Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives.

by Andrei P. Tsygankov

Publication Information: Article Title: Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's

Contending Geopolitical Perspectives. Contributors: Andrei P. Tsygankov -
author. Journal Title: East European Quarterly. Volume: 32. Issue: 3. Publication
Year: 1998. Page Number: 315+. COPYRIGHT 1998 East European Quarterly;
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

INTRODUCTION
The 1990s brought a new international relations perspective to Russia and the
former Soviet region. The New Political Thinking associated with Soviet reformer
Michael Gorbachev and his reform-minded advisors--i.e., a Russian of Western
interdependence theory --has passed away. The era of hope stimulated by the end
of the Soviet-West confrontation, the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet
hegemony, reunification of Germany, and the liberal ideas of a Common
European Home have disappeared. Russia's domestic and international political
agenda have gone through substantial changes.(1) The attention of those living in
the former Soviet region has shifted to new, much more alarming issues. Among
them are the break-up of the Soviet Union and the dangers of disintegration of
Russia itself; military conflicts in the Russian periphery and within Russia
(Chechnya); semi hostile attitude of some of the former Soviet republics towards
Russia and Russian native speakers, who happen to live in these republics;
military conflict in Balkans; and a threat of the NATO expansion.
All these changes have stimulated sharp criticism of Gorbachev's New Political
Thinking and its assumptions as utopian, impractical, and unrealistic and have
encouraged the rethinking of post-cold war international relations. A variety of
approaches are emerging which are highly critical of New Thinking. One of them
is Eurasianism,(2) a new intellectual movement which is looking for a geopolitical
rethinking of post cold war international relations and Russia's place in the post
cold war era. Having emerged in late the 1980s and early the 1990s, Eurasianism
contributed to changes in Russian foreign policy and has been gaining influence
among both politicians and intellectuals since the December 1993 parliamentary
elections.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute an understanding of the phenomena of
Eurasianism. As an intellectual and political movement, Eurasianism has been
studied from different angles. Scholars analyzed intellectual and historical roots of
its emergence,(3) its inherent political agenda and the reasons why it has gained
influence over Russian foreign policy.(4) This paper seeks to be original by
focusing on a hard-line version of Eurasianism,(5) the one that is not a part of
mainstream foreign policy discourse and, therefore, has received relatively little
scholars' attention. I will refer to this version as the hard-line one, because
politically, it presents itself as "irreconcilable opposition" to the regime of Boris
Yeltsin. The other label it uses for self-characterization is a "spiritual opposition"
that is the opposition armed with a significant intellectual capital for resisting
current political regime.(6) In attempts to reveal possible "spiritual" capital of
Russian hard-liners, I devote most of the paper to philosophical assumptions and
epistemological presses of hard-line Eurasianism. Accordingly, in this paper I treat
Eurasianism not so much as a political but as an intellectual movement, and I use
Den,' (Day) and Elementi (Elements), a hard-line publications as a source of new
ideas, new ways of rethinking the directions in which the world is moving.
Such an attention to ideas and the "metaphysical" dimension of Eurasianism will
help to answer two of the following questions. First, it will help to clarify the
political agenda of Eurasianists and of Russia to the extend the latter is influenced
by the four. Second, it will help to go beyond the common consideration of hard-
line Eurasianists as a relatively homogeneous intellectual group(7) and identify
different currents within it. In this paper, I shall argue that at least two different
schools of thought--I shall call them Modernizers and Expansionists--can be
identified within hard-line version of contemporary Russian Eurasianism. While
carrying some similarities and sharing a general philosophy of Eurasianism,
Modernizers and Expansionists are different in terms of their intellectual roots and
reality-defining assumptions. As a result, their policy prescriptions carry a lot of
differences too. For example, while Modernizers offer moderate expansion in the
former Soviet Union territory, Expansionists are hungry for immediate and wide-
spread territorial expansion much beyond the former Soviet borders.
My method of analyzing Eurasianism will be both descriptive and comparative. In
addition to describing its emergence and intellectual roots, I will distinguish
between two schools of hard-line Eurasianism and compare them to each other. I
will also make comparisons of major assumptions and arguments of the
Eurasianist group with those of Western international relations theory, particularly
with Western realism, when it is appropriate. The paper is organized in the
following way. The first section describes the emergence and intellectual roots of
the hard-line Eurasianism, and it analyses the Eurasianism's geopolitical
assumptions as commonly held by all Eurasianists and as compared to those of
Western realism. The second section makes a distinction between two different
schools of Eurasianist thought, and is devoted to the analysis of the inner dialectic
of hard-line Eurasianism. In particular, it distinguishes between Modernizers' and
Expansionists' intellectual sources and epistemological premises. Finally, the third
section considers Eurasianist strategies for Russia in a post cold war era as
determined by its major epistemological assumptions. I conclude with a summary
table and possible policy implications of the analysis of hard-line Eurasianism.
HARD-LINE EURASIANISM: THE EMERGENCE, ASSUMPTIONS,
INTELLECTUAL ROOTS
The emergence and assumptions
Hard-line Eurasianism emerged at the end of the 1980s as a reaction of
conservative-minded intellectuals to domestic and foreign policy reform launched
by Michael Gorbachev. After the establishment of a highly conservative weekly
Den' (Day)(8) in 1990, Eurasianists began to express themselves through the
promotion of an idea of the new Eurasian empire located between the West and
Asia, and distinguished from the Soviet empire. A geopolitical journal Elementi
(Elements) has became another major journal for hard-line Eurasianists.
A new (and probably the major) stimulus for Eurasinists' activity has been the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This event contributed tremendously to
Eurasianism's profile and served to distinguish it from traditional conservatives
(Communists and Nationalists). Unlike Communists, whose dream is to restore the
Soviet Union, and Nationalists who see the attainment of a Greater Russia as their
ideal, hard-line Eurasianists put forward the idea of the "Eurasian empire"
distinguished from both Russian and Soviet empires, and established by the means
of the strengthening of geopolitical power and the forming of the united Slav-
Turkish community.(9)
In their criticism of the Gorbachev's New Thinking, hard-line Eurasianism
proceed from certain set of assumptions about international politics. While not
being made explicitly, these assumptions might be deconstructed from the
Eurasianists' writings. In so doing, I adopt the framework used by Robert Keohane
in his analysis of Western political realism.(10) Realism was defined by Keohane
as based on three key assumptions (1) states are the key units of action; (2) they
seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) the
behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to
outsiders in rational terms.(11)
Power as a foreign policy end
Eurasianist conception of power is similar with the one of Western realists. Both
Western realists and Eurasianists emphasize control, domination, and conflict as
aspects of power(12) and deemphasize the element of cooperation and
regeneration which are also aspects of international relation.(13) It is drive for
power and strength Eurasianists argue that is predominant factors in world
politics. "We have to be strong, says Shamil' Sultanov in his article "The Spirit of
a Eurasianist," since the principle "down with the weak" is in this world as it has
always done."(14) Therefore, in achieving domestic and foreign policy goals, one
needs to rely only upon one's own values and interests instead of trusting to the
West's good intentions. The outside world, especially the United States, is only
looking for an opportunity to weaken Russia and then to take an advantages of its
weakness.
It is not in [the U.S.] interest to see a powerful Eurasian giant,
who has kept his unique spiritual capacity, hi unique ideal of the
Good, his formula of social justice [...] It is not the first time in a
history when we need to rely upon ourselves, upon our historical
experience, and physical and moral capacities [...].(15)
Empires as key players of international politics
Unlike Western realists who emphasize nation-states as key players of
international politics,(16) Eurasianists argue in favor of empires as the key units
action. For them, international politics is and will always be a place of struggle
between different empires for power and resources, struggle for three main goals--
security, stability, and development. The history of civilizations is considered to
be a drama of a birth, decline, and rebirth of empires. Empires are defined as
continental multinational units that represent an alternative to nation-states and to
illusions of a creation of the unified world political community.(17)
Culture and identity as motives of international behavior
Eurasianists argue that the Western notion of rationality is limited in explaining
state and empire interests and behavior.(18) In order to capture these interests one
has to pay attention to such non-rational phenomenon as "social feelings and
national pride, national memory and what the national blood demands (zov
krovi)."(19) In attempts to overcome this limitation, Eurasianists include cultural
and ethnic factors in their explanations of motives of state behavior.
Intellectual sources
Hard-line Eurasianism has drawn on several Western and domestic intellectual
sources.
As far as the Western sources are concerned, Eurasianism is inspired by
geopolitically-oriented Western sources. The most notable of them are French and
Belgian new right (Alan Benua, Jan Tiriar, Robert Stoykers) and the German
school of Geopolitics (specifically, Karl Haushofer, Karl Schmitt, Alfred Mahan).
From the former, Eurasianists borrow the idea of a Russo-European alliance
against the United States; from the latter, the basic arguments of classical
geopolitical thought applied to the analysis of contemporary international
relations.(20) Eurasianism, then, unlike Gorbachev's foreign policy analysts, is
inclined toward European, rather than toward American thought.(21) Although
Eurasianist "realists" obviously borrow from American literature,(22) it is difficult
to identify any possible links here, since they would never recognize those links
explicitly. One suspects the reason for this is their great animosity towards the
United States as a challenger to the Eurasian region.
Unlike New Political Thinking,(23) Eurasianism heavily relied on a rich domestic
intellectual tradition. At least, three sources deserve mention here.
First, is the Russian religious philosophy and its belief in Russia as a power with a
unique geopolitical location and a unique mix of different ethnic groups which
makes Russia a bearer of a unique geopolitical mission: to mediate and reconcile
military conflicts on its periphery. Konstantin Leontyev was probably the first to
urge Russians to forget about their unity With Slav nations and to turn to the
Asian continent for understanding Russian geographic and cultural similarity with
Asian nations.(24)
Second, of course, is the "classical" Eurasianism of the Russian emigre
intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s, whose cultural heritage is rather diverse,
from the ethno-linguistic studies of prince Nikolai Trubetskoi to the historical
tracts of Vernadski and geographic works of Petr Savitsky.(25) Contemporary
Eurasianists derive from them a sense of meaningfulness and uniqueness of
Russian culture and the task of resisting Western influence. Another important
part of the classic Eurasianists' writings is their sense of continuity between the
formation of the Stalin's Soviet Union and prior Russian history. Contemporary
Eurasianists adopt the same view on Eurasia--as a bridge between different
cultures and civilizations--as a unit that may exist in different forms--Great
Russian empire, the Soviet Union, or a post-Soviet Eurasian power.
The third source of Eurasianist writings are the works of Nikolay Gumilev.(26) A
geographer by training and a follower of Petr Savitsky, Gumilev, who died in
1990, influenced hard-line Eurasianists with his concept of "ethnogenesis," which
he described in a few books published illegally and semi-legally in the Soviet era.
Two components are particularly important for understanding Gumilev's concept--
the idea of geographic determinants of ethnic development and the necessity that
Eurasia as a unique civilization, be isolated from the West. According to Gumilev,
Western European and Russian ethnic groups are not only different, they are
opposite and can never be mixed. "It would have been the greatest mistake he
argued to think that the result of the construction of the "Common European
Home" would be a mutual victory of common human values. Entering the alien
Supraethnic group always means denial of one's own ethnically dominant
component and its replacement by a dominant belief-system of a new Supraethnic
group."(27) For contemporary Eurasians Gumilev's ideas served as an ethnic
justification of the possibility and desirability of creating a new Eurasian
community, a supra-ethnic group in Gumilev's terms, composed of Russians,
Turks, and other ethnic groups.
INNER DIALECTIC OF EURASIANISM "MODERNIZERS" AND
"EXPANSIONISTS"
Hard-line Eurasianists, therefore, are united in the following way: by their
hostility to the New Thinking, their promotion of a Eurasianist empire, and their
protectiveness of Russian values and beliefs as different from those of the West.
But in spite of these commonalties, two distinct schools of thought can be seen
within the Eurasianist approach. I shall call them "Modernizers" and
"Expansionists,"(28) because although sharing similar ideas and beliefs, they
differ in that they place more value either on importance of modernization and
development, or on immediate geopolitical expansion.(29) As it will be seen
below, their epistemological assumptions are somewhat different too.
Modernizers
Modernizers, the first school, are usually older and have a certain nostalgia about
the demise of the Soviet Union. They have learned very few lessons from the
Soviet collapse, and their criticism of the Soviet empire is typically limited to the
criticism of the personal qualities of Soviet leaders.(30) Modernizers realize that
to go back to the USSR would be impossible, but their main agenda is to
accelerate economic development and military technologies in order to revive an
empire in a different form and within more or less the same borders.(31) As one of
the prominent Eurasianist writers put it,
The double-headed eagle of the Russian Empire manifestly
expressed the main geopolitical and geohistorical essence of the
country: its inner Eurasian character [...]. Geopolitically the Soviet
Union represented a natural continuation and development
of Russia's Eurasianist character [...]. As a Eurasian historical
and geopolitical subject, our country was defined and is still
defined in space by the boundaries of the Soviet Union.(32)
Modernizers are influenced by Western realist approaches to analysis of
international relations and, like Western realists, have a nostalgia about stable
bipolar Cold War world.(33) They are very much concerned with power,
accumulation of military and economic resources, and geopolitical stability. "Each
society, argues Sultanov, must pursue three basic values--security, stability, and
development."(34) In another article Eurasianists, very much like Western realists,
argue that security is a major component of the national power. Their definition of
security is also similar with that of Hans Morgenthau.(35) One can also trace their
adherence to Western theories of modernization, to those which particularly
stressed the role of the state as initiator of modernization.(36) Their advocacy of
the technological development of the former Soviet Union and strong authoritarian
power capable of conducting technological transformation in order to compete
with the West(37) is very much in line with theories of late and late, late
modernization.(38) The most prominent advocators of this view are Alexander
Prokhanov and Shamil' Sultanov, editor-in-chief and the first deputy editor of
Den'-Zavtra.
Modernizers' major assumptions about international politics can be deconstructed
in the following way.
* Self-sufficient empires as key units of action. Therefore, while considering
empires as key players of international politics, Modernizers are inclined to view
empires, particularly the Soviet one, as self-sufficient, self-developing and
geopolitically stable territories.(39)
* Power as a means to protect. Being strong supporters of technological
development and economic modernization, Modernizers consider power primarily
as a means to protect the empire from its collapse as resulted from either internal
or external influences.(40)
* Moderate aggressiveness and rational behavior. Modernizers are relatively
rational in their explanations of the necessity to establish the Eurasian empire.
They view this empire as a continuation of the Soviet Union which in its turn, was
brought together by economic and security reasons. Accordingly, Modernizers
offer the restoration of the Soviet Union under the name of the Eurasian empire to
maintain geopolitical balance and international stability.(41) Modernizers'
explanation of international behavior, however, is not limited to egoistic self-
interests. In addition to those, they promote cultural (religion, ethnicity, tradition,
etc.) explanations. Thus, the necessity to revive the Soviet Union and revive the
Eurasian empire is determined, among other factors, by the historical traditions of
Russian unity with other nations on Russia's periphery and the closeness of
cultural and language ties among them.(42)
Expansionists
As compared to Modernizers, Expansionists are much younger and have no
respect for the Soviet Union. They argue that the Soviet Union was too fearful of
geopolitical expansion and, therefore, too conservative to survive as an empire.
(43) Unlike Modernizers who portray themselves as adherent to conservative
beliefs such as culture, religion and social stability,(44) Expansionists advocate, as
their general concept, the notion of a "conservative revolution."(45) They argue
that to be conservative is not enough. Dugin explains this in the following way:
Conservative revolutionaries support in principle the ideal and
"positive" side of the Right--that is, the ideas of tradition.
hierarchy, statism, nationalism, the intimate bond with native soil
[pochvennost], spirituality, and so forth. Conservative revolutionaries,
on the other hand, aspire to restore the entirety of
right-wing values in their full scope, because they are not
satisfied with compromises and palliative measures. That is why
they are revolutionaries.(46)
As revolutionaries, Expansionists advocate a further imperial expansion of Russia
much beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. They claim that a future
Eurasian empire should include all those who live in between Dublin and
Vladivost Jan Tiriar Claimed in Den,' such "European nationalism,"--the forming
of an "imperial republic united by a political necessity"--will help to block the
pressure of the U.S. imperial nationalism and to resolve European and world
problems. This notion is driven by the idea that Russia can no longer be a Great
Power while being isolated from European powers.(47) Expansionists' main
theoretical inspiration is old geopolitical theories, both Western and domestic.
Unlike Modernizers, they are not so much concerned about economic and
technological development, and claim to be ready to do whatever is necessary to
expand beyond Russia's Western and Eastern borders and to resist the United
States as an embodiment of all possible evils.(48) The most prominent
Expansionist is Alexander Dugin, the editor-in-chief of the geopolitical journal
Elementi and a frequent contributor to weekly Den.'
Another distinction of Expansionists from Modernizers is an explicit presence of a
strong war rhetoric in their writings. One example of it is Dugin's article on Jan
Tiriar.(49) The purpose of the article was to say good-bye to the strongest
advocator of European empire "from Dublin to Vladivostok" who died in
November 1992. Dugin who considers himself one of Tiriar's supporters and
followers reveals his own outlook in a very clear way. Language is a key for such
a revealing. Glorifying Jan Tiriar, Dugin uses metaphors of a "hero" and "knight,"
who "fought" and "fall down as a hero, in the middle of a battle, in a fire and
smoke of a great skirmish." Talking about Europe after World War II being under
the U.S. influence Dugin calls it "anti-Europe" and compares it with a "prisoner,
locked in a firm political, economic, and geopolitical fetters." Finally, talking
about future "Eurasian liberation," the author calls to establish a "front of
European liberation" in order to fight against "oversees invaders" and "to rise out
of ashes and ruins."
While sharing some commonalties with Modernizers, the Expansionists base their
arguments on assumptions that are actually different from those of Modernizers.
Upon closer inspection, it turns out that their interpretation of power as a foreign
policy goal, empires as a key units of action, and non-rational behavior as a
motivation for action can be distinguished from those of Modernizers.
* Constantly expanding empires as key units of action. While Modernizers
interpret empires as generally self-sufficient and geopolitically stable territories,
Expansionists argue in favor of constant expansion whenever possible as the only
way to survive in this fierce world. For example, Alexander Dugin, the prominent
Expansionist, sees the logic of world history as a result of a struggle for
geopolitical domination between two opposite forces. These forces, he believes,
can be characterized not so much by their belonging to a certain organizations,
nations or states, but "by their radical difference in geopolitical orientations"
which "stand beyond national, political, ideological, and religious differences and
are capable of uniting groups of people of different outlooks and beliefs."(50)
Arguing in a geopolitical terms, Dugin identifies two major transnational actors--
the Eurasianists and the Atlanticists.(51) According to him, the Eurasianist
orientation is the one expressed by Russia and Germany, two strong continental
powers whose geopolitical and economic interests and world outlook are the
opposite of the interests of England and the United States. He reminds us that
classic geopolitical theorists, notably Karl Haushofer, as well as Russian
Eurasianists of the "White" emigration such as Nikolay Trubetskoi, Piotr Savitski,
Georgi Florovski insisted on the necessity of a geopolitical alliance between
Russia-Germany-Japan against the Atlanticist policy.
* Power as a means to expand and conclude geopolitical alliances. In accordance
with this view, Expansionists treat power as a means to expand. Unlike
Modernizers, who are more inclined to isolated development, Eurasianist
Expansionists place deal of value upon the importance of geopolitical alliances as
long as they serve to resist the United States. They believe that Eurasia must unite
and replace states as international actors with state-continents such as the Roman
empire and the Russian empire in order to overcome a Pan American "new world
order."(52) Geopolitically the Eurasianist alliance is justified as an alliance of
Land power against See power. Regarding the resistance to the United States,
Russian Eurasianists agree with French and Belgian Eurasianists who claim that a
geopolitical power, embodied in the United States of America is currently the
main and the only enemy of all those people who want to keep their unique
national life, ethnic and national culture.(53)
* Aggressiveness and irrationalism. Expansionists are particularly aggressive
when pursuing culturally and geopolitically-based explanations of international
behavior. For example, Dugin in his article on Serbia claims that Serbian
"awakening" based upon ideas of "nation, religion, and freedom."(54) In still
another article he suggests moving beyond traditional nationalism, and he
promotes Eurasianism as a last and a highest stage of Russian nationalism and as a
rationale for pursuing territorial expansion. He believes that Russian nationalism
is well suited to became a Eurasianism, because unlike some other types of
nationalism it is not based upon ethnic principles. Instead, it includes religion,
connection with territorial, imperial inclination, and communitarianism as its
components. These are Eurasianist values, Dugin believes, which Eurasianism has
to advocate and pursue throughout the world.(55) Another example is an article by
Nikolay Lysenko who believes in pursuing the idea of nation.
Nation is always a great idea of universal scope giving a motivation
to millions; it is always a great sacrifice without requiring
any gratitude and great struggle without knowing a rest or
moving backward. "Everything or nothing!", "Victory of
death!"--here are eternal slogans of nations which have never
been understood or naturally accepted by the other nations. It
was this non-acceptance and non-understanding that directed
the strength of nations united by a single spiritual passion and
their spiritual dominance over people who never had that kind
universal victorious power.(56)
Even though these motives of behavior make sense to Eurasianists, they test the
boundaries of rationality according to Western standards and it is not accidental
that for a long time they have been ignored by the mainstream international
relations' theories in the West.(57)
HARD-LINERS' STRATEGIES FOR RUSSIA IN A POST-COLD WAR
ERA(58)
Generally, hard-line Eurasianists treat Russia as the last hope and the last pillar of
a future Eurasian empire. Today, they argue, only Russia has all necessary
preconditions to become an alternative to the New World Order meaning
American hegemony.(59) However, while sharing similar beliefs in Russia as
Eurasian power and Eurasian cultural and geopolitical uniqueness, Modernizers
and Expansionists see the post-Cold War world differently and favor different
Russia's strategies to pursue their main goals.
Modernizers
Modernizers' image of the Post-Cold War world is based upon a firm belief in the
economic and geopolitical decline of two previously strong superpowers. Here is a
sample of strategic thinking and policy recommendation to Russia in a post-cold
war era that is quite typical of Modernizers'
(1) The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the weakness of Russia as a world
power. Lacking strong charismatic leadership, the Soviet empire was doomed to
collapse. This is the reason why the United States managed to impose its own
rules of the game on the Soviet Union and, therefore, to win this battle.(60)
(2) However, the paradox is that the post-Cold War world is accompanied by the
decline of two previously strong superpowers, and in the near future, the United
States is also doomed to decline. Without an enemy American civilization cannot
exist. America was (and still is) a global economic empire with a rigid hierarchical
structure from top to bottom (U.S.--OECD--NIC--countries-resource suppliers)
which was cemented by the presence of a common enemy. Now that the enemy is
gone the whole structure is shaking, and Washington is desperately searching for a
new enemy. However, its decline is inevitable, because of the cyclical
development of world politics. According to one Modernizer, world politics is
currently going through the sixth cycle of its development, and very soon the U.S.
will face the awakening of Chinese, Japanese, German, Indian, Iranian, and
Turkish traditional imperial ambitions. As a result the U.S. will lose control of
former spheres of influence. Huntington's article on the "clash of civilizations"
was one of the notable signs of this.(61)
(3) The weakening of the previous balance of power is leading to the
establishment and acceleration of what is called the "Eurasian arch."(62) The
"Eurasian arch" is a geopolitical space laid out between the Russian Far East and
the Balkans. Balkan conflict, Kurdistan, and a civil war in Afghanistan are only
the few danger spots which might lead to further escalation of conflicts. These
spots are signs of the beginning of a coming re-division of the world.(63)
(4) Such a division can only come as a result of World War III. This process of re-
division of the world through world wars is quite deterministic--all previous re-
divisions of the world were accompanied by regional or world wars. Such cases
were Napoleonic wars which were the predecessors of the Vienna Congress of
1815. Such were World War I and World War II which ended with the formation
of new geopolitical structures. We are facing World War III, and this war,
Modernizers argue, has already begun.(64) This war is developing slowly and will
have to go through a number of stages until it reaches a possible nuclear clash.
There are several signs that it has begun. (a) Acceleration of the struggle for
control over different regions in the former Soviet Union, Central Asia, the Middle
East, and elsewhere. (b) Active formation of the German sphere of influence
which means a reproduction of the geopolitical model of the Holy Roman empire.
(c) The rise of terrorism as a non-controllable factor of world politics. (d) The
appearance of new regional conflicts which cannot be resolved by traditional
military means. Iraq, Somali, and Chechnya are examples of the failure of what
used to be great powers.
To take all these into account, Russia cannot afford to involve itself in global
military conflicts. Modernizers argue that it is temporarily weak, and it is in
Western interests to get Russia involved in military confrontation with the Muslim
world or China in order to complete a world re-division and to form the new world
order at the expense of Russia.(65) Instead, Russia should concentrate its
resources on an economic and technological breakthrough.(66)
Expansionists
Unlike Modernizers, the Expansionist are in favor of Russia's immediate and
wide-spread geopolitical expansion, in particular the expansion into China and the
Muslim world,(67) they are not worried about Russia's economic and
technological weakness. Today Russia is weak, but as Tiriar argues, it will restore
its status of a Great Power as it creates a new geopolitical empire.(68) Here is how
it is expressed in the language of Expansionists themselves.
From a purely strategic point of view Russia is equal to Eurasia
itself. To prove it, it is enough to say that Russian lands, Russian
population and Russian industrial-technological development
have a potential strong enough to become a base for continental
independence, autarky and to serve as a base for complete
continental integration [...]. Russia is the "Pivot of History [...]
only continental integration of Eurasia with Russia as a center
can guarantee to all its people and states genuine sovereignty as
well as full-scale political and economic autarky.(69)
Geopolitics, then, is the only key to explaining change in the modem world, and
geopolitics teaches, Expansionists argue, that the US Atlanticists are still
geopolitically powerful enough to control most of the world. Unlike Modernizers,
who predict future disintegration of the world as a result of the decline of
superpowers,(70) Expansionists continue to see a future world as essentially
bipolar, divided by the conflict of major geopolitical rivals--Eurasianists and
Atlanticists.(71)
For the Eurasianist Expansionists the picture of the world is also different as a
result of their specific outlook and "metaphysical" assumptions. The world is seen
as a much less rational, in even more pessimistic and gloomy tones than it is for
Modernizers and Western realists. While the latter tend to see the world politics as
a cycle with a regular repetition of similar stages and an inherent craving for an
equilibrium,(72) the Expansionists see the possibility of getting through these
cycles to a radically new world, "kingdom" "beyond this world" as Alexander
Dugin states.(73) They argue in favor of revolutionary breakthrough and claim
themselves to be followers of Communism and Fascism. However, unlike those
"proletarian" revolutions, the Eurasianist revolution is going to be a "conservative"
one, the revolution against progress and liberal ideals, the revolution against
Modernity.
Accordingly, a geopolitical strategy of the "Pax Evrasiatica" is proposed. The
"Pax Evrasiatica" is defined as a "strategic unity of Eurasian geopolitical and
geoeconomic organisms, a community with characteristics of neo-
totalitarianism."(74) One is necessary to absorb France, Germany, China, India,
and the "Muslim world" into the borders of such an empire(75) which is seen as
the only way to save Russia as an independent state. The argument again is that
the geopolitical vacuum of the post cold war has to be filled out by Russia before
it is filled by a hostile power. If Russia chooses any other way but the "way of
gathering an empire," Eurasianists argue, continental responsibility for the
Heartland will be taken by other powers and alliances. Only power, territorial
motives, and strategic advantages act in the sphere of geopolitical struggle. The
very fact of any hesitation on the issue of the "gathering of empire" can be
considered a justification for invasion of Russia's territories by alternative Big
Units. Therefore, the absence of action is an action in itself, and the price for
slowing down the "gathering of empire" will inevitably lead to Eurasian
bloodshed. To support the argument, the Balkan event is given as a fearful
example of what may happen to Russia in a much larger territory."(76)
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have offered an analysis of the phenomenon of hard-line
Eurasianism, an intellectual movement that emerged as a reaction to the
Gorbachev's New Thinking and the events that have eventually led to the end of
the cold war and the break-up of the USSR. I have argued that hard-line
Eurasianists are far from being homogeneous in terms of their intellectual roots
and reality-defining assumptions, and, as a result, they offer different strategies for
a post cold war world. Modernizers are influenced by Western modernization
theories and the power school in international relations, while Expansionists are
particularly fascinated by Western and Russian geopolitical theories. Modernizers
and Expansionists also proceed from different definitions of power, key units of
action, and motives of behavior in the world politics which lead them to defending
different strategies for Russia in a post-cold war era. Modernizers argue in favor
of economic and technological development, rational accumulation of power, and
Russia's moderate expansion in the former Soviet Union territory. On the contrary
Expansionists are hungry for immediate expansion and what they call
"conservative revolution." While these two approaches are united by the loose title
`Eurasianists' and share some basic assumptions, their differences are quite
remarkable (See the Table 1) and unlikely to disappear in the near future.
TABLE 1: MODERNIZERS VS. EXPANSIONISTS: INTELLECTUAL SOURCES,
ASSUMPTIONS, STRATEGIES

Modernizers

Geopolitics
Main intellectual Western realism
sources Theories of modernization

Deconstructed
assumptions

Power Power as a means to

protect

Key units Self-sufficient empires

Motives of Rational interests and

behavior cultural values

Power accumulation
Strategies through abstention from
for post cold war global military conflicts;
world economic and techno-
logical development,
moderate expansion

Expansionists

Main intellectual Geopolitics

sources

Deconstructed
assumptions

Power Power as a means

to expand and
conclude geopolitical
alliances

Key units Constantly expanding

empires

Motives of Cultural and

behavior geopolitical values

Strategies Immediate and

for post cold war wide-spread expansion
world to fill out geopolitical
vacuum
The arguments made in this paper allow us to formulate the following two policy
implications. 1. The more influence hard-line Eurasianism as intellectual
movement has on Russia's foreign policy course, the less likely that Russia will
evolve in a liberal society and adopt a liberal foreign policy towards Europe and
the former Soviet republics. The political agenda of hard-line Eurasianism is a
strong authoritarian empire and not a liberal democracy. Therefore, the better are
the chances of hard-line Eurasianism in influencing Russian foreign policy the
more aggressive and assertive Russia is likely to become and the more difficult
will be to continue a dialogue between Russia and the West.
2. However, even if hard-line Eurasianism becomes a mainstream attitude of
Russian foreign policy makers which currently is still far from being the case,
such a dialogue would be possible, given substantial differences between
Modernizers and Expansionists. One can suppose that such a dialogue will still be
possible to conduct with Modernizers who are less inclined to geopolitical
expansion and using a violent methods for the pursuit of their goals. Such a
dialogue, however, would be impossible with Expansionists. Their discourse is a
discourse of war.
NOTES
(1.) See Aleksei Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Alternatives," International
Security, 18 (1993); Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?"
RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (1994), No. 18; David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism:
The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies, 47
(1995), No. 6; Oleg Kovalev, "Russian `Realism': Theory and Policy Preferences"
(University of Delaware, 1996).
(2.) "Eurasianism," the result of the belief of its supporters in a special geopolitical
role for Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia.
(3.) See Nickolas Riasanovsky, The Emergence of Eurasianism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967).
(4.) See Alexander Rahr, "`Atlanticists' versus `Eurasians' in Russian Foreign
Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 22 (1992), No. 1; Hans Timmerman,
"Rossiiskaia vneshnaia politika: poiski novoi identichnosti," Mirovaia ekonomika
I mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, 2 (1994); Kerr, "The New Eurasianism...."
(5.) It is worth noting that the Eurasianism as an intellectual movement is
extremely diverse and includes supporter of very different political views, some of
which can be considered fairly liberal or moderate, while others imperialist and
anti-Western. Those interested in the liberal version of Eurasianism, see, for
example: Aleksandr Panarin, "Mezhdu atlantizmom i evraziistvom," Svobodnaia
misl', 11 (1993); Aleksandr Panarin, "Zapadniki I Ievraziitsi," Obschestvenniie
nauki i sovremennost', 11 (1993); Aleksandr Panarin, "Rossiia v evrasii:
geopoliticheskiie vizovi I tsivilizatsionniie otveti," Voprosi filosofii, 12 (1994);
Dmitrii Samuilov, "Mezh-tsivilizatsionnii podhod," Nezavisimaia gazeta, April
29, 1994; Dmitrii Samuilov, "Neizbezhno li stolknoveniie tsivilizatsii," SshA, 1-2
(1995). This version would probably be somewhat closer to the Western liberals,
since liberal Eurasianists have their respect to democracy and human rights. This
paper, for the above-described reasons, will focus exclusively on the phenomenon
of a hard-line Eurasianism and, therefore, use the labels "Eurasianists" and "hard-
line Eurasianists" interchangeably.
(6.) The subtitle of one of the major publications of hard-line Eurasianists, the
newspaper Den' (Day) reads "the newspaper of spiritual opposition."
(7.) See for example Rahr, "Atlanticists..."; Timmerman, "Rossiiskaia .... "
(8.) After the October 1993 crisis, the weekly began to appear under the title
"Zavtra" (Tomorrow). The reason being that during the October crisis the weekly
fiercely challenged the Yeltsin decision to dissolve parliament and as a result was
banned by Yeltsin's decree.
(9.) See Shamil' Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista," Nash Sovremennik, 7 (1992);
Aleksandr Dugin, Aleksandr, "Krim prinadlezhit Evrazii," Zavtra, 6 (1994);
"Rossiiskaia natsiia na poroge tret'ego tisiacheletiia," Kentavr, 2 (1993); Anatolii
Glivakovskii, "Rossiiskaia natsionalnaia bezopasnost i geopolitika," Kentavr, 5
(1991).
(10.) Applying Western concepts, such as "realists," or "rationalists," to a non-
Western empirical reality has of course its cost. This application should be treated
as an analytical exercise for the purpose of classifying Russian foreign policy
schools in a systematic way, and, therefore, it will not always be able to capture
what is culturally specific and never what is culturally unique for Russia.
(11.) Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986), p. 7.
(12.) For Western realists, "power has to be defined in terms of distribution of
capabilities," specifically, "military, economic, and technological capabilities."
See for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 192; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13.
(13.) See for example, Ann J. Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political
Realism," in James Der-Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations
(New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 59.
(14.) Shamil' Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista"; see similar claims in: Leonid Abalkin,
"O Rossiiskikh natsionalno-gosudarstvennih interesah," Voprosi ekonomiki, 2
(1994); El'giz Pozdniakov, "Natsiia, gosudarstvo, natsionalniie interesi, Rossiia,"
Voprosi ekonomiki, 2 (1994).
(15.) Shamil' Sultanov and Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia chtobi vizhit',"
Den', 6 (1991).
(16.) See for example Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Gilpin, War and
Change, p. 26.
(17.) Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista."
(18.) Along with assumptions of power as an end in itself or as a means to other
ends; and states as the key units of actions, the assumption of rational behavior is
an essential components of the Western realism (Keohane makes this point in
Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 7). These assumptions were inherited from classical
realists such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes.
(19.) Abalkin, "O Rossiiskikh ...."
(20.) The first issue of Elementi was specifically devoted to intellectual sources of
modem Eurasianism. See: Elementi, 1 (1992).
(21.) The "New Thinking" was heavily influenced by American neoliberal
interdependence theories. Gorbachev's and Yakovlev's foreign policy advisors
such as Nikolay Kosolapov and Georgi Shakhnazarov read Joseph Nye and Robert
O. Keohane Transnational Relations and World Politics (1972) and applied its
basic assumptions in designing the foreign policy speeches of Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze. After Gorbachev came to power, Nye was one of the first non-
Marxist international relations' theorists to publish a few of his article in the
leading Russian journal MEiMO.
(22.) One is struck by the similarity of their reflection on the balance of power
with Morgenthau's writings and on what used to be the stability of bipolar world
with the famous Kenneth Waltz's lines. See as an example Shamil' Sultanov,
"Tretia mirovaia voina uzhe nachalas'," Zavtra, 18 (1995).
(23.) Except Andrei Sakharov's works on the World Coexistence, Progress, and
Intellectual Freedom and Vernadski's work on Noosphera, it is hard to recall any
other domestic sources of Gorbachev's international thinking.
(24.) As cited in: Aleksandr Dugin, "Velikaia voina kontinentov," Den', 4, 5
(1992).
(25.) See on this subject: Riasanovsky, op. cit.; Igor Torbakov, "The `Statists' and
the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism," RFE/RL Research Report, 1, No.
49 (1992).
(26.) Nikolai Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii (Moskva: Politizdat, 1992); Nikolai
Gumilev, Etnogenez I biosfera zemli (Sankt-Peterburg: Gidrometeoizdat, 1990);
Nikolai Gumilev, "Ritmi Evrazii," Nash Sovremennik, 4 (1993).
(27.) As cited in: Igor Shishkin, "Obscheievropeiski dom: vot bog, a vot porog,"
Zavtra, 45 (1994).
(28.) I am grateful to Martha Little for suggesting these labels.
(29.) These labels are by no means comprehensive. Modernizers are also in favor
of territorial expansion, at least, within the former Soviet Union, while
Expansionists realize the importance of technological development as long as it
serves to the purpose off the geopolitical expansion. Yet I find these labels
appropriate to characterize the key priorities of two wing within Eurasianism.
(30.) See for example Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista"; Sergei Kurginian, "Esli ne
imperiia, to nichto," Zavtra (1994).
(31.) Different means can be selected for achieving this goal. One way, as Oleg
Shirgazin suggests, is to support the Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's
initiative to perform the economic and political integration of the major former
Soviet republics and thus form a Eurasian Union. See for example, Oleg
Shirgazin, "Imperativ Evraziistva," Zavtra, 36 (1994).
(32.) Sultanov, "Dukh Ievraziista"
(33.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia ...."
(34.) Shamil' Sultanov, "Vizov imperii," Den', 33 (1992).
(35.) They flesh out physical, cultural, religious, economic, territorial, and
futurological components of national security (Sultanov, Prohkanov, "Izmenitsia
chtobi vizhit'..."; Abalkin, "Rossiiskiie natsionalno-godudarstvenniie interesi...")--
compare with Morgenthau's geography, natural resources, industrial capacity,
national character, etc. as elements of national power (Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1985). Eurasianist language and arguments of interdependence between
negligence to components of national security and growing conflicts (Sultanov,
"Vizor imperii ...") are also similar with Morganthau's interdependence between
personal insecurity and social disintegration (Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations, pp. 122-123).
(36.) Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness
in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
(37.) Prokhanov, Sultanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi..."; Oleg Sergeiev, "Backward
Forever?" Den', 33 (1992).
(38.) Jack Snyder and Peter Gourevich provide good overview of theories of late
and late, late modernization (See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire. Domestic
Politics and International Ambition [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1991], p. 5658); Peter Gourevich, "The Second Image Reversed: The International
Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, 32, Winter (1977).
(39.) Aleksandr Prokhanov, "`Tretii Rim' ili `Respubblika Rus'," Zavtra, 22
(1995).
(40.) Sultanov, Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi .... "
(41.) El'giz Pozdniakov, ed. Geopolitika: teoriia i praktika (Moskva: IMEMO,
1993).
(42.) El'giz Pozdniakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps I Rossiia," Mezhdunarodnaia
zhizn', 8-9 (1992).; Prokhanov, "`Tretii Rim' ili.... "
(43.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Serbiia: konservativnaia revolutsiia," Den', 44 (1992).
(44.) Sergei Kurginian, "Tseli I tsennosti," Den', 24 (1991).
(45.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Konservativnaia revolutsiia. Kratkaia istoriia ideologii
tret'ego puti," Elementi, 1 (1992); Dugin, Serbiia...; Vadim Shtepa, "Zametki
neokonservatora," Nash sovremennik, 5 (1992); Vadim Shtepa, "Departiizatsiia,"
Nash sovremennik, 8 (1992).
(46.) As cited in: Torbakov, "The `Statists' and ...."p. 1.
(47.) Jan Tiriar, "Evropa do Vladivostoka," Den', 34 (1992); Jan Tiriar, "Tezisi,"
Elementi, 1 (1992).
(48.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," Elementi, 4 (1993).
(49.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Sumerki geroiev. Pominaia Zhana Tiriara," Den', 3
(1993).
(50.) Dugin, "Velikaia voina kontinentov .... "
(51.) See also Anatolii Glivakovski, "Okno v Evropu cherez svalku," Den', 16
(1993).
(52.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivleniie," Den', 2 (1992).
(53.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivleniie..."; see also Jan Tiriar, Yegor Ligachev, "Poka
voina prodolzhaietsia, voina ne proigrana," Den' 37 (1992).
(54.) Dugin, "Serbiia: konservativnaia revolutsiia...."
(55.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Apologiia natsionalizma," Den', 38 (1993).
(56.) Nikolai Lysenko, "Tsel' - velikaia imperiia," Den', 17 (1993).
(57.) See on this subject, George J. Demko and William B Wood, Reordering the
World. Geopolitical Perspectives on the Twenty-First Century (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 8; Andrew Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory
and Practice," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory
Today (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1995), p. 250.
(58.) This section is based on the part of my paper "Between Liberal
Internationalism and Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse
of Contemporary Russia" (forthcoming).
(59.) Andrei Karagodin, "Otkroveniia mondialistov," Zavtra, 36 (1994).
(60.) Sultanov, "Vizov imperii ...."
(61.) Karagodin, "Otkroveniia mondialistov ...."
(62.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia voina...."
(63.) See Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia..."; Pozdnyakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps ....
"
(64.) See "Ievraziiskoie soprotivleniie..."; Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia ...."
(65.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia...."
(66.) Sultanov, Prokhanov, "Izmenitsia, chtobi vizhit'...."
(67.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," Elementi, 3 (199), p. 33.
(68.) Tiriar, "Ievropa do Vladivostoka...."
(69.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," pp. 31-32.
(70.) See Abalkin, "O Rossiiskikh ...." pp. 12-14; Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia...";
Pozdniakov, "Geopoliticheskii kollaps..."; Pozdniakov, Geopolitka ....
(71.) See the polemic between Dugin and Sultanov in: "Ievraziiskoie
soprotivleniie .... "
 (72.) Sultanov, "Tretia mirovaia..."; Gilpin, War and Change ....
(73.) Aleksandr Dugin, "Potomu chto mi liubim tebia, revolutsiia," Den', 19
(1993).
(74.) "Evraziiskoie soprotivlenie..."
(75.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," p. 33.
(76.) "Rossiia i prostranstvo," pp. 33-34.

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Publication Information: Article Title: Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's

Contending Geopolitical Perspectives. Contributors: Andrei P. Tsygankov - author.
Journal Title: East European Quarterly. Volume: 32. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 1998.
Page Number: 315+. COPYRIGHT 1998 East European Quarterly; COPYRIGHT
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