Between hope and despair: China’s struggle for democracy and

modernization as seen through US media

--- The New York Times coverage of China between 2002-2003
 Introduction

The “Cold-War” and post Cold-War period during the last five decades witnessed

substantial coverage of China by US media. As an ideological rival and a member of the

socialist camp, China has always been a major focus of US foreign policy, and has

therefore attracted much attention in the US media. In surveying US’s media coverage of

Communist China in the past 50 years, it has generally been concluded that US news

organizations have either portrayed China in overly simplistic frames (Mann 1999), or

have focused on the failure of the Communist Party rule, social conflicts, and crises

(Gans 1980; Bennett & Edelman 1985; Goodman 1999).

Meanwhile, China is constantly changing. The 20- year economic reform initiated

since 1978 has put China right on track towards a market economy. The Chinese

government has still been insisting on the official rhetoric of communist and socialist

ideology; however, the orthodox principles of such ideology (class struggle, proletarian

dictatorship, egalitarianism, planned economy, public ownership of property, and equally

distributed wealth, etc.) have all given way to so-called “socialism with Chinese

characteristics,” which is marked by the ultimate goal of enhancing productivity, a

planned commodity economy, and the “open-door” policy (Liu & Wei 2002). Some hold

that China is now under the guise of socialism “ to achieve capitalist development”

(Dirlik & Zhang 1997, 5); others believe the situation is “semi-socialist, semi-capitalist”

(Pye 1999, 576). With its formal entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,

it seems that China is slowly but surely integrating itself into the world economic system,

though it is still generally considered by Western democracies a totalitarian state with

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human rights abuses and without freedom of speech. Nevertheless, tremendous changes

have indeed occurred in China socially, economically, and culturally (Cheng 1997).

So, how do US media portray and construct China’s reality at the beginning of the

21st century? Have they captured China’s profound social change? Compared with

previous coverage, is there any shift in the tone of US media coverage of China and any

noticeable change in US media framing of China?

This paper seeks to examine the most recent coverage of China between 2002 and

2003 by the most prestigious mainstream newspaper of the United States, The New York

Times. It finds that The New York Times stories have centered on the dilemma of China’s

“one party market economy,” delineating a transitional China marked by rapid economic

growth and social changes, yet besieged by serious social conflicts. With both a negative

side and some positive signs, China is seen as a land of crisis and opportunities. This

paper argues that The New York Times coverage of China indicates a subtle change in

tone and in the way of framing, with a more neutral and objective stance as well as a

more pluralistic perspective. All these suggest a tendency towards change in mainstream

US media portrait of China.

Here I must clarify two different categories of news regarding China, namely,

China news and China policy news (Chang 1993). According to the generally accepted

definition, “the reporting of foreign affairs deals with the news about a country’s foreign

policy toward another nation… While the reporting of foreign news involves events

occurred in a foreign country” (Chang 1993, 88).) Thus, China news here refers to those

news reports of what is happening in China written and dispatched by The New York

Times reporters posted in mainland China as objective observers; these news reports have

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no direct relationship with what is happening in the United States, and do not deal with

US foreign policy debates. On the other hand, China policy news refers to those news

reports directly related to debates in or out of the United States about US China policy;

they have much to do with what is happening in the United States. This paper focuses on

the first category of news reports, namely, China news, and particularly, mainland China

news, while excluding news reports about Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau.

Framing China: A Historical Survey

Previous studies have indicated that United States news discourse about foreign

countries is consistent with its dominant capitalist and liberal democratic ideology, and

therefore demonstrates a homogeneity and an absence of diverse perspectives (Donohue

and Glasser 1978; Gaziano 1989). Contemporary Western and US media often

concentrate on the negative aspect of the developing countries, such as crisis, social

conflicts, and disasters; and this focus has been a common complaint of the developing

countries (UNESCO 1985). Moreover, the deceitfulness and failure of communist

regimes are the most common narrative in the US media since World War II (Bennett &

Edelman 1985).

The US media coverage of China “ has paralleled their fragile bilateral

relationship, oscillating historically between romanticism and cynicism to selectively

reflect not only what is going on in China but also what is going on in the United States”

(Lee 2001). For example, Perlmutter found the visual image of China reflected American

ideological and cultural views, and was thus often not objective depiction. The evaluation

of China was positive or negative in relation to shifts in American foreign policy, and the

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coverage tended to focus on dysfunctional social events and on activities of political

leaders (Perlmutter 1996). Yan discovered that the reports about China in The New York

Times from 1949 to 1988 was in accordance with the shift of US China policy (Yan

1993). Peng found that the overall tone in the coverage of China in The New York Times

and The Los Angles Times between 1992 and 2001 remained negative; and political and

ideological frames were unfavorable (Peng 2003). Furthermore, in his examination of the

coverage of China by The Washington Post and The New York Times during the cold

war’s collapse and post cold war years, Goodman found that 24% of the reports were

about severe crisis, 70% about social conflicts, and 32% about violence (Goodman 1999).

In particular, Mann provided a list of “frames” that American news agencies have

employed to cover China. He argued that American news agencies had always portrayed

China “in one overly simplistic frame” although “American frames of China change

dramatically from decade to decade” (Mann 1999, 103). By a “frame”, he meant a single

story, image or concept that governs the coverage. The changing frames that he has

traced are as follows:

In the 1950s and the 1960s, the “frame” was of China as little blue ants or
automatons. In the 1970s, following the Nixon administration’s opening, the frame was
of the virtuous (entertaining, cute) Chinese, displaying their timeless qualities even under
communism. In the 1980s, the frame was that China “going capitalist.” And for most of
the 1990s, the frame was of a repressive China (Mann 1999, 103).

Lee also found that US media reports about China showed a more positive and

optimistic mood in the 1980s than previous decades when witnessing China’s economic

reform and open-door policy, as if “China was on the verge of embracing capitalism and

even fostering democracy” (Lee 2001). However, after witnessing the 1989 suppression

of the student democratic movement by the Chinese government, the 1990s “swung back

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to the cynical and hostile mode” (Lee 2001), with negative reports of China

overwhelming the US media.

The reports on China’s human rights violations have accounted for a large share

of US media coverage of China in the 1990s. However, only after the June 4th massacre

did US media become more concerned about human rights in China (Goldman 1996). In

the previous two decades, human rights violations in China were not a major focus of US

media. The June 4th massacre highlighted the ideological confrontation between China

and the United States, and since then US media have paid special attention to China’s

human rights problems. As Herman and Chomsky maintain, the US government and

media marginalize dissent in friendly countries and play up human rights violation in

unfriendly and Communist countries (Herman and Chomsky 1988).

Generally speaking, US media coverage of China reflected dominant capitalist

ideology and an “anti-communism” theme (Kobland, Du & Kwan 1992, 64). The anti-

communism theme and the portrait of a “corrupt, incompetent, and unyielding communist

regime” often dominated US coverage of China in the 1990s (Wang 1991, 59). However,

a subtle shift in US press coverage of China did occur noticeably during former US

president Clinton’s visit to China in 1998. At that time mainstream US media like The

Los Angeles Times, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times

published articles that objectively reported China’s progress and unexpected openness

(Ching 1998). This shift may signal a tendency to change in US media framing of China.

Theoretical Framework

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 The theoretical framework for this paper rests on the theory of framing and the

social construction of reality. Originally proposed by Berger and Luckmann, this theory’s

central inquiry asks how it is possible that human activities can be adequately understood

and appropriately constructed to become “objective facticities” (Berger & Luckmann

1966, 18).

Based on theoretical foundation provided by Berger and Luckmann, Hanna Adoni

and Sherrill Mane argue that there exist three types of reality: “objective social reality

that is experienced as the objective world existing outside the individual and confronting

him or her as facts;” symbolic social reality “which consists of any form of symbolic

expression of objective reality such as art, literature, or media content;” and subjective

social reality “where both the objective and the symbolic realities serve as an input for

the construction of the individual’s own subjective reality” (Adoni & Mane 1984, 325-

326). Media content is a key element of both symbolic social reality and subjective social

reality. Human beings are both “creators and products” of the “dialectical process” of the

social construction of reality (Adoni & Mane 1984, 325). Therefore, scholars nowadays

tend to maintain that news is constructed reality, and mass media play a central role in the

process of social construction of reality (Tuchman 1978; Adoni & Mane 1984; Gamson

et.al 1992; Hawkins & Pingree 1981).

Traditional sociologies argue that society creates consciousness and news simply

mirrors society. However, more recent interpretive sociologies believe in human agency

and active participation that collectively shape the social world (Tuchman 1978). This

approach believes that news not only constitutes a shared social phenomenon, but also

defines and shapes social events (Tuchman 1978). In addition, news and media images

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evince the point of view of elites and help to transmit hegemonic definitions and

explanations of happenings to the public, through selection, salience and attribution

(Tuchman 1978; Gamson et. al 1992).

All journalists consciously or unconsciously resort to “news frames” in the

construction of reality through their writing. The terms “frame” and “framing” have

become important concepts in mass media studies. These terms are variously used to

describe how the writer selects, organizes, and emphasizes the material; how the reader

receives the message; and how frames and framing can influence the ideological content

of the message.

The earlier definitions and use of media frame and framing process come from

Goffman, Gitlin, and Tuchman. Goffman defined frames as “ the principles of

organization which govern events—at least social ones— and our subjective involvement

in them” (Goffman 1974, 10). Using a special term of “strip” as “an arbitrary slice or cut

from the stream of ongoing activity” (Goffman 1974, 10-11), Goffman held that frames

organize strips of everyday world and render them meaningful. Gitlin argued that “ media

frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists

who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their report” (Gitlin 1980,

7). It was Tuchman who first tried to apply a framing process to news work in her work

Making News (1978). In analyzing Goffman’s idea of frame, Tuchman maintained that

“the news frame organizes everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of

everyday reality” (Tuchmann 1978, 193-194).

There exist two dimensions regarding the concept of frame per se —media frame

and audience frame. Previous studies have largely explored media frame with audience

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frame inadequately studied. For example, Gamson defined frame as a “central organizing

idea for the “interpretive package” (Gamson & Modigliani 1989, 3), and “a storyline or

unfolding narrative about an issue” (Gamson et.al 1992, 385). Entman argued that

“ News frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts,

symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative” (Entman 1991). He also

held that two essential elements of framing were selection and salience: “To frame is to

select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a

communicating text," in this way the media influence the way people perceive an issue,

thus possibly changing their final evaluation of that issue (Entman 1993, 53).

This paper also focuses on the first dimension of the concept of frame-- media

frames—as central organizing ideas to construct social reality. As explained by Tuchman,

“frames themselves are negotiated phenomena” (Tuchman 1978, 194). Then, the key

question facing framing analysis is: By what rule is everyday reality organized and

constructed?

Some scholars have argued that the framing process focuses the attention of

various social groups and ideologies to struggle over their preferred frames and the

consequent definition and construction of social reality (Gamson et.al 1992; Gurevitch &

Levy 1985). In associating frames with ideology, some scholars have also argued media

frame is "a system of ideas, values, and propositions which is characteristic of a

particular social class..." (Hackett 1984, 261). Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad argue

“ideology is a major source of framing in the news and framing is an important

mechanism by which ideology is transmitted through the news” (Akhavan-Majid &

Ramaprasad 1998, 134). Previous studies also found different ideological angles affected

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news frames of US media in depicting events and accidents. In his well-known research

comparing US media narratives of the Korean Air Lines and Iran Air incidents, Entman

found that “the news stories about the US downing of an Iranian plane called it a

technical problem while the Soviet downing of a Korean jet was portrayed as a moral

outrage” (Entman 1991, 6). This paper argues that guided by hegemonic ideology, US

media framed China from certain perspectives, thus constructing a complicated and

contradictory image of China.

Method

1.Sample

Through the New York Times News Tracker Alert system, and by using a key

word “China” to track, news reports of China from September 1, 2002 till March 31,

2003 have been collected. Excluding those reports regarding debates about China policy

and the US-China relationship written and released within the United States and other

countries and regions, a total of 206 were selected.

The period between September 2002 and March 2003 witnessed an important

change in China’s political stage. Internally and politically, the CPC’s 16th Congress held

in November 2002, and the First Assembly of the 10th National People’s Congress

convened in March 2003 marked a transfer of power in post-Deng era. The so-called

“Third Generation” leaders of the CPC, mainly former Party and state president, Jiang

Zemin, former premier Zhu Rongji, and former leader of the National People’s Congress,

Li Peng, all stepped down during this period. Their retreat from China’s political stage

marked the end of an era immediately following the June 4th massacre and the death of

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Deng Xiaoping. With the debut of the “Fourth Generation” leaders led by Hu Jintao,

there is worldwide concern about China’s new direction, and whether the CPC would

eventually lose its grip on China, or would lead China to go through all political and

economic difficulties and troubles. Externally and globally, the year 2002 marked the

first anniversary of China’s membership in the WTO, and witnessed remarkable social

changes accompanying China’s gradual integration with the world economic system. As

such, this period is especially significant for research.

2. Research questions

Based on the above discussion, three research questions are formulated as follows:

1) What are The New York Times discourses about China news during the period of

interest? And how do they frame China’s occurrences? What are those frames?

2) Is there any shift in the tone of The New York Times reports of China, and any

change in its ways of framing?

3) Does the anti-communism theme still prevail into the 21st century?

3. Research method

This study will combine a quantitative-oriented categorization of content and a

qualitative-oriented discourse analysis.

In the first step of analysis, I categorize the content of 206 stories, demonstrate

their basic themes, and identify the tone of their coverage. In the second step, I use a

“constructionist approach” (Gamson, 1988) to analyze media discourse. This approach

sees the media as “part of a cultural system worthy of a dynamic analysis in its own

right,” rather than as “an environmental stimulus” (Gamson, 1988, p.165); it also

emphasizes the role of media frames in shaping political culture (Gamson, 1988).

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According to this approach, media discourses can be “conceived of as a set of interpretive

packages” with frames at their cores to serve as “a central organizing idea” (Gamson &

Modigliani, 1989, p.3). The package is recognized “as a whole by the use of a variety of

symbolic devices (also termed tropes or figures of speech) that display its characteristic

elements” (Gamson and Lasch 1983, p.399), including metaphors, exemplars,

catchphrases, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences, etc. In the research I first

deconstruct the accounts of commentaries into key frames and identify symbolic devices,

thus creating what Gamson and Lasch called “signature matrix” (Gamson and Lasch

1983, p.400), then reconstruct them into interpretative packages (see Table 3). By this

means, I have identified different discourses with their respective frames.

Findings

A.The categorization of content

The main content of these 206 stories in the New York Times is categorized in Table

1; and their respective tones of coverage are illustrated in Table 2.

Table 1 and 2 Are About Here

In this research, the positive tone is defined as the favorable and optimistic evaluation

of China’s social, economic and political realty; the moderately positive tone is defined

as progress, improvement and hope indicated in the stories, although the overall reality is

unsatisfactory; the neutral tone is defined as objective reports without explicit judgment

of social conditions; and the negative tone is defined as unfavorable and pessimistic

reports and evaluations. For example, positive tone would include a story arguing that

“China’s economy has defied the worldwide slowdown and continued its long streak of

11
rapid growth, raising expectations that it has begun to pull its weight as a engine for Asia

and the world” (December 16, 2002), and a story saying US-China relation “has

improved significantly since the early days of the Bush administration” (October 25,

2002). Moderately positive tone would include a story describing “a resurgence of faith, a

relaxation of government policy toward officially registered religious groups…,” and

“officials’ more tolerant and open attitude toward churches” (October 6, 2002), and a

story saying worker protest against corruption resulted in the removing of corrupt

officials. Neutral tone would define a story talking about steel and oil production, or the

issue of bonds and e-commerce without making explicit evaluation about current issues.

Finally, negative tone defines a story discussing severe social problems and crises such as

deaths, accidents and disaster, or the looming catastrophe of AIDS and SARS, or human

rights violations. Two coders have coded these stories in terms of tone respectively, with

an agreement level of 70%.

As Table 1 and Table 2 show, the stories talking about China’s human rights

violation account for the largest share of the coverage (17.5%). This category deals with

four subthemes: Tibet and ethnic issues; the issue of freedom of religion; the issue of

dissent, labor leaders and protestors; and the issue of information control. The tone of

coverage is largely negative (30 out of 36). The second largest share of stories is those

reporting China’s economic and business development, constituting 17%. Its tone of

coverage is mainly neutral (24 out of 35) and positive (10 out of 35). The stories dealing

with China’s leadership reshuffle and the transfer of power account for the third largest

share (13.6%), and the tone of coverage is largely neutral (14 out of 28) with an even

distribution of negative and positive reports (6 vs.6). The following categories are those

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uncovering China’s social conflicts and problems (11.7%), and those discussing foreign

relation (11.2%). Their tones of coverage are largely negative (18 out of 24) and neutral

(14 out of 23) respectively. The remaining categories are health, art, science, legal and

political progress, as well as miscellaneous.

Overall speaking, The New York Times coverage of China during the period of

research interest is largely neutral (82 or 39.8%) and negative (75 or 36.4%), especially

when the reports deal with China’s human rights violation and social problems.

Moderately positive and positive reports constitute 11.2% and 12.6% respectively,

especially when they deal with China’s economic development, social life and the orderly

transition of power.

B.Discourse analysis

I construct a “signature matrix” to identify different frames and discourses, in which

the rows represent the core frames of different packages and the columns represent

symbolic devices (Gamson and Lasch 1983). The signature matrix is illustrated in Table

3.

Table 3 Is About Here

Upon the completion of the signature matrix, six discourses are identified: China

as an emerging economic superstar; as a cooperative partner of the United State; as an

evil human rights violator; as a transitional country besieged by various social problems;

as a country experiencing a major leadership reshuffle and transfer of power; and as an

artistic and cultural country. They are analyzed one by one in the following section.

1. The discourse of the emergence of China as an economic superstar

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 This discourse covered every aspect of China’s economy and business, from the

launch of joint ventures on cars, oil production, steel, mobile phones, e-commerce,

communication infrastructure, to the buying of Chinese enterprises’ stock shares by

foreign partners, the sharing of China’s vast media market by big foreign media

corporations, the march of foreign chain stores into China, and the intensive construction

in China’s cities and ports. The stories portrayed a busy, prosperous and promising China

with a high economic growth of nearly 8%, in striking contrast to the declining economic

performance worldwide.

The central frame emerged from this discourse is the image of China’s rise as an

economic superstar and its gradual integration into the world economic system, which

will be greatly beneficial not only to Asia but to the United States and the whole world.

The discourse has several themes: First, China’s economy can serve as an engine for Asia

and the world. “China’s economy has defied the worldwide slowdown and continued its

long streak of rapid growth, raising expectations that it has begun to pull its weight as a

engine for Asia and the world”. China “has begun to rival Japan as the pivotal player in

Asia’s economy. It has become the largest export market for both South Korea and

Taiwan, for example, and has elbowed out Japan to become Asia’s biggest exporter to the

United States” (December 16, 2002). Foreign businessmen can expect to make a fortune

in China, for, although “plenty of foreign investors still may lose money, they are

increasingly outnumbered by multinationals making profits that if not quite justifying the

exaggeration of the 1990’s, at least make China an indispensable part of their global

operations” (January 5, 2003). Second, China has made significant progress in its

freshman year in the World Trade Organization and has been evaluated very positively

14
and optimistically. “There has been significant progress in the promulgation of new

regulations, as well as significant efforts made in training and in building capabilities of

the Chinese regulatory system…Transparency has improved…The devil is in the details”

(December 8, 2002). Despite the fact that China’s annual trade surplus with the United

States is about $100 billion, the US trade representative, Robert Zoellick, said that

“progress has been made on many issues;” and “American businesses have voiced limited

criticisms of Chinese trade policies, saying that they are improving and are providing

more access for American companies to sell to Chinese citizens and businesses”

(February 20, 2003). Third, thus a rising China is NOT posing a threat to Asia, the United

States, and the world. Citing concerns of the Asian countries that their countries would

eventually work as “low-end suppliers to China,” the story held Asian neighbors’ concern

is largely rooted in historical memory and their current economic situation. In fact,

“China is not behaving in an expansionist way, and it still must cope with poverty and

other social problems” (November 24, 2002). A stable government and a booming

economy accorded with the interest of Asian countries more than an economic collapse

and a government taken over by extreme nationalists (November 24, 2002). A story titled

“China: Partner, Rival or Both?” (March 2, 2003) argued that “China’s growth has been

reinforcing one of the most prominent trends in America’s recent economic history: its

transition from a manufacturing to a service economy;” China’s cheap imports have

“forced American companies to pass along some of the savings to consumers,” thus

helping deflate in the manufacturing sector. Besides, “China’s fast growth helped

Southeast Asian recover from its financial crises in the late 1990’s, muting the ill effects

on the United States.” And “The U.S. is going to have increasing leverage over China

15
because of our economic relationship.” As for the so-called China threat, the story cited a

professor of economics as saying “ten years from now, it will still be a very poor country.

It will be better off—they’ve been growing rapidly—but dominate the United States?

That’s hysteria.”

The underlying message conveyed by the major frames of this discourse is that

China is a powerful force in the world (“engine,” “pivotal player,” “biggest exporter,”

“ fast growth,” potential for “making profits”), and a friend and partner not an adversary

or enemy. With its gradual integration with the world economic system, it is showing a

very optimistic and bright prospect.

2. The discourse of China as a cooperative partner of the United States

The basic argument of this discourse is that the US-China relation “has improved

significantly since the early days of the Bush administration” (October 25, 2002), and

now is moving toward a more stable, friendly and cooperative relationship. On the one

hand, China is determined to “cultivate closer economic and political ties with the United

States, which it sees as important to China’s economic and technological progress”

(September 26, 2002); On the other hand, “ Washington seeks China’s cooperation in the

war on terror and acquiescence to a strong United Nations resolution on Iraq” (September

26, 2002). Although China is still uncomfortable with the US’s dominance in

international affairs and arrogant military presence, the two countries share more

common concerns ranging from terrorism and regional security, to weapon proliferation

and international trade (November 15, 2002). Therefore, “ the more traditional pro-

business, pro-engagement view of China seems to have prevailed, at least for now”

(October 21, 2002). Signals for such improvement in bilateral ties included China’s

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playing down of U.S. navy violation of 200-mile zone (September 26, 2002), its backing

a resolution on Iraq, and “the highest level of reception” at Bush’s ranch in Crawford

offered by the US side to former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (October 21, 2002).

However, while China is rising as a significant regional power and reshaping its military

force, the United States does not considered it a potential threat, for China “lacks an arms

industry to build its own high-tech weapons,” it “has a long way to go to become a first-

tier military power” (October 16, 2002). Therefore, the stories called for the United States

and China “to come to a strategic understanding” in order to avoid conflict of interest

(October 16, 2002).

This discourse is framed by using such words as “cooperation,” “share,” “ties,”

“engagement” and “understanding.” Taken together, they signal a stable, friendly and

mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and China. The underlying

message conveyed by the discourse is, still, that China is a partner, a friend, not a rival.

3. The discourse of China as an evil human rights violator

The discourse focused on various flagrant human rights abuses carried out by the

Chinese government. It has several subthemes: First, the violation of free information

flow, freedom of speech and press, as reflected in China’s government repeated blocking

of the Internet search engine Google (September 4, 14, 20, 2002), and its blocking access

to some 50,000 sites out of 200,000 popular web addresses, discovered by a Harvard Law

School study (December 4, 2002). The basic argument of these stories is that the

suppression of free information and free speech not only “cuts the lifeblood of modern

entrepreneurship” (September 20, 2002), undermines the spirit of transparency, openness

and democracy, but also will ultimately hurt the rule of the Chinese government itself.

17
 Second, the violation of the right of ethnic minorities, as reflected in the Chinese

government’s reluctance to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama’ envoy on Tibet’s

autonomy (September 11 and 30, 2002), its detention of a Tibetan nun (October 18,

2002), the passing of the death sentence on a Lama and his follower (December 10, 2002;

February 23, 2003), the execution of a Tibetan on the charge of bomb attacks (January 28,

2003), and the repression of a Muslim group in Xinjiang in the name of fighting terrorism

(September 1, 2002).

Third, the serious violation of the freedom of religion and worship. This is

considered the worst human rights abuse in light of the long Western Christian tradition

and the respect for the freedom of religion. This subtheme mainly deal with the

persecution of Falun Gong followers and Christians. While reporting the arrest and trial

of Falun Gong followers because of their worship practices or hijacking cable television

programming (September 19, 21 and 25, 2002; January 30 and March 13, 2003), and the

sentence and torture of Christians (October 9, 11 and November 26, 2002), the stories

pinpoint the dictatorial and totalitarian nature of the Chinese communist regime. The

argument is that “China is in many ways freer than it has ever been, and it’s easy to be

dazzled by the cell phones and skyscrapers. But alongside all that sparkles is the old

police state” (November 26, 2002). However, the stories do notice changes even in this

darkest side of China’s human rights sector. The changes are indicated in the flourishing

Catholic churches, “a resurgence of faith, a relaxation of government policy toward

officially registered religious groups and—particularly in poor rural areas—better access

to money from international Catholic organizations;” and officials’ more tolerant and

open attitude toward churches (October 6, 2002). The change is also reflected in China’s

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overturning of the death sentences of Christian leaders under pressure from international

community (October 9, 2002). An article asserting that China is still a police country also

admits “there is progress…” and “in some parts of China Christians worship completely

freely. But in other areas the authorities brutally crush the independent churches…”

“ Increasingly, a historic change is visible: Citizens of China are becoming less afraid of

the government than it is of them” (November 26, 2002).

Fourth, the suppression of freedom of speech, democratic movement, and

dissidents. These stories mainly cover the detention of exiled dissidents who had engaged

in democratic movements in China (December 20 and 21, 2002), the release and sending

to America of pro-democracy activist Xu Wenli, who has spent 16 years in prison

(December 29, 2002), the cracking down on worker protests (January 2, 2003), and the

arrest of labor leaders (January 1, 2003). This coverage reveals the Chinese government’s

merciless suppression of freedom of opinion and dissidents, nipping any democratic bud

that would pose potential threat to its rule. The latent meaning in these stories is that there

is still no room for openly pro-democracy activities in contemporary China; There is still

a long, long way to go to achieve democratic goals.

Fifth, the violation of international refugee law. This subtheme deal with the

North Korean refugees who attempted to seek asylum in the diplomatic district of Beijing

and eventually to flee to South Korea or Japan (September 3, 4, 5, October 9, 2002;

January 21 and 22, February 8, 2003). By emphasizing the Chinese police’s thwarting

and arrest of these North Korean refugees, the stories argue that China have violated

international refugee law and damaged the human rights of these refugees.

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 To summarize, this discourse reveals the darkest side of China’s situation: the

rampant human rights abuses, by using such strong descriptive words as “violation,”

“blocking,” “detention,” “execution,” “repression,” “persecution,” “torture,”

“suppression”, etc. Its frame is that although changes are happening, China is

fundamentally a police state without basic human rights, namely, free information,

freedom of speech and press, freedom of religion, and citizens’ right to pro-democracy

activities and to the criticism and challenging of an unjust system.

4. The discourse of a problem-China as besieged with various social problems and crises

The discourse is overwhelmingly filled with negative reports of various social

problems, incidents, deaths, and diseases. They are corruptions (September 13 and

October 20, 2002; January 1, 2003); school children’s death caused by poisoning food

and a collapsed guardrail (September 18 and 25, 2002); rampant piracy (November 1,

2002); rising rural suicides (November 29, 2002); natural disasters like earthquake and

flood (December 15, 2002; February 25, 2003); coal mine explosion and the killing of

workers (January 28, February 18, and March 25, 2003); university campus blasts

(February 25 and March 9, 2003); the murder of a rich businessman (January 24 and

February 1, 2003); the protest of unemployed workers and students (January 9, March 10

and 13, 2003); as well as the looming catastrophe of AIDS and SARS (September 16,

October 1, 15, November 29, 2002; January 14, March 15, 17, 18, 20, 26, 27, 28, 2003).

These stories argue that serious social problems, class conflicts and crises are caused by

unprecedented social transformation in every aspect of life in China, and are even

worsened by corrupt and neglecting officials, the widening gap between rich and poor,

the ineffective and unjust judiciary system, and the government’s deliberate hiding of the

20
truth. For example, one article argues: “In a country where lawsuits and the court system

are unreliable venues for seeking justice, disgruntled people often resolve disputes

themselves” (February 25, 2003). The image of China in this discourse is a problem

country on the verge of volcanic eruption, with severe social conflicts threatening to

explode. The frame of this discourse is that a transitional China is being confronted and

challenged by intensified social contradictions and conflicts that may cause crises and

social turmoil that threaten social stability. The latent message implied in the discourse is

that China’s current system is incapable of dealing with these problems and reconciling

conflicts of various interest groups.

5. The discourse of China as experiencing a major leadership reshuffle and transfer of

power

This discourse mainly discusses the process and leadership reshuffle occurring

during the 16th Communist Party of China Congress in November 2002 and during the

10th National People’s Congress in March 2003. During these two assemblies, 59-year-

old Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin to take over power as Chinese Party Secretary and

state President; and Wen Jiabao replaced Zhu Rongji as Premier. However, Jiang Zemin

still maintained his power as the chairman of the Central Military Commission and was

very much in control. In addition to the coverage of the process and results of the

meetings and leadership changes (September 5, October 23, 25, November 13, 14, 15, 16,

21, 2002; March 5, 6, 16, 18, 2003), the discourse has two subthemes: First, the analysis

of the legacy of Jiang Zemin administration; Second, the expectation to Hu Jintao

administration and his policy change.

21
 In analyzing the performance of Jiang Zemin administration, the stories argue that

the legacy of Jiang Zemin administration was “auspicious but mixed” with both positive

and negative sides. The positive assessment includs the transformation of China from “an

isolated, introspective country” as it was in 1989 to a major global player and a member

of the WTO; a high economic growth rate of near 10 percent for many years; and a vastly

better living standard and expanded personal freedom. The negative assessment includes

a host of domestic problems Jiang had left behind him, like corruption, unemployment,

the lack of a social security system, and the widening gap between rich and poor, etc.

“There was widespread satisfaction with Chinese economic growth and the rise in its

international standing and influence… But people also complained of serious anxieties

and concerns, about issues like corruption, China’s poorly functioning legal system and

their lack of voice in government.” It is generally considered that Jiang was more widely

welcomed by “a cultured and prosperous middle-class family of doctors, scholars and

businessmen” with “bourgeois background”, than by peasants and workers (November 9

and 16, 2002).

The assessment of former Premier Zhu Rongji’s performance is similar. He is

given credit for well handling the Asian financial crisis and keeping the economy

growing rapidly, and for arranging China’s entry into the WTO. But “he never completed

the promised transition from central planning to a market economy. The banking system

is still hobbled by bad loans to state enterprises and state projects that Mr. Zhu

championed….China still has no national welfare system to care for the unemployed”

(March 19, 2003). Thus one of biggest shortcoming of Jiang Zemin administration is the

failure to address growing income inequality.

22
 In the observation and analysis of the earliest performance of new President Hu

Jintao and new Premier Wen Jiabao, the stories hold that “Mr. Hu takes over a country of

dazzling economic growth and social change, one that is taking a more confident place in

world affairs. But he must also cope with official corruption, spreading unemployment, a

widening gap between rich and poor and bubbling demands for political change that may

severely test the party” (November 14, 2002). Yet the new generation leaders may be

already well aware of the problems facing the country and begining to take initial steps to

tackle them. Such steps were noticed by sharp New York Times reporters and they were

considered to be signaling a “ subtle shift from the decade-long reign of Mr. Jiang.” “Mr.

Jiang courted capitalists and sought to foster a middle class, while steering billions of

dollars in state funds to build roads, bridges, subways and ports in prosperous east coast

cities. Mr. Wen spent the Chinese New Year holiday at the bottom of a coal shaft in the

less developed west. Mr. Hu visited herders in frigid Inner Mongolia. They have

emphasized building a social security system to replace the withered socialist welfare

state that has left tens of millions of workers without adequate pensions or health care.

They have stressed the urgency of reducing the wealth gap between urban and rural

residents. Their focus on the poor reflects worries that the traditional constituents of the

Communist Party could threaten its hold on power” (March 17, 2003). At the same time,

The New York Times stories also pointed out the new leadership today must “face dual

crises of identity and legitimacy,” “widespread alienation and cynicism,” “growing

dissent and challenges to party doctrine,” and the deeper problem of a lack of

“convincing philosophy or vision for the nation’s future” (November 7, 2002).

23
 Accompanying the transfer of power, the subtle change in political arena has

indeed occurred and has been captured by The New York Times reporters. In a story titled

“Chinese Freer to Speak and Read, but Not Act” (February 12, 2003), it was observed

that “ideas that once could land someone in prison are acceptable commerce today.” The

dissidents “have found outlets for their essays on overseas Web sites and have been

cooperating with intellectuals at universities, where talk of multiparty democracy and free

trade unions—ideas that would have meant jail time a decade ago—are now common

cafeteria discussions.” Some dissidents are “quite acceptable, and more and more people

are developing an interest in democracy.” "Longtime dissidents say they are finding new

outlets for their work and new ways to live,” they believe “the system is changing,

becoming more public and open.” In addition, new President Hu Jintao also signaled “he

would tolerate more diversity in the state-controlled press, even criticizing outlets that

routinely parrot the party line without producing fresh insights.” “ His apparent

enthusiasm for more open debate led to a flurry of frank news stories and commentaries

in the past several week, including many blunt calls for political reform” (March 19,

2003).

The central frame of this discourse is that there is an increasing coexistence

between hope, opportunities and challenge for the elimination of social disparities and for

long expected and long-denied political reform.

6. The discourse of an artistic and cultural China

This last discourse depicts a diversified social and cultural life of China with a

pluralistic perspective. It mainly talks about art and culture, like Ha Jin’s novel, the films

directed by Jiang Wen and Zhang Yang, Chinese artists’ experiments with avant-garde

24
art, the entry into China by Broadway music, Rolling Stone’s music, and Hollywood

films (September 18, 22, October 22, 25, December 18, 23, 2002; March 13, 2003). By

covering cultural life of contemporary Chinese society, these stories tell the hardships

inflicted on the Chinese during the suppressed “Cultural Revolution” era (Ha Jin’s

novel); reflect the tension between art and politics in China (avant-garde art); reveal

urban youth’s confusion and quest for the meaning of life in a rapidly changing society

(Zhang Yang’s film); and discover the role of American popular culture plays in

transmitting Western values and in spurring yearnings for accelerated changes among

ordinary Chinese people (Hollywood films). The frame here is that popular culture has

exposed deep, unknown emotion of Chinese people in a transitional era, and has revealed

underlying messages of yearning for change among ordinary people.

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed The New York Times coverage of China between 2002

and 2003 both quantitatively and qualitatively. Findings indicate that the news stories

have primarily centered on the dilemma and “unresolved contradiction of the Chinese

experiment with a one-party market economy” (November 15, 2002). As for the

development of market economy, the reports are mainly positive; as for one-party rule,

the reports are mainly negative, which shows The New York Times reports are tied closely

to the dominant capitalist and liberal democratic ideology. Altogether, the reports

delineate a transitional China besieged with serious social problems, yet characterized by

dazzling social changes and profound social transformation. Accordingly, crises and

opportunities coexist, and hope and despair compete. Findings also indicate that The New

25
York Times reports show a more objective tone and more positive evaluation of China’s

reality and future, with neutral and positive reports as a whole outnumbering negative

reports. The stories do capture the positive social and political changes, whether they are

remarkable or subtle. As such, the first two research questions have been answered. For

the third question, guided by dominant liberal democratic principles, The New York Times

stories still have an anti-Communism theme, but they do embrace a more pluralistic

perspective, and have more objective and comprehensive reports. Therefore, they are

definitely indicative of a tendency towards change in mainstream US media coverage of

China at the dawn of the 21st century.

Table 1. The Categorization of the New York Times Reports of China Between 2002
and 2003

Economy/ Transfer Social Human Rights Violation Foreign Health Art Science Others Legal/
Business of Power/ Problems/ Relation Political
Leadership Conflicts/ Progress
Reshuffle Crises

Tibet/ Freedom Dissent/ Media/

Ethnic of Labor Internet
Issue Religion Leader Control
35 28 24 8 9 11 8 23 16 11 8 20 5
17% 13.6% 11.7% Total 36 or 17.5% 11.2% 7.8% 5.3% 3.9% 9.7% 2.4%

26
Table 2. The New York Times Tone of Coverage by Categories

Tone Total Moderately Positive Neutral Negative

Stories Positive
Economy/ 35 1 10 24 0
Business

Transfer of 28 6 2 14 6
Power/
Leadership
Reshuffle
Social 24 2 1 3 18
Problems/
Conflicts/
Crises

Human Rights 36 2 0 4 30
Violation
Foreign 23 3 3 14 3
Relation
Health 16 0 1 4 11
Art 11 2 1 7 1
Science 8 2 2 4 0
Others 20 2 5 7 6
Legal/ 5 3 1 1 0
Political
Progress
Total Count 206 23 (11.2%) 26 (12.6) 82 (39.8) 75 (36.4)

Table 3. Signature Matrix for the New York Times Coverage of China between 2002
and 2003

27
Discourse Frame Metaphor Catchphrases Depictions Roots Consequences
The emergence China’s An To say China China is hot; China is not a
of China as an economic rise engine will At the beating potential
economic and its for Asia dominate the heart of an threat to Asia,
superstar gradual and the United export the US and the
integration world States is machine world; A
into the world hysteria. partner and
economic friend, not
system will enemy
be greatly
beneficial not
only to Asia
but to the
United States
and the whole
world.
Cooperative Friendly The more China has China is China is a
partner of the bilateral traditional considerable determined to friend, a
U.S. relation pro-business, influence “cultivate partner, not a
helpful for pro- closer rival
both sides engagement economic and
view of political ties
China seems with the
to have United
prevailed. States,” while
“ Washington
seeks China’s
cooperation in
the war on
terror and
acquiescence
to a strong
United
Nations
resolution on
Iraq”
A human rights Although An old Without free Undermines
violator changes are police information, the spirit of
happening, state freedom of transparency,
China is speech and openness and
fundamentally press, freedom democracy,
a police state of religion, and ultimately
without basic and citizens’ hurt the rule of
human rights right to pro- the Chinese
democracy government
activities itself.

A problem A transitional Natural unprecedented Severe social

country China is disasters, social problems may
being mine deaths, transformation cause crises
confronted poisoning causes serious and social
and foods, social turmoil to
challenged by incidents, problems, threaten

28
 intensified corruption, class conflicts national
social suicides, and crises, stability.
contradictions AIDS and which are
and conflicts SARS even
worsened by
corrupt
officials,
widening gap
between the
rich and the
poor, the
ineffective
and unjust
judiciary
system, and
the
government’s
deliberate
hiding of
truth.
Leadership Hope, Hu The Chinese The most The deeper The new
reshuffle and opportunities Jintao: experiment orderly and problem of a leadership
transfer of power and challenge Mystery with a “one- rule-based lack of today must
for a long Man at party market transition in “convincing face
expected and the Helm economy” the 81-year philosophy or unemployment
long-denied history of the vision for the and the rich-
political Party; Legacy nation’s poor gap,
reform and of growth and future,” rampant
the tight control continue on corruption,
elimination of economic dual crises of
social transformation identity and
disparities but not legitimacy.
coexist. political
reform
Artistic China Popular Hollywood
culture has is helping to
exposed deep, democratize
unknown China
emotion of
Chinese
people in a
transitional
era, and has
disclosed
hidden
message of
yearning for
change

29
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