1

The Diffusion of Religious Independence:

Predictors of Dropping Out Over Time

Ryan T. Cragun
University of Tampa
ryantcragun@gmail.com

This paper was originally part of my doctoral dissertation. I owe a

debt of gratitude to Rhys H. Williams, P. Neal Ritchey, and Steve Carlton-

Ford for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Abstract:
Glenn Vernon (1968), in the late 1960s, proposed that scholars of religion should focus more

attention on religious independents (a.k.a. religious nones). Some headway has been made in this

pursuit over the intervening 40 years (Bromley 1988), but much of this work has been a-theoretical and

focused almost exclusively on the correlates of dropping out. Researchers have discovered some

variables that correlate with dropping out of religious participation, including: being male, age, cohort,

educational attainment, lower levels of religious service attendance, less orthodox religious beliefs, and

postponing marriage. In this paper I examine these correlates in greater detail. My primary focus is on

the changing relationship between these correlates and dropping out over time using the combined GSS

data from 1973-2004. I find that dropping out of religion is an innovation, like other innovations

(Rogers 2006), and that it is slowly spreading through U.S. society. I examine these trends in light of

the secularization debate and argue that they reflect slow but steady secularization trends in the U.S.
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Introduction
Why do people dropout of religious participation? Much of the existing research addressing

this question is geared toward discovering simple correlates of dropping out with the aim of predicting

who will leave (Hadaway and Roof 1988). While scholars have found some correlates, many lacunae

remain in trying to answer this question. First, much of the literature is a-theoretical; it describes

characteristics correlated with dropping out without providing clear rationales for why those

characteristics are or should associate with dropping out (Hadaway and Roof 1988; Roof and

McKinney 1987). Secondly, there is little or no discussion of the changing characteristics of dropouts

over time (Condran and Tamney 1985) Given the increasing percentages of dropouts in the U.S.

(Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar 2001), it is possible that the characteristics of dropouts or predictors of

dropping out change over time. This project attempts to fill primarily the second lacunae by providing

a clear theoretical framework that helps, in part, explain why people drop out while examining the

changing relationship between dropping out and the correlates of dropping out over time.

Literature Review

Definitions
Before I discuss the correlates of dropping out, let me first clarify the definitions I use

throughout this paper as they reflect my categories of interest. As noted above, I am interested in the

correlates of dropping out. But what do I mean by dropping out? There are a number of existing terms

used to refer to people who leave religions, ranging from the relatively benign “disaffiliate” and

“disidentifier” to the more value laden “deserter” and “defector.” These terms refer to individuals who

leave a religion, but they do not necessarily specify where such individuals end up. I am interested in
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individuals who leave a religion but do not re-identify with another religion. In other words, they drop

out of religious affiliations altogether. They become “religious independents” (Vernon 1968), or

“religious nones.”

Previous researchers (Albrecht and Bahr 1983; Bahr and Albrecht 1989; Hoge 1988; Roozen

1980; Wilson and Sherkat 1994) employ the term “dropout” in reference to individuals who shed their

religious affiliation and do not re-affiliate. “Dropout” is almost as value laden as “defector” and

“deserter” in that its most common referent is to dropping out of school, which is generally considered

a negative behavior. However, given that it is framing a transition relative to having a religious

affiliation, I will continue to use the term.1 While being a “dropout” or “religious independent” may be

a temporary situation (Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977), it may also be long-term (Altemeyer and

Hunsberger 1997).

I will contrast dropouts with several other groups. First are the individuals raised in a religion

who stay members of that religion. Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977) refer to such individuals as

“identifiers,” but I find that term inadequately descriptive as anyone who adheres to a religious

tradition can claim that label despite a varied history that may include periods as members of many of

the above categories. I prefer the term “stayers” to refer to individuals who were raised religious and

remain religious. However, this label includes two groups of people: (1) “switchers,” individuals

raised in one denomination who later change their affiliation to another; and (2) “loyalists,” or

individuals who remain members of the same denomination in which they were raised. “Switcher” is a

popular label used by many researchers (Albrecht and Bahr 1983; Bibby and Brinkerhoff 1973, 1983;

Hadaway and Marler 1993; though see Stark and Finke 2000 for a different label for this group).2

1 I am, however, open to better, less value laden vocabulary.

2 Hadaway and Marler add a further specification to the label “switcher” by referring to “within” and “between” religious
family switchers. “Within” family switchers remain within the broad religious family they started in, but move to a
different denomination within that family (e.g., Episcopalian to Presbyterian). “Between” family switchers move from
one broad religious family to another (e.g., Muslim to Jew).
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Wilson and Sherkat (1994) used the term “loyalists” in their study of individuals who return to

religious activity.3

Similar to the loyalists are the “unchurched,” or individuals raised as “religious independents”

who remain “religious independents” (Hunsberger 1983). This is, technically, a form of loyalism, but

an a-religious form. This term also has negative connotations, as it implies these people should be

“churched.” Readers may be noticing a pattern here: labels referring to people who do not have an

affiliation tend to have a negative frame: “religious none,” “dropout,” and “unchurched.” I believe this

is a current limitation of this line of scientific inquiry as language holds a great deal of power

(Bosmajian 1983) and all of these labels paint irreligion negatively while painting affiliation positively.

As objective scholars of religion, it is probably time we came up with more objective labels to refer to

individuals who do not affiliate.

One final category is of interest to me in this study. While there has been some research on

individuals raised without a religious affiliation who join religions and affiliate later in life (Altemeyer

and Hunsberger 1997), there is, as of yet, no specific label to refer to these individuals.4 As “convert”

is too broad of a label (referring to anyone who experiences a change in their religious identity; see

Johnstone 1997), I propose a new label: “first-timers.” First-timers, thus, are individuals raised without

a religious affiliation who later join a religious group.

As I examine the correlates of dropping out over time, I need to do this relative to at least one of

the other groups described above. But rather than use just one of the other groups as the comparison

group (e.g., loyalists, switchers, etc.), I have chosen to use several groups as they all differ on one

factor of importance – they have an affiliation. Thus, in this analysis, I compare dropouts (those who
3 Wilson and Sherkat included the “unchurched” in their loyalist group. In their “limitations” section they note that
including the “unchurched” in their “loyalists” category likely influenced their findings.
4 Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) refer to individuals in a similar situation as “amazing converts,” but that label is very
specific to their research agenda in that study and they do not indicate that it refers to the broader group of first-time
converts.
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had an affiliation but left all religious affiliation) with those who have an affiliation, combining three

groups to do so: loyalists, switchers, and first-timers.

Theory
As part of a larger project examining religious identity change generally (Cragun 2007), I

wanted to know if the relationships between dropping out and other variables change over time. There

is justification for this line of inquiry (Condran and Tamney 1985; Rogers 2006; Tamney, Powell, and

Johnson 1989). Tamney et al., using data through the 1970s and 1980s, found that the characteristics of

religious independents changed over time. Since that may be the case for religious dropouts (who

become religious independents) as well – following the trends of innovators and innovation as

proposed by Rogers (2006) – I believe this warrants analyzing the relationships between the the risk

factors5 of dropping out and dropping out over time to see if the relationships changed.

Condran and Tamney (1985) describe the changing characteristics of religious independents

over time. Prior to 1960, they argue that people left religions because religions favored higher

socioeconomic classes over lower socioeconomic classes. As religions refocused their efforts on

members of lower socioeconomic classes in the 1960s, the factors leading people to leave changed.

The late 1960s were also a time of significant cultural turmoil in the U.S. Cultural trends opposing

traditional values were on the rise. One of the traditional values opposed was participation in

organized religion, or at least the moral values espoused by most organized religions at the time (see

Arnett and Jensen 2002 and Hoffman 1998 for current views of this perspective). As a result,

according to Condran and Tamney, the factors leading to dropping out changed from socioeconomic

status to moral and cultural factors.

5 I use “risk factors” in the demographic sense to refer to the factors that correlate with dropping out. In this particular
case I call them “secularizing risk factors” as they predict a change toward lower levels of religious commitment.
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Another argument for why these characteristics may change over time comes from the work of

Rogers (2006). Rogers details the characteristics of early adopters in his analysis of the diffusion of

innovation. Early adopters are generally young, male, highly educated, and risk takers. Given these

characteristics are also risk factors for dropping out of religion (see below), it is possible that religious

dropouts are, in essence, early adopters of a trend toward nonaffiliation (i.e., secularization). If this is

true, it may indicate that dropping out is a cultural and behavioral innovation that began gaining

momentum in the late 1960s (in the U.S. - earlier in other developed countries; see Bruce 2002). If

religious dropouts look less and less like early adopters or innovators, it may be the case that this

particular innovation – dropping out – is diffusing in U.S. society. Such a finding is relevant to the

discussion about the secularization of U.S. society (Bruce 2002; Dobbelaere 2002; Stark and Finke

2000) as it would indicate that secularization is just beginning in the U.S. and is likely to spread.

What, then, are the correlates or “risk factors” of dropping out? There is evidence that each of

the following lead to changes in religious identities that either protect against or increase the odds of

dropping out: sex (Levin, Taylor, and Chatters 1994); age (Hoge 1988); college attendance or education

in general (Funk and Willits 1987); marriage, delaying marriage, divorce, and having children

(Stolzenberg et al. 1995); being raised in or living in different parts of the U.S. (Stump 1986); and

changes in other dimensions of religiosity (Hoge and Roozen 1979). I discuss each of these factors in

greater detail below.

Sex
It is generally agreed upon by sociologists of religion that women (in the U.S. and Judeo-

Christian religions generally) exhibit higher religious commitment than men (Chaves 1997; Levin,

Taylor, and Chatters 1994; Nelsen and Potvin 1981; Thompson 1991). While the exact factors that
8

result in women being more religiously committed than men are still disputed (Nelson and Potvin

1981), there is at least some evidence to indicate that the differences are due to primary socialization

(Thompson 1991). Thompson finds that socialization into gender roles, which he views as a continuum

and not as two distinct categories, is probably the best way to understand the differences found in

religious commitment between men and women. Women are socialized into specific roles in social life

that tend to more closely ally with a religious outlook than the roles of men.

In relation to dropping out, most studies find that, in the U.S. and among Judeo-Christian

religions, men are more likely to dropout than are women (Hadaway and Roof 1988). Caplovitz and

Sherrow (1977) found that the Protestant and Catholic men in their college graduate samples were

almost twice as likely to dropout as were Protestant and Catholic women; 15% of Protestant men vs.

8% of Protestant women and 9% of Catholic men vs. 5% of Catholic women. Jewish women, however,

were only slightly less likely than were Jewish men to dropout; 14% of Jewish men vs. 11% of Jewish

women. Nelsen (1981) and Hoge (1988) found similar patterns in the 1970s and 1980s and

Stolzenberg et al. (1995) found similar patterns in the 1990s. In summary, gender is related to later-life

religious identities, specifically – men tend to have lower religious commitment levels than do women.

Age
Hoge (1988) notes that the primary drop out years – the teens and early twenties – overlap with

the time when many youths leave their parents' homes, which often involves a substantial transition in

many roles. A number of additional studies find that dropping out tends to occur when people are

relatively young (Hadaway and Roof 1988; Roof and McKinney 1987). Albrecht, Cornwall, and

Cunningham (1988) found that the majority of Mormon youth who leave do so when they are between

15 and 25 years old. They also found a slight difference in the ages for men and women: men dropout
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between 15 and 28; women dropout between 17 and 25. Hunsberger (1983), who did the majority of

his research in Canada, found that the average age when the college students in his sample had dropped

out was 14.7 years old, between four and five years before they ever entered college. Ozorak (1989)

also found that the majority of dropping out occurred while people were in high school. Age – more

specifically, youth – is related to dropping out of religious activity.

Previous findings looking at the influence of age and aging on religious commitment have not

offered much in the way of explanation. Findings on this correlate are often divorced from theory

(Hadaway and Roof 1988). One possible explanation is that age is a proxy measure tied to life

changes. That is, aging itself does not lead to religious identity conflict but instead it reflects, as a

proxy, other life events that do lead to religious identity conflict (Ebaugh 1988). What leads to

religious identity conflict are the changes that accompany aging. As Hoge noted, the prime dropping

out years overlap with the period when young adults experience substantial changes in their lives. This

is also the primary age period in which people who start their lives without religion find religion

(Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1997).

Stolzenberg et al., (1995) give another example of how age serves as a proxy for other risk

factors. In their “Family Life Cycle Model” they use age to understand changes in religious identities.

They find that religious participation increases in the late 20s and early 30s. However, the changes

come not from aging per se but from marrying and having children. The presence of young children in

the home increases religious participation significantly, as does marrying for men. As the presence of

young children in the home correlates with specific ages, this finding illustrates how age can serve as a

proxy for identity conflict risk factors.

Scholars also note that religious commitments are relatively stable in later-life – once past 50,

most people retain their religious identities (Albrecht and Bahr 1983; Albrecht, et al. 1988). As very
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few life changes occur in later-life and lifestyles tend toward relative stability, the threats to an

individual's religious identity are minimized, resulting in lower incidents of religious change.

Considering age as a proxy for other life changes explains Roozen's (1980) findings, as he

illustrated the complex relationship between age and disaffiliation. Few researchers explain that while

it is true younger people are more likely to dropout, it is those same young people who are going to age

and possibly return to religious activity at a later point in their lives (Hoge 1988). Roozen (1980)

calculated that close to 80% of dropouts later reinvolve themselves in religious activity. Roozen's 80%

figure is a stochastic extrapolation and does not actually reflect the number of people in his sample who

reinvolved themselves in religious participation (the actual number was 51%). Roozen's calculations

were based upon an individual's age and their probability of re-engaging at a later date. What Roozen's

work illustrates, then, is that status change from religiously involved to no religious affiliation is not

necessarily a permanent one. In fact, for a large percentage of religious exiters, the label “dropout” is a

temporary one during a relatively short period of their lives – for many, from their late teens to their

early thirties. The fact that levels of religious commitment change based upon age, going both up and

down, seems to indicate that age is more a proxy than an actual cause of religious identity conflict.

While it may seem like there is a straightforward correlation between age and religious

commitment – as people get older, they become more religiously committed – I do not think previous

studies indicate as much. At best it appears that there is a curvilinear effect – childrens' initial religious

identity is reflective of the identities of their parents (Smith and Denton 2005). Many teens and young

adults then experience a period of religious inactivity (i.e., a decline in organizational commitment; see

Arnett and Jensen 2002), but later increase their religious commitment (when they have kids or marry).

Religious commitments then tend to remain fairly stable from the late 20s and early 30s through the

rest of one's life. In summary, age is correlated with dropping out, but its relationship may be due to its
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relationship to other risk factors and it does not have a perfectly linear relationship with dropping out.

Educational Attainment
Numerous researchers have explored the complex relationship between education and religious

exiting (Hadaway and Roof 1988; Lee 2002). Higher levels of education do seem to lead to changes in

religious commitment; after all, the goal of most institutions of higher learning is an education that

encourages exploration, discovery, and change.6 Higher education introduces students to new ideas and

presents a myriad of opportunities for interacting with individuals with different religious identities

(Berger 1990).

Despite what some may believe is a straightforward relationship between education and

religious commitment, educational attainment's influence on religious identities is complex. Some

studies find more education leads to a higher likelihood of dropping out of religious participation, but

others do not. Hadaway and Roof (1988) found education relates positively and linearly to dropping

out – the more education you have the more likely you are to drop out of religion. In contrast,

Stolzenberg et al. (1995) found that each year of education increased the chance of religious

participation by about 2% and Lee (2002) found that college attendance was more likely to strengthen

religious convictions than weaken them; about 30% of respondents in her study said it strengthened

their beliefs while only 13% said it weakened them (the balance said it had no effect).

While I believe studies more often indicate that education leads to a decline in religious

participation and/or belief (Iannacccone, Stark, and Finke 1998; Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977) than the

opposite (Lee 2002), the most severe conflict surrounds the influence of a college education on
6 Here's a sample university mission statement: “In support of this mission, the University of Cincinnati strives to provide
the highest quality learning environment, world-renowned scholarship, innovation and community service, and to serve
as a place where freedom of intellectual interchange flourishes.” (emphasis mine) Source:
http://www.uc.edu/president/mission.html
12

religious commitment. Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977) found more dropouts at the end of college than

at the beginning; which is to say, college seniors are more likely to have dropped out than are college

freshmen. But, Hastings and Hoge (1981), using a survey that had been administered to both seniors

and freshmen at a single Catholic university for almost 30 years, did not find a difference in religious

commitment between seniors and freshmen, leading them to claim that education does not result in

more secular views. Lee (2002) also found that most students in her sample did not experience changes

in ideational or belief commitment as a result of their college education.

Johnson's (1997) analysis of the influence of college on dropping out may explain these

disparate findings (see also Wuthnow and Mellinger 1978). Johnson found that there is a split or

division that occurs during college. Among the religiously committed who enter college, some will

experience declines in their religious commitment (typically orthodoxy of belief or ideational

commitment; see Funk and Willits 1987) while others will experience increases in religious

commitment (typically identity and value commitment). For those who maintain a strong identity

commitment, that commitment and identity becomes very salient. In other words, they become more

religiously committed than they were before entering college. Thus, the college experience can

dichotomize groups: while it tends to reduce ideational religious commitment for most people (see

Funk and Willits 1987 and Hastings and Hoge 1981), it can actually increase religious commitment

(especially identity commitment) for others (Lee 2002). This dichotomization is difficult to ascertain

when looking at combined group data or cross-sectional data. In order to tease this out, longitudinal

data (like that used by Johnson) or data that specifically asks about the influence of college education

on religious commitments (like that used by Lee) is required. In short, college education can

simultaneously increase religious commitment for some while decreasing religious commitment for

others.
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An extension of this line of questioning involves the prestige of college education. Caplovitz

and Sherrow (1977) and Zelan (1968) both found that as the prestige of a school increases, dropout

rates increase. Stated another way, students who attend more prestigious or “elite” universities are

more likely to drop out of religion than are students who attend less prestigious universities. Both

Caplovitz and Sherrow and Zelan seem to equate “prestige” with “quality,” which is not necessarily the

same thing. As their distinction is between “elite” and “non-elite” universities rather than “high

quality” and “low quality” educations this distinction is noteworthy. It may not be the quality of an

education that leads to dropping out, but rather the environment or culture in which the education takes

place.

In summary, while the relationship between college education and dropping out of religion may

not be perfectly straightforward, it does appear that – with some exceptions (see Hastings and Hoge

1981 and Johnson 1997) – educational attainment tends to promote dropping out. The prestige of the

institution one attends may also play a role in one's likelihood of dropping out. Thus, educational

attainment is a risk factor for dropping out of religious participation.

Religious Intermarrying and Interpersonal Religious Conflict

While most people in the U.S. still marry someone who has a religious identity similar to their

own (Davidson and Widman 2002), religious intermarrying is often a cause of significant marital

discord (Lehrer and Chiswick 1993). Marriage is a major life event that involves intimate exchanges

with another person. As this relates to religious identities, marriage seems to highlight any conflicting

behavioral expectations that the marriage partners bring to the relationship. As a result, marriage is

very likely to lead to conflict and religious identity change if the identities of the partners differ.
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Stolzenberg et al. (1995) found that marriage can lead to both increases and decreases in

religious commitment. In their study using the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class

of 1972, Stolzenberg et al. found that cohabitation has a significant negative impact on church

membership. Couples who cohabit are much less likely to affiliate with a religion than are couples who

marry, a finding they attribute to a conflict in moral values as many religions in the U.S. frown upon

cohabitation. Despite Stolzenberg et al.'s findings, I do not hypothesize a relationship between

cohabitation and dropping out because I believe there is a problem with causality. With the other

interpersonal network correlates described below, a fairly convincing argument can be made that those

factors precede the changes in religious commitments. But cohabitation may be more of a reflection of

low levels of religious commitment (specifically, identity and ideational commitment). In other words,

individuals who cohabit may already be religious nones or religious dropouts, which is why they

cohabit (Bumpass and Lu 2000). Thornton and Camburn (1989) find reciprocal relationships between

religious commitment and attitudes toward sexuality as well as sexual behaviors – religious

commitment influences the attitudes and behaviors but the attitudes and behaviors also influence the

commitment. Because the causal relationship between cohabitation and dropping out is unclear and

potentially reciprocal, I do not examine it in this paper.

Marriage, on the other hand, does seem to have a more plausible causal role in changes in

religious commitment. Stolzenberg et al. (1995) find that marriage increases the probability of

religious participation, especially for men. Stolzenberg et al. also found that marital disruption (i.e.,

divorce or separation) reduces the probability of religious participation for men by about 10%, but

increases religious participation for women by about 8%. In other words, married men are more likely

to participate in religious activities than are single or divorced men. Married women, on the other

hand, actually see a slight increase in organizational commitment if their marriage dissolves.
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Stolzenberg et al. also found that the presence of children in a home increased religious identity

commitment. For relatively young, married men whose other characteristics give them a 50%

probability of being church members, the presence of two children in the home increased their

probability of church membership to over 70%. Presence of children in the home also increased

women's probability of being a church member.

Looking at things slightly differently, Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977) found that religious

intermarrying led to dropping out. They found that the rates of dropping out were four to five times as

high among those who intermarried than among those who married endogamously (within their own

religion). Also taking a slightly different approach, Hadaway and Roof (1988) found that those who

never married were more likely to have dropped out than married individuals. However, the

relationship between those never marrying and dropping out was not very strong in their study.

Similar to the influence of marriage, interpersonal networks (i.e., friends) can lead to religious

identity conflict (Ebaugh 1988). While researchers showed that network connections were vital to

conversion from one type of religious identity to another in the 1960s (Stark and Lofland 1965; see also

Stark and Bainbridge 1980), very few studies looking at dropping out of religion include measures of

interpersonal networks. Cornwall (1989) included such measures. She found that interpersonal

networks were second only to ideational commitment in their influence on organizational and identity

commitment, more influential than even the influence of parents and parental religious socialization.

Martin, White, and Perlman. (2003) also found that interpersonal networks played a significant role in

determining adult religious identities. And Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1983) found that most converts to

evangelical Christian religions in Canada, despite making up only a small fraction of the actual growth,

came through interpersonal networks. In these studies, peers play an important role in conversions to

religions.
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In summary, those who intermarry religiously and those who have never married are more

likely to dropout. Those who cohabit and men who divorce are more likely to dropout (though women

who divorce are more likely to increase their religious commitments). And having religious friends or

having children in the home can increase religious commitment.

Religious Commitment Conflict

As I am interested in the correlates of dropping out, which is a change in just one dimension of

religious commitment, religious “identity” commitment, it is plausible to argue that changes in the

other dimensions of religious identities may lead to changes in identity commitment (i.e., dropping

out). And, in fact, that is what some studies find (Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977; Cornwall 1987).

According to Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977), changes in religious commitments other than religious

identity commitment are the only “overwhelming determinants” of dropping out. Additionally, most

studies that include measures of religious commitment find that dropouts exhibit much lower levels of

personal religious commitment after dropping out. Hunsberger and Brown (1984) found that dropouts

are less religiously committed than are stayers. And Albrecht and Bahr (1983) found that Mormon

dropouts had the lowest levels of religious commitment of any group they examined.

There are, of course, two significant problem with this variable: causal direction and inferring

religious identity conflict, which go hand in hand in this relationship. It is possible to argue both that:

(1) declining levels of religious commitment ultimately lead to dropping out, and (2) dropping out leads

to declining levels of religious commitment. If there is no easy way to determine causality, one can

only see religious commitments as correlates of dropping out of religious activity. However, there is

some evidence to indicate the causal direction follows the first argument above. Hoge and Roozen

(1979) discuss this issue at length,

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What is the direction of causation between beliefs and church participation? This
question has been much discussed... Some researchers (for example, Lofland and Stark,
1965) have shown that religious beliefs evolve in the midst of church life and that
church life is initially based on personal relationships. Other researchers emphasize the
causal power of beliefs. Hoge and Polk (1976) and Hoge and Carroll (1978) constructed
and tested simple path models positing causation in first one direction, then the other,
and they concluded in both studies that the models positing causation from beliefs to
church participation were stronger than those positing the opposite direction. This
evidence is not very conclusive, but we have warrant for speaking of some causation
from doctrinal beliefs to church attendance. (p. 57)

Their finding, that changes in belief (ideational commitment) result in changes in behavior

(organizational, identity, and value commitment), also makes logical sense. For example, if an

individual belongs to an energetic congregation but finds their enthusiasm for religion waning, this can

lead to religious identity conflict. Alternatively, an individual attending a lackluster congregation

might find it stifling toward his/her religious ideational commitment, resulting in religious identity

conflict – in this case, between two or more dimensions of one's religious identity. A change in

congregation or religious affiliation would resolve the religious identity conflict in both situations.

While I posit this argument tenuously, I believe it accurately reflects what happens in peoples' lives:

certain aspects of one's religious identity may change (e.g., ideational commitment); those changes then

lead to conflict in the other aspects of one's religious identity (e.g., organizational, identity, and value

commitment). In other words, changes in religious participation (organizational commitment) and

religious belief (ideational commitment) could lead to dropping out.

Region of the Country and Rural vs. Urban Cultures

Previous research shows that two geographic factors correlate with religious commitment:
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region of the country and type of community, rural versus urban (Stump 1984, 1986). These factors

may influence religious commitment on multiple levels. Regional and rural/urban differences in

religious commitment are probably reflections of their respective regional and residential cultures.

Southern culture includes a predilection for high levels of religious commitment, while the culture in

the Pacific region of the U.S. is typified by lower levels of religious commitment (Hadaway and Roof

1988; Smith, Denton, Faris, and Regnerus 2002; Smith, Denton, Faris, and Regnerus 2003). Previous

research also shows that rural culture in the U.S. correlates with higher levels of religious commitment

than does urban culture (Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977; Stump 1986). Children raised in these varying

cultural milieus will be socialized into culture groups that exhibit these specific religious commitment

characteristics.

It is also possible that the surrounding culture of adults living in different environments will

influence them. Adults living in different regions of the country may be more or less influenced by the

dominant cultural values of those regions. As a result, later life religious identities may be influenced

by the cultural milieu of individuals' environments. Because regional and community type differences

can influence religious commitment at two levels, in early childhood socialization and during one's

adult life, both warrant examination as they relate to religious identities.

According to Stump (1986), different regions of the country place different levels of emphasis

on religion, which is transmitted through the socialization of children by parents. Among Caplovitz

and Sherrow's (1977) college graduates, those who lived in the Western U.S. were the most likely to

dropout or be unchurched to begin with. Those who lived in the Southern U.S. were the least likely to

drop out. Both Hadaway and Roof (1988) and Kluegel (1980) found similar patterns: the Western U.S.

leads the country in dropout rates.

Similarly, differences in religious commitment relate to the type of community in which

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someone was raised, either rural or urban (Hadaway and Roof 1988). Caplovitz and Sherrow (1977)

found that the dropout rates of the Protestants and Jews in their sample increased with the size of one's

home town. Hadaway and Roof (1988) noted a similar finding in their examination of GSS data from

the 1970s and 1980s. And Stolzenberg et al. (1995) found that individuals raised in rural areas were

more likely to affiliate with religious organizations than those raised in towns, cities, or suburbs.

In summary, regional and community type differences correlate with religious commitment.

Because these measures may have influences both on children and on adults, I examine both where

someone grew up and where they currently live.

Hypotheses
In summary, then, each of the following are risk factors for dropping out: age and sex; college

attendance or education in general (Funk and Willits 1987); marriage, delaying marriage, and having

children (Stolzenberg et al. 1995); being raised in or living in different parts of the U.S. (Stump 1986);

and changes in other dimensions of religiosity (Hoge and Roozen 1979). My goal in the analysis that

follows is not primarily to confirm that these are risk factors (though I do do that) but rather to see if

the relationship between these risk factors and dropping out has changed over the last 30 years.

Basically, I am asking: Are the risk factors outlined above still good predictors of dropping

out?7 If they are still good predictors of dropping out, this would indicate that religious dropouts

remain substantially different from religious affiliates and that it is not difficult to predict who will and

who will not drop out. If this is the case, this would indicate that dropping out is not an innovation and

that secularization is not taking place. But if they are decreasingly clear predictors of dropping out, i.e.

if their relationship with dropping out is not as strong as it used to be or dropouts and affiliates are

7 By “predictors” here I am not asserting a wholly causal relationship, though much of this literature does imply that.
20

increasingly similar, this would mean it will be increasingly difficult to use these risk factors to predict

who will and will not drop out of religious participation.

If dropouts are increasingly similar to affiliates, there are several possible explanations for this

change. It may be the case that affiliates are growing more like dropouts in that they are becoming less

religiously committed and the “authority” of religions is declining (Chaves 1994). Alternatively,

dropouts may be becoming more like religious affiliates, indicating people are leaving religions not

because they do not believe in god but rather because they have less confidence in religious institutions

(Hoffman 1998). Finally, a combination of both may be taking place – affiliates are growing more

secular while dropouts are growing more religiously committed. If either or both are taking place, I

believe this provides additional evidence that secularization is taking place in the U.S. (Chaves 1994;

Bruce 2002). Declining religious authority and people leaving because of lack of confidence in

institutions (i.e., believing without belonging, Davie 1994), indicates secularization (Bruce 2002).

One more theoretical approach is important in understanding what might be taking place: the

diffusion of innovation. Following the work of Rogers (2006), at least three of the above risk factors of

dropping out are common among innovators: being young, male, and highly educated. If it is

decreasingly the case that dropouts differ from affiliates on these three risk factors, it may also indicate

that dropping out is an innovation that is diffusing through U.S. society. If that is the case, it may be

possible to predict future diffusion and develop a time line for secularization in the U.S.

Data
Data for this project come from the combined 1972-2004 National Opinion Research Center's

(NORC) General Social Survey (GSS) data set. The combined data set has a total N of 46,510.
21

However, NORC did not ask one of the key questions required for this analysis in 1972 (religious

affiliation at age 16), so the following analyses do not include any participants from the 1972 wave of

the survey (n=1,613). Another 272 participants did not respond to one of the two questions used to

determine whether someone ended their religious affiliation (religious affiliation at age 16 and religious

affiliation at present), reducing the sample to n=44,625. All of the descriptive statistics and frequencies

reported in the tables below are for GSS participants whose religious status was determinable with the

exception of the unchurched, i.e., dropouts, first-timers, loyalists, and switchers (n=43,606).

Variables
I used four variables to create the five religious affiliation categories: (1) religious affiliation at

the age of 16 (RELIG16); (2) religious affiliation at the time of the interview (RELIG); (3)

denominational affiliation at 16 for Protestants (DENOM16); and denominational affiliation at the time

of the survey for Protestants (DENOM). The religious affiliation questions provided for up to 13

different religious categories, with only one of these listed as “NONE”. For three of the religious

affiliation types – dropout, unchurched, and first-timer – just the religion at 16 and religion at time of

survey variables were necessary. I dummy coded the two variables to indicate whether participants had

affiliations at 16 and the time of the survey. I then used those variables to indicate types. I classified

individuals who reported no religious affiliation at both 16 and the time of the interview as unchurched.

I classified individuals who reported no religious affiliation at 16 but an affiliation at the time of the

interview as first-timers. Finally, I classified individuals who reported a religious affiliation at 16 but

no affiliation at the time of the interview as dropouts.

The remaining two types of religious affiliation required some additional work. To determine

the loyalist and switcher types I first compared (by subtracting one from the other) the non-dummy
22

coded versions of affiliation at 16 and affiliation at the time of the survey. If they were different, I

classified participants as switchers. If they were the same, I classified them as loyalists. But this was

not sufficient for one group of respondents: if they reported being Protestant (#1) at both times, I had to

do some additional classifying. For all individuals who reported their affiliation as Protestant at 16 and

at the time of the survey I used the denominational affiliation variables to determine if they switched

denominations. I used the same technique as in the initial comparison, subtracting one from the other

(i.e., DENOM – DENOM16). Those who remained in the same denomination I classified as loyalists;

those who did not I classified as switchers (this approach follows those of Wilson and Sherkat 1994 and

Hadaway and Marler 1993).

Sex is measured as a simple dichotomous variable – (1) male, (0) female. I use two measures of

age in the analyses that follow. First, I use the standard measure of self-reported age (AGE). But due

to the curvilinear relationship between age and religious commitment (Chaves 1989; Glenn 1987;

Sasaki and Suzuki 1987), I decided to recode age into groups to tease out curvilinearity. The GSS does

not survey individuals under 18 years of age, so the youngest age included in the sample is 18. Also,

the GSS caps the age at 89, so the oldest age coded in the sample is 89 even though individuals older

than 89 may have participated. I recoded age into seven groups: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-

79, and 80+.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

I operationalize educational attainment as the number of years of schooling completed (EDUC),

ranging from 0 to 20 in 1 year increments. Twelve years (12) implies the participant completed high

school; 16 implies the participant completed an undergraduate degree; and 20 implies the participant
23

completed a graduate degree. The mean education of participants in the sample is 12.65 years, or

slightly more than a high school education.

The GSS asked participants their marital status (MARITAL). There are five response stems:

married, widowed, divorced, separated, and never married. As I noted above, I exclude divorce and

cohabitation from this analysis because their directional influences on religious commitment are

unclear. I dummy coded two of the statuses as individual dummy variables: married and never married.

Both are coded 1 if the participant falls into that category and 0 if they do not. I also include a simple

measure of the number of children that participants report (CHILDS).

[Insert Table 2 here.]

The GSS used two separate variables to capture spouse's current religious affiliation – SPREL

and RELIGSP. The first variable, SPREL, was used from 1972 through 1994. The second variable,

RELIGSP, was used in 1991 and in 1998. The question wording is almost identical. The SPREL

variable asked, “What is your spouse's religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some

other religion, or no religion?” The RELIGSP variable asked, “What is your husband's/wife's religious

preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?” Response categories

varied slightly. The SPREL variable included (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Jewish, (4) None, and (5)

Other. The RELIGSP variable included two additional stems – (4) Orthodox and (5) Moslem. I

recoded the RELIGSP variable to match the coding scheme of the SPREL variable (i.e., Orthodox and

Moslem became “Other”). There is actually overlap in one year, 1991. For the most part, responses to

the SPREL question matched the responses to the RELIGSP variable, but in 37 cases, they did not

match. While it is interesting to note that within the same survey people responded differently on
24

nearly identical questions, that finding is not of particular interest in this study. Without a clear

rationale for favoring one variable over the other, I simply chose to go with the responses to the SPREL

variable where the two did not agree.8 I combined the two variables into a new variable (SPRELX1)

and dummy coded the variable to reflect (1) affiliation and (0) non-affiliation (SPRELX3).

Given the importance of personal religious commitments in this project and how strong of a

correlate it is with dropping out in previous research (Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977), I include several

questions relating to participant's levels of religious commitment. The first is a measure of religious

organizational commitment, religious attendance (ATTEND). The question asked participants how

often they attended religious services and gave them options ranging from (0) never to (8) several times

a week. This is an interval-like ordinal variable and is often used as an interval variable in analyses.

The second variable asked participants if they believe in life after death (POSTLIFE): (1) yes

and (2) no were the response categories. I reversed the coding so the effect was in the same direction

as religious attendance: (1) yes (0) no (XPSTLIFE). The GSS also asked participants to report how

often they pray (PRAY). The response categories ranged from (1) several times a day to (6) never. I

also reverse coded this variable to bring the direction of its effect in line with religious attendance: (1)

never to (6) several times a day (XPRAY). This variable is also customarily used as an interval

variable even though it is an interval-like ordinal variable.

To capture any influence regional and rural/urban culture differences may have on religious

commitment, I examine it at two times, while participants were growing up and as adults. The GSS

includes a variable indicating the region of the country in which participants were raised (REG16).

The variable breaks the U.S. up into nine regions plus a category for individuals born outside the U.S.:

New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South

8 The 37 cases are less than .3% of the total.

25

Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. As previous research (Stump 1986) finds that

primarily two regions stand out in their relationships to religious commitment, being raised in the South

or West, I created dummy variables to indicate being raised in those two regions. The “South” dummy

code includes the following regions: South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central. The

“West” dummy code includes the Pacific and Mountain regions.9

To capture the influence of the size of one's community on religious commitment I use a

measure of the type of community in which participants lived while growing up (RES16). The

community types included in this variable are: country non-farm, farm, small city, medium city, suburb,

and large city. These are discrete, nominal categories. To capture their influence on religious

commitment, I dummy coded each category.

As the culture of the region of the country in which someone lives may also influence religious

commitment later in life, I examine region of the country at the time of the interview. With the

exclusion of the foreign-born option, the variable is coded the same as the region at 16 variable

described above. I also created two dummy variables from this variable to capture living in the South

and West.

A different measure captures rural/urban differences at the time of the interview: the size of the

community in which the participant was living at the time of the interview (SIZE). This is a continuous

variable that reports the size of a participant's community in thousands. It ranges from 1 to over 7,000

(i.e., over 7 million). To regularize the distribution (and reduce outliers), I used the natural logarithm

of this variable rather than the variable itself (XLOGSIZE). While it affects the intuitive meaning of

the variable, logging the variable does not change the statistical relationship between the the size of a

9 The states included in each region are as follows: South Atlantic = Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, District of Columbia; East South Central = Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama,
Mississippi; West South Central = Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas; Pacific = Washington, Oregon, California,
Alaska, and Hawaii; and Mountain = Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
26

participant's community and dropping out. I present descriptive statistics for all of these variables in

Tables 1 and 2.

Methods
In the analyses that follow, my comparison groups are (1) dropouts, and (0) affiliates (i.e.,

loyalists, switchers, and first-timers combined). I call this second group “affiliates” in this analysis, as

that is the typology dimension they have in common. I could compare affiliates to non-affiliates

(which would include the unchurched with dropouts), but because I am interested specifically in

religious change, I exclude the unchurched from this analysis to focus on the characteristics of

dropouts.

What, exactly, do I mean by “change over time”? I mean: Are the means of the risk factors (i.e.,

correlates) for the two groups of interest growing closer together or further apart? If the distance

between the two groups remains constant over time, the relationship between the secularizing risk

factors and dropping out is not changing. If the distance increases or decreases, the relationship is

changing.

The dependent variable in this analysis is not whether or not an individual is a dropout (or

affiliate) but rather the religious identity conflict risk factors themselves. I use a dummy variable

coded (1) dropout and (0) affiliate as one of the independent variables (more on this below). This

rearrangement of the independent and dependent variables is necessary in order to capture the trends in

the religious identity conflict risk factors over time.

I use a multiplicative interaction autoregression analysis (Pedhazur 1997) to test for differences

in slopes and intercepts for dropouts and affiliates. A multiplicative interaction model allows one to
27

test several things simultaneously. In the first analysis, there are three independent variables. The first

is time. By regressing each of the dependent variables (religious risk factors) on time, I can analyze the

resulting coefficients for change in the dependent variable over time: If the slope coefficient is

significant, this indicates a significant change in that variable over time. The second independent

variable is a dummy code for the two categories of interest, (1) dropout or (0) affiliate. If the slope

coefficient in the regression analysis for this variable is significant, this implies that the intercept of the

two categories differs. In other words, the difference between affiliates and dropouts is significant.

Finally, the interaction variable is the dummy variable multiplied by the year. If the slope coefficient of

the dummy variable is significant it indicates that the slopes for the two categories of interest differ

over time. In other words, the interaction variable indicates whether the difference between affiliates

and dropouts is significantly increasing or decreasing over time.

The formula used in this analysis can be represented as follows:

28

X =ab 1∗Y 1 b2∗Y 2b3∗Y 1∗Y 2b4∗X t −1

Where:
 X is the dependent variable (e.g., age)
 a is the regression intercept
 b1 is the slope of the first independent variable; for all the analyses, this is the
year of data collection
 Y1 is the year of data collection
 b2 is the slope of the dummy variable distinguishing affiliates from dropouts
 Y2 is the dummy variable
 b3 is the slope of the interaction variable
 (Y1 * Y2) = Y3 this is the interaction variable derived by multiplying the year by
the dummy code for stayer or dropout
 b4 is is the correction for serial autocorrelation
 Xt-1 is the predicted value of the dependent variable for the previous year

Because time is an independent variable in this analysis, serial auto-correlation is a concern.

Thus, the first step was to analyze the residuals from a regression of the dependent variable on time for

auto-correlation. To do this I regressed mean values for each religious identity conflict risk factor (e.g.,

age, educational attainment, etc.) for every year the variable was included in the survey on the year of

the survey and outputted the residuals (i.e., errors) from the analysis.10 The residual is the difference

between the predicted value and the expected value of a regression line (i.e., the distance between the

actual value and the regression line). I also had SPSS generate a Durbin/Watson statistic for each

regression, which tests for auto-correlation. I then generated correlations between the residuals for the

first 16 lags (the first 4 are shown in Table 2).

10 The regressions for each category of the variable used to generate the residuals have to be done separately in order for
the analysis to make sense. If the two categories are stacked before you generate the residuals it muddles the
relationship between the variable categories and time.
29

As the lags showed serial auto-correlation on a number of variables and the Durbin/Watson

statistic indicated there was auto-correlation, I decided to use the autoregression function of SPSS to

test the interaction variables rather than OLS regression. Thus, I generated all of the slope coefficients

reported below using the autoregression function, even if the Durbin/Watson statistic did not differ

substantially from 2 (Durbin and Watson 1950).

In order to test the interaction variable, I stacked the mean scores on the dependent variables for

the two categories of interest, dropouts and affiliates. In other words, there are two observations for

every year of the GSS survey in which the dependent variable was included. If the GSS included the

variable every year of the GSS, the maximum number of observations in the autoregression analysis is

48; 24 observations for each category of the dummy variable, dropouts and affiliates.

To reiterate, the goal of this analysis is to determine if the relationships between these variables

shown to correlate with dropping out change over time. Thus, of primary interest is the interaction

variable, which indicates whether there is a significant difference in slopes over time. If the difference

in slopes is statistically significant, the relationship between the variable of interest and dropping out

changed over time.

Results
I analyzed each of the variables previous research indicated were risk factors for dropping out.

Table 3 presents the results of the analyses. As mentioned above, the coefficients are of primary

interest; I included the Durbin/Watson and lag measures to illustrate the necessity of using

autoregression.

Many of the variables are significantly predicted by the year of the survey, indicating the mean
30

values for those variables changed over time. Several variables were not significantly predicted by the

year of the survey – percent male, frequency of prayer, frequency of attendance, percent of spouses

affiliated, percent raised in the South, percent live in the West, percent raised in the country, percent

raised in small towns, and percent raised in large cities. The variables that do show change over time

all show change in directions that make sense given what we know about the composition of the U.S.

population. For instance, there is a positive relationship between year of the survey and the average

age, indicating an aging U.S. population. There are also positive relationships between year of the

survey and: (1) size of one's community at the time of the survey (more people live in big cities); (2)

educational attainment (the U.S. populace is more educated); (3) and the percentage of people who

have never married. The variables that are negatively related to year of the survey are also intuitive:

the percent of people raised on a farm has declined in the last 30 years, as have more orthodox beliefs

about immortality, and the average number of children. The second column in Table 2 presents the

coefficients for the dummy coded variable indicating dropout or affiliate. Only three of the variables

are not significantly related to whether someone is a dropout or a religious affiliate – current

community size, percent raised in the country, and percent raised in a small town. All of the other

coefficients indicate significant differences between dropouts and religious affiliates.

[Insert Table 3 here.]

The third column indicates changing relationships between the risk factors and dropping out,

whether the interaction variable (time by group) is significant. In other words, if it is significant it

indicates that the differences between the means of the two groups changed over time. Figure 1

provides a clear illustration of the interaction as it charts the mean ages for dropouts and affiliates over
31

the roughly 30 year time span of the GSS. The interaction coefficient is significant, indicating that the

mean age for dropouts changed relative to the mean age for affiliates. As is the case for all of the

variables where the interaction is significant, the means grew closer together: dropouts were more

similar to affiliates in age in 2004 than they were in 1973. The average age for dropouts in 1973 was

36 versus 44 for affiliates. In 2004 the average ages for both groups went up, but more so for dropouts;

the average age was 41 for dropouts in 2004 and 46 for affiliates. The black lines in the figures are

regression lines that smooth out the observed points.11

[Insert Figure 1 here.]

I include two more figures to illustrate the trends. Figure 2 charts mean educational attainment

for dropouts and affiliates over the years of the GSS. The interaction coefficient for educational

attainment is also significant, indicating educational attainment changed at different rates for the two

groups. And, as was the case with age, the means grew closer together: In 1973, the mean educational

attainment for dropouts was 13 years, for affiliates it was 11. By 2004, both experienced increases,

from 13 to 14 years for dropouts, and from 11 years to 13.6 years for affiliates. The finding of interest,

however, is that affiliates increased their educational attainment at a faster rate than did dropouts. The

educational attainment for the two groups is now almost identical.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

Finally, I include Figure 3, which charts the mean number of children for dropouts and affiliates

over the course of the GSS. The interaction coefficient is not significant. Close scrutiny of Figure 3
11 The regression lines are not perfectly straight due to missing years in GSS data collection.
32

gives the impression that the two lines are converging, but the change has been so subtle that it does not

register as significant in the autoregression analysis. The figure does illustrate why the other two

coefficients – the year and dummy variables – are significant: there is a substantial difference in the

mean number of children dropouts have compared to affiliates and the number of children had by both

groups changed over time.

[Insert Figure 3 here.]

Discussion
The primary question I asked with this analysis was: Are the risk factors of dropping out of

religious participation still good predictors of dropping out? The above analyses seem to indicate that

they are, for now, but that they may not continue to be for much longer. Educational attainment, in

particular, is nearing parity between dropouts and affiliates. When that happens, it will no longer be a

good predictor of dropping out. The same is true of age. Other variables are changing as well, but at a

much slower rate (see below).

This analysis does not say for sure whether it is dropouts or affiliates who are changing, but it

seems to be dependent on the risk factor. Dropouts appear to be growing more religiously committed

in that they are more likely to believe in immortality, pray, and even attend religious services.

Additionally, it is dropouts who are growing older (meaning people dropout and stay out at later ages).

But affiliates seem to be changing in their level of educational attainment and the number of children

they are having, growing closer to dropouts on those risk factors.

What does this indicate in terms of secularization? The ranks of the dropouts are increasing,

and they are increasing with people who drop their affiliation but remain religiously committed in other
33

ways besides affiliation. This seems to indicate that confidence in religious institutions is, like

Hoffman (1998) found, on the rise. Individuals who leave religions apparently do not give up all

aspects of their religiosity but do drop their affiliations. As Davie (1994) described in Europe, people

believe but don't belong. Even so, there is still greater dissimilarity between dropouts and affiliates in

levels of religious commitment than there is similarity.

The above findings also indicate that Condran and Tamney (1985) were correct: the correlates

of dropping out do change over time. The changes in age and educational attainment between dropouts

and affiliates attest to that. But it may also indicate that religious exiting is a form of cultural

innovation that is increasingly popular in the U.S. (i.e., secularization is taking place). The increasing

percentage of the U.S. population without a religious affiliation supports this hypothesis (Kosmin,

Mayer, and Keysar 2001). Also, the declining dissimilarity between dropouts and affiliates on the two

key measures of age and educational attainment indicate the cultural innovation of religious

disaffiliation is spreading such that it is no longer just the early adopter demographic that is leaving

religions (Rogers 2006).12 It may still be a bit premature to make that claim, especially in light of the

differences that remain between men and women in their religious commitments, but it seems to me

that religious disaffiliation is on the rise and, if truly a diffusing innovation, it is likely to continue.

This analysis also holds some potential for addressing one of the issues often raised by critics of

secularization theory – a time line. While I mentioned this possibility earlier, I did not show any

projections in Table 3. It is, of course, possible, using the autoregression formulas generated for the

risk factors, to project into the future the time at which those factors will have reached parity for

dropouts and affiliates. The dates vary from variable to variable. Also, they are projections based on

the assumption that the social-structural factors influencing them during the end of the 20th Century will

12 An alternative interpretation is that stayers are changing such that education is less a threat to their religious
commitments.
34

remain the same, which is probably not a valid assumption. Even so, it offers some insight into the

future to examine these projections.

I projected values for dropouts and affiliates on several key variables into the future until they

reached parity. The year at which parity was reached in the projection along with the value at which

parity was reach follow each variable: percent male – 2077 (35%), age – 2044 (mean 51.5), belief in

immortality – 2059 (4%), frequency of prayer – 2131 (mean 1.53, which is almost daily), frequency of

attendance – 2337 (mean 2.55, which is about once per month), educational attainment – 2012 (11.8,

which is just less than high school),13 and percent married – 2035 (22%). Obviously there is a large

range here. According to these calculations, educational attainment will reach parity for dropouts and

affiliates in the year 2012. Given the assumptions I am making – that the social structural forces

guiding these changes will remain constant – this is probably the only relatively accurate forecast. But

some of the other projected dates are not too far into the future. Parity in age, belief in immortality, and

percent married could all occur in the next fifty years or so. Parity in the two religious behavioral

measures is much further in the future and may never actually occur (it is too distant to even guess).

Even so, if opponents of secularization theory want to continue to insist that advocates of secularization

have proposed or claim there is a time line for secularization, perhaps these projections can serve as

something of a foundation for a time line. Secularization is a slow process. It is taking place and is

probably a type of innovation,14 but a time line is hard to generate because different indicators of

secularization change at different rates.

I should also note that it is nearly impossible to actually give a time line as the end goal for

“completion” keeps changing. What is meant by “secularized” is not clear. Today in the U.S.

13 There is clearly a problem with this calculation as it is lower than current levels of education. I'm not sure what caused
this problem in the calculation.
14 If it is an innovation, these regressions underestimate the rate of change, as the diffusion of innovation generally follows
an S-shaped curve (Rogers 2006). If that is the case, at some point in the future there will be a rapid adoption of
secularism followed by a leveling off. We may, in fact, be in the midst of that rapid adoption in the U.S. right now.
35

somewhere between 20% and 30% of people attend church weekly (Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves

1998). While a much larger percentage attend less frequently, at what point do we consider the U.S. a

secular country? Does all religious service attendance have to stop, or is there a level of attendance at

which it can safely be said that a country is now secular? If so, who gets to draw that arbitrary line?

When 80% of the people in a country in any given week are not in church, that seems like a pretty

secular nation to me.15 Milestones of secularization need to be developed or the groups debating this

issue will continue talking past each other.

In conclusion, let me make some relatively conservative predictions. In the near future, the

U.S. will continue to grow more secular on various measures. Over the next fifty years, those without

an affiliation will grow increasingly similar to those with an affiliation in terms of age, percent married,

educational attainment, and even belief in immortality. However, three things will keep these two

groups apart: women will continue to be more religious than men, and religious affiliates will be more

likely to attend services and pray. As things are very likely to change dramatically beyond the next

fifty years or so, predictions beyond that point are probably too unsound to be of any value.

15 Granted, this only holds true for cultures where religious service attendance is expected, namely predominantly Judeo-
Christian countries.
36

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Table 1. Descriptives for continuous variables.
dropouts affiliates
mean SD mean SD
age 38.92 14.88 46.02 17.58
education 13.57 3.12 12.57 3.14
size of community^ 3.95 2.22 3.43 2.17
children 1.31 1.54 2.02 1.82
frequency of prayer† 2.80 1.51 4.44 1.44
religious attendance* 0.90 1.48 4.19 2.59
spouse's religious attendance* 1.45 2.38 4.19 2.74

* All of the attendance variables are coded from 0=never to 8=more than weekly.
† Frequency of prayer is coded from 1=never to 6=several times a day
^ Size of community is the natural log of the community size.
Table 2. Frequencies (%) for dropouts and affiliates.
sex male female
dropouts 58.7 41.3
affiliates 42.2 57.8

spousal affiliation affiliation no affiliation

dropouts 57.5 42.5
affiliates 96.0 4.0

belief in immortality believe don't believe

dropouts 55.6 44.4
affiliates 81.8 18.2

marital status married widowed divorced separated never married

dropouts 42.2 4.2 15.4 3.9 34.4
affiliates 56.4 10.7 11.6 3.4 17.8

middle east north west north east south west south

region at 16*
new england atlantic central central south atlantic central central mountain pacific
dropouts 6.0 17.0 19.8 7.4 10.9 4.1 6.6 5.7 16.5
affiliates 4.7 15.8 19.8 8.7 16.2 8.2 9.2 4.1 8.1
region at survey
dropouts 6.3 14.5 16.9 6.4 13.7 3.6 7.2 8.0 23.4
affiliates 4.7 15.2 19.0 7.8 19.3 7.2 9.3 5.4 11.9

country non-
community type
farm farm small city medium city suburb large city
dropouts 11.0 7.9 29.0 17.3 17.0 17.9
affiliates 11.0 17.9 31.8 14.5 9.9 15.0

*foreign born are not reported

Table3. Autoregression coefficients, Durbin/Watson statistics, and lags 1 through 4 for significant trend variables.
variable period dropout = 1 interaction groups Durbin/Watson lag1 lag2 lag3 lag4
age 0.069 ** -9.488 *** 0.132 *** affiliates 2.147 -0.080 -0.461 0.108 0.286
dropouts 1.861 0.052 0.042 -0.024 -0.049
% male 0.000 0.214 *** -0.002 *** affiliates 1.550 0.127 0.352 -0.061 0.265
dropouts 2.586 -0.296 -0.195 0.253 -0.128
education 0.071 *** 1.508 *** -0.038 *** affiliates 1.320 0.339 -0.092 -0.201 -0.140
dropouts 2.852 -0.451 0.224 -0.195 -0.017
# of children -0.013 *** -0.803 *** 0.008 affiliates 1.145 0.379 -0.003 -0.110 -0.224
dropouts 2.193 -0.111 0.043 -0.169 -0.136
% married -0.007 *** -0.172 *** 0.003 affiliates 0.839 0.356 0.123 0.110 -0.080
dropouts 2.164 -0.094 -0.373 -0.280 0.133
% never 0.004 *** 0.205 *** -0.003 * affiliates 1.571 0.070 0.031 0.191 -0.087
married dropouts 2.196 -0.106 -0.287 -0.094 0.183
frequency of 0.007 -1.896 *** 0.012 affiliates 1.518 0.196 0.180 -0.527 -0.215
prayer dropouts 1.995 -0.048 -0.284 0.057 -0.292
believe in -0.002 * 0.338 *** -0.004 ** affiliates 2.579 -0.293 0.003 -0.058 -0.056
immortality dropouts 2.149 -0.087 -0.088 -0.111 -0.117
frequency of -0.005 -3.471 *** 0.010 * affiliates 1.235 0.330 0.060 0.187 -0.212
attendance dropouts 2.161 -0.151 -0.163 0.107 0.093
% spouse's 0.001 0.352 *** -0.008 ** affiliates 1.153 0.346 0.096 0.070 -0.105
affiliated dropouts 1.153 0.346 0.096 0.070 -0.105
% raised in -0.001 -0.128 *** 0.000 affiliates 2.473 -0.255 -0.139 -0.070 -0.327
South dropouts 2.234 -0.297 -0.248 -0.016 0.283
% raised in 0.001 * 0.105 *** -0.001 affiliates 2.284 -0.202 0.004 -0.254 0.107
West dropouts 2.174 -0.155 -0.105 -0.031 -0.092
0.002 ** -0.128 *** 0.001 affiliates 2.648 -0.368 -0.142 0.064 -0.247
% live in South
dropouts 2.273 -0.228 -0.363 -0.122 0.277
% live in West 0.001 0.150 *** -0.001 affiliates 2.502 -0.261 0.145 -0.089 -0.012
dropouts 1.794 -0.001 -0.172 -0.025 -0.242
community size 0.013 *** 0.120 0.000 affiliates 1.401 0.204 -0.011 -0.236 0.029
dropouts 1.936 -0.016 0.086 0.441 -0.208
% raised in 0.000 -0.018 0.001 affiliates 1.855 0.040 0.001 -0.037 0.143
country dropouts 2.709 -0.382 -0.120 0.172 -0.209
% raised on -0.004 *** -0.137 *** 0.003 *** affiliates 2.709 -0.361 -0.148 -0.016 -0.108
farm dropouts 2.424 -0.235 0.017 -0.117 0.099
% raised in 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 affiliates 2.040 -0.090 -0.188 -0.124 -0.118
small town dropouts 1.838 -0.001 -0.063 0.021 0.192
% raised in 0.001 ** 0.054 *** -0.002 * affiliates 1.604 0.160 0.157 -0.004 -0.282
medium city dropouts 2.785 -0.395 0.065 -0.003 0.005
% raised in 0.002 *** 0.067 *** 0.000 affiliates 2.330 -0.169 0.153 -0.301 -0.139
suburb dropouts 2.052 -0.084 -0.038 -0.197 -0.132
% raised in 0.000 0.049 ** -0.001 affiliates 1.877 0.039 -0.192 0.013 0.029
large city dropouts 2.122 -0.078 -0.077 -0.230 -0.137
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Figure 1. Mean ages for affiliates and dropouts, 1973-2004.
50

47.5

45

42.5

40
age

37.5

35
affiliates
32.5 dropouts
regression affiliates
30 regression dropouts
27.5

25
1984

1991
1973

1975
1976
1977
1978

1982

1985

1987

1989
1990

1993

1996

2002
1974

1983

1988

1998

2004
1980

1986

1994

2000
period
 Figure 2. Mean educational attainment for affiliates and dropouts, 1973-2004.

15

14.5
mean educational attainment

14

13.5
13

12.5

12

11.5 affiliates
dropouts
11 regression affiliates
regression dropouts
10.5

10
1973

1975

1977
1978

1982

1985

1987
1988

1990

1993
1994

1998

2004
1976

1983

1991

2000
1980

1986

1996
1974

1984

1989

2002
period
 Figure 3. Mean number of children for affiliates and dropouts, 1973-2004.

2.4
affiliates
2.3
dropouts
2.2
regression affiliates
2.1 regression dropouts
mean # of children

2
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
1975
1976
1977
1978

1984
1985
1986

1990
1991
1993

2000
2002
1974

1982
1983

1988
1989

1996
1998
1973

1980

1987

1994

2004
period