Running head: SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR MANETS INCLUDING IDS DEVELOPMENT

Security Solutions for MANETs Including IDS Development

Cassall S. Graber-Tilton

University of Maryland University College

This material is not to be copied, reproduced, or altered in any way without express permission
of the author. Sources at the end should suffice to reproduce all information contained within this
document.
Running head: SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR MANETS INCLUDING IDS DEVELOPMENT
2

Abstract

Mobile ad-hoc networks or MANETs are networks that communicate wirelessly through nodes.

The nodes change as needed and the MANET network is subject to increased vulnerability

because the network is wireless. Should one node become malicious it can disrupt the routing

protocol and effectiveness of the MANET network. This research paper will examine the

components of a MANET system, the current security issues and potential solutions, and the

potential benefits of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for MANET.

Keywords: Mobile ad-hoc network, MANET, Intrusion detection system, IDS, security
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Security Solutions for MANETs Including IDS Development

A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a wireless network comprised of various devices

capable of self organization to form autonomous networks. MANET devices serve both as an

end point in a communication chain as well as a router. The network functions by sending a

message from one node, through the various other devices that have formed the autonomous

network, to the destination node. In order to achieve a successful exchange of information the

path between the two end-points must remain intact. The disadvantage of MANET is that the

reliance on other wireless networked devices creates numerous security challenges. The

advantages of MANETs lie in the network’s flexibility and ability to function in places where a

fixed infrastructure is not available (Kumar, 2009, p. 13-15).

Potential Applications of MANET

MANET has potential applications in both the commercial and military sectors. In the

military MANETs can be used for “battlefield communication and battlefield sensor monitoring

network” (Gorlatova et al., 2005, p. 55).In commercial settings MANETs are applicable for

“convention meetings, electronic classrooms, search-and-rescue efforts, disaster relief, and law

enforcement” (Gorlatova et al., 2005, p. 55).Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are a form of

MANETs that allow vehicles to communicate with equipment designed to monitor things such as

traffic density. MANETs can ideally be set up in situations when a fixed infrastructure is not

available, like aforementioned disaster relief or search and rescue operations. Whether or not a

military or commercial organization chooses to use MANET depends on the nature of the

information being sent. An area where security flaws of MANETs have the greatest impact is in

military applications. Soldiers might have to perform a cost benefit analysis before deciding to

use MANET since it brings the risks of detection and information interception.
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Security Problems in MANETs

The security problems of MANETs arise from the fact that a MANET has a peer to peer

(P2P) architecture that shares the wireless resources of a network with dynamic topology and

limited resources. MANETs need additional security in the form of secure routing, fault

tolerance, self-umpiring, and intrusion detection. Furthermore, MANETs require a diversity of

tactics that encompass both proactive and reactive solutions. The difficulty that arises is not the

development of these security measures, but in the trade-offs that occur in areas such as

bandwidth usage, processing time, and computing overhead. Overall, the security issues that

MANETs face can be summed up as a lack of centralized management/infrastructure, limited

resource availability, network size/scalability, exploitable cooperation of nodes, dynamic

topology, and limited power supply of individual nodes.

Different trade-offs may be more desirable depending on the scenario the MANET is

being used for. A military organization is more likely to desire a higher level of security than a

commercial one. This difference in needs leads to a use in different routing protocols and

security methods. Consequently the use of different routing protocols, equipment, and security

can hinder communication between nodes. A challenge of MANETs that is recognized, but not

discussed in this paper, is the differences in hardware, software, and energy configurations of the

various nodes. In addition to the differences in configurations, the networks capability of

supporting MANETs varies based on routing protocols and security measures used. Networks

that are designed to use fewer computing resources are generally less secure. Networks that

utilize cryptography have a large computational overhead. Most routing protocols are focused on

setting up MANETs that do not require cryptography but nonetheless have security measures to

insure the integrity of information. Routing protocols will be discussed in a later section to gain a
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general idea of the different types of protocols MANET can use and what the advantages and

disadvantages associated with some of them are.

Dynamic Topology of MANETs. The dynamic nature of a MANET network is

necessary since pathways between nodes must be continually re-established. While the dynamic

topology is an inherent part of MANET it is also a security problem. MANETs are multi-hop

networks. In order to communicate with node D, node A must pass its message through nodes B

and C. If node B moves out of range then an alternative route to pass the information to node D

must be found.

Before After

This means that new nodes are constantly entering and leaving the MANET. This makes

authentication difficult and attackers take advantage of this weakness to introduce malicious

nodes. The information passing through intermediate nodes is at additional risk if one of those

intermediate nodes has been corrupted.

Secure Multicasting. Secure multicasting is when a single node or user sends out a

message that is received by one or more users of the MANET. Secure multicasting has many

commercial applications such as video conferencing, collaborative applications, and distribution

of material etc. Security solutions for secure multicasting must take into consideration its broader

distribution scheme. The overhead in establishing correct routes and sending out the initial

message is much larger when there is more than one destination node. . The issue faced by
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secure multicasting as summed up by Meghanathan and Olgabegi (2010) is that, “one routing

protocol cannot be a solution for all energy efficient and security issues that are faced in

MANETs, but rather each protocol is designed to provide the maximum possible requirements,

according to certain required scenarios” (p. 12).Depending on the type of protocol used, the

source and destination nodes may each have to exchange secure group keys before a message

can be passed. Secure multicasting is the broadcasting of a message on a much greater scale and

with it brings a much greater likelihood that a malicious node will try to interrupt

communications. In such a large network one of the potentially harmful attacks a malicious node

can do is One protocol that can be used by secure multicasting is the Secure Routing Protocol

(SRP), which will be discussed in more detail later.

Secure Routing. Secure routing is a necessary part of MANET. There have been a

number of routing protocols suggested, each with their own pros and cons. A review of some of

these protocols show which ones work best, keeping in mind network efficiency and the need for

privacy. Most of the proposed protocols are vulnerable, and must be able to function even if

some nodes are compromised by an attack. Attacks from malicious nodes can try to sabotage a

transmission in many ways. It can fake the routing information, flood the network to create a

denial of service, or disclose the routing information (Jamalipour, Kato, Kurosawa, Nakayama,

& Nemoto, 2005, p.1). Built in fault tolerance combined with malicious node detection can allow

a network to function while simultaneously detecting and eliminating malicious nodes.

This paper will review a couple proactive and reactive routing protocols, and their

respective methods of functionality. MANETs have a wide range of configuration choices that

routing protocols must adapt to. Some routing protocols require a network meet a set of

assumptions in order to work properly. Overall, each routing protocol has strengths and
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weaknesses, and a brief overview of some of them should give us a good picture of how the

security of MANETs can be compromised (Jamalipour et al., 2005, p. 1-8).

Fault Tolerance. Fault tolerance refers to the ability of certain protocols to effectively

deliver their message despite the presence of malicious nodes. Fault tolerance in a routing

protocol is only concerned that the message will be delivered. On its own it does not do anything

about removing or identifying the malicious node.

Routing Protocol Security Solutions

Routing protocols deserve a significant amount of attention because they determine the

method of operation for the MANETs. The routing protocol a MANET uses determines how

messages will be exchanged, the level of security, and whether the MANET takes a proactive or

reactive approach. Proactive routing protocols continuously evaluate routes so that when a node

desires to send a message, a route is already awaiting them. Reactive routing protocols do not

continuously evaluate routes, so when a node desires to send a message a reactive protocol must

then establish a route and change the route based on external factors such as traffic volume and

malicious nodes.

Secure Routing Protocol (SRP). SRP is one of the more secure routing protocols that do

not use cryptography. Secure routing in MANET has to take into consideration route discovery.

In the SRP this is done through the establishment of correct network topology. According to

Haas and Papadimitratos (2002), “(SRP) guarantees that a node initiating a route discovery will

be able to identify and discard replies providing false topological information, or, avoid

receiving them” (p. 2). Through the SRP method the correct topology can be determined even if

there are malicious nodes in the network. The method uses a security association between two

nodes to track the path of a query from the source node A to the end node E. A sends out a route
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request containing a query sequence number, a random query identifier, the source, and the

destination. This information is used to calculate the Message Authentication Code (MAC).

When the message is sent it adds on the IP addresses of the intermediate nodes to the route

request packet. The destination node can tell, from the accrued IP addresses, the pathway the

packet took to get there. The destination node sends its reply to the source node over that same

pathway. The reply to the source node contains information regarding the packets received and

the routes that the destination node received this information from. This tells the source node

which routes are intact and the source node can send the packets over those intact routes (Haas &

Papadimitratos, 2002, p. 4-5).

The disadvantages of SRP are the assumptions it requires to work properly. SRP

assumes a security association between two end nodes already exists. It assumes bi-directional

communication between nodes, as well as their ability to validate one another. Another main

assumption is that the malicious nodes will consistently, not intermittently, exhibit malicious

behavior. “It is also expected that a one to one mapping between Medium Access Control and IP

addresses exists” (Haas & Papadimitratos, 2002, p. 5). Finally, all neighbors operate in

promiscuous mode and are able to overhear each transmission. While individually, these may not

affect the proper operation of SRP, the assumptions place limitations on the workability of SRP

outside the restricted circumstances (Meghanathan & Olgabegi, 2010, p. 1-6).

Self Organized Network Layer Security in MANETs (SCAN). SCAN is a non-

cryptographic solution used to protect the network layer of MANETs from malicious attacks.

SCAN is a reactive protocol. In the SCAN design, nodes form local networks based on their

geographical location and monitor each other. SCAN is designed to protect both the ad-hoc

routing and the packet forwarding aspects of MANETs. Each node checks the information it
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receives and the information sent to nearby nodes for anomalies. The nodes share the

information on malicious nodes they have gathered. Using the combined information they

determine which nodes have been corrupted and deprive them of network access. SCAN uses

mobile collaboration and “information cross validation” (Lu, Meng, Shu, & Yang, 2005, p. 2).to

check the information gathered and overheard. SCAN also uses a token renewal and revocation

scheme.

Destination Sequenced Distance Vector Routing (DSDV). DSDV was an important

step in the creation of MANET routing protocols. It is one of the earlier routing protocols and

serves as the basis for many other protocols. DSDV is a proactive protocol that operates by using

a table to track topology information. The table tracks the hops it takes for one node to reach all

potential destination nodes. “To keep the tables up to date they are exchanged between

neighboring nodes at regular intervals or when a significant topology changes are observed”

(Dash, Mishra, Rath, & Vijaya, 2011, p. 341).The constant updates of tables use more bandwidth

and energy resources than a purely reactive protocol. The nature of DSDV has an added

vulnerability. Nodes are tracked by sequence numbers and metric values. “A malicious node can

easily disrupt the routing protocol by arbitrarily tempering the sequence numbers or the metrics”

(Chen, Lin, & Wang, 2009, p. 2080). DSDV is vulnerable to malicious nodes that can alter the

Bellman-Ford algorithm it uses. In summary, DSDV faces security risks because it operates on a

pre-set table that malicious node can tamper with, and also because independently it doesn’t have

good authentication or detection measures in place.

Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV). AODV is a reactive protocol.

In AODV, “nodes maintain traditional routing tables specifying the next hop to take to reach the

destination. If there is no information in the routing table of the source then a route request is
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broadcasted” (Dash et al., 2011, p. 341). A node with updated information about a path to the

destination node will send a reply to the source node. The source node and all the intermediate

nodes will amend their routing tables to reflect the current information. The path from the source

node to the destination node that utilizes available resources most efficiently is then chosen

(Dash et al., 2011, p. 341).

AODV was built off of DSDV, but varies in that it only calculates routes when it is

needed. This technique has the advantage of using less bandwidth. The disadvantage is that the

lapse in route calculation time results in a greater number of broken links (Kumar, 2009, p. 4-5).

AODV like DSR is designed as a demand based, loop free, protocol to prevent unnecessary

bandwidth and power use (Dash et al., 2011, p. 341-342). A vulnerability of AODV is that when

a route request is sent out to obtain current table information a malicious node can respond with

false information and pretend it has routes to the destination node (Chen et al., 2009, p. 2080).

Another disadvantage from a security standpoint is that AODV maintains node information in

tables and does not utilize cryptography, introducing an additional vulnerability.

Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). DSR is a reactive source routing protocol. In DSR the

source node already knows the complete multi-hop route to the destination. If the path is intact

no route discovery needs to be performed. The source node stores the paths to the destination

node in a route cache. When the source node sends a message it travels down one of the routes in

the cache to the destination node, which then sends back a reply confirming the link is intact.

The route information is contained in the data packet’s header. DSR is unique because links the

information travels through do not have to be bi-directional to work properly. In DSR if the links

are bi-directional the confirmation of a complete link is sent over the pathway it was received. If

an intermediate node is a uni-directional link then the information gets routed back to the source
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through other intermediate nodes. It successfully confirms that the link is intact and unlike SRP

does not require bi-directional links to work properly. SRP’s security mechanism requires a bi-

directional link to work. DSR does not have the same security scheme in place, but carries the

added benefit of being able to function in networks with both uni and bi-directional nodes. In

situations where DSR does not have a route to the destination node in it performs a route request

and receives a route reply. An advantage of DSR is that is uses low bandwidth and “performs

well in high mobility scenarios” (Dash et al, 2011, p. 343). A disadvantage is that it is only

“designed for ad-hoc networks up to 200 nodes” (Dash et al., 2011, p. 343-344).DSR is a good

option for networks that use multiple types of directional links. DSR maintains security by not

operating in promiscuous mode, not eavesdropping, and only carrying the route information in

the data packet headers (Dash et al., 2011, p. 340-344).

Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR). OLSR is a proactive routing

protocol that maintains routes to all destinations in a standard routing table. OLSR uses

multipoint relays (MPRs). MPRs are certain nodes that send out the messages mapping the

network topology. This reduces overhead and resource use compared to routing protocols where

each node receives and transmits the information it received to the next node. OLSR is effective

for larger networks since it does not send out as many control messages to establish routes and

excels at finding routes with the smallest number of hops. The main security disadvantage of

OLSR is summed up by Moradiya and Sampalli (2010):

An intruder can modify the functionality of OLSR by generating and/or relaying

incorrect control messages such that the traffic flows through the intruder node and make

legitimate nodes to store incorrect information about the network topology…OLSR does
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not specify any security mechanism or validation procedure to avoid inconsistencies in

control messages or to verify whether a node is well-behaving or not.” (p. 544)

In short, while OLSR may carry the benefits of low usage of computational resources in large

networks, it requires security add-ons that increase computational overhead, thus negating the

true impact of that benefit.

Security Solution Options

Token System. Different techniques for dealing with the expulsion of malicious nodes

have been proposed. The token method uses tokens in place of currency. When a node receives a

packet it spends a token, and when it sends the packet on successfully it receives a token back. A

disadvantage of this scenario is that a malicious node could flood a good node with requests that

cannot be completed, and thus bankrupt the good node. A good node may not be able to work

because it no longer has tokens to spend to receive information, but a malicious node will be

detected because it will have hoarded a larger amount of tokens (Kathirvel & Srinivasan, 2010,

p. 264-265).

Self Umpiring. Self Umpiring refers to the practices of nodes monitoring their

neighboring nodes while operating in promiscuous mode. In a self umpiring system, “each node

in the path from source to destination has dual roles to perform: packet forwarding and umpiring.

In the umpiring role, each node in the path closely monitors the behavior of its succeeding node

and if any misbehavior is noticed immediately flags off the guilty node” (Kathirvel & Srinivasan,

2010, p. 264).In self umpiring, the nodes combine their information and using the combined

results can tell which nodes are potentially malicious. The methods of self umpiring differ, but

the main principle of neighbor reporting remains. In neighbor reporting nearby nodes can check

the information they overhear from other nodes since MANETs are broadcast networks. The
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problem with self umpiring is that operating in promiscuous mode is more concerned with

identifying malicious nodes and less concerned with the privacy and protection of information.

The token system can be applied to self-umpiring. In the token system each node would

be given a node ID and a status ID. The token authorizes a node to join the network. When a

node misbehaves a signal is sent to the source node which changes the misbehaving node’s status

ID. The change in status ID prevents the node from participating in the network and nodes direct

traffic away from the node (Kathirvel & Srinivasan, 2010, p. 264-265).

Self umpiring carries the risk that a good node will be falsely identified as a malicious

node. A malicious node can spread false information about a good node to try to aide this

erroneous ban from happening. The “false positive probability increases with increasing

percentage of malicious node and increased mobility” (Kathirvel & Srinivasan, 2010, p. 266).

Node collaboration works well because it requires a consensus before denying a node access to

the network. This collaboration reduces the possibility of falsely accusing a good node and

increases the likelihood of identifying malicious nodes. (Kathirvel & Srinivasan, 2010, p. 264-

265)

Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are designed to detect when a node attempts to exceed

its authorized boundaries (Kumar, 2009, p. 8). When anomalous activity occurs in a MANET the

IDS should detect and issue an appropriate responsive. “An intrusion detection system (IDS) can

be defined as the tools, methods, and resources to help identify, assess, and report unauthorized

or unapproved network activity” (Abdullah, Mandala & Ngadi, 2008, p. 2). The security and

survivability of MANET is dependent on its ability to perform effectively, protect data, and

withstand attacks or flaws that could cause a breach or failure of the network.
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Types of IDS. IDS architecture and methods vary widely. The three types of IDS are

signature based, anomaly based, and specification based. In signature based IDS systems

malicious activity is detected using scenarios and signatures that are already on file. Anomaly

based IDS systems detect abnormal activity in a system using statistics, neural networks,

immunology, data mining, and Chi-square tests (Abdullah et al., 2008, p. 2).The third type,

specification based IDS, is a cross between signature and anomaly based solutions. This type

keeps specifications of “desired functionality for security-critical entities” and compares current

activity to the stored specifications. If an anomaly between the two arises then specification

based IDS will report an attack (Abdullah et al., 2008, p. 2)

IDS Architecture. The four types of IDS architecture are standalone, distributed and

collaborative, hierarchical, and mobile agent architecture. Standalone architecture determines

intrusions autonomously and runs IDS on each node. The nodes do not cooperate with one

another or exchange information when an intrusion is detected. Similar to standalone

architecture, distributed and collaborative architecture also runs IDS on every node. In

distributed and collaborative architecture the “IDS agent is responsible for detecting and

collecting local events and data” (Abdullah et al., 2008, p. 3).The data the IDS agent collects is

analyzed to determine potential intrusions and an appropriate response. The third type of IDS

architecture, hierarchical architecture, divides the network into groups and uses the head of each

group as if it were a control point in a wired network (Abdullah et al., 2008, p. 3). Finally,

mobile agent architecture has agents that successfully dispense the IDS tasks by assigning a

particular job to each mobile agent.

Artificial Immune System IDS. Artificial Immune System (AIS) based IDS models the

IDS system after the human immune system. The human body is capable of what is known as
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15

self and non-self discrimination. When a foreign body enters the human immune system the

body’s T cells detect the intruder and issue a response. The adaptation of this model from a

human to a computer intrusion detection model is possible. In the model there is a set of

detectors, equivalent to the T cells that are produced by humans. The detectors are tested against

normal data sets to make sure they do not set off any false alarms. This is the self discrimination

aspect of AIS IDS. Detectors that erroneously react to normal network data are eliminated. The

ones that remain are deemed as proper functioning and are sent out into the network to perform

self and non-self discrimination. The idea behind this biologically inspired technique is that by

releasing detectors that have been tested against normal network data, they will recognize other

normal network data and only flag problematic behavior in the network (Bakar, Hardoroudi,

Hosseinpour & Kazazi, 2010, 323-324).

AIS IDS is an example of mobile agent architecture and an anomaly based IDS. The

mobile agents are the detectors that roam the network searching for anomalies. They identify the

anomaly based on the comparison of known normal behavior to the anomalous behavior. Since

the mobile agent detectors migrate from one suspected node to another rather than operating

individually on every node it brings the advantage of reduced network bandwidth (Bakar,

Hardoroudi, Hosseinpour & Kazazi, 2010, 323-324).

Authentication. Authentication is not discussed as widely as other security techniques.

In a 2009 article by Shrestha, Sung, Lee, Sik-Yun, Choi, and Han, the authors present secure IDS

with authentication for MANETs using AODV protocol. Their model of IDS uses individual IDS

systems on every node to track the message broadcast through the nodes. This is similar to the

technique used in self umpiring of monitoring neighboring nodes. The IDS model proposed was

anomaly based and depends on every node storing reports of usual activity and monitoring the
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network. The nodes monitor, “the number of packets send, idle periods, number of corrupted

packets etc.” and also implement “one way key chain authentication” (p. 760).The authors of the

article freely admit that while strong against external intrusions, their authentication protocols

are not as effective against internal intrusions. The IDS model proposed in their article integrates

the need for authentication before a message is sent. Despite its flaws, the model introduces an

element of integrity not seen in most networks operating in promiscuous mode, and is able to

provide this element of security without creating the same computational overhead as

cryptography.

Conclusion

Using MANETS provides a network with the unique capability of functioning without a

fixed infrastructure. The benefits are great and can be used in battlefield and disaster situations.

The problem with MANETs is that they are a wireless broadcasting system subject to more

vulnerabilities than fixed-infrastructure networks. MANETs rely on other mobile devices in

their network to serve as routers, bringing in the element of constantly changing topography.

Since nodes are regularly leaving and entering the network, a MANET needs to be able

to let newcomer nodes join the network securely. The security issues discussed in this paper arise

from this inherently dynamic environment.

Malicious nodes that enter the network become used as routers as all nodes are. A

malicious node can attack in numerous ways ranging from altering packet information, dropping

packets, flooding a network, changing route tables by falsely presenting itself as a valid path to a

destination node, or using its position to intercept information. Passive attacks such as

eavesdropping on other packets and nodes and collecting the information are especially

concerning because the mechanism of eavesdropping is the very basis for the security technique
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of self umpiring. Malicious nodes can conduct attacks that drain other nodes of their battery

power or use high levels of computational resources to reduce the effectiveness of the network.

Solutions presented to combat these problems range from different routing protocols to

techniques like IDS, self umpiring, and token systems. The routing protocols proposed range in

methods of operation; some of them are more commonly used than others, and they offer

different security options. One key point to notice when evaluating routing protocols is that the

ones offering more security are also higher in their use of computational resources (battery,

bandwidth etc.). SRP is an interesting protocol because it requires a path to be established

securely in both directions before it transmits the data. This combats the presence of malicious

nodes providing false topology information. If in SRP the node misrepresents itself then the

protocol will be unable to establish the path and the source node will find another path to the

destination node.

Techniques such as the use of self umpiring and token schemes are unique in that they

require network cooperation in order to function properly. Self umpiring comes with the added

security risk of other nodes eavesdropping while in promiscuous node. Conversely, it introduces

the benefit of being able to identify and ban malicious nodes from a network. If secure routing is

desired then the use of protocols that do not involve self umpiring is desirable. A token scheme

could probably be used in place of self umpiring in those situations, since the nodes do not

monitor each other and merely trade tokens per message transaction. An IDS system should be

implemented, but type and architecture will vary based on the size, resources, and protocols of

MANETs. Current security solutions seem to make compromises in areas of either security or

functionality in order to achieve the aspects that have been given priority. Overall, an ideal
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security solution is one that addresses the issues of confidentiality, anonymity, authentication,

integrity, and accessibility.

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