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    Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 + EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs George J. Tenet Response to Inspector General’s 9/11 Accountability Final Draft Report se as | : ‘Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 06220800 To: Inspector Gengzat Helgerson June 9, 2005, For the frst time | have been permitted 1 rea the fll IG draft report, and the Standard of judgment being applied, Iam accused of not devoting professionalism, skill and diligence io countering teorism as DCI. | abject o and rejest these accusations In my previous submission to you, I presented dotiled informtion to respond to that draft report's unsupporiabie conclusions, T incorporate my February 20, 2008 submission inthis response. ‘Aftorceading the final daft epor, iis clear that che material I previously submited has hed no impact ona draft report that continues lo mischereterze my ‘actions end ignores the context in which f served 98 DCI from 1997 trough 2001 to deal ‘ith the threat posed by al-Qa'ida ‘Your final daft cannot stund as & legitimate assessment of my performance ‘against al-Qa’ida before September 11,2001. You have failed to seek information kom those offcsls ouside CIA who were most intimately involved with mein dealing wih terrorism. Instead of gathering infrmation from such officials to enlighten and provide Context to your repor., you instead chose to speculate. In the most egregious example of this, your report states that policy makers were notable to realize the full advantage of thei nteligence capabilities and that amore eomprshensive approach could have ‘resulted in 8 more complete understanding and magnitude ofthe treat prompting @ ‘consensus within the Government to move ngsinal Bin Ladin eatler and more aggressively than it did. ‘Yet, your report fil to support such an assertion, It contains no information fiom any ofthe senior policy makers I worked with (often om a daly basis curing periods ‘of intense threat) in either the Clinton or Bush Adrinistations, There is nat one shred of evidence in your report that suggests tht these officals did not undersiand the urgency and mognitide ofthe threat, or tha they filed fo ake ection in response. In feet te ‘som testimony of these offical before the 9/11 Commission and othe bodies shows that they certainly understood the thret. Yet your report provides no facts or evaluation ‘of my interactions with two National Security Advisors, two Secretaries of Defense und their Deputies, two Secretaries of State and theie Deputies, wo Attomeys General the Interagency lawyers who drafted cover action Findings, NSC senior ditector Rachasd Clarke, and former FBI Director Freehand his counterterorism deputies, Yout report {ils to provide information about my participation in NSC Deputies and Prineipals TOPSRERETICODEWORDSENSITIVE- Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 TOPSECRETHEODEWORD-SENGHHVE— ‘meetings in either Administration or about my weekly meetings with NSC Advisor ‘Berger and NSC Aévisor Rice and their deputies, To assert thet policymakers would have formed » consensus to move against Bin Ladin calor and more aggressively is responsible without supporting evidence, The Clinton Administration chose not to invade Afghanistan, and the Bush Adininisbation 100k until Septernber 2001 to expand covert ation authorities shortly before the September 11 stacks. Your repor basically asserts hat one or both ofthese key decisions would have been made differen ithe DCI and US intelligence hae warned ‘or informed ofthe magnitude ofthe threat differently. There is aot one statement fom any senior policy oficial in ethec Administration to support such an unfounded sstertion, "enw giretly how the Clinton Administration reacted aftr the Eas ica bombings, and during the Millennium threat period, and afer the USS Cole was atacked, Atone point {informed President Clinton diredy to expect fn five to fifteen attacks ‘sgainst United Stats" iteress. I diecty interacted with NSC Advisor Berger Senior Director Clarke and Director Free during the Millenium tveat period ona daily bai, ‘Afterwards, Berger commissioned a ste action review ofthe actions taken o respond tothe threat, Neither he nor aay other senior official involved in countering teria ‘were ignorant of ether the threat or the challenge posed by al-Qa'ida, Proof ofthis is found in the specific cover action Findings developed by CIA working with NSC officals. The threat is carefully set fort in each of those documents, asi the ‘increasingly ageressive narue of our responses. These Findings were reviewed, debited ‘nd approved by senior policy makers. [had constant iteration with them duing NSC ‘meetings, nd ! assert without fear of contradiction that they filly understood the ‘maggtude ofthe treat and were taking the policy actions they felt were available to them atthe time. ‘The incoming Bush Administration was briefed on all counterterocian covert action Findings in January 2001, In addition, they were presénted with specific policy snd budgetary choices in » memerandu provided to the National Security Advisor by Richard Clarke on January 25, 2001. Clarke speciically articulated the threat posed by 1l-Qa'da and he stated thatthe NSA and CIA made collection against he al-Qa'ida network priority requirement with higher priority given only to suppor of ongoing lary operations (On Joly 10,2001, | personally fed a team to brief the Naional Secutity Advisor ‘on te treat posed by al-Qa'ida and I discussed with her and Richard Clatke stages take offensive action agains Bin Ladin. Throughout the sume of 2001, we prosased written assessments of te threat, sd the DDC attended a series of Deputies meetings at the NSC in which options were discussed. But your report provides absolutely no Understanding of any actions taken by me or others during ether Adminstration fo work Aircetly with thse in our Goverament who were desing with tevorism, You never ‘examined our interactions with Richard Clarke's CSG process in the White House, which 2 | STORSECRETICODEHORD SENSE ‘Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 FOPSEeRETeoBEWoRD SENSE — ‘rove countenerorism aetons throughout the Government.-You di aot lam from either Dr, Ries or from Richard Clarke that I diectly intervened inthe suramer of 2001 to urge that Clarke retum as chair ofthe CSG to insure tht the Government was aking al! necessary steps lo respond tothe threat as described by American intelligence White your report makes no reference to Clarke's effective CSG eff it makes ‘only passing acknowledgment that she mast effective interagency eff. aginst Bin [Ladin was that ofthe ADCI for Colletion who, rom the etly months of 1998 to September 11, worked with representatives of teverl intelligence agencies to strsulate collection, 1 agree that Mr Allen’ efforts were important and represented aerial, coordinated activity ofthe Ineligence Community. Bul what astounds me i that your ‘port fils to acknowledge thatthe ADCI for Collection acted at my diction as DCL t am informed that the IG team never interviewed Mr, Allen and therefore certainly never evaluated his interactions with me ‘The Intelligence Community at my direction through the ADCI for Collection ‘marsheled its resources wo enhance its collection against al-Qe'ida before September LI {interacted with Mr. Allen constantly, urging him to drive the Community's callectors as hard as possible. He used my Decemnber 1998 memorandum as leverage in bringing the collectors together and refining collection strategie aeross the Community. Mr. allen communicated with me directly abou these efforts, and | have attached at Tab A number ‘of his update memorandums in esponse to my memorandum, to show the extent of the ‘Community's active engagement. | provided Mr. Ailen steady nd direct feedback and pushed him to scelerate his efforts. Instead of acknowledging my effort in ths regard, ‘Your report discusses who atended what meetings, and whether my Decenber 1998 ‘memorandum was propery disseminated, The facts ae that Me. Allen atended my UBL. ‘update mectings, and 1 was driving the collectors in the intelligence Community aggressively againt the al-Qa'ida target through him. ‘There is no analysis in your report regarding the quality of ovr collection efforts, ‘or the magnitude ofthe collection resources and people involved across the Ineligence Community as result of the direction I provided to Mr. Allen or eve an assessment of what was not done in tens of collection. You never discussed these elf with Community program managers to assess my performance as DCL. Rather you opine that | ‘id not do enough to marshal the community's resources, ‘Your report suggests tha the leaders of the Community were not lly aware of the priority they should have given to counterterrorism, because, in some instances & rogram manager did not recall receiving my December {998 memorandum. Thi ‘nonsense. Read the update memorandums Mr. Allen sext to me. You will understand that the Community callectors were actively pusuing the teri target, Do you sctually believe that te Director of NSA was not filly aware of ‘We significance of that kindof action? And program managers testified with me before the authorizing and appropriations committer each year Curing out annual Budget, Presentatioas. They heart and supported the priciies we were budgeting against and 3 TOP SreReMCOBEWORESENSIIYE- ‘Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 —terseenemeonnwonssmestriee— \vnderstood fll well the importance I atached 1 countering terorisi. But youe report {ls to describe what the program managers knew arte role the ADCI for Collection ‘vas playing on my behalf because you did not seck information fom the Director of NNSA, the Direcor of NIMA, the Director of DIA or the Director and Acting Director of the FBI. Without gathering facts about my work with these ofiils or tei agencies, ‘your report accuses me of not performing my duties as DCI with skill, professionalista ‘and diligence. ‘Your report also continues 1o ignore how the National collection agencies worked with the Chief, Deputy Chief and Chief of Operations of CTC to insure tha he actions of the inelligence Community actively supported the Plan CTC putin plce ia 1989, Instead, your report continues to dismiss the 1999 Plan as merely tactical and operational lewas not. tt was our blueprint for atacking al-Qavida as vigorously a possible using the collection and operational elements ofthe Community. Ceraily ovr actions to implement the Plan were focused through CTC. ‘Thats because CTE served my Community interests a8 DCL. This fact was noted positively inthe August 2001 1G Inspetion report of CTC: “CTC fulfills interagency resporsblitice forthe DCI by coordinating ‘ations! intelligence, providing warning and promoting te effective use of ‘nvcligence Comnueity resources on terrorism issues.” (Eanghasis supplied.) With cgard to resources, you have chosen to largely ignore my previous submission which attempted to putin context the fiscal envionment in which the Community was operating end which explained the decisions! made to rebuild the CLA ‘nd Comumunity beginning in 1998. Despite the fact that we made specific decisions to triple NFIP funding in counterterorism as a percentage ofthe Community's budget during the decade ofthe 1990s when the NFIP declined by 10 percent intel tems, oF the fact that CLA counterterrorism resources quedrupld inthe same period, I continue fo be sccused of not marshaling suicient resources for counteterorisn. Yet, your report fails to explain what te proper level of resources should have been, By wha standard am t now being judged? What addtional resources were available from other programs to apply to countenerrorism? | must also correct your mischaracterizaton of my earlier submission. On line 4128, the veport states that “a meaningful strategy could ct be developed to deal with ‘aay treats uniess the CIA or the Community as a whole were rebut and given new lection.” { made no such statement or suggestion. Rebuilding capabilites ofthe CIA, including reruting and traning ase officer, and developing new overhead collection systems takes years, and ssl ongoing. I never implied in my previous fesponse thet | had 1 wait forthe rebuilding to be complete before moving against Key targets like ‘errorsm, We had no choioe bu io work against priority targets and, atthe same time, ebuild the CIA, recapitalze overhead systems and Fund NSA transformation, ‘Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 Approved for Release: 2015/06/10 C06220800 TorsrenemeoneweRBenierAe— Jn making the decisions necessary to rebuild the Intelligence Coramuity, [also ‘made decisions not to subject the Community o numerous bansfers and reprogramining quests that would have disrupted ongoing programmatic initiatives, involved proved. ~ negollations with die Departmiei of Defense aid OMB, id tesa OTs ‘congzessional committees. While we did reprogram some furs (o deal with urgent gaps, 1 etc itwas important to maintsn sustained funding in our rebuilding effort. ‘There is no meaningful discussion in your report of our budget submissions, our ‘over guidance packages, or our urgent supplemental requests OMB, Nor is there any

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