Analysis
February 16, 2011
Summary: The position Turkey
took regarding the developments
in Egypt was clear: listen to the
people and do what is necessary.
The winds of change in the
region have led to suggestions
that Turkey constitutes an
appropriate example for these
countries to follow to build their
own democratic systems. It is
not persuasive to suggest that
sharing a common religion
constitutes a sufficient basis
for Turkey to constitute a model
for other countries of the Arab
Middle East to build their
democracies.
In fact, some observers have
already commented that Egypt
may be inspired by a model that
Turkey has been working hard
to leave behind that allows the
military to intervene in politics as
a veto group and define the limits
of action for elected politicians
through constitutional means.
It is not clear how and to what
extent the Egyptian political
system will transform itself. There
is reason to suspect, however,
that the Turco-Egyptian relations
will continue to be ambivalent.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Paris • Brussels
Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
Turkey and Egypt: A Partisan for Democracy
or an Unwanted Intruder?
by Ilter Turan
According to rumor, when the Israeli
chief of staff was asked how it is
that the Israeli General Staff did not
anticipate the events in Egypt, he is
said to have retorted, “Neither did
the Egyptian general staff!” Whether
this conversation actually occurred
or not, there is little doubt that no
one predicted that a Tunisian street
vendor with a university degree whose
goods were confiscated by the local
police, deciding to burn himself to
attract the public’s attention, would
initiate a sweeping challenge to the
authoritarian regimes of the Middle
East. Yet, within less than three weeks,
anti-government demonstrations
spread to other parts of the region.
Tunisian and Egyptian presidents
have been forced to leave office in the
face of public manifestations. Other
governments have announced plans
to initiate or hasten reforms. In Egypt
and Tunisia, there are plans to hold
free elections, make new constitutions,
or, in short, build democratic systems.
Other systems are aware that their
own publics might decide to carry
their grievances to the streets. Which
country will be next is still a frequently
asked question to which speculative
answers are not lacking.
The United States and Turkey led the
way in offering public commentary
about the events. Their advice to the
government of Egypt was similar:
Listen to what the Egyptian people
want and do what is necessary. The
European Union and others joined in
later with similar recommendations.
President Mubarak, on the other hand,
resorted to dilatory moves to remain in
power until September when his term
would expire, but yielded to pressures
that he resign when it became clear
that he no longer enjoyed the support
of his military and faced the possibility
of being ousted. This brief will focus
on the policy Turkey followed with
regard to developments in Egypt.
Turkey: A Promoter of Democracy?
The position Turkey took regarding the
developments in Egypt was clear. Were
their remarks about listening to the
people motivated by Turkey’s commit-
ment, along with her allies and friends,
to the advancement of democracy in
the world and in the region?
It is generally true that countries
that are democracies tend to believe
that democracy is the best form of
government for the world. They also
Analysis
feel more secure in a world in which democratic systems
prevail, believing that democracies are less likely to initiate
war with each other. The intensity with which each pursues
a foreign policy designed to promote democratization of
other societies, however, is colored by their other interests.
In other words, democracy promotion is pursued only to
the extent that it either does not undermine other substan-
tive interests or it serves to advance them. This is no less
true of Turkey than other countries. For example, Turkey
has not put forth democracy and its inseparable compo-
nents such as the existence of individual liberties and the
observation of human rights as primary foreign policy goals
in its relations with the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States,
Libya, or Iran. Why then with Egypt?
Egypt had seen itself as the
leader of the Arab world and did
not welcome the appearance of
Turkey, a non-Arab country, as a
major regional actor.
Turkey began to take greater interest in the Middle East
after it adopted an export-oriented growth model in 1980.
The region seemed to be a natural geographical area for
Turkey to expand its economic interactions. The end of
the Cold War and the decline of Soviet power in the region
constituted the proper opening for Turkey to become more
active also in the politics of the region. The coming of the
Justice and Development Party to power in 2002 cemented
this political interest in two ways. First, the new political
leadership bore a greater sense of affinity for their co-reli-
gionists. But second and more importantly, along with other
regions neighboring Turkey, the Middle East was identified
as a region with which close relations would be developed
to enhance Turkey’s “strategic depth.”
While Turkey’s efforts to enhance its economic relations
in the region including with Egypt were successful, rela-
tions in the political domain advanced less smoothly. Egypt
2
had seen itself as the leader of the Arab world and did not
welcome the appearance of Turkey, a non-Arab country,
as a major regional actor. Egypt grumbled, for example,
as Turkey tried to broker proximity talks between Syria
and Israel. Relations took a turn for worse when Turkish-
Israeli relations began to deteriorate after Israel’s attack
on Gaza. Turkey wanted to send humanitarian aid that
could most easily be delivered through the Sinai. Egypt,
not wanting to provoke a negative Israeli response, was
uncooperative and did not welcome the Turkish assistance
convoys, and mistreated Turkish parliamentary deputies
from the governing AKP who were accompanying them.
It soon became apparent that Turkish-Egyptian differences
regarding Palestine were more comprehensive. Turkey
wanted to include Hamas as a legitimate actor in Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, whereas the Egyptians limited
their support to the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Turkish leadership judged that the accommodating poli-
cies of the Egyptian government toward Israel gave the
latter a freer hand in dealing harshly with Palestinians and
made them lose interest in the peace process. The Egyptian
government, on the other hand, tended to view Turkey as a
destabilizing force.
As the Mubarak regime was paralyzed by economic prob-
lems and rising domestic discontent, Turkey became more
active in the region, more vocal in its criticism of Israel’s
policies and more supportive of Palestinian causes, particu-
larly those of the Gazans. The outspoken Turkish Prime
Minister Erdoğan became more and more popular in the
Arab street. The opponents of the authoritarian and corrupt
Mubarak regime carried Turkish flags and posters of Mr.
Erdoğan in their demonstrations. Mr. Erdoğan appears to
enjoy this popularity and sees it as an indication of the rise
of Turkey to a leadership position in the Middle East.
Let us digress for a moment and explain how the greater
sympathy for its co-religionists that the current Turkish
government holds may affect its position. One line of
defense for the Mubarak regime had always been that it was
a bulwark against radical Islam. If it were not for Egypt’s
determined stand, the radical Muslims would take over
Egypt and threaten Middle East peace. This is the exact
line of reasoning that had been employed earlier in Turkey
for justifying an interventionist role for the military in the
politics of the country. Consequently, a string of religiously
Analysis
One may speculate that the
support the Turkish government,
have for those Egyptians who
demand political change is
stimulated by a sense of empathy.
conservative parties had been closed down by the Consti-
tutional Court as using religion for political ends; and the
prime minister himself had been given a prison term for
inciting religious hatred by citing a poem to crowds in a
provincial capital. One may speculate that the support the
Turkish government, i.e. Mr. Erdoğan and other leading
figures in his cabinet, have for those Egyptians who demand
political change is stimulated by a sense of empathy, seeing
in Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) an organization remi-
niscent of their own earlier existence in opposition.
Turkey: A Model for Egypt, et al.?
The winds of change in the region have led to sugges-
tions that Turkey constitutes an appropriate example for
these countries to follow to build their own democratic
systems. The logic of such suggestions is that, whatever
its shortcomings, Turkey is a democracy. That shows that
democracy can develop and take hold in a society with a
mainly Muslim population. Such optimistic evaluations
overlook the fact that there are a wide variety of countries
with majority Muslim populations. Each country reflects a
different historical experience and path of evolution. Some
are military dictatorships, others are absolutist monarchies.
There are ethnic, cultural differences among them. Some
are tribal, while others are in the nature of mass societies.
Different interpretations of religion prevail in each and
often within countries. There are significant differences in
their level of economic achievement and how that has come
about. Extractive wealth such as oil, for example, tends
to help authoritarian regimes to sustain themselves while
industrialization tends to create conditions more favorable
to political competition. In short, it is not persuasive to
suggest that sharing a common religion constitutes a suffi-
3
cient basis for Turkey to constitute a model for other coun-
tries of the Arab Middle East to build their democracies.
While Turkey may not constitute a model that others might
want to emulate in its entirety, there are a number of ways
Turkey may influence political developments in the region.
To begin with, the Turkish experience sets an example
of what is possible. As Arab populations get exposed to
Turkish society through increasing travel, Turkish films
and TV serials, businesses and products, and elections that
change governments, they see a modern, open, and pros-
perous society. This may lead them to demand that their
governments take them in the same direction as Turkey. It
should be understood, however, that these are a set of loose
expectations that governments may choose or not choose to
take into consideration in the formulation of their policies.
Second, when governments are preparing new constitu-
tions, democratizing their laws or more broadly affecting a
transition to political democracy, they often not only study
the experience of other countries but also borrow institu-
tional arrangements, laws, and techniques from them. Here
Turkey may constitute an interesting case to study. In fact,
some observers have already commented that Egypt may
be inspired by a model that Turkey has been working hard
to leave behind, which allows the military to intervene in
politics as a veto group and define the limits of action for
elected politicians through constitutional means. Finally, if
Egypt allows genuine political competition, some Turkish
political parties may offer assistance to their brethren in
running campaigns, developing party programs, etc. (This
has already been done in some Balkan countries.)
It is not persuasive to suggest
that sharing a common religion
constitutes a sufficient basis for
Turkey to constitute a model for
other countries of the Arab Middle
East to build their democracies.
Analysis
Conclusions
Turkey will continue to take a deep interest in Egyptian
political developments. There is reason to suspect, however,
that the Turco-Egyptian relations will continue to be ambiv-
alent. It is not clear how and to what extent the Egyptian
political system will transform itself. The Egyptian military
is likely to wield more influence in Egyptian politics than
the AKP government would find desirable, Egypt’s policy
toward Israel is unlikely to undergo a fundamental shift,
and the silent competition for regional leadership is likely
to continue. Finally, it is not clear that Mr. Erdoğan’s daily
appeals to his Egyptian brethren and clamor for democracy
is necessarily welcome by the current leadership, who must
address the more immediate problem of orderly change.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-par-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to
promoting better understanding and cooperation between North Amer-
ica and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by sup-
porting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere,
by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communi-
ties, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by
providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the
transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initia-
tives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe:
Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. GMF also has
smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/
turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.gmfus.org/
reaction.