Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components
Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)
No. Operational Failure Scenarios
Deviations
1 Overpressure Blockage of piping, valves
or flame arresters due to
solid deposition
Overpressure Valve in line rapidly closed
resulting in liquid hammer
and pipe rupture
Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998.
Inherently Safer/Passive
 Size piping system to maintain
minimum required velocity to
avoid deposition
 Piping designed for maximum
expected pressure
 Eliminate flame arrester
 Limit closing rate for motor
operated valves via appropriate
gear ratio
 Limit closing rate for
pneumatic actuator via
restriction orifice in air line
 Use slow closing manual
valves (i.e., gate instead of
quarter turn)
Active
 Emergency relief device
 Removal of solids from
process stream (KO pot, filter,
etc.) with automatic blowdown
of solids
 Tracing of piping to minimize
solid deposition
 Provide surge arrester
Procedural
 Removal of solids from
process stream (KO pot, filter,
etc) with manual blowdown of
solids
 Periodic manual system
cleaning
 Operator response to high
pressure alarm
 Periodic cleaning via flushing,
blowdown, internal line
cleaning devices (e.g., “pigs”)
 Use parallel switchable flame
arresters
 Operating procedures to close
valves slowly
12-1
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Overpressure Thermal expansion of liquid  Elimination of potential for  Pressure relief device  Procedures for draining of all
in blocked-in line leading to blocking in by removing valves  Expansion tank blocked-in lines during
line rupture and other closures (e.g. blinds) shutdown
 Drill small hole in valve gate to
allow pressure equalization

Overpressure Automatic control valve
opens inadvertently leading
to high pressure downstream
of the valve
 Design all downstream piping  Pressure relief device to protect
and equipment to handle full downstream piping
upstream pressure
 Provide limit stop to prevent
control valve from opening
fully, or a restriction orifice

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-2
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Overpressure Block valve upstream or  Eliminate all block valves in  Car-seal open or lock open all
(T) downstream of relief device relief path block valves upstream and
accidentally closed resulting  Provide trans-flow three-way downstream of relief valves per
in loss of relief capability block valve at inlet of dual applicable codes and provide
relief device installation administrative procedures to
regulate opening and closing of
such valves

Overpressure Blockage of relief device by  Provide flow sweep fitting at  Use rupture disks alone or in  Manual periodic or continuous
(T) solids deposition inlet of relief device combination with safety valves flush of relief device inlet with
(polymerization, with appropriate rupture disk purge fluid
solidification) leak detection
 Automatic flush of relief
device inlet with purge fluid

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-3
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Overpressure Deflagration and detonation  Limit temperature, pressure or  Multiple rupture  Inert purging prior to start-up
(T) in pipelines causing loss of pipe diameter to prevent DDT disks/explosion vents located at
containment from occurring (e.g., acetylene) appropriate points on piping
 Avoid/minimize use of elbows  Detonation or suitable
and fittings which can cause deflagration arresters between
turbulence and flame protected equipment and
acceleration potential ignition sources
 Liquid seal drum isolating
ignition source (e.g., flare)
 Operate outside flammable
range, e.g., O2 analyzer or
hydrocarbon analyzer control
inert purge or enrichment gas
addition
 Detect gas flame and actuate
fast closing valve or
suppression system

High Faulty tracing or jacketing of  Use of insulating material  Electrical tracing with  Operator action in response to
Temperature line leading to hot spots between tracer and pipe temperature limitation controls high temperature indication
resulting in exothermic (sandwich tracer) and alarm
reaction  Use of heat transfer media with
maximum temperature limited
to a safe level (jacketed pipe)

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-4
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
High External fire leading to  Fireproof insulation with  Fire detection system with  Fire detection system with
Temperature undesired process reaction stainless steel sheathing and automatic water spray manual water spray
(e.g., acetylene banding
decomposition)  Continuous welded pipe

Low Cold weather conditions
Temperature causing freezing of
accumulated water or
solidification of product in
line or deadends
 Insulation of process lines  Heat tracing of lines  Procedures to maintain a
 Elimination of collection points  Automatic drainage of minimum flow through line
or deadends potential collection points  Manual draining of potential
 Deadends should be sloped to collection points
avoid accumulation
 Blowdown lines should be
sloped to avoid accumulation

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-5
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Low Condensation in steam lines  Securely anchor piping  Heat tracing of lines  Procedures to slowly warm-up
Temperature due to cold ambient downstream piping
conditions resulting in steam
hammer

High Flow High fluid velocity in pipe
which causes erosion
especially if two phase flow  Material selection to resist
or abrasive solids are present
leading to loss of
containment
 Sizing of pipe to limit  Instructions to limit flow
velocities velocity
 Periodic inspection of high
erosion wear points
 Heavier walls at tees, elbows,
and other high abrasion points
 Minimize use of fittings where
erosion can occur
 Use tees instead of elbows in
abrasive solid service

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-6
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios
Deviations
High Flow High pressure drop across
control valve causing
flashing/vibration leading to
loss of containment
Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
 Locate valve as close to the
vessel inlet as possible
 Provide multiple intermediate
pressure letdown devices
(valve or orifices)
 Use valve type suitable for
high pressure drop and flashing
service
 Securely anchor piping

Reverse Flow Differential pressure on  Use incompatible fittings to  Check valve on lower pressure  Procedures for proper isolation
joining lines, drains or prevent unwanted connections line to prevent reverse flow of interconnected lines
temporary connections  Use separate lines to final  Automatic isolation on  Manual isolation on detection
causing back flow of product destination detection of low differential of low differential pressure
resulting in undesirable pressure
reaction, overfilling, etc.

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-7
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Loss of Failure to isolate flow from  Provide “deadman” (self-  Automatic closed loop  Provide double block and bleed
(T) Containment sample connection, drain and closing) valve sampling system valves, valve plugs, caps,
other fittings resulting in blinds, etc.
discharge to environment

Loss of Breakage of sight glasses
Containment and glass rotameters due to
overpressure, thermal stress,
or physical impact
 Eliminate the use of sight  Provide excess flow check  Procedure to normally isolate
glasses and rotameters valves to limit discharge due to sight glass when not in use
 Provide flow restriction orifice sight glass or rotameter failure
in glass connection
 Provide physical protection
against damage (i.e., armored
sight glass)
 Provide glasses with pressure
design rating exceeding
maximum expected pressure

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-8
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios
Deviations
Loss of Loss of containment from
Containment piping due to leak, flange
leak, valve leak, pipe
rupture, collision, or
improper support
Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
 Maximize use of all-welded  Provide automatic isolation on  Provide manual isolation via
pipe detection of high flow, low remotely located valve
 Avoid use of underground pressure, or external leak  Procedural restrictions to avoid
piping  Use fusible link valves for damage (crane restrictions,
 Use double walled pipe automatic closure under fire climbing restrictions)
 Minimize use of unnecessary conditions  Periodic inspection for leaks
fittings
 Use of higher integrity closures
(e.g., clamped connectors)
 Shielding at flanges to prevent
operator exposure
 Use of minimum diameter pipe
for physical strength
 Proper design and location of
piping supports
 Physical collision barriers

Loss of Pipe failure due to excessive  Expansion loops and joints

(T) Containment thermal stress  Insulation of pipe expansion
joints
 Additional support to prevent
sagging

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-9
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Loss of Degradation of transfer hose  Eliminate hose connections  Provide excess flow check  Pressure test transfer hose
Containment between use results in hose (hard piped) valve upstream and check before use
leak  Use higher integrity hose (e.g., valve downstream of hose  Manual isolation based on
metallic braided)  Automatic isolation based on detection of high flow, low
 Use higher pressure hose detection of high flow, low pressure or external leak
pressure or external leak  Periodic replacement of hoses
 Use fusible link valves for  Provide hose protection (e.g.,
automatic closure under fire ramp) when laying hoses
conditions across roadway
 Avoid sharp angle changes in
direction

Loss of Breakdown of pipe/hose  Use pipe metallurgy which  Periodic thickness testing of
Containment lining does not require lining metal pipe wall
(lined pipe/hose)  Use semi-conductive liner to  Periodic process stream
reduce degradation due to analysis for metals content
static build-up
 Use thicker liner material
 Limit liquid velocity to
minimize static buildup

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-10
Table 12: Failure Scenarios for Piping and Piping Components

Potential Design Solutions Piping (12)

No. Operational Failure Scenarios Inherently Safer/Passive Active Procedural
Deviations
Wrong Operator connects quick  Specify incompatible ends to  Procedures to prevent
Composition connect coupling to wrong prevent misconnection inadvertent cross-connections
connection  Avoid use of quick connects  Labeling and color coding of
for hazardous service lines

Chapter 12: "Guidelines for Design Solutions for Process Equipment Failures", Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 1998. 12-11