The continuing imposition of this global order constitutes a massive violation of the human right to

basic necessities.

When exploring human rights, they are universally agreed to be the basic and core freedoms every
individual is entitled to as a matter of justice. However, there is controversy regarding what claims those
rights put on the addressees of those rights. That is, who is duty bound to deliver the rights to the
individual who holds the right? In this essay I will explore the nature of human rights, and what duties they
impose on the individuals and communities that surround the right holder. I will then discuss the right to
sustenance, or basic necessities required for achieving a minimally adequate standard of life. In doing this,
I will address whether this right constitutes a human right, and more importantly, whether or not the
current global order is in violation of this right.

Human rights are characterised as the most basic rights that every single individual is entitled to as
a matter of justice. They take the form of claim rights, which means that “if a person has a basic right to
something- to perform an action of some sort or to gain access to an object of a certain kind- then there is a
claim on some other or others to ensure the contract of the right is obtained by the right holder”1. Claim
rights entitle the right holder to press a claim to something upon other individuals. Human rights have the
ability to entail both positive and negative duties. Negative duties require a passive role from the addressee
to the right holder: they are a claim by omission to not do something. For example, in the human right to
not be tortured, a negative duty is the duty not to torture another human being. Positive duties, in contrast,
require an active role from the addressee in ensuring that the right holder receives his right. In the human
right to not be tortured, a positive duty would be to aid any individual who is being tortured, and stop the
torturer from fulfilling his actions.

The traditional libertarian idea of human rights is that they consist of only negative duties, which
are the basic and core requirements of moral justice. Libertarians consider positive duties not to be a matter
of justice at all, but rather, a matter of charity and aid, not required for achieving moral justice. Human
rights can be ensured without fulfilling a positive duty; however, a negative duty is paramount in order for
their promotion. In the example of the human right not to torture: in order for this human right to not be
violated, all individuals assume the negative duty of not torturing anyone. However, it is not necessary that
the positive duty of aiding an individual who is being tortured be implemented, as if the negative duty were

1
Jones, p.52
to be fulfilled, the positive duty would be redundant. That is, the positive duties seem to act as a safety net
just in case the negative (claim) impositions of a human right are not fulfilled. They are not preventative
measures in their own right- they work in conjunction and seem to depend on the violation of the negative
duty in order to have their implementation necessary. Because the “human right” to basic necessities, or
sustenance is classed as a positive duty to aid those who are below the national poverty line, the libertarian
would deny it as being a human right at all. Are the libertarians correct in claiming that the basic
necessities are not a human right?

Thomas Pogge argues that although human rights entail only negative duties, the right to basic
necessities also imposes negative and not positive duties upon individuals and institutions. He claims that
the duty not to “help, uphold and impose coercive social institutions under which they do not have secure
access to the object of their human rights”2 is in fact a negative duty to not deny individuals the access and
ability to obtain the basic necessities they need for a minimal standard of life. He states that it is in fact a
negative duty „not to take part‟ and thus support the global order which plays a causal role in the global
chronic poverty. But is Pogge right in calling this a negative duty? It seems Pogge is taking what would
normally be considered a positive duty (providing aid, in whatever manner, which could be done passively
by taking a stand against unjust economic institutions) and classing it as negative by wording it as a duty
“not to uphold injustice, not to contribute or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others.”3 This
doesn‟t seem to be a negative duty at all: “not to contribute or profit from the unjust impoverishment of
others” is forcing individuals to actively aid the impoverished by avoiding institutions, individuals and
ideas that encourage unjust impoverishment. That is, if a company sold clothing that was resourced in a
third world country that did not pay adequate salary to ensure a minimal standard of living, and their
competitors did not, Pogge suggests that we should actively purchase from the competitor to promote the
human right to basic necessities. It is not a duty that involves an omission of an action (like a negative duty
would) it instead requires individuals to take action against unjust impoverishment. Pogge suggests that the
reason for chronic poverty is not domestic, but global, and so every individual is causally responsible for
the impoverishment of those below the national poverty line. By taking this line of argument, Pogge aims
to show the moral obligation every individual has to those who they supposedly impoverished. But how
can the blame of global institutionalization fall on individuals? Pogge ends up making too radical a claim
by blaming all individuals who do not live in poverty as causal agents in the problem of chronic poverty. It
seems that Pogge has used an appeal to moral guilt, combined with the insistence that the right to basic

2
Pogge, p.66
3
Pogge, p.197
necessities is a simple negative duty. Critics of Pogge have claimed that his global accusation for the
premature deaths of the international poor goes too far, and it is extreme to blame those who prosper from
the resources of the poor for the poverty that the poor face. Aside from not actively depriving them of their
resources, all individuals should be autonomous and responsible for their own destinies and prosperity. So
how can a student at university be responsible for the premature death of someone on the other side of the
world? Pogge also seems to transfer the blame historically, making today‟s generations responsible for the
actions of their ancestors. This is also unreasonable, as he attaches a direct blame for the current state of
affairs to people who are only indirectly connected with them. But perhaps Pogge doesn‟t go far enough.

Whilst the libertarian view believes human rights consist of negative duties, Henry Shue believes
that human rights impose both positive and negative duties. It doesn‟t make sense to divide rights into
those that entail either positive or negative duties, because all rights entail both. For example, the right to
not be assaulted entails both that no agent assaults another agent, but also that a police force be
implemented (the positive duty) as a proactive measure to prevent assault. The right to basic necessities
thus is considered a human right, claims Shue, because it is a precondition to the enjoyment of all other
human rights. Sustenance guarantees life, and without the requirements of living a minimally adequate life,
no other human rights can be enjoyed by the individual. Shue also believes in the interactional conception
of human rights instead of the institutional one. That is, he believes that the responsibility of delivering
human rights belongs to each individual and not the institution as a whole. Where Pogge fails by appealing
to moral responsibility of individuals but claiming that human rights involve negative duties- which is
contradictory, as negative duties do not entail moral responsibility for the violation of other individuals‟
human rights- Shue rightly explains that we are indeed morally responsible to aid those who‟s rights are
violated, which comes with aiding those who‟s rights are in threat of being violated (we should both act
out when someone is about to be assaulted as well as after they have been assaulted). Shue‟s inclusion of
positive duties makes heavier the burden of human rights violation, as we are responsible for those whose
rights are violated through sheer neglect. When we consider the global injustice of some individuals being
born with absolutely nothing, whilst others are born into extreme wealth, the minimal implications of
positive duties don‟t seem that extreme and demanding.

Ideally, individuals should be given an equal opportunity to flourish, both in ethical and personal
value. How can we call the current state of the world just when one person can be born into debt and
poverty, while another born into riches and prosperity? Instead of the economic barrier that stops
individuals from having the opportunity to flourish, everyone should commence at an equal baseline, and
their economic, social and ethical wealth should accumulate based on their actions rather than their
location, or the actions of external uncontrollable forces (for example, political powers, etc.). This would
be the strongest implementation of human justice, as it would ensure complete autonomy to every
individual, though it seems completely impractical to implement. Firstly, the sheer enormity of
redistribution of wealth required for all individuals to begin their existence as economic equals is
unfathomable. But more importantly, it contradicts the most important fundamentals of human nature. The
first of those is greed: every individual will always want to have more than those around him. If everyone
had the same economic wealth, surely chaos would ensue in the form of robberies, etc. Secondly, if all
individuals began their life with equal economic opportunity there would be little motivation to improve
their socio economic status. The idea of working and earning a living would be replaced with the idea of
being looked after by always being provided with enough to sustain life. However, the need to better ones
self may counter this, as I am suggesting everyone commence with equal economic stability, that does not
hold that their life should remain frozen in stability- rather that every individual become truly a product of
their autonomous choices, rather than a victim of their circumstances (geographically, historically, etc.).
The last problem human nature poses is the maternal and paternal desire to provide and ensure a more
fortunate life for one‟s offspring. If everyone started at the same economic point, surely paternal instinct
would cause individuals to save some of their income to give to their children. This over time would cause
the same economic inequality that exists today. Despite these flaws, the idea of creating complete global
economic equality as a baseline at the commencement of each individual‟s life serves to show how vital
complete equality is in ensuring autonomy and enjoyment of the most basic human rights. Through this we
see that the human right to basic necessities is a small burden of aid to those who are impoverished and
whose core freedoms and rights are being violated from the instant the come into existence.

To conclude, Thomas Pogge‟s assertion that “The continuing imposition of this global order
constitutes a massive violation of the human right to basic necessities” is completely true. Although he
argues that we violate this human right by not fulfilling the „negative‟ duty which it imposes upon us; and
Shue argues that we violate it by not fulfilling the claims of human rights, which by their nature impose
both positive and negative duties; I suggest that we violate it by not doing the minimum to aid those who
should ideally be given the same equal opportunity to live as autonomous beings as those of us who are
more fortunate have been. Essentially, if we (the fortunate) were asked to decide what fundamental right‟s
we‟d like to have without knowing what economic, geographical, and political status we would be entering
the world in- all of us would demand that the right to access to basic necessities in order to live a
minimally adequate life. So how is it that we don‟t demand that for others, though we ourselves would
demand it as a bare minimum?
Bibliography and works cited
Jones, Charles. Global Justice, Defending Cosmopolitanism. Oxford University Press, 1999
Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights. Polity Press (in association with Blackwell Publishers
Ltd), 2002.
Lecture Notes (including Symposium presentation by guest lecturer)