ABSTRACT

To gain competitive advantage in the Indian market by keeping their channel intermediaries motivated
and performing, suppliers must use appropriate influence strategies. This study examines the patterns
and consequences of suppliers' strategies to influence dealers in marketing channels in India. Suppliers
in India are found to use indirect influence strategies more frequently than direct influence strategies
toward their dealers. Of two possible indirect influence strategies, recommendations are used more often
than information exchange. When direct influence strategies are applied by suppliers, promises are used
most often, followed by requests, legal pleas, and threats. The effect of various influence strategies on
dealer satisfaction is also investigated. It is found that recommendations and legal pleas have a positive
impact on dealer satisfaction. Managerial implications of the findings are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The Indian market has become increasingly attractive for global marketers in recent years. Despite the
relatively low per capita income ($421) of the 1 billion strong population (Budhwar, 2001), there are about
203 million middle-class consumers in India, who belong to well-educated households with salaries worth
more than $5,000 in local purchasing power (Ramachandran, 2000), an amount sufficient to sustain
purchases of foreign consumer products. The economic liberalization policies undertaken by the Indian
government since the early 1990s have created great opportunities for foreign businesses to tap the
potential of the huge Indian market (Budhwar, 2001). As a result, foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to
India increased from a paltry $103 million in 1990-91 to $5.1 billion in 2000-01 (Bajpai, 2002). Foreign
marketers in diverse sectors, from automobiles and consumer electronics to soft drinks and fast food,
have entered the Indian market and are competing with domestic marketers.

An essential requirement for marketing success in India is access to local channels of distribution. Most
products sold in India use a three-tier distribution system: distributor, wholesaler, and dealer/retailer
(Ramachandran, 2000). Most channel intermediaries are small and relatively unsophisticated operators,
unlike the large chains commonly seen in the West. They are often family-run businesses bound in a
cultural tradition where bargaining and negotiation are common business practices. To remain
competitive in the attractive Indian market, foreign suppliers must be able to effectively manage their
relationships with local intermediaries. The key to this would be using the right influence strategies which
would help the supplier attain its business goals, but which would also keep the intermediaries satisfied,
motivated, and performing.
Influence strategies are communications directed by a source firm toward a target firm with an intention to
cause a change in the latter's behavior (Frazier & Summers, 1984). The vastly different cultural
environment in India likely means that influence strategies commonly used in the West may not be
effective in the Indian market and local adaptations need to be made. In this article, we report a study that
examines the patterns of suppliers' strategies to influence Indian dealers and the consequences of using
influence strategies in terms of achieving dealer satisfaction. The results would be of interest to foreign
marketers seeking to enter the Indian market through local intermediaries.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Taxonomy of Influence Strategies

Influence strategies are ways in which a firm (the source) attempts to control the actions of another firm
(the target) with which it does business. Channel members use influence strategies to get their way with
other channel members. Frazier and Summers (1984) proposed a taxonomy of influence strategies which
has subsequently been widely accepted by researchers. Of six identified influence strategies, four (called
direct influence strategies) involve a source's attempts to influence directly a target's behavior without
attempting to change its perceptions. The other two strategies seek to alter the target's perception so that
the desired behavior is seen as beneficial. These influence strategies are called indirect. The six influence
strategies are described below.

Direct Influence Strategies

Request. The source simply asks the favor of the target to perform a certain task without implying any
subsequent sanctions, positive or negative.

Promise. The source offers a specified reward (e.g., greater promotional allowances) to the target if the
latter complies with the source's stated desires.

Threat. The source informs the target that failure to comply with its demands will result in negative
sanctions (e.g., delayed service, termination of contract).

Legal Plea. The source expresses that the legal contract between the two parties requires the target to
perform the action sought by the source.

Indirect Influence Strategies

Information Exchange. The source discusses general business and operating procedures to try to alter
the target's general perceptions of behavior that would be in its best interest. The source does not request
or otherwise indicate any specific action by the target.

Recommendation. The source expresses the need for altered behavior by the target for the latter to
maintain or increase desired outcomes (e.g., unit or dollar sales, gross or net profits, market share).

Use of Interfirm Influence Strategies

Most of the empirical research on interfirm influence strategies has been conducted in the United States.
In a study of the automobile distribution channel in the United States, Frazier and Summers (1984, 1986)
found that manufacturers relied most on information exchange and requests in their interactions with
dealers. Recommendations, threats, legal pleas, and promises were used much less frequently. The use
of low-pressure strategies such as information exchange and requests were found to be associated with
high levels of dealer satisfaction. Coercion by manufacturers usually invited retaliation by dealers. Also,
dealers were less satisfied when the manufacturers resorted to coercion.

In a survey of the automobile tire industry in the United States, Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, and Simpson
(1992) found some results that were contrary to the findings in the earlier studies by Frazier and
Summers (1984, 1986). In this study, the use of requests was more highly correlated with that of threats
and legal pleas than with that of other noncoercive strategies (information exchange and
recommendations).

There has been one previous study recorded on the use of influence strategy in India--in the tungsten
carbide tool industry. In various reports from that study, Kale (1986, 1989), and Frazier, Gill, and Kale
(1989) found that suppliers used coercive influence strategies more frequently, and perceived supplier
power was positively related to the supplier's use of such coercive strategies. However, there was no
relationship between the manufacturer's use of coercive influence strategies and the dealer's reciprocal
use of such strategies (Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 1989). The dealers were unlikely to retaliate when the
manufacturers used coercion.

The differences in the findings between the United States and the Indian studies were attributed to the
difference in channel dependence structures. In the Indian market, the dealers were heavily dependent on
the manufacturers and this power asymmetry within the channel was believed to have prompted the
manufacturers to use coercion without fear of retaliation. On the other hand, the more symmetrical
dependence structure in the United States channel supposedly led to the greater use of noncoercive
influence strategies by manufacturers.
The study reported in this article extends and improves upon the earlier Indian study (Kale, 1986, 1989;
Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 1989) in the following respects:

1. The previous study was done in the mid-1980s, before the economic liberalization policies were
implemented. Market conditions in India are quite different now with much greater competition among
suppliers. The channel dependence structure has largely changed from a seller's market to a buyer's
market and, therefore, interfirm influence strategy patterns found in the previous study may not be
applicable at present. A new study to reflect the changed environment is called for.

2. The previous study did not measure the outcome of using influence strategies in terms of dealer
satisfaction, which is essential for the supplier's competitive success. Our study seeks to close this gap.

3. The previous study used a set of single-item measures developed by Frazier and Summers (1984) for
the six influence strategies. Our study uses multi-item scales (as described later) to measure the
influence strategies and this improves the reliability and validity of the measures (Boyle et. al, 1992). This
is particularly important for these measures, originally developed in the United States, to be applied and
validated in the substantially different cultural environment of India.

HYPOTHESES

Indirect Versus Direct Influence Strategies

Prior to the economic liberalization in the 1990s, the economy of India was a seller's market in most
instances. The usually asymmetrical power structures in Indian distribution channels in a seller's market
meant that suppliers were more likely to employ direct influence strategies (requests, promises, threats,
and legal pleas) and, in particular, the coercive ones among them (threats and legal pleas) which did not
seek to alter dealers' perceptions but just told them what to do. The market conditions are quite different
now with more competition and dealers being able to choose from among many suppliers in most
industries. Thus, the balance of power in distribution channels has become more symmetrical. This
makes it likely that suppliers, under the present circumstances, will often give up the use of direct
influence strategies in favor of indirect ones. Therefore, we offer our first hypothesis:

H1: Suppliers use indirect influence strategies more frequently compared to direct influence strategies in
India.

Indirect Influence Strategies

When indirect influence strategies are used in India, one might expect a greater reliance on
recommendations than on information exchange since the recommendation strategy specifies, however
softly the need for some desirable action. Dealers are typically smaller and less sophisticated operators
compared to suppliers. Such dealers are likely to derive greater benefit from directive recommendations
rather than open-ended information exchange, which they may not know what to do with. Hence, we
hypothesize:

H2: In India, suppliers use recommendations more frequently than information exchange when they use
indirect influence strategies toward dealers.

Direct Influence Strategies

Favors in exchange of desired actions are common and often expected in many traditional societies such
as India. In economically less affluent environments, the promise of some reward is usually highly
effective in getting others to perform desired acts (Kinsey, 1988). The promise strategy is likely to be used
quite frequently in interorganizational communications in such environments. The request strategy, which
does not specify any reward for compliance, is likely to be the "runner-up" to the promise strategy in terms
of usage frequency in Indian marketing channels.

Legal pleas are not likely to be used widely in a relatively traditional culture of India where relationships
are governed more by social norms than the word of law (Terpstra & David, 1991). The high-context
nature of the Indian culture (Hall, 1976) does not place a high value on formalized expressions since the
meanings of words used in communication tend to be more subjective and amenable to different
interpretations. Businesses in high-context cultures do not emphasize rules and regulations to the extent
that businesses in low-context cultures do (Terpstra & David, 1991). The threat strategy is likely to be
used even less because it is intimidatory by definition, and the relatively more symmetrical power balance
situation in Indian marketing channels mean that dealers are probably not going to take obvious threats
from suppliers lying down.

The preceding discussion leads to the following hypothesis regarding the use of various direct influence
strategies in Indian channels of distribution:

H3. In terms of frequency of usage, suppliers in India use promises, requests, legal pleas, and threats,
respectively, in descending order, toward their dealers.

The request strategy usually does not imply any positive or negative sanctions if the target firm is unable
to perform the action desired by the source. However, in the relatively traditional and resource-
constrained cultural environment of India, the dealer may implicitly expect some reward in exchange for
its compliance with the supplier's desire, and this may cause the request to be perceived as a promise.
Similarly, the dealer might infer that some negative sanction will be administered by the supplier firm if the
dealer fails to act in the manner desired by it, and then the influence strategy is perceived as a threat.
Thus, the distinction among requests, promises, and threats may become somewhat blurred in the Indian
context, and all three strategies may be perceived as being used simultaneously. Following this logic, the
Indian supplier may also actively use these three strategies in close relation with one another. These
considerations lead to the next hypothesis:

H4: In India, there is a positive relationship among the use of request, promise, and threat strategies by
the supplier.

Influence Strategies and Dealer Satisfaction

To motivate dealers and ensure their long-term cooperation, suppliers need to use influence strategies
that keep dealers satisfied. The hypothesis regarding dealer satisfaction is developed under the premise
that channel members will be more satisfied if interfirm communication patterns are consistent with the
norms prevailing in the host cultural environment. It was suggested in hypotheses H1 that, the Indian
market would be characterized by more indirect content in interfirm communication. Hypothesis H3
suggested that, among direct influence strategies, the legal plea is not likely to be popular in the high-
context culture of India. Also, the threat strategy is not likely to result in dealer satisfaction because of its
obvious intimidating nature. Promises and requests are more likely to be well received by dealers in India.
These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

H5: In India, dealer satisfaction is positively related with the supplier's use of information exchange,
recommendations, promises, and requests, and it is negatively related with the supplier's use of legal
pleas and threats.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sampling Frame

The hypotheses were tested by a cross-sectional field study in India. The population was comprised of
dealers of electric lamps and lighting equipment. The dealers were surveyed about their communication
patterns with their major (largest) suppliers. The owner, manager, or some other key employee in each
dealership who was primarily responsible for communicating with suppliers was asked to complete the
survey instrument.

Questionnaires were sent to 252 dealers who were all members of at least one of several light dealers'
associations in India, in and around the major metropolitan centers of Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai,
Bangalore, and Kolkata. The mail survey method was not used since in India, like in many other
developing countries, frequent delays in mail service are common and, also, businesspeople are
generally reluctant to respond to mail surveys. Therefore, survey questionnaires were personally
delivered to the dealers and collected from those who agreed to respond by a group of graduate student
interns. Ninety-three usable responses were returned by Indian dealers, thus yielding a response rate of
36.9 percent. Eighty-seven (93.5%) of the respondents were owners of their dealership businesses, while
the remaining six (6.5%) were managers. The average dealership was in business for 10.7 years and
employed 6.1 persons.

Construct Measurement

Multi-item scales were used to measure the key constructs: influence strategies (six types), and dealer
satisfaction. The psychometric properties for the various measures of constructs are summarized in Table
1. It is seen that all the multi-item measures had acceptable reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha).

Influence Strategies

The multi-item influence strategy scale used by Boyle et al. (1992) was adopted. The respondents were
asked to indicate how often the supplier's representatives used each of the six influence strategies in their
interaction with the dealer on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never, 5 = always). The influence strategies
measured were information exchange (average of four items), recommendations (average of four items),
requests (average of three items), promises (average of four items), threats (average of five items), and
legal pleas (average of five items). The average of the information exchange and recommendation scores
yielded the measure for indirect influence strategy use, and the average of the request, promise, threat,
and legal plea scores yielded the measure for direct influence strategy use.

Dealer Satisfaction

The dealers were asked to record the degree of their satisfaction (1 = very dissatisfied, 5 = very satisfied)
on a 5-point Likert scale regarding the various aspects of their relationship with their major supplier. The
issues included personal dealings with supplier's representatives, the amount and general nature of
communication with the supplier, supplier's assistance in cooperative advertising and sales training,
margins and profits obtained from the supplier's products, etc. A total of thirteen dealer satisfaction items
were used, and the average of these thirteen items yielded the measure for dealer satisfaction.

TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

The statistical tests to test hypotheses H1-H3 are presented in Table 2. To test Hypothesis H1, a paired t-
test was employed to compare indirect and direct influence strategy usage. The mean value of indirect
influence strategy use (3.354) was significantly higher (t = 12.363, p < .001) than the mean value of direct
influence strategy use (2.232). This provided support for hypothesis H1.

Hypothesis H2 was tested by a paired t-test to compare the use of the two indirect influence strategies:
information exchange and recommendations. The mean value for recommendations (3.773) was
significantly higher (t = 8.381, p < .001) than the mean for information exchange (2.949) and, therefore,
hypothesis H2 was supported.

To test hypothesis H3, paired t-tests were performed to compare among the means of all four direct
influence strategies (requests, promises, threats, and legal pleas), one pair at a time. As shown in Table
2, the differences between all pairs of direct influence strategies were found statistically significant (all at p
<.001 level). The promise strategy (mean = 3.023) was used most frequently among the four direct
strategies, and was followed by the request (mean = 2.389), legal plea (mean = 1.931), and threat (mean
= 1.683) strategies, in that order. The data, therefore, provided support for hypothesis H3.

Hypothesis H4 was tested by computing Pearson correlation coefficients among the use of requests,
promises, and threats, and the results appear in Table 3. Statistically significant positive correlations were
found between requests and promises (r = .383, p < .001), requests and threats (r = .642, p < .001), and
between promises and threats (r =.214, p < .05). Thus, a simultaneous positive relationship was found
among the uses of the request, promise, and threat strategies and, hypothesis H4 was supported.

Hypothesis H5 was tested by estimating a linear regression model with dealer satisfaction as the
dependent variable and the six influence strategies as independent variables. The results are shown in
Table 4. The overall regression model was a statistically significant fit (F = 8.992, p < .001), and the
adjusted [R.sup.2] was reasonable at .366. All six influence strategies did not have significant effects on
dealer satisfaction, however. The use of recommendations had a positive and significant effect on dealer
satisfaction, as hypothesized. The use of legal pleas significantly affected dealer satisfaction but, contrary
to expectation, the effect was positive. The other four influence strategies, information exchange,
requests, promises, and threats, did not have significant effects on dealer satisfaction. Hence, hypothesis
H5 was only partially supported.

DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

As suggested in Hypothesis H1, indirect influence strategy use was found to be greater compared to
direct influence strategy use in India. This demonstrates how the power balance within distribution
channels in India has changed toward greater symmetry between suppliers and dealers with increasing
competition in recent years. The Indian marketplace cannot be regarded as a seller's market anymore. A
closer look at the current state of the electric lamps and lighting industry in India, in which this study was
conducted, showed that dealers had many competing manufacturers (Philips, Osram, Crompton, Bajaj,
Surya, K-lite, Starlite, and Abby Lighting, to name a few) to choose from. Therefore, direct and coercive
influence strategies that were primarily relied upon by suppliers to gain compliance from their dealers in
previous times (Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 1989) had to be often replaced with indirect influence strategies.

It was also found in our study that suppliers in India used recommendations more than they did
information exchange when they had to choose between the two types of indirect influence strategies.
This is expected (H2) because, despite the closing of the power gap between suppliers and dealers, the
typical Indian dealer is still a small business, operated by the owner (ninety three percent of the key
informants responding were the owners themselves, and the average dealership employed only 6
employees). Such firms are not likely to have much expertise to make critical business decisions on their
own often, so suppliers see a greater benefit in using recommendations, which would suggest some
desirable course of action, over information exchange which would still leave the dealers to make their
own interpretations and decisions.

As far as direct influence strategies were concerned, promises were used more frequently than any other
direct strategy, as hypothesized (H3). Suppliers in India appear to believe that offering a reward in
exchange for compliance would be effective in making the dealers act according to their desires. A
positive correlation was observed, however, among the uses of promises, requests, and threats (H4).
This suggests that, dealers in India are likely to assume that a request from the supplier, if complied with,
might result in some kind of reward, even though the request strategy does not explicitly specify so.
Similarly, dealers may also perceive a request or a promise as a threat if they assume that some negative
sanction for non-compliance is implicit. The blurring of the distinction among requests, promises, and
threats will probably depend on how the language used by the supplier in its influence attempt is
perceived by the dealer. Hence, suppliers will need to be careful in their choice of words when they use
requests or promises, to ensure that the "right" message is conveyed.

As hypothesized (H5), the recommendation strategy has a positive impact on dealer satisfaction and, this
is also the most frequently used influence strategy (Table 2). Foreign suppliers entering the Indian market
should note this: they ought to make specific recommendations about desirable courses of action (rather
than just provide information) to keep the local dealers happy after they realize that changed conditions in
the Indian market warrant greater use of indirect influence strategies over direct ones. Also, the request,
promise, and threat strategies do not significantly impact dealer satisfaction (Table 4). This may be
because of the aforementioned blurring of the perceived distinction among requests, promises, and
threats by dealers. This observation reinforces the need to exercise caution in using any of these three
strategies.

Another unexpected observation was the positive impact of legal pleas on dealer satisfaction (Table 4)
rather than the negative impact that was hypothesized. In hindsight, one might attribute this observation
to the democratic tradition of government in India that probably causes people to have considerable faith
in the judicial system. Legal pleas, which demand compliance by referring to specific clauses in the legal
contract between the parties, may be regarded by dealers as "going by the book" and, therefore, fair.

When American and other foreign firms enter a market as culturally different as India, they must be able
to motivate Indian channel partners by using influence strategies that are compatible with local practices
and expectations. The empirical test presented in this paper illustrates the patterns of intrachannel
influence strategy use in India, particularly under the recently changed environment of economic
liberalization and increased competition. The key is to keep local dealers satisfied and to achieve that,
foreign suppliers will have to use influence strategies that may, in many ways, be different from what they
use in their domestic market. By using the "right" influence strategies in communicating with channel
partners, marketers will be able to alter the action of channel partners to suit their objectives as well as
keep them satisfied and performing at high levels.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

Our study has the usual limitations associated with most survey research. The empirical test was
conducted in only one channel, that of electric lamps and lighting fixtures. Caution must be exercised
before generalizing the results across other industries. Also, only one side of the supplier-dealer dyad (the
dealers' perceptions) was considered for the empirical test. This too indicates the necessity for caution
before generalizing the results.

CONCLUSION

Despite its limitations, our study has some significant theoretical and practical contribution in that it tries to
guide firms that seek to enter the emerging Indian market into adopting appropriate influence strategies
toward local intermediaries. Appropriate influence strategies will help supplier firms manage their
relationships with local intermediaries better, and that will make the supplier firms more competitive in the
increasingly attractive Indian market. This study can be regarded as a step toward a better understanding
of interfirm communication strategies in general, and influence strategies in particular, in a market that is
culturally very different from the West and has changed substantially over the previous decade.

TABLE 1
Overview of Multi-Item Measures

Measure Number of Items Reliability

(Cronbach's alpha)

Influence Strategies:
Information Exchange 4 .613
Recommendation 4 .835
Request 3 .749
Promise 4 .661
Threat 5 .911
Legal Plea 5 .896

Dealer Satisfaction 13 .909

TABLE 2
Comparative Use of Influence Strategies (H1 - H3)

Variables Mean Paired t Significance

(S.D.)

Hypothesis H1:
Indirect Influence 3.354 12.363 p < .001
Strategy Use (.697)
Direct Influence Strategy 2.232
Use (.719)

Hypothesis H2:
Recommendations 3.773 8.381 p < .001
(.878)
Information Exchange 2.949
(.784)
Hypothesis H3:
1. Promises 3.023 1&2: 5.726 (a)
(.763) 2&3: 7.110 p < .001
2. Requests 2.389 3&4: 4.113
(1.017) p < .001
3. Legal Pleas 1.931
(.903) p < .001
4. Threats 1.683
(.838)

(a) To be read as: paired t-value between means of variables

1 (promises) and 2 (requests) = 5.726

TABLE 3
Intercorrelation of Request, Promise, And Threat Strategies (H4)

Influence Strategies Request Promise Threat

Request 1.000
Promise 0.383 (a) 1.000
Threat 0.642 (a) .214 (b) 1.000

(a) Significant at p < .001, (b) Significant at p < .05

TABLE 4
Regression of Dealer Satisfaction on Influence Strategies (1-15)

Dependent Variable: Dealer Satisfaction, N = 93

Independent Variable Unstd. Std. Std. t- Significance

Coeff. Error Coeff. value

Intercept 2.600 .390 6.66 p < .001

Information Exchange .054 .109 .058 .50 Not Sig.
Recommendations .422 .094 .497 4.46 p < .001
Requests -.198 .117 -.271 -1.68 Not Sig.
Promises -.166 .099 -.173 -1.67 Not Sig.
Threats -.182 .142 -.205 -1.28 Not Sig.
Legal Pleas .509 .169 .620 3.01 p < .01

For the regression model, F = 8.992, p <.001,

Adjusted [R.sup.2] = .366

REFERENCES

Bajpai, N. (2002). A decade of economic reforms in India: The unfinished agenda. CID Working Paper
No. 89, Center for Industrial Development, Harvard University.

Budhwar, P. (2001,). Doing business in India. Thunderbird International Business Review, 43 (4), 549-
568.

Boyle, B., Dwyer, F.R., Robicheaux, R.A., & Simpson, J.T. (1992, November). Influence strategies in
marketing channels: Measures and use in different relationship structures. Journal of Marketing
Research, 29, 462-473.

Frazier, G., Gill, J.D., & Kale, S.H. (1989, January). Dealer dependence levels and reciprocal actions in a
channel of distribution in a developing country. Journal of Marketing, 53, 50-69.

Frazier, G., & Summers, J.O. (1984, Summer). Interfirm influence strategies and their application in
distribution channels. Journal of Marketing, 48, 43-55.

Frazier, G., & Summers, J.O. (1986, May). Perceptions of interfirm power and its use within a franchise
channel of distribution. Journal of Marketing Research, 23, 169-176.

Hall, E.T. (1976). Beyond culture. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Kale, S.H. (1986, November). Dealer perceptions of manufacturer power and influence strategies in a
developing country. Journal of Marketing Research, 23, 387-393.

Kale, S.H (1989). Dealer dependence and influence strategies in a manufacturer-dealer dyad. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 74 (3), 379-384.

Kinsey, J. (1988). Marketing in developing countries. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Macmillan.

Ramachandran, R. (2000, February). Understanding the market environment of India. Business Horizons,
43 (January-), 44-52.

Terpstra, V., & David, K. (1991). The cultural environment of international business. Cincinnati, OH: South
Western Publishing Company.

Soumava Bandyopadhyay is marketing professor at Lamar University. His research interests include
international marketing strategy, channels of distribution, and electronic marketing. He can be contacted
at bandyopasu@hal.lamar.edu.
1
Taxonomy of Influence Strategies

Influence strategies are ways in which a firm (the source) attempts to control the actions of another firm
(the target) with which it does business. Channel members use influence strategies to get their way with
other channel members. Frazier and Summers (1984) proposed a taxonomy of influence strategies which
has subsequently been widely accepted by researchers. Of six identified influence strategies, four (called
direct influence strategies) involve a source's attempts to influence directly a target's behavior without
attempting to change its perceptions. The other two strategies seek to alter the target's perception so that
the desired behavior is seen as beneficial. These influence strategies are called indirect. The six influence
strategies are described below.

Direct Influence Strategies

Request. The source simply asks the favor of the target to perform a certain task without implying any
subsequent sanctions, positive or negative.

Promise. The source offers a specified reward (e.g., greater promotional allowances) to the target if the
latter complies with the source's stated desires.

Threat. The source informs the target that failure to comply with its demands will result in negative
sanctions (e.g., delayed service, termination of contract).

Legal Plea. The source expresses that the legal contract between the two parties requires the target to
perform the action sought by the source.

Indirect Influence Strategies

Information Exchange. The source discusses general business and operating procedures to try to alter
the target's general perceptions of behavior that would be in its best interest. The source does not request
or otherwise indicate any specific action by the target.

Recommendation. The source expresses the need for altered behavior by the target for the latter to
maintain or increase desired outcomes (e.g., unit or dollar sales, gross or net profits, market share).

Use of Interfirm Influence Strategies

Most of the empirical research on interfirm influence strategies has been conducted in the United States.
In a study of the automobile distribution channel in the United States, Frazier and Summers (1984, 1986)
found that manufacturers relied most on information exchange and requests in their interactions with
dealers. Recommendations, threats, legal pleas, and promises were used much less frequently. The use
of low-pressure strategies such as information exchange and requests were found to be associated with
high levels of dealer satisfaction. Coercion by manufacturers usually invited retaliation by dealers. Also,
dealers were less satisfied when the manufacturers resorted to coercion.

In a survey of the automobile tire industry in the United States, Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, and Simpson
(1992) found some results that were contrary to the findings in the earlier studies by Frazier and
Summers (1984, 1986). In this study, the use of requests was more highly correlated with that of threats
and legal pleas than with that of other noncoercive strategies (information exchange and
recommendations).

There has been one previous study recorded on the use of influence strategy in India--in the tungsten
carbide tool industry. In various reports from that study, Kale (1986, 1989), and Frazier, Gill, and Kale
(1989) found that suppliers used coercive influence strategies more frequently, and perceived supplier
power was positively related to the supplier's use of such coercive strategies. However, there was no
relationship between the manufacturer's use of coercive influence strategies and the dealer's reciprocal
use of such strategies (Frazier, Gill, & Kale, 1989). The dealers were unlikely to retaliate when the
manufacturers used coercion.