Mortar Bn. and at least three 320mm
spigot mortar8 of the 1st Arty. Mortar Regt. were em
ployed against the 1st Marine Division during May.
One 320mm mortar and a few grenade dischargers
were left to delay the advance around TOHTGUSUKU MURA.
Intense mortar and grenade discharger fire was
encountered once more when the Division attacked the
KUNISHI-MEZADO area, where the remnants of the 7th
and 8th Companies, 2nd Light Mortar Bn., were in sup
port of the 32nd Inf. Regt.
Artillery:
Three battalions totalling thirty-six 15cm howit
zers (2nd Bn, 1st Med. Arty. Regt., and 1st and 2nd
Bn, 23rd Med Arty. Regt. ) and one battalion of six
15cm guns (100th Heavy Arty. Bn.) covered the enemy's
entire front north of SHURI. They entered the month
of May with 25-30 pieces operating. Several 12cm to
itii
*~sr
20cm Navy guns also were assigned t t general support of

o the western sector of the enemy's front.
In direct support of the infantry were five Bat
talion Gun companies with at least ten 75mm field guns
and an equal number of 70mm battalion howitzers.
Firing missions in the 1st Marine Division Z of A
also were carried out by the 42nd FA Regt., of the 24th
Div., which was normally in direct support of the 24th
Div. The regiment had a total of ten 10cm howitzers,
four 15cm howitzers, and four 75mm field guns.
When the enemy withdrew behind his ITOMAN-GUSHI CHAN line he was able to take with him about eight 15cm
howitzers of the 1st and 23rd Med. Arty. Regts. and at
least four of the guns of the 42nd Regt. The effect
iveness of these weapons was limited by an ammunition
shortage, however.
In light calibers, the enemy used 20mm and 25mm
AA guns of the 103rd Mach, Cannon Bn. and of Navy AA
units for ground defense. Fifteen 20mm and eleven 25mm
gun6 were destroyed or captured by the 1st Marine
Division.
Tanks:
Only four enemy light tanks and one tankette were
encountered by the 1st Marine Division and all of these
had been knocked out behind the enemy's lines by artil
lery, NGF, or air strikes.
General:
Systematic use of service and specialized troops
and of local conscripts as infantry replacements was
instituted by the enemy on OKINAWA. Casualties suf
fered by a unit proved to be misleading gauges of that
unit's current strength. Prior to the landing, one or
more classes of OKINAWAN youths were called up and used
to bring the enemy's combat units over-strength. As
casualties thinned the ranks, first the service ele
ments of the division, then independent service troops
called in from rear areas, including Navy men, were
absorbed.
* - 36
9(,0
As xne Jspafleffe" siffllmon deteriorated, some of

the better service or specialized units took over
sectors of the line as units, instead of being sent
piecemeal as replacements. Such units were lightly
armed by comparison with the regular infantry forces,
however.
Organization and Tactics:
^- w *T 22r lD
~* *
The Japanese defense of Southern OKINAWA (and

therefore the defense of the entire Island, for It
was upon the refusal of this vital lower area to our
forces that the enemy pinned all his practical hopes
for success) was well conceived and, until Its col
lapse on 22 June, 1945, equally well executed. The
length of the battle eighty-two (82) days, and the
American casualties, now over 35,000 dead and wounded,
bear silent witness to the effectiveness of the enemy's
effort.
Generally speaking the defensive forces were dis
posed in great depth. This scheme enabled the Japan
ese commander, Lt. Gen USHIJIMA, CG, 32nd Army, to
halt our advance with the minimum number of troops
deployed across a comparatively narrow front. It also,
as long as we selected to attack frontally from the
North, gave him command of all rear areas and thus
enabled him to keep open almost to the last his nor
mal routes of supply, reinforcement, and withdrawal.
This defense, like all Japanese defenses en
countered to date, made admirable use of the terrain, which in Itself constituted a strong barrier to our
advance. The enemy established three (3) main defen
sive lines, each of which occupied a critical terrain feature - a single ridge or a series of ridges and
hill masses lying generally East-West across the Is
land, perpendicular to our direction of advance. The first of these lines was established at the narrowest portion of Southern OKINAWA along KAKAZU Ridge; the
second (and strongest) in an area North of SHURI, and the third, East-West from ITOMAN to GUSHICHAN through the Central terrain bulwarks of YUZA-DAKE and YAEJU DAKE.

The enemy's defense, as thus organized, was es
sentially a defense of attrition. Each of the lines

**^*ftwfWi
Kuissino
Infantry:
*&>! '-J#"V
was held in great strength until It became untenable,

at which time the bulk of the enemy forces withdrew
to the next position. Small, suicidal holding forces
were left to delay our advance through each line, and
scattered groups were employed in the broken terrain
between lines to slow our movement there. The enemy's
withdrawal and delaying action were conducted in a
skillful manner. This Division encountered the second
and third defensive lines.
The enemy's tactics within this general conception
showed no marked change from those recently encountered
in the Pacific War, but the Improvements and advances
of his detailed tactical ideas are significant and
important. A discussion by component defensive ele
ments follows:
Cave warfare characterized the enemy's primary

resistance. First employed in the MARIANAS and sub
sequently at PELELIU and IWO JIMA, it was considerably
improved on OKINAWA. This improvement was no mere
haphazard result of experience. Captured documents of
battle doctrine discussed in explicit detail the weak
nesses and strong features of cave warfare, and meth
ods to eliminate the faults.
The enemy built his defenses around caves, the
number of which is almost beyond reckoning. All ter
rain features were studded with them - both natural
ones and those excavated for definite tactical pur
poses. Each cave wes the center of an infantry strong-
point. Automatic weapons and sometimes light artillery
pieces were emplaced in the caves, the mouths of which
were small and well-concealed. Foxholes and rifle
pits guarded each cave against the inevitable close-
quarter attack of our infantry and tank-Infantry teams.
All ceve strongpoint defenses were interlocked into a
system of mutual supporting fires so that the advan
cing forces were faced with an integrated defensive
line.
The scheme of operation of the enemy defenses
v - s one that denied the attacker any rest. Usually,
f' the enemy defenses were in three (3) lines on a hill
38
Wz
JttfiUSEIFIED
""
i
_ _
*"' ' * ** < * *
mass - on the forward s l o p e , the c r e s t , and the reverse s l o p e . Automatic weapons, r i f l e , and knee mortar f i r e was d e l i v e r e d from the f r o n t a l p o s i t i o n s and from f l a n k i n g caves on adjacent h i l l s . 81mm and 90mm mortar f i r e and a r t i l l e r y f i r e of a l l c a l i b e r s were coordinated with small arms and machine gun f i r e . Once t h i s f i r e was n e u t r a l i z e d , the forward s l o p e s of the h i l l mass secured, and the c r e s t of the h i l l reached, severe infantry wea pons f i r e was r e c e i v e d from that area and from some of the r e v e r s e slope p o s i t i o n s that faced forward up the hill. Heavy weapons f i r e was coordinated with that de l i v e r e d l o c a l l y i n an a l l - o u t e f f o r t to force our w i t h drawal. Of the three phases, perhaps t h i s defense of the r i d g e c r e s t was the most f i e r c e . A h i l l could not be secured u n t i l the rear slope was occupied and cleared of a l l enemy troops, a task the Japanese opposed w i t h extreme t e n a c i t y . For with the c r o s s - c o r r i d o r , t e r r a i n pattern over which we were forced to operate, reverse slope d e f e n s e s , i n addition to preventing flanking a t t a c k s , formed more o f t e n than not one s i d e of a "pocket". From these well-hidden and sometimes almost i n a c c e s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s , the enemy fought with s k i l l and desperation. Grazing, e n f i l a d e machine gun f i r e was d e l i v e r e d from each c r e v i c e and corner, knee mortar f i r e f e l l on our troops from out of nowhere and mortar s h e l l s were lobbed i n t o the v a l l e y w i t h extreme accuracy and frequency. Here t o o , the en emy employed to b e s t advantage h i s a n t i - t a n k t a c t i c s , an element of h i s defense d i s c u s s e d separately. The enemy attempted only one (1) major counter a t t a c k a g a i n s t TENTH Army f o r c e s , that being an a l l - o u t l a n d , sea, and a i r a s s a u l t on the night of 4-6 May. This attack f a i l e d primarily because i t was l o o s e l y executed, although the idea - heavy a i r s t r i k e s , l a n d i n g s behind our l ^ n e s , and a land thrust a g a i n s t the Blue l e f t f r o n t - was a w e l l - c o n c e i v e d one. A l l other o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n was i n the form of small attempts at p e n e t r a t i o n and g e n e r a l l y haphazard night i n f i l t r a t i o n s . Artillery: The Japanese employed artillery^ in Southern
OKINAWA to a greater extent than ever before in the
ations of fire
pacific War. However, although on
received were heavy until the sy
was complete, and a great variety of cal

ibers was in evidence, massed fire was not used. This
may have been due to a shortage of ammunition and lack
of communications. There are no definite indications
that fire was delivered at any one time either on this
Division or on any other, by more than a battery. Nor
do PW interrogations disclose any plan of employment
more extensive than that. While all caliber weapons
from 37mm to 15cm were captured or destroyed, little
modern fire control equipment was ever noted.
Concentrated artillery fires were delivered primar
ily against front line troops; their accuracy attests
to excellent visual observation of our positions. These
fires were heaviest during the dawn and dark hours.
Rear areas were not totally exempt however; it was ob
vious that critical points in the terrain and road net
works, areas where bivouacs, dumps and CP's are often
established, had been registered upon before our land
ings. Light artillery, 47mm and 75mm, was generally
delivered in close support missions while the heavier
calibers were most often used for harassing and inter
dictory fire. Some counter-battery fire was noted in
the early stages of the battle.
Ant1-Tank:
Except for the extensive use of anti-tank mines, the enemy's t a c t i c s i n the employment of t h i s arm of h i s defense had never been c l e a r l y established before the b a t t l e f o r Southern OKINAWA. However, they are c l e a r now. The enemy r e a l i z e s the offensive value of our tanks and i s aware that in future land-mass operations they w i l l be employed to an ever greater extent than evidenced here. He has therefore evolved a defensive system against them, a three-step process that he hope* w i l l reduce t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Knowing that we employ tanks in conjunction with Infantry, the enemy f i r s t attempted to i s o l a t e the tank by concentrated mortar and a r t i l l e r y f i r e on i t and the accompanying personnel. This f i r e may also disable the tank, although i t i s believed that i t i s intended p r i marily to break up the tank-infantry team.
The tank, then alone and probably stopped, becoD.ee

in the second phase the target for 47mm anti-tank fire.
The effectiveness of this weapon cannot be underestimated;
in the battle for Southern OKINAWA twenty-two of the
Division's tanks were damaged (two beyond repair) by such
fire. This fire was usually delivered against tanks
operating in a draw or pocket from positions within
600-800 yards range. These positions were well camou
flaged and in at least one Instance could not be de
tected even while firing. Generally, the field of fire
for the gun was narrow, a character!etic apparently
limited by the enemy's desire for concealment and cover.
However, the guns were, in most cases, employed in pairs
or threes. In WANA Draw no less than five 47mm A/T guns,
located in well-scattered and strong positions, covered
the 8ingle approach.1
The 47mm fire was delivered primarily against tank
suspension systems and other points where the vehicle
could be most easily disabled. The 47mm AP projectile
will pierce, at ranges up to 800 yards, all parts of the
M-4 tank except the glacis.
Once the tank was disabled, anti-tank assault teams
were to finish it off. It was this phase of the defense
that failed, for all except one of these teams were
killed before they ever accomplished their mission.
These groups of generally two to five men carried satchel
charges, anti-tank mines, and smoke grenades. It was
their Job to advance up to the tank under cover of the
smoke and destroy it (and in view of the type demolitions
carried, presumably themselves).
The following tabulations by the 1st Tank Bn show
the results of this defensive scheme.
Cause Heavy artillery and mortar fire 47mm A/T fire 75mm artillery fire Close-in attack (satchel charge) - 41 Damaged Damaged beyond repair* (no. of tanks) (no. of tanks) 14 20 3 1 2 1
LULndtull \
Y6j
Other a n t i - t a n k a c t i o n s had the following r e s u l t s : Cause Mines A/T grenades 20mm A/T fire Damaged 30 5 1 Damaged beyond r e p a i r * 1 0 0
F i f t e e n a d d i t i o n a l tanks were damaged beyond r e p a i r by enemy demolition teams o p e r a t i n g a t night a g a i n s t tanks l e f t i n the f i e l d . As can be observed from the above t a b l e , i n a d d i t i o n to h i s three-phase a t t a c k the enemy made extensive use of mines a g a i n s t our t a n k s . Generally t h i s damage* was i n f l i c t e d by a n t i - v e h i c u l a r mine f i e l d s placed on and along side r o a d s . However, i n several infltanoes the enemy s p e c i f i c a l l y , under cover of darkness, l a i d mines where tanks had been o p e r a t i n g i n the d a y l i g h t hours. Engineer: The enemy employed mines, anti-personnel, and anti-
vehicular, to a considerable but not extensive degree.
Usually these weapons wers buried along roads and in areas
where traffic was expected. The patterns were vague and
uncertain and it appeared that little planned, systematic
mining was done. The fact that the enemy often used roads
only a day or a few hours before Blue forces controlled
them may account for this apparent tactical blunder. The
incidence of hasty mining - sometimes by night infiltra
tors in rear areas - was much greater than that of planned
and deliberated mining.
2quipment (new development):
Enemy equipment encountered by this Division in
Southern OKINAWA was generally commensurate, in volume
and quality, with the Japanese forces engaged. With the
exception of two new type mines, all materiel was stan
dard.
Infantry weapons captured or destroyed were ortho
dox. Rifles and LMGs encountered were almost all Model
99, 7.7mm; HMOs Model 92. Mortars included all standard
'-*iî^r:i-^v^ v - * * ^
- 42
types from 50mm to 90mm. 150mm mortar shellings were

reported frequently but none of the weapons were ever
found. Of historical interest were several Model 11,
MURATA rifles (llmm), the first standard military rifle
of Japanese design, and a few 82mm Chinese mortar pro
jectiles. The MURATA rifle was invented in 1880 and
first used in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The
mortar firing the 82mm shell was never found.
Over one hundred eighteen artillery pieces 37mm to
15cm, were captured or destroyed. All of the weapons
were standard models, although the Model 89, 15cm gun
had never been captured before the OKINAWA campaign.
The artillery pieces most extensively encountered were
the Type 1, 47mm A/T gun and the Model 95, 75mm field
gun.
The Division also encountered, for the first time,
the 320mm spigot mortar. Several specimens of the pro
jectile and one tube and base assembly were recovered.
Grenades and mines were noted in considerable quantity; all known types were captured. The two new mines previously mentioned were: \l) A hemispherical, serrated, cast-iron, anti-personnel mine and (2) an electrically detonated anti-vehicular mine. Several examples of this latter weapon, which was likewise hemispherical but had a smooth steel shell, were found buried three to four feet below road surfaces. Three hundred fifty yard lead wires were attached to this two hundred fifty lb mine. Aerial bombs rigged as mines, quasi-standard satchel charges, and booby traps of various types were common. The Division encountered Innumerable dumpsammu
nition, quartermaster, electrical and communications
gear, medical supplies, etc. Considerable motor trans
port was captured. Several prime movers, one tankette,
and four light tanks were also captured or destroyed.
^placements:
The enemy was favored in the defense of Southern
OKINAWA by terrain so completely advantageous that the
large scale construction and subsequent employment of
artificial defensive installations was entirely
43 -
IED
EClASJflf
ESW&SIFIED
*^mm ^BW MM m m W
W
mm
m wfW ^W
unnecessary. Any extensive system of concrete and

steel fortifications, the use of which has previously
characterized Japanese Central Pacific defenses, would
have been superfluous to his already strong defensive
organization and utilization of the ground. All that
the enemy had to do was make slight improvements on
that which Nature had provided.
The few and scattered independently strong em
placements that the enemy did build were generally
conventional in design and construction. As noted on
IWD J IMA and in Northern and Central OKINAI'JA, the Jap
anese have learned much in the past year of war con
cerning the faults and points of vulnerability of such
fortifications. Pillboxes and casemates encountered
were low and well concealed. Firing ports were located
so as to flank logical approaches rather than to front
them. The emphasis was not upon positions of arro
gantly defiant physical strength but on those that af
forded adequate and inconspicuous protection for an
automatic weapon and its crew. A 32nd Army order cited,
eplgrammatically, the keynote of the construction of
enemy defensive installations: "Camouflage is stronger
than concrete."
As stated above, however, the greater part of the
enemy's emplacements of major importance were improve
ments on natural terrain features. As was expected,
caves formed the bulk of these installations. In many
cases they were natural limestone caves, in others
they were man-made tunnels dug out of the almost rock
like blue clay found in this portion of the Island.
The same observations that have been made con
cerning artificial pillboxes and casemates may be re
peated for these installations. Several documents
captured during the campaign disclosed in great detail
the weaknesses of defensive caves previously employed
against American troops and listed corrective measures
for each of them. As far as the emplacement itself
was concerned, the documents stressed the improvement
of camouflage, the necessity for multiple entrances,
anti-fragment, anti-gas, and anti-flame barricades,
widely separated air vents, etc.; and the elimination
of dead space both within the cave and in the area
covered by the gun embrasures, the latter correction
nrfitJifflfi
V L U LI I U U I 1 I
WW
to be coupled with Increased firepower.

A simple step advocated by the Japanese command
for the improvement of this last-named feature is the
construction of what he terms a "sleeve type" firing
port. This opening, pictured here, widens the area
covered and allows more than one weapon to be fired
from it at once. Normal employment of such a port,
both advocated and observed, is by one automatic wea
pon and two rifles.
f
RIFLE
LMG
^
*IFIE
All of these improvements were noted to varying

extents in the enemy's defensive caves, although no
single cave was so impregnable as to completely deny
reduction.
The Japanese did not show any reluctance to use
the native burial vaults for defensive positions.
Beehive Hill, a veritable honeycomb of tombs, was one
of the most difficult obstacles to the Division's
progress. There was little evidence, however, that
these tomb positions were prepared in advance, but
it appears that the enemy used them as he fell back
to them, Just as he would employ a terrain feature
that provided cover. Tomb positions were, therefore,
primarily used for emplacement of Infantry weapons
although a few observed contained artillery pieces.
&nemy artillery was emplaced either in open pits
or in caves, the latter positions being the more
frequent. Practically all of the artillery caves
were man-made tunnels, some of which contained tracks
on which the artillery piece could be rolled in and
out of the firing position.
The Hill 81, Z of A. in caves best examples of these caves were found on
the last area of resistance in the Division's
Here three 15cm field pieces were emplaced
whose openings covered the ground to the
- 45 -
DFPMAAtT
The guns were rolled out to the cave

mouth on tracks and withdrawn immediately after firing.
Individual emplacements were primarily foxholes.
Trenches encountered were generally used for communi
cation. Both "spider-trap" holes and "octopus-pot
(foxholes that are enlarged inside to provide cover
from air bursts) type, mentioned frequently in docu
ments, were encountered. For the most part, however,
topographic variationsclefts, crevices, nooks and
cornersprovided sufficient cover for the individual
Japanese soldier.
ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION
The enemy was at all times aware of the forces
and situations confronting him. The very nature of
the terrain enabled him to dictate the conditions of
battle and afforded him excellent visual observation
of not only our front line deployments but often of
our rear areas. The accuracy of his artillery shell
ing bears strong testimony to this fact - front lines,
CP's, road Junctions, and dumps were pinpoint targets
for his fire.
Numerous Japanese OP's were spotted during the
campaign. More often than not they were merely con
venient terrain features, a pinnacle on a ridge crest
or, a narrow rock cleft in the side of a flanking hill
mass. Well-concealed caves whose location afforded
them protection from Blue artillery and Naval gun fire
were also used.
The enemy's wire communications were put out of
action early in the campaign. Adequate provision had
apparently been made, however, to maintain contact by
other means. There were frequent instances of carrier
pigeons being observed and in several cases shot
down. On at least one occasion an overlay of Blue
positions was retrieved from the bird's leg. PsW
have testified to the extensive use of runners to re
lay information from front line OP's to rear area
CP's.
From enemy dead and from overrun cave positions
innumerable maps showing dispositions of our forces
IFIED
were captured.
The extent to which the enemy employed radio in
conjunction with his OP18 is not definitely known.
Comparatively few radios were captured. On several
occasions, however, Japanese radio conversations
were intercepted on frequencies used by Blue nets.
Japanese 00B may be considered fair. Only limit
ed knowledge of what he knew concerning the identities
of the forces opposing him Is as yet available. The
first notation Indicative of the enemy's cognizance
of this Division was in an undated document captured
16 May by the 96th Inf. Div., although the enemy had
"identifled" two Marine Divisions early in the cam
paign. These previous documents named the organiza
tions as the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions.
- 47
V?/
CUAPTEQ. HX".
OPERATIONAL RESULTS SPECIAL ACTION REPORT ...NANSEI SHOTO
*?3
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
Speclai Action Report
Nan e e l Shoto
1 . Area secured See attached map and overlay, 2 , Enemy c a s u a l t i e s The following casualties were Inflicted on the enemy
by this Division from 1 April, 1945 through 30 June, 1945.
a. Phase II (1 April, 1945 through 30 April, 1945)
Enemy dead Military PaW
687 27
b . Phase I I I (1 May, 1945 through 30 June, 1945) Enemy dead M i l i t a r y PsW 16,932 499 17,619 526
c. Overall l o s s e s (1 A p r i l , 1945 through 30 June, 1945) Enemy dead M i l i t a r y PsW
3 . Operational material damage to enemy The f o l l o w i n g enemy equipment was captured or destroyed on OKINAWA by the F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n during the period 1 A p r i l , 1945, through 30 June, 1945. MACHINE GPN3 L G M
HMG
Gap 112 26 1 2 10
56 0
Pes
Total 210 58 1 6 10
12.7 13mm A/C M G MORTARS 50mm G/d Type 89 50mm Type 98 70mm Barrage 81mm 90mm &20mm {m&tfgot)
98 33 0 4 0
79 3
6 3 10 2 - 1
0 1 8
135 3 6 4 18
yf5tnfcîf itU
ARTILLERY 20mm AA 25mm AA 37mm AT 40mm AA 47mm AT 75mm AA Dp (88) 70mm Howitzer
75mm Field Piece
3" Naval Guns
3" CD
105mm Field piece 15cm Field Piece 6" CD Guns Unstated caliber Cap Pes Total
10 0 3 1 14 11 2 23 2 1 8 7 2 0
10 12 2 0 13 2 0 17 0 0 0 15 0 5
20 12 5 1 27 13 2
40 2
1
8 22 2 5
Numerous dumps containing considerable supplies of the

following type have been captured or destroyed:
Demolition
Ammunition
Communication Equipment
Chemical Warfare (protective equipment)
Fuel
Quartermaster
Food
Engineer supplies
Miscellaneous supplies and equipment.
4. Own Losses
KIA
0 First Marine Division CT - 8 Other attached units TOTAL E
WIA 0 E
MIA
DOW
0
-
J
12
-
54 1079 1 1 48 16
260 5993 9 8 241 105
11 139
1 1
JL
56 1143
277 6339
12
12 143
iisciAssinifc
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RYUKYU-RETTO 1:25,000
10
AHA SE
POA 1 (REVISION OF FIRST EDITION AMS 2)
SHEET 3625-IV SE
108
69
{>
261S(" 32
^5L5L
31
76
12'30'
12'30"
3157000yds.|\J
26 10'
CONVERSION GRAPH N O T at the scale of t h e m a p . Meters Feet
12737'30W
105^000ydi^_
Il070
71
T1072 P
S 40T1073P
"1074 P
A.M.S. L891
First Edition ( A M S 1 ) , 1 9 4 4 ; R e v i s e d ( A M S 2 ) , 1 9 4 4 .
P O A 1 (Revision of First Edition A M S 2)
T1075P Q R Scale 1:25,000

0
T1076 P
7*77 P
1 Mile
Q42'3^
T1078P
T1080P
P81P
S
May
JP7"45'
1945
26-10'
Reproduced by 3 0 t h Engr. Base Top. B n . USAFPOA N o . 1 4 6 1 - 2
3 000
F~
10 000
'
Prepared under t h e direction of t h e Chief of Engineers by the A r m y M a p Service ( G E A M ) , U. S. A r m y , W a s h i n g t o n , D. C. C o m p i l e d in 1 9 4 4 f r o m aerial photography d a t e d Sept. and Oct. 1 9 4 4 by s t e r e o p h o t o g r a m m e t r i c and p h o t o - p l a n i m e t r i c m e t h o d s , by reference to U. S. H y d r o g r a p h i c C h a r t 1 9 1 2 , 1 9 4 2 . by U. S. G . S. H y d r o g r a p h y c o m p i l e d by H y d r o g r a p h i c Office, U. S. Navy, 1 9 4 4 . All place n a m e s are t r a n s c r i b e d according to t h e Modified Hepburn (Romaji) System. Revised by 6 4 t h . Engr. Top. Bn. U S A F C P B C J a n . 1 9 4 5 utilizing 1633 rd. Engineer Photomapping Platoon multiplex a e r o - p r o j e c t o r s from vertical and oblique photography 10 Oct. 1 9 4 4 . Revised by the 3 0 t h Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA April 1 9 4 5 ,
3RD REVISION
1000 1000
COVERAGE 2 0 0 0 Meters 2 0 0 0 Yards
DIAGRAM
INDEX TO
BOUNDARIES
INDEX TO ADJOINING
SHEETS
^ 9,000
3
CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 AND 20 METERS
A p p r o x i m a t e Contours S h o w n in Areas of Sparsely Controlled
w
'
12752'30"
3625 I NW
WTt
i "C"
NOTE: M a p sources and photographs are not reconcilable. Therefore this sheet does not m a t c h with adjoining sheets.
3625-IV SE g
T O G I V E G R I D A N D TARGET-AREA R E F E R E N C E S O N T H I S S H E E T FIGURES. IGNORE the SMALLER figures printed around the margin of the map. These are for finding the full co-ordinates. USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP. Viz. lOgrpo POINT WANA REFERENCE
T r i m e t r o g o n Oblique Coverage POLYCONIC

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD
PROJECTION
MlN. Z O N E
POLYCONIC GRID. BAND
T H E LAST THREE DIGITS OF T H E GRID N U M B E R S ARE O M I T T E D
2605'
North Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Northwards North 779737 DESIGNATOR 7773 NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL HARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND NAIL DIRECT TO THE C H I E F OF ENGINEERS. W A S H I N G T O N . D. C. Photo stereo trom OKINAWA-KEN A . NAKAGAMI-GUN 6 " focal length a . URASOE M U R A b. NISHIBARA-MURA
50 p 5,000
utilizing s t e r e o p h o t o g r a m m e t r i c m e t h o d s f r o m aerial photography d a t e d Feb. 1 9 4 5
(Multiplex)
FOR S T A N D A R D M I L I T A R Y G R I D East Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Eastwards East STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE
= 4,000 Prefectural Road Road, 2-4 meters wide Track and Trail
2,000
LEGEND
=
= Railroad 3 ' 6 " g a u g e - s t e a m Railroad 3 ' 6 " g a u g e - e l e c t r i c Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow g a u g e Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow g a u g e - h o r s e - d r a w n Soundings F a t h o m line 1 1 1 1 1 1 ELECTRIFIED | I I I I I , , , 1 HORSE-DRAWN 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 10 * line ..,-. o
GLOSSARY
.gun -gusuku (-jo) 737 -kawa (-gawa) -ken -ko (minato) county castle rivpr prefecture harbor -mura -saki (-zaki,-misaki) -se (-ze) -shima (-jima) -yama (-zan,-san) township cape reef, shoal island mountain
Use diagram APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1 9 4 4 FOR CENTER OF SHEET NO A N N U A L MAGNETIC CHANGE only fo obtain north south numerical line, edge connect or the values. the map GRID on map.
v e r t i c a l p h o t o s of
M<
I n t e n s i f i e d f r o m p h o t o s of 1 2 ' f o c a l l e n g t h or l o n g e r
B. S H I M A J I R I - G U N c. d. MAWASHI-MURA HAEBARU-MURA
(To nearest 100 yards)
e. OROKU M U R A f. g
Road in built-up areas = 1,000 Mud or tidal flats Rice field Orchard Sea Wall _ _. .
FOR T A R G E T - A R E A
To determine pivot with NORTH the point the
magnetic * P * o n the
TOMIGUSUKU-n
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies Take LETTER of the 200 yard square in which the point lies. TARGET AREA DESIGNATOR (Locates within 200-yard square)
-kuchi ( g u c h i ) channel HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APRROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER REEFS MAY BE COVERED AT LOW WATER
- R NAHA SE, RYUKYU-RETTO UA

OKINAWA-KEN N2610-E12737.5/5x7.5
KOCHINDA-MURA
value and
of
the
angle
between plotted or the
h.ozATO-MURA
7773 Q
MAGNETIC scale
NORTH,as edge
L i m i t i n g d a n g e r line or l o w w a t e r
Nearest similar grid or target-area reference-100,000 yards (Approximately 57 miles)
HEIGHTS IN METERS-DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
degree
at the north
RYUKYU-RETTO PHOTO MAPS 1:25,000

1074
NAHA SE
1075 1076
FIRST
EDITION-AMS
3
5 4 3 2 1 0
- L L L L J I 1 I J_
SHEET 3625-IV SE
12745' 2615'
1077
42'30
1078
1079
31
76
31
75
31
74
31
73
31
72
12'30'
12'30'
31
7 1
31
70
31
69
31
68
3157000yds. |\|
31
67
2610 12737'30" lOggOOOyds.^

1 0
2610' 70 10
71
10
72
40' 10
73
10
74
10
75
10
76
10 7 7
42'30"
l0
78
10g0
10
81
12745'
A.M.S. L091
First Edition (AMS 1), 1944; revised (AMS 3 ) , 1944.
Reproduced by 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA No.1461 M a y 1945
Scale 1:25,000 (Approximate)

1 Mile
2620'
I N D E X T O A D J O I N I N G SHEETS
I2730' 3625-IV NE 3J25JV 12752'30'
Prepared under t h e direction of t h e Chief of Engineers by t h e Army M a p Service ( A M ) , U . S . A r m y , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 1944. Mosaic controlled by average fit to 1:25,000 m a p . Aerial photographs flown by U.S.A.A.F. a n d U.S.N. Sorties: S e p t e m b e r 1944, 14 P L / M R 7 6 " TV; October 1944, WASP 2 3 1 , 232 1 2 " . FRANK 125(B) 6"V,
1000 1000
500
1000 1000
2000 Meters 2000 Yards

A P P R O X I M A T E MEAN D E C L I N A T I O N 1 9 4 4 FOR C E N T E R O F S H E E T NO A N N U A L M A G N E T I C CHANGE
625-1 NW 5
NW7
mm
3625-111 NE
500
LHZHS
O N E T H O U S A N D Y A R D W O R L D P O L Y C O N I C G R I D . B A N D 11 I N . Z O N E " C
T H E LAST T H R E E DIGITS O F T H E G R I D N U M B E R S A R E O M I T T E D
3625-111 JUW
3625-IU
POLYCONIC
PROJECTION
Use diagram To determine with
only io obtain magnetic
numerical
values.
north line, connect the of the map GRID between
Reliability of grid uncertain due to local minor disagreement between photo map and topographic map.
Q3IJI3
mm
NOTE:
OFFICERS USINS THIS HAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME
pivot point *P" on the south edge the value of the angle NORTH and MAGNETIC
NAHA SE. RYUKYU-RETTO

OKINAWA-KEN,
NAKAGAMI-GUN, SHIMAJIRI-GUN
N2610-E12737.5/5x7.5
TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO T H E C H I E F O F E N G I N E E R S . W A S H I N G T O N . D C.
NORTH, as plotted on
HEIGHTS IN METERS
the degree scale at the north edge of the map.
RYUKYU-RETTO 1:25,000
s-io- r p
r
For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution
ITOMAN NE
POA / (REVISION OF FIRST EDITION AMS I)

10
5
1079
1 0
io8o
SHEET 3625-111 NE
10
1 I I I 1 I 1 i l l I l I I I l I J-L
12737'30"
io69
77
42'30"
10
78
81
^
Hi;
"*
)7'30"
p2605' 12745'
10
lOggoOOyds. [ CONVERSION GRAPH NOT at t h e scale of t h e m a p . Meters Feet 3,000
lOgl
1 0
82
75
Scale 1:25,000
R e p r o d u c e d by 3 0 t h E n g r . B a s e T o p . B n . U S A F P O A N o
1461-4
May
1945
A.M.S. L891
First Edition ( A M S POA 1 1), 1944. l) ( R e v i s i o n of First Edition A M S
c~ 10,000
_E 9,000
1000 1000
I | _ [
500
2000
Meters SORTIE
COVERAGE
DIAGRAM
INDEX
TO
BOUNDARIES
INDEX
TO A D J O I N I N G
SHEETS
P r e p a r e d under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e Chief of E n g i n e e r s by t h e A r m y M a p S e r v i c e ( G E A M ) , U . S. A r m y , W a s h i n g t o n , D. C. C o m p i l e d in 1 9 4 4 f r o m a e r i a l p h o t o g r a p h y d a t e d S e p t . a n d O c t . 1 9 4 4 by s t e r e o p h o t o g r a m m e t r i c a n d photo-planimetric ^ H ij , ,
3 P R 5 M 6 3 IV FEB 4S
1000
2000
Yards
r~~ 1 /
b 1 c
'
m e t h o d s , by r e f e r e n c e t o J a p a n e s e H y d r o g r a p h i c C h a r t 2 2 2 , 1935. H y d r o g r a p h y c o m p i l e d by H y d r o g r a p h i e O f f i c e , U . S. All p l a c e n a m e s a r e t r a n s c r i b e d a c c o r d i n g t o T O GIVE G R I D A N D T A R G F T A R E A R E F E R E N C E S O N T H I S S H E E T FIGURES. IGNORE the SMALLER figures printed around the margin of the map. These are for finding the full coordinates. USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE R e v i s e d by t h e 3 0 t h Engr. Base T o p . Bn. U S A F P O A April utilizing stereophotogrammetric f r o m aerial photography dated methods (Multiplex) POINT U D O REFERENCE FOR S T A N D A R D M I L I T A R Y G R I D 1945, FACE OF THE MAP. Viz. 3157OOO ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BAND MlN.ZONE " C "
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED
NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS M TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL L I MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME - T TO T H F CHIEF OF ENGINEERS. W A S H I N G T O N . D. C. POLYCONIC PROJECTION
#*
CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 METERS
Navy, 1 9 4 4 .
the Modified Hepburn (Romaji) System.
i
fs r c. chartered town APPROXIMATE MEAN D E C L I N A T I O N 1 9 4 4 FOR CENTER OF SHEET NO A N N U A L MAGNETIC CHANGE Use diagram only to obtain north numerical line, edge connect values. the I n t e n s i f i e d f r o m p h o t o s o f 12 ' focal l e n g t h or l o n g e r .
y ^^
**"' i
fx
\ >
!f.
~'T \>^~Z
OKINAWA-KEN SHIMAJIRI-GUN a. TOMIGUSKlf-MURA b. KANEGUSUKU-MURA KOCHINDA'-MURA d. OZATO-MHRA e. TAMAGUSUKU-MURA f. TAKAMINEMURA g. h. i. j. k. KIYAN-MU.RA MABUNI-lflURA MAKABE-MURA GUSHICHAN-MttRA ITOMAN MACHI
Feb. 1 9 4 5 .
LEGEND
Prefectural Road Road,2-4 meters wide.. Track and Trail Road in built-up areas Railroad 3'6"gauge-steam Railroad 3 ' 6 " gauge-electric Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow gauge HORSE-DRAWN Railroad 2 ' 6 " narrow Soundings Fathom line Limiting danger line gauge-.horse-drawn i l I I I ELECTRIFIED I I I I I I I
East Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Eastwards East STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE
North Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate tenths Northwards North 773572 DESIGNATOR 7757 ^ _ _ Q [ 7757"$
GLOSSARY
dake (-take) mountain county castle cape prefecture DATUM machi mura saki ( - z a k i , - m i s a k i ) shima ( - j i m a j sho APPROXIMATE with WATER the value of the angle between plotted GRID on NORTH the and MAGNETIC scale NORTH,as edge gun g u s u k u (-jo) kaku (-saki,-hana) ken _ township cape island reef tiled f r o m m a p o r liable photos. To determine pivot HYDROGRAPHIC LEVEL O F LOWEST LOW point magnetic
572
(To nearest 100 yards)
FOR T A R G E T - A R E A
ITOMAN NE, RYUKYU-RETTO

OKINAWA-KEN N2605-E12737.5/5x7.5
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies. Mud or tidal flats Rice field Take LETTER of the 200 yard square in which the point lies. TARGET AREA DESIGNATOR (Locales within 200-yard square)
"?" on the south
of ( h e map
i 1 _
Nearest similar grid or target-area refercnce-100,000 yards (Approximately 57 miles)
HEIGHTS IN METERS-DEPTHS IN FATHOMS
degree
at the north
of the map.
Orchard
RYUKYU-RETTO PHOTO MAPS 1:25,000

12737'30" 26 10
For use,by War and Navy Deparfment Agencies only Not for sale or distribution
10
ITOMAN N E
FIRST
EDITION
-A MS
SHEET 3625-111 NE
1069
10
70
71
I I
3157000yds. [\|
12737'30"
lOggOOOyds.^
2605' 1 0 g 2 12745'
A.M.S. L091
First Edition (AMS 1), 1944; revisecHAMS 2), 1944.
Reproduced by 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA No. 1461 May 1945
Scale 1:25,000 (Approximate)

1 Mile
INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

3625-IV NW
I 2752'30'
Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service (AM), U.S.Army, Washington, D.C., 1944. Mosaic controlled by average fit to 1: 25,000 map. Aerial photographs flown by U.S.A.A.F. and U.S.N. Sorties: September 1944, 14PL/MR7 12"Ry, 14PL/MR7 6"TV, 11PL/MR7 6"TV; October* 1944, WASP 231 12";CV6 129 6"V
7
3625-IV SE
3625-1
1000 1 hH 1000
500 hH~]^ 500
1000 1000
2000 Meters 2000 Yards

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1 9 4 4 FOR C E N T E R O F SHEET CHANGE
C sw
3625-1 NW
3625 I NW
% g
3625 111^ / NF ^
Reliability of grid uncertain due to local minor disagreement between photo map and topographic map.
m ow
1M 2l$*> VJ3
ONE T H O U S A N D YARD W O R L D POLYCOMIC GRID. BAND I M N . Z O N E " C

T H E LAST T H R E E DIGITS O F T H E G R I D N U M B E R S ARE O M I T T E D
NO A N N U A L M A G N E T I C
3625-111 SE
POL.YCONIC
NOTE:
PROJECTION
OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HErtEON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME
TO CHEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT To T H E C H I E F O F E N G I N E E R S . W A S H I N G T O N . D. C
HEIGHTS IN METERS
Use diagram only fo obtain numerical values. To determine magnetic north line, connect the pivot point *P" on the south edge of the map with the value of the angle between CR!D NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, as plotted on the degree scale at the north edge of the map.
ITOMAN NE, RYUKYU-RETTO

OKINAWA-KEN, SHIMAJIRI-GUN N2605-E12737.5/5x7.5
OVERLAY SHOWING^ AQEA SECURED ST i MAR tflV (REIN) PHASE HE SOUTHERN OKINAWA
Map $f: Mukyu-I^fetfo,
Scale: 1/25,000
< &
SHEET i OF 2
^ J
SHEET 2 OF 2 OVERLAY OF AREA SECURED

-Pi
* > Jf>
CMAPTEQ X COMMENTS..
QCCOMMfNIDATION S SPECIAL ACTION QEPORT NANSEI SMOTO
<<*?
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nansei Shoto
The following comments and recommendations are of
a general nature and pertain to the OKINAWA Operation
as a whole.
Detailed comments and recommendations will be found
in the appropriate annexes to this report.
0-1 SECTION
Comment:
During the planning phase; enlisted personnel who
had served overseas for twenty-four months as of 30 Nov
ember, 1944, were rotated to the United States for
rehabilitation. About sixty officers had to take thirty
days leave in lieu of being rotated.
Recommendation:
That definite authority to effect rotation of all
personnel completing twenty-four months te granted well
In advance, in order that once the operation has been
concluded this matter can be expedited, with resultant
high morale effect and early reorganization.
Comment:
Two battle Replacement Drafts were attached with
instructions from higher authority directing that they
be retained intact for shore party labor details. Their
retention was extended beyond completion of unloading of
assault shipping and thus these men were deprived of val
uable training during the operations in central and
northern OKINAWA. Their not having been previously
assigned to a specific unit also led to administrative
difficulties in that there was no effective control, and
the personnel themselves had no definite address. Al
though assignments of the personnel of the two drafts
had been planned on paper well in advance, their actual
assignment under combat conditions could not be executed
in the same orderly manner that could have been accomplish
ed prior to mounting out. In this connection, during
Lelr five weeks1 employment on the beaches of OKINAWA

a number of casualties had occurred and separations ef
fected, in addition to the natural tendency to straggle
forward.
Re comme nda t io n:
That necessary shore party labor be furnished by
non-organic service units or Special Naval Construction
Battalion. That battle replacements train with the
units to which they will eventually be assigned and
that, in the assault, they be used for ship platoons
and boat ridersto be Immediately released upon un
loading of assault shipping.
Comment:
Replacements furn .shed during the training period
bore no resemblance to actual needs. Communication,
Quartermaster, and Engineer personnel were woefully in
adequate and this, in addition to an almost total lack
of promotions in such specialist branches, reduced the
combat efficiency of this Division.
Recomme ndatlon:
That the requisition system be reconstituted, and
that steps be taken to authorize promotion in these
ranks.
Comment:
The administrative burden of this Division was
greatly Increased when the destination of the rear
echelon was changed. The rear echelon remained afloat
for over two months and, In view of the inadequacies of shipping provided, had no access to administrative
records during this period. Its onward routing was not made known to the forward echelon with the attendant
communications difficulties, including mailing, with
the forward echelon and higher headquarters. This
resulted in an accumulation of orders and instructions, including personnel transfers, which were delayed until the rear echelon was unloaded after the operation had
been concluded.

Recommendation:
It'is strongly recommended that the destination of a
re arechelon. IJ.OJ be changed during the conduct of an
operation.
- 2
nrpi_.AE&
Bfc&MSmED
Evacuated personnel were returned to.duty with thle

div islon la Increasing numbers as the campaign progressed.
In most cases, very short notice was given to clear such
personnel from the beaches, using organic transportation.
The division organized a reception center In Its Service
Battalion, but due to the prolonged nature of the operation,
this proved to be inadequate.
R e oommendatl on:
(1) That the next higher echelon establish a reception
center where personnel can be properly outfitted, Instructed,
and rehabilitated for a short period, and that that echelon
transport personnel returning to the division.
(2) That such reception center be equipped to include
medical examination and treatment, and that men not be
returned who are not, in fact, ready for combat employment.
Comment:
Military Government detachments provided were not
sufficiently equipped to execute their assigned tasks. The
composition of these detachments was unbalanced as between
offloer and enlisted personnel. It is considered that there
la no place for highly specialized personnel in detachments
furnished a oombat division.
Recommendation:
(1) That if such detachments are furnished divisions
they be strengthened with military police and general duty
personnel and furnished transportation and equipment to
evacuate civilians from the forward areas.
(2) That a Military Government Officer be furnished to
division on a permanent basis, as prescribed in our rent
tables of organization.
Comment:
No hospital oorpsmen were included in replacement drafts
subsequent to the two drafts lifted in assault. This
presented a most acute problem. Towards the end of the
campaign a special draft was flown in, too late*
Comment: Before the OKINAWA Operation, the Division received r e l i e f maps from four d i f f e r e n t sources, FMF, P a c i f i c , Camp Radford, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, and I I I Phib Corps. All maps were of d i f f e r e n t types of composition and varied g r e a t l y i n s c a l e and d e t a i l . Now that Marine Divisions are operating as an i n t e g r a l part of Corps, i t i s b e l i e v e d that the Division R e l i e f Mapping Section should be disbanded and absorbed into the Corps u n i t . This system would lead to l e s s duplication and have the advantage of economy of personnel. Recommendation: That the D i v i s i o n R e l i e f Mapping Units be disbanded and absorbed by Corps. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT Comment: No JICPOA Captured Equipment Team was furnished t h i s D i v i s i o n for the OKINAWA Operation. Tenth Army's Captured Equipment Teams were composed of enemy materiel e x p e r t s , but included no personnel for p h y s i c a l l y guarding and handling captured m a t e r i e l . I t i s emphasized that regiments cannot d e t a i l personnel to stay behind and guard t h i s m a t e r i e l . Such a system, e s p e c i a l l y i n a f a s t moving s i t u a t i o n , would s e r i o u s l y impair t h e i r combat e f f i c i e n c y . Recommendation: That higher headquarters provide teams to guard and c o l l e c t captured enemy m a t e r i e l . CENSORSHIP Comment: Large numbers of Marines were evacuated to Army h o s p i t a l s during the OKINAWA Operation. Army censors at these h o s p i t a l s refused to handle t h e i r mail* s i n c e i t bore F l e e t Post Office* rather than APO return addresses. Consequently, the mail of these men was delayed u n n e c e s s a r i l y .
GECWIED
^3
KKMSIFIED
Recommendation:
That censors in Army hospitals be authorized to censor
and stamp mail of Marine patients, without any change in the
latters1 return address being necessary.
LANGUAGE PERSONNEL
Comment:
During the operation I t was found that considerable enemy information of immediate t a c t i c a l value to battalions was l o s t because there was no one at battalion headquarters with any knowledge of the Jaoaneae Language. Re commendation: That the number of enlisted Japanese Interpreters i n a d i v i s i o n be increased from twelve (12) to eighteen ( 1 8 ) . (a) NISEI INTERPRETERS Comment: Nisei interpreters and translators have been found invaluable by t h i s Division, and other d i v i s i o n s , i n e a r l i e r campaigns. None were a v a i l a t l e on OKINAWA, Recommendation: That a team of s i x (6) Nisei be attached to the Division for each campaigi.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Comment: In order to carry on p s y c h o l o g i c a l warfare, there i s a
d e f i n i t e need in a d i v i s i o n for a "sound Jeep". I t i s understood that the Second Marine Division developed and tested such a device, and found i t very successful. Recommendation: That one (1) "sound Jeep" be furnished to each Marine Division*
V?Y .
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS Comment: Aerial photographic coverage on the OKINAWA Campaign, was, by and l a r g e , very s a t i s f a c t o r y . However, several v e r t i c a l s o r t i e s were too cloudy to be of value. Recommendation: That v e r t i c a l coverage be flown at as low a l e v e l as may be p r a c t i c a b l e , thus eliminating most cloud cover. Comment: Oblique and v e r t i c a l coverage of the zones of action of adjacent u n i t s would be very helpful f o r o r i e n t i n g personnel, for a r t i l l e r y counter-battery f i r e , and for other purposes. A l l that should be necessary to achieve t h i s extra d i s t r i b u t i o n i s the preparation of additional prints of boundary a r e a s . Bulges and pockets i n the l i n e are.almost always c r i t i c a l p o i n t s , and should not be neglected. Recommendation: That a d d i t i o n a l p r i n t s of boundary areas be prepared, so that each u n i t may be given coverage of key terrain f e a t u r e s to i t s flanks as well as to i t s front. Comment: Sonne s t r i p s would have been of great value i n determining water depths o f f beaches ( i n Phase I ) and also for a s c e r t a i n i n g beach d e f e n s e s . Similarly, dicing runs would have been very helpful for preparing beach oblique mosaics. Recommendation: That Sonne s t r i p s and d i c i n g runs be made of a l l beach areas i n advance of" future landings. Comment: Large scale gridded mosaics were of great value during
the campaign, especially in the early weeks, when maps were
very inaccurate and unsatisfactory. Lithographed mosaics
are not satisfactory.
DECLASSIFIED
Recommendation:
That gridded mosaics, scales between 1:5,000 and
1:10,000, of any future operating areas be furnished the
Division as early as is practicable.
Comment:
In fast-moving s i t u a t i o n s , photography sometimes lags far behind. In such circumstances, prints reaching front l i n e units are frequently of areas two thousand yards and more to the rear. Recommendation: Tha*t in fast-moving s i t u a t i o n s , aerial oho to graphs as requested by the Division must be furnished in time to be of value to assault u n i t s .
COMMUNICATIONS Comment:
G-2 l i a i s o n teams attached to infantry regiments were unable to operate properly many times during the campaign because of Inadequate radio communications. When operating over a large land mass in a fast-moving situation the SCR 610 i s not powerful enough to assure continuous radio contact between G-2 and i t s l i a i s o n teams. This w i l l be especially true in a l l future operations. I t i s believed that this s i t u a t i o n could be remedied by using SCR 608 radios for the d i v i s i o n i n t e l l i g e n c e net. Recommendation: That the Division G-2 Section be furnished three (3)
Jeeps equipped with SCR 508 radios, so that one may be
assigned to each l i a i e o n team operating with an infantry regiment. G-3 SECTION Comment:
Close coordination between the naval and marine staffs is
necessary to work out the loading details, Boat Allocation
Plan, Boat Assignment Tables, Debarkation and Approval
Schedules, Landing Diagram, etc. Such coordination was
found very difficult to obtain during the planning phase
.*&:*Mmtlfl* for the OKINAWA Operation, since the naval s t a f f remained ashore only three days, a f t e r which time they returned to t h e i r s h i p s . The ships then were continually under way from one place to another i n the RUSSELL ISLANDS; i t was impossible for marine s t a f f o f f i c e r s to maintain l i a i s o n with the naval s t a f f , A great deal of confusion, delay and misunderstanding r e s u l t e d . Recommendation: That necessary transport squadron and transport d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r s a r r i v e at D i v i s i o n Headquarters at l e a s t four weeks prior to the embarkation date and remain u n t i l d e t a i l s of l o a d i n g and s h i p - t o - s h o r e plans are completed. Comment: In the GUADALCANAL rehearsals for the OKINAWA Operation, LSTs which were to % oarry elements of assault b a t t a l i o n s arrived too l a t e to take part i n the e x e r c i s e s . Exercises were executed with Incomplete boat groups. The ship-to-shore movement as planned was never rehearsed with a l l a s s a u l t elements p a r t i c i p a t i n g . R e commendation: That the rehearsals do not commence u n t i l a l l LSTs carrying a s s a u l t b a t t a l i o n s are loaded and ready to p a r t i c i p a t e . Comment:
During both the rehearsal phase and the assault landing
It was found that many wave guide officers were unable to
execute their assigned mission without confusion, because
they had not been orooerly briefed beforehand, or had
* suddenly been given a different assignment. In the landing
on OKINAWA some waves were as much as fifteen minutes lâte
in hitting the beach. This could have caused serious
consequences had the landing been heavily opposed.
Recommendation:
That wave guide officers be assigned early, maintained
on the same assignment, and be given a thorough briefing.
Comment:
In the actual landing the Seventh Infantry Division
landed on PURPLE and ORANGE Beaches which were adjacent to the
- 9
^tlFIED
\ KWiPB
i$%*U
BLUE and Y L O Beaches on which the First Marine Division EL W landed. The control v e s s e l s for PURPLE and O A G Beaches RNE flew exactly the same identifying flags as did the BLUE and Y L O control vessels* As a result several Army waves landed EL W on Marine Beaches and vice-versa. The cross t r a f f i c through the boat lanes also materially hampered the waves which were trying to land at the correct beaches. Recommendation: That wave guide o f f i c e r s be properly briefed on the numbers of their control v e s s e l s to prevent confusion by identical control f l a g s , and/or that adjacent beaches not be given similar oolor designation. Comment:
Often advances were delayed waiting for engineers to remove
mine fields. Engineers were busily employed elsewhere on
construction, maintenance and demolition projects. Thus
both essential engineering work and tactical advances were
impeded by infantry^ inability to breach mine fields. In
future operations it is anticipated that the enemy will make
more extensive use of all types of mines.
Recommendation:
That infantry units be thoroughly trained in mine detection
and removal* Training programs must provide ample instruction
and time for practice in this subject;
Comment:
Throughout the campaign the enemy defended reverse slopes of a l l favorable terrain features in his defensive l i n e s * Recommendation: Reverse slopes must be thoroughly "processed" by heavy air and naval gunfire strikes before the Infantry arrives in the v i c i n i t y of such slopes. Fire should be l i f t e d only when i t endangers the assaulting infantry. Comment: Tank-infantry t a c t i c s as executed proved to be sound and extremely profitable i n reducing enemy T>osltions. Successes attained resulted from constant mutual oro tectio n o f tanks ai ual oro tectio n o f tank
- 10 - I " "
~Z
T~ * ' " ' "
infantry. Japanese close assault tank hunters were totally unsuccessful In their attempts to destroy our tanks. Re commendation: A minimum of infantry (usually a f i r e team per tank) should protect the tanks at maximum range, sometimes as great as 300 yards:' tanks invariably draw heavy a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire which destroys personnel advancing in close proximity of the tank. Training of the tank-infantry teams should begin early in the training phase and must be given top emphasis. Infantrymen must be given opportunities to ride in tanks, to be picked up and discharged through escape hatches, and to be thoroughly grounded in a l l phases of tank-infantry coordination. Continued stress must be laid upon proteotlng tanks from enemy tank hunters. Comment: Flame-thrower tanks were extensively used by a l l units for cleaning out caves and pillboxes. Recommendation: I t i s recommended that one company of flame-thrower tanks be added to the Tank Battalion. (See Tank Annex). Comment: On two occasions night attacks resulted in the capture of strongly-held enemy positions which had resisted our continued daylight assaults. The enemy had. during daylight, supported his positions by heavy fire from inaccessible dominating terrain features which lay outside this Division's zone of action. Our night attacks, which came as a surprise to the Japanese, enabled us to attain the objective against practically no opposition. R e commendation: During the training period more emphasis should be placed on night operations. Units must be schooled not only i n limited objective attacks but also in the seizure of major p o s i t i o n s .
DEBtnlSonED
Comment:
During Phase I and II of this operation Periodic Reports
submitted by the various Divisional Staff Sections did
not cover the same period and were not submitted to higher
headquarters at the same time. It was oarticularly difficult
for the regiments and battalions who were forced to make
several messenger runs from the front lines at all hours to
deliver various reports, which could have been delivered in
one trip if the required times for submission had been
uniform. Furthermore, the Periodic Reports submitted by the
Division Staff Sections were to some extent overlapping,
and it was difficult to make the Information in one report
agree with the same information in another report submitted
by another Staff Section, when that report was made to cover
a different period. For example the G--1 report covered the
period from 0001 to 2400 and the G-3 report the period from
1600 to 1600. Cases occurred where the G-3 report gave an
account of a comparatively quiet day and at the same time
included a list of heavy casualties bases on information
obtained from the 0-1 whose information was for a different
period altogether.
Recommendation:
That Periodic Reports of all sections cover the same period
and be submitted to higher headquarters at the same time.
Comment:
With the change from Jungle warfare to combat over more
open and varied terrain, the opportunity exists for massing
machine guns and mortars as a battalion base of fire.
Recommendation:
That a board of experienced infantry officers be appointed
to consider the advisability of reforming the battalion
weapons company. The board to revelw this oroblem in light
of the tactical employment, training and supply and to consider
the effect of recoiless weapons on this organization.
This will be the subject of further study and recommendations
by this headquarters.
Comment:
Extensive paJ&Djling was conducted with the aid of scout War Dogs.' Afl units using these dogs commented favorably on t h e i r a b i l i t y to a l e r t to the presence of enemy hidden In brush and caves. Messenge*%<Jpgp V e r I M e iL - 12
DJTT1
V k W U #'
i n f r e q u e n t l y ; the employment of these s p e d ! a l l y - t r a i n e d doge does not appear to be further warranted. Recommendation: That the War Dog Platoon be increased to f i f t y dogs, a l l scout d o g s . Comment: The 4 . 5 i n c h barrage rocket was used with good r e s u l t s . However, the l i m i t e d range (1,200 yards) of t h i s weapon o f t e n made "it d i f f i c u l t to get the launchers close enough for f i r e m i s s i o n s . The present 4x4 cargo truck n e g o t i a t e s rough t e r r a i n with great d i f f i c u l t y and affords no protection for crew members. Organic transportation of the Rocket Detachment i s inadequate. Recommendation: That the range of the rocket be increased, to about 2,500 yards. P r o j e c t i l e s should be s p i n - s t a b i l i z e d for g r e a t e r accuracy. That e i t h e r a h a l f - t r a c k or f u l l - t r a c k e d v e h i c l e be adopted for mounting launchers and two 6x6 cargo trucks be added to each f i r i n g s e c t i o n . Comment: OneÂrmy company of 4.2 inch mortars was attached to
t h i s D i v i s i o n during the b a t t l e for Southern OKINAWA.
These weapons furnished accurate high angle d e s t r u c t i v e , n e u t r a l i z a t i o n f i r e s , and smoke cover. The 4.2e engaged t a r g e t s which could be reduced by neither a r t i l l e r y nor 81mm mortar8. Recommendation: That one company of 4 . 2 inch mortars be made organic i n the Marine D i v i s i o n . That t h i s company be patterned a f t e r the Army o r g a n i z a t i o n ; and be equipped with s u i t a b l e transportation and communication equipment to insure rapid movement of the company and quick completion of assigned f i r e missions. Comment:
* *
OPs for a l l u n i t s were frequently crowded with
sightseers and persons not on official business. Their

presence tended to give away the position, draw fire, and
lower the efficiency of the OP,
Recommendation:
That OPs for all units be selected and operated with
extreme care. The practice of Indiscriminate visiting of
OPs must be completely revised. All personnel must observe
the rules of dispersion and observation from concealed
positions. The fact that the OP is not currently under
fire does not excuse breaches of mandatory OP discioline.
Comment:
Frequently during t h i s operation the clearance of air s t r i k e s close to the boundary between Corps was seriously delayed because of i n s u f f i c i e n t communication between adjacent ALPs to monitor their own frequencies and those of another control net as w e l l . Recommendation: That the Control Stations (CASCtTs) be provided with additional radio equipment to permit them to monitor the nets of adjacent Control S t a t i o n s . Comment: During this operation it was found that bombs of the 100,
250, and 500 pound class were not suitable for bombing
Japanese positions.
Recommendation:
That the availability of heavier bombs of the 1000 and
2000 pound class be increased.
- 14
G-4 SECTION Embarkation and debarkation 1. Ships 1 TQM1s should be present as early as p o s s i b l e prior to embarkation date to f a c i l i t a t e planning. 2* Accurate ships' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s must be furnished early so l a s t minute changes i n loading -olans can be avoided. 3. An LST representative authorized to make de c i s i o n s for the LST F l o t i l l a Commander should be present during the planning phase. 4. More emphasis should be placed on the Stowage Plan and P r o f i l e Plan. The Cargo and Loading Analysis and the Consolidated Vehicle Table should be eliminated. 5. Due to limited space a v a i l a b l e only twenty days 1 r a t i o n s and fuel should be embarked on assault shirking. 6. I t was not & und p r a c t i c a l to get boat cargo t i c k e t s from s h i p , to control boat, to reef transfer, to Shore Party Commander, to dump. However, they were found u s e f u l at the control b o a t s . The landing craft carried t i c k e t from ship to control boat and then stood by u n t i l that type cargo was needed ashore. 7. Understowing of LST'a: This type of loading requires a great amount of work for the small tonnage loaded. Stowing g a s o l i n e burning v e h i c l e s over dunnaged high e x p l o s i v e s may not have a high s a f e t y f a c t o r . However, because the LST area i s always much nearer the beaches than the transport area; and because LST's can be unloaded by amphibian v e h i c l e s over beaches or r e e f s that LCVP's or LCMfB cannot apT>roach, i t i s a t a c t i c a l n e c e s s i t y that not l e s s than two u n i t s of f i r e be loaded on LST's. If a s u f f i c i e n t number o f LST's were assigned t o a d i v i s i o n so that four could be used as supply s h i p s , understowing would not be necessary. This would approach an i d e a l s o l u t i o n . For a d i v i s i o n reinforced with three Amphibian Tractor B a t t a l i o n s , two D K Companies, and one Naval UW Construction B a t t a l i o n , t h i r t y LST's would be required. - 15
LU
t]HCl^ e
Amphibian Trailers are useful to Medical, Sig

nal and Artillery units in landing certain fragile, crit
ical instruments and supplies and artillery ammunition.
When vehicle shipping space is limited, their use should
be held to a minimum.
9. In this operation. Transport Division Control
Officers were not informed of proper unloading priorities
of higher echelon units. A representative of Army, Corps
G-4 or TQM Section should be placed on Transport Division
Control Boat before higher echelon units are ordered in.
This would prevent confusion and misunderstanding in the
landing of these units.
10. In addition to control boats at the transfer
line, a control boat for each beach should be stationed
between the transport area and the reef transfer line.
These boats would serve as "information centers" and
could direct coxswains to the proper control boat at the
transfer line. They would also know the positions of the
various Transport Squadrons and Transport Divisions and
could give coxswains bearings to their parent ships in
case predesignated transport areas had been subsequently
changed.
Shore Party
1. To handle cargo over limited beaches or through reef transfer p o i n t s , controlled unloading must be e f f e c t e d . This was accomplished by two means: a. Unloading only carefully selected cargo on LOVE Day. While beach e x i t and dump areas are being prepared, only the sut>r>lles actu a l l y needed should be sent ashore. This Division used a "Hot Cargo System" as shown i n Attack Order ComPhib Grout) 4 No. A405-45 Annex (B) Enclosure (C). This olan Droved excellent. b. Traffic control by Transport Division Control Boat. This began on LOVE Day for "Hot Cargo" and continued during a l l unloading. Thus, only the number of landing craft that could ^jaêôfrked was sent into reef transfer p o i n t s ,
r&v
and by use of "Cargo Tickets" the type of supplies needed by troops ashore was given p r i o r i t y . This plan was successfully exe cuted. 2. Causeways were of l i t t l e value in unloading a s s a u l t supplies over r e e f s . t A d i r e c t radio channel between the Shore Party Commander and the Reef Beachmaster should be established. There should also be a d i r e c t radio channel between the Reef Beachmaster and the Marine T M aboard the Transport Q Squadron Flag Ship. 4 . Liaison Officers from the pontoon barg detach ments and from the LST Group should maintain close con t a c t between t h e i r commands and the Shore Party Commander. 5. Barge propulsion u n i t s should be tested for operating efficiency enroute to the target area. 6. Beach l i g h t i n g equipment should be provided i n beach dumps to f a c i l i t a t e night unloading. 7. Dump signs for r a t i o n s , fuel, ammunition, water and miscellaneous supolles should be oainted with a luminous p a i n t . 8 . New oioneer equipment was not provided in s u f f i c i e n t time before leaving the staging aea to service i t f u l l y . I f the equipment had been provided e a r l i e r , the operators could have been more fully trained and damage to t h e equipment could have been avoided. 9. Spare p a r t s aid tools were not received i n s u f f i c i e n t quantity to r e p a i r vehicles ard equipment used on the PALAU Operation and to provide a sufficient stock for r e p a i r on t h i s operation. 10. More expendable supplies, cable, welding sup p l i e s , and metal stock should be provided for the repair of equipment. In the p a s t , supply of these items has been inadequate for maintenance and r e p a i r of equipment. Materiel Recommendations 1. CT-9 Trackson cranes should be powered by a d i e s e l operated engine instead of a gasoline one. Less
:
'f.' V !>
-17
S~6f
hen be encountered in g e t t i n g CT-9 Trackson Cranes ashore and o p e r a t i n g . The front suspension o f the CT-9 Crane should be strengthened. At p r e s e n t , the front suspension i s weak, and i n a s s a u l t o p e r a t i o n s the crane must be moved frequently over rough t e r r a i n r e s u l t i n g i n many breakdowns. 2 . The crane mounted on the TD-14 Tractor did not orove s a t i s f a c t o r y during the OKINAWA Operation. The boom on the crane i s too s h o r t , the speed of the crane i s too slow, and the crane i s poorly c o n s t r u c t e d . 3 . The Trackson Crane was not s a t i s f a c t o r y for d i r e c t unloading of small boats on the b e a c h e s . More cranes with l o n g boom and of f i v e (5) ton capacity should be made a v a i l a b l e , as most of t h e s e cranes were o p e r a t i n g on barges at the t r a n s f e r l i n e . 4 . I t i s recommended t h a t , during extended oper a t i o n s , a d d i t i o n a l spare p a r t s f o r ordnance equipment be i n c l u d e d i n resuoply shipments. Shortages e x i s t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g items during o p e r a t i o n s i n Southern OKINAWA: a. Spare p a r t s for ^4A2 Tank D i e s e l e n g i n e s . b . Soare p a r t s for the Continental engine i n the M7 Motor Carriage. c S o l e n o i d s for .30 Cal. machine guns mounted i n tanks. d. P i s t o l , spare p a r t s . e. Spare p a r t s for LVT(3)'s. f. Shotgun spare p a r t s . g # Additional b a r r e l s for . 3 0 Cal. machine guns, M1917A1. 5 . I t i s recommended that the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e care be e x e r c i s e d i n planning resupply shipments to p r o v i d e a s u f f i c i e n t allowance of spare p a r t s f o r motor t r a n s p o r t , a l l types of t r a c t o r s , and e n g i n e e r i n g e q u i p ment. Equipment u r g e n t l y needed for combat o p e r a t i o n s was deadlined for l a c k of spare p a r t s . 6 . I t i s recommended that the primer g a s o l i n e l i n e running through the b a t t e r y w e l l i n the motor c a r r i a g e i n the M-7 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , be removed as dangerous f i r e s have s t a r t e d from b a t t e r y sparks when t h i s g a s o l i n e l i n e has been ruptured during removal and i n s t a l l a t i o n of the b a t t e r y *
IFiEO
*Jtt6IA ^FIFn
7. The M7B1 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , was found to be more s a t i s f a c t o r y than the M-7. The Ford motor in the M7B1 has more power and can be maintained more e a s i l y . Organization 1. I t I s recommended that, i n future operations, Service Regiments support Divisions by transporting s u p p l i e s to D i v i s i o n dumps. During the OKINAWA Operation, i t was necessary for the Division to transport Class II and IV items from the 7th Service Regiment's dumps. In l a r g e o p e r a t i o n s , where i t becomes necessarv to d i s o l a c e dumps forward several times, i t i s not p o s s i b l e for Div i s i o n s to transport supplies from the supply agency's dumps and at the same time keep D i v i s i o n dumps well for ward. The D i v i s i o n ' s transportation and personnel r e sources are not capable of performing t h i s double duty. 2. I t i s recommended that the Tank Maintenance Platoon be made part of the Tank B a t t a l i o n and removed from the Ordnance Company, and that the Tank B a t t a l i o n be made r e s p o n s i b l e for the maintenance of the M-7 105mm Howitzer, S . P . , i n the D i v i s i o n . 3. I t i s recommended that each Infantry regiment be furnished two (2) TD-9 Tractors, dozer equipped, to be used for i n i t i a l road, t r a i l , dump clearance, construc t i o n , e t c . Experience on t h i s operation, Involving ex t e n s i v e movement over a f a i r l y : l a r g e lard mass and poor roads,- i n d i c a t e s a need i n the infantry regiment for some organic earth moving equipment. Transportation 1. I t i s recommended that the truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo, I n t e r n a t i o n a l , be discarded as a combat v e h i c l e and r e l e g a t e d to rear area use; and that the truck 3 / 4 ton, Dodge, Weaoons Carrier, or the truck, l f - t o n , 6x6, Dodge, replace i t . 2. I t i s recommended that each infantry regiment be equipped with f i v e (5) M Prime Movers with t r a i l e r s 5 to be used for transporting ammunition and supplies over r o u t e s impassable to wheeled v e h i c l e s , and to supplement regular motor transportation. - 19
3. It Is recommended that the Division be supplied

with eighty (80) M29C Carriers to be used primarily in
wire laying. It is recognized that this vehicle is too
light with limited cargo capacity for all around per
formance but its use in special cases makes it very de
sirable. It has not proved efficient in deep mud, but
otherwise was able to traverse most terrain encountered.
Division Quartermaster
1. It is recommended that:
a. One (1) Ammunition Company be attached to
the Service Battalion operating under a
munitions officer.
b. One (1) Quartermaster Truck Company be
attached to the Service Battalion and oper
ate under the control of the Division Quar
termaster, to consist of:
3 Platoons, of sixteen (16) trucks each.
1 Service Platoon, for labor, tractor oper
ations, and Motor Vehicle maintenance.
c. Motor vehicles, bull dozers and tractor
cranes be organically assigned, and not
pooled with any other unit.
The present organization of the Service Battalion, which
includes Quartermaster supply activities, is not suitable
to tactical or ordinary operational requirements. These
defects have been very clearly shown during this operation
which involved considerable distance and frequent forward
displacement. In small island seizure it was not entirely
suitable, but in most instances in the past the duration
of the operation was so short and the distances involved
so minor that a satisfactory supply procedure could be
improvised from personnel, equipment, and transportation
available.
The functions of the Division Quartermaster (Service
Battalion), fall into the following three classes:
a. ADMINISTRATIVE: Preparing, screening and consoli
dating of requisitions for various cJggfê^Q^f sût^ljj
- 20
roy
Preparation of d a l l y r e p o r t s . b . OPERATION OF SERVICES: (1) Bakery (2) Laundry (3) Chemical (4) Graves R e g i s t r a t i o n (5) Salvage (6) Ordnance Repair
c. OPERATION OF DIVISION DUMPS: (1) Class I , Rations and Water. (2) Class I I and IV, General Supply, Clothing, Equipment, F o r t i f i c a t i o n Material, HouseKeeping Gear, and Chemical Gear. (3) Class I I I , Fuel O i l , Greases, and Gasoline. (4) Class V, Ammunition. It is absolutely essential that any organization of the
Service Battalion, Division Quartermaster, should embrace
these activities regardless of how the responsibility is
subdivided, whether Quartermaster or Service Command.
This discussion is mainly concerned with the activities
listed in 2c above - operation of Division Dumps. Here
is where the present organization is Particularly weak
and is not corrected in the new Table of Organisation for
the Service Battalion of a Division.
The setting- U P of division dumps is essential as supply
regiments and army supply units will not deal with indiv
idual units of a division, nor can they break issues
down into small components for distribution tj subordlnat
units. This must be accomplished in the division dumps.
To take care of tnis function and provide for displace
ment, when it is usually necessary to continue the oper
ation of an old dump simultaneously with the establish
ment of a new one, requires:
a. Sufficient Officers.
b. Enlisted personnel, clerical, labor and
security.
c. Equipment.
d. Transportation.
Tne above should be sufficient to be able to split three
wavs with overall supervision in order to operate in the
initial phases of"a landing.
i '* H IT
*
All classes of sup oil eV are 'usually dumped on three

separate beaches by the combat teams, and revert to the
Division Quartermaster after the shore party has com
pleted its mission. This us usually the most critical
nhase, owing to the inevitable confusion on the beaches.
Only after considerable time and effort is it possible
to consolidate these combat team dumps into a Division
dump.
In detail, the requirements for such operation are as follows:
a. Class I, Rations and Water.
1 Officer, Commissary, in charge.
3 Assistant Officers, or W.O.'s.
Enlisted, Clerical and labor.
2f-ton trucks, cargo.
Jeeps.
Camp equipment.
b. CI as 8 II and IV, General Property.
1 Officer in charge, accountable officer.
3 Assistant Officers, (1) Clothing,
Individual Equipment and Housekeep
ing supplies. (2) Fortification
Material. (3) Chemical.
Enlisted personnel, clerical and labor.
Transportation; 2J-ton trucks, cargo,
and Jeeps.
Equipment; Tractor cranes and bull dozer.
Csmp Equipment.
c. Class III, Fuel, Oil, Greases, and
Gasoline. 1 Officer in charge, qualified fuel officer. 2 A s s i s t a n t s , o f f i c e r s or W.O.'s. Enlisted personnel, c l e r i c a l and labor. Equipment: Tractor cranes, bull dozer and fuel oumos. Transoortatloh: 2f-ton trucks, cargo and Jeeps. Camp Equipment. d. Class V, Ammunition. This i s most urgent and c r i t i c a l . At present there i s no organic personnel or transportation assigned s o e c i f i c a l l y
- 22
57*
for t h i s duty. I t has been necessary to use Ordnance Company trucks and Ordnance Comoany s p e c i a l i z e d personnel for t h i s task*. For t h i s purpose there I s urgently required: One (1) Ammunition Company with a munitions o f f i c e r In charge and a s s i s t ants, or at l e a s t a munitions platoon attached to Ordnance or 3ut>oly Comp any, with 2-^-ton trucks, cargo; also one b u l l dozer. In order that transoortation, equipment, and personnel may be out to maximum use In operating the above l i s t e d dumr>s and s u p o l i e s , there should be attached to the Service B a t t a l i o n , operating under d i r e c t supervision of the D i v i s i o n Quartermaster:. 1 Quartermaster Truck Company of 3 Platoons of 16 trucks each. 1 Service Platoon of approximately 100 men, for handling Class I , I I , I I I and IV s u p o l i e s . Bull dozer and crane operators. Motor v e h i c l e maintenance personnel. Equipment: 48 2^-toh trucks, cargo.
3 Bull dozers, TD-14 or l a r g e r .
4 Tractor cranes,
10 J - t o n trucks, with t r a i l e r s . The above transportation and equipment should be organ i c a l l y assigned and d e f i n i t e l y should not be pooled with any other o r g a n i z a t i o n , as experience has shown that deoending upon another u n i t for equipment and transport a t i o n i s not p r a c t i c a b l e . All too often such equipment and transportation i s not a v a i l a b l e when needed, which prevents planning and adequate s e r v i c e . Bull dozers are i n constant need for preparation of dump s i t e s , fuel o i l trenches, and ammunition revetments. The Division Quartermaster's department has a d e f i n i t e mission to oerform and should be given the means and Dersonnel with which to do i t . The need for re-organization along the above l i n e s i s urgent i f future operations contemplate movement over d i s t a n c e s exceeding three (3) miles from the beach,
- 23
WW
DECUWMIII
DE#*0
Miscellaneous 1 . 75mm Tank ammunition should be s t e n c i l e d with a white "TH or "TANK" on ends of c l o v e r l e a f s to d i s t i n g u i s h i t from other types of 75mm ammunition.
2 Period covered and time due on a l l adminis t r a t i v e , supoly ordnance and ammunition r e p o r t s should be standardized. 3 . I t i s recommended t h a t five-man and twenty-man s t o v e s , Coleman, gasoline burning, be furnished i n f a n t r y regiments. 4 . The "10 i n 1M r a t i o n s a r e e x c e l l e n t f i e l d r a t i o n s and a r e highly recommended for future u s e . 5.' Extra coffee, f r u i t s and f r u i t Juices g r e a t l y improve morale and combat efficiency of a l l troops and p r o v i s i o n should be made to resupply these items during extended o p e r a t i o n s . 6 # The new type " C r a t i o n shows a vast improvement over t h e old type and i s recommended for i s s u e on future operations. 7. I t i s considered p r a c t i c a b l e , i n planning future o p e r a t i o n s , to include with the V O squadron four add M i t i o n a l OY planes rigged for casualty evacuation or i n some other way provide from higher echelon planes f o r casualty evacuation. 8. I t i s recommended t h a t information concerning standard packaging of supplies and t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of dropping c e r t a i n types of supplies by parachute be d i s s eminated to a l l u n i t 8 who might use a i r d r b p s . -9. I t i s recommended t h a t each i n f a n t r y regiment be equipped with some type of tracked, armored t r a n s p o r t a t i o n such as a tank e s p e c i a l l y equipped t o evacuate "casualties and t r a n s p o r t supplies and munitions i n a b a t t l e zone. In p r a c t i c a l l y everv advance of an i n f a n t r y u n i t j d u r l n g t h i s operation an area remained which had t o be cleared of sniper f i r e . The existance of t h i s type of r e s i s t a n c e was often discovered only when an attempt was made t o move supplies forward or to evacuate c a s u a l t i e s . We, therefore^, suffered add! Ltional lossesîA a ^ i f A
- 24
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS
3 1695 00536 6299
COMBINED ARMS I
supposedly secured area. To avoid t h i s type of J.ass, tanks were used on many occasions to carry woundea from the immediate combat area and return with v i t a l s u p p l i e s . 1 0 . I t i s recommended that each infantry regiment be equipped with 300 Army Ply-wood Pack Carriers. A l i m i t e d number of these carriers were used by one r e g i ment during the OKINAWA campaign and found to be highly practical. 1 1 . The present issue poncho should be replaced by the Army type which i s l i g h t e r , more durable, has a draw s t r i n g to c l o s e the neck opening, and corner grommets f o r ' r i g g i n g , as a s h e l t e r .
ku

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COPY NO.

FIPST MARINE DIVISION

01718 1990-5-80 485/390

Subject; Reference: Enclosure:

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Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

Chapter VII - Assault Phase

r~g%rt k' 9W-, IJ.,

...CHAPTER IE... ..TASK ORGANIZATION... SPECIAL ACTION QE1POQT ...NANSE1I SWOTO...

Col Kenneth B. CHAPPELL, USMC

Col John H. &RIEBEL, USI'C

3rd PlaC iST*Wl

Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (8 DUKW)

Col Wilburt S. BROWN, USMC

Lt Col James S. MONAHAN, USMC

Annexes: Personnel lntelli aence Operations Supply j Logistics Medical

#* 0~ " * tw" ***"

Elements composing the Division for this operation were;

Attached to the Division for operational control for this

The First Marine Division rear echelon, with a strength of 80

Attached Units (including Battle Replacements);

Total First Marine Division (Reinforced):

Some fifty key enlisted men also elected to take leave in

___ , r?-. .-</* ?>** 0 * afk -^ ,_, .

Many of these men, were deserving of promotion for creditable

During each CPX, time was allowed for instruction and

w o n ^ { l ) , 4 h o ^ r Ud^SC^>two (2) days ja, jffifik^

*h*? **.$& %**

with special emphasis on combat phrases. The

5 ' # ' f f '&*r-$2'' '

Because liaison teams from the Division Intelligence Sec

1:12,300 1:15,500 1:5,000 1:5,000 1:10,000 1:11,000 1:6,000 1:6,000

22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 3 Jan 45 3 3 Jan 45 Jan 45

14 Feb 45 16 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 20 Feb 45 25 Mar 45 25 Mar 45 5 Mar 45

1:5,000 1:6,000 1:10,000 ~ 1:10,000 1:3,000 1:8,000 1:8,000 1:10,000 1:15,000

Beach coverage was especially good. A written report on

22 January, 1945, and 1 March, 1945# Also the scales of com

1:50,000 1:100,000 l:25Q,000

Final distribution of relief maps was made to all above-

- "Estimates of Order of Battle in the TENTH Army Z of A

Phase II - capture of IE JIMA, and the remainder of

Tentative S'irsi, Marine Division Operational Plan 1-45 was

The OKINAWA Operation was similar to the PALAU Operation

-CHAPTER BE TRAINING # REHEARSALS SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -IMANSEI SHOTO

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Training for the NANSEI SHOTO Campaign cannot be said to

In addition to training for these new types of warfare,

again received a thorough test in an extensive command post

- CHAPTER Yl LOADING t EMBARKATION SPECIAL ACTION QEPOQT NANSEI SHOTO

5! " " PIT"

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The forms required by FMF, Pac, are much too detailed

CHAPTER, m .MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SWOTO...

News was also received, as L day neared, of the successful

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

YONTAN Airfield had excellent command of all landing beaches

This Division went ashore according to plan over Beaches Blue 1

unbpr I HO-JIM A OKAHA-IWA ^ usuku, 1 '*

Flra$ reports from assault elements of the Division reported

Our attack" continued to progress against very light opposition

Weather continued clear after dark, but there was no enemy

3 '* 5 /v " J CLK miya f^Z'jjk

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h? .$& %

"Kishabo, Atsu+0< > lariya/' Unjo 'V5- . ' 1 \

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