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The nuclear reactor after the disaster. Reactor 4 (center). Turbine building (lower left). Reactor 3 (center right). Date Time Location 26 April 1986 02:39 a.m. (UTC+3) Pripyat, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union Casualties 56 direct deaths
The abandoned city of Pripyat with Chernobyl plant in the distance
Radio-operated bulldozers being tested prior to use
Abandoned housing blocks in Pripyat The Chernobyl disaster was a nuclear accident that occurred on 26 April 1986, at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine (then in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Soviet Union). It is considered the worst nuclear power plant accident in history and is the only level 7 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale. The disaster occurred on 26 April 1986, at reactor number four at the Chernobyl plant, near the town of Pripyat in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, during a systems test. A sudden power output surge took place, and when an attempt was made for emergency shutdown, a more extreme spike in power output occurred which led to a reactor vessel rupture and a series of explosions. This event exposed the graphite moderator components of the reactor to air and they ignited; the resulting fire sent a plume of radioactive fallout into the atmosphere and over an extensive geographical area, including Pripyat. The plume drifted over large parts of the western Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Northern Europe. Large areas in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia had to be evacuated, with over 336,000 people resettled. According to official post-Soviet data, about 60% of the fallout landed in Belarus. Despite the accident, Ukraine continued to operate the remaining reactors at Chernobyl for many years. The last reactor at the site was closed down in 2000, 14 years after the accident. The accident raised concerns about the safety of the Soviet nuclear power industry as well as nuclear power in general, slowing its expansion for a number of years while forcing the Soviet government to become less secretive about its procedures. The countries of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have been burdened with the continuing and substantial decontamination and health care costs of the Chernobyl accident. A 2006 report prepared by the Chernobyl Forum, led by the World Health
Organization (WHO) states, "Among the 134 emergency workers involved in the immediate mitigation of the Chernobyl accident, severely exposed workers and fireman during the first days, 28 persons died in 1986 due to ARS(Acute Radiation Syndrome), and 19 more persons died in 1987-2004 from different causes. Among the general population affected by Chernobyl radioactive fallout, the much lower exposures meant that ARS cases did not occur". It is estimated that there will ultimately be a total of 4,000 deaths attributable to the accident, due to increased cancer risk. However, the largest health problem of the accident was the perception was the "mental health impact" from the anxiety experienced by those exposed.
• • • •
1 Accident o 1.1 Conditions prior to the accident o 1.2 Experiment and explosion 1.2.1 Radiation levels 1.2.2 Plant layout 1.2.3 Individual involvement 1.2.4 Deaths and survivors o 1.3 Immediate crisis management 1.3.1 Radiation levels 1.3.2 Fire containment 126.96.36.199 Timeline 1.3.3 Evacuation of Pripyat 1.3.4 Steam explosion risk 1.3.5 Debris removal 2 Causes 3 Effects o 3.1 International spread of radioactivity o 3.2 Radioactive release o 3.3 Health of plant workers and local people o 3.4 Residual radioactivity in the environment 3.4.1 Rivers, lakes and reservoirs 3.4.2 Groundwater 3.4.3 Flora and fauna 4 Chernobyl after the disaster 5 Recovery process o 5.1 Recovery projects 5.1.1 The Chernobyl Shelter Fund 5.1.2 The United Nations Development Programme 5.1.3 The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident 6 Assessing the disaster's effects on human health 7 In popular culture 8 Commemoration of the disaster o 8.1 Chernobyl 20 9 See also
Nuclear power reactors require cooling.5 MW required to run one main cooling water pump. and it had been suggested that the mechanical energy (rotational momentum) of the steam turbine could be used to generate electricity to run the main cooling water pumps while the turbine was still spinning down. An initial test carried out in 1982 showed that the excitation voltage of the turbine-generator was insufficient. Chernobyl's reactors had three backup diesel generators. (UTC+3). The system was modified. even when not actively generating power. analyses indicated that this residual momentum had the potential to provide power for 45 seconds. Each generator required 15 seconds to start up but took 60–75 seconds to attain full speed and reach the capacity of 5. There had been concerns that in the event of a power grid failure. Following an emergency shutdown (scram). external power would not have been immediately available to run the plant's cooling water pumps. The accident occurred during an experiment scheduled to test a potential safety emergency core cooling feature. Once the reactor is scrammed. leading to explosions in the core. . typically provided by coolant flow. it did not maintain the desired magnetic field during the generator spindown. and previous tests had ended unsuccessfully. In theory. This capability still needed to be confirmed experimentally. at 01:23 a.000 liters (7. This one-minute power gap was considered unacceptable. to remove decay heat. reactor 4 suffered a catastrophic power increase. which is initially about seven percent of the total thermal output of the plant. If not removed by coolant systems. As the name suggests.1 Documents 11 References 12 External links  Accident On 26 April 1986. This dispersed large quantities of radioactive fuel and core materials into the atmosphere and ignited the combustible graphite moderator. the core still generates a significant amount of residual heat. which would bridge the power gap between the onset of the external power failure and the full availability of electric power from the emergency diesel generators. the heat could lead to core damage.600 individual fuel channels. The test procedure was to be repeated again in 1986.m. and in 1984 the test was repeated. which took place during the normal shutdown procedure.400 USgal)) of water per hour. carried by the smoke. but again proved unsuccessful. and scheduled to take place during the maintenance shutdown of Reactor Four. The reactor consisted of about 1. reactor cooling is still required to keep the temperature in the reactor core low enough to avoid fuel damage. In 1985 the tests were attempted a third time. as the reactor had not been contained by any kind of hard containment vessel (unlike all Western plants). but also yielded negative results. and each operational channel required a flow of 28 metric tons (28.• • • 10 Further reading o 10. The burning graphite moderator increased the emission of radioactive particles. Pressurized Water Reactors use water flow at high pressure to remove waste heat.
Since the test procedure was to begin when the reactor was scrammed automatically at the very beginning of the experiment. the steam supply was to be closed off the turbines would be allowed to freewheel down generator performance was to be recorded to determine whether it could provide the bridging power for coolant pumps  Conditions prior to the accident The conditions to run the test were established prior to the day shift of 25 April 1986. which may explain why they continued the test even when serious problems arose. Instead. it was approved only by the director of the plant (and even this approval was not consistent with established procedures). Further rapid reduction in the power level .. and by the beginning of the day shift the power level had reached 50% of its nominal 3200 MW thermal. and the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of Chernobyl's output be postponed. well into the job. the test should have been finalized during the day shift.m. If test conditions had been as planned the procedure would almost certainly have been carried out safely. the Kiev grid controller allowed the reactor shut-down to resume. According to the test parameters. as power was needed to satisfy the peak evening demand. The Chernobyl power plant had been in operation for two years without the capability to ride through the first 60–75 seconds of a total loss of electric power—an important safety feature. Therefore. The Chernobyl plant director agreed and postponed the test. the evening shift was also preparing to leave. At 11:04 p. and the night shift would only have had to maintain decay heat cooling systems in an otherwise shut-down plant. and why the requisite approval for the test was not sought from the Soviet nuclear oversight regulator (even though there was a representative at the complex of 4 reactors). As planned. The station managers presumably wished to correct this at the first opportunity. which was inconsistent with approved procedure. between >700 MW & 800 MW the steam turbine was to be run up to full speed when these conditions were achieved. The day shift workers had been instructed in advance about the test and were familiar with procedures. the night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. the eventual disaster resulted from attempts to boost the reactor output once the experiment had been started.m. at the start of the experiment the thermal output of the reactor should have been no lower than 700 MW. The experimental procedure was intended to run as follows: • • • • • the reactor was to be running at a low power. and the night shift would not take over until midnight. the experiment was not anticipated to have any detrimental effect on the safety of the reactor. on 25 April a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit was begun at 01:06 a. According to plan. This delay had some serious consequences: the day shift had long since departed. another regional power station unexpectedly went off-line. the test program was not formally coordinated with either the chief designer of the reactor (NIKIET) nor the scientific manager. A special team of electrical engineers was present to test the new voltage regulating system..The test was focused on the switching sequences of the electrical supplies for the reactor. At this point.
it seems emergency alarm signals concerning thermal-hydraulic parameters were ignored. including the movement of the control rods. and Leonid Toptunov was the operator responsible for the reactor's operational regime. As part of the test plan. which now more closely approached the nucleate boiling temperature of water. In this case the majority of control rods were withdrawn to their upper limits. though several minutes elapsed between their extraction and the point that the power output began to increase and subsequently stabilize at 160–200 MW (thermal). After a period. The control room received repeated emergency signals of the levels in the steam/water separator drums. The reactor power dropped to 30 MW thermal (or less)—an almost completely shutdown power level that was approximately 5 percent of the minimum initial power level established as safe for the test.m. Toptunov was a young engineer who had worked independently as a senior engineer for approximately three months. xenon-135. on 26 April extra water pumps were activated. of relief valves opened to relieve excess steam into a turbine condenser. a more or less stable state at a power level of 200 MW was achieved. The flow exceeded the allowed limit at 1:19 a. even without further operator action. The rapid reduction in the power during the initial shutdown. because of the natural production in the core of a neutron absorber. increasing the water flow. however. of large excursions or variations in the flow rate of feed water. reactor power continued to decrease. and preparation for the experiment continued. Alexander Akimov was chief of the night shift.m. Toptunov committed an error and inserted the control rods too far. The exact circumstances will probably never be known. At the same time the extra water flow lowered the overall core temperature and reduced the existing steam voids in the core. Emergency signals from the Reactor Emergency Protection System (EPS-5) triggered a trip which turned off both turbine-generators. The operation of the reactor at the low power level with a small reactivity margin was accompanied by unstable core temperature and coolant flow. In the period between 00:35 and 00:45. Control-room personnel therefore made the decision to restore the power and extracted the reactor control rods. The test plan called for the power output of reactor 4 to be gradually reduced to 700– 1000 MW thermal. and the subsequent operation at a level of less than 200 MW led to increased poisoning of the reactor core by the accumulation of xenon-135. And as the power reached approximately 500 MW. The increased coolant flow rate through the reactor produced an increase in the inlet coolant temperature of the reactor core. Since water also absorbs neutrons (and the higher density of liquid water makes it a better absorber than steam). . This made it necessary to extract additional control rods from the reactor core in order to counteract the poisoning. apparently to preserve the reactor power level. and possibly by instability of neutron flux.from 50% was actually executed during the shift change-over. as both Akimov and Toptunov died from radiation sickness. bringing the reactor to a nearshutdown state. at 1:05 a. and from the neutron power controller. but the low value of the operational reactivity margin restricted any further rise of reactor power. turning on additional pumps decreased the reactor power still further. The power level established in the test program (700 MW) was achieved at 00:05 on April 26. and reducing the safety margin.
m. and a run down of the turbine generator began. so any power excursion would produce boiling. The steam to the turbines was shut off. which would limit the value of the safety rods when initially inserted in a scram condition. the water flow rate . Lumps of graphite moderator ejected from the core.This prompted the operators to remove the manual control rods further to maintain power. the experiment began. Nearly all of the control rods were removed. All these actions led to an extremely unstable reactor configuration. which was complete by 01:23:43. As the momentum of the turbine generator that powered the water pumps decreased. Roof of the turbine hall is damaged (image center). At 1:23:04 a. Roof of the adjacent reactor 3 (image lower left) shows minor fire damage. but had limited margin to boiling. reducing neutron absorption by the water. together with four (of eight total) Main Circulating Pumps (MCP). during this period the power for these four MCPs was supplied by the coasting down turbine generator.  Experiment and explosion Aerial view of the damaged core. The largest lump shows an intact control rod channel. The diesel generator started and sequentially picked up loads. The reactor was in an unstable configuration that was clearly outside the safe operating envelope established by the designers. the reactor coolant had reduced boiling. Further.
 Then according to some estimations. There is a view that the scram may have been ordered as a response to the unexpected rapid power increase. This was a steam explosion like the explosion of a . it was now primed to embark on a positive feedback loop.000 ton upper plate (to which the entire reactor assembly is fastened). The control rod insertion mechanism operated at a relatively slow speed (0. The scram was started when the EPS5 button (also known as the AZ-5 button) of the reactor emergency protection system was pressed thus fully inserting all control rods. the SKALA clearly registered a manual scram signal. A few seconds after the start of the scram. the reactor jumped to around 30 GW thermal. Some of the fuel rods fractured. Because of the positive void coefficient of the RBMK reactor at low reactor power levels. which in turn increased the reactor's power output. Some have suggested that the button was not pressed but rather that the signal was automatically produced by the emergency protection system. tearing off and lifting by force the 2. The reason the EPS-5 button was pressed is not known. There are assertions that the pressure was caused by the rapid power acceleration at the start. It was not possible to reconstruct the precise sequence of the processes that led to the destruction of the reactor and the power unit building. blocking the control rod columns and causing the control rods to become stuck after being inserted only one-third of the way. the question as to when or even whether the EPS-5 button was pressed was the subject of debate.4 m/s) taking 18–20 seconds for the rods to travel the full approximately 7-meter core length (height). and allegations that the button was not pressed until the reactor began to self-destruct but others assert that it happened earlier and in calm conditions.decreased. As a result. Within three seconds the reactor output rose above 530 MW. the core overheated. as recorded by the SKALA centralized control system. In spite of this. an emergency shutdown or scram of the reactor was initiated. For whatever reason the EPS-5 button was pressed. a massive power spike occurred. The subsequent course of events was not registered by instruments: it is known only as a result of mathematical simulation. although there is no recorded data convincingly testifying to this. ten times the normal operational output. and seconds later resulted in the initial explosion. First a great rise in power caused an increase in fuel temperature and massive steam buildup with rapid increase in steam pressure. including the manual control rods that had been incautiously withdrawn earlier. during almost the entire period of the experiment the automatic control system successfully counteracted this positive feedback. However. A bigger problem was a flawed graphite-tip control rod design. Apparently this was the first explosion that many heard. continuously inserting control rods into the reactor core to limit the power rise. however. which initially displaced coolant before neutron-absorbing material was inserted and the reaction slowed. There is a general understanding that it was steam from the wrecked channels entering the reactor inner structure that caused the destruction of the reactor casing. leading to increased formation of steam voids (bubbles) in the core. At 1:23:40. whether it was done as an emergency measure or simply as a routine method of shutting down the reactor upon completion of the experiment. insertion of control rods into the reactor core began. This caused yet more water to flash into steam. giving yet a further power increase. in which the formation of steam voids reduced the ability of the liquid water coolant to absorb neutrons. This destroyed fuel elements and ruptured the channels in which these elements were located. the scram actually increased the reaction rate in the lower half of the core.
Bagdasarov made his own decision to shut down the reactor. the ratio of xenon radioisotopes released during the event provides compelling evidence that the second explosion was a nuclear power transient. . Ejected material ignited at least five fires on the roof of the (still operating) adjacent reactor 3. Yuri Bagdasarov. The total water loss combined with a high positive void coefficient to increase the reactor power. Inside reactor 3. evidence indicates that the second explosion resulted from a nuclear excursion. According to this version. Some of them fell onto the roof of the machine hall and started a fire. but chief engineer Nikolai Fomin would not allow this. the flow of steam and the steam pressure caused all the destruction following the ejection from the shaft of a substantial part of the graphite and fuel. The air ignited the hot graphite and started a graphite fire. Parts of the graphite blocks and fuel channels were out of the reactor building. As a result of the damage to the building an airflow through the core was established by the high temperature of the core. by steam.  Contrary to safety regulations. a combustible material (bitumen) had been used in the construction of the roof of the reactor building and the turbine hall. However. however. This nuclear transient released ~0. greatly contributing to the spread of radioactive material and the contamination of outlying areas. There were initially several hypotheses about the nature of the second explosion. ." Another hypothesis posits that the second explosion was a thermal explosion of the reactor as a result of the uncontrollable escape of fast neutrons caused by the complete water loss in the reactor core. However. exceptionally. It was imperative to put those fires out and protect the cooling systems of reactor 3. According to observers outside Unit 4. the graphite fire continued. A second. the analysis indicates that the nuclear excursion was limited to a small portion of the core.  Radiation levels Approximate radiation levels at different locations shortly after the explosion: . The operators were given respirators and potassium iodide tablets and told to continue working.  The nuclear excursion dispersed the core and effectively terminated that phase of the event.01 kiloton of TNT equivalent (40 GJ) of energy. This ruptured further fuel channels— as a result the remaining coolant flashed to steam and escaped the reactor core. leaving only those operators there who had to work the emergency cooling systems.steam boiler from the excess pressure of vapor. One view was that "the second explosion was caused by the hydrogen which had been produced either by the overheated steam-zirconium reaction or by the reaction of red-hot graphite with steam that produce hydrogen and carbon monoxide.... A third hypothesis was that the explosion was caused. the chief of the night shift. At 05:00. more powerful explosion occurred about two or three seconds after the first. wanted to shut down the reactor immediately. About 25 per cent of the red-hot graphite blocks and overheated material from the fuel channels was ejected.. burning lumps of material and sparks shot into the air above the reactor.
000 500–15.0 compartments control room.0 pumps 6.000–15.4 floor of the pipe aisle in the deaerator gallery main floor of the turbine hall.0 deaerator floor.000 10. house switchgear.6 separators 28.000–20.500 1. gallery of the refueling mechanism 39.0 steam distribution corridor 2. floor under the reactor lower biological shield.9 roof of the deaerator gallery 35.5 basement floor of the turbine hall  Individual involvement Main article: Individual involvement in the Chernobyl disaster  Deaths and survivors Main article: Deaths due to the Chernobyl disaster  Immediate crisis management .2 upper pressure suppression pool 0.3 lower side of the turbine hall roof 24.000 1. main circulation 10. shortly after explosion Gidroelektromontazh depot nearby concrete mixing unit  Plant layout based on the image of the plant radiation (roentgens per hour) 3 15. measurement and control instruments room 16.2. floor of the main circulation pump motor 12.000 5.6 roof of the reactor building.5 lower pressure suppression pool -5. other turbine hall levels -4.location vicinity of the reactor core fuel fragments debris heap at the place of circulation pumps debris near the electrolyzers water in the Level +25 feedwater room level 0 of the turbine hall area of the affected unit water in Room 712 control room.000 5.000–1.2 -6. floor of the space for pipes to steam 31.5 floor of the main reactor hall upper side of the upper biological shield.0 ground level.000 3–5 30 10–15 level objects 49. turbine hall level -0.
All remaining dosimeters had limits of 0. They were not told how dangerously radioactive the smoke and the debris were. firefighters arrived to try to extinguish the fires. Radiation levels The radiation levels in the worst-hit areas of the reactor building have been estimated to be 5. and another one failed when turned on. the reactor crew chief Alexander Akimov assumed that the reactor was intact. "It's hot. much higher in some areas.3 µA/kg) and therefore read "off scale.000 R/s (0. the reactor crew could ascertain only that the radiation levels were somewhere above 0.3 µA/kg). First on the scene was a Chernobyl Power Station firefighter brigade under the command of Lieutenant Volodymyr Pravik. died from radiation exposure within three weeks.  Because of the inaccurate low readings.m..3 A/kg) was inaccessible because of the explosion. trying to pump water into the reactor..6 R/h. the driver of one of the fire-engines." he said. including Akimov. The pieces of graphite were . We saw graphite scattered about. A lethal dose is around 500 roentgens (0. Misha asked: "What is graphite?" I kicked it away. or 0. which is equivalent to more than 20. No one had told us. But one of the fighters on the other truck picked it up.000 roentgens per hour." Thus. who died on 9 May 1986 of acute radiation sickness. The evidence of pieces of graphite and reactor fuel lying around the building was ignored. while the true levels were much.6 roentgens per second (R/s) (1.001 R/s (3. later described what happened: We arrived there at 10 or 15 minutes to two in the morning . Shortly after the accident. None of them wore any protective gear. being decorated for bravery.  Fire containment Firefighter Leonid Telyatnikov. so in some areas. were dismissed under the assumption that the new dosimeter must have been defective. and may not even have known that the accident was anything more than a regular electrical fire: "We didn't know it was the reactor.13 coulombs per kilogram) over 5 hours. unprotected workers received fatal doses within several minutes. Most of them. a dosimeter capable of measuring up to 1.4 milliamperes per kilogram). and the readings of another dosimeter brought in by 4:30 a." Grigorii Khmel.001 R/s (0. Akimov stayed with his crew in the reactor building until morning. However.
" 20 years after the disaster. and I never saw them again. From eyewitness accounts of the firefighters involved before they died (as reported on the CBC television series Witness).. Anatoli Zakharov.  However.. 3 and keep its core cooling systems intact. but many firefighters received high doses of radiation.  Timeline • • • • • • • 1:26:03 . Misha filled the cistern and we aimed the water at the top. clay. 2 were aware of the risks." and feeling a sensation similar to that of pins and needles all over his face. The fires were extinguished by 5 a.of different sizes. it is possible that well over half of the graphite burned out. lead.arrival of firefighters from Pripyat.turbine hall roof fire extinguished 2:30 ..000 metric tons of materials like sand. and Volodya Pravik . But it was a moral obligation—our duty. We were like kamikaze. 4 to protect No. They went up the ladder . The fire was extinguished by a combined effort of helicopters dropping over 5. Kibenok's guard 1:40 .arrival of Kiev firefighters . and boron onto the burning reactor and injection of liquid nitrogen.arrival of local firefighters. The immediate priority was to extinguish fires on the roof of the station and the area around the building containing Reactor No. into the air: the residents of the surrounding area observed the radioactive cloud on the night of the explosion. offers a different description: I remember joking to the others. iodine-131. We'll be lucky if we're all still alive in the morning. Ukrainian filmmaker Vladimir Shevchenko captured film footage of a Mi-8 helicopter as it collided with a nearby construction crane. radioactive elements like caesium-137. We didn't know much about radiation. a fireman stationed in Chernobyl since 1980. he claimed the firefighters from the Fire Station No..) The explosion and fire threw hot particles of the nuclear fuel and also far more dangerous fission products. The fire inside Reactor No. 4 continued to burn until 10 May 1986. a Manhattan Project physicist who died days after a fatal radiation overdose from a criticality accident. causing the helicopter to fall near the damaged reactor building and kill its four-man crew. Even those who worked there had no idea. we would never have gone near the reactor. (This is similar to the description given by Louis Slotin. some small enough to pick up .arrival of Telyatnikov 2:10 . one described his experience of the radiation as "tasting like metal. some big..fire alarm activated 1:28 . "There must be an incredible amount of radiation here. strontium-90 and other radionuclides. There was no water left in the trucks. Then those boys who died went up to the roof—Vashchik Kolya and others. Pravik's guard 1:35 . Of course we knew! If we'd followed regulations.main reactor hall roof fires suppressed 3:30 ..m..
on 27 April. most of the residents left most of their personal belongings which can still be found today at Pripyat. The government committee was eventually formed as announced to investigate the accident. Only after radiation levels set off alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden over one thousand miles from the Chernobyl Plant did the Soviet Union admit that an accident had occurred. Aid will be given to those affected and a committee of government inquiry has been set up. Electrical equipment (4). For example. in evacuating the city of Pripyat. the following warning message was read on local radio: "An accident has occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The talk page may contain suggestions.  Steam explosion risk Chernobyl Corium lava flows formed by fuel-containing mass in the basement of the plant. Legasov's committee had to acknowledge the destruction of the reactor and order the evacuation of Pripyat. two people had died and 52 were in the hospital. Concrete (2). the residents were told to bring only what was necessary since the authorities said it would only be temporary and would last approximately three days. An exclusion zone of 30 km (19 mi) remains in place today. As a result. (April 2009) The nearby city of Pripyat was not immediately evacuated after the incident. Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir from the emergency cooling pumps and as a pressure suppression system capable of .all fires extinguished  Evacuation of Pripyat This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. To speed up the evacuation. The evacuation began at 2 p.m. By the time Legasov arrived. Steam pipe (3). Lava flow (1). Please improve this section if you can.fires mostly localized 6:35 . It was headed by Valeri Legasov who arrived at Chernobyl in the evening of 26 April. Based on the evidence at hand.• • 4:50 . One of the atomic reactors has been damaged. authorities attempted to conceal the scale of the disaster. By the night of 26–27 April — more than 24 hours after the explosion — Legasov's committee had ample evidence showing extremely high levels of radiation and a number of cases of radiation exposure. Nevertheless." This message gave the false impression that any damage or radiation was localized.
The steam released from a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into the pools to bubble through a layer of water. a meltdown was less likely to produce a powerful steam explosion. and at least two—Ananenko and Bezpalov—later died. after 20. To do so. the third floor above them. it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the reactor. Volunteers in diving suits entered the radioactive water and managed to open the gates. these workers could only spend a maximum of 40 seconds at a time working on the rooftops of the surrounding buildings because of the extremely high doses of radiation given off by the blocks of graphite and other debris. Conversion of bubbler pool water to H2O2 is confirmed by the presence in the Chernobyl lavas of studtite and metastudtite. It was estimated that 25 metric tons of liquid nitrogen per day would be required to keep the soil frozen at −100 °C. creating corium.000 metric tons of highly radioactive water were pumped out. These were engineers Alexei Ananenko (who knew where the valves were) and Valeri Bezpalov. If this mixture had melted through the floor into the pool of water. leaving them to find the valves by feeling their way along a pipe. Using oil drilling equipment. Boris Baranov. The smoldering graphite. It became an immediate priority to drain the pool. It is likely that intense alpha radiation hydrolyzed the water. The reactor itself was covered with bags containing sand. generating a low-pH hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) solution akin to an oxidizing acid. much of it shoveled in by liquidators wearing heavy protective gear (dubbed "biorobots" by the military). To reduce the likelihood of this. though this lamp failed. The operation was not completed until 8 May.  Debris removal The worst of the radioactive debris was collected inside what was left of the reactor. By . started to burn through the reactor floor and mixed with molten concrete that had lined the reactor. served as a steam tunnel.condensing steam from a (small) broken steam pipe. the only minerals that contain peroxide. it would have created a massive steam explosion that would have ejected more radioactive material from the reactor. injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May. The bubbler pool could be drained by opening its sluice gates. Despite their good condition after completion of the task. The pools and the basement were flooded because of ruptured cooling water pipes and accumulated fire water.000 metric tons during the week following the accident). They now constituted a serious steam explosion risk. accompanied by a third man. lead. below the reactor. This idea was soon scrapped and the bottom room where the cooling system would have been installed was filled with concrete. at more than 1200 °C. which would also stabilize the foundations. who provided them with light from a lamp. the molten core would now have to reach the water table below the reactor. fuel and other material above. Fire brigade pumps were then used to drain the basement. All of them returned to the surface and according to Ananenko. a radioactive semi-liquid material comparable to lava. and boric acid dropped from helicopters (some 5. all of them suffered from radiation sickness. Some sources claim incorrectly that they died in the plant. With the bubbler pool gone. their colleagues jumped for joy when they heard they had managed to open the valves.
Personnel had an insufficiently detailed understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor. which in its report of 1986. In this analysis of the causes of the accident. Thus the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule infringement plus the operational routine allowed by the power station staff. on the whole also supported this view. According to these allegations. Several procedural irregularities also helped to make the accident possible. most giving off doses of 10–30 R/h (0. deficiencies in the reactor design and in the operating regulations that made the accident possible were set aside and mentioned only casually.December 1986 a large concrete sarcophagus had been erected. The following general picture arose from these observations. Normally the reactor would have started to insert all of the control rods. The main process computer. at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key safety systems turned off. One was insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge of the experiment being run that night. "During preparation and testing of the turbine generator under run-down conditions using the auxiliary load. The computer would have also started the "Emergency Core Protection System" that introduces 24 control rods into the active zone within 2. was published in August 1986 and effectively placed the blame on the power plant operators. and AZ (emergency power reduction system). SKALA. The reactor operators disabled safety systems down to the generators. namely the intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures.  Causes There were two official explanations of the accident: the first. most notably the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The developers of the reactor plant considered this combination of events to be impossible and therefore did not allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing the combination of events that led to the crisis. the catastrophic accident was caused by gross violations of operating rules and regulations. was running in such a way that the main control computer could not shut down the reactor or even reduce power.5 seconds. which is still slow by 1986 . INSAG-1. LAR (Local Automatic control system). To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA created a group known as the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG). personnel disconnected a series of technical protection systems and breached the most important operational safety provisions for conducting a technical exercise. based on the data provided by the Soviets and the oral statements of specialists. as well as lack of experience and training.  In this view. subsequently acknowledged as erroneous. Serious critical observations covered only general questions and did not address the specific reasons for the accident. and knowingly ignored regulations to speed test completion." This was probably due to their lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering. which the test was really about.7–2 µA/kg) over 20 years after the disaster. Many of the vehicles used by the "liquidators" remain parked in a field in the Chernobyl area to this day. to seal off the reactor and its contents.
 and for a long time remained dominant in the public consciousness and in popular publications."." In this later report. increasing the reactor's power output. working at this low level of power was not forbidden in the regulations. so the reactor produces less power (a negative feed-back)..standards. increasing the intensity of vaporization means that more neutrons are able to split uranium atoms. they attempt to decrease heat output when the vapor phase in the reactor increases." and furthermore. All control was transferred from the process computer to the human operators. However. acts like a harmful neutron absorber. INSAG-7. because if the coolant contains steam bubbles. because steam absorbs neutrons much less readily than water. The void coefficient is a measurement of how a reactor responds to increased steam formation in the water coolant. . ". (see also ). Thus neutrons are slowed down even if steam bubbles form in the water. There are two such reasons: • The reactor had a dangerously large positive void coefficient. presented in appendix I.e. Faster neutrons are less likely to split uranium atoms. According to this account. Regulations forbade work with a small margin of reactivity. and this property of the reactor was unknown to the crew. "ORM was not treated as an operational safety limit. and also interfering with the settings on the protection equipment and blocking the level and pressure in the separator drum. Furthermore. used solid graphite as a neutron moderator to slow down the neutrons. however. though they were possibly a breach of regulations. Nevertheless. did not contribute to the original cause of the accident and its magnitude. most of the accusations against staff for breach of regulations were acknowledged to be erroneous. postaccident studies have shown that the way in which the real role of the ORM is reflected in the Operating Procedures and design documentation for the RBMK-1000 is extremely contradictory. However. turning off the ECCS. i. This view is reflected in numerous publications and also artistic works on the theme of the Chernobyl accident that appeared immediately after the accident. despite what Soviet experts asserted in 1986. namely working with a small operational reactivity margin (ORM) and working at a low level of power in the reactor. Human factors contributed to the conditions that led to the disaster. Chernobyl's RBMK reactor. Turning off the emergency system designed to protect against the stopping of the two turbine generators was not a breach of regulations. in 1993 the IAEA Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) published an additional report. based on incorrect information obtained in August 1986.[which?] the chief reasons for the accident lie in the peculiarities of physics and in the construction of the reactor. less than 700 MW—the level documented in the run-down test program.. This report reflected another view of the reasons for the accident. and prone to suddenly increasing energy production to a dangerous level. and the water in it. This behavior is counter-intuitive. which reviewed "that part of the INSAG-1 report in which primary attention is given to the reasons for the accident. fewer neutrons are slowed down. According to this report. This makes the RBMK design very unstable at low power levels. Most other reactor designs have a negative coefficient. on the contrary. violation of which could lead to an accident.
although the plant was known to be in a very different condition from that intended for the test. operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time. including the Chief Engineer. According to the IAEA's 1986 analysis. Thus for the first few seconds of control rod activation. Both views were heavily lobbied by different groups. “The accident can be said to have flowed from a deficient safety culture.”   Effects Main article: Chernobyl disaster effects . the lower part of each control rod was made of graphite and was 1. not only at the Chernobyl plant. as registered by the instruments and sensors. With this design. rather than reduced as desired. unapproved changes in the test procedure were deliberately made on the spot. were not completely published in the official sources. Once again. the graphite parts initially displace some coolant. as were its non-compliance with accepted standards and with the requirements of nuclear reactor safety. put a heavy burden on the operating crew. One reason there were such contradictory viewpoints and so much debate about the causes of the Chernobyl accident was that the primary data covering the disaster. during activities at other stages in the lifetime of nuclear power plants (including design. and to no lesser extent. engineering. the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions. Other deficiencies besides these were noted in the RBMK-1000 reactor design. The upper part of the rod—the truly functional part that absorbs the neutrons and thereby halts the reaction—was made of boron carbide. the human factor had to be considered as a major element in causing the accident. close attention is paid in report INSAG-7 to the inadequate (at the moment of the accident) “culture of safety” at all levels. INSAG’s view is that it was the operating crew's deviation from the test program that was mostly to blame. INSAG notes that both the operating regulations and staff handled the disabling of the reactor protection easily enough: witness the length of time for which the ECCS was out of service while the reactor was operated at half power. when the rods are inserted into the reactor from the uppermost position. but throughout the Soviet design.”  As in the previously released report INSAG-1. This behavior is counter-intuitive and was not known to the reactor operators. In the RBMK reactor design. since graphite (in the RBMK) is a more potent neutron moderator (absorbs far fewer neutrons than the boiling light water). and the Soviet and Ukrainian governments. The poor quality of operating procedures and instructions. This greatly increases the rate of the fission reaction. construction.• • A more significant flaw was in the design of the control rods that are inserted into the reactor to slow down the reaction. manufacture and regulation). and in the space beneath the rods were hollow channels filled with water.3 meters shorter than necessary. power plant personnel. Deficiency in the safety culture was inherent not only at the operational stage but also. “Most reprehensibly. reactor power output is increased. But according to the IAEA's 1993 revised analysis the main cause was the reactor's design. and their conflicting character. including the reactor's designers.
100 km (680 mi) from the Chernobyl site) were found to have radioactive particles on their clothes. was silently completed before the disaster became known outside the Soviet Union. but a civil service strike delayed the response and publication. Belarus. after they had determined there was no leak at the Swedish plant. as were parts of northwestern Ukraine. the Chernobyl disaster released 100 to 1000 times less radioactivity. precautionary measures taken in response to the radiation included seemingly arbitrary regulations banning the importation of certain foods but not others. The fallout was detected over all of Europe except for the Iberian Peninsula. In Western Europe. A large area in Russia south of Bryansk was also contaminated. 36 hours after the initial explosions. However. that at noon on April 28 led to the first hint of a serious nuclear problem in the western Soviet Union. Resettlement may even be possible in prohibited areas provided that people comply with appropriate dietary rules. but from Sweden. The initial evidence that a major release of radioactive material was affecting other countries came not from Soviet sources.. which were believed to have been passed onto them by wild boars. The rise in radiation levels had at that time already been measured in Finland. where on the morning of 28 April workers at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant (approximately 1. the 2006 TORCH report stated that half of the volatile particles had landed outside Ukraine. Official figures in southern Bavaria in Germany indicated that some wild plant species contained substantial levels of caesium. Contamination from the Chernobyl accident was scattered irregularly depending on weather conditions. compared to the total amount released by nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. However. It was Sweden's search for the source of radioactivity. a significant number of which had already contained radioactive particles above the allowed level.  Recently published data from a long-term monitoring program (The Korma-Report) show a decrease in internal radiation exposure of the inhabitants of a region in Belarus close to Gomel. Hence the evacuation of Pripyat on April 27.  Radioactive release . In France some officials stated that the Chernobyl accident had no adverse effects. International spread of radioactivity Four hundred times more radioactive material was released than had been by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Reports from Soviet and Western scientists indicate that Belarus received about 60% of the contamination that fell on the former Soviet Union. consuming them. and Russia. Studies in surrounding countries indicate that over one million people could have been affected by radiation.
one by the OSTI and a more detailed report by the OECD. the Chernobyl release was controlled by the physical and chemical properties of the radioactive elements in the core. including krypton and xenon. different isotopes were responsible for the majority of the external dose. • • • • All of the noble gases. its effects are almost eclipsed by those of its fission products. Two reports on the release of radioisotopes from the site were made available. was released. This corresponds to the atmospheric emission of 6 t of fragmented fuel.5%. and the majority of the radioactivity present in the core was retained in the reactor. such as some isotopes of iodine and strontium. and organic iodine compounds. At different times after the accident. this was later revised to 3. Contributions of the various isotopes to the (atmospheric) dose in the contaminated area soon after the accident.The external gamma dose for a person in the open near the Chernobyl site. The dose to a person in a shelter or the internal dose is harder to estimate. solid particles. . The release of radioisotopes from the nuclear fuel was largely controlled by their boiling points.5 ± 0. Caesium and tellurium were released in aerosol form. 55% of the radioactive iodine in the reactor. While the general population often perceives plutonium as a particularly dangerous nuclear fuel. contained within the reactor were released immediately into the atmosphere by the first steam explosion. The dose that was calculated is that received from external gamma irradiation for a person standing in the open. Particularly dangerous are highly radioactive compounds that accumulate in the food chain. An early estimate for fuel material released to the environment was 3 ± 1. as a mixture of vapor. both in 1998. About 1760 PBq of I-131. Like many other releases of radioactivity into the environment.5%.
including neptunium. After this initial period.5 micrometers (aerodynamic diameter) and large particles of 10 micrometers. The radioactive contamination of aquatic systems therefore became a major issue in the immediate aftermath of the accident. radioactivity in rivers and reservoirs was generally below guideline limits for safe drinking water. Guideline maximum levels for . thus at the time of the WHO report being undertaken the rates of solid cancer deaths were no greater than the general population. levels of radioactivity (particularly radioiodine: I-131. between 1991 and 1998. of whom 31 died within the first three months. lanthanum-140. lakes and reservoirs Earth Observing-1 image of the reactor and surrounding area in April 2009 The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located next to the Pripyat River. one of the largest surface water systems in Europe.  Residual radioactivity in the environment  Rivers. which feeds into the Dnipro River reservoir system. There were no further deaths identified in the general population affected by the disaster as being caused by ARS. Bio-accumulation of radioactivity in fish resulted in concentrations (both in western Europe and in the former Soviet Union) that in many cases were significantly above guideline maximum levels for consumption. Whereas.000 from Pripyat.000 people were evacuated from the area. however. Of the 72.000 Russian Emergency Workers being studied. 216 non cancer deaths are attributed to the disaster.3 to 1. the World Health Organization's report 2006 Report of the Chernobyl Forum Expert Group from the 237 emergency workers who were diagnosed with ARS. who were not fully aware of how dangerous exposure to the radiation in the smoke was. niobium-95. cerium-144 and the transuranic elements. The latency period for solid cancers caused by excess radiation exposure is 10 or more years. plutonium and the minor actinides. Most of these were fire and rescue workers trying to bring the accident under control. 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness. The large particles contained about 80% to 90% of the released nonvolatile radioisotopes zirconium-95.Two sizes of particles were released: small particles of 0. embedded in a uranium oxide matrix.Some 135. including 50.  Health of plant workers and local people In the aftermath of the accident. In the most affected areas of Ukraine. radiocaesium: Cs-137 and radiostrontium: Sr-90) in drinking water caused concern during the weeks and months after the accident. ARS was identified as the cause of death for 28 of these people within the first few months after the disaster.
Groundwater was not badly affected by the Chernobyl accident since radionuclides with short half-lives decayed away long before they could affect groundwater supplies. out of the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone). A robot sent into the reactor itself has returned with samples of black. earning the name of the "Red Forest". In small "closed" lakes in Belarus and the Bryansk region of Russia. significant transfers of radionuclides to groundwater have occurred from waste disposal sites in the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone around Chernobyl. Most domestic animals were evacuated from the exclusion zone.radiocaesium in fish vary from country to country but are approximately 1.e.000 Bq/kg in the European Union. four square kilometers of pine forest in the immediate vicinity of the reactor turned reddish-brown and died. and longer-lived radionuclides such as radiocaesium and radiostrontium were adsorbed to surface soils before they could transfer to groundwater. The contamination of fish caused short-term concern in parts of the UK and Germany and in the long term (years rather than months) in the affected areas of Ukraine. . concentrations in fish were several thousand Bq/kg during the years after the accident. Some cattle on the same island died and those that survived were stunted because of thyroid damage.  Groundwater Map of radiation levels in 1996 around Chernobyl.1 to 60 kBq/kg during the period 1990–92. the IAEA Chernobyl Report argues that this is not significant in comparison to current levels of washout of surface-deposited radioactivity. but horses left on an island in the Pripyat River 6 km (4 mi) from the power plant died when their thyroid glands were destroyed by radiation doses of 150–200 Sv. However. Some animals in the worst-hit areas also died or stopped reproducing.  Flora and fauna After the disaster. Although there is a potential for transfer of radionuclides from these disposal sites off-site (i. The next generation appeared to be normal. and Russia as well as in parts of Scandinavia. Belarus. concentrations in a number of fish species varied from 0. In the Kiev Reservoir in Ukraine. melanin-rich radiotrophic fungi that are growing on the reactor's walls.
 Chernobyl after the disaster Main article: Chernobyl after the disaster  Recovery process  Recovery projects  The Chernobyl Shelter Fund The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established in 1997 at the Denver 23rd G8 summit to finance the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP).2 billion. and ecological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.  Assessing the disaster's effects on human health . constructed away from the shelter to avoid high radiation. in hopes of discovering the main cause of health problems due to 131I radiation. the 2006 estimate was $1. and Electricité de France. most of the foreign aid was given to Russia. Zhytomyrska. CRDP works in the four most Chernobylaffected areas in Ukraine: Kyivska. These funds were divided between Ukraine. Battelle. and no positive outcome from this money has been demonstrated. Chernihivska and Rivnenska. and Russia. and conceptual design for the NSC consists of a movable arch. the three main affected countries. Dimensions: • • • Span: 270 m (886 ft) Height: 100 m (330 ft) Length: 150 m (492 ft)  The United Nations Development Programme The United Nations Development Programme has launched in 2003 a specific project called the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (CRDP) for the recovery of the affected areas. The main goal of the CRDP’s activities is supporting the Government of Ukraine in mitigating long-term social. As there was significant corruption in former Soviet countries. The plan calls for transforming the site into an ecologically safe condition by means of stabilization of the Sarcophagus followed by construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC). to be slid over the sarcophagus.  The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPEHCA) was created and received US $20 million. economic. for further investigation of health effects. The SIP is being managed by a consortium of Bechtel. mainly from Japan. The NSC is expected to be completed in 2013. Belarus. and will be the largest movable structure ever built. The programme was initiated in February 2002 based on the recommendations in the report on Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. While the original cost estimate for the SIP was US$768 million.
Chromosomal aberrations.6 per 1. Investigators have documented the prevalence of malformations since 1983. Most of the excess resulted from a cluster of 12 cases among children born in January 1987..000 [6 cases]).000 live births).. The Mustafakemalpasa State Hospital.2 per 1. The first evidence in support of a possible association between CNS malformations and fallout from Chernobyl was published by Akar et al. the prevalence decreased again (1.3 per 1. July–December 1987). This initial report was supported by several similar findings in observational studies from different regions of Turkey. On the basis of current coefficients.. In 1987. but during the first 6 months of 1987 increased to 20 per 1. and in 1989. Austria.77. however. Inasmuch as some types of aberrations are almost specific for ionizing radiation.[ 11.000 live births [27–31 cases]).000 for all NTDs. Common features of this class of malformations are more or less extended fissures.2 per 1. constant culture preparation and analysis protocols ensure a high quality of data. . 1. Chemical or physical interactions with this process can cause NTDs. NTDs include spina bifida occulta and aperta.e. The prevalence of Down syndrome in 1988 was 1.. in which prevalence increased 5-fold (i. Germany.11 per 1.000 for anencephaly). The authors noted that the isolated geographical position of West Berlin prior to reunification.000 births.35–1. the neural tube differentiates into the brain and spinal cord (i. covers a population of approximately 90. During the embryonic phase of fetal development. 12] Between 1980 and 1986.59 per 1. and—in the extreme case— anencephaly.7 to 9. 0. The excess was most pronounced for the subgroup of anencephalics. encephalocele. prevalence of Down syndrome (trisomy 21) peaked 9 months following the main fallout. These findings are relevant because a close relationship exists between chromosome changes and congenital malformations. and it reached pre-Chernobyl levels during the first half of 1988 (all NTDs: 0. In West Berlin.6 per 1.000. the birth prevalence of Down syndrome was quite stable (i.. and complete coverage of the population through one central cytogenetic laboratory support completeness of case ascertainment. in 1988. the free genetic counseling. it reached preChernobyl values. in addition.e.e. 10 per 1. Neural tube defects (NTDs) in Turkey. In the consecutive months that followed (i. and Germany argue against a simple dose-response relationship between degree of exposure and incidence of aberrations. The prevalence of NTDs was 1. researchers use aberrations to assess exposure dose. one cannot assume that calculation of individual exposure doses resulting from fallout would not induce measurable rates of chromosome aberrations.000. Reports of structural chromosome aberrations in people exposed to fallout in Belarus and other parts of the former Soviet Union. often accompanied by consecutive dislocation of central nervous system (CNS) tissue.000 (12 cases). anencephaly: 0.e.• • • Down syndrome (trisomy 21). 46 cases were diagnosed (prevalence = 2.000). Bursa region. collectively forming the central nervous system).
Apart from this increase. WHO. There is no scientific evidence of increases in overall cancer incidence or mortality rates or in rates of non-malignant disorders that could be related to radiation exposure. UNSCEAR states: Among the residents of Belaruss 09. The risk of leukaemia in the general population. does not appear to be elevated. Precisely. one of the main concerns owing to its short latency time. the great majority of the population is not likely to experience serious health consequences as a result of radiation from the Chernobyl accident. UNDP. to assess the long-term effects of radiation on human health.000 additional cancer cases due to the accident. about 4. or solid cancers (such as lung cancer) corroborating UNSCEAR's assessments. the Russian Federation and Ukraine there had been.Demonstration on Chernobyl day near WHO in Geneva An international assessment of the health effects of the Chernobyl accident is contained in a series of reports by the United Nations Scientific Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). there is no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 20 years after the accident. In addition. and more cases are to be expected during the next decades. UNEP. Although those most highly exposed individuals are at an increased risk of radiation-associated effects. many of those cancers were most likely caused by radiation exposures shortly after the accident. and the World . UNSCEAR originally predicted up to 4. Many other health problems have been noted in the populations that are not related to radiation exposure. Apart from the 57 direct deaths in the accident itself. the IAEA states that there has been no increase in the rate of birth defects or abnormalities.000 cases of thyroid cancer reported in children and adolescents who were exposed at the time of the accident. after the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thyroid cancer is generally treatable. UNSCEAR was set up as a collaboration between various UN bodies. However. UN-OCHA. With proper treatment. other United Nations organizations (FAO. the five-year survival rate of thyroid cancer is 96%. UNSCEAR has conducted 20 years of detailed scientific and epidemiological research on the effects of the Chernobyl accident. Notwithstanding problems associated with screening. UNSCEAR. The Chernobyl Forum is a regular meeting of IAEA. including the World Health Organisation. up to 2002. the latest UNSCEAR reports suggest that these estimates were overstated. and 92% after 30 years.
 Another study critical of the Chernobyl Forum report was commissioned by Greenpeace. To reverse such attitudes and behaviors will likely take years although some youth groups have begun programs that have promise. overuse of alcohol and tobacco. weak and lacking control over their future. has led either to over cautious behavior and exaggerated health concerns. berries and game from areas still designated as highly contaminated. Russia and Ukraine alone the accident could have resulted in an estimated 200.  In popular culture See also: Chernobyl disaster in popular culture and Nuclear power debate The Chernobyl accident attracted a great deal of interest. it was thought that unit number three had also suffered a dire accident. . disadvantaged children around Chernobyl suffer from health problems that are attributable not only to the Chernobyl accident. and it roughly estimated that cancer deaths caused by Chernobyl may reach a total of about 4. or to reckless conduct." The German affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) argued that more than 10. and the governments of Belarus. in turn. but also to the poor state of post-Soviet health systems. a great deal of debate about the situation at the site occurred in the first world during the early days of the event. This. and Ukraine that issues regular scientific assessments of the evidence for health effects of the Chernobyl accident. A number of adolescents and young adults who have been exposed to modest or small amounts of radiation feel that they are somehow fatally flawed and there is no downside to using illicit drugs or having unprotected sex. It also concluded that a greater risk than the long-term effects of radiation exposure is the risk to mental health of exaggerated fears about the effects of radiation: The designation of the affected population as “victims” rather than “survivors” has led them to perceive themselves as helpless. and unprotected promiscuous sexual activity. In addition. Russia.000 people having received the greatest exposures. such as consumption of mushrooms.000 people are today affected by thyroid cancer and 50. which asserts that "the most recently published figures indicate that in Belarus.000 additional deaths in the period between 1990 and 2004. Because of defective intelligence based on photographs taken from space.Bank).000 among the 600. Fred Mettler commented that 20 years later: The population remains largely unsure of what the effects of radiation actually are and retain a sense of foreboding.000 cases are expected in the future. The Chernobyl Forum concluded that twenty-eight emergency workers died from acute radiation syndrome including beta burns and 15 patients died from thyroid cancer. Because of the distrust that many people (both within and outside the USSR) had in the Soviet authorities.
" In an interview in "Animage" magazine in 1995. Heavy Water: A film for Chernobyl was released by Seventh Art in 2006 to commemorate the disaster through poetry and first-hand accounts. Ukraine. oldfashioned and apparently deserted small village which is dominated by a huge. Dutch. This was essentially an animated music video lasting almost seven minutes. Denmark. exemplifies worldwide awareness of the event. Australia. Ukraine. Italy began phasing out its nuclear power plants in 1988. a lithograph by Susan Dorothea White in the National Gallery of Australia. The opening scene shows a clean. Russian. Switzerland. the exhibition was launched at the "Chernobyl 20 Remembrance for the Future" conference on 23 April 2006. The film secured the Cinequest Award as well as the Rhode Island "best score" award  along with a screening at Tate Modern. The 20 individuals whose stories are related in the exhibition are from Belarus. It was then exhibited during 2006 in the United States.  Commemoration of the disaster The Front Veranda (1986). the Chernobyl accident was reflected in the outcome of the 1987 referendum. asymmetrical version of the Chernobyl "sarcophagus. a music video for Japanese pop duo Chage & Aska. the Netherlands. Ukraine. German. Latvia. noting the survival of plant life. As a result of that referendum. In Kiev. Developed by Danish photo-journalist Mads Eskesen. and the United Kingdom. and the United Kingdom.  Chernobyl 20 This exhibit presents the stories of 20 people who have each been affected by the disaster. Miyazaki compared the sarcophagus in the video to Chernobyl. and each person's account is written on a panel.  See also • • • • • • • Chernobyl compared to other radioactivity releases Chernobyl disaster effects Chernobyl Shelter Fund Liquidator (Chernobyl) List of Chernobyl-related articles Red Forest Threat of the Dnieper reservoirs . In Italy. Sweden. In 1995 Japanese animator Miyazaki Hayao wrote and directed "On Your Mark". and Ukrainian.Journalists mistrusted many professionals (such as the spokesman from the UK NRPB). and in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them. Danish. Russia. a decision that was reversed in 2008. France. the exhibition is prepared in multiple languages including English.
Abbott. (2006) (in Russian).. Academy Chicago. Hoffmann.. The Legacy of Chernobyl. which relate to the emergency.2. Chernobyl. Nauchtechlitizdat. Zhores A. http://www. Ablaze! The Story of Chernobyl.htm.phyast. (1990). Medvedev. Archives of Environmental Health. Cohen. Chernobyl. ISBN 2-226-04031-5 (Hardcover).edu/~blc/chapter7. Chernobyl. Dnepropetrovsk. Random House UK (paperback 1997). VAAP. Vengeance of peaceful atom. Read. ISBN 966-8135-21-0 (paperback).ru/elib/sherb000/index. The Nuclear Energy Option: An Alternative for the 90's. "(7) The Chernobyl accident — can it happen here?". showing the inside of the power plant with remarkable accuracy  Further reading • • • • • • • • • • Cheney. Grigori (1989). Nikolaj V. W.. Risk & Socitey 8. Moscow. Dyatlov. Norton & Company (paperback 1992). Sowiet Writers. W. http://www. Fallout From the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster and Congenital Malformations in Europe. Yurii (1991) (in Russian). OCLC 231661295. IKK “Balance Club”. ISBN 978-0306435676.html. 105–121. ISBN 978-0749316334 (paperback). First American edition published by Basic Books in 1991.pitt.. Karpan. Chernobyl: Living With Risk and Uncertaity. Bernard Leonard (1990). published in the unofficial sources: • • Technological Regulations on operation of 3 and 4 power units of Chernobyl NPP (in force at the moment of emergency) Tables and graphs of some parameters variation of the unit before the emergency  References . The Truth About Chernobyl. Pamela (2006). Wolfgang (2001). Shcherbak. Piers Paul (1993). ISBN 0-89733-418-3.• • Zone of alienation Ukrainian National Chernobyl Museum Other • • National Geographic Seconds From Disaster episodes Zero Hour episode.x-libri.. First American edition in 1990. Anatoly (2003) (in Russian).  Documents The source documents. Glenn Alan (1995). Plenum Press. Journey to Chernobyl: Encounters in a Radioactive Zone. ISBN 9780393308143 (paperback). Medvedev. pp. How did it happen. ISBN 5-93728-006-7 (paperback). Health.
and the "Chernobyl Interinform Agency.info/index. page 61. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. More and more articles were written about drug abuse.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/techstds/standard/hdbk1019/h1019v1. volume 1 of 2. VA 22161. A wave of 'bad news' swept over the readers in 1986-87. http://www. ^ a b IAEA Report INSAG-7 Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 Safety Series. ^ "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition (NUREG-0800)". but it was only in the tragic days following the Chernobyl disaster that glasnost began to change from an official slogan into an everyday practice. May 2010. http://www. ^ Medvedev Z. http://www." 11.html? _r=2&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin.Karpan : 312-313 9. Springfield. Retrieved 11 September 2010. ^ a b Medvedev Z.pdf#p age=85. and "Chernobyl Committee: MailTable of official data on the reactor accident") 2. IAEA. ^ Kagarlitsky. module 1." 4. The policy of openness (glasnost) and 'uncompromising criticism' of outmoded arrangements had been proclaimed back at the 27th Congress. Richard A. Retrieved 3 June 2010. U. Vienna.com/2005/09/06/international/europe/06chernobyl. 3. (quoting the "Committee on the Problems of the Consequences of the Catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP: 15 Years after Chernobyl Disaster". 10. The truth about Chernobyl which eventually hit the newspapers opened the way to a more truthful examination of other social problems. (1990):73 6. ^ A. Kiev und". Chernobyl. The New Detente: Rethinking East-West Relations. Retrieved 2 June 2010.hss. ^ "DOE Fundamentals Handbook — Nuclear physics and reactor theory" (DOEHDBK-1019/1-93 / Available to the public from the National Technical Information Services. 333–334. ^ a b Elisabeth Rosenthal (International Herald Tribune) (6 September 2005). ISBN 0860919625. United States Department of Energy.nytimes.chernobyl. January 1996. 5285 Port Royal.info/index. In part.V. The State Committee on Safety in the Atomic Power Industry is permanently represented at the Chernobyl station. Minsk. in fact. pp. The confidence of readers was re-established only after the press was allowed to examine the events in detail without the original censorship restrictions.S. 2001. It often seemed to people that there were many more outrages in the epoch of perestroika than before although. Gerald Holden. Boris (1989). corruption and the mistakes of leaders of various ranks. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. 7.S.1.info.php?userhash=&navID=534&lID=2. In Mary Kaldor.. Falk. ^ "Fuel Unloaded from Chernobyl Reactor". No.. crime. "Perestroika: The Dialectic of Change". Medvedev writes: "The mere fact that the operators were carrying out an experiment that had not been approved by higher officials indicates that something was wrong with the chain of command. 5.nrc. shaking the consciousness of society. (1991).chernobyl. http://www.75-INSAG-7. (1990):36-38 . New York Times. ^ "Geographical location and extent of radioactive contamination".5. the tragedy was the product of administrative anarchy or the attempt to keep everything secret. 8. ^ Medvedev Z.doe. Retrieved 11 September 2010. which patently understated the scale of the catastrophe and often contradicted one another. they had simply not been informed about them previously.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/.). "Experts Find Reduced Effects of Chernobyl". Yet the engineers and experts in that office were not informed about the program.Djatlov:30 12. "No one believed the first newspaper reports. p. Many were horrified to find out about the numerous calamities of which they had previously had no idea. (1990):18-20. http://www. ^ N. United Nations University Press. Department of Commerce. 5/6 ff.php?navID=2.
33. http://handle. Chernobyl. 2002 27. ^ a b Pakhomov. ISBN 5-98706-018-4 (Hardcover). Meltdown in Chernobyl.youtube.Cherkashov. (1991). 17.S. ^ ". (1987).gov. Retrieved 2010-03-22. et al. ^ National Geographic. 25–27 November 1998 28.ua. Retrieved 11 September 2010. [Video]. Atomic Energy. Yu.com/watch? v=aw-ik1U4Uvk. ^ Medvedev Z. 26. The Beaver 75 (4): 20–27.2 24. ^ The RBMK is a boiling water reactor. (1990):42 30. Slavutich. -ISBN 5-283-03618-9.I. IAEA.org/classic/FH/LA/Louis_Slotin_1. 36. The RBMK design has a negative void coefficient above 700 MW. Sergey A. p54. ^ a b Medvedev Z.O. 18.".uk/world/2006/mar/26/nuclear. 308-320. v. ^ (Russian) Фатахов Алексей Чернобыль как это было . Retrieved 11 September 2010.Davletbaev «Last shift.ua/rabslovo/?aid=62. Ten years later. 1995. ^ Shcherbak. http://www.Adamov.guardian. ^ The information on accident at the Chernobyl NPP and its consequences. 32. Dubasov (16 December 2009). ^ Medvedev G.2/ADA335076. «Development of ideas about reasons and processes of emergency on the 4-th unit of Chernobyl NPP 26.com .mil/100. ^ "Веб публикация статей газеты". 61. 39. London: Guardian.© retained by authors) 167: 575. Inevitability or chance?». doi:10. "Adam Higginbotham: Chernobyl 20 years on | World news | The Observer". Ukraine. No. Nuclear Energy Agency. ^ Medvedev Z.russia. 1986. Martin (August/September 1995). http://www.jpg. ^ (Russian) [[Anatoly Dyatlov.1986». (1990):44 31.co. Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 Safety Series. ^ Adam Higginbotham (2006-03-26).neimagazine. 38. (Quoted in Medvedev Z. (1990):42-50 34. Retrieved 2010-03-22. Moscow. Vienna. "Estimation of Explosion Energy Yield at Chernobyl NPP Accident".. Retrieved 2008-04-28.:73 15. ^ Medvedev Z. . International conference "Shelter-98".dtic. "Louis Slotin And 'The Invisible Killer'". http://www. [Video]. 40. 2006. How did it happen? Chapter 4. 21. ^ N. Y. p. 19. ^ Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impact (Chapter 1). ^ Medvedev Z.swrailway. (1991):247-48 35. p. (2004). Chernobyl. Energoatomizdat. (1990):44) 37. 366 25.» /«Chernobyl. ^ Mil Mi-8 crash near Chernobyl. ^ (Russian) E.M.13. Yunost. 14. Swrailway.Djatlov:31 16. prepared for IAEA.P. (1990):31 23. GUP NIKIET.Karpan:349 20. Pure and Applied Geophysics (open access on Springerlink. (1990):32 29. ^ A. ^ Zeilig. ^ (Russian) The official program of the test. so in-core boiling is normal at higher power levels.] 22.com/journals/Power/NEI/March_2006/attachments/RBMK1 000Key. ^ The accumulation of Xenon-135 in the core is burned out by neutrons: higher power settings burn the Xenon out more quickly. 2006 (Chapter 13:578). Moscow.gov. ^ (Russian) R.75-INSAG-7.04. Yuri V. ^ IAEA Report INSAG-7. «Channel Nuclear Power Reactor RBMK». This results in shifting neutron flux/power within a graphite-moderated reactor such as the RBMK. ^ "Cross-sectional view of the RBMK-1000 main building". http://www. ^ (Russian)Checherov K. 6.1007/s00024-009-0029-9.V.mphpa. http://www.htm.
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RFI.org/cms/topics/dokbin/118/118559.Emelyanov «Channel Nuclear Power Reactor».html. ^ EURATOM Council Regulations No. series "Energy & Environment" by Forschungszentrum Jülich 73. (page 3) 67. IAEA.yahoo.torch_executive_summary@en. ^ a b OECD Papers Volume 3 Issue 1. No. 70. European Greens and UK scientists Ian Fairlie PhD and David Sumner. 3958/87. No. ^ a b "Environmental consequences of the Chernobyl accident and their remediation"PDF IAEA.38 MB) 69. ^ a b IAEA Report INSAG-7. Vol. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. Radioactive contamination of aquatic ecosystems following the Chernobyl accident.Dollezhal. No. http://www.. Atomizdat. Vienna. 63.pdf.rfi. H. ^ a b Kryshev.Korma-Studie. P. No. "The number of deaths in the first three months were 31[. Berlin ISBN 3-54023866-2 79.irsn. 145-158 82. ^ "NEI Source Book: Fourth Edition (NEISB_3. EnergyCitationsDatabase. Agence France Presse. ^ Fleishman. April 2006. ^ a b c d Chernobyl: Catastrophe and Consequences. CRC Press. 48. 770/90 81. 1994. IAEA. 24: p.3. Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 Safety Series. atmospheric dispersion. http://worldnuclear. World Nuclear Association. Vienna..aspx. D.fr/FR/popup/Pages/tchernobyl_animation_nuage. 1995. Springer. http://www.:79-83 61. ^ (French) "Tchernobyl. (1991).A1. ^ "Chernobyl Accident".anl. ^ (Russian) N.I. ^ IAEA Report INSAG-7.. Cs-137 in fish of some lakes and rivers of the Bryansk region and North-West Russia in 1990–1992. http://www. Chernobyl Record: The Definitive History of the Chernobyl Catastrophe. R. p.insc.A1)". ISBN 0873-719-964. Lennartz.Ya. 68. ^ Mould. IAEA.gov/neisb/neisb4/NEISB_3. Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 Safety Series. ^ Mould 2000. 1991 85. I. Hill. ^ a b The International Chernobyl Project Technical Report. by Stefen Mulvey. Retrieved 18 June 2008. B. (1991). Retrieved 2006-12-16. IRSN.. 207-219 80. 2003 76. ^ Chernobyl source term. http://sg. and dose estimation. ^ "Ten years after Chernobyl : What do we really know?" IEAE. ^ Ympäristön Radioaktiivisuus Suomessa — 20 Vuotta TshernobylistaPDF (7. August 2010. William H (1994).news.asp. p. 66. 2218/89. 29. http://www. April 1996 65. 74. BBC News 84. I. No. OECD.3. Vienna 83.gov. ISBN 0-750-306-70X.75-INSAG-7. 1 November 1989 75." 77. et al. ^ Wildlife defies Chernobyl radiation..75-INSAG-7. Heuel-Fabianek. 20 ans après". 2006-04-24.:24 64. ^ IAEA Bulletin Autumn 1986PDF (0. 31. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. 72. J. 994/89. Radiation Protection.G. Insc.]" 78.60. Retrieved 2006-04-21. Retrieved 2006-04-24. 27: p.A... CRC Press.anl. 15. ^ Dederichs. ^ (French) "Path and extension of the radioactive cloudl".99 MB) 71. Moscow.org/info/chernobyl/inf07. p. (1980):34-35 (Hardcover) 62.html. Pillath. Retrieved 2010-07-31. Vienna.html. "Reported thus far are 237 cases of acute radiation sickness and 31 deaths. . ^ "'Radioactive boars' on loose in Germany".greensefa. ^ "TORCH report executive summary" (PDF).com/afp/20100807/tts-germany-hunting-food-chernobyl509a08e. (2009): Langzeitbeobachtung der Dosisbelastung der Bevölkerung in radioaktiv kontaminierten Gebieten Weißrusslands . ^ "Black Fungus Found in Chernobyl Eats Harmful Radiation". ^ Hallenbeck. May 2008. Richard Francis (2000). Retrieved 9 August 2010.fr/actufr/articles/076/article_43250.
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wikipedia. Helens eruption Terrorism American Airlines Flight 77 · Bali bombing · Munich Massacre · Oklahoma City bombing · US embassy bombings Air France 4590 (Concorde) · BOAC 781 / SA 201 (Comet) · Tenerife airport disaster · Air Florida 90 (Washington) · American 191 (Chicago) · American 587 (Queens.• • • • • • • • Official UN Chernobyl site Frequently Asked Chernobyl Questions.38944°N 30. New Air and space York) · British Midland 092 (Kegworth) · El Al 1862 disasters (Amsterdam) · The Hindenburg (New Jersey) · TWA 800 (Long Island) · United 232 (Sioux City) · ValuJet 592 (Florida) · Space Shuttle Challenger · Space Shuttle Columbia Train disasters Marine disasters 1993 Big Bayou Canot train wreck · Kaprun disaster · Gare de Lyon rail accident · Eschede train disaster K-141 Kursk · MS Herald of Free Enterprise · M/S Scandinavian Star · RMS Titanic · USS Forrestal Fire King's Cross fire · Mont Blanc Tunnel Collapses Explosions Hyatt Regency walkway collapse · Sampoong Department Store collapse · Hotel New World disaster · Stava Dam Chernobyl disaster · Guadalajara explosions · Puerto Rico shoe store · Piper Alpha oil platform · Texas oil refinery Retrieved from "http://en. by the IAEA Chernobyl's LegacyPDF (902KB). showing details of the reactor hall. updated in 2006 Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (United Nations Development Programme) Photographs from inside the zone of alienation and City of Prypyat (2010) Photographs from inside the Chernobyl Reactor and City of Prypyat Photographs of those affected by the Chernobyl Disaster EnglishRussia Photos of a RBMK-based power plant. by the Chernobyl Forum (UN).09889°E Coordinates: [hide]v · d · eIncidents covered in Seconds From Disaster Super Outbreak · 2004 Asian tsunami · Galtür Avalanche · Natural disasters Kobe earthquake · Montserrat eruption · 1980 Mount St. and the control room 51°23′22″N 30°05′56″E51. pumps.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster" Categories: Chernobyl disaster | 1986 in the Soviet Union | 20th-century explosions | Disasters in the Soviet Union | Energy in Ukraine | Health in Ukraine | History of Belarus (1945–1990) | History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia | Industrial accidents and incidents | Industrial fires and explosions | Nuclear accidents .
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