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What does it mean to live a life in “human dignity”? Obviously, answers to this
question are closely interconnected with answers to the other central question,
what is the spirit and purpose of human rights. But how exactly are we to explain
and interpret this interrelation? From the point of view of philosophy (I tried to
politics”. The basic idea was: Every human being has the – so to say – prior moral
somewhere between morality, law and also politics: It was a moral definition, I
beings. It was also a legal definition, since concrete and substantial constitutional
rights result from that fundamental “right to have rights”, as Hannah Arendt said.
And at the end it was also a political notion of human rights, for the addressees of
corresponding duties are all those people and institutions that are responsible for
the political system concerned – But the question now is: What does it all has to
In what follows I will start by focussing on the history of human rights, which we
have not really touched yet. In this history of human rights and also human
dignity a deep and fundamental break has to be bookmarked: namely the year of
1945. Not until 1945 began – what we can call – the political presence of human
human dignity. It goes without saying that there had been reflection on the
interrelation between human rights and dignity also before. But the constitutive
monstruos that the history of human rights was shaked to its very foundations.
National Socialists but also that of Russian Stalinists – against which the most
reminded of the “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind“.
So these were acts of barbarism, the global regime of human rights after 1945 are
innitially grounded on as some kind of a global promise that things like this will
never happen again.2 Therefore we will not grasp the very idea of human rights
moral and political catastrophy; a catastrophy, in which there had been monstruos
So article 1 of the Universal Declaration proclaims: “All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights”. And article 2 adds: “without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. Likewise “my” German
constitution, the Grundgesetz, which was passed in 1949, startes right at the
beginning with the idea of a dignity, that every human being has, just because it is
a human being. In article 1 it is said (I translate): “The dignity of the human being
is untouchable. It is the main obligation of all state power to respect and protect
it”. And also “your” Peruvian constitution from 1993 claims right at the beginning
in article 1 (I do not translate, please excuse my Spanish): “La defensa de la
But if we take a closer look on the term “human dignity” and its philosophical and
hand most interpreters of human dignity assume that dignity is something that
Therefore human beings simply do have human dignity, just because they are
human. On the other hand it cannot be denied, that there are in fact fundamental
violations or even losses of dignity. And the question is: How is it possible to
it slightly differently: Why should something be protected by the state, that you
cannot lose anyway? If human beings already have human dignity, why should
In what follows I will try to explain and clear this confusion. In the first part of
my paper the historical and philosophical interrelations between human rights and
human dignity shall become a little more traceable (1). In the second part it will
be shown that in philosophical and legal debates there are basically and at large
consequences regarding human rights (2). In the third part of the paper I then will
subsribe to only one of this four interpretations by showing what exactly has to be
understood as the substantial content of dignity (3). At the end I want to adress
between the philosophical idea, that human dignity is a inalienable, inborn value
and the empirical observation, that it indeed can be violated or even lost (4).
1. The relevance of human dignity for human rights
Even if human rights have not unfold their true potential before the second part of
the 20th century, its very idea is obviously much older. From the philosophical
point of you what primarely mentions here is so-called “natural law”.3 The
philosophical roots of natural law can be traced back up to antiquity, but it reaches
its philosophical heights much later – with the European enlightment of the 17th
and 18th century. As different thinkers of natural law tradition might be in detail,
their common premise is the following: We are allowed to state certain natural
rights that all human beings have just because of their anthropological condition
their validity as well as our status as subjects of this natural rights do not depend
on a certain nation state or political system to codify them. We simply have those
rights, whether a certain state does respect them or not, just because our being
It is exactly this natural law belief that is reflected in the revolutionary
Vgl. Ernst Bloch (1961), Naturrecht und menschliche Würde, Frankfurt a.M.
Rights from 1776 and in the French Déclaration des droits de l´homme et du
citoyen from 1789. The groundbreaking innovation is the following: Since human
beings have some of their most important rights – for example the right to live, to
circumstances of their application; what at that time mainly meant to protect them
But there was also a major second step nessessary within the historical
development of rights for the central claim of human rights to get its
breakthrough. The historic sources and documents do indeed and explicitly speak
of “rights of man” or “human rights”, but if we take a closer look at them, it
becomes more than doubtful, whether in fact every human being was meant.
These historic documents were first and foremost tailored to the national contexts
of those states and peoples, whose constitutions they were to be. The chartered
rights in these documents applied only to people, who were citizens of the nation
states concerned. Therefore these rights were “only” civic rights. Neither residents
who did not count as full citizens nor any foreign persons or non resident aliens
were mentioned. Not until political fights and social movements in the aftermath –
movement, the women’s movement or flows of refugees caused by the two World
Wars – not until such fights took place, the true dynamics of humans rights were
released: namely the insight, that every human being should count equally as a
subject of human rights. Only these fights for recognition of marginalized groups
– slaves, workers, indigenous people, women, refugees, homosexuals et cetera –
With the totalitarianism of the 20th century it than became obvious, that human
rights do not only need national state protection, but also effective international
cover. Human beings are to be protected from the threat of nation state
dictatorship. And who else could guarantee such protection if not the global
community of states? It was Hannah Arendt who – shortly after World War II –
pointed out a fundamental “aporia of human rights”4. The nation state, Arendt
said, can no longer be seen as the neutral instrument to enforce human rights, but
biggest threat to human rights. The “Aporia” consists in the following: The state,
whose power is constitutive and needed to enforce natural rights of every citizen,
has at the same time proved himself as the most serious enemy of those rights.
What follows from this? Facing Arendt’s aporia, the global community of states
human rights development, allthough it is well known that this document was
Let me sum up what I said so far and raise the rather systematic question, what is
new with the idea of human rights after 1945. Human rights primarely are claims
against the state. But the state plays the somewhat paradoxical double role of a
protector and violator of those rights. Insofar as he has proved himself as the most
serious threat to human dignity, both human rights and human dignity call for an
additional international institutionalization and protection. – Well, I do not really
give away a secret, when I tell you, that the global enforcement of human rights is
still a controversial matter (I spoke about this problem yesterday). Indeed many,
but not all states have signed relevant covenants and conventions in international
law. Every now and then some states in the UN have just signed those
reservations, if the human rights treaty in question touched deep rooted traditional
convictions or values.
have the time to discuss them here), these objections more than often misjudge a
simple truth of human existence, to which we cannot shut our eyes any more;
especially not after 1945. And this truth is: Every human being, from whatever
culture we might come or which language we speak, all use the term “human”, we
all presuppose common interests in respect and protection, that are typical for
now focus on the question, which kind of common interests we can legitimately
Let us consider more precisely the argument that I have just sketched: That human
rights are tailored to protect the fragile preconditions of human existence, does
obviously mean more than just the protection of “mere”, “naked” living or
rights call for a form of life of “higher” quality. And exactly this higher form of
life, this purpose of justification is meant by the notion of a human life “in
dignity”. As I want to show now: The term “dignity” is the normative and
If we look back to the historical sources the present use of the term “dignity”
stems from, a change of meaning in three stages can be revealed: First, in Roman
antiquity the term dignity (lat. dignitas) was reservated for high-ranking persons
which explained their fame and dignity. Then came, second, christian theology of
the middle ages and gave the term a universalist shift. The ancient idea of a
the central position human beings as such had as the “pride of gods creation”.
From now on human beings as such, that means despite all individual differences,
were supposed to simply have dignity as “god’s image”; a special dignity, that
other creatures would not have. Third, it was European Renaissance then,
especially Pico della Mirandola, and later on enlightment, above all Immanuel
dignity, not because they simply reflected a divine splendor, but because they
were capable of reason and autonomy and therefore by themselves were goodlike
But how do we use the term today? Philosophers in Germany just had an intensive
debate on the notion of dignity. It was because the German government had to
decide some serious “bio”-political topics in medical law and ethics. With view
human life begins and when it gets the moral and legal standing of rights and
(a) Who actually does count as a member of the group of human beings, who are
supposed to have dignity? Do we have do understand the term in the way that
every human fom of life already participates from the beginning? Or does
“dignity” mean some sort of a salient feature that can only be adjudged to persons
(b) Is human dignity an inalienable good, that simply cannot or must not be
graded; a value that everyone has in exactly the same and equal way? Does a 14-
days-old embryo really have the same dignity as for example a grown up adult?
Or can or even must we distinguish legally and morally between different grades
The main difference between these two sets of problems can be marked as
follows: In the first case we are confronted with the question wheter to distinguish
between human beings in the “full” sense and “other” human forms of life;
whereas only the first may then have dignity. Following the second set of
questions it could be possible, that the dignity of two different human beings are
only realized to a different extend, even if every human being – without exception
(1) Dignity as a “dower”: The first and most widely accepted interpretation of
dignity presupposes, that dignity is given from the very beginning of human life
and in each case in exactly the same non-graduated form. Here the assumption
philosophical argument is presented here: They all do agree, that every human
Arnd Pollmann (2005), Menschenwürde nach Maß, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Philosophie,
Nr. 4/2005.
being has dignity from the very beginning, just because it is human. Therefore
(2) Dignity as a “potential”: The second group of interpreters does agree with the
first by assuming, that indeed every human being already participates in human
dignity. But at the same time they are convinced, that it is possible to differentiate
between sometimes “more” and sometimes “less” dignity. The central argument
here is: Allthough every human being – as a member of human mankind – has the
potential to live a life in dignity, since we all carry its “kernel”, the question
whether we really are able to fully unfold this kernel and potential is up to our
concrete life conditions. In other words: The extend to which our potential to
dignity is actually realized always depend on – by and large – decent and humane
denying, that every human being already has dignity. They rather want to make
clean cuts, that are morally significant, between for example certain pre-forms of
human “persons” emerge. In consequence only persons do have dignity, and that
means – the other way around – that those human beings who do not count as
persons – for example embryos, people in coma or old people suffering from
“personal property” that – by definition – only persons could have; that means a
certain subset of human kind. In the Kantian tradition for instance one might think
of the capability of autonomy and moral respect. If you might find this restriction
(4) Dignity as an “achievment”: The fourth group of interpreters shares with the
third the assumption that we have to distinguish between human and personal
human life, but at the same time it adopts the conviction of the second group, that
people always do have dignity more or less. Here a persuasion becomes central
which reminds us of Roman antiquity: Persons not only have to gain the status of
dignity in public, but also to defend it against offenses and aggressions. Fellow
people will only adjudge dignity to a person, when she lives a public life worth of
that kind of social estimation. Only then she will experience, what we usually call
as an “achievement”, that has to be made in social life. From there it follows, that
neither all human beings can have dignity nor in exactly the same way, but only
participants too often miss the difference between two important, but separate
problems: The question, whether all human beings do in fact have human dignity
and to what extend, is very much dependend but different from the second
question, what exactly has to be seen as the content of dignity. Whether you want
or even a social achievement will in each case have very different consequences
But however you want to decide here: All four different conceptions of dignity
actually do agree on the basic presupposition, that there must be certain or typical
dignity of the human species. Which special features are meant here? I will start
by listing just some quiet popular definitory characteristics of dignity. The
ascending order of those characteristics will at the same time reflect the extend, to
(a) When we first ask for the specific or original feature that makes us count as
potential addresses of human dignity, we simply come up with the fact of being
human as such. Our mere belonging to the human species is already sufficient for
words, the almost trivial premise is: Being human is in every way a nessessary
(b) The special form of social recognition, we are obliged to, when we adjudge
dignity to another person, we usually call “respect”. When a person sees herself
treated decently or in an humane way – that means treated as an equal being from
human “flesh and blood” and not as a mere thing, a maschine or an animal – she
probably will feel respected; respected as an equal beneath equals.
(c) From this experience of mutual respect may result a very special form of
personal self-relation, that is of vital importance for the idea of dignity. We call
in social relations, if she feels convinced, that – as a human being – she really is
an equal beneath equals; that she is of the same worth as every other human being
(d) Whereas self-respect first and foremost is an “inner” self-relation, people want
which is obviously sometimes more and sometimes only less in accordance with
than – and not just metaphorically – is “erectness” or “spine” or we say that they
in public life makes them vulnerable. If people live in deep inhuman and
derogatory circumstances, how should they keep their self-respect? How should
they live up to it and express it, when life or other people knock them down again
“discrimination” or “debasement”.
dignity: Allthough the protection of human dignity can be seen (a) as a universal
good, that is in all human beings’ interest, just because we are human, we (b) can
only really share this good, when other people do actually respect our equal
worth. Additionally, this good is only realized completely, when the person
expressing and embodying her self-respect in public life, what presupposes e) that
she must find adequate and decent life conditions, so that a life in dignity, that
self-respect. If that was true, than a concrete loss of or damage to dignity still
might be the result of social disrespect, but at the end it had to be interpreted as
the absence or lack of self-respect. – Can this really be the right interpretation?
Let me give you a literary example from a novel written by the swiss author
(“Night-Train to Lisbon”) a man named João Eça, who has once been victim of
the Portuguese military dictatorship, tells his friend Gregorius, what it meant to
was a horrible humiliation, but I did not get the feeling of losing my dignity.
Gregorius asked.
This he had asked himself again and again, said Eça, and he had dreamt
about it. He came to the conclusion, that they really would have destroyed
him with that, but still, his dignity, they would’t have deprived him from. To
That there are certain things in life, that one would never do or accept at
any price. Maybe that is, what dignity is made of, said Gregorius. These
limits don’t have to be just moral limits. You can gamble away your dignity
Let us assume, both friends involved in this conversation as well as the author of
the novel did not totally miss the point of dignity. If that is really true, that we can
“gamble away” our dignity, what follows than is: (f) Keeping our dignity is – last
but not least – also dependent on our ability and power to preserve self-respect.
Therefore also g) is true, that there are no simple causal or automatic relations
between a personal attack on dignity and its actual loss. People might often be
victims of massive assaults – and the case of torture is probably the most
because of withhold recognition. But no other person can totally deprive us from
our dignity as long as we do not lose our self-respect. However cruel it may
sound: At the end we all have to keep our own personal dignity.
Though at this point we must avoid the missunderstanding, that an actual violation
of dignity is partly the fault of the victim concerned. Of course not. From reasons,
people do not have much influence on, some persons simply have more strength
than others to preserve their self-respect. What I only wanted to say was: There is
no loss in dignity without a loss in self-respect. That does not mean, to be sure,
that persons themselves are – fully or even not partly – in charge of preserving
their own dignity. It is still true that a person will only then possess full dignity,
when no one is affecting the quality of her life in a way, that it becomes likely,
that she loses her dignity. Acts of disrespect, humiliation or discrimination still are
serious threats to dignity, because they constrain the social scope of freedom, that
people need to preserve and embody it. But if they really do so, is finally also up
As a consequence – and with this central argument I slowly aproach the end of my
paper – there can only be a human right to “protect” dignity, in the sense of a right
to protect the social scope of embodied self-respect, but there can never be a right
“to” dignity. However limited our own contribution to our personal dignity may
be, a mutual guarantee of such a life in dignity is impossible because of that own
contribution. What we can only mutually guarantee is the best possible social or
every human being has to be regarded as equal insofar as we all are deeply
interested in a life of self-respect and dignity. But people are different inasmuch
as the extend to which they actually realize self-respect and dignity may differ.
Not all human beings and not even all persons have full dignity, but they all
participate in human dignity and therefore all have exactly the same universal
right to be protected. Precisely at this point a decisive but often ignored difference
has to be marked: The question, whether people are actually possessing dignity
and to what extend, has to be distinguished properly from the related, but
divergent question, whether we all have exactly the same right to the protection of
our dignity. Well, at the end, such a right to the protection of our dignity only then
From reasons I sketched before the human right concerned can only guarantee the
protection and not the possession of dignity. This particular right shall allow us
room for living an upright life in embodied dignity and self-respect without
discrimination and humiliation. For we can presume – so to say by proxy – that all
human beings and even non-persons do have a vital interest in an humane and
dignity. Because of the fact that this common interest will only then be realized
truly as an universal interest – that means if every human being respects the living
space of every other human being – we can also postulate a mutual and general
right to get the nessessary social conditions of our dignity protected. Hence from
the point of view of human rights we must come to the conclusion, that human
in that potential, but not all human beings are allowed to realize it in the same
satisfying way. That is why they need the human right in question. In other words:
And this special human right shall allow us room for an unhindered realizing and
of my paper is the following: One should not make the mistake to extrapolate
assume. Again: Not all human beings and not even all persons have full dignity,
but they all have the same universal right to the protection of their dignity.
At this point and at the end we have to avoid a last misunderstanding: Of course
not only those people, who already fully posses dignity, have such a right. This
people might need it least of all. No, every human being as a human being has
such a right, because we all are vulnerable and can lose our self-respect. And so
we all are allowed to realize and embody our dignity only to a different extend.
And in fact legal and moral protection is needed especially, when the dignity of a