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Stephen Grenville and Mark Thirlwell
Tempo (Jakarta)
24 March 2010
The G20’s arrival at the apex of the international economic architecture gives East Asia a much
greater presence at the top table of the world economy: six regional economies are members of
the G20 1 , in contrast to the G7, which only had room for Japan. But seizing this opportunity
presents challenges as well as opportunities.
The case for a caucus
One way to loosen this resource constraint would be by promoting the formation of an East Asian
2
caucus group. The function of such a group would be first, to identify G20type issues which
lend themselves to the formulation of a regional position, second, to refine and distil a consensus
argument, and third, present this to the rest of the G20 as something which has the backing of
the caucus members.
Moreover, the function and operation of the G20 itself is, to a large extent, still up for grabs. The
creation of an East Asian caucus would enhance the region’s ability to help shape the future
workings of the new grouping.
What topics should the caucus consider?
A look at the issues currently under discussion at the G20 suggests that there is plenty to talk
about.
First, there are important issues of macroeconomic policy coordination. Current policy issues
such as the withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus and the removal of bank guarantees
would benefit from a degree of international coordination. On the perennial topic of international
imbalances, the caucus countries could widen the current debate so that it is less focused on the
bilateral imbalance between the United States and China, and more focused on policies that will
3
maintain and expanding globalisation, including in capital flows.
1
Japan, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Australia.
2
Hadi Soesastro has made the case for leaders of the Asian G20 members to ‘direct their finance ministers
to have regular ‘strategy meetings’ to strengthen East Asia’s engagement in formulating G-20 policies and
actions towards the recovery of the global economy and in shaping global economic governance.’ See East
Asia, the G20 and global economic governance, East Asia Forum, 8 March 2009, available at
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/03/08/eastasiatheg20andglobaleconomicgovernance/.
3
For more on global imbalances and a possible role for the G20, see Stephen Grenville, External
imbalances and the G20, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute, Sydney, 14 September 2009.
Second, international coordination of prudential regulation. Much of the current international
debate is not relevant to many of the Asian countries, because it is largely about how to organize
the prudential supervision of complex international banks. Now, with the downside of complexity
clearly demonstrated in the United States, there might be a new opportunity to develop a set of
principles more appropriate for East Asian countries.
Third, the G20 represents an opportunity to update the anachronistic postWWII balance of
power in the international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund. There
are other related issues here. How to coordinate the regional crisisresponse architecture
(primarily the Chiang Mai Initiative) with the IMF’s more global approach. How to develop the new
lowconditionality resources – the IMF’s Flexible Line of Credit – so that it can be used without the
stigma attached to a conventional IMF program.
Resisting protectionism and dealing with climate change are just two more of the many issues
where the region will have interests which differ in substance or emphasis from the current world
view.
What’s in a G20 Caucus for the rest of East Asia?
What about the countries of the region which are not in G-20? This caucus could be embedded in
the East Asia Summit framework, thus connecting all EAS countries into the G-20 discussions.
When the six EAS members bring their arguments to G-20, they will be reflecting not just these six
countries but the wider regional constituency.
There is a legitimate concern that any new international grouping will diminish the role of the old;
in this case ASEAN and APEC. There seems little overlap here with ASEAN, which would still be
the premier forum for issues within the SE Asia region. This arrangement would, in fact,
strengthen ASEAN by giving it a strong linkage to the overall international economic debate,
absent at present. APEC might potentially have more to lose here, as its Leaders’ Meeting has
been its main drawcard, and the G-20 Leaders’ meeting might over time displace it. But evolution
of forums seems not only inevitable, but desirable, when the new arrangement represents a more
coherent approach to international economic issues.
Conclusion
It is sometime said that, while East Asia is keen to have a greater voice in managing the world
economy, the region tends to be reluctant to take on a more active leadership role or to come up
with policy proposals. Membership of G-20 is an opportunity to show that there is no gap between
aspiration and delivery. The six countries may not sing in unison at G-20, but they could certainly
sing in harmony.
A longer version of this article can be found at www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1153